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5.2f. Self-Knowledge, Misc (Self-Knowledge, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Barresi, John (1987). Prospects for the cyberiad: Certain limits on human self-knowledge in the cybernetic age. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 17 (March):19-46.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Barton Perry, Ralph (1909). The mind's familiarity with itself. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (5):113-122.   (Google | More links)
Bartsch, Shadi (2006). The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: People in the ancient world thought of vision as both an ethical tool and a tactile sense, akin to touch. Gazing upon someone—or oneself—was treated as a path to philosophical self-knowledge, but the question of tactility introduced an erotic element as well. In The Mirror of the Self , Shadi Bartsch asserts that these links among vision, sexuality, and self-knowledge are key to the classical understanding of the self. Weaving together literary theory, philosophy, and social history, Bartsch traces this complex notion of self from Plato’s Greece to Seneca’s Rome. She starts by showing how ancient authors envisioned the mirror as both a tool for ethical self-improvement and, paradoxically, a sign of erotic self-indulgence. Her reading of the Phaedrus , for example, demonstrates that the mirroring gaze in Plato, because of its sexual possibilities, could not be adopted by Roman philosophers and their students. Bartsch goes on to examine the Roman treatment of the ethical and sexual gaze, and she traces how self-knowledge, the philosopher’s body, and the performance of virtue all played a role in shaping the Roman understanding of the nature of selfhood. Culminating in a profoundly original reading of Medea , The Mirror of the Self illustrates how Seneca, in his Stoic quest for self-knowledge, embodies the Roman view, marking a new point in human thought about self-perception. Bartsch leads readers on a journey that unveils divided selves, moral hypocrisy, and lustful Stoics—and offers fresh insights about seminal works. At once sexy and philosophical, The Mirror of the Self will be required reading for classicists, philosophers, and anthropologists alike
Beare, John I. (1896). Self-knowledge. Mind 5 (18):227-235.   (Google | More links)
Benjamin, Harry (1971). Basic Self-Knowledge. London: Samuel Weiser.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bergmann, Gustav (1949). Professor Ayer's analysis of knowing. Analysis 9 (June):98-106.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2003). The elusiveness thesis, immunity to error through misidentification, and privileged access. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Google)
Bhattacharya, Kalidas; Mohanty, Jitendranath & Banerjee, S. P. (eds.) (1978). Self, Knowledge, and Freedom: Essays for Kalidas Bhattacharyya. World Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Mohanty, J. N. Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a metaphysician.--Deutsch, E. On meaning.--Potter, K. Towards a conceptual scheme for Indian epistemologies.--Ganguly, S. N. Rationality versus reasonableness (freedom: a reinterpretation).--Sen, P. K. A sketch of a theory of properties and relations.--Mohanty, J. N. Perceptual consciousness.--Chattopadhyaya, D. P. Theory and practice.--Bhadra, M. K. The idea of self as purpose, an existential analysis.--Matilal, B. K. Saptabhaṅgī.--Banerjee, H. The identification of mental states and the possibility of freedom.--Chatterjee, M. A phenomenological approach to the self.--Banerjee, S. P. Alienation and freedom.--Sinha, D. Cognitive language in Vedanta.
Bicknell, Jeanette (2004). Self-knowledge and the limitations of narrative. Philosophy and Literature 28 (2).   (Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (2005). Self-knowledge, intentionality, and normativity. Iyyun 54 (January):5-24.   (Google)
Black, Deborah L. (1993). Consciousness and self-knowledge in Aquinas's critique of averroes's psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (3).   (Google)
Bolton, Derek (1995). Self-knowledge, error, and disorder. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Mameli, Matteo (2006). Deception in psychology : Moral costs and benefits of unsought self-knowledge. Accountability in Research 13:259-275.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play a role in shaping education, informing policies and in general creating a more efficient and just society.
Brady, Rob (1981). Verdictives, self-presentation, and self-knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:11-20.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (1999). A century of deflation and a moment about self-knowledge. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):25-46.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1996). Our entitlement to self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:91-116.   (Cited by 59 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2000). Reason and the first person. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Byrne, Alex (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from the computer and the desk on which it sits. How that mechanism works is a complicated story—to put it mildly—and of course much remains unknown. But we can at least produce more-or- less plausible sketches of how the mechanism can start from retinal irradiation, and go on to deliver knowledge of my surroundings. Moreover, in the sort of world we inhabit, specialized detection mechanisms that are causally affected by the things they detect have no serious competition—seeing the computer by seeing an idea of the computer in the divine mind, for example, is not a feasible alternative
Byrne, Alex (online). The puzzle of transparency.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (ms). Cartesian epistemology: Is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, encouraging them to do so
Carruthers, Peter (2010). Introspection: Divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won’t challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn’t (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren’t introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called “dual systems theories” of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency
Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1968). On the logic of attributions of self-knowledge to others. Journal of Philosophy 65 (15):439-456.   (Google | More links)
Cassam, Quassim (ed.) (1994). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Abstract: This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability of the Self" by Roderick M. Chisholm, "Introspection" by D. M. Armstrong, "The First Person" by G. E. M. Anscombe, "On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I" by Hector-Neri Casta((n-))eda, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" by John Perry, "Self-Identification" by Gareth Evans, and "The First Person--and Others" by P. F. Strawson. The only reader of its kind, Self-Knowledge fills a major gap in the history of philosophy and will be an accessible addition to a wide range of courses
Cassam, Quassim (1998). Self-knowledge, A Priori knowledge, and the cognitive structure of the mind. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Cassam, Quassim (1996). Self-reference, self-knowledge and the problem of misconception. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):276-295.   (Google)
Chittick, William C. (2001). The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afḍal Al-Dīn Kāshānī. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book introduces the work of an important medieval Islamic philosopher who is little known outside the Persian world. Afdal al-Din Kashani was a contemporary of a number of important Muslim thinkers, including Averroes and Ibn al-Arabi. Kashani did not write for advanced students of philosophy but rather for beginners. In the main body of his work, he offers especially clear and insightful expositions of various philosophical positions, making him an invaluable resource for those who would like to learn the basic principles and arguments of this philosophical tradition but do not have a strong background in philosophy. Here, Chittick uses Kashani and his work to introduce the basic issues and arguments of Islamic philosophy to modern readers
Coliva, Annalisa (2006). Error through misidentification: Some varieties. Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):407-425.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Coliva, Annalisa (2003). The first person: Error through misidentification, the split between speaker's and semantic reference, and the real guarantee. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416-431.   (Google)
Coliva, Annalisa (2002). Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9:27-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). Thus, if Campbell is right, it would not be true that when the subject makes a mental self-ascription on the basis of introspective awareness of a given mental state, there is no possible world in which she could be wrong as to whether it is really she who has that mental state. Notice the interesting interdisciplinary implications of Campbell’s project: on the one hand, a fairly precise notion elaborated in philosophy such as IEM (and the related notion of error through misidentification, EM hereafter) is used to describe a characteristic symptom of schizophrenia.1 On the other hand, such a phenomenon, described in the way proposed, is taken to be a possible counterexample to a sort of “philosophical dogma” such as IEM of introspection-based non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. In the first section of the paper I will point out the characteristic features of EM and explain logical immunity to error through misidentification of introspection-based mental self-ascriptions; in the second section I will consider the case of thought insertion in more detail and show why, after all, it is not a counterexample to the view that introspectionbased mental self-ascriptions are logically IEM. Finally, I will offer a re-description of the phenomenon of thought insertion
Craig, William Lane (1997). Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):291–295.   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2000). The case for rorts. In R.B. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Dewey, John (1918). Concerning alleged immediate knowledge of mind. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (2):29-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2004). Knowing what you think vs. knowing that you think it. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Due, Reidar (2000). Self-knowledge and moral properties in Sartre's being and nothingness. Sartre Studies International 6 (1):61-94.   (Google)
Edwards, J. (1999). Interpreted logical forms and knowing your own mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):169-90.   (Google | More links)
Fernandez, Jordi (2007). Desire and self-knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge
Fernández, Jordi (2010). Thought insertion and self-knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.   (Google)
Abstract: I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way
Fricker, Elizabeth (1998). Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- a dichotomy rejected. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & 1998 Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- A dichotomy rejected. (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gertler, Brie (2002). Can feminists be cartesians? Dialogue 41 (1):91-112.   (Google)
Abstract:      I defend one leading strand of Descartes's thought against feminist criticism. I will show that Descartes's “first-person” approach to our knowledge of minds, which has been criticized on feminist grounds, is at least compatible with key feminist views. My argument suggests that this strand of Cartesianism may even bolster some central feminist positions
Gertler, Brie (2003). Introduction to Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (ed.) (2003). Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic difference between (a) one’s belief that she thinks it will rain tomorrow, or that she has a headache, and (b) her belief that it is raining, or that another person has a headache
Gertler, Brie (online). Self-Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: "Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other realms. Partially because of this disagreement, philosophers have endorsed competing accounts of how we acquire self-knowledge. These accounts have important consequences for the scope of mental content, for mental ontology, and for personal identity
Gertler, Brie (2000). The mechanics of self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 28:125-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: It is often said that we can know our own thoughts more directly or with more certainty than anyone else can know them. And this disparity is usually taken to be principled, in that we would not be the rational, reflective beings that we are without it. My aim is to trace the consequences of a principled disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge for what may be termed the “mechanics ” of self-knowledge . I use a new thought experiment to show that if introspective states are merely causally related to introspected thoughts, the disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is not truly principled. An account of self-knowledge adequate to a truly principled disparity will allow that thought tokens can be
Goldberg, Sandy (1993). An intuition about self-knowledge: A challenge to Fodor. Conference 4 (1):50-63.   (Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (forthcoming). Ascent routines for propositional attitudes. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying our attitude as belief, desire, hope, etc., without presupposing some sort of recognition process. The criticism can be answered, but only by giving up a tacit—and wholly unnecessary—assumption that has influenced discussions of ascent routines. Abandoning the assumption allows a different account of ARs that avoids the criticism and even provides an algorithm for finding a corresponding lower level utterance for any PA. The account I give is supported by research on children’s first uses of a propositional attitude vocabulary
Gordon, Jill (2004). Self-knowledge in another woman. In Aeon J. Skoble & Mark T. Conard (eds.), Woody Allen and Philosophy: You Mean My Whole Fallacy Is Wrong? Chicago: Open Court.   (Google)
Griswold, Charles L. (1986). Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus. Pennsylvania State University Press.   (Google)
Hacker, P. M. S. (2005). Of knowledge and knowing that someone is in pain. In Alois Pichler & Simo Saatela (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works. The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. First person authority: the received explanation Over a wide range of psychological attributes, a mature speaker seems to enjoy a defeasible form of authority on how things are with him. The received explanation of this is epistemic, and rests upon a cognitive assumption. The speaker’s word is a authoritative because when things are thus-and-so with him, then normally he knows that they are. This is held to be because the speaker has direct and privileged access to the contents of his consciousness by means of introspection, conceived as a faculty of inner sense. Like perceptual knowledge, introspective knowledge is held to be direct and non-evidential. Accordingly, the first-person utterances ‘I have a pain’, ‘I believe that p’, ‘I intend to V’ are taken to be descriptions of what is evident to inner sense. Many classical thinkers held such subjective knowledge to be not only immediate, but also infallible and indubitable. The challenge to the received conceptions came from Wittgenstein. He denied the cognitive assumption, arguing that it cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know that I am in pain. For what is that supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in pain?1 If it makes no sense to say that one knows that one is in pain, then the epistemic explanation is a non-starter, since it explains the special authoritative status of a person’s avowal of pain by reference to the putative fact that the subject of pain knows, normally knows, or cannot but know, that he is in pain when he is. It is important to note that Wittgenstein did not mechanically generalize the case of pain across the whole domain of firstperson utterances. The case of pain constitutes only one pole of a range of such utterances. Avowals and averrals of belief and intention approximate the other pole, and require independent analysis and grammatical description..
Hagberg, Garry (2002). Davidson, self-knowledge, and autobiographical writing. Philosophy and Literature 26 (2).   (Google)
Hampton, Cynthia M. (1989). Self-knowledge in Plato's "phaedrus". Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4).   (Google)
Hart, Daniel & Karmel, M. P. (1996). Self-awareness and self-knowledge in humans, apes, and monkeys. In A. Russon, Kim A. Bard & S. Parkers (eds.), Reaching Into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Hintikka, Jaakko (1970). On attributions of self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 67 (February):73-87.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hofmann, Frank (online). The epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious states are available to the subject in a very special way in which non-conscious states are not available. This is the first part of the explanation. The crucial further element in the representationalist account is what I would like to call the ‘introspective mode of mind’. A mind can operate in certain ways or modes – modes of mind. Introspection normally takes place in the introspective mode of mind, judgments about one’s environment in the mode of ‘taking one’s appearances at face value’. And there probably are other modes of mind. The introspective mode of mind is characterized by the special way or framework in which cognitive capacities are employed
Howell, Robert J. (2002). Self-knowledge and self-reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Howell, Robert J. (2006). Self-knowledge and self-reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.   (Google | More links)
Howell, Robert J. (2010). Subjectivity and the elusiveness of the self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):pp. 459-483.   (Google | More links)
Hudson, H. (1956). Why we cannot witness or observe what goes on 'in our heads'. Mind 65 (April):218-230.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (ms). Do we know how we know our own minds yet?   (Google | More links)
Jones, J. R. (1956). Self-knowledge, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120:120-142.   (Google)
Jopling, David A. (2000). Self-Knowledge and the Self. Routledge.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Kemmerling, Andreas (1999). How self-knowledge can't be naturalized (some remarks on a proposal by dretske). Philosophical Studies 95 (3):311-28.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kornblith, Hilary (1998). What is it like to be me? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lawlor, Krista (2009). Knowing what one wants. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):47-75.   (Google)
Lawlor, Krista (2004). Reason and the past: The role of rationality in diachronic self-knowledge. Synthese 145 (3):467-495.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one’s rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account
Lewis, Frank A. (1996). Self-knowledge in Aristotle. Topoi 15 (1).   (Google)
Lloyd, Genevieve (1994). Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
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Lycan, William G. (2002). Dretske's ways of introspecting. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘[I]ntrospection’ is just a convenient word to describe our way of knowing what is going on in our own mind, and anyone convinced that we know—at least sometimes—what is going on in our own mind and therefore, that we have a mind and, therefore, that we are not zombies, must believe that introspection is the answer we are looking for. I, too, believe in introspection
Macdonald, C.; Smith, Peter K. & Wright, C. (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
MacDonald, Cynthia (2004). Self-knowledge and the first person. In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.   (Google)
Abstract: Self-Knowledge and the First-Person1 It is a familiar view in the philosophy of mind and action is that for a thought or attitude to constitute a reason for an action is for it to render intelligible, in the light of norms of rationality or reason, that action. However, I can make sense of your actions in this way by crediting you with attitudes that I myself do not hold. Equally, you can do this for my actions. So not all reasons for one’s actions are one’s own reasons. What more is involved in a reason’s being one’s own reason for acting?
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Abstract: Self-knowledge is based on several different forms of information, so distinct that each one essentially establishes a different 'self. The ecological self is the self as directly perceived with respect to the immediate physical environment; the interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species-specific signals of emotional rapport and communication; the extended self is based on memory and anticipation; the private self appears when we discover that our conscious experiences are exclusively our own; the conceptual self or 'self-concept' draws its meaning from a network of socially-based assumptions and theories about human nature in general and ourselves in particular. Although these selves are rarely experienced as distinct (because they are held together by specific forms of stimulus information), they differ in their developmental histories, in the accuracy with which we can know them, in the pathologies to which they are subject, and generally in what they contribute to human experience
Newen, Albert & Vosgerau, Gottfried (2007). A representational account of self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s own states (or processes) in an indexical mode of presentation. The philosophical debate is concentrating on mental states (or processes). If we characterize self-knowledge by natural language sentences, the most adequate utterance has a structure like “I know that I am in mental state M”. This common sense characterization has to be developed into an adequate description. In this investigation we will tackle two questions: (i) What precisely is the phenomenon referred to by “self-knowledge” and how can we adequately describe a form of self-knowledge which we might realistically enjoy? (ii) Can we have self-knowledge given the fact that the meaning of some words which we utter depends on the environment or the speech community? The theory we defend argues that we have to distinguish the public meaning of utterances, on the one hand, and the mental representations which are constituting a mental state of an individual, on the other. Self-knowledge should be characterized on the level of mental representations while the semantics of utterances self-attributing mental states should be treated separately. Externalism is only true for the public meaning of utterances but not for beliefs and other mental states including self-knowledge
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (2003). Reading one's own mind: A cognitive theory of self-awareness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oup.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun (2000). The mind's "I" and the theory of mind's "I": Introspection and two concepts of self. Philosophical Topics 28:171-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Introspection plays a crucial role in Modern philosophy in two different ways. From the beginnings of Modern philosophy, introspection has been used a tool for philosophical exploration in a variety of thought experiments. But Modern philosophers (e.g., Locke and Hume) also tried to characterize the nature of introspection as a psychological phenomenon. In contemporary philosophy, introspection is still frequently used in thought experiments. And in the analytic tradition, philosophers have tried to characterize conceptually necessary features of introspection.2 But over the last several decades, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to the cognitive characteristics of introspection. This has begun to change, impelled largely by a fascinating body of work on how children and autistic individuals understand the mind.3 In a pair of recent papers, Stephen Stich and I have drawn on this empirical work to develop an account of introspection or self-awareness.4 In this paper, I will elaborate and defend this cognitive theory of introspection further and argue that if the account is right, it may have important ramifications for psychological and philosophical debates over the self
Nolan, Lawrence & Whipple, John (2005). Self-knowledge in Descartes and Malebranche. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (1).   (Google)
O'Brien, Lucy F. (2003). On knowing one's own actions. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
O'Brien, Lucy (2007). Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O’Hagan, Emer (2009). Moral self-knowledge in Kantian ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525-537.   (Google)
Abstract: Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics
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Pryor, James (1999). Immunity to error through misidentification. Philosophical Topics 26:271-304.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Rampersad, Hubert K. (2003). Linking self-knowledge with business ethics and strategy development. Business Ethics 12 (3):246–257.   (Google | More links)
Reed, Baron (2010). Self-knowledge and rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):164-181.   (Google | More links)
Reginster, Bernard (2004). Self-knowledge, responsibility, and the third person. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):433-439.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Sankowski, Edward T. (1978). Wittgenstein on self-knowledge. Mind 87 (April):256-261.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schmid, Walter T. (1983). Socratic moderation and self-knowledge. Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (3).   (Google)
Scott-Kakures, Dion (1997). Self-knowledge, akrasia, and self-criticism. Philosophia 25 (1-4):267-295.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: A self-ascription is a thought or sentence in which a predicate is self-consciously ascribed to oneself. Self-ascriptions are best expressed using the first-person pronoun. Mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of mental predicates (predicates that designate mental properties), non-mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of non-mental predicates (predicates that designate non-mental properties). It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM for short). What this means, and exactly which self-ascriptions are properly classed as IEM, is a topic hotly disputed. Some claim that only mental self-ascriptions are IEM, others claim that some non-mental self-ascriptions are IEM. Before this question can be decided, it needs to be judged exactly what it means to say that a self-ascription is IEM. And here we stumble across the fact that there are, at least, two non-equivalent ways of defining the phenomenon1. I will be claiming that one of these definitions should be rejected
Stoneham, Tom (1998). On believing that I am thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stoneham, Tom (2004). Self-knowledge. In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
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Abstract: 1. Much of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind in the ‘analytic’ tradition has presupposed, since Descartes, what might be called a realist view about the mind and the mental. According to this view there are independently existing, determinate items (states, events, dispositions or relations) that are the truth-conferrers of our ascriptions of mental predicates.[1] The view is also a cognitivist one insofar as it holds that when we correctly ascribe such a predicate to an individual the correctness consists in the discovery of a determinate fact of the matter about the state the individual is in ( a state which is somehow cognized by the ascriber. Disputes have arisen about the nature of the truth-conferrers (e.g., whether they are physical or not) and about the status and the nature of the individual’s own authority about the state he is in. A dissenting position in philosophy of mind would have to be handled carefully. It would, most importantly, need to allow for the objectivity of ascriptions of mental predicates at least insofar as it made sense to reject some and accept others on appropriate grounds. Perhaps such a position in the philosophy of mind can be likened in at least one way to what David Wiggins has characterised as a doctrine of ‘cognitive underdetermination’ about moral or practical judgments.[2] In comparing his position of cognitive underdetermination about moral or practical judgments to some things Wittgenstein has said about the philosophy of mathematics, Wiggins suggests that, ‘In the assertibility (or truth) of mathematical statements we see what perhaps we can never see in the assertibility of empirical (such as geographical or historical) statements: the compossibility of objectivity, discovery, and invention.’[3]
Thomasson, Amie L. (2005). First-person knowledge in phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction was designed precisely to find a route to knowledge of the structures of consciousness that was independent of any appeal to observation of one’s own mental states. The goals of this essay are to explicate Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction in contemporary terms that (1) show its distance from all inner-observation accounts, (2) exhibit its kinship to and historical influence on outer-observation accounts of selfknowledge popularized by Sellars, and (3) demonstrate that a contemporary ‘cognitive transformation’ view based on Husserl’s method may provide a viable contribution to contemporary debates about the source of self-knowledge
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Abstract: What is truth? This fascinating spectrum of studies into the various rationalities of our human dealings with life - psychological, aesthetic, economic, spiritual - reveals their joints and calls for a new approach to truth. Putting both classical and contemporary conceptions aside, we find the primogenital ground of truth in the networks of correspondences, adequations, relevancies, and rationales at work in life's becoming. Does this plurivocal differentiation mean that the status of truth is relative? On the contrary, submits Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, given the universal significance of the crucial instrument of the logos of life, "truth is the vortex of life's ontopoietic unfolding"
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Abstract: Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction "Know Yourself" is the basis of all self-regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self-knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, notably, self-deception (§2). Finding none of Kant's solutions to the problem of self-deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self-knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3)
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Wright, C.; Smith, B. & Macdonald, Cynthia (eds.) (2000). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Originally published in print: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2000.
Wright, C. (2000). Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
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Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2005). Putting extrospection to rest. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):658-661.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Jordi Fernández has recently responded to my objection that his 'extrospectionist' account of self-knowledge posits necessary and sufficient conditions for introspective justification which are neither necessary nor sufficient. I show that my criticisms survive his response unscathed.
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2005). Self-verification and the content of thought. Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (2004). Unnatural Access. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):435-38.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jordi Fernandez has recently offered an interesting account of introspective justification according to which the very states that (subjectively) justify one's first-order belief that p justify one's second order belief that one believes that p. I provide two objections to Fernandez's account.