MindPapers: 5.2c. Constitutive Accounts

Albritton, Rogers (1995). Comments on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bilgrami, Akeel (2000). Self-knowledge and resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bruecker, A. (1998). Shoemaker on second-order belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):361-64. (Google | Edit)

Coliva, Annalisa (ms). Self-knowledge (but not: "Know thyself"). (Google | Edit)

Edwards, Jim (1992). Best opinion and intentional states. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):21-33. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Fernandez, Jordi (2005). Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore's paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis

Greene, R. (2003). Constitutive theories of self-knowledge and the regress problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48. (Google | More links | Edit)

Katsafanas, P. (2007). Constitutivism and self-knowledge. APA Proceedings and Addresses 80 (3). (Google | Edit)

Larkin, William S. (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Moran, Richard A. (1988). Making up your mind: Self-interpretation and self-constitution. Ratio 1 (2):135-51. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Peacocke, Christopher (2001). First-person reference, representational independence, and self-knowledge. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Peacocke, Christopher (1996). Our entitlement to self-knowledge: Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117-58. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1990). First-person access. Philosophical Perspectives 4:187-214. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1995). Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28. (Cited by 21 | Google | More links | Edit)

Siewert, Charles (2003). Self-knowledge and rationality: Shoemaker on self-blindness. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Stoneham, Tom (2003). Conditionals and biconditionals in constitutive theories of self-knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):149-55. (Google | Edit)

Stueber, Karsten R. (2002). The problem of self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-96. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being mistaken about ones mental states. Rather, self-knowledgehas to be seen as only a general constraint or as the default assumption of interpreting somebodyas a rational and intentional agent. This is compatible with the diagnosis of a localized lack of self-transparency

Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2005). Basic self-knowledge: Answering Peacocke's criticisms of constitutivism. Philosophical Studies. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

5.2c	Constitutive Accounts [18]

5.2e	Incorrigibility [59]

5.2f	Self-Deception [108]

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