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5.3. The Problem of Other Minds (The Problem of Other Minds on PhilPapers)

See also:
Allen, A. H. B. (1952). Other minds. Mind 61 (243):328-348.   (Google | More links)
Andrews, Kristin (2000). Our understanding of other minds: Theory of mind and the intentional stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett's position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.
Aune, Bruce (1986). Other minds after twenty years. Midwest Studies in Philosophy.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barton Perry, Ralph (1909). The hiddenness of the mind. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (2):29-36.   (Google | More links)
Benton, Jeremy J. (1969). The problem of other minds. Kinesis 2:26-38.   (Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1994). Other minds. In J. Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.   (Google)
Brewer, Bill (2002). Emotion and other minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: What is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? As very preliminary clarification, I mean by ‘emotional experience’ such things as the subjective feeling of being afraid of something, or of being angry at someone. On the side of behavioural expression, I focus on such things as cowering in fear, or shaking a fist or thumping the table in anger. Very crudely, this is behaviour intermediate between the bodily changes which just happen in emotional arousal, such as sweating or the secretion of adrenalin, and reasoned actions done ‘out of an emotion’, such as breathing deeply to clam down, or writing a letter of complaint, for which a standard rationalizing explanation can be given.1 I pursue the relation between this experience and expression in a somewhat roundabout manner. First, I note an analogy between a problem of other minds, and Berkeley’s (1975) challenge to Locke’s (1975) realism. Second, I sketch what I regard as the correct strategy for meeting this challenge. Third, I develop and defend a parallel response to the problem of other minds, as this applies to certain basic directed emotions. This yields the following answer to my opening question. Reference to the appropriate expressive behaviour is essential to the identification of the way in which various emotional experiences present their worldly objects
Buck, R. (1962). Non-other minds. In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Barnes and Noble.   (Google)
Buford, Thomas O. (1970). Essays on Other Minds. University of Illinois Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1998). Computer proof, A Priori knowledge, and other minds. Philosophical Perspectives 12:1-37.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Cornwell, William (online). Making sense of the other: Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Conference Proceedings).   (Google)
Abstract: Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem: how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Other's experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Other's feelings and sensations. Carnap's solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the idea of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each person's being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other. To be human is to be "hard-wired" to make sense of the Other without having to verify the Other's private sensations. I suggest that being-with emerged from an evolutionary imperative for conspecific animals to recognize each other and to coordinate their activities. Wittgenstein also rejected the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a term is its usage and that terms about private sensations were meaningful because they have functions in our language-games. For example, "I'm in pain," like a cry of pain, functions to get the attention of others and motivate others to help. Wittgenstein's theory shows how Dasein's being-with includes "primitive" adaptive behavior such as cries, smiles, and threatening or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors are partially superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions.
de Armey, Michael H. (1982). William James and the problem of other minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20:325-336.   (Google)
de Vignemont, F. (2004). The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):97-114.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different mirror matching mechanisms have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one''s own? I intend in this essay to address the epistemic problem of other minds by developing Ayer''s notion of co-consciousness
Dewan, Edmond M. (1957). Other minds: An application of recent epistemological ideas to the definition of consciousness. Philosophy of Science 24 (January):70-76.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Dilman, Ilham (1975). Matter And Mind: Two Essays In Epistemology. Macmillan.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Donagan, Alan (1966). Other minds and other periods. Journal of Philosophy 63 (October):577-579.   (Google | More links)
Dotterer, Ray H. (1940). Our certainty of other minds. Philosophy of Science 7 (October):442-450.   (Google | More links)
Downes, Chauncey (1965). Husserl and the coherence of the other minds problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (December):253-259.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1973). Perception and other minds. Noûs 7 (March):34-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Duhrssen, Alfred (1963). Philosophic alienation and the problem of other minds. Philosophical Review 69 (2):211-220.   (Google | More links)
Engel, M. (1993). The problem of other minds: A reliable solution. Acta Analytica 11 (11):87-109.   (Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1958). II. other minds and the egocentric predicament. Journal of Philosophy 55 (23):978-987.   (Google | More links)
Fields, Lloyd (1972). Other people's experiences. Philosophical Quarterly 22 (January):29-43.   (Google | More links)
Fulton, James S. (1942). Our knowledge of one another. Philosophical Review 51 (September):456-475.   (Google | More links)
Gallagher, Kenneth T. (1964). Intersubjective knowledge. In The Philosophy of Knowledge.   (Google)
Gardner, Sebastian (1994). Other minds and embodiment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:35-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Garvey, J. C. (1979). Wittgenstein and other minds. Philosophical Studies 26:72-95.   (Google)
Glasgow, W. D. & Pilkington, G. W. (1970). Other minds on evidential necessity. Mind 79 (315):431-35.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Glennan, Stuart S. (1995). Computationalism and the problem of other minds. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):375-88.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I discuss Searle's claim that the computational properties of a system could never cause a system to be conscious. In the first section of the paper I argue that Searle is correct that, even if a system both behaves in a way that is characteristic of conscious agents (like ourselves) and has a computational structure similar to those agents, one cannot be certain that that system is conscious. On the other hand, I suggest that Searle's intuition that it is “empirically absurd” that such a system could be conscious is unfounded. In the second section I show that Searle's attempt to show that a system's computational states could not possibly cause it to be conscious is based upon an erroneous distinction between computational and physical properties. On the basis of these two arguments, I conclude that, supposing that the behavior of conscious agents can be explained in terms of their computational properties, we have good reason to suppose that a system having computational properties similar to such agents is also conscious
Glendinning, Simon (1998). On Being with Others: Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: On Being With Others is an outstanding and compelling work that uncovers one of the key questions in philosophy: how can we claim to have knowledge of minds other than our own? Simon Glendinning's fascinating analysis of this problem argues that it has polarized debate to such an extent that we do not know how to meet Wittgenstein's famous challenge that "to see the behavior of a living thing is to see its soul". This book sets out to discover whether Wittgenstein's remark can be justified by drawing on both the analytic and continental traditions
Gomes, Anil (forthcoming). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry.   (Google)
Abstract: John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
Goodman, Russell B. (1985). Cavell and the problem of other minds. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):43-52.   (Google)
Gregory, Joshua C. (1920). Do we know other minds mediately or immediately? Mind 29 (116):446-457.   (Google | More links)
Green, Mitchell S. (2009). Speech acts, the handicap principle and the expression of psychological states. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them is suited to help us answer our question. I also argue that concepts from the evolutionary biology of communication provide one source of insight into how speech acts enable one to show, and thereby express, a psychological state
Gregory, Joshua C. (1922). Some tendencies of opinion on our knowledge of other minds. Philosophical Review 31 (2):148-163.   (Google | More links)
Hacker, P. M. S. (1972). Other minds and professor Ayer's concept of a person. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (March):341-354.   (Google | More links)
Harnad, Stevan (1991). Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. [Journal (Paginated)] 1 (1):43-54.   (Cited by 99 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is "everything" a body with a mind can do? Turing's original "pen-pal" version (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body
Hardie, C. D. (1939). Our knowledge of other minds. Philosophy of Science 6 (3):309-317.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hasker, William (1971). Theories, analogies, and criteria. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):242-256.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2000). Other minds, rationality and analogy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 74 (74):1-19.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1997). Understanding other minds from inside. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Henslee, Douglas (1982). Methods and other minds. Southwest Philosophical Studies 8 (October):1-8.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1985). On getting to know others. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):257-266.   (Google)
Hoffman, Robert R. (1960). The problem of other minds - genuine or pseudo? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (June):503-512.   (Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (2002). The world is not enough: Shared emotions and other minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Hyde, William H. (1979). Empirical realism and other minds. Philosophical Investigations 2:13-21.   (Google)
Hyslop, Alec (1979). A multiple case inference and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):330-36.   (Google | More links)
Hyslop, Alec (1975). A reply to Don Locke. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-69.   (Google | More links)
Hyslop, Alec (online). Other minds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Alec Hyslop defends a (modified) version of the traditional analogical inference to other minds and rejects alternatives, but only after subjecting each of...
Hyslop, Alec (1970). The identity theory and other minds. Philosophical Forum 2:152-153.   (Google)
Hyslop, Alec (1969). The plight of the inner process. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):385-395.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (2005). First-person and third-person mindreading. In P. Gampieri-Deutsch (ed.), Psychoanalysis as an Empirical, Interdisciplinary Science. Austrian Academy of Sciences.   (Google)
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Karalis, Nicholas (1956). Knowledge of other minds. Review of Metaphysics 9 (June):565-568.   (Google)
Khanom, Hamida (1959). Knowledge of other minds. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 6:122-127.   (Google)
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Kurthen, M. Moskopp; D., Linke & D. B., Reuter (1991). The locked-in syndrome and the behaviorist epistemology of other minds. Theoretical Medicine 12 (March):69-79.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, the problem of correct ascriptions of consciousness to patients in neurological intensive care medicine is explored as a special case of the general philosophical other minds problem. It is argued that although clinical ascriptions of consciousness and coma are mostly based on behavioral evidence, a behaviorist epistemology of other minds is not likely to succeed. To illustrate this, the so-called total locked-in syndrome, in which preserved consciousness is combined with a total loss of motor abilities due to a lower ventral brain stem lesion, is presented as a touchstone for behaviorism. It is argued that this example of consciousness without behavioral expression does not disprove behaviorism specifically, but rather illustrates the need for a non-verificationist theory of other minds. It is further argued that a folk version of such a theory already underlies our factual ascriptions of consciousness in clinical contexts. Finally, a non-behaviorist theory of other minds for patients with total locked-in syndrome is outlined
Lenman, James (1994). Beliefs about other minds: A pragmatic justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):223-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Lindsay, James E. (1917). The knowledge of other minds. Philosophical Review 26 (5):545-547.   (Google | More links)
Locke, Don (1968). Myself and Others: A Study in Our Knowledge of Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Loizzo, Joseph (1997). Intersubjectivity in Wittgenstein and Freud: Other minds and the foundations of psychiatry. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 18 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Intersubjectivity, the cooperation of two or more minds, is basic to human behavior, yet eludes the grasp of psychiatry. This paper traces the dilemma to the problem of other minds assumed with the epistemologies of modern science. It presents the solution of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, known for his treatment of other minds in terms of human agreement in language.Unlike recent studies of Wittgenstein's psychology, this one reviews the Philosophical Investigations' private language argument, the crux of his mature views on mind. It reads that argument as recording his shift from the modern egocentric paradigm of mind to an intersubjective one
Long, Douglas C. (1979). Agents, mechanisms, and other minds. In Body, Mind And Method. Dordrecht: Reidel.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the goals of physiologists who study the detailed physical, chemical,and neurological mechanisms operating within the human body is to understand the intricate causal processes which underlie human abilities and activities. It is doubtless premature to predict that they will eventually be able to explain the behaviour of a particular human being as we might now explain the behaviour of a pendulum clock or even the invisible changes occurring within the hardware of a modern electronic computer. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that hovering in the background of investigations into human physiology is the promise or threat, depending upon how one looks at the matter that human beings are complete physical-chemical systems and that all events taking place within their bodies and all movements of their bodies could be accounted for by physical causes if we but knew enough. I am not concerned at the moment with whether or not this ’mechanistic’ hypothesis is true, assuming that it is clear enough to be intelligible, nor with whether or not we could ever know that it is true. I wish to consider the somewhat more accessible yet equally important question whether our coming to believe that the hypothesis is true would warrant our relinquishing our conception of ourselves as beings who are capable of acting for reasons to achieve ends of our own choosing. I use the word ’warrant’ to indicate that I will not be discussing the possibility that believing the mechanistic hypothesis might lead us, as a matter of psychological fact, to think of human beings as mere automata, as objects whose movements are to be explained only by causes rather than by reasons, as are the actions of a personal subject. I intend to consider only whether the acceptance of mechanism would in fact justify such a change in conception
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McGinn, Colin (1984). What is the problem of other minds? Aristotelian Society Proceedings 58:119-37.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) constructivist account needs greater emphasis on how individual differences in caregivers' impact on the efficacy of epistemic triangle interaction in fostering children's understanding of mind. Caregivers' attunement to their infants' mental states and their willingness to enable infants to participate in exchanges about the mind are posited as important determinants of effective epistemic triangle interaction
Mellor, W. W. (1956). Three problems about other minds. Mind 65 (April):200-217.   (Google | More links)
Misak, C. J. (1995). Verificationism: Its History and Prospects. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Verificationism is the first comprehensive history of a concept that dominated philosophy and scientific methodology between the 1930s and 1960s,surveying the precursors,the main proponents and the rehabilitators. This title available in eBook format. Click here for more information . Visit our eBookstore at:
Morick, Harold (ed.) (1967). Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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O'Connell, Sanjida (1998). Mindreading: An Investigation Into How We Learn to Love and Lie. Doubleday.   (Google)
Abstract: "I know what you're thinking," we say, but how do we know what others are thinking or feeling? Because evolution has granted us what has come to be known as "Theory of Mind," the ability not only to be self-aware but aware of others' consciousness. Theory of Mind develops slowly-and in some cases, such as autism, develops little or not at all. Theory of Mind allows us to interact socially, to care about others, to manage our behavior in groups, to fall in love, and--less admirably--it allows us to lie. Some of the subject matter covered in Mindreading: You are less likely to detect lies told to you by your longterm partner than by a new acquaintance.Female babies react more strongly and more often to another baby's cries than male babies. In other words, female children are more predisposed to become personally distressed by emotion in others and to cry in sympathy.In general, the female brain is superior to the male brain when it comes to social relationships; the male brain is better at spatial skills. People with autism follow the male trend, but to a much greater extreme.Autistics, like many normal men, collect things, focus on what seems to others to be trivial detail, and have a narrow range of interests. Could autism be an extreme form of the male brain?For evolutionary reasons, you should take very good care to detect eye gaze, because when another animal is looking at you it can mean one of the three 'F's. Either the animal wants to fight you, feed on you, or mate with you
Overgaard, Søren (2005). Rethinking other minds: Wittgenstein and Levinas on expression. Inquiry 48 (3):249 – 274.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One reason why the problem of other minds keeps cropping up in modern philosophy is that we seem to have conflicting intuitions about our access to the mental lives of others. On the one hand, we are inclined to think that it is wrong to claim, like Cartesian dualists must, that the minds of others are essentially inaccessible to direct experience. But on the other hand we feel that it is equally wrong to claim, like the behaviorists, that the mental lives of others are completely accessible to an outside spectator. This paper attempts to address the problem of the accessibility of other minds while staying faithful to both these intuitions. Central to this undertaking is the idea that we express our mental lives in our bodily behavior. With a firm grasp of the notion of expression, as it is developed in the writings of Wittgenstein and Levinas, we can understand how other minds can be directly perceivable and yet retain a certain inaccessibility. The key is to emphasize the difference between the expressive appearance of a human being and the way an object appears in perception
Overgaard, Søren (2006). The problem of other minds: Wittgenstein's phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):53-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper discusses Wittgenstein's take on the problem of other minds. In opposition to certain widespread views that I collect under the heading of the “No Problem Interpretation,” I argue that Wittgenstein does address some problem of other minds. However, Wittgenstein's problem is not the traditional epistemological problem of other minds; rather, it is more reminiscent of the issue of intersubjectivity as it emerges in the writings of phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. This is one sense in which Wittgenstein's perspective on other minds might be called “phenomenological.” Yet there is another sense as well, in that Wittgenstein's positive views on this issue resemble the views defended by phenomenologists. The key to a proper philosophical grasp of intersubjectivity, on both views, lies in rethinking the mind. If we conceive of minds as essentially embodied we can understand how intersubjectivity is possible
Overgaard, Søren (2007). Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: A compelling new approach to the problem that has haunted twentieth century philosophy in both its analytical and continental shapes. No other book addresses as thoroughly the parallels between Wittgenstein and leading Continental philosophers such as Levinas, Husserl, and Heidegger
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Abstract: Intrigues: From Being to the Other examines the possibility of writing the other, explores whether an ethical writing that preserves the other as such is possible, and discusses what the implications are for an ethically inflected criticism. Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, whose works constitute the most thorough contemporary exploration of the question of the other and of its relation to writing, are the main focus of this study. The book's horizon is ethics in the Levinasian sense: the question of the other, which, on the hither side of language understood as a system of signs and of representation, must be welcomed by language and preserved in its alterity. Martin Heidegger is an unavoidable reference, however. While it is true that for the German philosopher Being is an immanent production, his elucidation of a more essential understanding of Being entails a deconstruction of onto-theology, of the sign and the grammatical and logical determinations of language, all decisive starting points for both Levinas and Blanchot.At stake for both Levinas and Blanchot, then, is how to mark a nondiscursive excess within discourse without erasing or reducing it. How should one read and write the other in the same without reducing the other to the same?Critics in recent years have discussed an "ethical moment or turn" characterized by the other's irruption into the order of discourse. The other becomes a true crossroads of disciplines, since it affects several aspects of discourse: the constitution of the subject, the status of knowledge, the nature of representation, and what that representation represses (gender, power). Yet there has been a tendency to graft the other onto paradigms whose main purpose is to reassess questions of identity, fundamentally in terms of representation; the other thus loses some of its most crucial features.Through close readings of texts by Heidegger, Levinas, and Blanchot the book examines how the question of the other engages the very limits of philosophy, rationality, and power
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Abstract: This paper compares the treatment of other minds in Strawson and Sartre. Both discussions are presented here as transcendental arguments, and some striking parallels between them are brought out. However the primary significance of the alignment lies in the difference that emerges between two forms of transcendental proof, with the phenomenological treatment in Sartre promising to yield a stronger conclusion than Strawson's argument. The paper goes some way towards bringing out this difference
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Abstract: The force of sceptical inquiries into out knowledge of other people is a paradigm of the force that philosophical views can have. Sceptical views arise out of philosophical inquiries that are identical in all major respects with inquiries that we employ in ordinary cases. These inquiries employ perfectly mundane methods of making and assessing claims to know. This paper tries to show that these inquiries are conducted in cases that lack certain contextual ingredients found in ordinary cases. The paper concludes that these ordinary methods of inquiry, when employed in these limited cases, put us in a position in which we actually cannot know. Thus our ability to know will be a function of the added contextual elements that are found in ordinary cases. A second conclusion is that we come literally to observe bodily behaviour in the course of the sceptical inquiry; while in ordinary cases we observe pain-behaviour
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Smythe, Thomas W. (1983). Our knowledge of other minds. Philosophia 13 (September):35-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Spencer, W. W. (1930). Our Knowledge of Other Minds. Yale University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Spencer, W. W. (1927). Our knowledge of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 24 (9):225-237.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1992). Ayer on other minds. In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer. Open Court.   (Google)
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Abstract: Brain damage can cause massive changes in consciousness levels. From a clinical and ethical point of view it is desirable to assess the level of residual consciousness in unresponsive patients. However, no direct measure of consciousness exists, so we run into the philosophical problem of other minds. Neurologists often make implicit use of a Turing test-like procedure in an attempt to gain access to damaged minds, by monitoring and interpreting neurobehavioral responses. New brain imaging techniques are now being developed that permit communication with unresponsive patients, using their brain signals as carriers of messages relating to their mental states
Stratton, Melville (1974). On time and other minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (December):211-222.   (Google | More links)
Smith, Joel (forthcoming). Transcendental Arguments and Other Minds. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. OUP.   (Google)
Abstract: I critically discuss Strawson's transcendental argument against other minds scepticism, and look at the prospects for a naturalised version of it.
Smith, Joel (forthcoming). The Conceptual Problem of Other Bodies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.   (Google)
Abstract: It is a condition of a plausible account of concepts of mental states that their meaning be univocal across first- and third-person cases. That is, the thought about another person, 'They are Ψ', must employ the very same concept, Ψ, as the thought about oneself, 'I am Ψ'. However, it has often been suggested that there is a problem in showing how this condition could be satisfied. This is the, so called, conceptual problem of other minds. But it is not immediately obvious why the demand for univocity in mental concepts should be considered problematic. Indeed, 'the' problem is often articulated in a number of quite different ways. In section 2 I sketch two ways of understanding the problem, arguing that one is to be preferred. In sections 3 and 4 I outline two responses to the problem, the Behavioural Demonstrative view held by Brewer and the Perceptual view held by Pickard and Cassam. I argue that each is incomplete as it offers no account of the univocity of concepts of bodily behaviour. That is, there is an unanswered 'conceptual problem of other bodies'. In section 5 I outline Peacocke's Interlocking Account, arguing that whilst it is not subject to precisely the same concern as are the Behavioural Demonstrative and Perceptual views, a closely related objection can be raised in relation to its account of the epistemology of other-ascriptions of mental concepts. Due to limitations of space I do not offer a solution to the conceptual problem of other bodies. My aim is the modest one of arguing that a solution to it is needed if we are to make headway with the conceptual problem of other minds.
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Thalberg, Irving (1969). Other times, other places, other minds. Philosophical Studies 20 (January-February):23-29.   (Google | More links)
Thalberg, Irving (1961). Telepathy. Analysis 21 (January):49-53.   (Google)
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Treanor, Brian (2006). Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel, and the Contemporary Debate. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: "Every other is truly other, but no other is wholly other." This is the claim that Aspects of Alterity defends. Taking up the question of otherness that so fascinates contemporary continental philosophy, this book asks what it means for something or someone to be other than the self. Levinas and those influenced by him point out that the philosophical tradition of the West has generally favored the self at the expense of the other. Such a self-centered perspective never encounters the other qua other, however. In response, postmodern thought insists on the absolute otherness of the other, epitomized by the deconstructive claim "every other is wholly other." But absolute otherness generates problems and aporias of its own. This has led some thinkers to reevaluate the notion of relative otherness in light of the postmodern critique, arguing for a chiastic account that does justice to both the alterity and the similitude of the other. These latter two positions--absolute otherness and a rehabilitated account of relative otherness--are the main contenders in the contemporary debate.The philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas and Gabriel Marcel provide the point of embarkation for coming to understand the two positions on this question. Levinas and Marcel were contemporaries whose philosophies exhibit remarkably similar concern for the other but nevertheless remain fundamentally incompatible. Thus, these two thinkers provide a striking illustration of both the proximity of and the unbridgeable gap between two accounts of otherness.Aspects of Alterity delves into this debate, first in order understand the issues at stake in these two positions and second to determine which description better accounts for the experience of encountering the other.After a thorough assessment and critique of otherness in Levinas's and Marcel's work, including a discussion of the relationship of ethical alterity to theological assumptions, Aspects of Alterity traces the transmission and development of these two conceptions of otherness. Levinas's version of otherness can be seen in the work of Jacques Derrida and John D. Caputo, while Marcel's understanding of otherness influences the work of Paul Ricoeur and Richard Kearney.Ultimately, Aspects of Alterity makes a case for a hermeneutic account of otherness. Otherness itself is not absolute, but is a chiasm of alterity and similitude. Properly articulated, such an account is capable of addressing the legitimate ethical and epistemological concerns that lead thinkers to construe otherness in absolute terms, but without the "absolute aporias" that accompany such a characterization.
Ullian, Joe (1957). Karalis and other minds. Review of Metaphysics 10 (March):525-528.   (Google)
Urban, Wilbur M. (1917). The knowledge of other minds and the problem of meaning and value. Philosophical Review 26 (3):274-296.   (Google | More links)
Vendler, Zeno (1984). The Matter of Minds. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Vesey, Godfrey Norman Agmondisham (1973). Other Minds? Bletchley,Open University Press.   (Google)
Waldow, Anik (2009). David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Other minds and their place in the Hume-literature -- A modern approach -- Scepticism versus naturalism -- The vulgar and the philosopher -- Relative ideas -- Concepts of the real -- Intuition and common sense -- Epistemic responsibility -- Degeneration of reason -- Just philosophy -- Conceiving minds -- Abstraction -- Argument from analogy -- Sympathy -- Limitations -- Generality -- Hume's concept of mind -- The world and the other -- Habit and intersubjective responsiveness -- Belief and education -- Mental facts -- Signs of mind and world -- The belief-grounding function of sympathy -- Corrigibility of belief -- Cognitive architecture.
Ward, Keith (1970). The ascription of experiences. Mind 79 (July):415-420.   (Google | More links)
Weinberg, Julius (1946). Our knowledge of other minds. Philosophical Review 60 (September):35-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Weinzweig, Marjorie (1962). Our knowledge of other minds: A pseudo-problem? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (September):250-255.   (Google | More links)
Wellman, C. (1961). Our criteria for third-person psychological sentences. Journal of Philosophy 58 (May):281-93.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Wisdom, John O. (1946). Other minds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 20:122-47.   (Google)
Wisdom, John (1941). Other minds (II.): "But this is different". Mind 50 (197):1-21.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John (1941). Other minds (III.). Mind 50 (198):97-121.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John (1940). Other minds (I.). Mind 49 (196):369-402.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John (1941). Other minds (IV.). Mind 50 (199):209-242.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John O. (1941). Other minds, part IV. Mind 50 (July):209-242.   (Google)
Wisdom, John O. (1940). Other minds, part I. Mind 49 (October):369-402.   (Google)
Wisdom, John O. (1942). Other minds, part VI. Mind 51 (January):1-17.   (Google)
Wisdom, John O. (1943). Other minds, part VIII. Mind 52 (October):289-313.   (Google)
Wisdom, John (1941). Other minds (V.). Mind 50 (200):313-329.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John (1942). Other minds (VI.). Mind 51 (201):1-17.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John (1943). Other minds (VII.). Mind 52 (207):193-211.   (Google | More links)
Wisdom, John (1943). Other minds (VIII.). Mind 52 (208):289-313.   (Google | More links)
Wollheim, Richard (1951). Privacy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51:83-104.   (Google)
Young, Gary (1972). Castaneda on other minds. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):58-67.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Zahavi, Dan (2001). Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):151-67.   (Google)
Abstract: Drawing on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Sartre, this article presents an overview of some of the diverse approaches to intersubjectivity that can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Starting with a brief description of Scheler’s criticism of the argument from analogy, the article continues by showing that the phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity involve much more than a ‘solution’ to the ‘traditional’ problem of other minds. Intersubjectivity doesn’t merely concern concrete face-to-face encounters between individuals. It is also something that is at play in simple perception, in tool-use, in emotions, drives and different types of self-awareness. Ultimately, the phenomenologists would argue that a treatment of intersubjectivity requires a simultaneous analysis of the relationship between subjec- tivity and world. It is not possible simply to insert intersubjectivity somewhere within an already established ontology; rather, the three regions ‘self’, ‘others’, and ‘world’ belong together; they reciprocally illuminate one another, and can only be under- stood in their interconnection
Zemach, Eddy M. (1966). Sensations, raw feels, and other minds. Review of Metaphysics 20 (December):317-40.   (Google)
Ziff, P. (1965). The simplicity of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 62 (October):575-84.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)

5.3a Analogy and Other Minds

Alexander, Peter (1950). Other people's experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51:25-46.   (Google)
Ameriks, Karl (1973). Plantinga and other minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16:285-91.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Aune, Bruce (1961). The problem of other minds. Philosophical Review 70 (July):320-339.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Belford, Jules (1972). A note on Hampshire's analogy. Mind 81 (October):600.   (Google | More links)
Budlong, Theodore W. (1975). Analogy, induction and other minds. Analysis 35 (January):111-112.   (Google)
Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1962). Criteria, analogy, and knowledge of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 59 (September):533-546.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Feigl, Herbert (1959). Other minds and the egocentric predicament. Journal of Philosophy 56:980-87.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Frankel, Melissa (2009). Something-we-know-not-what, something-we-know-not-why: Berkeley, meaning and minds. Philosophia 37 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea of it, then one cannot speak meaningfully of it. But if this is Berkeley’s position, then there is a puzzle, because Berkeley also explicitly claims that it is impossible to perceive/have ideas of minds. So if he is relying on a criterion on which terms get their meaning by referring to ideas, then, just as Berkeley rejects talk of material substance, so, too, must he reject talk of mental substance. Famously, however, Berkeley insists that there is no parity between the cases of material and mental substance. It is typically suggested that the disparity between matter and minds rests on the fact that although one cannot strictly speaking perceive minds, nonetheless Berkeley thinks that one can have experiential access to minds via reflection, and that this access allows for meaningful talk of minds. Of course, one can only have reflective experience of one’s own mind. But what of other minds, which one cannot reflectively experience? Here the usual tactic is to suppose that, although one cannot have direct reflective experience of other minds, nonetheless one can indirectly experience such minds via analogy to our own minds, and that this indirect experience grounds the meaningfulness of talk of other minds. In this paper, I argue that the reasoning behind Berkeley’s ‘likeness principle,’ that an idea can only be like another idea, can be generalized to argue against this experience-based account of our access to other minds. I claim instead that Berkeley allows for the meaningfulness of talk of other minds by expanding the criterion of meaning in a different way. I argue that Berkeley holds a criterion of meaning on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies either an object of experience or an object that one has reason to posit on the basis of experience, i.e., an object that is necessary to explain our experiences. When an object is neither experienced nor explains our experiences, then and only then is Berkeley willing to reject it as meaningless. Thus he writes of “the word matter,” that “it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us: and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about we know not what, and we know not why” (Principles, §77.) The word is not meaningless merely because we do not know what matter might be; it is meaningless because we also do not know why it should be. Correspondingly, I argue that the term ‘mind’ is meaningful because although we have no experience of minds, nonetheless they play an important role in explaining our experiences
Gotlind, Erik (1954). Mr Hampshire on the analogy of feeling. Mind 63 (October):519-524.   (Google | More links)
Hampshire, Stuart N. (1952). The analogy of feeling. Mind 61 (January):1-12.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Hyslop, Alec & Jackson, Frank (1972). The analogical inference to other minds. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (June):168-76.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Locke, Don (1973). Just what is wrong with the argument from analogy? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (August):153-56.   (Google | More links)
Meiland, J. W. (1966). Analogy, verification, and other minds. Mind 75 (October):564-568.   (Google | More links)
Olshewsky, Thomas M. (1974). The analogical argument for knowledge of other minds reconsidered. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):63-69.   (Google)
Prior, Stephen & Rosenmeier, Henrik (1979). Other minds and the argument from. Philosophical Investigations 2:12-33.   (Google)
Prior, Stephen & Rosenmeier, Henrik (1979). Other minds and the arment from analogy. Philosophical Investigations 2:12-33.   (Google)
Sayward, Charles (2003). A defense of mill on other minds. Dialectica 57 (3):315–322.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
Sikora, Richard I. (1977). The argument from analogy is not an argument for other mnds. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):137-41.   (Google)
Thomson, James F. (1951). The argument from analogy and the problem of other minds. Mind 60:336-50.   (Google)
Wollheim, Richard (1952). Hampshire's analogy. Mind 61 (October):567-573.   (Google | More links)

5.3b Abduction and Other Minds

Hyslop, Alec (1976). Other minds as theoretical entities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (August):158-61.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Melnyk, Andrew (1994). Inference to the best explanation and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):482-91.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ostein, P. A. (1974). God, other minds, and the inference to the best explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:149-62.   (Google)
Pargetter, Robert (1984). The scientific inference to other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (June):158-63.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Stemmer, Nathan (1987). The hypothesis of other minds: Is it the best explanation? Philosophical Studies 51 (January):109-121.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

5.3c Criteria and Other Minds

Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2008). Insects and the problem of simple minds: Are bees natural zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8).   (Google | More links)
Arrington, Robert L. (1979). Criteria and entailment. Ratio 21 (June):62-72.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1962). Criteria, analogy, and knowledge of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 59 (September):533-546.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hall, Harrison B. (1976). Criteria, perception and other minds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):257-274.   (Google)
Hyslop, Alec (1973). Criteria and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (August):105-14.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1958). Knowledge of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 55 (September):35-52.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Sayward, Charles (2004). Malcolm on criteria. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):349-358.   (Google)
Temkin, J. (1990). Wittgenstein on criteria and other minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:561-93.   (Google)

5.3d Direct Knowledge and Other Minds

Duddington, Nathalie A. (1921). Do we know other minds mediately or immediately? Mind 30 (118):195-197.   (Google | More links)
Gomes, Anil (2009). Other minds and perceived identity. Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds
Green, Mitchell S. (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, the philosophy of language, social psychology, pragmatics, aesthetics, and neuroscience to present a stimulating and accessible interdisciplinary work
Malmgren, Helge (1976). Immediate knowledge of other minds. Theoria 42:189-205.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McNeill, William E. S. (forthcoming). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis.

I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you see that James is angry in the first way, your knowledge is inferential. If you see that James is angry in the second way, your knowledge is not inferential. These are different ways of knowing that James is angry. So the Perceptual Hypothesis alone does not adequately answer the question of how you know that fact. To ascertain how you know it, we need to decide whether or not you saw his anger.

This is an epistemological argument. But it has consequences for a theory of perception. It implies that there is a determinate fact about which features of an object you see. This fact is made true independently of what you come to know by seeing.

In the final section of the paper, I seek to undermine various ways in which the claim that you see James’ anger may be thought implausible.
Smith, Joel (forthcoming). Seeing Other People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: I present a perceptual account of other minds that combines a Husserlian insight about perceptual experience with a functionalist account of mental properties.
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2004). Direct knowledge and other minds. Theoria 70 (2-3):271-293.   (Google | More links)
Zahavi, Dan (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):514-522.   (Google)
Abstract: Simulationists have recently started to employ the term "empathy" when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler's classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding - in particular the understanding of emotional expressions - that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines

5.3e Induction and Other Minds

Andrews, Kristin (2000). Our understanding of other minds: theory of mind and the intentional stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett's position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.
Ayer, A. J. (1953). One's knowledge of other minds. Theoria 13 (September):35-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Budlong, Theodore W. (1975). Analogy, induction and other minds. Analysis 35 (January):111-112.   (Google)
Everett, Theodore J. (2000). Other voices, other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):213-222.   (Google | More links)
Gellman, Jerome I. (1974). Inductive evidence for other minds. Philosophical Studies 25 (July):323-336.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Plantinga, Alvin (1966). Induction and other minds. Review of Metaphysics 19 (March):441-61.   (Google)
Plantinga, Alvin (1968). Induction and other minds II. Review of Metaphysics 12 (March):524-33.   (Google)
Ray, Peter (1976). An inductive argument for other minds. Philosophical Studies 29 (February):129-139.   (Google | More links)
Schlesinger, George N. (1974). Induction and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):3-21.   (Google | More links)
Slote, Michael A. (1966). Induction and other minds. Review of Metaphysics 20 (December):341-60.   (Google)

5.3f Other Minds, Misc

Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2010). Blindsight in Monkeys: Lost and (perhaps) found. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Stoerig and Cowey’s work is widely regarded as showing that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly persuasively argue that the experimental results are compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing only a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised procedure which can distinguish these hypotheses, and offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis provides a superior explanation. The study of blindsight might contribute towards a general investigation into animal consciousness, though there is a problem when it comes to showing how a non-verbal animal can indicate whether or not it is perceiving consciously. Perhaps whether there is something that it is like to be a given animal depends on whether it exhibits the cognitive profile of conscious vision as opposed to non-conscious “natural blindsight.”
Aune, Bruce (1963). On thought and feeling. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):1-12.   (Google | More links)
Cook, John R. (2009). Mindblindness and Radical Interpretation in Davidson. Analecta Hermeneutica 1:15-34.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper reviews some of the arguments put forward by some psychologists in which they come to the conclusion that autistic individuals suffer from mindblindness, and also looks at one particular implication these sorts of individuals pose for Donald Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation. It has been claimed that a particular manifestation of mindblindness in autistic people serves as a counter example to claims Davidson has made about the relation between belief and intention in linguistic competence.
Ellis, Brian (1976). Avowals are more corrigible than you think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (August):201-5.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Harnad, Stevan (1984). Verifying machines' minds. Contemporary Psychology 29:389 - 391.   (Google)
Abstract: he question of the possibility of artificial consciousness is both very new and very old. It is new in the context of contemporary cognitive science and its concern with whether a machine can be conscious; it is old in the form of the mind/body problem and the "other minds" problem of philosophy. Contemporary enthusiasts proceed at their peril if they ignore or are ignorant of the false starts and blind alleys that the older thinkers have painfully worked through
Reynolds, Jack (2010). Problems of other minds: Solutions and dissolutions in analytic and continental philosophy. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):326-335.   (Google)
Abstract: While there is a great diversity of treatments of other minds and inter-subjectivity within both analytic and continental philosophy, this article specifies some of the core structural differences between these treatments. Although there is no canonical account of the problem of other minds that can be baldly stated and that is exhaustive of both traditions, the problem(s) of other minds can be loosely defined in family resemblances terms. It seems to have: (1) an epistemological dimension (How do we know that others exist? Can we justifiably claim to know that they do?); (2) an ontological dimension that incorporates issues having to do with personal identity (What is the structure of our world such that inter-subjectivity is possible? What are the fundamental aspects of our relations to others? How do they impact upon our self-identity?); and (3) A conceptual dimension in that it depends on one's answer to the question what is a mind (How does the mind – or the concept of 'mind'– relate to the brain, the body and the world?). While these three issues are co-imbricated, I will claim that analytic engagements with the problem of other minds focus on (1), whereas continental philosophers focus far more on (2). In addition, this article will also point to various other downstream consequences of this, including the preoccupation with embodiment and forms of expressivism that feature heavily in various forms of continental philosophy, and which generally aim to ground our relations with others in a pre-reflective manner of inhabiting the world that is said to be the condition of reflection and knowledge

5.3g Private Language and Other Minds

Addis, Mark R. (1999). Wittgenstein: Making Sense of Other Minds. Ashgate.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The difficulties about other minds are deep and of central philosophical importance. This text explores attempts to apply Wittgenstein's concept of criteria in explaining how we can know other minds and their properties. It is shown that the use of criteria for this purpose is misguided.
Mclaughlin, William J. (1970). Private languages and other minds. Personalist 51:338-354.   (Google)
van De Vate Jr, Dwight (1966). Other minds and the uses of language. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (July):250-254.   (Google)