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5.2c. Constitutive Accounts (Constitutive Accounts on PhilPapers)

See also:
Albritton, Rogers (1995). Comments on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bar-On, Dorit (ms). Externalism and skepticism: Recognition, expression, and self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I’m only under some kind of illusion about what's in front of me. Analogously, according to content skepticism, I cannot know that I am thinking that there is water in my glass, even if in fact that is what I am thinking. This is because for all I know, my way of telling what I am thinking does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I am only under some kind of illusion about what I am thinking
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Bilgrami, Akeel (2000). Self-knowledge and resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bruecker, A. (1998). Shoemaker on second-order belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):361-64.   (Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33:79--104.   (Google)
Coliva, Annalisa (2009). Self-knowledge and commitments. Synthese 171 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states
Coliva, Annalisa (ms). Self-knowledge (but not: "Know thyself").   (Google)
Edwards, Jim (1992). Best opinion and intentional states. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):21-33.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Fernandez, Jordi (2005). Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore's paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis
Greene, R. (2003). Constitutive theories of self-knowledge and the regress problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.   (Google | More links)
Katsafanas, P. (2007). Constitutivism and self-knowledge. APA Proceedings and Addresses 80 (3).   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Moran, Richard A. (1988). Making up your mind: Self-interpretation and self-constitution. Ratio 1 (2):135-51.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (2001). First-person reference, representational independence, and self-knowledge. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Peacocke, Christopher (1996). Our entitlement to self-knowledge: Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117-58.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1990). First-person access. Philosophical Perspectives 4:187-214.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1995). Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.   (Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (2003). Self-knowledge and rationality: Shoemaker on self-blindness. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Spitzley, Thomas (2009). Self-knowledge and rationality. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and (2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality is, indeed, a necessary condition for self-knowledge. In addition, I distinguish two aspects of rationality which I call basic and local rationality. After that I concentrate on the second question for the remaining larger part of this article. Here I proceed in two stages: first I examine whether self-knowledge is necessary for basic rationality, and then whether it is necessary for local rationality
Stoneham, Tom (2003). Conditionals and biconditionals in constitutive theories of self-knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):149-55.   (Google)
Stueber, Karsten R. (2002). The problem of self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-96.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being mistaken about ones mental states. Rather, self-knowledgehas to be seen as only a general constraint or as the default assumption of interpreting somebodyas a rational and intentional agent. This is compatible with the diagnosis of a localized lack of self-transparency
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2006). Basic self-knowledge: Answering Peacocke's criticisms of constitutivism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke’s own account of self-knowledge
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2008). Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.