Javascript Menu by
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
click here for help on how to search

5.1o. Thought and Thinking (Thought and Thinking on PhilPapers)

See also:
Altman, Ira (1997). The Concept of Intelligence: A Philosophical Analysis. University Press of America.   (Google)
Bishop, John D. (1980). The analogy theory of thinking. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):222-238.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Crane, Tim, Sainsbury on thinking about an object.   (Google)
Abstract: SUMMARY: R.M. Sainsbury’s account of reference has many compelling and attractive features. But it has the undesirable consequence that sentences of the form “x is thinking about y” can never be true when y is replaced by a non-referring term. Of the two obvious ways to deal with this problem within Sainsbury’s framework, I reject one (the analysis of thinking about as a propositional attitude) and endorse the other (treating “thinks about” as akin to an intensional transitive verb). This endorsement is also within the spirit of Sainsbury’s account of reference
Gauker, Christopher (2007). On the alleged priority of thought over language. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hartnack, Justus (1972). On thinking. Mind 81 (October):543-552.   (Google | More links)
Johnson, W. E. (1918). Analysis of thinking (I). Mind 27 (105):1-21.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
K, (1995). Some varieties of thinking: Reflections on meinong and Fodor. Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:365-395.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lacey, A. R. (1963). Thoughts and the Sui Generis. Mind 72 (January):129-132.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Long, Douglas C. (1961). Second thoughts: A reply to mr Ginnane's thoughts. Mind 70 (July):405-411.   (Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1979). Ryle's three accounts of thinking. International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (December):443-450.   (Google)
Monsarrat, Keith W. (1955). On Human Thinking. London,: Methuen.   (Google)
Moravcsik, Julius (1983). Can there be a science of thought? Conceptus 17:239-262.   (Google)
Mouton, David L. (1969). The concept of thinking. Noûs 3 (November):355-372.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Reeves, Joan W. (1965). Thinking About Thinking. New York: Braziller.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Russell, John M. (1980). How to think about thinking. Journal of Mind and Behavior 1:45-62.   (Google)
Stokes, Dustin (2007). Incubated cognition and creativity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):83-100.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many traditional theories of creativity put heavy emphasis on an incubation stage in creative cognitive processes. The basic phenomenon is a familiar one: we are working on a task or problem, we leave it aside for some period of time, and when we return attention to the task we have some new insight that services completion of the task. This feature, combined with other ostensibly mysterious features of creativity, has discouraged naturalists from theorizing creativity. This avoidance is misguided: we can maintain unconscious incubated cognition as (sometimes) part of the creative process and we can explain it in scientifically responsible ways. This paper, focusing on the effects of attention on the functional networking of the brain, attempts just such an explanation. It also serves to assuage the naturalist's scepticism about other features of creative cognition. The broad upshot, one would hope, is that philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists return some attention to the long neglected topic of creativity
Swinburne, Richard (1985). Thought. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):153-172.   (Google)
Taylor, Daniel M. (1956). Thinking. Mind 65 (April):246-251.   (Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (online). Review of Derek Melser, The Act of Thinking. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is a book that challenges the current orthodoxy, both in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences, that thinking (construed broadly to include perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc.) is a mental process in the head. Such a view has been largely taken for granted since the demise of behaviorism in the 1960s, and it underpins both the representational and computational theories of mind, including their connectionist and dynamicist variants. While the orthodoxy has been rejected in recent years by a motley collection of e-theorists—externalists, embodiers, embedders, and extended minders—Melser’s view is quite distinct from such views. For Melser, rather than thinking being a process that begins in the head but extends beyond it (as most e-theorists hold), it is a personal-level activity, something that a person does through her actions. Since Melser views such activities as being disjoint from natural processes, thinking is not a natural process at all, the sort of thing that we might study scientifically. Thus, thinking is a personal action that calls for a different kind of study, one that draws on empathy, interpretation, and hermeneutics. That is the view defended at the core of the book (chh.1-7), and if it makes it sound like a very old-fashioned book, that’s because it is. Melser’s antecedents are philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austin, and Stuart Hampshire, both in style and in content. Apart from Melser’s heavy reliance on selective parts of developmental psychology, there is minimal discussion of substantive work in contemporary cognitive science. That is what might be expected from an author whose view is that whatever it is cognitive scientists are doing, it is not (much to their surprise, no doubt) the investigation of thinking. As I will try to show in a moment, however, the central argument of the book could have been strengthened by more direct engagement with such empirical work
Zangwill, Nick (1998). Direction of fit and normative functionalism. Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the difference between belief and desire? In order to explain the difference, recent philosophers have appealed to the metaphor of