MindPapers: 5.2a. Observational Accounts

Arnold, Denis G. (1997). Introspection and its objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94. (Google | Edit)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Self-knowledge via inner observation of external objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts

Charlton, William (1986). Knowing what we think. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):196-211. (Google | More links | Edit)

Finkelstein, David H. (1999). On self-blindness and inner sense. Philosophical Topics 26:105-19. (Google | Edit)

Gertler, Brie (forthcoming). Introspection. In Timothy J. Bayne (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method of knowing one’s own mental states, and not just self-directed attention. But the more restrictive use is standard, and provides the topic of the current entry.) As we will see, some contemporary philosophers and psychologists doubt that any such introspective process underlies self-knowledge

Kind, Amy (2003). Shoemaker, self-blindness and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is thirdperson evidence available to the selfblind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises

Larkin, William S. (ms). A broad perceptual model of privileged introspective judgments. (Google | Edit)

Lormand, Eric (ms). Inner sense until proven guilty. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is the key to explaining the most puzzling kind of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness—there being "something it is like" to have certain mental states. My aim in this paper is to defend this view against accusations— twenty-two in all!—rather than to argue positively for the view. However, I begin by indicating some of the motivation for the account I defend

Lormand, Eric (2000). Shoemaker and "inner sense". Philosophical Topics. (Google | Edit)

MacDonald, Cynthia (1998). Self-knowledge and the "inner eye". Philosophical Explorations 1:83-106. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

MacDonald, Cynthia (1999). Shoemaker on self-knowledge and inner sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):711-38. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Myers, Gerald E. (1986). Introspection and self-knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (April):199-207. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Newton, Natika (1988). Introspection and perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays the role of external reality in discourse about physical objects. Discourse about any sort of entity or property can be viewed as involving a domain or frame of reference which constrains what can be said about the entities; this view is related to Johnson-Laird''s theory of mental models. On my approach evidence, including sensory evidence, may be involved in decisions about one''s mental states. I conclude that while Shoemaker may well be right about different roles for sense impressions in introspection and perception, the exact differences and their significance remain to be established

Rosenberg, Jay F. (2000). Perception vs. inner sense: A problem about direct awareness. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):143-160. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience -- self knowledge and inner sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314. (Google | Edit)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Self-knowledge and "inner sense". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:249-314. (Google | Edit)

5.2a	Observational Accounts [16]

5.2e	Incorrigibility [59]

5.2f	Self-Deception [108]

Search tips