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5.1n. Pleasure (Pleasure on PhilPapers)

See also:
Ainslie, George (2009). Pleasure and aversion: Challenging the conventional dichotomy. Inquiry 52 (4):357 – 377.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophy and its descendents in the behavioral sciences have traditionally divided incentives into those that are sought and those that are avoided. Positive incentives are held to be both attractive and memorable because of the direct effects of pleasure. Negative incentives are held to be unattractive but still memorable (the problem of pain) because they force unpleasant emotions on an individual by an unmotivated process, either a hardwired response (unconditioned response) or one substituted by association (conditioned response). Negative incentives are divided into those that are always avoided and those that are avoided only by higher mental processes—archetypically the passions, which are also thought of as hardwired or conditioned. Newer dichotomies within the negative have been proposed, hinging on whether a negative incentive is nevertheless sought (“wanted but not liked”) or on an incentive's being negative only because it is confining (the product of “rule worship”). The newer dichotomies have lacked motivational explanations, and there is reason to question conditioning in the motivational mechanism for the older ones. Both experimental findings and the examination of common experience indicate that even the most aversive experiences, such as pain and panic, do not prevail in reflex fashion, but because of an urge to attend to them. The well-established hyperbolic curve in which prospective rewards are discounted implies a mechanism for such an urge, as well as for the “lower” incentives in the other dichotomies. The properties of these lower incentives are predicted by particular durations of temporary preferences on a continuum that stretches from fractions of a second to years
Alpern, Kenneth D. (1983). Aristotle on the friendships of utility and pleasure. Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (3).   (Google)
Annas, Julia (1987). Epicurus on pleasure and happiness. Philosophical Topics 15 (2):5-21.   (Google)
Aubry, Gwenaelle (2009). Nicomachean ethics VII. 14 (1154a22-b34) : The pain of the living and divine pleasure. In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Aydede, Murat (2000). An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Baier, Glen (1999). A proper arbiter of pleasure: Rousseau on the control of sexual desire. Philosophical Forum 30 (4):249–268.   (Google | More links)
Bain, Alexander (1892). Pleasure and pain. Mind 1 (2):161-187.   (Google | More links)
Baxley, Anne Margaret (2008). Pleasure, freedom and grace: Schiller's “completion” of Kant's ethics. Inquiry 51 (1):1 – 15.   (Google | More links)
Bedford, E. (1959). Pleasure and belief, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:73-92.   (Google)
Binik, Yitzchak M. (1997). Pain, pleasure, and the mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):440-441.   (Google)
Birmingham, P. (2003). The pleasure of your company: Arendt, Kristeva, and an ethics of public happiness. Research in Phenomenology 33 (1):53-74.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay, I examine Arendt's and Kristeva's account of the archaic event of natality, arguing that each attempts to show how this event is the source of our pleasure in the company of others. I first examine Arendt's understanding of natality, showing that in her early writings, specifically in The Origin of Totalitarianism, the event of natality carries with it a capacity for violence that Arendt does not continue to develop in her later formulations. This lack of development leaves her later thought, specifically her notion of "public happiness" strangely light-minded on the topic of domination, unable to give an account of how violence can be part and parcel of our appearance in the public space itself. I then turn to Kristeva's understanding of the event of natality, arguing that her account, specifically the "violence beneath our desires" contributes significantly to Arendt's account of natality, allowing us to understand how pleasure in the company of others is possible despite such violence. I argue that Kristeva locates our capacity for public happiness in the aspect of natality Arendt abandons in her later thought. I conclude by showing how Kristeva's account of natality provides a foundation for Arendt's understanding of public happiness
Blum, Alex (1991). A note on pleasure. Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (October):367-70.   (Google | More links)
Booher, Troy (online). J.s. Mill's test for higher pleasure.   (Google)
Abstract: of (from Studies in the History of Ethics)
Boris Nikolsky, (2001). Epicurus on pleasure. Phronesis 46 (4):440-465.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper deals with the question of the attribution to Epicurus of the classification of pleasures into 'kinetic' and 'static'. This classification, usually regarded as authentic, confronts us with a number of problems and contradictions. Besides, it is only mentioned in a few sources that are not the most reliable. Following Gosling and Taylor, I believe that the authenticity of the classification may be called in question. The analysis of the ancient evidence concerning Epicurus' concept of pleasure is made according to the following principle: first, I consider the sources that do not mention the distinction between 'kinetic' and 'static' pleasures, and only then do I compare them with the other group of texts which comprises reports by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus. From the former group of texts there emerges a concept of pleasure as a single and not twofold notion, while such terms as 'motion' and 'state' describe not two different phenomena but only two characteristics of the same phenomenon. On the other hand, the reports comprising the latter group appear to derive from one and the same doxographical tradition, and to be connected with the classification of ethical docrines put forward by the Middle Academy and known as the divisio Carneadea. In conclusion, I argue that the idea of Epicurus' classification of pleasures is based on a misinterpretation of Epicurus' concept in Academic doxography, which tended to contrapose it to doctrines of other schools, above all to the Cyrenaics' views
Brannmark, Johan (2006). Like the Bloom on youths' : How pleasure completes our lives. In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Bradley, Francis H. (1888). On pleasure, pain, desire and volition. Mind 13 (49):1-36.   (Google | More links)
Brewer, Talbot (2003). Savoring time: Desire, pleasure and wholehearted activity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: There is considerable appeal to the Aristotelian idea that taking pleasure in an activity is sometimes simply a matter of attending to it in such a way as to render it wholehearted. However, the proponents of this idea have not made adequately clear what kind of attention it is that can perform the surprising feat of transforming otherwise indifferent activities into pleasurable ones. I build upon Gilbert Ryle's suggestion that taking pleasure in an activity is tantamount to engaging in the activity while fervently desiring to do it and it alone. More specifically, I draw upon insights into the sort of evaluative attention involved in having a desire to generate corollary insights into the sort of attention that makes activity pleasurable. My aim is to offer a compelling account of a certain class of pleasures, and to shed light on their relation to reasons. I argue that prospective pleasures in this class are not always reasons for action, and that even when they are reasons they have this status only derivatively, as vivid apprehensions of an independent realm of values. This does not mean that such pleasures are never good. They are good provided that they track real values, for then they constitute a proper savoring of one's activities and/or circumstances, and provide a valuable respite from the distractions and unwarranted doubts that so often leave us at odds with ourselves and alienated from our own doings
Brody, Stuart (1997). Vaginas yield far more pleasure than pain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):442-443.   (Google)
Cafaro, Philip (2001). Economic consumption, pleasure, and the good life. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):471–486.   (Google | More links)
Carroll, Nol (2003). Horror, tragedy and pleasure: The general theory of horrific appeal. In Steven Jay Schneider & Daniel Shaw (eds.), Dark Thoughts: Philosophic Reflections on Cinematic Horror. Scarecrow Press.   (Google)
Casement, William (1986). William Morris on labor and pleasure. Social Theory and Practice 12 (3):351-382.   (Google)
Chen, Shaoming (2010). On pleasure: A reflection on happiness from the confucian and daoist perspectives. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):179-195.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper discusses the structural relationship between ideals on pleasure and pleasure as a human psychological phenomenon in Chinese thought. It describes the psychological phenomenon of pleasure, and compares different approaches by pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist scholars. It also analyzes its development in Song and Ming Confucianism. Finally, in the conclusion, the issue is transferred to a general understanding of happiness, so as to demonstrate the modern value of the classical ideological experience
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1987). Brentano's theory of pleasure and pain. Topoi 6 (1).   (Google)
Conolly, Oliver (2005). Pleasure and pain in literature. Philosophy and Literature 29 (2).   (Google)
Cooper, Neil (1968). Pleasure and goodness in Plato's philebus. Philosophical Quarterly 18 (70):12-15.   (Google | More links)
Cowan, Joseph L. (1968). Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology. Macmillan.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Crisp, Roger (2007). Neutrality and pleasure. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):81-88.   (Google)
Cummins, W. Joseph (1984). The greeks on pleasure. Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (3).   (Google)
Dearden, R. F. (1971). Play and pleasure. Reply to Nancy Gayer and M. F. Burnyeat. Journal of Philosophy of Education 5 (1):37–41.   (Google | More links)
de Marchi, Neil (2006). Smith on ingenuity, pleasure, and the imitative arts. In Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Downie, R. S. (1966). Mill on pleasure and self-development. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (62):69-71.   (Google | More links)
Drake, Durant (1919). Is pleasure objective? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (24):665-668.   (Google | More links)
Draper, Paul (1989). Pain and pleasure: An evidential problem for theists. Noûs 23 (3):331-350.   (Google | More links)
Driver, By Julia (2004). Pleasure as the standard of virtue in Hume's moral philosophy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):173–194.   (Google | More links)
Ducasse, C. J. (1943). Esthetic contemplation and sense pleasure--a reply. Journal of Philosophy 40 (6):156-159.   (Google | More links)
Duncker, Karl (1941). On pleasure, emotion, and striving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (June):391-430.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
J. Dybikowski, (1970). False pleasure and the philebus. Phronesis 15 (s 1-2):147-165.   (Google)
Dybikowski, James C. (1970). Mixed and false pleasure in the philebus: A reply. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (80):244-247.   (Google | More links)
Earle, William James (1989). Foucaults the use of pleasure as philosophy. Metaphilosophy 20 (2):169–177.   (Google | More links)
Earle, William James (2007). Pleasure and provocation: Reaction-shots to Michel Foucault's history of madness. Philosophical Forum 38 (3):309–324.   (Google | More links)
Edwards, R. (1975). Do pleasures and pains differ qualitatively? Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (4):270-81.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ferguson, Harvie (1990). The Science of Pleasure: Cosmos and Psyche in the Bourgeois World View. Routledge.   (Google)
Foddy, Bennett & Savulescu, Julian (2006). Autonomy, addiction and the drive to pleasure: Designing drugs and our biology: A reply to Neil Levy. Bioethics 20 (1):21–23.   (Google | More links)
Foddy, Bennett & Savulescu, Julian (2007). Addiction is not an affliction: Addictive desires are merely pleasure-oriented desires. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):29 – 32.   (Google)
Fort, Andrew O. (1988). Beyond pleasure: Śankara on Bliss. Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (2).   (Google)
Fox, Adam (1945). Plato for Pleasure. Folcroft Library Editions.   (Google)
Franklin, Benjamin (1930). A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain. The Facsimile Text Society.   (Google)
Francisco J. Gonzalez, (1991). Aristotle on pleasure and perfection. Phronesis 36 (2):141-159.   (Google)
Freud, Sigmund (2010). Beyond the pleasure principle : Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. In Christopher Want (ed.), Philosophers on Art From Kant to the Postmodernists: A Critical Reader. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Frede, Dorothea (2009). Nicomachean ethics VIII. 11-12: Pleasure. In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book Vii: Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Frede, Dorothea (2009). Nicomachean ethics VII. 11-12 : Pleasure. In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Frede, Dorothea (2006). Pleasure and pain in Aristotle's ethics. In Richard Kraut (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Fuchs, Alan E. (1976). The production of pleasure by stimulation of the brain: An alleged conflict between science and philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (June):494-505.   (Google | More links)
Gallie, W. B. (1954). Pleasure, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 147:147-164.   (Google)
Garvin, Lucius (1942). Pleasure theory in ethics and esthetics. Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):57-63.   (Google | More links)
Gardner, John (online). Six theses about pleasure.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics (December, 2004), pp. 247-267. Abstract: I defend these claims: (1) ‘Pleasure’ has exactly one English antonym: ‘unpleasure’. (2) Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity. (3) The hedonic calculus is a joke. (4) An important type of pleasure is background pleasure. (5) Pleasures in bad company are still good. (6) Higher pleasures aren’t pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn’t be higher). Thesis (1) merely concerns terminology, but theses (2)-(6) are substantive, evaluative claims
Gayer, Nancy & Burnyeat, M. F. (1971). Play and pleasure. Journal of Philosophy of Education 5 (1):29–36.   (Google | More links)
Gilliland, M. S. (1892). Pleasure and pain in education. International Journal of Ethics 2 (3):289-312.   (Google | More links)
Gladwell, Adèle Olivia (1995). Catamania: The Dissonance of Female Pleasure and Dissent. Distributors to the Us Book Trade, Subterranean Company.   (Google)
Goldworth, Amnon (1972). Bentham's concept of pleasure: Its relation to fictitious terms. Ethics 82 (4):334-343.   (Google | More links)
Goldstein, Irwin (1981). Cognitive pleasure and distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Explaining pleasure's 'intentional object', I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleased. Bernard Williams, Irving Thalberg, and Gilbert Ryle, who reject this analysis, are discussed.
Goldstein, Irwin (2000). Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of mental states in this way
Gosling, J. C. B. (1982). The Greeks on Pleasure. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Provides a critical and analytical history of ancient Greek theories on the nature of pleasure, and of its value and rolein human lfie, from the ealriest times down to the period of Epicurus and the early Stoics
Grayling, A. C. (2007). The Choice of Hercules: Pleasure, Duty and the Good Life in the 21st Century. Phoenix.   (Google)
Hadreas, P. (1999). Intentionality and the neurobiology of pleasure. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 30 (2):219-236.   (Google)
Hadreas, Peter (2004). The functions of pleasure in nicomachean ethics X 4-. Ancient Philosophy 24 (1):155-167.   (Google)
Haezrahi, Pepita (1960). Pain and pleasure: Some reflections on Susan Stebbing's view that pain and pleasure are moral values. Philosophical Studies 11 (5).   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2009). Incompatibilism's threat to worldly value: Source incompatibilism, desert, and pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):621-645.   (Google)
Harte, Verity (2004). The philebus on pleasure: The good, the bad and the false. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):111–128.   (Google)
Hawton, Hector (1949). Philosophy for Pleasure. London, Watts.   (Google)
Heathwood, Chris (online). The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: sub> One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation quali?es as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible for- mulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections
Helm, Bennett W. (2002). Felt evaluations: A theory of pleasure and pain. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously con- stitutive of that import by virtue of the broader rational patterns of which they are a part and that they serve to de?ne. This account of felt eval- uations makes sense of the way in which pleasures and pains grab our attention and motivate us to act and of the peculiar dual objectivity and subjectivity of their implicit evaluations, while o?ering a phenomenology adequate to both emotional and bodily pleasures and pains
Henry, Devin (2002). Aristotle on pleasure and the worst form of akrasia. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows us is that if we distinguish between two ways of having knowledge (potentially and actually), the Socratic thesis can effectively account for a wide range of cases (collectively referred to here as drunk-akrasia) in which an agent acts contrary to his general knowledge of the Good, yet can still be said to know in the qualified sense that his actions are wrong. However, Book 7 also shows that the Socratic account of akrasia cannot take us any farther than drunk-akrasia, for unlike drunk-akrasia, genuine akrasia cannot be reduced to a failure of knowledge. This agent knows in the unqualified sense that his actions are wrong. The starting-point of my argument is that Aristotle's explanation of genuine akrasia requires a different solution than the one found in NE 7 which relies on the distinction between qualified and unqualified knowing: genuinely akratic behaviour is due to the absence of an internal conflict that a desire for the proper pleasures of temperance would create if he could experience them
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, Theism, the hypothesis of indifference, and the biological role of pain and pleasure.   (Google)
Abstract: Following Hume’s lead, Paul Draper argues that, given the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems, the observed facts about pain and pleasure in the world are antecedently much more likely on the Hypothesis of Indifference than on theism. I examine one by one Draper’s arguments for this claim and show how they miss the mark
Huby, Pamela M. (1992). Pleasure, knowledge, and being: An analysis of Plato's philebus. Ancient Philosophy 12 (2):431-433.   (Google)
Jiménez, Erick Raphael (2008). Pleasure in Aristotle's ethics. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 29 (1):277-281.   (Google)
Johannson, Ingvar (2001). Species and dimensions of pleasure. Metaphysica 2 (2):39-72.   (Google)
Jones, Ward E. (2006). The function and content of amusement. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):126-137.   (Google | More links)
Katz, Leonard D. (2005). Opioid Bliss as the felt hedonic core of mammalian prosociality – and of consummatory pleasure more generally? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):356-356.   (Google)
Abstract: Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky's (D&M-S's) language suggests that, unlike Kent Berridge, they may allow that the activity of a largely subcortical system, which is presumably often introspectively and cognitively inaccessible, constitutes affectively felt experience even when so. Such experience would then be phenomenally conscious without being reflexively conscious or cognitively access-conscious, to use distinctions formulated by the philosopher Ned Block
Katz, Leonard D. (online). Pleasure. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Kelly, Jack (1973). Virtue and pleasure. Mind 82 (327):401-408.   (Google | More links)
Kershnar, Stephen (2010). A complex experiential account of pleasure. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2).   (Google)
Kinget, G. Marian (1999). On Being Human and Pleasure and Pain: Two Humanistic Works. University Press of America.   (Google)
Klocksiem, Justin (2010). The amenability of pleasure and pain to aggregation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: According to several prominent philosophers, pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities. This thesis is controversial, however, and many philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false. One important class of these arguments concerns the problem of aggregation, which says that if pleasure and pain were measurable quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of them. It is sometimes argued that such operations cannot be sensibly applied to pleasure and pain, and that sentences expressing such operations must be false or meaningless. The purpose of this paper is to present, explain, and rebut several versions of this argument. In the first section, I present a generic version of the argument. In the second section, I present a defense of its key premise based on a case involving comparisons of relief from pain, and explain why I think it fails. In the third section, I present and rebut another defense, based on a pair of analogies with temperature. In the final section, I present a third defense, based on an analogy with spatial distances. I then present my reasons for rejecting it. Along the way, I explain my reasons for thinking that pleasure and pain are amenable to interval measurement
Klocksiem, Justin (2008). The problem of interpersonal comparisons of pleasure and pain. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1).   (Google)
Kupperman, Joel J. (1978). Do we desire only pleasure? Philosophical Studies 34 (4).   (Google)
Kusser, Anna & Spohn, Wolfgang (1992). The utility of pleasure is a pain for decision theory. Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):10-29.   (Google | More links)
Langton, Rae (2000). Locke's relations and God's good pleasure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):75–91.   (Google)
Law, Iain, Evil pleasure is good for you!   (Google)
Abstract: Many people are uncomfortable with the idea that pleasure from certain sources is genuinely beneficial. These sources can be sorted into two classes: ones that involve others’ pain; and ones that involve what seems to be damage rather than benefit to the person involved. Here’s an example of the latter: a woman who claims that she enjoys her work performing in hard-core pornographic films. Some find it hard to take such a claim at face value – they instinctively assume that the woman is insincere or self-deceived.1 The reason seems a strongly paternalistic one: because the activity is assumed to be bad, it’s thought that only someone who was in some way damaged could genuinely like it. A statement from Brian Hill, the director of a documentary about such women, illustrates this: ‘I felt certain that she couldn’t enjoy what she does, that there must be some reason why she’s undergoing this kind of experience. But there was nothing: no messed-up childhood, no sense of pain or humiliation.’ (Smith, 2003, 17) Forced to conclude that the woman in question really does enjoy her work, Hill changes his view to imply that the pleasure gained cannot be truly beneficial: ‘When I hear a young woman talking about doing videos of fisting and asphyxiation, I have to wonder what it’s doing to her – even if she says that she’s having fun.’ (Smith, 2003, 17)
Macintyre, Alasdair (1965). Pleasure as a reason for action. The Monist 49 (April):215-233.   (Google)
MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1989). Sexuality, pornography, and method: "Pleasure under patriarchy. Ethics 99 (2):314-346.   (Google | More links)
Mackenzie, Robin (forthcoming). The neuroethics of pleasure and addiction in public health strategies moving beyond harm reduction: Funding the creation of non-addictive drugs and taxonomies of pleasure. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Abstract: We are unlikely to stop seeking pleasure, as this would prejudice our health and well-being. Yet many psychoactive substances providing pleasure are outlawed as illicit recreational drugs, despite the fact that only some of them are addictive to some people. Efforts to redress their prohibition, or to reform legislation so that penalties are proportionate to harm have largely failed. Yet, if choices over seeking pleasure are ethical insofar as they avoid harm to oneself or others, public health strategies should foster ethical choice by moving beyond current risk management practices embodied in the harm reduction movement. The neuroscience of pleasure has much to offer neuroethics and public health strategies. Distinguishing between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ fosters new understandings of addiction. These hold promise for directing the search for pharmacotherapies which prevent addiction and relapse or disrupt associated neuromechanisms. They could inform new research into creating lawful psychoactive substances which give us pleasure without provoking addiction. As the health and well being of human and other animals rests upon the experience of pleasure, this would be an ethical objective within public health strategy. Were ethical and neurobiological obstacles to ending addiction to be overcome, problems associated with excessive consumption, the lure of unlawful psychoactive substances and the paucity of lawful means to achieve pleasurable altered states would remain. Non-addictive designer drugs, which reliably provided lawful access to pleasures and altered states, would ameliorate these public health concerns insofar as they fostered citizens’ informed, ethical choices according to a neurobiological taxonomy of pleasures
Manser, A. R. (1961). Pleasure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:223-238.   (Google)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1895). Emotions versus pleasure-pain. Mind 4 (14):180-194.   (Google | More links)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1894). Pleasure-pain. Mind 3 (12):533-535.   (Google | More links)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1892). Pleasure-pain and sensation. Philosophical Review 1 (6):625-648.   (Google | More links)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1893). Prof. Bain on pleasure and pain. Mind 2 (5):89-93.   (Google | More links)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1889). The classification of pleasure and pain. Mind 14 (56):511-536.   (Google | More links)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1891). The physical basis of pleasure and pain. Mind 16 (63):327-354.   (Google | More links)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1891). The physical basis of pleasure and pain. (II.). Mind 16 (64):470-497.   (Google | More links)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1893). V. —discussions: Prof. Bain on pleasure and pain. Mind 2 (5).   (Google)
Mason, Elinor (2007). The nature of pleasure: A critique of Feldman. Utilitas 19 (3):379-387.   (Google)
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McDougall, William (1929). Dr. Lloyd Morgan on consonance of welfare and pleasure. Mind 38 (149):77-83.   (Google | More links)
Donal McGibbon, (1960). Pleasure as the "criterion" in democritus. Phronesis 5 (2):75-77.   (Google)
Mendola, Joseph (2007). Review essay on pleasure and the good life. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):220–232.   (Google | More links)
Mezes, Sidney E. (1895). Pleasure and pain defined. Philosophical Review 4 (1):22-46.   (Google | More links)
Miller, Dickinson S. (1929). The pleasure-quality and the pain-quality analysable, not ultimate. Mind 38 (150):215-218.   (Google | More links)
Miyasaki, Donovan (2004). Freud or Nietzsche: the Drives, Pleasure, and Social Happiness. Dissertation, University of Toronto   (Google)
Abstract: Many commentators have remarked upon the striking points of correspondence that can be found in the works of Freud and Nietzsche. However, this essay argues that on the subject of desire their work presents us with a radical choice: Freud or Nietzsche. I first argue that Freud’s theory of desire is grounded in the principle of inertia, a principle that is incompatible with his later theory of Eros and the life drive. Furthermore, the principle of inertia is not essentially distinct from his later theory of the death drive. Consequently, Freud’s theory of desire can only be interpreted consistently as a monism of the death drive. I then analyze Nietzsche’s attempt to ground his theory of desire in the concept of the will to power. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of desire is fundamentally opposed to the key elements of Freud’s theory of desire: the principle of constancy, the Freudian definition of the drive, and the pleasure principle. Next, I explicate the stakes of this opposition by analyzing the social consequences of each view for morality and justice. I argue that the Freudian subject seeks to dominate the social other, and that there is an insurmountable conflict between the satisfaction of desire and the demands of social life. Consequently, Freud’s view allows only for a negative conception of the social good in which morality is defined as the intrinsically impossible task of eliminating evil, and justice can be achieved only through the equal distribution of instinctual frustration. Finally, I argue that in Nietzsche’s theory of desire there is no essential conflict between individual desire and social life. The Nietzschean subject desires to manifest power in the form of activity that is independent of external agents, not to dominate the other. Consequently, Nietzsche’s view allows for the possibility of a positively defined concept of the social good in which morality is the affirmation and enhancement of every subject’s happiness, and justice can be achieved through the promotion and protection of an equality of power among subjects.
Momeyer, Richard W. (1975). Is pleasure a sensation? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September):113-21.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Morgan, C. Lloyd (1929). Consonance of welfare and pleasure. Mind 38 (150):207-214.   (Google | More links)
Morillo, Carolyn R. (1992). Reward event systems: Reconceptualizing the explanatory roles of motivation, desire and pleasure. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):7-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: A developing neurobiological/psychological theory of positive motivation gives a key causal role to reward events in the brain which can be directly activated by electrical stimulation (ESB). In its strongest form, this Reward Event Theory (RET) claims that all positive motivation, primary and learned, is functionally dependent on these reward events. Some of the empirical evidence is reviewed which either supports or challenges RET. The paper examines the implications of RET for the concepts of 'motivation', 'desire' and 'reward' or 'pleasure'. It is argued (1) that a 'causal base' as opposed to a functional' concept of motivation has theoretical advantages; (2) that a causal distinction between the focus' and the 'anchor' of desire suggests an ineliminable 'opacity' of desire; and (3) that some affective concept, such as 'pleasure', should play a key role in psychological explanation, distinct from that of motivational (or cognitive) concepts. A concept of 'reward' or 'pleasure' as intrinsically positive affect is defended, and contrasted with the more 'operational' definitions of 'reward' in some of the hypotheses of Roy Wise
Moss, Jessica, Pleasure and illusion in Plato.   (Google)
Abstract: In the many, deception seems to come about on account of pleasure. For while it is not the good, it appears to be. They choose the pleasant as being good, then, and avoid pain as being bad. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1113a33-b2) Plato is suspicious of pleasure. He devotes the whole of the Philebus and a significant portion of the Gorgias to attacks on hedonism. He declares that “the soul of a true philosopher…keeps away from pleasures and appetites and pains and fears as much as it can (Phaedo 83b5-7)” and denounces pleasure as “evil’s greatest lure” (Timaeus 69d1).1 And even when acknowledging that some pleasures are good, and that the good life (the philosopher’s life) is supremely pleasant, he holds that the very best life – the life of the gods – is a life with no pleasure at all (Philebus 33b)
Moss, Jessica (2007). The doctor and the pastry chef: Pleasure and persuasion in Plato's gorgias. Ancient Philosophy 27 (2):229-249.   (Google)
Mulvey, Laura (2010). Afterthoughts on "visual pleasure and narrative cinema". In Marc Furstenau (ed.), The Film Theory Reader: Debates & Arguments. Routledge.   (Google)
Mulvey, Laura (2010). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema. In Marc Furstenau (ed.), The Film Theory Reader: Debates & Arguments. Routledge.   (Google)
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Nichols, Herbert (1892). The origin of pleasure and pain, II. Philosophical Review 1 (5):518-534.   (Google | More links)
Nichols, Herbert (1892). The origin of pleasure and pain, I. Philosophical Review 1 (4):403-432.   (Google | More links)
Nuttall, A. D. (1997). Book review: Why does tragedy give pleasure? Philosophy and Literature 21 (2).   (Google)
Ohrenstein, Roman A. (ms). The talmudic doctrine of the 'benefit of a pleasure': Psychological well-being in talmudic literature.   (Google)
Abstract:      In this article, we attempt to analyze the Talmudic notion of well-being in the light of modern hedonic psychology. First, we examine the thoughts of Hebrew "wisdom" and Greek "sophia" concerning the phenomenon of happiness. We then discuss the Talmudic doctrine of "optimality", a concept similar to that of the Pareto improvement. This is followed by a discourse deemed to be of extraordinary significance - the idea of "mutual benefit", which may be described as "super optimum". Thereafter, the doctrine of the "Benefit of a Pleasure" is demonstrated to be a "pleasure-measure" of reciprocal and nonreciprocal happiness. Finally, it is argued, that although Plato, according to Professor Lowry, detailed precise "trade-offs" between degrees of pleasure, pain, and time, it was applied to "moral values" only, whereas the Talmudists posited the existence of a "psychoeconomic" category, in which pleasure itself is equated with money
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Philips, Michael (1981). A pleasure paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):323 – 331.   (Google | More links)
Pianalto, Matthew (2009). Against the intrinsic value of pleasure. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1).   (Google)
Plato, (1945). Plato's Examination of Pleasure. Cambridge [Eng.]The University Press.   (Google)
Plantinga, Carl (2009). Rethinking affects, narration, fantasy, and realism. Rethinking affects, narration, fantasy, and realism. Trauma, pleasure, and emotion in the viewing of titanic: A cognitive approach. In Warren Buckland (ed.), Film Theory & Contemporary Hollywood Movies. Routledge.   (Google)
Plantinga, Carl (2009). Rethinking affects, narration, fantasy, and realism. Trauma, pleasure, and emotion in the viewing of titanic: A cognitive approach. In Warren Buckland (ed.), Film Theory and Contemporary Hollywood Movies. Routledge.   (Google)
Plochmann, George K. (1950). Some neglected considerations on pleasure and pain. Ethics 61 (October):51-55.   (Google | More links)
Puccetti, Roland (1969). The sensations of pleasure. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (October):239-245.   (Google | More links)
Quinn, Warren S. (1968). Pleasure -- disposition or episode? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (June):578-86.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Rachels, Stuart (2000). Is unpleasantness intrinsic to unpleasant experiences? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):187-210.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Unpleasant experiences include backaches, moments of nausea, moments of nervousness, phantom pains, and so on. What does their unpleasantness consist in? The unpleasantness of an experience has been thought to consist in: (1) its representing bodily damage; (2) its inclining the subject to fight its continuation; (3) the subject's disliking it; (4) features intrinsic to it. I offer compelling objections to (1) and (2) and less compelling objections to (3). I defend (4) against five challenging objections and offer two reasons to believe it. Hence, I advocate "Intrinsic Nature," the idea that unpleasantness is intrinsic to unpleasant experiences.
Rachels, Stuart (2004). Six theses about pleasure. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend these claims: (1) 'Pleasure' has exactly one English antonym: 'unpleasure.' (2) Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity. (3) The hedonic calculus is a joke. (4) An important type of pleasure is background pleasure. (5) Pleasures in bad company are still good. (6) Higher pleasures aren't pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn't be higher). Thesis (1) merely concerns terminology, but theses (2)-(6) are substantive, evaluative claims
Rapp, Christof (2009). Nicomachean ethics VII. 13-14 (1154a21) : Pleasure and eudaimonia. In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rebec, George (1905). Pleasure, idealism, and truth in art. International Journal of Ethics 15 (2):210-221.   (Google | More links)
Reginster, Bernard (2005). Nietzsche on pleasure and power. Philosophical Topics 33 (2):161-191.   (Google)
Richardson, Henry S. (1990). Measurement, pleasure, and practical science in Plato's. Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1).   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (2006). What is it like to like? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a "pleasure sensation" - for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's "feeling episode" theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought into relation to the account of liking one's sensations
Rogers, Arthur K. (1919). The place of pleasure in ethical theory. Philosophical Review 28 (1):27-46.   (Google | More links)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1974). The place of pleasure in Aristotle's ethics. Mind 83 (332):481-497.   (Google | More links)
Rudebusch, George (1999). Socrates, Pleasure, and Value. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving the textual puzzle and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good
Russell, Daniel C. (2005). Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Daniel Russell develops a fresh and original view of pleasure and its pivotal role in Plato's treatment of value, happiness, and human psychology. This is the first full-length discussion of the topic for fifty years, and Russell shows its relevance to contemporary debates in moral philosophy and philosophical psychology. Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life will make fascinating reading for ancient specialists and for a wide range of philosophers
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1895). Emotions versus pleasure-pain. Mind 4 (14):180-194.   (Google | More links)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1892). Pleasure-pain and sensation. Philosophical Review 1 (6):625-648.   (Google | More links)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1893). Prof. Bain on pleasure and pain. Mind 2 (5):89-93.   (Google | More links)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1889). The classification of pleasure and pain. Mind 14 (56):511-536.   (Google | More links)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1891). The physical basis of pleasure and pain. (II.). Mind 16 (64):470-497.   (Google | More links)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1891). The physical basis of pleasure and pain. Mind 16 (63):327-354.   (Google | More links)
Ryle, Gilbert (1954). Pleasure, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 135:135-146.   (Google)
Sagawa, Y.; Sawai, H. & Sakai, N. (2002). A hypothesis concerning a relationship between pleasantness and unpleasantness. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Scaltsas, Theodore (2006). Mixed determinates : Pleasure, good, and truth. In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Schroeder, Timothy (2008). Unexpected pleasure. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive tract, feels an impressive number of the sensations felt by someone who is gut-wrenchingly sad. Yet, unless she feels bad, the way she feels is only a pale echo of the feeling of sadness. If she feels good in spite of the burrito and the wind, then she does not feel at all the way she would if she were sad. Likewise, a man falling asleep can hardly fail to feel his muscles relax, his heart rate fall, and so on, but unless he feels good his state is only a shadow of feeling content. This paper will begin with a sketch of the nature of pleasure and displeasure, and the relation between them and the feelings that are characteristic of emotions. It will then argue that the capacity to feel pleased and displeased is, quite literally, a sense modality: one allowing us to perceive net change in the satisfaction of our intrinsic desires. As with any sense modality, the capacity to feel pleased and displeased displays substantial modularity. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the modularity of pleasure and displeasure contributes to effects that might reasonably be called “the modularity of the emotions.”
Schroeder, Timothy (2001). Pleasure, displeasure, and representation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):507-530.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Schroeder, Timothy (2008). Unexpected pleasure. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Scott Berman, (1991). Socrates and callicles on pleasure. Phronesis 36 (2):117-140.   (Google)
Seth, James (1896). Is pleasure the summum bonum? International Journal of Ethics 6 (4):409-424.   (Google | More links)
Soulez, Antonia (2002). Practice, theory, pleasure, and the problems of form and resistance: Shusterman's. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (1).   (Google)
Splawn, Clay (2002). Updating epicurus's concept of katastematic pleasure. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4).   (Google)
States, Bert O. (1996). Book review: The pleasure of the play. Philosophy and Literature 20 (1).   (Google)
Stalley, Richard (2009). Pleasure, mind, and soul. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (3):630 – 633.   (Google)
Stanley, Hiram M. (1889). Relation of feeling to pleasure and pain. Mind 14 (56):537-544.   (Google | More links)
Steiner, Wendy (1996). Book review: The scandal of pleasure: Art in an age of fundamentalism. Philosophy and Literature 20 (1).   (Google)
Sully, James (1880). Pleasure of visual form. Mind 5 (18):181-201.   (Google | More links)
Tanyi, Attila (forthcoming). Sobel on pleasure, reason, and desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response, following Sobel, I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views of pleasure. Although Sobel raises several objections to both accounts, I argue in detail that the phenomenological view is not as implausible as he claims it to be, whereas the tracking view, on its best version advocated by Thomas Scanlon, is an instance of the phenomenological view and is therefore also defensible
Taylor, C. C. W. (1963). Pleasure. Analysis 23 (January):2-20.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
C. C. W. Taylor, (1967). Pleasure, knowledge and sensation in democritus. Phronesis 12 (s 1-2):6-27.   (Google)
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Tessitore, Aristide (1989). A political reading of Aristotle's treatment of pleasure in the nicomachean ethics. Political Theory 17 (2):247-265.   (Google | More links)
Thurston, Carl (1943). Is our pleasure in single colors esthetic? Journal of Philosophy 40 (12):320-323.   (Google | More links)
Tiles, J. E. (1992). Pleasure, passion and truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):931-941.   (Google | More links)
Tim O'Keefe, (2002). The cyrenaics on pleasure, happiness, and future-concern. Phronesis 47 (4):395-416.   (Google)
Abstract: The Cyrenaics assert that (1) particular pleasure is the highest good, and happiness is valued not for its own sake, but only for the sake of the particular pleasures that compose it; (2) we should not forego present pleasures for the sake of obtaining greater pleasure in the future. Their anti-eudaimonism and lack of future-concern do not follow from their hedonism. So why do they assert (1) and (2)? After reviewing and criticizing the proposals put forward by Annas, Irwin and Tsouna, I offer two possible reconstructions. In the first reconstruction, I explain claim (1) as follows: happiness has no value above and beyond the value of the particular pleasures that compose it. Also, there is no "structure" to happiness. The Cyrenaics are targeting the thesis that happiness involves having the activities of one's life forming an organized whole, the value of which cannot be reduced to the value of the experiences within that life. I explain claim (2) as follows: a maximally pleasant life is valuable, but the best way to achieve it is to concentrate heedlessly on the present. In the second reconstruction, the good is radically relativized to one's present preferences. The Cyrenaics assert that we desire some particular pleasure, e.g., the pleasure that results from having this drink now. Thus, our telos - which is based upon our desires - is this particular pleasure, not (generic) 'pleasure' or the maximization of pleasure over our lifetime. As our desires change, so does our telos. I conclude that the scanty texts we have do not allow us to decide conclusively between these reconstructions, but I give some reasons to support the second over the first
Trigg, Dylan (2004). Schopenhauer and the sublime pleasure of tragedy. Philosophy and Literature 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : In 1999, Philosophy and Literature gave the top prize in its annual Bad Writing Contest to Judith Butler, and the national press echoed the journal in denouncing critical theory as overblown, jargon-ridden, and ungrammatical. Academic theorists reacted with pique, but not a soul in the public sphere came to their defense. Now, the professors have issued an anthology justifying their prose and denouncing Denis Dutton and other critics of bad writing. They claim that bad, or rather "difficult" writing has a critical thrust: to break down common sense and dismantle unjust social notions.They fail to make their case. Much of the writing is, alas, bad. Entries offer tendentious, petulant reactions to the hubbub. Rarely do they address the basic point of the contest: that humanities professors no longer respect ideals of wit, eloquence, and learning. Instead, we have another parade of academic parochialism and radical chic passing itself off as adversarial culture and social justice
Tuozzo, Thomas M. (1996). The general account of pleasure in Plato's. Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (4).   (Google)
Van Riel, Gerd (1999). Does a perfect activity necessarily yield pleasure? An evaluation of the relation between pleasure and activity in Aristotle, nicomachean ethics VII and X. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):211 – 224.   (Google)
Abstract: In his discussion of pleasure, Aristotle assumes the thesis that a perfect activity always and necessarily yields pleasure. The occurrence of pleasure is even presented as a sign that the activity is perfect. But this assumption seems to be too easy. It is possible that we do feel pleasure in activities which are not perfectly performed, and on the other hand, it is not certain at all that I will enjoy a perfect activity. Pleasure falls into the category of what J. Elster has called 'states that are essentially by-products'. Up to a point, Aristotle acknowledges this, but he does not follow this analysis to its final consequences. If one agrees, as Aristotle does, that there is a difference between the perfect activity and pleasure, it should be possible that an activity is perfect without yielding pleasure, or that pleasure will accompany even an activity which is not perfect
van Riel, Gerd (2000). Pleasure and the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists. Brill.   (Google)
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Wallis, Wilson D. (1919). What is real pleasure? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (14):384-386.   (Google | More links)
Ward, Lester F. (1897). The nature of pleasure. International Journal of Ethics 8 (1):100-101.   (Google | More links)
Philip Webb, (1977). The relative dating of the accounts of pleasure in Aristotle's ethics. Phronesis 22 (s 2-3):235-262.   (Google)
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Wielenberg, Erik (2002). Pleasure, pain, and moral character and development. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):282-299.   (Google | More links)
Williams, Bernard A. O. (1959). Pleasure and belief, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:57-72.   (Google)
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Yarnall, Patrick H. (2001). The intrinsic goodness of pain, anguish, and the loss of pleasure. Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4).   (Google)
Yonah, Yossi (2001). Well-being, categorical deprivation and pleasure. Philosophia 28 (1-4).   (Google)
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Zimmerman, Michael J. (1980). On the intrinsic value of states of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):26-45.   (Google | More links)
Zink, Sidney (1942). Esthetic appreciation and its distinction from sense pleasure. Journal of Philosophy 39 (26):701-711.   (Google | More links)

5.1n.1 Pleasure and Pain

Goldstein, Irwin (1994). Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
Goldstein, Irwin (1989). Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
Goldstein, Irwin (1980). Why people prefer pleasure to pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by reason, and hence by what there is reason to choose, seek, and prefer, when they act.

5.1n.2 Pleasure, Misc

Goldstein, Irwin (1985). Hedonic pluralism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I criticize the thesis that 'pleasure' cannot be given a single, all-embracing analysis.

5.1n.3 The Value of Pleasure

Goldstein, Irwin (2003). Malicious pleasure evaluated: Is pleasure an unconditional good? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
Goldstein, Irwin (1989). Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
Goldstein, Irwin (1980). Why people prefer pleasure to pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by reason, and hence by what there is reason to choose, seek, and prefer, when they act.