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5.3d. Direct Knowledge and Other Minds (Direct Knowledge and Other Minds on PhilPapers)

Duddington, Nathalie A. (1921). Do we know other minds mediately or immediately? Mind 30 (118):195-197.   (Google | More links)
Gomes, Anil (2009). Other minds and perceived identity. Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds
Green, Mitchell S. (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, the philosophy of language, social psychology, pragmatics, aesthetics, and neuroscience to present a stimulating and accessible interdisciplinary work
Malmgren, Helge (1976). Immediate knowledge of other minds. Theoria 42:189-205.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McNeill, William E. S. (forthcoming). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis.

I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you see that James is angry in the first way, your knowledge is inferential. If you see that James is angry in the second way, your knowledge is not inferential. These are different ways of knowing that James is angry. So the Perceptual Hypothesis alone does not adequately answer the question of how you know that fact. To ascertain how you know it, we need to decide whether or not you saw his anger.

This is an epistemological argument. But it has consequences for a theory of perception. It implies that there is a determinate fact about which features of an object you see. This fact is made true independently of what you come to know by seeing.

In the final section of the paper, I seek to undermine various ways in which the claim that you see James’ anger may be thought implausible.
Smith, Joel (forthcoming). Seeing Other People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: I present a perceptual account of other minds that combines a Husserlian insight about perceptual experience with a functionalist account of mental properties.
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2004). Direct knowledge and other minds. Theoria 70 (2-3):271-293.   (Google | More links)
Zahavi, Dan (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):514-522.   (Google)
Abstract: Simulationists have recently started to employ the term "empathy" when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler's classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding - in particular the understanding of emotional expressions - that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines