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5.1n.1. Pleasure and Pain (Pleasure and Pain on PhilPapers)

Goldstein, Irwin (1994). Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
Goldstein, Irwin (1989). Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
Goldstein, Irwin (1980). Why people prefer pleasure to pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by reason, and hence by what there is reason to choose, seek, and prefer, when they act.