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5.2. Self-Knowledge (Self-Knowledge on PhilPapers)

See also:
Śańkarācārya, (1947). Self-Knowledge. Madras, Sri Ramakrishna Math.   (Google)
Śaṅkarācārya, (1946). Self-Knowledge (Ātmabodha): An English Translation of Śankarāchārya's Ātmabodha with Notes, Comments, and Introduction. Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center.   (Google)
Bernecker, Sven (2009). Self-knowledge and the Bounds of authenticity. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p ’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p , is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p . Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity
Bohman, James (2009). Pluralism, pragmatism and self-knowledge. Human Studies 32 (3):375-381.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving. Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.   (Google)
Abstract: There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or justification leads subjects to report attitudes that are not consistent with their previous attitudes or with their future behavior. On the basis of these findings, Tim Wilson (2002) argues that analyzing reasons compromises self knowledge. I shall defend a realistic account of the effects of reason giving which is compatible with the empirical findings on introspection and also with the claim that deliberation and justification have epistemic benefits.
Brickhouse, Thomas C. (1992). Self-knowledge in Plato's phaedrus. Ancient Philosophy 12 (1):187-189.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony (2007). Scepticism about self-knowledge redux. Analysis 67 (296):311–315.   (Google | More links)
Buckley, Joseph A. & Hall, Lisa L. (1999). Self-knowledge and embodiment. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):185-196.   (Google)
Caston, Victor (2006). Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge". Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
Coliva, Annalisa (2008). Peacocke's self-knowledge. Ratio 21 (1):13–27.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
De George, Richard T. (unknown). Psychoanalysis, metaphysics and self-knowledge. :197-204.   (Google)
Fernández, Jordi (2005). Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore's paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.   (Google)
Abstract: I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis
Frank, Manfred (2002). Self-consciousness and self-knowledge: On some difficulties with the reduction of subjectivity. Constellations 9 (3):390-408.   (Google | More links)
Frank, Manfred (2000). Self-awareness and self-knowledge: Mental familiarity and epistemic self-ascription. In Willem van Reijen & Willem G. Weststeijn (eds.), Subjectivity. Rodopi.   (Google)
Gilbert, Margaret (1971). Vices and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (15):443-453.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:      Towards an account of character traits in self-Knowledge, With an assessment of the sartrean thesis ("spectatorism") that character trait concepts are fitted for other-Ascription rather than self-Ascription. The logic of ascriptions of evil character and specific vices is dealt with. The relationship of self-Ascription to self-Falsification and "seeing oneself as an object" is examined. Self-Ascription has peculiarities, But at most a very mild form of spectatorism is born out
Green, Garth (2010). The Aporia of Inner Sense: The Self-Knowledge of Reason and the Critique of Metaphysics in Kant. Brill.   (Google)
Hanna, Robert & Chadha, Monima (forthcoming). Non-conceptualism and the problem of perceptual self-knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: In this paper we (i) identify the notion of 'essentially non-conceptual content' by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a 'minimalist' solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism
Harper, Ralph (1946). Concerning self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (4):623-627.   (Google | More links)
Hardwig, John, Privacy, self knowledge, and the commune:Toward an epistemology of the family.   (Google)
Abstract: Advocates of communal living often urge that life in a commune provides the framework for a deeper knowledge of other people. I believe this is clearly true and because it is true, communal living is also instrumental in promoting self knowledge. The dialogue that is part of the life of a commune enables one to incorporate the insights of the other members into his understanding of himself and his world
Harcourt, Edward (2008). Wittgenstein and bodily self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):299-333.   (Google)
Hibbs, Thomas (2009). Self-knowledge, and the virtues of practical reasoning. In Lawrence Cunningham (ed.), Intractable Disputes About the Natural Law: Alasdair Macintyre and Critics. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (1993). Intention detecting. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):298-318.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Crispin Wright has argued that our concept of intention is extension-determining, and that this explains why we are so good at knowing our intentions: it does so by subverting the idea that we detect them. This paper has two aims. The first is to make sense of Wright's claim that intention is extension-determining; this is achieved by comparing his position to that of analytic functionalism. The second is to show that it doesn't follow from this that we do not detect our intentions. Wright has conflated two questions. Firstly, do we detect our intentions? Secondly do we detect the concept of intention itself? The extension-determining account returns a negative answer only to the second.
Holton, Richard (1991). Intentions, response-dependence, and immunity from error. In P. Menzies (ed.), Response Dependent Concepts. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 1.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: You are, I suspect, exceedingly good at knowing what you intend to do. In saying this I pay you no special compliment. Knowing what one intends is the normal state to be in. And this cries out for some explanation. How is it that we are so authoritative about our own intentions? There are two different approaches that one can take in answering this question. The first credits us with special perceptual powers which we use when we examine our own minds. On this view we detect our own mental states in much the same way that we detect the state of the world around us; but the powers we direct inward are much less prone t o error than those we direct outwards. The alternative approach denies that there is such a thing as inward perception. On this view the whole idea the we detect our own mental states using some kind of internal perceptual apparatus is misguided; a wholly different account is needed
Hossack, Keith (2002). Self-knowledge and consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kane, William (unknown). Self-knowledge: True and false. :187-197.   (Google)
Kemmerling, Andreas, Glamorous self knowledge – what's it good for?   (Google)
Abstract: We have self-knowledge of various sorts: knowledge of things we have done or suffered, for example, and some knowledge of who we are: of our character-traits, our temper, our inclinations, weaknesses, feelings, addictions, worries, lusts and so on. Most of this knowledge is human knowledge of the regular kind, nothing exciting about it, epistemologically speaking
Kihlstrom, John F. & Klein, S. B. (1997). Self-knowledge and self-awareness. In James G. Snodgrass & R. Thompson (eds.), The Self Across Psychology: Self-Recognition, Self-Awareness, and the Self Concept. New York Academy of Sciences.   (Google)
King-Farlow, John (1978). Self-Knowledge and Social Relations: Groundwork of Universal Community. Science History Publications.   (Google)
Mackenzie, Catriona (2002). Critical reflection, self-knowledge, and the emotions. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):186-206.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Drawing on recent cognitive theories of the emotions, this article develops an account of critical reflection as requiring emotional flexibility and involving the ability to envisage alternative reasons for action. The focus on the role of emotions in critical reflection, and in agents' resistance to reflection, suggests the need to move beyond an introspective to a more social and relational conception of the process of reflection. It also casts new light on the intractable problem of explaining how oppressive socialisation impairs the capacity for autonomy
Macdonald, Cynthia (2008). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and authoritative self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):319-346.   (Google)
Abstract: Many recent discussions of self-consciousness and self-knowledge assume that there are only two kinds of accounts available to be taken on the relation between the so-called first-order (conscious) states and subjects' awareness or knowledge of them: a same-order, or reflexive view, on the one hand, or a higher-order one, on the other. I maintain that there is a third kind of view that is distinctively different from these two options. The view is important because it can accommodate and make intelligible certain cases of authoritative self-knowledge that cannot easily be made intelligible, if at all, by these other two types of accounts. My aim in this paper is to defend this view against those who maintain that a same-order view is sufficient to account for authoritative self-knowledge
Macarthur, David (ms). Skepticism, self-knowledge and responsibility.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Modern skepticism can be usefully divided into two camps: the Cartesian and the Humean.1 Cartesian skepticism is a matter of a theoretical doubt that has little or no practical import in our everyday lives. Its employment concerns whether or not we can achieve a special kind of certain knowledge – something Descartes calls “scientia” 2—that is far removed from our everyday aims or standards of epistemic appraisal. Alternatively, Humean skepticism engages the ancient skeptical concern with whether we have good reason, or any reason at all, for our beliefs, including the common or garden beliefs that are presupposed in our ordinary practical affairs. On this traditional conception, philosophical doubt is a projection of everyday doubt and the lessons of the study are potentially lessons for the street. In this paper I shall focus on the Humean strain of skepticism whose focus concerns whether we have adequate reasons for our beliefs. Henceforth when I speak of skepticism it is this variety of skepticism that I am primarily referring to.3 I want to relate skepticism, so understood, to two kinds of self-knowledge. I shall argue that the failure of past solutions and dissolutions of skepticism to provide a satisfying response to the skeptic can be accounted for in terms of two stances that we can take towards our own..
Manley, David (2007). Safety, content, apriority, self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute ‘strong privileged access’, and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge
Morin, Alain & Everett, Jennifer (1990). Inner speech as a mediator of self-awareness, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge: An hypothesis. New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Neta, Ram (2003). Skepticism, contextualism, and semantic self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):396–411.   (Google | More links)
Novak, Michael (1965). Belief and Unbelief: A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge: With a New Preface. University Press of America.   (Google)
O'Brien, Gerard (1987). Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
O’Brien, Lucy (2005). Self-knowledge, agency and force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580-601.   (Google)
Peacocke, Christopher (ms). Mental action and self-awareness (II): Epistemology.   (Google)
Abstract: We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
Perry, John (ms). Myself and I.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay I distinguish three kinds of self-knowledge. I call these three kinds agent-relative knowledge, self-attached knowledge and knowledge of the person one happens to be. These aspects of self-knowledge differ in how the knower or agent is represented. Most of what I say will be applicable to beliefs as well as knowledge, and to other kinds of attitudes and thoughts, such as desire, as well
Pippin, Robert B., What is a western? Politics and self- knowledge in John Ford's the searchers.   (Google)
Abstract: It is generally agreed that while, from the silent film The Great Train Rob- bery (1903) until the present, well over seven thousand Westerns have been made it was not until three seminal articles in the nineteen fifties by Andre´ Bazin and Robert Warshow that the genre began to be taken seriously. Indeed Bazin argued that the “secret” of the extraordinary persistence of the Western must be due to the fact that the Western embodies “the essence of cinema,” and he suggested that that essence was its incorporation of myth and a mythic consciousness of the world.1 He appeared to mean by this that Westerns..
Ren, Huiming (2009). Entitlement to self-knowledge and brute error. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):543 – 562.   (Google)
Abstract: I discuss Burge's argument that our entitlement to self-knowledge consists in the constitutive relation between the second-order review of thoughts and the thoughts reviewed, and defend it against Peacocke's criticism. I then argue that though our entitlement to self-knowledge is neutral to different environments, as Burge claims, the consideration of Burge's own notion of brute error shows that Burge's effort to reconcile externalism and self-knowledge is not successful
Rocknak, Stefanie (2008). Pam and Jim on the make : The epistemology of self-deception (us). In Jeremy Wisnewski (ed.), The Office and Philosophy: Scenes From the Unexamined Life. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Sanborn, Patricia (1967). Objectification and self-knowledge: A critical examination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (1):39-47.   (Google | More links)
Schneider, Johann F.; Pospeschill, Markus & Ranger, Jochen (2005). Does self-consciousness mediate the relation between self-talk and self-knowledge? Psychological Reports 96 (2):387-396.   (Google)
Schneider, Johann F. (2002). Relations among self-talk, self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Psychological Reports 91 (3):807-812.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Schick, Frederic (2000). Surprise, self-knowledge, and commonality. Journal of Philosophy 97 (8):440-453.   (Google | More links)
Schick, Frederic (1979). Self-knowledge, uncertainty, and choice. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):235-252.   (Google | More links)
Scott-Kakures, Dion (2002). At "permanent risk": Reasoning and self-knowledge in self-deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3).   (Google | More links)
Smythe, Thomas W. (2001). Self-knowledge and the self. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):287-294.   (Google)
Stich, Stephen & Nichols, Shaun (2004). Reading one's own mind: Self-awareness and developmental psychology. In R. Stanton, M. Ezcurdia & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30. University of Calgary Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises from the growing body of work on “mindreading”, the process of attributing mental states to people (and other organisms). During the last 15 years, the processes underlying mindreading have been a major focus of attention in cognitive and developmental psychology. Most of this work has been concerned with the processes underlying the attribution of mental states to other people. However, a number of psychologists and philosophers have also proposed accounts of the mechanisms underlying the attribution of mental states to oneself. This process of reading one’s own mind or becoming self-aware will be our primary concern in this paper
Stovall, Preston (2007). Hegel's realism: The implicit metaphysics of self-knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):81-117.   (Google)
Unknown, Unknown (online). The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge.   (Google)
Verene, Donald Phillip (1998). Book review: Philosophy and the return to self-knowledge. Philosophy and Literature 22 (1).   (Google)
Walker, Jeremy (1969). Embodiment and self-knowledge. Dialogue 8 (June):44-67.   (Google)
Weisberg, Jonathan (2007). Conditionalization, reflection, and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 135 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. I argue that neither principle entails the other, and thus neither can be used to motivate the other in the way van Fraassen says. There are ways to connect Conditionalization to Reflection, but these connections depend on poor assumptions about our introspective access, and are not tight enough to draw the sorts of conclusions van Fraassen wants. Upon close examination, the two principles seem to be getting at two quite independent epistemic norms
Wilkerson, William/fnms> (2000). Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, error; and the place of consciousness. Continental Philosophy Review 33 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: "Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, error and the place of consciousness" examines texts and problems from the phenomenological tradition to show that the other does not present her/himself as a consciousness enclosed in a merely material body. I discuss Merleau-Ponty''s attempt to supplant this view with the view that the other is always seen as an "incarnate consciousness" - a unity of mind and body in activity. This view faces a difficulty in that it seems to collapse the distinction between one''s own understanding of one''s behavior and the understanding which another might have of this same behavior. In response to this objection, I study how the meaning of people''s behaviors are settled in dialogue. I argue that the meanings that an actor gives to her or his behavior cannot rest entirely with that person, nor are they determined solely by the interpreter, but instead develop in the interaction between the actor and the interpreter

5.2a Observational Accounts

Arnold, Denis G. (1997). Introspection and its objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Self-knowledge via inner observation of external objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts
Charlton, William (1986). Knowing what we think. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):196-211.   (Google | More links)
Finkelstein, David H. (1999). On self-blindness and inner sense. Philosophical Topics 26:105-19.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (2009). Introspection. In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method of knowing one’s own mental states, and not just self-directed attention. But the more restrictive use is standard, and provides the topic of the current entry.) As we will see, some contemporary philosophers and psychologists doubt that any such introspective process underlies self-knowledge
Gotterbarn, Donald (1974). A note on Locke's theory of self-knowledge. Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (2).   (Google)
Kind, Amy (2003). Shoemaker, self-blindness and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is thirdperson evidence available to the selfblind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises
Larkin, William S. (ms). A broad perceptual model of privileged introspective judgments.   (Google)
Lormand, Eric (ms). Inner sense until proven guilty.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is the key to explaining the most puzzling kind of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness—there being "something it is like" to have certain mental states. My aim in this paper is to defend this view against accusations— twenty-two in all!—rather than to argue positively for the view. However, I begin by indicating some of the motivation for the account I defend
Lormand, Eric (2000). Shoemaker and "inner sense". Philosophical Topics.   (Google)
MacDonald, Cynthia (1998). Self-knowledge and the "inner eye". Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that contentful properties in such cases have two features in common with observational properties of objects. In section three, I develop a quasi-observational account of self-knowledge for the cogito-like cases by considering various accounts of the nature of observational properties (specifically, secondary qualities) and by applying them to these cases. I conclude by addressing some important objections to the account
MacDonald, Cynthia (1999). Shoemaker on self-knowledge and inner sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):711-38.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Myers, Gerald E. (1986). Introspection and self-knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (April):199-207.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Newton, Natika (1988). Introspection and perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays the role of external reality in discourse about physical objects. Discourse about any sort of entity or property can be viewed as involving a domain or frame of reference which constrains what can be said about the entities; this view is related to Johnson-Laird''s theory of mental models. On my approach evidence, including sensory evidence, may be involved in decisions about one''s mental states. I conclude that while Shoemaker may well be right about different roles for sense impressions in introspection and perception, the exact differences and their significance remain to be established
Reynolds, Steven L. (1992). Self-recognition. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):182-190.   (Google | More links)
Rosenberg, Jay F. (2000). Perception vs. inner sense: A problem about direct awareness. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):143-160.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience -- self knowledge and inner sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Self-knowledge and "inner sense". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:249-314.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture I: The object perception model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.   (Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.   (Google | More links)
Thomasson, Amie L. (2006). Self-awareness and self-knowledge. Psyche 12 (2).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Higher-order theories and neo-Brentanian theories of consciousness both consider conscious states to be states of which we have some sort of
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2008). Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.

5.2b Commitment/Expression-Based Accounts

Allen, Robert F. (online). The subject is qualia: Paronyms and temporary identity.   (Google)
Bar-On, Dorit & Long, Douglas C. (2001). Avowals and first-person privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):311-35.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
Bar-On, Dorit & Long, Douglas C. (2003). Expressing truths and knowing truths. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Google)
Bar-On, Dorit (2009). First-person authority: Dualism, constitutivism, and neo-expressivism. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for being dissatisfied with materialist introspectionism as a way out of the dilemma. In section 3, “Constitutivism”, I outline two constitutivist alternatives to materialist introspectionism. In section 4, “A Neo-Expressivist View”, I offer my neo-expressivist view (defended in Bar-On, Speaking my mind: Expression and self-knowledge. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004 ), according to which the distinctive status of mental self-ascriptions is to be explained by appeal to the expressive character of acts of issuing them (in speech or in thought). This view, I argue, allows us to stay clear of eliminativism without committing to Cartesian substance dualism, thereby offering a viable way of slipping between the horns of Rorty’s dilemma
Bar-On, Dorit (ms). Neo-expressivism: Avowals' security and privileged self-knowledge (reply to brueckner) UNC-Chapel hill.   (Google)
Abstract: Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: my present states of mind. I normally know these states directly, immediately, non-inferentially – I know them the way no one else can know them, and in a way I know nothing else. It’s the job of philosophers to tell us scope and source of this selfknowledge and to explain what renders it privileged
Bar-On, Dorit (2010). Précis of Dorit Bar-on's speaking my mind: Expression and self-knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (1).   (Google)
Bar-On, Dorit (2000). Speaking my mind. Philsophical Topics 28:1-34.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Bar-On, Dorit (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states? Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which an avowal is an act through which a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds
Boyle, Matthew (2010). Bar-on on self-knowledge and expression. Acta Analytica 25 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’ solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our own present mental states, but how we can reasonably regard ourselves as entitled to claim self-knowledge. Addressing this aspect of the problem of self-knowledge requires confronting questions about the metaphysical nature of mental states, questions that Bar-On’s approach seeks to avoid
Boyle, Matthew (2009). Two kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is in an important sense fundamental, since it is intimately connected with the very capacity for rational reflection, and since it must be present in any creature that understands the first-person pronoun. Moreover, I suggest that these thoughts about self-knowledge have a Kantian provenance
Byrne, Alex, Review essay of Dorit Bar-on's speaking my mind.   (Google)
Abstract: “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her self-ascription or to reject it on the basis of our contrary judgement. Furthermore, unlike ordinary empirical reports, and somewhat like apriori statements, avowals are issued with a very high degree of confidence and are not easily subjected to doubt. (3) The project of this ambitious, original, and challenging book is to explain why avowals have this distinctive security. Bar-On’s guiding idea is that avowals “can be seen as pieces of expressive behavior, similar in certain ways to bits of behavior that naturally express subjects’ states” (227). Crying and moaning are natural expressions of pain, yawning is a natural expression of tiredness, reaching for beer is a natural expression of the desire for beer, and so on. In some important sense, avowals are supposed to be like that. In what sense, though? It will be useful to begin with the simplest answer
Child, William (2006). Memory, expression, and past-tense self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):54–76.   (Google | More links)
Child, William (2006). Wittgenstein's externalism: Context, self-knowledge & the past. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Chrisman, Matthew (2009). Expressivism, truth, and (self-) knowledge. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (3):1-26.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I consider the prospects of two different kinds of expressivism – ethical expressivism and avowal expressivism – in light of two common objections. The first objection stems from the fact that it is natural to think of ethical statements and avowals as at least potential manifestations of knowledge. The second objection stems from the fact that it is natural to treat ethical statements and avowals as truth-evaluable. I argue that, although a recent avowal expressivist attempt (Bar-On 2004) to meet the second objection may succeed, the related response to the first objection threatens to undermine the principal advantages of that view. Then, I argue that although recent ethical expressivist attempts (especially Blackburn 1998 and Gibbard 2003) to meet the first objection are successful, the related response to the second objection threatens to undermine the principal advantages of that view. This suggests a cross-pollination of defensive strategies, which I go on to explore in order to articulate the theoretical commitments one must take on to make either cross-pollinated position work in the face of both objections. In light of this, I suggest that the prospects for the resulting ethical expressivist position are considerably better than the prospects for the resulting avowal expressivist position, though both positions involve significant theoretical costs
Corbí, Josep E. (forthcoming). First-person authority and self-knowledge as an achievement. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract : There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first-person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition. I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes between the deliberative and the theoretical attitudes is ultimately inconsistent with a satisfactory account of psychoanalytic practice; mainly because, despite Moran's claims to the contrary, such a distinction is still inspired by a Cartesian picture of the self. I argue that, in the light of his distinction, Moran may emphasize that an agent's psychological dispositions should be permeable to her decisions and projects, but is forced to reject the idea that permeability could go the other way too. I explore Bernard Williams' notion of acknowledgment and Simone Weil's distinction between two notions of necessity, in order to articulate a notion of receptive passivity which may help us to characterize this second direction of permeability. I finally outline why receptive passivity (and, thereby, the double direction of permeability) is crucial in order to identify the goal of psychoanalytic treatment and, derivatively, to understand how a certain kind of awareness may have a significant therapeutic effect
Eldridge, Richard (2003). Authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge. Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):360–368.   (Google | More links)
Falvey, Kevin (2000). The basis of first-person authority. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
Finkelstein, David H. (2003). Expression and the Inner. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gardner, Sebastian (2004). Critical notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Review 113 (2):249-267.   (Google | More links)
Gertler, Brie (2008). Do we look outward to determine what we believe? In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to dispositional beliefs, which are arguably more central examples of belief than occurrent judgments. First, one’s dispositional beliefs as to whether p may diverge from the occurrent judgments generated by the method of transparency. Second, even in cases where these are reliably linked — e.g., in which one’s judgment that p derives from one’s dispositional belief that p — using the judgment to self-attribute the dispositional belief requires an ‘inward’ gaze
Hofmann, Frank (2005). Immediate self-knowledge and avowal. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):193-213.   (Google | More links)
Jacobsen, Rockney (1996). Wittgenstein on self-knowledge and self-expression. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):12-30.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Lear, Jonathan (2004). Avowal and unfreedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448-454.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Moran, Richard A. (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 66 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or...
Moran, Richard (2004). Précis of authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):423–426.   (Google | More links)
Moran, Richard A. (2003). Responses to O'Brien and Shoemaker. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):402-19.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Moran, Richard A. (1997). Self-knowledge: Discovery, resolution, and undoing. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-61.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
O'Brien, Lucy F. (2003). Moran on agency and self-knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):391-401.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
O'Brien, Lucy F. (2005). Self-knowledge, agency, and force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580–601.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to articulate further what may be called an agency theory of self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self- knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two notions.2 However, it has not always been clear what _epistemic_ advantage agency gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate account of how a subject knows her own mental states and acts, that it construe the known mental states and acts realistically and as independent of their self-ascription, and that it deliver genuine epistemic standing to the knower. The main task of the paper will, then, be to explore how our having rational agency with respect to our mental states may be able to secure genuine epistemic warrant for our self-ascriptions of states or acts independent of the ascriptions. This task will be carried out by focussing on the question of what account we should give of our knowledge of what I call our acts of judging. In the remainder of this section, I will do a little to clarify what is meant by that question. Section 2 will attempt to introduce us to elements of the best way to approach the question by considering some alternative strategies. Section 3 is devoted to forming some idea of what _kind_ of warrant we are looking for when considering how agency might give us self-knowledge. Section 4 aims to present a suggestion as to how agency gives us the kind of warrant identified over our acts of judging. Section 5 deals with some objections
Owens, David (ms). Deliberation and the first person.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief
Owens, David J. (2003). Knowing your own mind. Dialogue 42 (4):791-798.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. What exercises philosophers is the fact that people seem to produce these descriptions of their own mental lives without any pretence of considering evidence or reasons of any kind and yet these descriptions are treated by the rest of us as authoritative, at least in a wide range of cases. How can this be?
von Savigny, Eike (2006). Taking avowals seriously: The soul a public affair. In Alois Pichler & Simo Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works. Ontos.   (Google)
Schlosser, Markus E. (2008). Review of "Self-knowledge and resentment", by Akeel Bilgrami. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):185–187.   (Google | More links)
Setiya, Kieran (forthcoming). Knowledge of intention. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Anscombe's 'Intention'. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of "transparency" more familiar in connection with belief.
Shoemaker, Sydney (2003). Moran on self-knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):391-401.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Tanesini, Alessandra (2008). Self-knowledge and resentment. Philosophical Books 49 (3):238-245.   (Google)
Thomas, Alan (online). Moran on self-knowledge and practical agency.   (Google)
Abstract: Richard Moran’s Authority and Estrangement develops a compelling explanation of the characteristic features of self-knowledge that involve the use of ‘I’ as subject. Such knowledge is immediate in the sense of non-inferential, is not evidentially grounded and is epistemically authoritative.1 A&E develops its distinctive explanation while also offering accounts of other features of self-knowledge that are often overlooked, such as the centrality of self-knowledge characterised in this way to the concept of the person and its ethical importance. Moran recognises that were an agent to lack the capacity authoritatively to avow his or her own state of mind this would be an ethically damaging defect. Moran’s treatment of these issues is subtle and in places profoundly insightful. I will argue, however, that there is a loose fit between two separate explanations that he gives of self-knowledge. On the one hand Moran argues that the best explanation of self-
Tomberlin, James E. (1968). The expression theory of avowals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (September):91-96.   (Google | More links)
Walsh, W. H. (1982). Self-knowledge. In Ralph Charles Sutherland Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Way, Jonathan (2007). Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency. Analysis 67 (295):223–230.   (Google | More links)
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2008). Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.

5.2c Constitutive Accounts

Albritton, Rogers (1995). Comments on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bar-On, Dorit (ms). Externalism and skepticism: Recognition, expression, and self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I’m only under some kind of illusion about what's in front of me. Analogously, according to content skepticism, I cannot know that I am thinking that there is water in my glass, even if in fact that is what I am thinking. This is because for all I know, my way of telling what I am thinking does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I am only under some kind of illusion about what I am thinking
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Bilgrami, Akeel (2000). Self-knowledge and resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bruecker, A. (1998). Shoemaker on second-order belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):361-64.   (Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33:79--104.   (Google)
Coliva, Annalisa (2009). Self-knowledge and commitments. Synthese 171 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states
Coliva, Annalisa (ms). Self-knowledge (but not: "Know thyself").   (Google)
Edwards, Jim (1992). Best opinion and intentional states. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):21-33.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Fernandez, Jordi (2005). Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore's paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis
Greene, R. (2003). Constitutive theories of self-knowledge and the regress problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.   (Google | More links)
Katsafanas, P. (2007). Constitutivism and self-knowledge. APA Proceedings and Addresses 80 (3).   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Moran, Richard A. (1988). Making up your mind: Self-interpretation and self-constitution. Ratio 1 (2):135-51.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (2001). First-person reference, representational independence, and self-knowledge. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Peacocke, Christopher (1996). Our entitlement to self-knowledge: Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117-58.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1990). First-person access. Philosophical Perspectives 4:187-214.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1995). Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.   (Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (2003). Self-knowledge and rationality: Shoemaker on self-blindness. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Spitzley, Thomas (2009). Self-knowledge and rationality. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and (2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality is, indeed, a necessary condition for self-knowledge. In addition, I distinguish two aspects of rationality which I call basic and local rationality. After that I concentrate on the second question for the remaining larger part of this article. Here I proceed in two stages: first I examine whether self-knowledge is necessary for basic rationality, and then whether it is necessary for local rationality
Stoneham, Tom (2003). Conditionals and biconditionals in constitutive theories of self-knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):149-55.   (Google)
Stueber, Karsten R. (2002). The problem of self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-96.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being mistaken about ones mental states. Rather, self-knowledgehas to be seen as only a general constraint or as the default assumption of interpreting somebodyas a rational and intentional agent. This is compatible with the diagnosis of a localized lack of self-transparency
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2006). Basic self-knowledge: Answering Peacocke's criticisms of constitutivism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke’s own account of self-knowledge
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2008). Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.

5.2d First-Person Authority and Privileged Access

Alston, William P. (1971). Varieties of priveleged access. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Alston, William P. (1983). What's wrong with immediate knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative immediate knowledge. It is concluded that their arguments are lacking in cogency
Audi, Robert N. (1975). The epistemic authority of the first person. Personalist 56:5-15.   (Google)
Bar-On, Dorit (ms). Neo-expressivism: Avowals' security and privileged self-knowledge (reply to brueckner) UNC-Chapel hill.   (Google)
Abstract: Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: my present states of mind. I normally know these states directly, immediately, non-inferentially – I know them the way no one else can know them, and in a way I know nothing else. It’s the job of philosophers to tell us scope and source of this selfknowledge and to explain what renders it privileged
Bar-On, Dorit (2010). Précis of Dorit Bar-on's speaking my mind: Expression and self-knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (1).   (Google)
Boyle, Matthew (2009). Two kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is in an important sense fundamental, since it is intimately connected with the very capacity for rational reflection, and since it must be present in any creature that understands the first-person pronoun. Moreover, I suggest that these thoughts about self-knowledge have a Kantian provenance
Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1966). `He': A study in the logic of self-consciousness. Ratio 7:130--57.   (Google)
Cassam, Quassim (2004). Introspection, perception, and epistemic privilege. The Monist 87 (2):255-274.   (Google)
Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1967). On the logic of self-knowledge. Noûs 1 (1):9-21.   (Google | More links)
Cassam, Quassim (2009). The basis of self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless. I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient to account for its epistemological distinctiveness
Chan, Timothy (2010). Moore's paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox. Synthese 173 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly, while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations, I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry highlighted by Moore’s Paradox
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Clark, Romane L. (1988). Self knowledge and self consciousness: Thoughts about oneself. Topoi 7 (March):47-55.   (Google | More links)
Coseru, Christian (2009). Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach. Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of sva- samvitti (“self-awareness,” “self-cognition”) following similar attempts in the domains of phe- nomenology and analytic epistemology. I examine the extent to which recent work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and inten- tionality could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. I am also concerned with naturalism more generally, and the ways in which spe- cific models such as that of embodied cognition, can benefit from some of the valuable insights of Buddhist epistemology.
Davidson, Donald (1984). First person authority. Dialectica 38:101-112.   (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1993). Reply to Eva Picardi's first-person authority and radical interpretation. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers (Foundations of Communication). Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Dretske, Fred (2006). Representation, teleosemantics, and the problem of self-knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Eilan, Naomi M. & Roessler, Johannes (2003). Agency and self-awareness: Mechanisms and epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Falvey, Kevin (2000). The basis of first-person authority. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
Farkas, Katalin (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception
Fernandez, Jordi (2003). Privileged access naturalized. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism
Fernandez, Jordi (2005). Privileged access revisited. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102-105.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose that you form a certain belief on the basis of perception. You believe, say, that your car is black. How can you be entitled to the belief that you believe that your car is black? I have proposed that the perceptual state that normally grounds your belief about your car also grounds your belief about your own perceptual belief. More generally, my suggestion was that, for any proposition p, if a subject believes that p on the basis of her own apparent perceptions or memories, or on the basis of inference or testimony, then she is entitled to believe that she believes that p if she forms that meta-belief on the basis of the state that lead her to believe that p.1 It will be convenient to coin an expression that abbreviates that someone has formed a meta- belief thus. Let us baptize this procedure of meta-belief formation as ‘extrospection’
Gallois, André (1996). The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this original and challenging study, Andre; Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2004). Review of Maria Frapolli (ed.), Esther Romero (ed.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (1).   (Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1991). Self-knowledge: Looking in the wrong direction. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):35-47.   (Google)
Hacker, P. M. S. (1997). Davidson on first-person authority. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):285-304.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hamilton, Andy (2000). The authority of avowals and the concept of belief. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):20-39.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hartnack, Justus (1952). The alleged privacy of experience. Journal of Philosophy 49 (June):405-410.   (Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (2001). On first-person authority. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.   (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob (2002). Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):235-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Holly, W. J. (1986). On Donald Davidson's first person authority. Dialectica 40:153-156.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
Landesman, Charles (1964). Mental events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (March):307-317.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Lawlor, Krista (2003). Elusive reasons: A problem for first-person authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, but one's self- ascriptions may lack authority. I present this new challenge from social psychology and use it to argue that first-person authority is agential authority: one's self-ascriptions are authoritative, in part anyway, because they are reliable expressions of those attitudes that govern further choices and behavior
Levison, Arnold B. (1987). Rorty, materialism, and privileged access. Noûs 21 (September):381-393.   (Google | More links)
Lockie, Robert (2003). Depth psychology and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception--in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose--or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception--the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception--not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches
Louch, A. R. (1965). Privileged access. Mind 74 (April):155-173.   (Google | More links)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1994). First-person knowledge and authority. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Language Mind and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Macdonald, Cynthia (2007). Introspection and authoritative self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism
Maitra, Keya (2005). Self-knowledge: Privileged in access or privileged in authority? Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):101-114.   (Google)
Manley, David (2007). Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-23.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge the traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute 'strong privileged access', and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge
Margolis, Joseph (1964). The privacy of sensations. Ratio 6 (December):147-153.   (Google)
McCullagh, Mark (2002). Self-knowledge failures and first person authority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: No account of self-knowledge is satisfactory, I claim, unless it explains how we might truly attribute *failures* to possess self-knowledge. We can make progress towards a satisfactory account, then, by asking, What sorts of self-knowledge could be at issue in true attributions of such failures? It might seem that it can’t be the sort of self-knowledge whose possession conditions Tyler Burge and Donald Davidson have described. I argue that it can be, once we generalize Burge’s and Davidson’s accounts along a certain dimension along which propositional attitude-types can differ. For the sort of self-knowledge required to have attitudes of one type can differ from the sort of self-knowledge required to have attitudes of other types.
McGinn, Colin (2004). Inverted first-person authority. The Monist 87 (2):237-254.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
McHugh, Conor (2010). Self-knowledge and the kk principle. Synthese 173 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions
Mitchell, D. (1953). Privileged utterances. Mind 62 (July):355-366.   (Google | More links)
Mortensen, Chris; O'Brien, Gerard & Paterson, Belinda (1993). Distinctions: Subpersonal and subconscious. Psycoloquy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation. Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion
Neta, Ram, The nature and reach of privileged access.   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers accept a “privileged access” thesis concerning our own present mental states and mental events. According to these philosophers, if I am in mental state (or undergoing mental event) M, then – at least in many cases – I have privileged access to the fact that I am in (or undergoing) M. For instance, if I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap, then (in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap. Similarly, if I now imagine a parade coming down Main Street, then (again, in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that I am now imagining a parade coming down Main Street. And again, if it now visually appears to me as if there is a cloud in the sky, then (again, in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that it now visually appears to me as if there is a cloud in the sky. In each of these aforementioned cases, if circumstances are normal, then, these philosophers say, I have a distinctive kind of privileged epistemic access to facts about my own mental states or events. Of course, I don’t have privileged epistemic access to all facts about my own mental states or events. For instance, I don’t have privileged epistemic access to facts about which unconscious mental states or events I have. But I do have privileged epistemic access to many facts about my own mental states or events, and in particular to the various facts listed above
Newstead, Anne (2006). Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing.   (Google)
Nolan, Lawrence & Whipple, John (2005). Self-knowledge in Descartes and Malebranche. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (1).   (Google)
Odegard, Douglas (1992). Inner states. Personalist Forum 8:265-73.   (Google)
Parent, T. (2007). Infallibilism about self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):411-424.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts
Peacocke, Christopher (1998). Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Picardi, Eva (1993). First-person authority and radical interpretation. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers (Foundations of Communication). Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Raffman, Diana (1999). What autism may tell us about self-awareness: A commentary on Frith and Happe, Theory of Mind and Self Consciousness: What is It Like to Be Autistic?. Mind and Language 14:23-31.   (Google)
Reynolds, Steven L. (1992). Self-recognition. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):182-190.   (Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1995). Self-knowledge and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3).   (Google)
Saunders, John T. (1969). In defense of a limited privacy. Philosophical Review 78 (April):237-248.   (Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2000). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2002). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of visual imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2002). Why did we think we dreamed in Black and white? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (4):649-660.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the 1950s, dream researchers commonly thought that dreams were predominantly a black and white phenomenon, although both earlier and later treatments of dreaming assume or assert that dreams have color. The first half of the twentieth century saw the rise of black and white film media, and it is likely that the emergence of the view that dreams are black and white was connected to this change in film technology. If our opinions about basic features of our dreams can change with changes in technology, it seems to follow that our knowledge of the experience of dreaming is much less secure than we might at first have thought it to be
Setiya, Kieran (forthcoming). Knowledge of intention. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Anscombe's 'Intention'. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of "transparency" more familiar in connection with belief.
Siewert, Charles (2008). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.   (Google)
Sosa, Ernest (2003). Privileged access. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002)
Stalnaker, Robert (2008). Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Starting in the middle -- Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument -- Locating ourselves in the world -- Notes on models of self-locating belief -- Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability -- Acquaintance and essence -- Knowing what one is thinking -- After the fall.
Stevenson, Leslie (1999). First person epistemology. Philosophy 74 (4):475-497.   (Google)
Sussman, Alan N. (1978). Semantic analysis in the philosophy of mind: A reply to Ellis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (May):68-71.   (Google | More links)
Thole, Bernhard (1993). The explanation of first person authority. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers (Foundations of Communication). Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fernandez, Jordi (forthcoming). Desire and self-knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: We often form beliefs about our own mental states. I believe that I have political beliefs of a certain kind. Perhaps you believe that you want to eat fish for lunch. Most of us have believed, at some moment or other, that we were in love. Let us call beliefs of this kind ‘self-ascriptions’ of mental states. Self- ascriptions normally enjoy a special kind of epistemic justification when the self-ascribed mental state is of a certain type, such as a belief or a desire. Our justification for self-ascriptions of those mental stases seems to be, in some way, privileged or authoritative. In the philosophical literature, this idea is often expressed by saying that we have privileged access to our own mental states, or that our self-ascriptions constitute self-knowledge. The goal of this discussion will be to account for that fact. I will concentrate on privileged access to our own desires.[ii]
Walsh, W. H. (1982). Self-knowledge. In Ralph Charles Sutherland Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Way, Jonathan (2007). Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency. Analysis 67 (295):223–230.   (Google | More links)
Williamson, Timothy (1996). Self-knowledge and embedded operators. Analysis 56 (4):202–209.   (Google | More links)
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2008). Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.

5.2e Infallibility and Incorrigibility

Armstrong, David M. (1963). Is introspective knowledge incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (October):417-32.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Armstrong, David M. (1976). Incorrigibility, materialism, and causation. Philosophical Studies 30 (August):125-28.   (Google | More links)
Atwell, John E. (1966). Austin on incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (December):261-266.   (Google | More links)
Audi, Robert N. (1974). The limits of self-knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (December):253-267.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bailey, George (1979). Pappas, incorrigibility, and science. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):319-321.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Beck, Lewis White (1948). Self-justification in epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 45 (10):253-260.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (1958). Minkus-Benes on incorrigibility. Mind 67 (April):264-266.   (Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (ms). Cartesian epistemology.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, encouraging them to do so
Chandler, J. H. (1970). Incorrigibity and classification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):101-6.   (Google)
Costa, Claudio F. (2001). I'm thinking. Ratio 14 (3):222-233.   (Google | More links)
Dauer, Francis W. (1981). Incorrigibility. Ratio 23 (December):98-113.   (Google)
Doppelt, Gerald (1978). Incorrigibility and the mental. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (May):3-20.   (Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (1977). Lehrer and Ellis on incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (December):201-5.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, Brian (1976). Avowals are more corrigible than you think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (August):201-5.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Evans, J. L. (1978). Knowledge And Infallibility. St Martin's Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Exdell, John & Hamilton, James (1975). The incorrigibility of first person disavowals. Personalist 56:389-394.   (Google)
Feldman, Fred & Heidelberger, Herbert (1973). Tormey on access and incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 70 (May):297-298.   (Google | More links)
Fleming, Brice N. (1965). Price on infallibility. Mind 75 (April):193-210.   (Google | More links)
Gotlind, Erik (1952). Some comments on mistakes in statements concerning sense-data. Mind 61 (July):297-306.   (Google | More links)
Hales, Steven D. (1994). Certainty and phenomenal states. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):57-72.   (Google)
Hansson, Bengt (2006). Infallibility and incorrigibility. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Harrison, Jonathan (1984). The incorrigibility of the cogito. Mind 93 (July):321-335.   (Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (1967). A note on incorrigibility and authority. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (December):358-363.   (Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (1973). Is there a good argument against the incorrigibility thesis? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):51-62.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Jacobsen, Rockney (1997). Self-quotation and self-knowledge. Synthese 110 (3):419-445.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I argue that indirect quotation in the first person simple present tense (self-quotation) provides a class of infallible assertions. The defense of this conclusion examines the joint descriptive and constitutive functions of performative utterances and argues that a parallel treatment of belief ascription is in order. The parallel account yields a class of infallible belief ascriptions that makes no appeal to privileged modes of access. Confronting a dilemma formulated by Crispin Wright for theories of self-knowledge gives an epistemological setting for the account of infallible belief ascription
Johnson, Sidney D. (1970). Statements and incorrigibility. Mind 79 (October):600-601.   (Google | More links)
Kaufman, Frederik (1990). Conceptual necessity, causality and self-ascriptions of sensation. International Studies in Philosophy 22:3-11.   (Google)
Kekes, John (1983). An argument against foundationalism. Philosophia 12 (March):273-281.   (Google | More links)
Kroiter, Edward (1972). On defining incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):279-282.   (Google | More links)
Langtry, Bruce N. (1970). Perception and corrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (December):369-372.   (Google | More links)
Mackie, J. L. (1963). Are there any incorrigible empirical statements? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):12-28.   (Google | More links)
Margolis, Joseph (1964). Certainty about sensations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (December):242-247.   (Google | More links)
Margolis, Joseph (1970). Indubitability, self-intimating states, and privileged access. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):918-31.   (Google | More links)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1974). Incorrigibility revisited. Personalist 55:253-260.   (Google)
Nakhnikian, George (1968). Incorrigibility. Philosophical Quarterly 18 (July):207-15.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nolan, Lawrence & Whipple, John (2005). Self-knowledge in Descartes and Malebranche. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (1).   (Google)
Noren, Stephen J. (1973). A note on statements and incorrigibility. Mind 82 (April):273-275.   (Google | More links)
Pappas, George S. (1975). Defining incorrigibility. Personalist 56:395-402.   (Google)
Pappas, George S. (1976). Incorrigibility and central-state materialism. Philosophical Studies 29 (June):445-56.   (Google | More links)
Pappas, George S. (1975). Incorrigibilism and future science. Philosophical Studies 28 (September):207-210.   (Google | More links)
Pappas, George S. (1974). Incorrigibility, knowledge, and justification. Philosophical Studies 25 (April):219-25.   (Google | More links)
Pappas, George S. (1980). Reply to Bailey. Philosophical Studies 37 (February):201-202.   (Google | More links)
Parent, T. (2007). Infallibilism about self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):411-424.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts
Raff, Charles (1966). Introspection and incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (September):69-73.   (Google | More links)
Reichenbach, Hans (1952). Are phenomenal reports absolutely certain? Philosophical Review 61 (April):147-159.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Richard H. (1972). The concept of incorrigibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (June):427-441.   (Google)
Rorty, Richard (1970). Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental. Journal of Philosophy 67 (June):399-424.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Rorty, Richard (1974). More on incorrigibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (September):195-197.   (Google)
Scheer, Richard K. (1998). How to criticize an incorrigibility thesis. Philosophical Investigations 21 (4):359-368.   (Google | More links)
Scherer, Donald (1973). Incorrigibilist dilemmas. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11:237-239.   (Google)
Sheridan, Gregory (1969). The electroencephalogram argument against incorrigibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (January):62-70.   (Google)
Shirley, Edward S. (1976). 'Appear' and incorrigibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14:197-201.   (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain processes and incorrigibility - a reply to professor Baier. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):68-70.   (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain processes and incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:68-70.   (Annotation | Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (1975). Minimal incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (December):254-56.   (Google | More links)
Thalberg, Irving (1965). Looks, impressions and incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):365-374.   (Google | More links)
Tomberlin, James E. (1975). A problem with incorrigibility. Philosophia 5 (October):507-12.   (Google | More links)
Tormey, Alan (1973). Access, incorrigibility, and identity. Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):115-128.   (Google | More links)
van Rappard, J. F. H. (1979). Psychology as Self-Knowledge: The Development of the Concept of the Mind in German Rationalistic Psychology and its Relevance Today. Van Gorcum.   (Google)
Verges, F. G. (1974). Jackson on incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):243-50.   (Google | More links)
Warner, Richard (1993). Incorrigibility. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Waters, Bruce (1942). Basic sentences and incorrigibility. Philosophy of Science 9 (July):239-244.   (Google | More links)
Weinberg, Julius R. (1977). Ockham, Descartes, and Hume: Self-Knowledge, Substance, and Causality. University of Wisconsin Press.   (Google)
Winkler, Earl (1969). Incorrigibility: The standard contemporary doctrine. Personalist 50:179-193.   (Google)
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (ms). Infallible introspection.   (Google)

5.2f Self-Knowledge, Misc

Barresi, John (1987). Prospects for the cyberiad: Certain limits on human self-knowledge in the cybernetic age. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 17 (March):19-46.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Barton Perry, Ralph (1909). The mind's familiarity with itself. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (5):113-122.   (Google | More links)
Bartsch, Shadi (2006). The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: People in the ancient world thought of vision as both an ethical tool and a tactile sense, akin to touch. Gazing upon someone—or oneself—was treated as a path to philosophical self-knowledge, but the question of tactility introduced an erotic element as well. In The Mirror of the Self , Shadi Bartsch asserts that these links among vision, sexuality, and self-knowledge are key to the classical understanding of the self. Weaving together literary theory, philosophy, and social history, Bartsch traces this complex notion of self from Plato’s Greece to Seneca’s Rome. She starts by showing how ancient authors envisioned the mirror as both a tool for ethical self-improvement and, paradoxically, a sign of erotic self-indulgence. Her reading of the Phaedrus , for example, demonstrates that the mirroring gaze in Plato, because of its sexual possibilities, could not be adopted by Roman philosophers and their students. Bartsch goes on to examine the Roman treatment of the ethical and sexual gaze, and she traces how self-knowledge, the philosopher’s body, and the performance of virtue all played a role in shaping the Roman understanding of the nature of selfhood. Culminating in a profoundly original reading of Medea , The Mirror of the Self illustrates how Seneca, in his Stoic quest for self-knowledge, embodies the Roman view, marking a new point in human thought about self-perception. Bartsch leads readers on a journey that unveils divided selves, moral hypocrisy, and lustful Stoics—and offers fresh insights about seminal works. At once sexy and philosophical, The Mirror of the Self will be required reading for classicists, philosophers, and anthropologists alike
Beare, John I. (1896). Self-knowledge. Mind 5 (18):227-235.   (Google | More links)
Benjamin, Harry (1971). Basic Self-Knowledge. London: Samuel Weiser.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bergmann, Gustav (1949). Professor Ayer's analysis of knowing. Analysis 9 (June):98-106.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2003). The elusiveness thesis, immunity to error through misidentification, and privileged access. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Google)
Bhattacharya, Kalidas; Mohanty, Jitendranath & Banerjee, S. P. (eds.) (1978). Self, Knowledge, and Freedom: Essays for Kalidas Bhattacharyya. World Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Mohanty, J. N. Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a metaphysician.--Deutsch, E. On meaning.--Potter, K. Towards a conceptual scheme for Indian epistemologies.--Ganguly, S. N. Rationality versus reasonableness (freedom: a reinterpretation).--Sen, P. K. A sketch of a theory of properties and relations.--Mohanty, J. N. Perceptual consciousness.--Chattopadhyaya, D. P. Theory and practice.--Bhadra, M. K. The idea of self as purpose, an existential analysis.--Matilal, B. K. Saptabhaṅgī.--Banerjee, H. The identification of mental states and the possibility of freedom.--Chatterjee, M. A phenomenological approach to the self.--Banerjee, S. P. Alienation and freedom.--Sinha, D. Cognitive language in Vedanta.
Bicknell, Jeanette (2004). Self-knowledge and the limitations of narrative. Philosophy and Literature 28 (2).   (Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (2005). Self-knowledge, intentionality, and normativity. Iyyun 54 (January):5-24.   (Google)
Black, Deborah L. (1993). Consciousness and self-knowledge in Aquinas's critique of averroes's psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (3).   (Google)
Bolton, Derek (1995). Self-knowledge, error, and disorder. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Mameli, Matteo (2006). Deception in psychology : Moral costs and benefits of unsought self-knowledge. Accountability in Research 13:259-275.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play a role in shaping education, informing policies and in general creating a more efficient and just society.
Brady, Rob (1981). Verdictives, self-presentation, and self-knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:11-20.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (1999). A century of deflation and a moment about self-knowledge. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):25-46.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1996). Our entitlement to self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:91-116.   (Cited by 59 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2000). Reason and the first person. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Byrne, Alex (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from the computer and the desk on which it sits. How that mechanism works is a complicated story—to put it mildly—and of course much remains unknown. But we can at least produce more-or- less plausible sketches of how the mechanism can start from retinal irradiation, and go on to deliver knowledge of my surroundings. Moreover, in the sort of world we inhabit, specialized detection mechanisms that are causally affected by the things they detect have no serious competition—seeing the computer by seeing an idea of the computer in the divine mind, for example, is not a feasible alternative
Byrne, Alex (online). The puzzle of transparency.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (ms). Cartesian epistemology: Is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, encouraging them to do so
Carruthers, Peter (2010). Introspection: Divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won’t challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn’t (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren’t introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called “dual systems theories” of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency
Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1968). On the logic of attributions of self-knowledge to others. Journal of Philosophy 65 (15):439-456.   (Google | More links)
Cassam, Quassim (ed.) (1994). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Abstract: This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability of the Self" by Roderick M. Chisholm, "Introspection" by D. M. Armstrong, "The First Person" by G. E. M. Anscombe, "On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I" by Hector-Neri Casta((n-))eda, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" by John Perry, "Self-Identification" by Gareth Evans, and "The First Person--and Others" by P. F. Strawson. The only reader of its kind, Self-Knowledge fills a major gap in the history of philosophy and will be an accessible addition to a wide range of courses
Cassam, Quassim (1998). Self-knowledge, A Priori knowledge, and the cognitive structure of the mind. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Cassam, Quassim (1996). Self-reference, self-knowledge and the problem of misconception. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):276-295.   (Google)
Chittick, William C. (2001). The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afḍal Al-Dīn Kāshānī. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book introduces the work of an important medieval Islamic philosopher who is little known outside the Persian world. Afdal al-Din Kashani was a contemporary of a number of important Muslim thinkers, including Averroes and Ibn al-Arabi. Kashani did not write for advanced students of philosophy but rather for beginners. In the main body of his work, he offers especially clear and insightful expositions of various philosophical positions, making him an invaluable resource for those who would like to learn the basic principles and arguments of this philosophical tradition but do not have a strong background in philosophy. Here, Chittick uses Kashani and his work to introduce the basic issues and arguments of Islamic philosophy to modern readers
Coliva, Annalisa (2006). Error through misidentification: Some varieties. Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):407-425.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Coliva, Annalisa (2003). The first person: Error through misidentification, the split between speaker's and semantic reference, and the real guarantee. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416-431.   (Google)
Coliva, Annalisa (2002). Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9:27-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). Thus, if Campbell is right, it would not be true that when the subject makes a mental self-ascription on the basis of introspective awareness of a given mental state, there is no possible world in which she could be wrong as to whether it is really she who has that mental state. Notice the interesting interdisciplinary implications of Campbell’s project: on the one hand, a fairly precise notion elaborated in philosophy such as IEM (and the related notion of error through misidentification, EM hereafter) is used to describe a characteristic symptom of schizophrenia.1 On the other hand, such a phenomenon, described in the way proposed, is taken to be a possible counterexample to a sort of “philosophical dogma” such as IEM of introspection-based non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. In the first section of the paper I will point out the characteristic features of EM and explain logical immunity to error through misidentification of introspection-based mental self-ascriptions; in the second section I will consider the case of thought insertion in more detail and show why, after all, it is not a counterexample to the view that introspectionbased mental self-ascriptions are logically IEM. Finally, I will offer a re-description of the phenomenon of thought insertion
Craig, William Lane (1997). Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):291–295.   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2000). The case for rorts. In R.B. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Dewey, John (1918). Concerning alleged immediate knowledge of mind. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (2):29-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2004). Knowing what you think vs. knowing that you think it. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Due, Reidar (2000). Self-knowledge and moral properties in Sartre's being and nothingness. Sartre Studies International 6 (1):61-94.   (Google)
Edwards, J. (1999). Interpreted logical forms and knowing your own mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):169-90.   (Google | More links)
Fernandez, Jordi (2007). Desire and self-knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge
Fernández, Jordi (2010). Thought insertion and self-knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.   (Google)
Abstract: I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way
Fricker, Elizabeth (1998). Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- a dichotomy rejected. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & 1998 Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- A dichotomy rejected. (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gertler, Brie (2002). Can feminists be cartesians? Dialogue 41 (1):91-112.   (Google)
Abstract:      I defend one leading strand of Descartes's thought against feminist criticism. I will show that Descartes's “first-person” approach to our knowledge of minds, which has been criticized on feminist grounds, is at least compatible with key feminist views. My argument suggests that this strand of Cartesianism may even bolster some central feminist positions
Gertler, Brie (2003). Introduction to Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (ed.) (2003). Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic difference between (a) one’s belief that she thinks it will rain tomorrow, or that she has a headache, and (b) her belief that it is raining, or that another person has a headache
Gertler, Brie (online). Self-Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: "Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other realms. Partially because of this disagreement, philosophers have endorsed competing accounts of how we acquire self-knowledge. These accounts have important consequences for the scope of mental content, for mental ontology, and for personal identity
Gertler, Brie (2000). The mechanics of self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 28:125-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: It is often said that we can know our own thoughts more directly or with more certainty than anyone else can know them. And this disparity is usually taken to be principled, in that we would not be the rational, reflective beings that we are without it. My aim is to trace the consequences of a principled disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge for what may be termed the “mechanics ” of self-knowledge . I use a new thought experiment to show that if introspective states are merely causally related to introspected thoughts, the disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is not truly principled. An account of self-knowledge adequate to a truly principled disparity will allow that thought tokens can be
Goldberg, Sandy (1993). An intuition about self-knowledge: A challenge to Fodor. Conference 4 (1):50-63.   (Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (forthcoming). Ascent routines for propositional attitudes. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying our attitude as belief, desire, hope, etc., without presupposing some sort of recognition process. The criticism can be answered, but only by giving up a tacit—and wholly unnecessary—assumption that has influenced discussions of ascent routines. Abandoning the assumption allows a different account of ARs that avoids the criticism and even provides an algorithm for finding a corresponding lower level utterance for any PA. The account I give is supported by research on children’s first uses of a propositional attitude vocabulary
Gordon, Jill (2004). Self-knowledge in another woman. In Aeon J. Skoble & Mark T. Conard (eds.), Woody Allen and Philosophy: You Mean My Whole Fallacy Is Wrong? Chicago: Open Court.   (Google)
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Abstract: 1. First person authority: the received explanation Over a wide range of psychological attributes, a mature speaker seems to enjoy a defeasible form of authority on how things are with him. The received explanation of this is epistemic, and rests upon a cognitive assumption. The speaker’s word is a authoritative because when things are thus-and-so with him, then normally he knows that they are. This is held to be because the speaker has direct and privileged access to the contents of his consciousness by means of introspection, conceived as a faculty of inner sense. Like perceptual knowledge, introspective knowledge is held to be direct and non-evidential. Accordingly, the first-person utterances ‘I have a pain’, ‘I believe that p’, ‘I intend to V’ are taken to be descriptions of what is evident to inner sense. Many classical thinkers held such subjective knowledge to be not only immediate, but also infallible and indubitable. The challenge to the received conceptions came from Wittgenstein. He denied the cognitive assumption, arguing that it cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know that I am in pain. For what is that supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in pain?1 If it makes no sense to say that one knows that one is in pain, then the epistemic explanation is a non-starter, since it explains the special authoritative status of a person’s avowal of pain by reference to the putative fact that the subject of pain knows, normally knows, or cannot but know, that he is in pain when he is. It is important to note that Wittgenstein did not mechanically generalize the case of pain across the whole domain of firstperson utterances. The case of pain constitutes only one pole of a range of such utterances. Avowals and averrals of belief and intention approximate the other pole, and require independent analysis and grammatical description..
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Abstract: Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious states are available to the subject in a very special way in which non-conscious states are not available. This is the first part of the explanation. The crucial further element in the representationalist account is what I would like to call the ‘introspective mode of mind’. A mind can operate in certain ways or modes – modes of mind. Introspection normally takes place in the introspective mode of mind, judgments about one’s environment in the mode of ‘taking one’s appearances at face value’. And there probably are other modes of mind. The introspective mode of mind is characterized by the special way or framework in which cognitive capacities are employed
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Kemmerling, Andreas (1999). How self-knowledge can't be naturalized (some remarks on a proposal by dretske). Philosophical Studies 95 (3):311-28.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kornblith, Hilary (1998). What is it like to be me? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lawlor, Krista (2009). Knowing what one wants. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):47-75.   (Google)
Lawlor, Krista (2004). Reason and the past: The role of rationality in diachronic self-knowledge. Synthese 145 (3):467-495.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one’s rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account
Lewis, Frank A. (1996). Self-knowledge in Aristotle. Topoi 15 (1).   (Google)
Lloyd, Genevieve (1994). Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
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Lycan, William G. (2002). Dretske's ways of introspecting. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘[I]ntrospection’ is just a convenient word to describe our way of knowing what is going on in our own mind, and anyone convinced that we know—at least sometimes—what is going on in our own mind and therefore, that we have a mind and, therefore, that we are not zombies, must believe that introspection is the answer we are looking for. I, too, believe in introspection
Macdonald, C.; Smith, Peter K. & Wright, C. (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
MacDonald, Cynthia (2004). Self-knowledge and the first person. In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.   (Google)
Abstract: Self-Knowledge and the First-Person1 It is a familiar view in the philosophy of mind and action is that for a thought or attitude to constitute a reason for an action is for it to render intelligible, in the light of norms of rationality or reason, that action. However, I can make sense of your actions in this way by crediting you with attitudes that I myself do not hold. Equally, you can do this for my actions. So not all reasons for one’s actions are one’s own reasons. What more is involved in a reason’s being one’s own reason for acting?
Magada-Ward, Mary (2003). "As parts of one esthetic total": Inference, imagery, and self-knowledge in the later Peirce. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (3).   (Google)
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Abstract: Self-knowledge is based on several different forms of information, so distinct that each one essentially establishes a different 'self. The ecological self is the self as directly perceived with respect to the immediate physical environment; the interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species-specific signals of emotional rapport and communication; the extended self is based on memory and anticipation; the private self appears when we discover that our conscious experiences are exclusively our own; the conceptual self or 'self-concept' draws its meaning from a network of socially-based assumptions and theories about human nature in general and ourselves in particular. Although these selves are rarely experienced as distinct (because they are held together by specific forms of stimulus information), they differ in their developmental histories, in the accuracy with which we can know them, in the pathologies to which they are subject, and generally in what they contribute to human experience
Newen, Albert & Vosgerau, Gottfried (2007). A representational account of self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s own states (or processes) in an indexical mode of presentation. The philosophical debate is concentrating on mental states (or processes). If we characterize self-knowledge by natural language sentences, the most adequate utterance has a structure like “I know that I am in mental state M”. This common sense characterization has to be developed into an adequate description. In this investigation we will tackle two questions: (i) What precisely is the phenomenon referred to by “self-knowledge” and how can we adequately describe a form of self-knowledge which we might realistically enjoy? (ii) Can we have self-knowledge given the fact that the meaning of some words which we utter depends on the environment or the speech community? The theory we defend argues that we have to distinguish the public meaning of utterances, on the one hand, and the mental representations which are constituting a mental state of an individual, on the other. Self-knowledge should be characterized on the level of mental representations while the semantics of utterances self-attributing mental states should be treated separately. Externalism is only true for the public meaning of utterances but not for beliefs and other mental states including self-knowledge
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (2003). Reading one's own mind: A cognitive theory of self-awareness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oup.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: Introspection plays a crucial role in Modern philosophy in two different ways. From the beginnings of Modern philosophy, introspection has been used a tool for philosophical exploration in a variety of thought experiments. But Modern philosophers (e.g., Locke and Hume) also tried to characterize the nature of introspection as a psychological phenomenon. In contemporary philosophy, introspection is still frequently used in thought experiments. And in the analytic tradition, philosophers have tried to characterize conceptually necessary features of introspection.2 But over the last several decades, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to the cognitive characteristics of introspection. This has begun to change, impelled largely by a fascinating body of work on how children and autistic individuals understand the mind.3 In a pair of recent papers, Stephen Stich and I have drawn on this empirical work to develop an account of introspection or self-awareness.4 In this paper, I will elaborate and defend this cognitive theory of introspection further and argue that if the account is right, it may have important ramifications for psychological and philosophical debates over the self
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Abstract: Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics
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Abstract: A self-ascription is a thought or sentence in which a predicate is self-consciously ascribed to oneself. Self-ascriptions are best expressed using the first-person pronoun. Mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of mental predicates (predicates that designate mental properties), non-mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of non-mental predicates (predicates that designate non-mental properties). It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM for short). What this means, and exactly which self-ascriptions are properly classed as IEM, is a topic hotly disputed. Some claim that only mental self-ascriptions are IEM, others claim that some non-mental self-ascriptions are IEM. Before this question can be decided, it needs to be judged exactly what it means to say that a self-ascription is IEM. And here we stumble across the fact that there are, at least, two non-equivalent ways of defining the phenomenon1. I will be claiming that one of these definitions should be rejected
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Abstract: 1. Much of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind in the ‘analytic’ tradition has presupposed, since Descartes, what might be called a realist view about the mind and the mental. According to this view there are independently existing, determinate items (states, events, dispositions or relations) that are the truth-conferrers of our ascriptions of mental predicates.[1] The view is also a cognitivist one insofar as it holds that when we correctly ascribe such a predicate to an individual the correctness consists in the discovery of a determinate fact of the matter about the state the individual is in ( a state which is somehow cognized by the ascriber. Disputes have arisen about the nature of the truth-conferrers (e.g., whether they are physical or not) and about the status and the nature of the individual’s own authority about the state he is in. A dissenting position in philosophy of mind would have to be handled carefully. It would, most importantly, need to allow for the objectivity of ascriptions of mental predicates at least insofar as it made sense to reject some and accept others on appropriate grounds. Perhaps such a position in the philosophy of mind can be likened in at least one way to what David Wiggins has characterised as a doctrine of ‘cognitive underdetermination’ about moral or practical judgments.[2] In comparing his position of cognitive underdetermination about moral or practical judgments to some things Wittgenstein has said about the philosophy of mathematics, Wiggins suggests that, ‘In the assertibility (or truth) of mathematical statements we see what perhaps we can never see in the assertibility of empirical (such as geographical or historical) statements: the compossibility of objectivity, discovery, and invention.’[3]
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Abstract: An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction was designed precisely to find a route to knowledge of the structures of consciousness that was independent of any appeal to observation of one’s own mental states. The goals of this essay are to explicate Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction in contemporary terms that (1) show its distance from all inner-observation accounts, (2) exhibit its kinship to and historical influence on outer-observation accounts of selfknowledge popularized by Sellars, and (3) demonstrate that a contemporary ‘cognitive transformation’ view based on Husserl’s method may provide a viable contribution to contemporary debates about the source of self-knowledge
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Abstract: What is truth? This fascinating spectrum of studies into the various rationalities of our human dealings with life - psychological, aesthetic, economic, spiritual - reveals their joints and calls for a new approach to truth. Putting both classical and contemporary conceptions aside, we find the primogenital ground of truth in the networks of correspondences, adequations, relevancies, and rationales at work in life's becoming. Does this plurivocal differentiation mean that the status of truth is relative? On the contrary, submits Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, given the universal significance of the crucial instrument of the logos of life, "truth is the vortex of life's ontopoietic unfolding"
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Abstract: Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction "Know Yourself" is the basis of all self-regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self-knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, notably, self-deception (§2). Finding none of Kant's solutions to the problem of self-deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self-knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3)
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Abstract: Originally published in print: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2000.
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Abstract: Jordi Fernández has recently responded to my objection that his 'extrospectionist' account of self-knowledge posits necessary and sufficient conditions for introspective justification which are neither necessary nor sufficient. I show that my criticisms survive his response unscathed.
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Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2004). Unnatural Access. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):435-38.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jordi Fernandez has recently offered an interesting account of introspective justification according to which the very states that (subjectively) justify one's first-order belief that p justify one's second order belief that one believes that p. I provide two objections to Fernandez's account.