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5.1l.6.8. Sympathy (Sympathy on PhilPapers)

Aboulafia, Mitchell (2008). W.e.B. Du Bois : Double-consciousness, Jamesian sympathy, and the critical turn. In C. J. Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abramson, Kate (2001). Sympathy and the project of Hume's second enquiry. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 83 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: More than two hundred years after its publication, David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is still widely regarded as either a footnote to the more philosophically interesting third book of the Treatise, or an abbreviated, more stylish, version of that earlier work. These standard interpretations are rather difficult to square with Hume's own assessment of the second Enquiry. Are we to think that Hume called the EPM “incomparably the best” of all his writings only because he preferred that later style of exposition? Or worse, should we take his preference for the second Enquiry as a sign of aging literary vanity? Does Hume's stated preference for the EPM in no way speak to its philosophical content?
Ainslie, George (2006). Cruelty may be a self-control device against sympathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (3):224-225.   (Google)
Abstract: Dispassionate cruelty and the euphoria of hunting or battle should be distinguished from the emotional savoring of victims' suffering. Such savoring, best called negative empathy, is what puzzles motivational theory. Hyperbolic discounting theory suggests that sympathy with people who have unwanted but seductive traits creates a threat to self-control. Cruelty to those people may often be the least effortful way of countering this threat
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1978). Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice. Philosophia 7 (2).   (Google)
Bouwsma, O. K. (1942). Stace's "the primacy of sympathy". Journal of Philosophy 39 (23):631-635.   (Google | More links)
Bradley, F. H. (1883). Sympathy and interest. Mind 8 (32):573-575.   (Google | More links)
Bray, Michael (2007). Sympathy, disenchantment, and authority: Adam Smith and the construction of moral sentiments. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 28 (1):159-193.   (Google)
Broadie, Alexander (2006). Sympathy and the impartial spectator. In Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Bryant, Sophie (1895). Antipathy and sympathy. Mind 4 (15):365-370.   (Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1999). Sympathy and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):465-82.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Chismar, Douglas (1988). Empathy and sympathy: The important difference. Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (4).   (Google)
Cullity, Garrett (2004). Sympathy, discernment, and reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):37–62.   (Google | More links)
Darwall, Stephen (1998). Empathy, sympathy, care. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3).   (Google)
Debes, Remy (2007). Has anything changed? Hume's theory of association and sympathy after the treatise. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2):313 – 338.   (Google)
Debes, Remy (2007). Humanity, sympathy and the puzzle of Hume's second enquiry. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (1):27 – 57.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John A. (1987). Taking sympathy seriously: A defense of our moral psychology toward animals. Environmental Ethics 9 (3):197-215.   (Google)
Abstract: Sympathy for animals is regarded by many thinkers as theoretically disreputable. Against this I argue that sympathy appropriately underlies moral concern for animals. I offer an account of sympathy that distinguishes sympathy with from sympathy for fellow creatures, and I argue that both can be placed on an objective basis, if we differentiate enlightened from folk sympathy. Moreover, I suggest that sympathy for animals is not, as some have claimed, incompatible with environmentalism; on the contrary, it can ground environmental concern. Finally, I show that the traditional concept of anthropomorphism has no coherent basis, and I argue that the attempt to prove that animals lack thoughts is both unsuccessful and irrelevant to sympathy for languageless creatures
Frierson, Patrick R. (2006). Adam Smith and the possibility of sympathy with nature. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):442–480.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith's moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith's "all important emotion of sympathy" (Callicott, 2001, p. 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in "History of Astronomy and Physics," I show that sympathy with non-sentient nature is possible within a Smithian ethics. This provides the possibility of extending sympathy, and thereby benevolence and justice, to nature
Frierson, Patrick (ms). Adam Smith and the possibility of sympathy with nature Patrick R. Frierson.   (Google)
Abstract: As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith’s moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith’s “all important emotion of sympathy” (Callicott 2001: 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments , as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in “History of Astronomy and Physics,” I show that sympathy with non-sentient nature is possible within a Smithian ethics. This provides the possibility of extending sympathy, and thereby benevolence and justice, to nature
Glassford, John (2007). Sympathy and spectatorship in scottish writing after Hume. The Monist 90 (2):213-232.   (Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (1995). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. Ethics 105 (4):727-742.   (Google | More links)
Griseri, Paul (1994). FOCUS: Consistency and sympathy changing attitudes through moral theories. Business Ethics 3 (4):201–206.   (Google | More links)
Hausman, Daniel M. (2005). Sympathy, commitment, and preference. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):33-50.   (Google)
Abstract: While very much in Sen's camp in rejecting revealed preference theory and emphasizing the complexity, incompleteness, and context dependence of preference and the intellectual costs of supposing that all the factors influencing choice can be captured by a single notion of preference, this essay contests his view that economists should recognize multiple notions of preference. It argues that Sen's concerns are better served by embracing a single conception of preference and insisting on the need for analysis of the multiple factors that determine ‘preference’ so conceived
Heath, Eugene (1995). The commerce of sympathy: Adam Smith on the emergence of morals. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3).   (Google)
Hunt, Lester H. (2004). Sentiment and sympathy. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (4):339–354.   (Google | More links)
James, Susan (2005). Sympathy and comparison : Two principles of human nature. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kaebnick, Gregory E. (2007). The problem with trust and sympathy. Hastings Center Report 37 (2).   (Google)
Kennett, Jeanette (2002). Autism, empathy and moral agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is empathy characterized in the literature, and how crucial is empathy, so described, to moral understanding and agency? I argue that an examination of moral thinking in high-functioning autistic people supports a Kantian rather than a Humean account of moral agency.
Kirby, Brian (2003). Hume, sympathy, and the theater. Hume Studies 29 (2):305-325.   (Google)
Levy, David M. & Peart, Sandra J. (2004). Sympathy and approbation in Hume and Smith: A solution to the other rational species problem. Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):331-349.   (Google)
Abstract: David Hume's sympathetic principle applies to physical equals. In his account, we sympathize with those like us. By contrast, Adam Smith's sympathetic principle induces equality. We consider Hume's “other rational species” problem to see whether Smith's wider sympathetic principle would alter Hume's conclusion that “superior” beings will enslave “inferior” beings. We show that Smith introduces the notion of “generosity,” which functions as if it were Hume's justice even when there is no possibility of contract. Footnotes1 An earlier version was presented at the 18th-Century Scottish Studies Society, Arlington meeting in June 2001. We benefited from conversations with and comments from Gordon Schochet, Roger Emerson and Silvia Sebastiana. A letter from Leon Montes helped sharpen the argument. The readers for the journal contributed to the output. We remain responsible for the errors and omissions
Lipkin, Robert J. (1987). Altruism and sympathy in Hume's ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):18 – 32.   (Google | More links)
MacKay, Alfred F. (1986). Extended sympathy and interpersonal utility comparisons. Journal of Philosophy 83 (6):305-322.   (Google | More links)
Maibom, Heidi (online). Feeling for others: Empathy and sympathy as sources of moral motivation.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the Humean theory of motivation, we only have a reason to act if we have both a belief and a pro-attitude. When it comes to moral reasons, it matters a great deal what that pro-attitude is; pure self-interest cannot combine with a belief to form a moral reason. A long tradition regards empathy and sympathy as moral motivators, and recent psychological evidence supports this view. I examine what I take to be the most plausible version of this claim: empathy or sympathy is necessary for someone to be motivated not to harm others. I argue that one can be motivated not to harm others even if one cannot feel either empathy or sympathy. The evidence comes from the clinical population of people with frontal lobe damage. In addition, if empathy is a moral motivator, we have a conflict with moral autonomy. Either empathy morally motivates, but agents are not autonomous, or agents are autonomous and need not be motivated by empathy. Sympathy suffers from two shortcomings as a moral motivator: it is unlikely that we must sympathize with ourselves in order to feel obligated not to harm ourselves, and there appears to be many other considerations that motivate us not to harm others: fear of harming ourselves, reluctance to add to the cycle of violence, and so on. These considerations are more self-centered than empathy or sympathy, but, perhaps for that very reason, they do not conflict with moral autonomy
McGill, V. J. (1942). Scheler's theory of sympathy and love. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2 (3):273-291.   (Google | More links)
McKinnon, C. (2002). Desire-frustration and moral sympathy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):401 – 417.   (Google)
Mercer, Philip (1972). Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between Sympathy and Morality with Special Reference to Hume's Treatise. Oxford,Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Morrow, Glenn R. (1923). The significance of the doctrine of sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith. Philosophical Review 32 (1):60-78.   (Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1988). Sympathy, empathy, and the stream of consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (June):169-195.   (Google | More links)
Paul, L. A. (ms). The worm at the root of the passions: Poetry and sympathy in JS mill's utilitarianism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper explores J.S. Mill's theory of poetry and experience and its relation to his utilitarianism. It's probably one of my best papers, but for reasons I hesitate to speculate upon it's been largely ignored
Richerson, Peter (ms). Darwinian evolutionary ethics: Between patriotism and sympathy.   (Google)
Abstract: Darwin believed that his theory of evolution would stand or fall on its ability to account for human behavior. No species could be an exception to his theory without imperiling the whole edifice. One of the most striking features of human behavior is our very elaborate social life involving cooperation with large numbers of other people. The evolution of the ethical sensibilities and institutions of humans was thus one of his central concerns. Darwin made four main arguments regarding human morality: (1) that it is a product of group selection; (2) that an immense difference existed between human moral systems and those of other animals; (3) that the human social instincts were “primeval” and essentially the same in all modern humans; and (4) that moral progress was possible based on using the instinct of sympathy as the basis for inventing and favoring the spread of improved social institutions. Modern studies of cultural evolution suggest that Darwin’s arguments about the evolution of morality are largely correct in their essentials
Silver, John Sabini Andmaury & Sabini, John (1985). On the captivity of the will: Sympathy, caring, and a moral sense of the human. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):23–36.   (Google | More links)
Smith, K. K. (1998). Storytelling, sympathy and moral judgment in american abolitionism. Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (4):356–377.   (Google | More links)
Sugden, Robert (2002). Beyond sympathy and empathy: Adam Smith's concept of fellow-feeling. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):63-87.   (Google)
Taylor, C. (1999). Sympathy. Journal of Ethics 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I examine an example of sympathy -- the actions of one woman who rescued Jews during their persecution in Nazi Europe. I argue that this woman''s account of her actions here suggests that sympathy is a primitive response to the suffering of another. By primitive here I mean: first, that these responses are immediate and unthinking; and second, that these responses are explanatorily basic, that they cannot be explained in terms of some more fundamental feature of human nature -- such as some particular desire or sentiment that we possess. My conclusion is then that our sympathetic responses are themselves partially constitutive of our conception of what is to be a human being
Taylor, Craig (2002). Sympathy: A Philosophical Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends
Taylor, Paul C. (2004). Silence and sympathy: Dewey's whiteness. In George Yancy (ed.), What White Looks Like: African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question. Routledge.   (Google)
Tietzel, Manfred (1980). Sympathy for the devil. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 11 (2).   (Google)
Torre, Pablo S. & Torre, Sison, Sympathy for the devil? Child homicide, victim characteristics, and the sentencing preferences of the american conscience.   (Google)
Abstract:      The act of killing a child holds the distinction of attracting a deluge of attention in the media but a relative drip of sociological literature. This thesis deconstructs American views of child homicide and conducts the first experimental test of the effects of victim characteristics like age on sentencing recommendations in four different homicide scenarios: accidental, drunken, impulsive, and premeditated. The findings illuminate the link between social norms and sentencing severity. Ultimately, three conclusions may be drawn: first, child sympathy does not appear to vary by the respondent's demographic traits; second, child killers are sentenced more harshly than the killers of adults, but only when criminal intent is evident; and third, while there is a positive relationship between youth of the victim and the severity of punishment assigned to the offender, the effects for child and teen homicide are not so dissimilar as to contradict existing legal statutes in the United States
Turco, Luigi (1999). Sympathy and moral sense: 1725-1740. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1):79 – 101.   (Google)
Vitz, Rico (2004). Sympathy and benevolence in Hume's moral psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3).   (Google)
Wand, Bernard (1955). A note on sympathy in Hume's moral theory. Philosophical Review 64 (2):275-279.   (Google | More links)
Weinstein, Jack (2006). Sympathy, difference, and education: Social unity in the work of Adam Smith. Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):79-111.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article, I examine Adam Smith's theory of the ways individuals in society bridge social and biological difference. In doing so, I emphasize the divisive effects of gender, race, and class to see if Smith's account of social unity can overcome such fractious forces. My discussion uses the metaphor of “proximity” to mean both physical and psychological distance between moral actors and spectators. I suggest that education – both formal and informal in means – can assist moral judgment by helping agents minimize the effects of proximity, and, ultimately, learn commonality where difference may otherwise seem overwhelming. This article uses the methods of the history of philosophy in order to examine an issue within contemporary discourse. While I seek to offer an authentic reading of Smith representative of his eighteenth-century perspective, I do so with an eye towards determining the extent to which Smith anticipated central issues in modern multiculturalism. (Published Online April 18 2006) Footnotes1 I would like to thank Luc Bovens, Kim Donehower, David Levy, Elizabeth Sund, and Leah M. McClimans, for their help on previous drafts of this article
Whittaker, John H. (2005). Sympathy: A philosophical analysis. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1).   (Google)
Wolfe, A. B. (1923). The rôle of sympathy and ethical motivation in scientific social research. Journal of Philosophy 20 (9):225-234.   (Google | More links)
Woods, Kerri (2009). Suffering, sympathy, and (environmental) security: Reassessing Rorty's contribution to human rights theory. Res Publica 15 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This article reassess Rorty’s contribution to human rights theory. It addresses two key questions: (1) Does Rorty sustain his claim that there are no morally relevant transcultural facts? (2) Does Rorty’s proposed sentimental education offer an adequate response to contemporary human rights challenges? Although both questions are answered in the negative, it is argued here that Rorty’s focus on suffering, sympathy, and security, offer valuable resources to human rights theorists. The article concludes by considering the idea of a dual approach to human rights, combining Rorty’s emphasis on sentiment with an analysis of patterns of responsibility for the underfulfilment of human rights