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5.4. Free Will (Free Will on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alexander, Patrick Proctor (1866). Mill and Carlyle: An Examination of Mr. John Stuart Mill's Doctrine of Causation in Relation to Moral Freedom with an Occasional Discourse on Sauerteig by Smelfungus [I.E. P. P. Alexander]. Norwood Editions.   (Google)
Anselm, (1977). St. Anselm's Treatise on Free Will: The Booke of Seynt Anselme Which Treatith of Free Wylle Translated in to Englysche: A Facsimile of the Complete Text of a Recently Discovered 15th C. Manuscript. Toucan Press.   (Google)
Baxter, Donald L. M. (1989). Free choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):12-24.   (Google | More links)
Berndtson, Arthur (1942). The Problem of Free-Will in Recent Philosophy. Chicago, Ill..   (Google)
Blumenfeld, David C. (1988). Freedom and mind control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Blum, Alex (2000). N. Analysis 60 (3):284-286.   (Google)
Bowes, Pratima (1971). Consciousness And Freedom: Three Views. London,: Methuen.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bradley, R. D. (1958). Free will: Problem of pseudo-problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):33 – 45.   (Google)
Bradley, Raymond (ms). The meaning of life reflections on God, immortality, and free will.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers, and other thinking people, have long pondered three grand questions about the nature of reality and our status and significance within it
Browne, S. S. S. (1942). Paralogisms of the free-will problem. Journal of Philosophy 39 (19):513-520.   (Google | More links)
Broad, C. D. (1919). The notion of a general will. Mind 28 (112):502-504.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Buss, Sarah (online). Personal autonomy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that when our intentions are not under our own control, we suffer from self-alienation. What conditions must be satisfied in order to ensure that we govern ourselves when we act? Philosophers have offered a wide range of competing answers to this question.
Campbell, C. A. (1967). In Defence of Free Will. London, Allen & Unwin.   (Google)
Campbell, C. A. (1963). Professor Smart on free-will, praise and blame; a reply. Mind 72 (287):400-405.   (Google | More links)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1986). Free will and intentional action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.   (Google | More links)
Cherkasova, Evgenia V. (2004). Kant on free will and arbitrariness: A view from dostoevsky's underground. Philosophy and Literature 28 (2).   (Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2007). The appearance of freedom. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):51 – 57.   (Google)
Collins, Anthony (1976). Determinism and Freewill: Anthony Collins' a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty: With a Discussion of the Opinions of Hobbes, Locke, Pierre Bayle, William King and Leibniz. Nijhoff.   (Google)
Costa, Claudio F. (2006). Free will and the soft constraints of reason. Ratio 19 (1):1-23.   (Google | More links)
Cover, J. & Hawthorne, John (1996). Free agency and materialism. In Daniel Howard-Snyder & J. Scott Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman and Littlefield.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cudworth, Ralph (1838). A Treatise of Freewill and an Introduction to Cudworth's Treatise. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Danto, Arthur C. (1959). The paradigm case argument and the free-will problem. Ethics 69 (2):120-124.   (Google | More links)
Davidson, Martin (1937). Free Will or Determinism. London, Watts & Co..   (Google)
Davis, William Hatcher (1971). The Freewill Question. The Hague,Nijhoff.   (Google)
Davidson, Martin (1942). The Free Will Controversy. London, Watts.   (Google)
Davis, Wayne A. (1991). The world-shift theory of free choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):206-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davenport, John J. (2007). Will as Commitment and Resolve: An Existential Account of Creativity, Love, Virtue, and Happiness. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve , Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the contrast between "eastern" and "western" attitudes toward assertive willing, Davenport traces the lineage of the idea of projective motivation from NeoPlatonic and Christian conceptions of divine motivation to Scotus, Kant, Marx, Arendt, and Levinas. Rich with historical detail, this book includes an extended examination of Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonist theories of human motivation. Drawing on contemporary critiques of egoism, Davenport argues that happiness is primarily a byproduct of activities and pursuits aimed at other agent-transcending goods for their own sake. In particular, the motives involved in virtue and in its practice as understood by Alasdair MacIntyre are projective rather than eudaimonist. This theory is supported by analyses of radical evil, accounts of intrinsic motivation in existential psychology, and contemporary theories of identity-forming commitment in analytic moral psychology. Following Viktor Frankl, Joseph Raz, and others, Davenport argues that Harry Frankfurt's conception of caring requires objective values worth caring about, which serve as rational grounds for projecting new final ends. The argument concludes with a taxonomy of values or goods, devotion to which can make life meaningful for us
Daw, Russell & Alter, Torin (2001). Free acts and robot cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
Denyer, Nicholas (1981). Time, Action & Necessity: A Proof of Free Will. Duckworth.   (Google)
Dewitt, Larry W. (1973). The hidden assumption in MacKay's logical paradox concerning free will. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):402-405.   (Google | More links)
Dilley, Frank B. (1969). Predictability and free will. International Philosophical Quarterly 9 (June):205-213.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Dorschel, Andreas (2002). The authority of the will. Philosophical Forum 33 (3-4):425-442.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1994). How to frame the free will problem. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):149-72.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1999). In defense of the Smart aleck: A reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9.   (Google)
Dretske, Fred (1992). The metaphysics of freedom. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-13.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Duggan, Timothy J. & Gert, Bernard (1979). Free will as the ability to will. Noûs 13:197-217.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Edwards, Jonathan (1797). A Dissertation Concerning Liberty & Necessity. New York,B. Franklin Reprints.   (Google)
Edwards, Jonathan (1984). Freedom of the Will. Franklin Library.   (Google)
Enteman, Willard F. (1967). The Problem of Free Will. New York, Scribner.   (Google)
Euangelou, Iasōn[from old catalog] (1975). Eleutheria Tēs Voulēseōs.   (Google)
Ewing, Alfred C. (1951). Indeterminism. Review of Metaphysics 5 (December):199-222.   (Google)
Fain, Haskell (1958). Prediction and constraint. Mind 67 (July):366-378.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Federman, Asaf (2010). What kind of free will did the Buddha teach? Philosophy East and West 60 (1):pp. 1-19.   (Google)
Felt, James W. (1994). Making Sense of Your Freedom: Philosophy for the Perplexed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ferre, Frederick P. (1973). Self-determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (July):165-176.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fisk, Samuel (1973). Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. Neptune, N.J.,Loizeaux Bros..   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1986). Power necessity. Philosophical Topics 14 (2):77-91.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1985). Scotism. Mind 94 (April):231-243.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Forrest, Peter (1985). Backwards causation in defense of free will. Mind 94 (April):210-17.   (Google | More links)
Freydberg, Bernard (2008). Schelling's Dialogical Freedom Essay: Provocative Philosophy Then and Now. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The unfolding of the task -- Freedom, pantheism, and idealism -- The account of the possibility of evil -- The account of the actuality of freedom -- The description of the manifestation of evil in man -- God as moral beingthe nature of the whole with respect to freedom -- Indifference and the birth of love.
Galton, Francis (1884). Free-will--observations and inferences. Mind 9 (35):406-413.   (Google | More links)
Garrett, K. Richard (1985). Elbow room in a functional analysis: Freedom and dignity regained. Behaviorism 13:21-36.   (Google)
Gemes, Ken (2009). Nietzsche on free will, autonomy, and the sovereign individual. In Ken Gemes & Simon May (eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gibbs, Robert (ed.) (2006). Hermann Cohen's Ethics. Brill.   (Google)
Glannon, Walter (1995). Responsibility and the principle of possible action. Journal of Philosophy 92 (5):261-274.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Gleason Spaulding, Edward (1933). Freedom, necessity, and mind. Philosophical Review 42 (2):156-201.   (Google | More links)
Glossop, Ronald J. (1970). Beneath the surface of the free-will problem. Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (1).   (Google)
Gómez, Luis O. (1975). Some aspects of the free-will question in the nikāyas. Philosophy East and West 25 (1):81-90.   (Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1968). Actions, predictions, and books of life. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):135-151.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldstick, D. (1979). Why we might still have a choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):305-308.   (Google | More links)
Gomberg, Paul (1975). Free will as ultimate responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:205-12.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goodenough, Daniel W. (1986). Providence and Free Will in Human Actions. Swedenborg Scientific Association.   (Google)
Gordon, Jeffrey (1982). Introspective method and human freedom. Southwest Philosophical Studies 8 (October):67-77.   (Google)
Grant, C. K. (1952). Free will: A reply to professor Campbell's Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?. Mind 61 (July):381-385.   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1978). Behavior control and freedom of action. Philosophical Review 87 (April):225-40.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Greenberg, Sean (2006). Review of James A. Harris, Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).   (Google)
Grillaert, Nel, Determining one's fate: A delineation of Nietzsche's conception of free will.   (Google)
Grunbaum, A. (1971). Free will and the laws of human behavior. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (October):299-317.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Guignon, Charles B. (2002). Ontological presuppositions of the determinism--free will debate. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Habermas, Jürgen (2007). Reply to Schroeder, Clarke, Searle, and Quante. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):85 – 93.   (Google)
Habermas, J (2007). The language game of responsible agency and the problem of free will: How can epistemic dualism be reconciled with ontological monism? Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):13 – 50.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.   (Google | More links)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2010). Free will and reactive attitudes – Michael McKenna and Paul Russell (eds). Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):213-218.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2000). On responsibility, history and taking responsibility. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):392-400.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2000). Replies to Kane and Fischer. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):364-367.   (Google)
Halverson, W. H. (1964). The bogy of chance: A reply to professor Smart's free-will, praise and blame. Mind 73 (October):567-570.   (Google)
Hampshire, Stuart N. (1965). Freedom Of The Individual. Harper & Row.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Harrison, Jonathan (1984). Anscombe, Davidson and Lehrer on a point about freedom. Philosophical Studies 46 (September):259-262.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hartnack, Justus (1953). Free will and decision. Mind 62 (247):367-374.   (Google | More links)
Hill, Benjamin (2008). Of liberty and necessity: The free will debate in eighteenth-century british philosophy (review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 646-647.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1984). Watsonian freedom and the freedom of the will. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (September):294-98.   (Google | More links)
Himma, Kenneth Einar (2010). Plantinga's version of the free-will argument: The good and evil that free beings do. Religious Studies 46 (1):21-39.   (Google)
Hintz, Howard W. (1958). Causation, will, and creativity. Journal of Philosophy 55 (June):514-519.   (Google | More links)
Hodgson, Shadworth H. (1880). Dr. ward on free-will. Mind 5 (18):226-253.   (Google | More links)
Hodgson, Shadworth H. (1891). Free-will: An analysis. Mind 16 (62):161-180.   (Google | More links)
Hodgson, Shadworth H. (1881). Free-will: A rejoinder to dr. ward. Mind 6 (21):107-114.   (Google | More links)
Hospers, John (1950). Meaning and free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (March):307-30.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Howard, George S. (1993). Steps toward a science of free will. Counseling and Values 37:116-28.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Howard-Snyder, Daniel (1998). Transworld sanctity and Plantinga's free will defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It used to be widely held by philosophers that God and evil are incompatible.1 Not any longer. Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense is largely responsible for this shift. Indeed, Robert Adams avers that "it is fair to say that Plantinga has solved this problem. That is, he has argued convincingly for the consistency of [God and evil]."2 And William Alston writes that "Plantinga...has established the possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right thing."3 You might expect praise like this from Christian philosophers. You might not expect it from William Rowe, one of the foremost atheistic philosophers of our day, but this is precisely what we find. Rowe writes
Huby, Pamela M. (1967). The first discovery of the free will issue. Philosophy 42:333-62.   (Google)
Humbach, John A., Free will ideology: Experiments, evolution and virtue ethics.   (Google)
Hume, David (1977). The obviousness of the truth of determinism. In Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.   (Google)
Abstract: In this splendid section from his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Hume's first concern is our ordinary belief that the natural world -- the world leaving our own conscious existence aside -- is a world of determinism, all cause and effect. He gives his account of what this ordinary belief can come to, the fact of the matter. Turning to our own conscious existence, he finds the same fact of the matter. Hence our world too is a world of determinism, all cause and effect. That is the story with the man who comes to dinner and does not rob Hume of his silver standish. The story of Indeterminism, and in particular of the kind of freedom that is origination, must be a mistake
Hutten, E. H. (1954). Indeterminism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 5 (18).   (Google | More links)
Inwagen, Peter (1972). Lehrer on determinism, free will, and evidence. Philosophical Studies 23 (5).   (Google)
Ismael, Jenann (ms). Freedom and determinism.   (Google)
Jaswal, Liberty (2005). Isolating disparate challenges to Hodgson's account of free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):43-46.   (Google)
Jordan, Jeff (1992). The doctrine of conservation and free-will defence. Sophia 31 (1-2).   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1991). How powerful are we? American Philosophical Quarterly (October) 331 (October):331-338.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kenny, A. J. P. (1976). Will, Freedom, and Power. Blackwell.   (Cited by 55 | Google)
Kerr-Lawson, Angus (2001). Freedom and free will in Spinoza and Santayana. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 14 (4).   (Google)
Koestler, Arthur; Hartshorne, Charles & Rensch, Bernhard (1977). Free will in a hierarchic context. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature: The Interface of Science and Philosophy. University Press of America.   (Google)
Kolak, Daniel & Martin, Raymond (1992). The Experience of Philosophy (Second Edition). Belmont: Wadsworth.   (Google)
Kosch, Michelle (2006). Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Michelle Kosch examines the conceptions of free will and the foundations of ethics in the work of Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. She seeks to understand the history of German idealism better by looking at it through the lens of these issues, and to understand Kierkegaard better by placing his thought in this context. Kosch argues for a new interpretation of Kierkegaard's theory of agency, that Schelling was a major influence and Kant a major target of criticism, and that both the theory and the criticisms are highly relevant to contemporary debates
Lacey, A. R. (1958). Freewill and responsibility. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:15-32.   (Google)
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Lehrer, Keith (1964). Doing the impossible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (May):86-97.   (Google | More links)
Lehrer, Keith (1964). Doing the impossible: A second try. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):249-251.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: It might be the case that absence of constraint is the relevant sense of ' freedom' when we are discussing the freedom of the will, but it needs arguing for. ...
Luther, Martin (2008). Bondage of the Will. Hendrickson Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: Erasmus' preface reviewed (section 1) -- Erasmus' skepticism (sections 2-6) -- The necessity of knowing God and his power (sections 7-8) -- The sovereignty of God (sections 9-27) -- Exordium (sections 28-40) -- Discussion : first part (sections 41-75) -- Discussion : second part (sections 76-134) -- Discussion : third part (sections 135-166) -- Conclusion (sections 167-168).
Luther, Martin; Erasmus, Desiderius; Rupp, E. Gordon & Watson, Philip S. (eds.) (1969). Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation. Philadelphia, Westminster Press.   (Google)
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Meynen, Gerben (forthcoming). Wegner on hallucinations, inconsistency, and the illusion of free will. Some critical remarks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google)
Abstract: Wegner’s argument on the illusory nature of conscious will, as developed in The Illusion of Conscious Will ( 2002 ) and other publications, has had major impact. Based on empirical data, he develops a theory of apparent mental causation in order to explain the occurrence of the illusion of conscious will. Part of the evidence for his argument is derived from a specific interpretation of the phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations as they may occur in schizophrenia. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the validity of the evidence on auditory verbal hallucinations as employed by Wegner. I conclude that auditory hallucinations do not provide solid evidence for Wegner’s theory. Moreover, the phenomena in schizophrenia provide, in fact, an argument against part of Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation
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Abstract: Introduction -- The nature of free will -- Requirements of freedom : preeminently deliberation -- Free will requires the absence of thought-external -- Determination over choices and decisions -- Choice and decision are crucial -- Doing and trying -- Free action and agent causality -- Modes of freedom -- Metaphysical and moral freedom -- Moral freedom is removed by manipulation and especially -- Compulsion -- Intention and moral standing -- Moral freedom of the will involves agent intent and motivation -- Ramifications of freedom -- Free will requires up-to-the-end revisability but this does not gainsay probabilistic predictability -- Issues of revision and control -- The counterfactual dimension : "could have done otherwise" -- Problem cases : machines and lunatics -- Free will as outside causality but compatible with it -- Averting the zenonic fallacy of casual regression -- Averting predetermination (contrasting pre-determination with precedence determination) -- The crucial contrast between events and eventuations -- Choices and decisions as terminating eventuations -- Free will stands outside the stream of natural causality -- On freedom and causality -- Free will excludes pre-determinism but not motive determinism -- Motivational determinism vs. casual necessitation -- Motivations and motives -- Freedom from what? : certainly not from one's own motives -- And reasons: freedom demands motivational determination -- Free will requires motivational determinism -- Determination by one's autonomous motives is the crux of moral freedom -- Compulsion is impulsion -- Objections to motive determinism can be met -- Freedom and motivation -- Must an agent choose his motives for a decision to qualify (morally) as free? -- Freedom does not require motivational self-construction -- Does freedom require self-understanding? -- Willing to will : does freedom require the will to be self-endorsing? -- Does freedom require the approval of intellect and reason? -- Does freedom require self-approved motives? -- Buridan's ass : a random willfulness is not freedom -- Compatibilism regains : what free will excludes is not agent -- Determination but gant-bypassing nature determination -- The explanation of free acts via agent determination -- Freedom, responsibility, and "could have done otherwise" -- Reasons and motives impel but do not compel -- Compatibilism again -- Mind-matter partnership -- A two-sided coin -- The issue of initiative -- A salient duality -- Mind-brain interaction works by coordination not by causality -- Does free will exist? deliberations -- Pro and con -- On evidentiating free will -- Is free will unscientific? -- So does science counter-indicate free will -- Free-will naturalism and evolution.
Richards, Joyce A. (1972). Diderot's Dilemma; His Evaluation Regarding the Possibility of Moral Freedom in a Deterministic Universe. New York,Exposition Press.   (Google)
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Rocha, James (forthcoming). Sean A. Spence, the actor's brain: Exploring the cognitive neuroscience of free will. Journal of Value Inquiry.   (Google)
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Segalowitz, Sidney J. (2007). Whose free will is it anyway? Or, the illusion of determinism. In Henri Cohen & Brigitte Stemmer (eds.), Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain. Elxevier Academic Press.   (Google)
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Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1975). Reply to Alan Donagan on my views on 'determinism and freedom'. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):149-184.   (Google)
Sharples, Robert (2009). Fate, prescience and free will. In John Marenbon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Boethius. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
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Sloman, Aaron (1993). How to dispose of the free will issue. AISB Quarterlye 82:31-2.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Smilansky, Saul (1993). Does the free will debate rest on a mistake? Philosophical Papers 22 (3):173-88.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Smilansky, Saul (1997). Egalitarian justice and the importance of the free will problem. Philosophia 25 (1-4).   (Google)
Smilansky, Saul (2003). Free will and the mystery of modesty. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):105-118.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smilansky, Saul (2003). Free will, egalitarianism and Rawls. Philosophia 31 (1-2).   (Google)
Smilansky, Saul, Is justice binary?: A free-will-related exploration.   (Google)
Abstract: This article asks whether justice is binary, whether matters are either-or with respect to it. This question has been inexplicably neglected, and the elementary conceptual work has not been done. We consider this question through exploring the implications of free-will-related justice. We see that there are actually two questions of very different scope here, and that two distinct notions of binarity need to be distinguished. In the process, the plausibility of considering justice as a binary notion is evaluated
Sommers, Tamler (2010). Experimental philosophy and free will. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper develops a sympathetic critique of recent experimental work on free will and moral responsibility. Section 1 offers a brief defense of the relevance of experimental philosophy to the free will debate. Section 2 reviews a series of articles in the experimental literature that probe intuitions about the "compatibility question"—whether we can be free and morally responsible if determinism is true. Section 3 argues that these studies have produced valuable insights on the factors that influence our judgments on the compatibility question, but that their general approach suffers from significant practical and philosophical difficulties. Section 4 reviews experimental work addressing other aspects of the free will/moral responsibility debate, and section 5 concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research
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Stampe, Dennis W. & Gibson, Martha I. (1992). Of one's own free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):529-56.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Steinvorth, Ulrich (ms). A third concept of freedom of the will.   (Google)
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Trakakis, Nick (2003). On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno. Sophia 42 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies
Trakakis, Nick (2004). Second thoughts on the alleged failure of free will theodicies. Sophia 43 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception of free will in order to substantiate the aforementioned claim, there remains good reason to think that free will theodicies are not explanatorily inadequate in the way suggested by Tierno
Turner, Jason (2004). The supervenience argument. Florida Philosophical Review 4 (1):12-24.   (Google)
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Unger, Peter K. (1977). Impotence and causal determinism. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):289-305.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (1978). Ability and responsibility. Philosophical Review 87 (April):201-24.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (2004). Freedom to break the laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):334–350.   (Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (1990). Logic and the free will problem. Social Theory and Practice 16:277-90.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (1972). Lehrer on determinism, free will, and evidence. Philosophical Studies 23 (October):351-357.   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (1992). Reply to Christopher hill's Van Inwagen on the consequence argument. Analysis 52 (2):56-61.   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (1977). Reply to Gallois's Van Inwagen on free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):107-111.   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (1989). When is the will free? Philosophical Perspectives 3:399-422.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Velleman, J. David (1989). Epistemic freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (March):73-97.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm any one of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism
Velleman, David (1989). Practical Reflection. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google | More links)
Abstract: “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation of morals. This new edition of Practical Reflection contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science.
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1989). Responsibility and free will. Philosophy 24:85-100.   (Google)
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Vihvelin, Kadri (1994). Stop me before I kill again. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):115-148.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Vihvelin, Kadri & Tomkow, Terrance A. (2006). The dif. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):183-205.   (Google)
Viney, Donald W. & Crosby, Donald A. (1994). Free will in process perspective. New Ideas in Psychology 12:129-41.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Viney, Donald W. (1986). William James on free will and determinism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:555-565.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Visser, Margaret (2002). Beyond Fate. House of Anansi Press.   (Google)
Vos, A. (1993). Buridan on contingency and free will. In Egbert P. Bos & H. A. Krop (eds.), John Buridan, a Master of Arts: Some Aspects of His Philosophy: Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of its 15th Anniversary, Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 19. Ingenium Publishers.   (Google)
Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm (1981). Free agency: A non-reductionist causal account. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:113-132.   (Google)
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Wainwright, William J. (1975). Christian theism and the free will defense: A problem. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):243-250.   (Google)
Walsh, James J. (1964). Is Buridan a sceptic about free will ? Vivarium 2 (1):50-61.   (Google)
Walton, Douglas N. (1981). Lehrer on action, freedom and determinism. In J.B. Radu (ed.), Profiles: Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Reidel.   (Google)
Waller, Bruce N. (2004). Neglected psychological elements of free will. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (2):111-118.   (Google)
Ward, W. G. (1880). Dr. Bain on free will. Mind 5 (18):264-273.   (Google | More links)
Wayman, Alex (1975). Discussion of Frederick Streng's "reflections on the attention given to mental construction in the indian buddhist analysis of causality" and Luis O. gómez' "some aspects of the free-will question in the nikāyas". Philosophy East and West 25 (1):91-93.   (Google | More links)
Westcott, Malcolm R. (1977). Free will: An exercise in metaphysical truth or psychological consequences. Canadian Psychological Review 18:249-63.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Whittier, Duane H. (1965). Causality and the self. The Monist 49 (April):290-303.   (Google)
White, Mary Terrell (1993). The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Williams, Gardner (1941). Free-will and determinism. Journal of Philosophy 38 (December):701-711.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Williams, Gardner (1945). Logical and natural compulsion in free will. Journal of Philosophy 42 (March):185-191.   (Google | More links)
Willaschek, Marcus (forthcoming). Non-relativist contextualism about free will. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: Contextualist accounts of free will recently proposed by Hawthorne and Rieber imply that the same action can be both free and unfree (depending on the attributor's context). This paradoxical consequence can be avoided by thinking of contexts not as constituted by arbitrary moves in a conversation, but rather by (relatively stable) social practices (such as the practices of attributing responsibility or of giving scientific explanations). The following two conditions are suggested as each necessary and jointly sufficient for free will: (i) the agent is able to form considered practical judgements and to act accordingly, and (ii) the agent (or some agent-involving event) is the original cause of her actions. A contextualist reformulation of the second condition is developed according to which only contexts in which responsibility is attributed are relevant for the kind of original causation required for free will, which allows for a non-relativist contextualism about free will
Williams, Gardner (1959). The natural causation of human freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (June):529-531.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Williams, Gardner (1968). The natural causation of free will. Zygon 3 (March):72-84.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Xenakis, Jason (1957). Free will, a "negative" concept. Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):70-73.   (Google | More links)
Xie, Wenyu (2002). The Concept of Freedom: The Platonic-Augustinian-Lutheran-Kierkegaardian Tradition. University Press of America.   (Google)
Yaffe, Gideon (2000). Free will and agency at its best. Philosopical Perspectives 14:203-230.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Young, Robert (1975). Freedom, Responsibility, and God. Macmillan.   (Google)

5.4a Free Will and Science

Stent, Gunther S. (2002). Paradoxes of Free Will. American Philosophical Society.   (Google)
Stoica, Ovidiu Cristinel, Convergence and free-will.   (Google)
Abstract: If our mind is just an algorithm running on a flesh hardware, then it seems that there is no place for the free-will. An algorithm decides everything based on deterministic computations, or on random inputs, but neither inevitability nor pure hazard is free choice. Hopefully, some day, Science will be able to understand, monitor and simulate all the mind processes. Even then, it will still be a possibility for the free-will to exist, based on the convergence of the initial data. I propose a crucial experiment to test this hypothesis

5.4a.1 Free Will and Genetics

Greenspan, Patricia S. (1993). Free will and the genome project. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):31-43.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Popular and scientific accounts of the U.S. Human Genome Project often express concern about the implications of the project for the philosophic question of free will and responsibility. However, on its standard construal within philosophy, the question of free will versus determinism poses no special problems in relation to genetic research. The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in connection with genetic research. Whether it does depends on the extent to which the genetic basis for behavior turns on behavioral incapacities
Greenspan, Patricia S. (ms). Free will and genetic determinism: Locating the problem(s).   (Google)
Abstract: I was led to this clarificatory job initially by some puzzlement from a philosopher's standpoint about just why free will questions should come up particularly in connection with the genome project, as opposed to the many other scientific research programs that presuppose determinism. The philosophic concept of determinism involves explanation of all events, including human action, by prior causal factors--so that whether or not human behavior has a genetic basis, it ultimately gets traced back to _something_ true of the world before our birth. The philosophic problem of free will and determinism arises because this seems to undercut moral responsibility: How can we reasonably be held responsible for something whose causes we couldn't control?
Greenspan, Patricia S. (2001). Genes, electrotransmitters, and free will. In Patricia S. Greenspan, David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit (eds.), Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Methods, Meanings, and Morals. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: There seems to be evidence of a genetic component in criminal behavior. It is widely agreed not to be "deterministic"--by which discussions outside philosophy seem to mean that by itself it is not sufficient to determine behavior. Environmental factors make a decisive difference--for that matter, there are nongenetic biological factors--in whether and how genetic
Lipton, Peter (2004). Genetic and Generic Determinism: A New Threat to Free Will? In D. Rees & Steven P. R. Rose (eds.), The New Brain Sciences: Perils and Prospects. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: We are discovering more and more about the human genotypes and about the connections between genotype and behaviour. Do these advances in genetic information threaten our free will? This paper offers a philosopher’s perspective on the question
Young, Garry (2007). Igniting the flicker of freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt scenario. Philosophia 35 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility

5.4a.2 Free Will and Neuroscience

Alavi, Roksana (2005). Robert Kane, free will, and neuro-indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.   (Google)
Anderson, Joel (2007). Introduction: Free will, neuroscience, and the participant perspective. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):3 – 11.   (Google)
Andrews, Kristin (2003). Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.   (Google)
Balaguer, Mark (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Mit Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Formulating the problem of free will -- The old formulation of the problem of free will -- Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will -- The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will -- Some remarks on libertarianism -- Synopsis of the book -- Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant -- What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, assuming the OL view is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, even if the OL view isn't correct -- The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question -- The coherence question -- The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting) -- Generalizing the argument -- Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question -- Where we stand and where we're going next -- An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question -- The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question -- The moral responsibility question -- Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy -- Preliminaries -- Torn decisions -- Indeterminacy -- Appropriate non-randomness -- The argument -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them -- The argument from token-token identity -- The argument from phenomenology -- Objections -- Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control -- Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free -- Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions -- Where we stand -- Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)? -- An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism) -- An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism) -- Empirical arguments -- Arguments for universal determinism -- Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism -- Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism -- Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision -- Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism -- The argument from Tegmark's work -- The argument from Libet's work -- Arguments from psychology -- Where we stand.
Banks, William P. & Pockett, Susan (2007). Benjamin Libet's work on the neuroscience of free will. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Batthyany, Alexander (2009). Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency. In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.   (Google)
Abstract: There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation. But in recent years, Libet‘s experiment on readiness potentials (Libet, Wright, and Gleason 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983), and a more recent replication by a research team led by John Dylan Haynes (Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.-D. [2008]) are often singled out because they appear to demonstrate empirically that consciousness is not causally involved in our choices and actions. In this paper, an alternative interpretation of these studies is offered; one which is in accordance both with the empirical evidence and also with the phenomenology of the will, demonstrating that the two opposing views of agency – both the ones that deny the reality of free will and the ones that affirm it – are equally compatible with the outcomes of these two experiments. On this basis, it is shown that the claim that the results on the timing of readiness potential tip the scales in favour of one or the other view cannot be justified - neither from a neurological, nor from a philosophical perspective.
Baumeister, Roy F.; Mele, Alfred R. & Vohs, Kathleen D. (eds.) (2010). Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
Berridge, Kent C. (2009). Wanting and liking: Observations from the neuroscience and psychology laboratory. Inquiry 52 (4):378 – 398.   (Google)
Abstract: Different brain mechanisms seem to mediate wanting and liking for the same reward. This may have implications for the modular nature of mental processes, and for understanding addictions, compulsions, free will and other aspects of desire. A few wanting and liking phenomena are presented here, together with discussion of some of these implications
Bielfeldt, Dennis (2009). Freedom and neurobiology: Reflections on free will, language, and political power. By John R. Searle. Zygon 44 (4):999-1002.   (Google)
Burns, Jean E. (1999). Volition and physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):27-47.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Cairns-Smith, Graham; Clark, Thomas W.; Gomatam, Ravi; Kane, Robert H.; Maxwell, Nicholas; Smart, J. J. C.; Spence, Sean A. & Stapp, Henry P. (2005). Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a plain person's free will". Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):20-75.   (Google)
Abstract: REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry Stapp
Carlos, & René, Campis (2008). DID I DO IT? -YEAH, YOU DID! Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences:34- 37.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we analyze Libet’s conclusions on «free will» (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein’s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet’s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein´s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article´s conclusion is part of an ongoing research.
Churchland, Patricia (ms). The big questions: Do we have free will?   (Google)
Abstract: As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous system must also reflect our social need for a working concept of responsibility
Clark, Thomas W. (1997). Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain. In Libet, B., Freeman, A., Sutherland & K. (eds.), The Volitional Brain:Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Crusio, Wim E. (1999). Behavioral neurogenetics beyond determinism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):890-891.   (Google)
Abstract: Rose's Lifelines justifiably attacks the rigid genetic determinism that pervades the popular press and even some scientific writing. Genes do not equate with destiny. However, Rose's argument should not be taken too far: genes do influence behavior, in animals as well as in man
Dyer, Michael G. (1994). Quantum physics and consciousness, creativity, computers: A commentary on Goswami's quantum-based theory of consciousness and free will. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):265-90.   (Google)
Eccles, John C. (1976). Brain and free will. In Gordon G. Globus (ed.), Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Edmonds, Bruce (online). Towards implementing free-will.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some practical criteria for free-will are suggested where free-will is a matter of degree. It is argued that these are more appropriate than some extremely idealised conceptions. Thus although the paper takes lessons from philosophy it avoids idealistic approaches as irrelevant. A mechanism for allowing an agent to meet these criteria is suggested: that of facilitating the gradual emergence of free-will in the brain via an internal evolutionary process. This meets the requirement that not only must the choice of action be free but also choice in the method of choice, and choice in the method of choice of the method of choice etc. This is directly analogous to the emergence of life from non-life. Such an emergence of indeterminism with respect to the conditions of the agent fits well with the `Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis' which posits that our intelligence evolved (at least partially) to enable us to deal with social complexity and modelling `arms races'. There is a clear evolutionary advantage in being internally coherent in seeking to fulfil ones goals and unpredictable by ones peers. To fully achieve this vision several other aspects of cognition are necessary: open-ended strategy development; the meta-evolution of the evolutionary process; the facility to anticipate the results of strategies; and the situating of this process in a society of competitive peers. Finally the requirement that reports of the deliberations that lead to actions need to be socially acceptable leads to the suggestion that the language that the strategies are developed within be subject to a normative process in parallel with the development of free-will. An appendix outlines a philosophical position in support of my position
Fisher, C. M. (2001). If there were no free will. Medical Hypotheses 56:364-366.   (Google | More links)
Freeman, Walter J. (1999). Neurogenetic determinism is a theological doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):893-894.   (Google)
Abstract: In “Lifelines” Steven Rose constructs a case against neurogenetic determinism based on experimental data from biology and in favor of a significant degree of self determination. Two philosophical errors in the case favoring neurogenetic determinism are illustrated by Rose: category mistakes and an excessively narrow view of causality restricted to the linear form
Frith, Christopher D. (1996). Commentary on free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):91-93.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Consciousness and free will. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39:7-16.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Intentionality and intentional action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.   (Google | More links)
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (2001). Free will and events in the brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):287-310.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Glannon, Walter (2005). Neurobiology, neuroimaging, and free will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):68-82.   (Google | More links)
Gomes, Gilberto (2005). What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43.   (Google)
Haggard, Patrick; Catledge, P.; Dafydd, M. & Oakley, David A. (2004). Anomalous control: When "free will" is not conscious. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Hansen, Jorgen (ms). Do We Really Have Control? New Problems Facing Libertarian Free Will.   (Google)
Abstract: Newly emerging neuroscientific evidence has important ramifications for the metaphysics of free will. In light of this new evidence, I examine the two most common notions of Libertarianism. I argue that advocates for both the agent-causation and causal indeterminist models of libertarian free will suppose a misguided depiction of what constitutes a free decision. In order to retain a consistent standpoint, I argue that libertarians must view the conscious decision-making process as one of an Architectural nature. Libertarians suppose (depending on their notion) that humans are either the primary cause of their actions, or that they at least have the option to do otherwise. For either of these claims to be necessarily the case, I argue that libertarians must regard humans as having the ability to create their decisions. This ability is a requirement of the Architectural framework, which I explain in detail. I continue my case against libertarian free will, by demonstrating that the Architectural conception is also mistaken, and that the conscious decision-making process is instead one of an Archaeological nature. In this new paradigm, our conscious minds simply discover decisions, rather than create them. I show that both neuroscientific and philosophical evidence support this new model of conscious decision making and I examine how this Archaeological view of conscious discovery significantly undermines libertarian free will.
Hartmann, Dirk (2004). Neurophysiology and freedom of the will. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):275-284.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first two sections of the paper, some basic terminological distinctions regarding “freedom of the will” as a philosophical problem are expounded and discussed. On this basis, the third section focuses on the examination of two neurophysiological experiments (one by Benjamin Libet and one by William Grey Walter), which in recent times are often interpreted as providing an empirical vindication of determinism and, accordingly, a refutation of positions maintaining freedom of the will. It will be argued that both experiments fall short in this respect, and that in general—for methodical reasons—the prospects of ever deciding the dispute about freedom of the will through empirical research are rather poor
Hodgson, David (2002). Consciousness, quantum physics, and free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (1991). The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: In this book, Hodgson presents a clear and compelling case against today's orthodox mechanistic view of the brain-mind, and in favor of the view that "the mind matters." In the course of the argument he ranges over such topics as consciousness, informal reasoning, computers, evolution, and quantum indeterminancy and non-locality. Although written from a philosophical viewpoint, the book has important implications for the sciences concerned with the brain-mind problem. At the same time, it is largely non-technical, and thus accessible to the non-specialist reader
Honderich, Ted (1988). A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Kaposy, Chris (2009). Will neuroscientific discoveries about free will and selfhood change our ethical practices? Neuroethics 2 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a “self” is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral blame, or of recognizing others as persons rather than as objects, will change as a result of neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and the concept of the self. I contest suggestions that neuroscience’s conclusions about the illusory nature of free will and the self will cause significant change in our practices. I argue that we have self-interested reasons to resist allowing neuroscience to determine core beliefs about ourselves
Labooy, Guus (2004). Freedom and neurobiology: A scotistic account. Zygon 39 (4):919-932.   (Google | More links)
Larmer, Robert A. (1986). Free will, hegemony and neurophysiological indeterminism. Philosophia 16 (August):177-189.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Donald (2003). Neural holism and free will. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Both libertarian and compatibilist approaches have been unsuccessful in providing an acceptable account of free will. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, including the connectionist theory of mind and empirical findings regarding modularity and integration of brain functions, provide the basis for a new approach: neural holism. This approach locates free will in fully integrated behavior in which all of a person's beliefs and desires, implicitly represented in the brain, automatically contribute to an act. Deliberation, the experience of volition, and cognitive and behavioral shortcomings are easily understood under this model. Assigning moral praise and blame, often seen as grounded in the notion that a person has the ability to have done otherwise, will be shown to reflect instead important aspects of signaling in social interactions. Thus, important aspects of the traditional notion of free will can be accounted for within the proposed model, which has interesting implications for lifelong cognitive development
Libet, Benjamin W. (2001). Consciousness, free action and the brain: Commentary on John Searle's article (with reply from Searle). Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):59-65.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1996). Commentary on free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1999). Do we have free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:47-57.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (2002). Do we have free will? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W.; Freeman, Anthony & Sutherland, Keith (1999). The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely accepted in science that the universe is a closed deterministic system in which everything can, ultimately, be explained by purely physical...
Locke, Don (1974). Action, movement, and neurophysiology. Inquiry 17 (1-4):23 – 42.   (Google)
Abstract: Action is to be distinguished from (mere) bodily movement not by reference to an agent's intentions, or his conscious control of his movements (Sect. I), but by reference to the agent as cause of those movements, though this needs to be understood in a way which destroys the alleged distinction between agent-causation and event-causation (Sect. II). It also raises the question of the relation between an agent and his neurophysiology (Sect. III), and eventually the question of the compatibility of purposive and mechanistic accounts of human behaviour (Sect. IV). For the two to be compatible it is necessary that, e.g., intentions and brain states be not merely co-existent but also causal equivalents, in a way which allows for the mechanical explanation of teleological states — or vice versa
Maasen, Sabine (2006). Neurosociety ahead? Debating free will in the media. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
Mayr, Ulrich (2004). Conflict, consciousness, and control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):145-148.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free will: Theories, analysis, and data. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2010). Testing free will. Neuroethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This article describes three experiments that would advance our understanding of the import of data already generated by scientific work on free will and related issues. All three can be conducted with existing technology. The first concerns how reliable a predictor of behavior a certain segment of type I and type II RPs is. The second focuses on the timing of conscious experiences in Libet-style studies. The third concerns the effectiveness of conscious implementation intentions. The discussion of first two experiments highlights some important problems with certain inferences made on the basis of existing data in scientific work on free will. The discussion of the third calls attention to powerful evidence that conscious intentions sometimes are among the causes of corresponding actions. This evidence has been largely ignored in the literature on free will
Morris, Stephen G. (2007). Neuroscience and the free will conundrum. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):20 – 22.   (Google)
Muñoz-Suárez, Carlos Mario & Campis, René J. (2008). Did I do It? Yeah, You did! On Wittgenstein and Libet on Free Will. In Hannes Leitgeb & Alexander Hieke (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we analyze Libet’s conclusions on «free will» (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein’s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet’s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein´s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article´s conclusions are part of an ongoing research.
Murphy, Nancey C. (2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: New approaches to knotty old problems -- Avoiding Cartesian materialism -- From causal reductionism to self-directed systems -- From mindless to intelligent action -- How can neural nets mean? -- How does reason get its grip on the brain? -- Who's responsible? -- Neurobiological reductionism and free will.
Newton, Natika (2003). A critical review of Nicholas Maxwell's the human world in the physical universe: Consciousness, free will, and evolution. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):149 – 156.   (Google)
Abstract: Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires firm and nuanced arguments to support it. Here Maxwell's work is weakest; his arguments for contingent mind-body identity and for free will, on which his larger theory depends, are inadequate. The book is valuable both for its comprehensive view of the human condition and its mysteries, and for its demonstration of the difficulties in making such a view coherent
Pirtoek, Zvezdan (2009). The concept of free will entering the field of neurological sciences. In Eva Zerovnik, Olga Markič & A. Ule (eds.), Philosophical Insights About Modern Science. Nova Science Publishers, Inc..   (Google)
Pockett, Susan (2002). Backward referral, flash-lags, and quantum free will: A response to commentaries on articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and trevena and Miller. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.   (Google)
Roskies, Adina L. (online). Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: phenomena that are hallmarks of what it is to be human free will whether or not the universe is deterministic, many [1,2,4,26]. There is now a widespread and industrious people think that freedom can yet be salvaged if the scientific community, whose aim is to understand the universe is indeterministic, for they favor a Libertarian mechanisms underlying these phenomena [7,9,10, account which posits an agent as an uncaused cause 27–32]. The underlying worry is that those things that [17,18]. In that case, trouble arises if the universe is once seemed to be forever beyond the reach of science deterministic. might soon succumb to it: neuroscience will lead us to see the ‘universe within’ as just part and parcel of the
Rossi, E. L. (1988). Paradoxes of time, consciousness, and free will: Integrating Bohm, Jung, and Libet on ethics. Psychological Perspectives 19:50-55.   (Google)
Searle, John R. (2000). Consciousness, free action and the brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):3-22.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Searle, John R. (2001). Free will as a problem in neurobiology. Philosophy 76 (298):491-514.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The problem of free will arises because of the conflict between two inconsistent impulses, the experience of freedom and the conviction of determinism. Perhaps we can resolve these by examining neurobiological correlates of the experience of freedom. If free will is not to be an illusion, it must have a corresponding neurobiological reality. An explanation of this issue leads us to an account of rationality and the self, as well as how consciousness can move bodies at all. I explore two hypotheses. On the first, freedom is a complete illusion. On the second, it is not an illusion, and there is a corresponding indeterminism at the neurobiological level. This can only occur if there is in fact a quantum mechanical element in the fundamental neurobiology of consciousness
Searle, John R. (2007). Neuroscience, intentionality and free will: Reply to Habermas. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):69 – 76.   (Google)
Shariff, Azim F. & Peterson, Jordan B. (2005). Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's Veto and a close-enough theory of free will. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2010). The bcn challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2008). The real challenge to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.   (Google)
Abstract: Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most significantly challenged by the recent discoveries. Those discoveries show that it is not as obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons as it seems. Hence, we have to rethink our concept of reasons-responsiveness
Smart, J. J. C. (2005). Comments on Hodgson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):58-64.   (Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1979). Consciousness, free will and personal identity. In David A. Oakley & H.C. Plotkin (eds.), Brain, Behaviour, and Evolution. Methuen and Company.   (Google)
Spence, Sean A. (1996). Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):75-90.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Thalberg, Irving (1970). New light on brain physiology and free will? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (4):379-383.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Usher, Matthew (2006). Control, choice, and the convergence/divergence dynamics: A compatibilistic probabilistic theory of free will. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):188-213.   (Google | More links)
Velmans, Max (2004). Why conscious free will both is and isn't an illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain
Walter, Henrik (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Walter, Henrik (2002). Neurophilosophy of free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Weil, Vivian M. (1980). Neurophysiological determinism and human action. Mind 89 (January):90-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

5.4a.3 Free Will and Physics

Bishop, Robert C. (2002). Chaos, indeterminism, and free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (2005). Hyperbolas and hyperbole: The free will problem remains. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):652-653.   (Google)
Abstract: Hyperbolic theories have the fatal flaw that because of their vertical asymptote they predict irresistible choice of immediate rewards, regardless of future contingencies. They work only for simple situations. Theories incorporating intermediate unconscious choices are more flexible, but are neither exponential nor hyperbolic in their predictions. They don't solve the free will paradox, which may be just a consistent illusion
Conway, John H., The strong free will theorem.   (Google)
Abstract: The two theories that revolutionized physics in the twentieth century, relativity and quantum mechanics, are full of predictions that defy common sense. Recently, we used three such paradoxical ideas to prove “The Free Will Theorem” (strengthened here), which is the culmination of a series of theorems about quantum mechanics that began in the 1960s. It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe. Our argument combines the well-known consequence of relativity theory, that the time order of space-like separated events is not absolute, with the EPR paradox discovered by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935, and the Kochen-Specker Paradox of 1967 (See [2].) We follow Bohm in using a spin version of EPR and Peres in using his set of 33 directions, rather than the original configuration used by Kochen and Specker. More contentiously, the argument also involves the notion of free will, but we postpone further discussion of this to the last section of the article. Note that our proof does not mention “probabilities” or the “states” that determine them, which is..
Dyer, Michael G. (1994). Quantum physics and consciousness, creativity, computers: A commentary on Goswami's quantum-based theory of consciousness and free will. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):265-90.   (Google)
Esfeld, Michael (2000). Is quantum indeterminism relevant to free will? Philosophia Naturalis 37 (1):177-187.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Quantum indeterminism may make available the option of an interactionism that does not have to pay the price of a force over and above those forces that are acknowledged in physics in order to explain how intentions can be physically effective. I show how this option might work in concrete terms and offer a criticism of it
Evans, D. A. & Landsberg, P. T. (1972). Free will in a mechanistic universe? An extension. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):336-343.   (Google | More links)
Garson, James W. (1995). Chaos and free will. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):365-74.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Abstract: This paper explores the possibility that chaos theory might be helpful in explaining free will. I will argue that chaos has little to offer if we construe its role as to resolve the apparent conflict between determinism and freedom. However, I contend that the fundamental problem of freedom is to find a way to preserve intuitions about rational action in a physical brain. New work on dynamic computation provides a framework for viewing free choice as a process that is sensitive and unpredictable, while at the same time organized and intelligent. I conclude that this vision of a chaotic brain may make a modest contribution to an intuitively acceptable physicalist account of free will
Goldstein, Sheldon, What does the free will theorem actually prove?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Conway and Kochen have presented a “free will theorem” [4, 6] which they claim shows that “if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles.” In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition “MIN” motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this conclusion is not correct, while for deterministic models it is not new. In the way the free will theorem is formulated and proved, it only concerns deterministic models. But Conway and Kochen have argued [4, 5, 6, 7] that “randomness can’t help,” meaning that stochastic models are excluded as well if we insist on the conditions “SPIN”, “TWIN”, and “MIN”. We point out a mistake in their argument. Namely, the theorem is of the form deterministic model with SPIN & TWIN & MIN ⇒ contradiction , (1) and in order to derive the further claim, which is of the form stochastic model with SPIN & TWIN & MIN ⇒ contradiction , (2) Conway and Kochen propose a method for converting any stochastic model into a deterministic one [4]
Hodgson, David (2005). Response to commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):76-95.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I am very grateful to the commentators for their consideration of my target article. I found their comments thought-provoking and challenging, but I am not persuaded that any substantial departure is required from the views I expressed in the article. I will respond to each comment in turn, and then I will briefly review how my nine propositions have fared
Hodgson, David (ms). The Conway-kochen 'free will theorem' and unscientific determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: One has it that earlier circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely determine later circumstances, and the other has it that past present and future all exist tenselessly in a ‘block universe,’ so that the passage of time and associated changes in the world are illusions or at best merely apparent
Loewer, Barry M. (1996). Freedom from physics: Quantum mechanics and free will. Philosophical Topics 24:91-112.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Margenau, Henry (1967). Quantum mechanics, free will, and determinism. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):714-725.   (Google | More links)
Moreh, J. (1994). Randomness, game theory and free will. Erkenntnis 41 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make one unpredictable to opponents and may therefore be rational. Similarly, playing a game with a mixed strategy may have an unpredictable outcome in every single play, but the strategy is rational, in that it is meant to maximize the expected value of an objective, be it private or social. As to whether the outcome of such behaviour is genuinely unpredictable as in quantum mechanics, or predictable by a hypothetical outside observer knowing all natural laws, it is argued that it makes no difference in practice, as long as it is not humanly predictable. Thus we have a new version of libertarianism which is compatible with determinism
Stapp, Henry P., Philosophy of mind and the problem of free will in the light of quantum mechanics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Arguments pertaining to the mind-brain connection and to the physical effectiveness of our conscious choices have been presented in two recent books, one by John Searle, the other by Jaegwon Kim. These arguments are examined, and it is explained how the encountered difficulties arise from a defective understanding and application of a pertinent part of contemporary science, namely quantum mechanics. The principled quantum uncertainties entering at the microscopic levels of brain processing cannot be confined to the micro level, but percolate up to the macroscopic regime. To cope with the conflict between the resulting macroscopic indefiniteness and the definiteness of our conscious experiences, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces the idea of agent-generated probing actions, each of which specifies a definite set of alternative possible empirically/experientially distinguishable outcomes. Quantum theory then introduces the mathematical concept of randomness to describe the probabilities of the various alternative possible outcomes of the chosen probing action. But the agent-generated choice of which probing action to perform is not governed by any known law or rule, statistical or otherwise. This causal gap provides a logical opening, and indeed a logical need, for the entry into the dynamical structure of nature of a process that goes beyond the currently understood quantum mechanical statistical generalization of the deterministic laws of classical physics. The well-known quantum Zeno effect can then be exploited to provide a natural process that establishes a causal psychophysical link within the complex structure consisting of a stream of conscious experiences and certain macroscopic classical features of a quantum mechanically described brain. This naturally created causal link effectively allows consciously felt intentions to affect brain activity in a way that tends to produce the intended feedback. This quantum mechanism provides an eminently satisfactory alternative to the classical physics conclusion that the physical present is 1 completely determined by the physical past, and hence provides a physicsbased way out of the dilemma that Searle and Kim tried to resolve by philosophical analysis..
Usher, Matthew (2006). Control, choice, and the convergence/divergence dynamics: A compatibilistic probabilistic theory of free will. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):188-213.   (Google | More links)

5.4a.4 Free Will and Psychology

Ainslie, George (2001). Breakdown of Will. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of behavior such as altruism, sadism, gambling, and the 'social construction' of belief. This book uniquely integrates approaches from experimental psychology, philosophy of mind, microeconomics, and decision science to present one of the most profound and expert accounts of human irrationality available. It will be of great interest to philosophers and an important resource for professionals and students in psychology, economics and political science
Andrew, Wayne K. (1980). Human freedom and the science of psychology. Journal of Mind and Behavior 1:271-290.   (Google)
Arieti, Silvano (1972). The Will to Be Human. [New York]Quadrangle Books.   (Google)
Assagioli, Roberto (1973). The Act of Will. New York,Viking Press.   (Google)
Audi, Robert N. (1976). B.f. Skinner on freedom, dignity, and the explanation of behavior. Behaviorism 4:163-186.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Baer, John; Kaufman, James C. & Baumeister, Roy F. (eds.) (2008). Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Do people have free will, or this universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? How and why might a sense of free will have evolved? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? In recent years a number of psychologists have tried to solve one or more of the puzzles surrounding free will. This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief. These essays should be of interest not only to social scientists, but to intelligent and thoughtful readers everywhere
Batthyany, Alexander (2009). Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency. In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.   (Google)
Abstract: There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation. But in recent years, Libet‘s experiment on readiness potentials (Libet, Wright, and Gleason 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983), and a more recent replication by a research team led by John Dylan Haynes (Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.-D. [2008]) are often singled out because they appear to demonstrate empirically that consciousness is not causally involved in our choices and actions. In this paper, an alternative interpretation of these studies is offered; one which is in accordance both with the empirical evidence and also with the phenomenology of the will, demonstrating that the two opposing views of agency – both the ones that deny the reality of free will and the ones that affirm it – are equally compatible with the outcomes of these two experiments. On this basis, it is shown that the claim that the results on the timing of readiness potential tip the scales in favour of one or the other view cannot be justified - neither from a neurological, nor from a philosophical perspective.
Baumeister, Roy F.; Crescioni, A. William & Alquist, Jessica L. (forthcoming). Free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Free will can be understood as a novel form of action control that evolved to meet the escalating demands of human social life, including moral action and pursuit of enlightened self-interest in a cultural context. That understanding is conducive to scientific research, which is reviewed here in support of four hypotheses. First, laypersons tend to believe in free will. Second, that belief has behavioral consequences, including increases in socially and culturally desirable acts. Third, laypersons can reliably distinguish free actions from less free ones. Fourth, actions judged as free emerge from a distinctive set of inner processes, all of which share a common psychological and physiological signature. These inner processes include self-control, rational choice, planning, and initiative
Baumeister, Roy F.; Mele, Alfred R. & Vohs, Kathleen D. (eds.) (2010). Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
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Bergson, Henri (1913). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Dover Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: Bergson argues for free will by showing that the arguments against it come from a confusion of different conceptions of time. As opposed to physicists' idea of measurable time, in human experience life is perceived as a continuous and unmeasurable flow rather than as a succession of marked-off states of consciousness--something that can be measured not quantitatively, but only qualitatively. His conclusion is that free will is an observable fact
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Bratman, Michael (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.   (Google)
Abstract: What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends
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Carter, Steven (1993). He's Scared, She's Scared: Understanding the Hidden Fears That Sabotage Your Relationships. Delacorte Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Available for the first time in paperback, this follow-up to the phenomenally successful Men Who Can't Love tackles the issue of commitmentphobia, that persistent obstacle to truly satisfying contemporary relationships. Authors Stephen Carter and Julia Sokol explore why modern men and women are torn between the desire for intimacy and the equally intense need for independence. Drawing on numerous interviews and real-life scenarios, and written with humor, insight, and the kind of wisdom gained by personal experience, He's Scared, She's Scared offes guidance for all of us who want genuine, sustained intimacy with our romantic partners. From the Trade Paperback edition
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Engeström, Yrjö; Miettinen, Reijo & Punamäki-Gitai, Raija-Leena (eds.) (1999). Perspectives on Activity Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Activity theory is an interdisciplinary approach to human sciences that originates in the cultural-historical psychology school, initiated by Vygotsky, Leont'ev, and Luria. It takes the object-oriented, artifact-mediated collective activity system as its unit of analysis, thus bridging the gulf between the individual subject and the societal structure. This volume is the first comprehensive presentation of contemporary work in activity theory, with 26 original chapters by authors from ten countries. In Part I of the book, central theoretical issues are discussed from different points of view. Some topics addressed in this part are epistemology, methodology, and the relationship between biological and cultural factors. Part II is devoted to the acquisition and development of language - a theme that played a central role in the work of Vygotsky and Luria. This part includes a chapter that analyzes writing activity in Japanese classrooms, and an original case study of literacy skills of a man with cerebral palsy. Part III contains chapters on play, learning, and education, and part IV addresses the meaning of new technology and the development of work activities. The final part covers issues of therapy and addiction
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Fogel, Alan; Lyra, Maria C. D. P. & Valsiner, Jaan (eds.) (1997). Dynamics and Indeterminism in Developmental and Social Processes. L. Erlbaum.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most profound insights of the dynamic systems perspective is that new structures resulting from the developmental process do not need to be planned in advance, nor is it necessary to have these structures represented in genetic or neurological templates prior to their emergence. Rather, new structures can emerge as components of the individual and the environment self-organize; that is, as they mutually constrain each other's actions, new patterns and structures may arise. This theoretical possibility brings into developmental theory the important concept of indeterminism--the possibility that developmental outcomes may not be predictable in any simple linear causal way from their antecedents. This is the first book to take a critical and serious look at the role of indeterminism in psychological and behavioral development. * What is the source of this indeterminism? * What is its role in developmental change? * Is it merely the result of incomplete observational data or error in measurement? It reviews the concepts of indeterminism and determinism in their historical, philosophical, and theoretical perspectives--particularly in relation to dynamic systems thinking--and applies these general ideas to systems of nonverbal communication. Stressing the indeterminacy inherent to symbols and meaning making in social systems, several chapters address the issue of indeterminism from metaphorical, modeling, and narrative perspectives. Others discuss those indeterministic processes within the individual related to emotional, social, and cognitive development
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Harcum, E. Rae (1994). A Psychology of Freedom and Dignity: The Last Train to Survival. Praeger.   (Google)
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Holton, Richard (2009). Determinism, self-efficacy, and the phenomenology of free will. Inquiry 52 (4):412 – 428.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible. I suggest a different explanation, and in doing so try to shed some light on the phenomenology of free will. I contend that one aspect of the phenomenology is our impression that maintaining a resolution requires effort—an impression well supported by a range of psychological data. Determinism can easily be interpreted as showing that such effort will be futile: in effect determinism is conflated with fatalism, in a way that is reminiscent of the Lazy argument used against the Stoics. If this interpretation is right, it explains how belief in determinism undermines moral motivation without needing to attribute sophisticated incompatibilist beliefs to subjects; it works by undermining subjects' self-efficacy. It also provides indirect support for the contention that this is one of the sources of the phenomenology of free will
Holton, Richard (forthcoming). Response to 'free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William crescioni and Jessica L. alquist. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (2004). Review of Daniel Wegner, The illusion of conscious will. Mind 113 (449):218-221.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (2001). Mind the guff. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):62-78.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (I) John Searle's conception of consciousness in the 'Mind the Gap' issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies remains short on content, no advance on either materialism or traditional dualism. Still, it is sufficiently contentful to be self-contradictory. And so his Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels, like materialism and dualism, needs replacing by a radically different conception of consciousness -- such as Consciousness as Existence. (II) From his idea that we can discover 'gaps', seeming absences of causal circumstances, in our experience of deciding and acting, Searle is led to the positing of a self and to mysterious causing. (III) In fact philosophers of determinism and freedom over three centuries have concerned themselves with what are now termed 'gaps'. Searle's advance is a useful terminological one. Compatibilist philosophers of freedom, contrary to what is said, have not missed any point at all. A successor to both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism is needed. (IV) Searle's previous account of deciding and acting in Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels does indeed fail because of its epiphenomenalism. (V) The culmination of his paper, his preferred hypothesis now about deciding and acting, is that down-up causation is true of it but not left-right causation. Quantum Theory as often interpreted doesn't work down-up but does work left-right. The hypothesis is entirely in the tradition of the Incompatibilist and Libertarian philosophers of determinism and freedom, whom Searle has joined, but is factually incredible
Kane, Robert H. (online). Symposium: The psychology of free will. Commentary.   (Google)
Abstract: These three papers are exceptionally rich and varied and I will be selective in responding. My aim is to relate the psychological research they discuss to the broader context of current philosophical debates about free will
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Leiter, Brian, Nietzsche's philosophy of action.   (Google)
Abstract: Nietzsche holds that people lack freedom of the will in any sense that would be sufficient for ascriptions of moral responsibility; that the conscious experience we have of willing is actually epiphenomenal with respect to the actions that follow that experience; and that our actions largely arise through non-conscious processes (psychological and physiological) of which we are only dimly aware, and over which we exercise little or no conscious control. At the same time, Nietzsche, always a master of rhetoric, engages in a “persuasive definition” (Stevenson 1938) of the language of “freedom” and “free will,” to associate the positive valence of these terms with a certain Nietzschean ideal of the person unrelated to traditional notions of free will
Levy, Neil (online). Are zombies responsible? The role of consciousness in moral responsibility.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilists often think they can afford to be complacent with regard to scientific findings. But there are apparent threats to free will besides determinism. Robert Kane has recently claimed that if consciousness does not initiate action, all accounts of free will go down, compatibilist and incompatibilist. Some cognitive scientists argue that in fact consciousness does not initiate action. In this paper I argue that they are right (though not for the reasons they advance): as a matter of fact consciousness does not initiate action. But, I contend, Kane is wrong in thinking that it follows that we have no free will. I sketch how we might have free will in spite of the finding that consciousness does not initiate action, and remark on the implications for several well-known accounts of responsibility, include Clarke's agent-causal theory and Fischer and Ravizza's reasons-responsiveness account
Lichtenstein, Sarah & Slovic, Paul (eds.) (2006). The Construction of Preference. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors
Maasen, Sabine & Sutter, Barbara (eds.) (2007). On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-?-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan.   (Google)
Abstract: Currently, the neurosciences challenge the concept of will to be scientifically untenable, specifying that it is our brain rather than our "self" that decides what we want to do. At the same time, we seem to be confronted with increasing possibilities and necessities of free choice in all areas of social life. Based on up-to-date (empirical) research in the social sciences and philosophy, the authors convened in this book address this seeming contradiction: By differentiating the physical, the psychic, and the social realm, the neuroscientific findings can be acknowledged within a comprehensive framework of selves in neoliberal societies
Maasen, Sabine; Prinz, Wolfgang & Roth, Gerhard (eds.) (2003). Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. Yet, performing and action and defining it are different matters. What counts as an action? When does it begin? Does the conscious desire to perform an action always precede the act? If not, is it really a voluntary action? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of Philosophy, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Social Science. This book brings together some to the leading thinkers from these disciplines to consider this deep and often puzzling topic. The result is a fascinating and stimulating debate that will challenge our fundamental assumptions about our sense of free-will
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Abstract: Wegner's refutation of the notion of a conscious free will is addressed to a general reader. Despite a wide ranging and instructive survey and a conclusion acceptable to current psychological thinking, it is flawed by terminological confusions and lack of attention to relevant evidence and previous psychological approaches. It is suggested that psychology best drop the term will altogether
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Mele, Alfred R. (2009). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects' reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists disagree about this. Mele's final chapter closes with a discussion of imaginary scientific findings that would warrant bold claims about free will and consciousness of the sort he examines in this book.
Miller, John G. (2004). Qbq!: The Question Behind the Question: Practicing Personal Accountability in Work and in Life. G. P. Putnam's Sons.   (Google)
Abstract: Who Moved My Cheese? showed readers how to adapt to change. Fish! helped raise flagging morale. Execution guided readers to overcome the inability to get things done. QBQ! The Question Behind the Question , already a phenomenon in its self-published edition, addresses the most important issue in business and society today: personal accountability. The lack of personal accountability has resulted in an epidemic of blame, complaining, and procrastination. No organization-or individual-can achieve goals, compete in the marketplace, fulfill a vision, or develop people and teams without personal accountability. The solution involves an entirely new approach. We can no longer ask, "Who dropped the ball?" "Why can't they do their work properly?" or "Why do we have to go through all these changes?" Instead, every individual has to ask the question behind the question: "How can I improve this situation?" "What can I contribute?" or "How can I make a difference?" Succinct, insightful, and practical, QBQ! The Question Behind the Question provides a method for putting personal accountability into daily action, which can bring astonishing results: problems get solved, barriers come down, service improves, teamwork grows, and people adapt to change
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Monroe, Andrew E. & Malle, Bertram F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate about people's folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: People’s concept of free will is often assumed to be incompatible with the deterministic, scientific model of the universe. Indeed, many scholars treat the folk concept of free will as assuming a special form of nondeterministic causation, possibly the notion of uncaused causes. However, little work to date has directly probed individuals’ beliefs about what it means to have free will. The present studies sought to reconstruct this folk concept of free will by asking people to define the concept (Study 1) and by confronting them with a neuroscientific claim that free will is an illusion (Study 2), which invited them to either reconcile or contrast free will with determinism. The results suggest that the core of people’s concept of free will is a choice that fulfills one’s desires and is free from internal or external constraints. No evidence was found for metaphysical assumptions about dualism or indeterminism.
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (online). Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: During the past two decades, an interest among philosophers in fictitious and illusory beliefs has sprung up in fields ranging anywhere from mathematics and modality to morality.1 In this paper, we focus primarily on the view that Saul Smilansky has dubbed “free will illusionism”—i.e., the purportedly descriptive claim that most people have illusory beliefs concerning the existence of libertarian free will, coupled with the normative claim that because dispelling these illusory beliefs would produce negative personal and societal consequences, those of us who happen to know the dangerous and gloomy truth about the non-existence of libertarian free will should simply keep quiet in the name of the common good
Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Matveeva, Tatyana (2009). Positive illusions, perceived control and the free will debate. Mind and Language 24 (5):495-522.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a common assumption among both philosophers and psychologists that having accurate beliefs about ourselves and the world around us is always the epistemic gold standard. However, there is gathering data from social psychology that suggest that illusions are quite prevalent in our everyday thinking and that some of these illusions may even be conducive to our overall well being. In this paper, we explore the relevance of these so-called 'positive illusions' to the free will debate. More specifically, we use the literature on positive illusions as a springboard for examining Saul Smilansky's so-called 'free will illusionism'. At the end of the day, we will use data from both social and developmental psychology concerning perceived control to try to show that his view is on shaky empirical footing
Nahmias, Eddy A.; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason (2005). Surveying freedom: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561–584.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people’s prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research
Nahmias, Eddy (2007). Autonomous agency and the threat of social psychology. In M. Marraffa, M. Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: This chapter discusses how research in situationist social psychology may pose largely undiscussed threats to autonomous agency, free will, and moral responsibility.
Nahmias, Eddy (2007). Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology. In Massimo Marraffa, Mario Cardeo & Francesco Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: But other threats to autonomy are less often discussed, threats that are not metaphysical or political but psychological. These are threats based on putative facts about human psychology that suggest we do not govern our behavior according to principles we have consciously chosen. For instance, if our behavior were governed primarily by unconscious Freudian desires rather than by our reflectively considered desires, we would be much less autonomous than we presume. Or if our behaviors were the result of a history of Skinnerian reinforcement rather than conscious consideration, our actions would be shaped by our environment more than by our principles. Since the influence of Freud and Skinner has waned, we might feel we have escaped such threats to our autonomy from psychology. But, as I will explain below, more recent and viable theories and evidence from social psychology pose significant threats to autonomous agency.
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2006). Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: My initial work, with collaborators Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner (2005, 2006), on surveying folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility was designed primarily to test a common claim in the philosophical debates: that ordinary people see an obvious conflict between determinism and both free will and moral responsibility, and hence, the burden is on compatibilists to motivate their theory in a way that explains away or overcomes this intuitive support for incompatibilism. The evidence, if any, offered by philosophers to support the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive has consisted of reports of their own intuitions or informal polls of their students. We were skeptical about the reliability of such evidence, so we used the methodology--”now associated with the label 'experimental philosophy'--”of conducting formal surveys on non-philosophers. Our participants read a scenario that describes a deterministic universe and were then asked to judge whether agents in those scenarios act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. Using three different scenarios with hundreds of participants, we consistently found that the majority (2/3 to 4/5) responded that agents in deterministic universes do act of their own free will and are morally responsible. That is, we found that most ordinary folk do not seem to find incompatibilism intuitive or obviously correct. Our results have been challenged in various ways, philosophical and methodological. For instance, Shaun Nichols (2004, this volume) and Nichols and Joshua Knobe (unpublished) offer some experimental evidence suggesting that, in certain conditions, most people express incompatibilist and libertarian intuitions. I will respond to this work in the following section. I agree that people express conflicting intuitions about free will (after all, we consistently found a minority of participants expressing incompatibilist
Nichols, Shaun (2006). Free will and the folk: Responses to commentators. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:305-320.   (Google)
Abstract: Experimental research on folk intuitions concerning free will is still in its infancy. So it is especially helpful to have such an excellent set of commentaries, and I greatly appreciate the work of the commentators in advancing the project. Because of space limitations, I can’t respond to all of the comments. I will focus on just a few issues that emerge from the comments that I think are especially promising for illumination
Nahmias, Eddy; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason (2004). The phenomenology of free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers often suggest that their theories of free will are supported by our phenomenology. Just as their theories conflict, their descriptions of the phenomenology of free will often conflict as well. We suggest that this should motivate an effort to study the phenomenology of free will in a more systematic way that goes beyond merely the introspective reports of the philosophers themselves. After presenting three disputes about the phenomenology of free will, we survey the (limited) psychological research on the experiences relevant to the philosophical debates and then describe some pilot studies of our own with the aim of encouraging further research. The data seem to support compatibilist descriptions of the phenomenology more than libertarian descriptions. We conclude that the burden is on libertarians to find empirical support for their more demanding metaphysical theories with their more controversial phenomenological claims.
Nahmias, Eddy (forthcoming). The Psychology of Free Will. In Jesse Prinz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: I have argued that the traditional free will debate has focused too much on whether free will is compatible with determinism and not enough on whether free will is compatible with specific causal explanations for our actions, including those offered by empirical psychology. If free will is understood as a set of cognitive and volitional capacities, possessed and exercised to varying degrees, then psychology can inform us about the extent to which humans (as a species and as individuals) possess those capacities and manage to exercise them across various situations. While recent work on the role of consciousness in action has been misinterpreted to suggest its role is illusory, recent work in social psychology presents a more viable challenge to our free will. The extent to which we can act on reasons we would accept or can know why we are doing what we do appears to be much less than we presume. Further work is necessary, of course, and it will need to involve both philosophical analysis and psychological investigation. Questions regarding the nature of human freedom and responsibility clearly require the conceptual resources of philosophy and the empirical resources of psychology.
Nichols, Shaun (2006). Folk intuitions on free will. Journal of Cognition and Culture.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper relies on experimental methods to explore the psychological underpinnings of folk intuitions about free will and responsibility. In different conditions, people give conflicting responses about agency and responsibility. In some contexts, people treat agency as indeterminist; in other contexts, they treat agency as determinist. Furthermore, in some contexts people treat responsibility as incompatible with determinism, and in other contexts people treat responsibility as compatible with determinism. The paper considers possible accounts of the psychological mechanisms that underlie these conflicting responses
Nichols, Shaun (2009). How can psychology contribute to the free will debate? In J. Baer, J. Kaufman & R. Baumeister (eds.), Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Are people free and morally responsible? Or are their actions determined, i.e. inevitable outcomes of the past conditions and the laws of nature? These seem fairly straightforward questions, but it is important to distinguish 3 different dimensions of the free will debate: a descriptive project, a substantive project, and a prescriptive project. In this chapter, I’ll consider how psychology can contribute to each project in turn. First, I should say a bit more about the projects
Nichols, Shaun (2004). The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts. Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to agent-causal accounts of free will, agents have the capacity to cause actions, and for a given action, an agent could have done otherwise. This paper uses existing results and presents experimental evidence to argue that young children deploy a notion of agent-causation. If young children do have such a notion, however, it remains quite unclear how they acquire it. Several possible acquisition stories are canvassed, including the possibility that the notion of agent-causation develops from a prior notion of obligation. Finally, the paper sets out how this work might illuminate the philosophical problem of free will
Nozick, Robert (1990). The Normative Theory of Individual Choice. Garland.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2005). Freedom With a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:207-227.   (Google)
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1980). The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (2 Vols.). Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Abstract: The phenomenon of action in which the mind moves the body has puzzled philosophers over the centuries. In this new edition of a classic work of analytical philosophy, Brian O'Shaughnessy investigates bodily action and attempts to resolve some of the main problems. His expanded and updated discussion examines the scope of the will and the conditions in which it makes contact with the body, and investigates the epistemology of the body. He sheds light upon the strangely intimate relation of awareness in which we stand to our own bodies, doing so partly through appeal to the concept of the body-image. The result is a new and strengthened emphasis on the vitally important function of the bodily will as a transparently intelligible bridge between mind and body, and the proposal of a dual aspect theory of the will.
Panksepp, Jaak (2004). Free will and the varieties of affective and conative selves. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):671-672.   (Google)
Abstract: A causally efficacious conscious will is a small part of our everyday activities, but a part that deserves to be recognized, studied, and cherished, perhaps as a fundamental, emotion- and conation-related, right hemispheric neuronal process. Such brain functions might be less in doubt if we consider all the pieces of the larger pie, especially those where our passions and desires reside
Parinello, Anthony (1998). The Power of Will: Key Strategies to Unlock Your Inner Strengths and Enjoy Success in All Aspects of Life. Chandler House Press.   (Google)
Peters, George A. (2006). Human Error: Causes and Control. Crc/Taylor & Francis.   (Google)
Abstract: Applying and extending principles that can help prevent consumer error, worker fault, managerial mistakes, and organizational blunders, Human Error: Causes and Control provides useful information on theories, methods, and specific techniques for controlling human error. It forms a how-to manual of good practice, focusing on identifying human error, its causes, and how to control or prevent it. It presents constructs that assist in optimizing human performance and to achieve higher safety goals. Human Error: Causes and Control bridges the gap and illustrates the means for achieving a comprehensive, fully integrated, process compatible, user effective, methodologically sound model
Powell, Tia (2007). Wrestling Satan and conquering dopamine: Addiction and free will. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):14 – 15.   (Google)
Rank, Otto (1936). Truth and Reality. Norton.   (Google)
Rodin, Judith; Schooler, Carmi & Schaie, K. Warner (eds.) (1990). Self-Directedness: Cause and Effects Throughout the Life Course. L. Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Abstract: This book, the third in a series on the life course, has significance in today's world of research, professional practice, and public policy because it symbolizes the gradual reemergence of power in the social sciences. Focusing on "self-directedness and efficacy" over the life course, this text addresses the following issues: * the causes of change * how changes affect the individual, the family system, social groups, and society at large * how various disciplines--anthropology, sociology, psychology, epidemiology--approach this field of study, with consideration given to common themes and differences Finally, an effort is made to develop a multidisciplinary perspective unique to the study of self-directedness and efficacy
Ross, Peter W. (2006). Empirical constraints on the problem of free will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1980). Concepts of free will. Journal of Mind and Behavior 1:9-32.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1976). Can psychology be objective about free will? Philosophical Psychologist 10:2-9.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1979). Discovering Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1994). Four kinds of determinism and "free will": A response to Viney and Crosby. New Ideas in Psychology 12:143-46.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1994). Is free will a process or a content: Both? Neither? Are we free to take a position on this question? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14:62-72.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1991). Some theoretical and methodological questions concerning Harcum's proposed resolution of the free will issue. Journal of Mind and Behavior 135:135-150.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sappington, A. A. (1990). Recent psychological approaches to the free will versus determinism controversy. Psychological Bulletin 108:19-29.   (Google)
Scott, John Finley (1971). Internalization of Norms. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.   (Google)
Sharlow, Mark F. (ms). Yes, we have conscious will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I examine Daniel M. Wegner's line of argument against the causal efficacy of conscious will, as presented in Wegner's book "The Illusion of Conscious Will" (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002). I argue that most of the evidence adduced in the book can be interpreted in ways that do not threaten the efficacy of conscious will. Also, I argue that Wegner's view of conscious will is not an empirical thesis, and that certain views of consciousness and the self are immune to Wegner's line of argument
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2010). The bcn challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2008). The real challenge to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.   (Google)
Abstract: Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most significantly challenged by the recent discoveries. Those discoveries show that it is not as obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons as it seems. Hence, we have to rethink our concept of reasons-responsiveness
Silf, Margaret (2007). Wise Choices: A Spiritual Guide to Making Life's Decisions. Bluebridge.   (Google)
Abstract: With advice that combines ancient spiritual traditions with the common sense of the 21st century, this book offers soothing and practical guidance to the frazzled decision-maker. Those concerned about making the best choices can find techniques for broadening their way of thinking and effectively solving problems that also make sense for them spiritually. From everyday choices to landmark decisions, this book will simplify problem-solving and guide readers through all stages of life
Simcox, G. A. (1879). An empirical theory of free will. Mind 4 (16):469-481.   (Google | More links)
Slife, Brent D. (1994). Free will and time: That "stuck" feeling. Journal of Theoretical and Philsophical Psychology 14:1-12.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1976). Changing concepts of consciousness and free will. Perspectives in Biology And Medicine 20 (1):9-19.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Spence, Gerry (2001). Seven Simple Steps to Personal Freedom: An Owner's Manual for Life. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Beloved author of, among many other books, the bestsellers How to Argue and Win Every Time and The Making of a Country Lawyer , Gerry Spence distills a lifetime of wisdom and observation about how we live, and how we ought to live in Seven Simple Steps to Personal Freedom . Here, in seven chapters, he delivers messages that inspire us first to recognize our servitude-to money, possessions, corporations, the status quo, and our own fears-and then shows us how to begin the self-defining process toward liberation. Seven Simple Steps to Personal Freedom is a powerfully affirming, large-hearted, and life-changing book that asks us all to take the greatest risk for the greatest reward-our own freedom
Staddon, J. E. R. (ed.) (1980). Limits to Action, the Allocation of Individual Behavior. Academic Press.   (Google)
Steiner, Claude (1981). The Other Side of Power. Grove Press.   (Google)
Stroud, Joanne (1994). The Bonding of Will and Desire. Continuum.   (Google)
Stroud, Sarah & Tappolet, Christine (eds.) (2003). Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.   (Google)
Abstract: Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area
Tappan, Henry Philip (1839). A Review of Edward's "Inquiry Into the Freedom of the Will": Containing Statement of Edwards's Systems. Ams Press.   (Google)
Tasler, Nick (2008). The Impulse Factor: The Hidden Force Behind the Choices We Make. Simon & Schuster.   (Google)
Abstract: Origin of seekers : from caveman to cage fighters -- Impulsivity's hidden side : the secret of being directionally correct -- Eat or be eaten : what politicians have learned from primates -- Bubblology : the plague of the $76,000 flower -- Common sense of ownership -- Factoring you into your decisions -- Potential seekers : directing your innovative impulses -- Risk managers : conquering the fear of big cats -- Striking a balance.
Twerski, Abraham J. (2003). Successful Relationships: At Home, at Work, and with Friends: Bringing Control Issues Under Control. Distributed by Mesorah Publications.   (Google)
Vallacher, Robin R. (1985). A Theory of Action Identification. L. Erlbaum.   (Google)
Van Over, Raymond (1974). The Psychology of Freedom. Fawcett Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: The individual and society: Meerloo, J. A. M. Freedom--our mental backbone. Allport, G. Freedom. Marcuse, H. The new forms of control. Kerr, W. A. Psychology of the free competition of ideas. Eysenck, H. J. The technology of consent. Dewey, J. Toward a new individualism. Emerson, R. W. Self-reliance. Fromm, E. Freedom and democracy.--Religion and the inner man: St. Augustine. The freedom and the will. Mercier, L. J. A. Freedom of the will and psychology. Dostoyevsky, F. The grand inquisitor. Berdyaev, N. Master, slave and free man. Buber, M. I and thou. Govinda, A. Time and space and the problem of free will. Prabhavananda, S. Control of the subconscious mind.--Philosophy and philosophical psychology: Bergson, H. Psychological determinism. James, W. The dilemma of determinism. Mill, J. S. The freedom of the will. Sartre, J. P. Being and doing: freedom. Wyschogrod, M. Sartre, freedom and the unconscious. May, R. Will, decision and responsibility: summary remarks. Knight, R. P. Determinism, "freedom," and psychotherapy. Royce, J. Meaning, value, and personality.--Selected bibliography (p. 393-408)
Vargas, Manuel R. (2006). Philosophy and the folk. Journal of Cognition and Culture.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: First, unlike a good many philosophical puzzles that absorb the efforts of professional philosophers, the web of problems surrounding free will does not take philosophical training to appreciate. It is a ubiquitously accessible problem discussed at length by novelists, poets, musicians, scientists, religious believers, atheists, and more than a few undergraduates in late- night discussions. At least in the Western philosophical tradition it is also a very old problem: versions of it can be found at least as far back as the Stoics and the Epicureans, and arguably in Aristotle. Taken as a whole, these considerations suggest that at least a significant source of puzzles about free will can be found in aspects of our thinking that are available to us at easily accessible levels of reflection. Second, over the past 30 years or so, the philosophical arsenal of incompatibilists
Velmans, Max (2003). Preconscious free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will. Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain. I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law
Velmans, Max (2004). Why conscious free will both is and isn't an illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain
Vogel, Elizabeth (2000). Dealing with Choices. Powerkids Press.   (Google)
Wegner, Daniel M. (2004). Precis of the illusion of conscious will (and commentaries and reply). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27.   (Google)
Wegner, Daniel M. (2003). The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.   (Cited by 467 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue.
Wells, Valerie (1999). Naturally Powerful: 200 Simple Actions to Energize Body, Mind, Heart and Spirit. Perigee Books.   (Google)
Wheelis, Allen (1990). The Path Not Taken: Reflections on Power and Fear. Norton.   (Google)
Wicklund, Robert A. (1974). Freedom and Reactance. Potomac, Md.,L. Erlbaum Associates; Distributed by the Halsted Press Division, Wiley.   (Google)
Wilton, R. (2000). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Explanation of Human Behavior. Edwin Mellen Press.   (Google)
Zhu, Jing (2004). Is conscious will an illusion? Disputatio 16.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Zukav, Gary (2003). The Mind of the Soul: Responsible Choice. Free Press.   (Google)
Abstract: "This book can dramatically change your life by showing you how to take responsibility for the choices you make and break free from the illusion that you are a victim of your circumstances." So begins one of the most significant works you will ever encounter. People make hundreds of choices every day -- both large and small -- yet most individuals feel they have little control over their own lives. Now Gary Zukav, author of the monumental bestseller The Seat of the Soul, joins his spiritual partner, Linda Francis, in a revolutionary look at the power of choice and how to use it wisely. They explain how changing our decision-making can help us avoid self-defeating patterns of thought and action -- and help us take control of our lives by creating authentic, positive power. The Mind of the Soul describes how each moment in life is a moment of decision: wheth- er to persist in the old, limited patterns of life or to choose instead to experiment with the unbounded, liberating potential ahead of us. Using the same pragmatic terms that made The Heart of the Soul so meaningful, Zukav and Francis allow readers to develop, step by step, the ability to break free of unconscious choices that hold them back and limit their fulfillment in life. Whether your choices are large ones -- concerning work, marriage, parenting, or divorce -- or smaller day-to-day choices, such as shouting or showing annoyance when you are angry, they carry consequences for which you must assume responsibility. You will discover that in any situation one choice among the many that present themselves to you is the optimal choice -- to create harmony, cooperation, sharing, or reverence for Life. When you make this choice, you gain the freedom to experiment with your life, see what does or does not work for you, learn to change yourself instead of blaming others, open your heart, and develop authentic power. The Mind of the Soul is a book to be used, not merely read. It is packed with specific, practical exercises, diagrams, and meaningful illustrations that make you a participant in the process of responsible choice. To accompany this book, the authors have created a special Self-Empowerment Journal with additional material to help you focus your thoughts and emotions as you read and to invite you to record your insights after each exercise. The discoveries you make in both the book and the Journal will become a permanent part of your life long after you have turned the last page

5.4a.5 Free Will and Science, Misc

Beckermann, Ansgar (ms). Would biological determinism rule outthe possibility of freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: I shall disclose the answer to the title question straight away, and the answer is “NO, it would not”. If it turned out that we really are neurobi- ologically determined beings, this result would not necessitate any change in our idea of humanity – it would not affect the idea that we are free and responsible human beings. Or at any rate, it would not do so under certain conditions of which I am sure that, as a matter of fact, they are satisfied. But let us first ask the question, “Whence the opposite con- viction, according to which it would prove a disaster for our self-image and the idea that we are free and responsible beings if it emerged that everything we do, think or feel is completely determined by biological factors?”
Dennett, Daniel Clement (2003). Freedom Evolves. Viking.   (Google)
Abstract: Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems of moral and political freedom. Like the planet's atmosphere on which life depends, the conditions on which our freedom depends had to evolve, and like the atmosphere, they continue to evolve-and could be extinguished. According to Dennett, biology provides the perspective from which we can distinguish the varieties of freedom that matter. Throughout the history of life on this planet, an interacting web and internal and external conditions have provided the frameworks for the design of agents that are more free than their parts-from the unwitting gropings of the simplest life forms to the more informed activities of animals to the moral dilemmas that confront human beings living in societies. As in his previous books, Dennett weaves a richly detailed narrative enlivened by analogies as entertaining as they are challenging. Here is the story of how we came to be different from all other creatures, how our early ancestors mindlessly created human culture, and then, how culture gave us our minds, our visions, our moral problems-in a nutshell, our freedom
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Natural freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-458.   (Google | More links)
Fisher, Mark (1983). A note on free will and artificial intelligence. Philosophia 13 (September):75-80.   (Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). Dennett on freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):414-426.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article is my contribution to an author-meets-critics session on Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves (Viking, 2003) at the 2004 meetings of the American Philosophical Association – Pacific Division. Dennett criticizes a view I defend in Autonomous Agents (Oxford University Press, 1995) about the importance of agents’ histories for autonomy, freedom, and moral responsibility and defends a competing view. Our disagreement on this issue is the major focus of this article. Additional topics are manipulation, avoidance, and avoidability
Hanson, David J. (1970). Science, determinism and free will. Journal of Social Research 13 (March):49-54.   (Google)
Mameli, Matteo (2003). On Dennett and the natural sciences of free will. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: _Freedom Evolves _is an ambitious book. The aim is to show that free will is compatible with what physics, biology and the neurosciences tell us about the way we function and that, moreover, these sciences can help us clarify and vindicate the most important aspects of the common-sense conception of free will, those aspects that play a fundamental role in the way we live our lives and in the way we organize our society
Maxwell, Nicholas (2005). Science versus realization of value, not determinism versus choice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):53-58.   (Google)
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
Newton, Natika (2003). A critical review of Nicholas Maxwell's the human world in the physical universe: Consciousness, free will, and evolution. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):149 – 156.   (Google)
Abstract: Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires firm and nuanced arguments to support it. Here Maxwell's work is weakest; his arguments for contingent mind-body identity and for free will, on which his larger theory depends, are inadequate. The book is valuable both for its comprehensive view of the human condition and its mysteries, and for its demonstration of the difficulties in making such a view coherent
O'Connor, Timothy (2005). Pastoral counsel for the anxious naturalist: Daniel Dennett's freedom evolves. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):436-448.   (Google)
Usher, Matthew (2006). Control, choice, and the convergence/divergence dynamics: A compatibilistic probabilistic theory of free will. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):188-213.   (Google | More links)
Vargas, Manuel R. (2005). Compatibilism evolves?: On some varieties of Dennett worth wanting. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):460-475.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Vargas, Manuel R. (2006). Philosophy and the folk. Journal of Cognition and Culture.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: First, unlike a good many philosophical puzzles that absorb the efforts of professional philosophers, the web of problems surrounding free will does not take philosophical training to appreciate. It is a ubiquitously accessible problem discussed at length by novelists, poets, musicians, scientists, religious believers, atheists, and more than a few undergraduates in late- night discussions. At least in the Western philosophical tradition it is also a very old problem: versions of it can be found at least as far back as the Stoics and the Epicureans, and arguably in Aristotle. Taken as a whole, these considerations suggest that at least a significant source of puzzles about free will can be found in aspects of our thinking that are available to us at easily accessible levels of reflection. Second, over the past 30 years or so, the philosophical arsenal of incompatibilists

5.4b Theories of Free Will

5.4b.1 Agent Causation

Allen, Robert F. (online). Agent causation and ultimate responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: Positions taken in the current debate over free will can be seen as responses to the following conditional: If every action is caused solely by another event and a cause necessitates its effect, then there is no action to which there is an alternative. The Libertarian, who believes that alternatives are a requirement of free will, responds by denying the right conjunct of C’s antecedent, maintaining that some actions are caused, either mediately or immediately, by events whose effects could be different, even if they were to recur under identical circumstances. We have here a denial of Laplacian Determinism (LD), according to which the condition of the world at any instant makes only one state possible at any other instant.<sup>1</sup> One prominent defender of this view, Robert Kane, holds that unless an agent’s neural mechanisms operated indeterministicly in forming her character she is not responsible for its manifestations.<sup>2</sup> This requirement is entailed by the principle of “ultimate responsibility” (UR) according to which an act is freely willed only if (a) its agent is personally responsible for its performance in the sense of having caused it to occur by voluntarily doing something that was avoidable and (b)
Balaguer, Mark (2002). A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will. Noûs 36 (3):379-406.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bishop, John D. (1983). Agent-causation. Mind 92 (January):61-79.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Bishop, John D. (1986). Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive? Synthese 67 (May):225-47.   (Google)
Bishop, John D. (2003). Prospects for a naturalist libertarianism: O'Connor's persons and causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
BonJour, Laurence A. (1976). Deeterminism, libertarianism, and agent causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14:145-56.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court.   (Cited by 177 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Agent causation and event causation in the production of free action. Philosophical Topics 24:19-48.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2005). Agent causation and the problem of luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1993). Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will. Noûs 27 (2):191-203.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1983). Agent causation, chance, and determinism. Philosophical Inquiry 5:29-42.   (Google)
Feldman, Richard H. & Buckareff, Andrei A. (2003). Reasons explanations and pure agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism
Fischer, John Martin (2001). Book review. Persons and causes: The metaphysics of free will Timothy O'Connor. Mind 110 (438).   (Google)
Griffith, Meghan E. (2005). Does free will remain a mystery? A response to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it
Griffith, Meghan (2007). Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions. Acta Analytica 22 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that trying is the locus of freedom and moral responsibility. Thus, any plausible view of free and responsible action must accommodate and account for free tryings. I then consider a version of agent causation whereby the agent directly causes her tryings. On this view, the agent is afforded direct control over her efforts and there is no need to posit—as other agent-causal theorists do—an uncaused event. I discuss the potential advantages of this sort of view, and its challenges
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2004). Active control, agent-causation and free action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation
Hurst, T. L. (ms). Causation and Free Will.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper looks at the basic philosophic positions on the problem of free will and suggests that there is a difference in usage of the term "determinism" between hard and soft determinists. The term "freewillism" is introduced, which is defined as the view that events can be caused by willed choices. Instead of "soft determinism", "hard determinism" and "libertarianism" the terms "soft freewillism", "(hard) determinism" and "hard freewillism" are used. Hence there is only one form of determinism, and the issue is resolved.

This change is allied to an expansion of the questions by which the philosophic positions are distinguished to allow a correlation between the questions on free will and questions on causality. This suggests a mapping of the main philosophic positions on free will to the types of causation:

- (Hard) determinism correlates to event-event causation, and is not compatible with free will.
- Indeterminism correlates to random causation, which is also incompatible with free will.
- Hard freewillism (libertarianism) allows all three types of causation (event-event, random and agent), and indeterminate (libertarian) free will.
Soft freewillism (soft determinism) allows event-event and agent causation, and determinate free will.

The evidence supporting the three types of causation is then considered.
Hurst, T. L. (ms). The Demise of Compatibilism?   (Google)
Abstract: This paper suggests that compatibilism is incoherent because determinism allows neither causal input to your choices and actions, nor a sound form of moral responsibility. Free will requires, at least, moral responsibility, if not causal input. Hence, it is not possible to be compatible with both determinism and free will, as they are not compatible with each other.

A form of free will is identified in which our choices are determinate at the time we make them, because they are determined by our natures. However, our natures can change over time, and the unique ability of sentient beings to reflect on choices, actions and events allows input to that process. Thus giving us input to future choices.

This form of free will is not compatible with determinism because our choices are not fixed for all time by events in the distant past, but instead become fixed over time as choices are made and events unfold. The term "soft freewillism" is used for the philosophic position that allows this form of determinate free will.
Lowe, E. J. (2001). Event causation and agent causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:1-20.   (Google)
Markosian, Ned (1999). A compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Here is a question about (physical) mereological simples that I raised in a recent paper. The Simple Question: What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object’s being a simple? And here is the answer to this question that I defended...
O'Connor, Timothy (1995). Agent causation. In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In what follows, I will contend that the commonsense view of ourselves as fundamental causal agents - for which some have used the term “unmoved movers" but which I think might more accurately be expressed as “not wholly moved movers” - is theoretically understandable, internally consistent, and consistent with what we have thus far come to know about the nature and workings of the natural world. In the section that follows, I try to show how the concept of ‘agent’ causation can be understood as a distinct species (from ‘event’ causation) of the primitive idea, which I’ll term “causal production”, underlying realist or non-Humean conceptions of event causation. In section III, I respond to a number of contemporary objections to the theory of agent causation. Sections IV-V are devoted to showing that the theory is compatible with ordinary reasons explanations of action, which then places me in a position to respond, in the final section, to the contention that we could never know, in principle, whether the agency theory actually describes a significant portion of human activity.
O'Connor, Timothy (2000). Causality, mind, and free will. Noûs.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One familiar affirmative answer to this question holds that these facts suffice to entail that Descartes' picture of the human mind must be mistaken. On Descartes' view, our mind or soul (the only essential part of ourselves) has no spatial location. Yet it directly interacts with but one physical object, the brain of that body with which it is, 'as it were, intermingled,' so as to 'form one unit.' The radical disparity posited between a nonspatial mind, whose intentional and conscious properties are had by no physical object, and a spatial body, all of whose properties are had by no mind, has prompted some to conclude that, pace Descartes, causal interaction between the two is impossible. Jaegwon Kim has recently given a new twist to this old line of thought.(1) In the present essay, I will use Kim's argument as a springboard for motivating my own favored picture of the metaphysics of mind and body and then discussing how an often vilified account of freedom of the will may be realized within it
O'Connor, Timothy (2001). Dualist and agent-causal theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oup.   (Google)
Abstract: I Introduction This essay will canvass recent philosophical accounts of human agency that deploy a notion of 'self' (or 'agent') causation. Some of these accounts try to explicate this notion, whereas others only hint at its nature by way of contrast with the causality exhibited by impersonal physical systems. In these latter theories, the authors' main argumentative burden is that the apparent fundamental differences between personal and impersonal causal activity strongly suggest mind-body dualism. I begin by noting two distinct, yet not commonly distinguished, philosophical motivations for pursuing an agent-causal account of human agency. In the course of discussing the accounts that some philosophers have developed in response to these considerations, I reconsider both the linkage of agent causation with mind-body dualism and its sharp cleavage from impersonal (or 'event') causation
O’Connor, Timothy (2005). Freedom with a human face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: As good a definition as any of a _philosophical_ conundrum is a problem all of whose possible solutions are unsatisfactory. The problem of understanding the springs of action for morally responsible agents is commonly recognized to be such a problem. The origin, nature, and explanation of freely-willed actions puzzle us today as they did the ancients Greeks, and for much the same reasons. However, one can carry this ‘perennial-puzzle’ sentiment too far. The unsatisfactory nature of philosophical theories is a more or less matter, and some of them have admitted of improvement over time. This, at any rate, is what we self-selecting metaphysicians tend to suppose, and I will pursue that high calling by suggesting a few improvements to a theory of metaphysical freedom, or freedom of the will
O'Connor, Timothy (2005). Freedom With a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:207-227.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1993). Indeterminism and free agency: Three recent views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-26.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a commonplace of philosophy that the notion of free will is a hard nut to crack. A simple, compelling argument can be made to show that behavior for which an agent is morally responsible cannot be the outcome of prior determining causal factors.1 Yet the smug satisfaction with which we incompatibilists are prone to trot out this argument has a tendency to turn to embarrassment when we're asked to explain just how it is that morally responsible action might obtain under the assumption of indeterminism. Despair over the prospect of giving a satisfactory answer to this question has led some contemporary philosophers to a position rarely, if ever, held in the history of philosophy: free, responsible action is an incoherent concept.2
O'Connor, Timothy (2007). Is it all just a matter of luck? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A central argument of Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck (2006) is that the problem of luck poses essentially the same problem for all the main indeterministic accounts of free will. Consequently, there is no advantage is certain theories (notably, agent-causal theories) in their capacity to respond to the problem of luck. I argue that Mele has not made a persuasive case for these claims
O'Connor, Timothy (2002). Libertarian views: Dualist and agent-causal theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 77 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This provocative book refurbishes the traditional account of freedom of will as reasons-guided "agent" causation, situating its account within a general metaphysics. O'Connor's discussion of the general concept of causation and of ontological reductionism v. emergence will specially interest metaphysicians and philosophers of mind
O'Connor, Timothy & Churchill, John (2006). Reasons Explanation And Agent Control: In Search Of An Integrated Account. Philosophical Topics 32:241-256.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1996). Why agent causation? Philosophical Topics 24:143-58.   (Google)
Abstract: I Introduction The question of this paper is, what would it be to act with freedom of the will? What kind of control is inchoately in view when we speak, pretheoretically, of being ‘self- determining’ beings, of ‘freely making choices in view of consciously considered reasons’ (pro and con) - of its being ‘up to us’ how we shall act? My question here is not whether we have (or have any reason to think we have) such freedom, or what is the most robust account of our freedom compatible with late twentieth-century science. Many contemporary philosophers are all too ready to settle for a deflationary account of freedom and declare victory, with some brief remarks reminding us that we were created a little lower than the angels. I am not so sanguine about the ability of such accounts to leave reasonably intact our judgments about human autonomy, dignity, and responsibility. But, as I’ve said, that’s not my concern here. Instead, I want to revisit the question of what exactly ‘self-determination’, on our ordinary conception, comes to
Pereboom, Derk (forthcoming). Is our concept of agent-causation coherent? Philosophical Topics.   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (2007). On Alfred Mele's free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism
Rowe, William L. (2006). Free will, moral responsibility, and the problem of OOMPH. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):295-313.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral responsibility. In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist, agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility
Rowe, William L. (1991). Responsibility, agent-causation, and freedom: An eighteenth-century view. Ethics 101 (2):237-257.   (Google | More links)
Schlosser, Markus E. (2008). Agent-causation and agential control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3 – 21.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the proponents of the agent-causal approach, that substance-causation is possible, as I will argue against that theory on the ground that it fails as a theory of agency. I will argue that the non-reductive agent-causal theory fails to account for agency, because it fails to account for agential control: it cannot explain why the stipulated irreducible relation between the agent and an action constitutes the agent's exercise of control over the action. This objection, I will argue, applies to the agent-causal theory in particular, and to the non-reductive approach in general
Silvers, Stuart (2003). Agent causation, functional explanation, and epiphenomenal engines: Can conscious mental events be causally efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (1998). Free will as a gift from God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Tucker, Chris (2007). Agent causation and the alleged impossibility of rational free action. Erkenntnis 67 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Galen Strawson has claimed that “the impossibility of free will and ultimate moral responsibility can be proved with complete certainty.” Strawson, I take it, thinks that this conclusion can be established by one argument which he has developed. In this argument, he claims that rational free actions would require an infinite regress of rational choices, which is, of course, impossible for human beings. In my paper, I argue that agent causation theorists need not be worried by Strawson’s argument. For agent causation theorists are able to deny a key principle which drives the regress. Oversimplifying things a bit, the principle states that if one is responsible for her rational actions, then she was antecedently responsible for the reasons on which she acted
von Wachter, Daniel (2003). Agent causation before and after the ontological turn. In Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbvhpt.   (Google)
Abstract: Chisholm's theory of agent causation is criticised. An alternative theory of agent causation is proposed.
von Wachter, Daniel (2003). Free agents as cause. In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.   (Google | More links)
Widerker, David (2005). Agent-causation and control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Xu, Xiangdong (ms). Does Agent-Causation Theory Explain Free Agency?   (Google)
Zuriff, G. E. (2004). Conscious will and agent causation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):678-679.   (Google)
Abstract: Wegner (2002) fails to (1) distinguish conscious will and voluntariness; (2) account for everyday willed acts; and (3) individuate thoughts and acts. Wegner incorrectly implies that (4) we experience acts as willed only when they are caused by unwilled thoughts; (5) thoughts are never true causes of actions; and (6) we experience ourselves as first performing mental acts which then cause our intentional actions

5.4b.2 Compatibilism

Abbruzzese, John (2000). Garrett on the theological objection to Hume's compatibilism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):345 – 352.   (Google | More links)
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Aune, Bruce (1970). Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Baker, Lynne Rudder, What is human freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theoretical significance
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Balaguer, Mark, The metaphysical irrelevance of the compatibilism debate (and, more generally, of conceptual analysis).   (Google)
Abstract: It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes-for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will-except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questionsnamely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility-are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings
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Beckermann, Ansgar (ms). Would biological determinism rule outthe possibility of freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: I shall disclose the answer to the title question straight away, and the answer is “NO, it would not”. If it turned out that we really are neurobi- ologically determined beings, this result would not necessitate any change in our idea of humanity – it would not affect the idea that we are free and responsible human beings. Or at any rate, it would not do so under certain conditions of which I am sure that, as a matter of fact, they are satisfied. But let us first ask the question, “Whence the opposite con- viction, according to which it would prove a disaster for our self-image and the idea that we are free and responsible beings if it emerged that everything we do, think or feel is completely determined by biological factors?”
Beebee, Helen & Mele, Alfred R. (2002). Humean compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a false premiss. We also display some striking similarities between Humean compatibilism and libertarianism, an incompatibilist view. For example, standard libertarians face a problem about luck, and we show that Humean compatibilists face a very similar problem
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Berofsky, Bernard (2010). Free will and the mind–body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As bona fide laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). Global control and freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, the global controller nullifies freedom because she is an agent, whereas natural forces are at work in conventional deterministic worlds. Other key differences that undermine the analogy are identified. It is also shown that the argument begs the question against the classical compatibilist, who believes that determinism does not preclude alternative possibilities
Berofsky, Bernard (2002). Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
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Abstract: This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Berofsky, Bernard (2000). Ultimate rsponsibility in a determined world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.   (Google)
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Abstract: Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today
Bok, Hilary (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I do?" and sifting through alternatives to find the most justifiable course of action--we have reason to hold ourselves responsible for what we do. But when we engage in theoretical reasoning--searching for causal explanations of events--we have no reason to apply concepts like freedom and responsibility. Bok contends that libertarians' arguments against "compatibilist" justifications of moral responsibility fail because they describe human actions only from the standpoint of theoretical reasoning. To establish this claim, she examines which conceptions of freedom of the will and moral responsibility are relevant to practical reasoning and shows that these conceptions are not vulnerable to many objections that libertarians have directed against compatibilists. Bok concludes that the truth or falsity of the claim that we are free and responsible agents in the sense those conceptions spell out is ultimately independent of deterministic accounts of the causes of human actions.Clearly written and powerfully argued, Freedom and Responsibility is a major addition to current debate about some of philosophy's oldest and deepest questions.
Boysen, Thomas (2004). Death of a compatibilistic intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.   (Google | More links)
Bregant, Janez (2003). The problem of causal exclusion and Horgan's causal compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.   (Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Compatibilism and doxastic control. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable
Byrd, Jeremy (2008). Kant's compatibilism in the new eludication of the first principles of metaphysical cognition. Kant-Studien 99 (1).   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (1997). A compatibilist theory of alternate possibilities. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):339-44.   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2005). Compatibilist alternatives. Canadian Journal Of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: _If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in whose shadow Wittgenstein ought to be standing,_ _considered the matter. He pointed out that even if determinism is true, there remains a sense in which you_ _can still do otherwise than you do: you will do otherwise if you so choose. That, on reflection, is consistent_ _with determinism. The doctrine of the compatibility of freedom and determinism is saved. Joseph Keim_ _Campbell, strong philosopher at Washington State University, provides the latest thinking on this seemingly_ _unavoidable dispute. You do not have to agree that either compatibilism or incompatibilism must be true in_ _order to appreciate the carefulness of his reasoning in this piece of ongoing American philosophy. It_ _requires and repays attention._
Canfield, John V. (1961). Determinism, free will and the ace predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1963). Free will and determinism: A reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1962). The compatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Review 71 (July):352-368.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Chappell, Vere (ms). Descartes’s compatibilism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilism is the doctrine that the doctrine of determinism is logically consistent with the doctrine of libertarianism. Determinism is the doctrine that every being and event is brought about by causes other than itself. Libertarianism is the doctrine that some human actions are free. Was Descartes a compatibilist? There is no doubt that he was a libertarian: his works are full of professions of freedom, human as well as divine. And though he held that God has no cause other than himself, Descartes thought that everything apart from God is externally caused: he was a determinist with respect to the created universe. So it appears, assuming him consistent with himself, that Descartes must have been a compatibilist. And indeed, there are passages in his writings in which he appears explicitly to affirm that he is. Since both Descartes’s libertarianism and his determinism are complex doctrines, however, his view of the relation between them is complex as well
Clarke, Randolph (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points of dispute concerning free will.
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2007). Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument
Crissman, Paul (1942). Freedom in determinism. Journal of Philosophy 39 (September):520-526.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2006). The trouble with externalist compatibilist autonomy. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve the CNC manipulation problem. After briefly reflecting on the present status of responses to the manipulation problem in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists of various stripes, I will draw the over-all pessimistic conclusion that no party deals with this problem satisfactorily
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2004). The trouble with Harry: Compatibilist free will internalism and manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Deery, Oisín (2007). Extending compatibilism: Control, responsibility, and blame. Res Publica 13 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. MIT Press.   (Cited by 473 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel Clement (2003). Freedom Evolves. Viking.   (Google)
Abstract: Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems of moral and political freedom. Like the planet's atmosphere on which life depends, the conditions on which our freedom depends had to evolve, and like the atmosphere, they continue to evolve-and could be extinguished. According to Dennett, biology provides the perspective from which we can distinguish the varieties of freedom that matter. Throughout the history of life on this planet, an interacting web and internal and external conditions have provided the frameworks for the design of agents that are more free than their parts-from the unwitting gropings of the simplest life forms to the more informed activities of animals to the moral dilemmas that confront human beings living in societies. As in his previous books, Dennett weaves a richly detailed narrative enlivened by analogies as entertaining as they are challenging. Here is the story of how we came to be different from all other creatures, how our early ancestors mindlessly created human culture, and then, how culture gave us our minds, our visions, our moral problems-in a nutshell, our freedom
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Natural freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-458.   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. & Taylor, Christopher (ms). Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is no doctrine about determinism and freedom that has proved to be as resilient over the past century as that of Compatibilism. It is, of course, the doctrine that we can be both free and also subject to a real determinism. If it goes back at least to Hobbes and Hume, it was strengthened and refurbished throughout the 1900's. Part of its strength has been the extent to which it has satisfied theses that in fact seem to be the very substance of the doctrine opposed to it. This is Incompatibilism. What follows here is the most recent and the very best attempt to steal what has appeared to be the thunder of Incompatibilism. Professors Taylor and Dennett make use of a certain amount of technicality in giving sense, on the assumption of determinism, to the ideas that we can nevertheless do otherwise than we actually do and we can also really take credit for things. It is not my own view, but it is one that must be reckoned with by all who struggle with the problem. Put in some effort with the formalism if you have to, find out a little about possible worlds. It is certainly worth the effort
Dänzer, Lars (2008). A neglected argument for compatibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):211-218.   (Google)
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Eggerman, Richard W. (1976). The language of soft determinism. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7:91-99.   (Google)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (1998). Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation
Everson, Stephen (1990). Aristotle's compatibilism in the nicomachean ethics. Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):81-103.   (Google)
Fales, Evan (1984). Davidson's compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):227-246.   (Google | More links)
Falk, Arthur E. (1981). On some modal confusions in compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):141-48.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fara, Michael (2008). Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind 117 (468).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of agential abilities in terms of dispositions. The analysis is shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to incompatibilism about free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the “master argument” for incompatibilism is unsound
Feltz, Adam; Cokely, Edward T. & Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2009). Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Abstract: In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far
Ferraiolo, William (2004). Against compatibilism: Compulsion, free agency and moral responsibility. Sorites 15 (December):67-72.   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1996). A new compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24:49-66.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2007). Compatibilism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2005). Dennett on the basic argument. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Christopher Taylor has greatly clarified my thinking on this topic and shown me how to launch a deeper and more radical campaign in support of my earlier claims to this effect, and our coauthored paper (Taylor and Dennett 2001) provides more technical detail than is needed here. Here I will attempt a gentler version of our argument, highlighting the main points so that non-philosophers can at least see what the points of contention are, and how we propose to settle them, while leaving out almost all the logical formulae. Philosophers should consult the full-dress version, of course, to see if we have actually tied off the loose ends, and closed the loopholes that are passed by without mention in this telling. (Dennett
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-style compatibilism. In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Abstract: In this essay I shall begin by sketching a "Frankfurt-type example." I shall then lay out a disturbing challenge to the claim I have made above that these examples help us to make significant progress in the debates about the relationship between moral responsibility and causal determinism. I then will provide a reply to this challenge, and the reply will point toward a more refined formulation of the important contribution I believe Frankfurt has made to defending a certain sort of compatibilism.
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Flint, Thomas P. (1987). Compatibilism and the argument from unavoidability. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):423-40.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1978). Compatibilism. Kind 87 (July):421-28.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1979). Compatibilism and control over the past. Analysis 39 (March):70-74.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1981). Compatibilism: A reply to Shaw. Mind 90 (April):287-288.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1980). Reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 40 (March):101-103.   (Google)
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Fowler, C. A. (1996). A pragmatic defense of free will. Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):247-60.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Intentionality and intentional action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.   (Google | More links)
Garvey, Brian (2008). Free will, compatibilism and the human nature wars. .   (Google)
Abstract: There has been much controversy over whether the claims of evolutionary psychologists, if true, imply that we humans are significantly less free than has traditionally been thought. This in turn gives rise to the concern that excuses are being given to philanderers and other ne’er-do-wells for their behaviour. Evolutionary psychologists themselves often respond to this concern by claiming that it presupposes that they believe in genetic determinism, which they do not. Philosophers, such as Janet Radcliffe Richards in Human Nature after Darwin, respond by appealing to compatibilist accounts of free will. The thought is that whether or not our behaviour is caused by evolved mental mechanisms, has no bearing on whether or not it is free. The present paper takes issue with this use of compatibilist arguments. Compatibilist accounts of free will do not just say that an action can be determined and still free; they also distinguish between situations where we are free and ones where we are not. The latter includes not just situations of external coercion, but also situations where there are internal obstacles such as compulsion, addiction or self-deception. While not attempting to outline a full account of what it is to be free, this paper will outline one set of conditions which are sufficient for our freedom to be said to be restricted – conditions which are shared by situations of addiction, self-deception, etc. But a central pillar of evolutionary psychology is that the mind consists wholly or largely of modules whose operation is mandatory. The outputs of these modules are often characterised as desires or goals. It will be argued that this implies internal obstacles to free will that are relevantly similar to the obstacles of addiction, self-deception, etc. It is ultimately a scientific question, and hence outside the scope of this paper, whether the relevant evolutionary-psychological claims are true or not. However, they are central to the discipline, and this paper will argue that if they are true that has negative consequences for how free we are. Hence, the view that evolutionary psychology implies that we are less free than has traditionally been thought is not without foundation
Gert, Bernard & Duggan, Timothy J. (1979). Free will as the ability to will. Noûs 13 (2):197-217.   (Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1993). Freedom of the will and mental content. Ratio 6 (2):89-107.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1980). The conditional analysis of freedom. In P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Glossop, Ronald J. (1969). Freedom, determinism, and mechanism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7:181-186.   (Google)
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Graham, Peter A. (2008). A defense of local miracle compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 140 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2002). Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Haji, By Ishtiyaque (2008). Dispositional compatibilism and Frankfurt-type examples. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):226–241.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article critically examines Kadri Vihvelin's proposal that to have free will is to have the ability to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to have this ability is to have a bundle of dispositions that can be exercised in more than one way. It is argued that partisans of Frankfurt examples can still make a powerful case for the view that being able to do otherwise, even on Vihvelin's compatibilist explication of ‘could have done otherwise,’ is not required for moral responsibility
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Introduction: Semi-compatibilism, reasons-responsiveness, and ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):91 – 93.   (Google | More links)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (1998). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility
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Harding, Gregory (1997). Free will and determinism: Why compatibilism is false. Erkenntnis 47 (3):311-349.   (Google | More links)
Harris, James A. (2005). Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eighteenth century was a time of brilliant philosophical innovation in Britain. In Of Liberty and Necessity James A. Harris presents the first comprehensive account of the period's discussion of what remains a central problem of philosophy, the question of the freedom of the will. He offers new interpretations of contributions to the free will debate made by canonical figures such as Locke, Hume, Edwards, and Reid, and also discusses in detail the arguments of some less familiar writers. Harris puts the eighteenth-century debate about the will and its freedom in the context of the period's concern with applying what Hume calls the "experimental method of reasoning" to the human mind. His book will be of substantial interest to historians of philosophy and anyone concerned with the free will problem
Hausman, D. B. (1975). Compatibilism again. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (March):509-514.   (Google)
Helm, Paul (2010). God, compatibilism, and the authorship of sin. Religious Studies 46 (1):115-124.   (Google)
Heller, M. (1996). The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-37.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hobart, R. E. (1934). Free will as involving determinism and inconceivable without it. Mind 43 (169):1-27.   (Google | More links)
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Holton, Richard (2007). Freedom, coercion and discursive control. In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If moral and political philosophy is to be of any use, it had better be concerned with real people. The focus need not be exclusively on people as they are; but it should surely not extend beyond how they would be under laws as they might be. It is one of the strengths of Philip Pettit’s work that it is concerned with real people and the ways that they think: with the commonplace mind. In this paper I examine Pettit’s recent work on free will.2 Much of my concern will be to see how his contentions fit with empirical findings about human psychology. Pettit is a compatibilist about free will: he holds that it is compatible with determinism. But he finds fault with existing compatibilist accounts, and then proposes his own amendment. My aim is to challenge his grounds for finding fault; and then to raise some questions about his own positive account
Holmstrom, Nancy (1977). Firming up soft determinism. Personalist 58 (January):39-51.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Holton, Richard (2009). Determinism, self-efficacy, and the phenomenology of free will. Inquiry 52 (4):412 – 428.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible. I suggest a different explanation, and in doing so try to shed some light on the phenomenology of free will. I contend that one aspect of the phenomenology is our impression that maintaining a resolution requires effort—an impression well supported by a range of psychological data. Determinism can easily be interpreted as showing that such effort will be futile: in effect determinism is conflated with fatalism, in a way that is reminiscent of the Lazy argument used against the Stoics. If this interpretation is right, it explains how belief in determinism undermines moral motivation without needing to attribute sophisticated incompatibilist beliefs to subjects; it works by undermining subjects' self-efficacy. It also provides indirect support for the contention that this is one of the sources of the phenomenology of free will
Holton, Richard (forthcoming). Response to 'free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William crescioni and Jessica L. alquist. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (2006). The act of choice. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (3):1-15.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Choice is one of the central elements in the experience of free will, but it has not received a good account from either compatibilists or libertarians. This paper develops an account of choice based around three features: (i) choice is an action; (ii) choice is not determined by one's prior beliefs and desires; (iii) once the question of what to do has arisen, choice is typically both necessary and sufficient for moving to action. These features might appear to support a libertarian account, but they do not. Instead it is argued that all three features can be accommodated within a compatibilist account, where choice is needed because of agents' inabilities to arrive at judgements about what is best. Choice differs though from random picking: in choosing, agents frequently (though not always) deploy abilities that enable them to make good choices. In such cases, judgements about what is best will frequently follow the choice. Finally choice is distinguished from agency, and, on the basis of the distinction, the claim that choice is an action is made good.
Honderich, Ted (online). After compatibilism and incompatibilism.   (Google)
Abstract: A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run up against a conviction owed to reflecting on your own past life. The conviction is that an attitude akin to one tied to indeterminism, a way of holding yourself morally responsible, has some basis despite the truth of determinism. We need to look for radical ideas here, as radical as Consciousness as Existence with the problem of perceptual consciousness. Could that doctrine help with determinism and freedom? Could a problem about causation and explanation do so?
Honderich, Ted (2006). Compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem. The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy Website.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1996). Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the Smart aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):855-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (2002). Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (ms). Determinism's consequences -- the mistakes of compatibilism and incompatibilism, and what is to be done now.   (Google)
Abstract: From before the time of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th Century, right up to John Searle's impertinent piece in Journal of Consciousness Studies a few months ago, and a major conference in Idaho in April, philosophers of determinism and freedom have divided into Compatibilists and Incompatibilists. The first regiment says that determinism is logically compatible with freedom. The second says it is logically incompatible. They can do this. In a way it is easy-peasy. The first regiment achieves its end by defining free decisions and actions as voluntary: owed to certain causes rather than others -- causes somehow internal to the agent rather than external or constraining causes. The second regiment satisfies itself by defining free decisions and actions as not only voluntary but also originated -- where an originated event, however mysterious, is definitely not a causally necessitated one
Honderich, Ted (2002). How free are you? The determinism problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Abstract: In this fully revised and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic, he offers a concise and lively introduction to free will and the problem of determinism, advancing the debate on this key area of moral philosophy. Honderich sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question, "Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?" and asks instead if there is such a clear version of free will. He goes on to address the question of whether determinism is true and finally asks, "What can we conclude about our lives if determinism is true?"
Honderich, Ted (online). Thomas Hobbes: Causation, determinism, and their compatibility with freedom.   (Google)
Abstract: _What Thomas Hobbes has to say of the nature of causation itself in_ _Entire Causes_ _and Their Only Possible Effects_ _is carried further in the first of the two excerpts here_ _-- although not at its start. His second subject in this imperfectly sequential piece of_ _writing is determinism itself -- a deterministic philosophy of mind. In the mind, as_ _elsewhere, each event has a 'necessary cause' -- a cause that necessitates the event._ _His third subject in the first excerpt is freedom, this being voluntariness, and its_ _relation to the determinism. He gives a statement of what is now known as_ _Compatibilism -- roughly the doctrine that determinism and freedom properly_ _understood do not conflict with but are consistent with one another. We can be_ _entirely subject to determinism or 'necessity' and also be perfectly free. Certainly a_ _distinction between freedom as 'the absence of opposition', which can co-exist with_ _determinism, and some other kind of freedom, had been made before Hobbes. But it_ _will take a better historian than me to say if he was anticipated by someone else who_ _said that the particular freedom consistent with determinism is all that we can_ _properly mean by the term 'freedom'. Certainly he got in ahead of lovely_
Horgan, Terence E. (1985). Compatibilism and the consequence argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Howsepian, A. A. (2004). A libertarian-friendly theory of compatibilist free action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):453-480.   (Google)
Howsepian, A. A. (2007). Compatibilism, evil, and the free-will defense. Sophia 46 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical compatibilism
Hudson, Hud (1994). Kant's Compatibilism. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Hume, David (online). Our freedom reconciled with determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness since the first origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression; and that that disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other
Hurst, T. L. (ms). The Demise of Compatibilism?   (Google)
Abstract: This paper suggests that compatibilism is incoherent because determinism allows neither causal input to your choices and actions, nor a sound form of moral responsibility. Free will requires, at least, moral responsibility, if not causal input. Hence, it is not possible to be compatible with both determinism and free will, as they are not compatible with each other.

A form of free will is identified in which our choices are determinate at the time we make them, because they are determined by our natures. However, our natures can change over time, and the unique ability of sentient beings to reflect on choices, actions and events allows input to that process. Thus giving us input to future choices.

This form of free will is not compatible with determinism because our choices are not fixed for all time by events in the distant past, but instead become fixed over time as choices are made and events unfold. The term "soft freewillism" is used for the philosophic position that allows this form of determinate free will.
Jennings, Ian (1997). Autonomy and hierarchical compatibilism. South African Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):44-50.   (Google)
Jones, David H. (1968). Deliberation and determinism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 6:255-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Judisch, Neal (2007). Reasons-responsive compatibilism and the consequences of belief. Journal of Ethics 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility
Kane, Robert (2002). Responsibility, reactive attitudes and free will: Reflections on Wallace's theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):693–698.   (Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kapitan, Tomis (1991). Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The use of predicate and sentential operators to express the practical modalities -- ability, control, openness, etc. -- has given new life to a fatalistic argument against determinist theories of responsible agency. A familiar version employs the following principle: the consequences of what is unavoidable (beyond one's control) are themselves unavoidable. Accordingly, if determinism is true, whatever happens is the consequence of events in the remote past, or, of such events together with the laws of nature. But laws and the remote past are not under our control and, by the principle, neither are their consequences. Therefore, none of our choices and actions, nor anything that results from them, is under our control.1 Whether refinements of the closure principle underlying this unavoidability argument are acceptable depends upon the precise sense of 'consequence' and 'unavoidable' involved. Roughly, a proposition P is a consequence of a set of propositions M iff it is impossible that P be false when each member of M is true, or, conversely, when M necessitates P. Since P is unavoidable for S when P is true and S is (was) unable to prevent P from being true, it might seem that if P is unavoidable the same should hold of what is necessitated by P. There is, in fact, 1 an easy defense of the principle which utilizes the incompatibilist condition that S is able to do action K only if it is as yet undetermined whether or not S will K. With it, there is no question but that one is unable to accomplish what is already determined by what one was unable to prevent. Of course, this reasoning is unlikely to impress the compatibilist who rejects the condition outright and, expectedly, it is not the procedure of the proponents of the unavoidability argument. The latter might rest content with appeals to intuition, but more significant are defenses of the closure principle and independent derivations of the unavoidability argument that rely upon distinct principles concerning the logic of the practical modalities, for example, closure of ability under entailment (Cross 1986, Brown 1988) or, claims about the "fixity of the past" and the "inescapability of laws" (Ginet 1990)..
Kapitan, Tomis (2000). Autonomy and manipulated freedom. Philosopical Perspectives 14:81-104.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, compatibilism has been the target of two powerful challenges. According to the consequence argument, if everything we do and think is a consequence of factors beyond our control (past events and the laws of nature), and the consequences of what is beyond our control are themselves beyond our control, then no one has control over what they do or think and no one is responsible for anything. Hence, determinism rules out responsibility. A different challenge--here called the manipulation argument--is that by allowing agents to be fully determined compatibilist accounts of practical freedom and responsibility are unable to preclude those who are subject to global manipulation from being free and responsible
Kapitan, Tomis (1986). Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (April):230-51.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By deliberation we understand practical reasoning with an end in view of choosing some course of action. Integral to it is the agent's sense of alternative possibilities, that is, of two or more courses of action he presumes are open for him to undertake or not. Such acts may not actually be open in the sense that the deliberator would do them were he to so intend, but it is evident that he assumes each to be so. One deliberates only by taking it for granted that both performing and refraining from any of the acts under consideration are possible for one, and that which is to be selected is something entirely up to oneself. What is it for a course of action to be presumed as open, or for several courses of action to present themselves as a range of open alternatives? Answering these questions is essential for an understanding of deliberation and choice and, indeed, for the entire issue of free will and responsibility. According to one common view, a deliberator takes the considered options to be open only by assuming he is free to undertake any of them and, consequently, that whichever he does undertake is, as yet, a wholly undetermined matter. Built into the structure of deliberation, on this theory, is an indeterministic bias relative to which any deliberator with deterministic beliefs is either inconsistent or condemned to a fatalistic limbo. An unmistakable challenge is thereby posed: is there an alternative conception of the presuppositions underlying deliberation more congenial to a deterministic perspective yet adequate to the data? Convinced that there is, I develop a partial account of deliberation that, though highly similar to the aforementioned view, diverges at a critical juncture
Kearns, Stephen (2008). Compatibilism can resist prepunishment: A reply to Smilansky. Analysis 68 (299):250–253.   (Google | More links)
Klein, M. (1990). Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book casts new light on the traditional disagreement between those who hold that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions if they are causally determined, and those who deny this. Klein suggests that reflection on the relation between justice and deprivation offers a way out of this perplexity
Koons, Jeremy Randel (2002). Is hard determinism a form of compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free will. Assuming the correctness of this concession, that leaves compatibilism and hard determinism as the only remaining choices in the free will debate. In this paper, I will argue that hard determinism turns out to be a form of compatibilism, and therefore, compatibilism is the only remaining position in the free will debate. I will attempt to establish this conclusion by arguing that hard determinists will end up punishing or rewarding the same acts (and omissions) that the compatibilists punish and reward. Next, I will respond to several objections that attempt to pry apart hard determinism and compatibilism. It will emerge not only that hard determinism and compatibilism are identical at the practical level, but also that the key terms employed by the hard determinist have the same meaning as equivalent terms ("free," "morally responsible," and "retributive punishment") employed by the compatibilist. I conclude that hard determinism genuinely is a form of compatibilism
Lamb, James W. (1993). Evaluative compatibilism and the principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 60 (10):517-27.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Langsam, Harold (2000). Kant's compatibilism and his two conceptions of truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):164–188.   (Google | More links)
Lehrer, Keith (1976). 'Could' in theory and practice: A possible worlds analysis. In M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel.   (Google)
Lenman, James (2006). Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility. Ethics 117 (1).   (Google)
Lenman, James (2002). On the alleged shallowness of compatibilism: A critical study of Saul Smilansky: Free will and illusion. Iyyun 51 (January):63-79.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The millionaire’s idle, talentless and self-centered daughter inherits a large sum of money that she does not really deserve. The victim of kidnapping rots in a cell in 1980s Beirut in a captivity that springs not from any wrong he has done but from his ill-fortune in being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The hard-working, brilliant and self-denying Nobel Prize-winning scientist receives a large cheque for his extraordinarily productive labours. The murderer spends decades in jail for the terrible crimes he has freely committed. The first two cases are cases where justice seems ill-served, where someone’s good or ill-fortune reflects not what they deserve but mere luck. The second two are cases where justice seems to be honoured: what befalls Scientist and Murderer reflects not their good or bad luck but their merits and deserts
Levin, Michael (2007). Compatibilism and special relativity. Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):433-463.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (online). Closing the door on the belief in ability thesis.   (Google)
Abstract: It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic openness that is entirely compatible with determinism (Dennett 1984; Kapitan 1986). Since, however, the claim that deliberation presupposes freedom is accepted by all sides in the free will debate, it ought to be possible to frame a minimal version that is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism, and which therefore can be accepted by everyone. Peter van Inwagen has advanced the best-known such claim: ‘all philosophers who have thought about deliberation agree on one point: one cannot deliberate about whether to perform a certain act unless one believes it is possible for one to perform it’ (van Inwagen 1983: 154). It is the purpose of this paper to argue that van Inwagen, and the many philosophers who have followed him in this regard, is wrong
Levy, Neil (2009). Luck and history-sensitive compatibilism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote – constitutive – luck
Levy, Neil (2006). On determinism and freedom. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):310-312.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (forthcoming). Restrictivism is a Covert compatibilism. In N. Trakakis (ed.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Abstract: _Libertarian restrictivists hold that agents are rarely directly free. However, they seek to reconcile their views_ _with common intuitions by arguing that moral responsibility, or indirect freedom (depending on the version of_ _restrictivism) is much more common than direct freedom. I argue that restrictivists must give up either the_ _claim that agents are rarely free, or the claim that indirect freedom or responsibility is much more common_ _than direct freedom. Focusing on Kane’s version of restrictivism, I show that the view holds people responsible_ _for actions when (merely) compatibilist conditions are met. Since this is unacceptable by libertarian lights,_ _they must either accept that compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are sufficient, or make their_ _restrictivism more extreme than it already is._
Levy, Neil & Mckenna, Michael (2007). Symposium on free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):151 – 152.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (online). The luck problem for compatibilists.   (Google)
Abstract: Libertarianism in all its varieties is widely taken to be vulnerable to a serious problem of present luck, inasmuch as it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to action. Genuine indeterminism entails luck, and lack of control over the ensuing action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is generally taken to be free of the problem of present luck, inasmuch as it does not require indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. Taken by itself, the compatibilist problem with present luck is less serious than the analogous problem confronting libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for the entire account of freedom: the present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the compatibilist response to distant – constitutive – luck
Lewis, David (1981). Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47:113-21.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism.
Litton, Paul (2007). The insignificance of choice and Wallace's normative approach to responsibility. Law and Philosophy 26 (1):67-93.   (Google | More links)
Lomasky, Loren E. (1975). Are compatibilism and the free will defense compatible? Personalist 56:385-388.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1988). Compatibilism now and forever: A reply to Tomberlin. Philosophical Papers 17 (August):133-139.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2003). Free will and the burden of proof. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defense of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyze such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into event-causation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven’t done this, and if all the same you do believe such things as that I raised my arm and that Jolns [sic] killed his uncle, and if moreover you still think it’s a joke to talk about the agent as cause, then, I’m afraid, the joke is entirely on you.’)
Lyons, Edward C. (ms). All the freedom you can want: The purported collapse of the problem of free will.   (Google)
Abstract:      Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable for its consequences. The standard argument against free choice asserts that free choice cannot exist because determinism, as a property of laws governing the cosmos, excludes such a possibility. This contingent factual claim, however, has always proven problematic. Contemporary discussions - no doubt aware of this disputed factual premise - draw upon a more novel, and arguably more devastating critique: free will must be rejected because its very conception is incoherent. Rather than assuming the existence of determinism and attempting to show its incompatibility with free will, this argument begins with consideration of the idea of free choice and concludes that, if it is to have any sense at all, it must be compatible with determinism. Obviously, no single treatment of the free will problem could address all its nuances. This Article more modestly offers one possible approach to the question. Part I elaborates in more detail the view that the traditional conception of free choice is incoherent and, thus, inevitably undermines the very responsibility it is asserted to constitute; Part II considers the resulting effort to develop a model of human freedom compatible with determinism; and Part III, drawing upon the prior discussions, describes - in terms of classical action theory - a conception of free choice justifying personal moral and legal responsibility that avoids both the incoherence of "uncaused freedom" as well as the shortcomings of determinism
Machina, K. (1994). Challenges for compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):213-22.   (Google)
Mackay, Donald M. (1967). Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Macintosh, Douglas C. (1940). Responsibility, freedom and causality: Or, the dilemma of determinism or indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 37 (January):42-51.   (Google | More links)
Madhok, Bindu (2002). The price of Frankfurt's compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:577-584.   (Google)
Magill, Kevin (1997). Experience and Freedom: Self-Determination Without Illusions. Macmillan.   (Google)
Maier, John, The possibility of freedom.   (Google)
Abstract: People generally are so common in one’s experience that it is natural to take them for granted, as presenting no puzzle or mystery, and to think only of such practical problems as arise in one’s relationships to them, as fish must take other fish for granted, or as we take for granted the air around us and the stones at our feet . . . but some philosophic spirits, sometimes, are overwhelmed by a seeming discontinuity between themselves and the rest of physical nature, and they are sufficiently tormented by this apparent contrast to want to understand it and see what it implies
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
McIntyre, Alison (1994). Compatibilists could have done otherwise: Responsibility and negative agency. Philosophical Review 103 (3):453-488.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
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McKenna, Michael (2009). Compatibilism & desert: Critical comments on four views on free will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
McKenna, Michael S. (1998). Does strong compatibilism survive Frankfurt-style counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 91 (3):259-64.   (Google)
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McKenna, Michael S. (1998). The limits of evil and the role of moral address: A defense of Strawsonian compatibilism. Journal of Ethics 2 (2):123-142.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: P.F. Strawson defends compatibilism by appeal to our natural commitment to the interpersonal community and the reactive attitudes. While Strawson''s compatibilist project has much to recommend it, his account of moral agency appears incomplete. Gary Watson has attempted to fortify Strawson''s theory by appeal to the notion of moral address. Watson then proceeds to argue, however, that Strawson''s theory of moral responsibility (so fortified) would commit Strawson to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. Watson also argues that the reactive attitudes do not lend unequivocal support to Strawsonian compatibilism and that the reactive attitudes are sometimes sensitive to considerations which suggest an incompatibilist or skeptical diagnosis. Watson attempts to provide a Strawsonian defense against these difficulties, but he ultimately concludes that the skeptical threats raised against Strawsonian compatibilism cannot be sufficiently silenced. I believe that Watson has done Strawsonian compatibilism a great service by drawing upon the notion of moral address. In this paper I attempt to defend the Strawsonian compatibilist position, as Watson has cast it, against the problems raised by Watson. I argue against Watson that Strawson''s theory of responsibility, as well as the notion of moral address, does not commit the Strawsonian to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. I also argue that Watson misinterprets the point of certain reactive attitudes and thereby wrongly assumes that these attitudes are evidence against Strawsonian compatibilism
Mele, Alfred R. (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 156 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). Agnostic autonomism revisited. In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (2007). Free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (forthcoming). Manipulation, compatibilism, and moral responsibility. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus
Mele, Alfred R. (2009). Moral responsibility and history revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed
Mills, Eugene (2006). The sweet mystery of compatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Any satisfactory account of freedom must capture, or at least permit, the mysteriousness of freedom—a “sweet” mystery involving a certain kind of ignorance rather than a “sour” mystery of unintelligibility, incoherence, or unjustifiedness. I argue that compatibilism can capture the sweet mystery of freedom. I argue first that an action is free if and only if a certain “rationality constraint” is satisfied, and that nothing in standard libertarian accounts of freedom entails its satisfaction. Satisfaction of this constraint is consistent with the universal causal predetermination of action (UCP). If UCP is true and the rationality constraint satisfied, there’s a sense in which our actions are explanatorily (though not necessarily causally) overdetermined. While it seems plausible (given UCP) that our actions are so overdetermined, it seems utterly mysterious why they should be so overdetermined. Compatibilism’s capacity to accommodate this mystery is a mark in its favor
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Moreh, J. (1994). Randomness, game theory and free will. Erkenntnis 41 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make one unpredictable to opponents and may therefore be rational. Similarly, playing a game with a mixed strategy may have an unpredictable outcome in every single play, but the strategy is rational, in that it is meant to maximize the expected value of an objective, be it private or social. As to whether the outcome of such behaviour is genuinely unpredictable as in quantum mechanics, or predictable by a hypothetical outside observer knowing all natural laws, it is argued that it makes no difference in practice, as long as it is not humanly predictable. Thus we have a new version of libertarianism which is compatible with determinism
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Nichols, Shaun (2007). The rise of compatibilism: A case study in the quantitative history of philosophy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):260-270.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Incompatibilists about free will and responsibility often maintain that incompatibilism is the intuitive, commonsense position. Recently, this claim has come under unfavorable scrutiny from naturalistic philosophers who have surveyed philosophically uneducated undergraduates.1 But there is a much older problem for the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive – if incompatibilism is intuitive, why is compatibilism so popular in the history of philosophy? In this paper I will try to answer this question by pursuing a rather different naturalistic methodology. The idea is to look not at the responses of the philosophically naïve, but at the views of the most sophisticated – the philosophers..
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Abstract: Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC), allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism of the Consequence Argument fails
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Pendleton, Robert (ms). Time and free will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In spite of the inherent oddity of the notion that the human soul might be constrained by its own lawlike will, it is not likely that the arguments I have advanced against that notion will be entirely convincing to committed incompatibilists. I should expect that the point of view will soon be reaffirmed that, in some sense, human beings, because of the lawlike behavior of their wills, cannot be free. It is to this puzzling intractability of the ‘free-will’ debate that I turn in this paper. By my own arguments (See note \5/ on R. Pendleton) it is logically possible that human beings might be construed as ‘constrained’ by their own wills. All we have to do is define the constrained human self so as to exclude the willing faculty. But does it make any sense to construe the human self in such a way? Can the human will itself be conceived as an ‘alienable’ property capable of constraining, in a meaningful way, the human self?
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Perry, John (2004). Compatibilist options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilism is the thesis that an act may be both free and determined by previous events and the laws of nature. I assume that in normal cases a condition of a person's performing an act freely is that the person is able to refrain from performing the act. Thus, I accept that if determinism entails that agents do not have this ability, we must give up compatibilism. In this paper I try to contribute to the rethinking of compatibilism by distinguishing between strong and weak accounts of laws and strong and weak accounts of ability. I argue that compatibilism is a tenable position when combined with either a weak account of laws, or a weak account of ability, or both. I shall concentrate on influential arguments for incompatibilism due to Peter van Inwagen, often called collectively the "consequence argument".
Perry, John & Kapitan, Tomis (ms). Is there hope for compatibilism?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: …those who accept that responsibility for a situation implies an ability to bring it about and, perhaps, an ability to prevent it, must explain how agents are able to do other than they are caused to do. Without it, they can give no defense of their counterexamples. With it, they can be confident that
Perszyk, Kenneth J. (2000). Molinism and compatibilism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1).   (Google)
Pippin, Robert B. (1999). Naturalness and mindedness: Hegel' compatibilism. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):194–212.   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of freedom in modern philosophy has three basic components: (i) what is freedom, or what would it be to act freely? (ii) Is it possible so to act? (iii) And how important is leading a free life?1 Hegel proposed unprecedented and highly controversial answers to these questions
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Ravizza, Mark (1994). Semi-compatibilism and the transfer of non-responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):61-93.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Ritchie, Jack (2005). Causal compatibilism -- what chance? Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation
Rogers, Katherin A. (2004). Augustine's compatibilism. Religious Studies 40 (4):415-435.   (Google)
Abstract: In analysing Augustine's views on freedom it is standard to draw two distinctions; one between an earlier emphasis on human freedom and a later insistence that God alone governs human destiny, and another between pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian freedom. These distinctions are real and important, but underlying them is a more fundamental consistency. Augustine is a compatibilist from his earliest work on freedom through his final anti-Pelagian writings, and the freedom possessed by the un-fallen and the fallen will is a compatibilist freedom. This leaves Augustine open to the charge that he makes God the ultimate cause of sin
Rosell, Sergi (online). On an attempt to undermine reason-responsive compatibilism by appealing to moral luck. Reply to Gerald K. Harrison.   (Google)
Russell, Paul (1988). Causation, compulsion, and compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):313-321.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Russell, Paul (ms). Free will and irreligion in Hume's treatise.   (Google)
Abstract: Hume’s views on free will have been enormously influential and are widely regarded as representing “the best-known classical statement of what is now known as compatibilism”.1 There are a number of valuable studies that consider his contribution on this subject from a contemporary, critical perspective, but this will not be my particular concern in this paper.2 My primary interest, consistent with the specific aims and objectives of this volume, is to explain the way that Hume’s arguments in T, 2.3.1-2 relate to his fundamental intentions in the Treatise as a whole. Contrary to what is generally supposed, I will show that Hume’s arguments in these two sections are significantly concerned with problems of religion. More specifically, Hume’s necessitarian commitments, I argue, contain features that are systematically irreligious in character. These features of Hume’s views on this subject are indicative of his deeper and wider irreligious intentions throughout the Treatise
Russell, Paul (forthcoming). Free will, art and morality. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject
Russell, Paul, Hobbes, bramhall, and the free will problem.   (Google)
Abstract: Thomas Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy in ways that still structure and resonate within the contemporary debate. It was Hobbes’s central aim, particularly as expressed in the Leviathan, to make moral philosophy genuinely ‘scientific’, where this term is understood as science had developed and evolved in the first half of the seventeenth century. Specifically, it was Hobbes’s aim to provide a thoroughly naturalistic description of human beings in terms of the basic categories and laws of matter and motion. By analyzing the individual and society in these terms, Hobbes proposed to identify and describe a set of moral laws that are eternal and immutable, and can be known to all those who are capable of reason and science (L, 15.40). Even more ambitiously, it was Hobbes’s further hope that these ‘theorems of moral doctrine’ would be put into practical use by public authorities with a view to maintaining a peaceful, stable social order (L, 31.41)
Russell, Paul (online). Hume on free will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..
Russel, Paul (1983). On the naturalism of Hume's 'reconciling project'. Mind 92 (October):593-600.   (Google | More links)
Russell, Paul (2002). Pessimists, pollyannas, and the new compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: If a man is a pessimist, he is born a pessimist, and emotionally you cannot make him an optimist. And if he is an optimist, you can tell him nothing to make him a pessimist. - Clarence Darrow..
Russell, Paul (web). Selective hard compatibilism. In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke and Harry Silverstein, eds., Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming
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Salles, Ricardo (2001). Compatibilism: Stoic and modern. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 83 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: It is agreed by most scholars that the Stoics were compatibilists regarding the relation between responsibility and determinism. On this view, the Stoics depart from two other positions. Unlike some eliminative determinists — labelled in modern discussions “hard-determinists”, but already active in Antiquity — they assert that, despite determinism, there are things that “depend on us”, or are : things for which we are genuinely responsible and for which, therefore, we may justifiably be praised or blamed. But the Stoics also depart from the libertarian or “anti-determinist” 2 a position championed by the Epicureans in the early Hellenistic period and by Alexander of Aphrodisias on behalf of the Peripatetics, towards the end of the second century AD. Unlike the libertarian, who agrees on the incompatibility alleged by the hard-determinist, but preserves responsibility by rejectin necessitation, the Stoics preserve both responsibility and necessitation
Salles, Ricardo (2005). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ashgate Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: The basis of stoic determinism (a) : everything has a cause -- The basis of stoic determinism (b) : causation is necessitating -- The threat of external determination -- Reflection and responsibility -- The three compatibilist theories of Chrysippus -- Epictetus on responsibility for unreflective action.
Sattig, Thomas (2010). Compatibilism about coincidence. Philosophical Review 119 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of counterexamples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular kinds of ordinary object. Since both the anticoincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples flow from the folk conception of ordinary objects, the paradoxes threaten this conception with inconsistency. Typical approaches to the paradoxes reject the anticoincidence principle or some portion of the assumptions driving the counterexamples, thereby partially revising our common conception of the world around us. This essay offers a compatibilist solution to the paradoxes that sustains the folk conception of ordinary objects in its entirety. According to this solution, the various cases of distinct coincidents do not clash with the anticoincidence principle since the cases and the principle manifest different yet compatible perspectives on the world. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this?
Schnieder, Benjamin S. (2004). Compatibilism and the notion of rendering something false. Philosophical Studies 117 (3):409-428.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In my paper I am concerned with Peter van Inwagen''s Consequence Argument. I focus on its probably best known version. In this form it crucially employs the notion of rendering a proposition false, anotion that has never been made sufficiently clear. The main aim of my paper is to shed light on thisnotion. The explications offered so far in thedebate all are based on modal concepts. Iargue that for sufficient results a ``stronger'''',hyper-intensional concept is needed, namely theconcept expressed by the word ``because''''. I show that my analysis is superior to the prior ones. On the basis of this analysis I further explain why van Inwagen''s argument fails
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Schroeder, Timothy (2007). Reflection, reason, and free will. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):77 – 84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ju¨rgen Habermas has a familiar style of compatibilism to offer, according to which a person has free will insofar as that person responds appropriately to her reasons. But because of the ways in which Habermas understands reasons and causes, he sees a special objection to his style of compatibilism: it is not clear that our reasons can suitably cause our responses. This objection, however, takes us out of the realm of free will and into the realm of mental causation. In this response to Habermas, I focus on the details of his style of compatibilism. I suggest that, while the basic picture is appealing, three key details of it are problematic
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Abstract:   Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects
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Abstract: Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise
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Smilansky, Saul (2003). Compatibilism: The argument from shallowness. Philosophical Studies 115 (3):257-82.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The compatibility question lies at the center of the free will problem. Compatibilists think that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and the concomitant notions, while incompatibilists think that it is not. The topic of this paper is a particular form of charge against compatibilism: that it is shallow. This is not the typical sort of argument against compatibilism: most of the debate has attempted to discredit compatibilism completely. The Argument From Shallowness maintains that the compatibilists do have a case. However, this case is only partial, and shallow. This limited aim proves itself more powerful against compatibilists than previous all-or-nothing attempts. It connects to the valid instincts of compatibilists, making room for them, and hence is harder for compatibilists to ignore
Smilansky, Saul (2007). Determinism and prepunishment: The radical nature of compatibilism. Analysis 67 (296):347–349.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I shall argue that compatibilism cannot resist in a principled way the temptation to prepunish people. Compatibilism thus emerges as a much more radical view than it is typically presented and perceived, and is seen to be at odds with fundamental moral intuitions
Smilansky, Saul (1991). The contrariety of compatibilist positions. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:293-309.   (Google)
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Abstract: 1. “All Theory is Against Free Will…” Powerful arguments have been leveled against the concepts of free will and moral responsibility since the Greeks and perhaps earlier. Some—the hard determinists—aim to show that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is true. Therefore there is no free will. Others, the “no-free-will-either-way-theorists,” agree that determinism is incompatible with free will, but add that indeterminism, especially the variety posited by quantum physicists, is also incompatible with free will. Therefore there is no free will. Finally, there are the a priori arguments against free will. These arguments conclude that it makes no difference what metaphysical commitments we hold: free will and ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts. Why? Because in order to have free will and ultimate moral responsibility we would have to be causa sui, or ‘cause of oneself.’ And it is logically impossible to be self-caused in this way. Here, for example, is Nietzsche on the causa sui
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Steward, Helen (2008). Moral responsibility and the irrelevance of physics: Fischer's semi-compatibilism vs. anti-fundamentalism. Journal of Ethics 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected
Steward, Helen (2009). The truth in compatibilism and the truth of libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper offers the outlines of a response to the often-made suggestion that it is impossible to see how indeterminism could possibly provide us with anything that we might want in the way of freedom, anything that could really amount to control, as opposed merely to an openness in the flow of reality that would constitute the injection of chance, or randomness, into the unfolding of the processes which underlie our activity. It is suggested that the best first move for the libertarian is to make a number of important concessions to the compatibilist. It should be conceded, in particular, that certain sorts of alternative possibilities are neither truly available to real, worldly agents nor required in order that those agents act freely; and it should be admitted also that it is the compatibilist who tends to give the most plausible sorts of analyses of many of the 'can' and 'could have' statements which seem to need to be assertible of those agents we regard as free. But these concessions do not bring compatibilism itself in their wake. The most promising version of libertarianism, it is argued, is based on the idea that agency itself (and not merely some special instances of it which we might designate with the honorific appellation 'free') is inconsistent with determinism. This version of libertarianism, it is claimed, can avoid the objection that indeterminism is as difficult to square with true agential control as determinism can sometimes seem to be
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Abstract: This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
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Abstract: Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions
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Abstract: Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence "I could have done otherwise," and (2) in such universes, one can never really take credit for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe's birth. Throughout the free will
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Abstract: Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions
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Abstract: There are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if they are indeed unanswerable) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with determinism. And there are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if indeed . . . ) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. But if free will is incompatible both with..
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Abstract: This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility
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Abstract: Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is inclined to care about them. The problem with the resulting conception, as we have seen, is that it entails the normative judgment that one ought to be inclined to care about the specified features, on pain of irrationality, and this normative judgment requires justification. The advantage of internalism is that it avoids these normative commitments. It says that things count as reasons for someone only if he is inclined to care about them, and so it leaves the normative question of whether to care about them entirely open. Yet if we try to leave this question open, by defining things as reasons only for those inclined to care about them, we'll end up with a definition that's relativized to the inclinations of particular agents—won't we? Not necessarily. For suppose that all reasons for acting are features of a single kind, whose influence depends on a single inclination. And suppose that the inclination on which the influence of reasons depends is, not an inclination that distinguishes some agents from others, but rather an inclination that distinguishes agents from nonagents. In that case, to say that these features count as reasons only for those who are inclined to care about them will be to say that they count as reasons only for agents—which will be to say no less than that they are reasons for acting, period, since applying only to agents is already part of the concept of reasons for acting. The restriction on the application of reasons will drop away from our definition, since it restricts their application, not to some proper subset of agents, but rather to the set of all agents, which is simply the universe of application for reasons to act
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Abstract: The debate over free will has pittedlibertarian insistence on open alternativesagainst the compatibilist view that authenticcommitments can preserve free will in adetermined world. A second schism in the freewill debate sets rationalist belief in thecentrality of reason against nonrationalistswho regard reason as inessential or even animpediment to free will. By looking deeperinto what motivates each of these perspectivesit is possible to find common ground thataccommodates insights from all those competingviews. The resulting metacompatibilist view offree will bridges some of the differencesbetween compatibilists and incompatibilists aswell as between rationalists andnonrationalists, and results in a free willtheory that is both more philosophicallyinclusive and more firmly connected tocontemporary research in psychology andbiology
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Abstract: In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane''s work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options
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Wood, Ledger (1941). The free-will controversy. Philosophy 16 (October):386-397.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Xie, Simon Shengjian (2009). What is Kant: A compatibilist or an incompatibilist? A new interpretation of Kant's solution to the free will problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding the second controversy, I will argue that Kant's solution to the free will problem is not a success because his effort in making the effects of freedom part of the field of appearance has made his solution incoherent and ambiguous. Despite this, I argue that Kant's attempt to solve the free will problem is groundbreaking because he at least has separated freedom from the dominance of determinism
Young, Robert M. (1979). Compatibilism and conditioning. Noûs 13 (September):361-378.   (Google | More links)
Young, Robert M. (1974). Compatibilism and freedom. Mind 83 (January):19-42.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Young, Robert M. (1976). Omnipotence and compatibilism. Philosophia 6 (March):49-67.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Zimmerman, D. (1994). Acts, omissions, and semi-compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):209-23.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Zimmerman, Michael (1981). 'Can', compatibilism, and possible worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):679-692.   (Google)

5.4b.3 Free Will Skepticism

Beckermann, Ansgar (2005). Free will in a natural order of the world. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bok, Hilary (2001). Review of Metaphilosophy and free will by Richard Double. Mind 110 (438):452-455.   (Google)
Bradley, M. C. (1974). Kenny on hard determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):202-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Burns, Jean E. (1999). Volition and physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):27-47.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Cohen, Daniel (2006). Openness, accidentality and responsibility. Philosophical Studies 127 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   In this paper, I present a novel argument for scepticism about moral responsibility. Unlike traditional arguments, this argument doesn’t depend on contingent empirical claims about the truth or falsity of causal determinism. Rather, it is argued that the conceptual conditions of responsibility are jointly incompatible. In short, when an agent is responsible for an action, it must be true both that the action was non-accidental, and that it was open to the agent not to perform that action. However, as I argue, an action is only non-accidental in those cases where it isn’t open to the agent not to perform it
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2004). The trouble with Harry: Compatibilist free will internalism and manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Double, Richard (1996). Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Abstract: Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed
Double, Richard (2002). Metaethics, metaphilosophy, and free will subjectivism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Double, Richard (2004). The ethical advantages of free will subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1991). The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Abstract: The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion
Duus-Otterström, Göran (2008). Betting against hard determinism. Res Publica 14 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument
Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Fisher, C. M. (2001). If there were no free will. Medical Hypotheses 56:364-366.   (Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl (2002). Living without free will by Derk Pereboom. Journal of Ethics 6 (3).   (Google)
Harrison, Gerald (2009). Hooray! We're not morally responsible! Think 8 (23):87-95.   (Google)
Abstract: Being morally responsible means being blameworthy and deserving of punishment if we do wrong and praiseworthy and deserving reward if we do right. In what follows I shall argue that in all likelihood we're not morally responsible. None of us. Ever.
Hurley, Susan L. (2000). Is responsibility essentially impossible? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):229-268.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies these considerations to responsibility in particular. Theimpossibility of regressive choice or control is explained. It is arguedthat this impossibility does not support the claim that no one is everresponsible on either context-driven or theory-driven accounts of`responsibility''
Mele, Alfred R. (2003). Review of Derk Pereboom's Living without free will. Mind 112 (446):375-378.   (Google)
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (online). Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: During the past two decades, an interest among philosophers in fictitious and illusory beliefs has sprung up in fields ranging anywhere from mathematics and modality to morality.1 In this paper, we focus primarily on the view that Saul Smilansky has dubbed “free will illusionism”—i.e., the purportedly descriptive claim that most people have illusory beliefs concerning the existence of libertarian free will, coupled with the normative claim that because dispelling these illusory beliefs would produce negative personal and societal consequences, those of us who happen to know the dangerous and gloomy truth about the non-existence of libertarian free will should simply keep quiet in the name of the common good
Nowell-Smith, P. H. (1954). Determinists and libertarians. Mind 63 (July):317-337.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1997). Is Free Will Just Another Chaotic Process? (Review of Three Books). Times Literary Supplement (Dec.5).   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2003). Review of Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will. Philosophical Quarterly 53:308-310.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2003). Understanding free will: Might we double-think? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.   (Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge Univ Pr.   (Cited by 100 | Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2002). Meaning in life without free will. Philosophic Exchange 33:19-34.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent article Gary Watson instructively distinguishes two faces or aspects of responsibility. The first is the self-disclosing sense, which is concerned centrally with aretaic or excellence-relevant evaluations of agents. An agent is responsible for an action in this respect when it is an action that is inescapably the agent’s own, if, as a declaration of her adopted ends, it expresses what the agent is about, her identity as an agent. An action for which the agent is responsible in this sense expresses what the agent is ready to stand up for, to defend, to affirm, to answer for. (1996: 233-4) . The second face of responsibility has perhaps had a more explicit role in debates about free will — it concerns control and accountability. Watson argues that when one is skeptical about the second "accountability" face, one need not also be skeptical about responsibility as self-disclosure. I agree, and in my view, this helps us see why maintaining that determinism precludes accountability need not also commit one to the view that determinism precludes responsibility in a way that threatens meaning in life. Part of the reason for this is that when responsibility as accountability is undermined, less of what we deem valuable needs to be relinquished than often believed. But in addition, it turns out that the kind of accountability precluded by determinism is not nearly as important to what is most significant in human life as is responsibility as self-disclosure. Indeed, it may be that an unfortunate fusing of these two notions underlies the concern that if determinism imperils accountability, it also threatens what most fundamentally makes our lives meaningful
Smilansky, Saul (2001). Free will: From nature to illusion. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):71-95.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sir Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was a landmark in the philosophical understanding of the free will problem. Building upon it, I attempt to defend a novel position, which purports to provide, in outline, the next step forward. The position presented is based on the descriptively central and normatively crucial role of illusion in the issue of free will. Illusion, I claim, is the vital but neglected key to the free will problem. The proposed position, which may be called ‘Illusionism’, is shown to follow both from the strengths and from the weaknesses of Strawson’s position
Smilansky, Saul (ms). Free will: Two radical proposals.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The free will problem and the basic alternative ways of dealing with it have been known for some 2000 years, and have engaged the greatest philosophers through the ages. In the last 50 years much philosophical progress has been added on top of that ancient cumulative understanding. Hence it would be natural to wonder why I think that any new proposal can be made on this classic problem, let alone two radical proposals
Smilansky, Saul (1999). Free will: The positive role of illusion. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.   (Google)
Sommers, Tamler (ms). Darrow and determinism: Giving up ultimate responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: This year marks the 80 th anniversary of Clarence Darrow’s brilliant and passionate defense of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, two wealthy teenagers who pled guilty to the kidnapping and murder of 14 year old Bobby Franks. On August 22, 1924 Darrow gave his famous twelve hour closing statement, bringing tears to the eyes of the presiding judge and saving his clients from the death penalty. Here are two excerpts from the summation
Strawson, Galen (1989). Consciousness, free will, and the unimportance of determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Strawson, Galen (2002). Dreams of final responsibility. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Strawson, Galen (1986). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 102 | Google)
Abstract: On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the nature, causes, and consequences of our deep commitment to belief in freedom
Strawson, Galen (2002). The Bounds of freedom. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Strawson, Galen (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Vargas, Manuel R. (ms). Libertarianism and skepticism about free will: Some arguments against both.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: On one way of putting things, incompatibilism is the view that in some important sense free will (and/or moral responsibility) is incompatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is typically taken to come in two species: libertarianism, which holds that we are free and responsible (and correspondingly, that determinism does not hold), and skeptical incompatibilism.1 The latter includes views such as hard determinism, which hold that we are not free (and/or responsible) and views that argue that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, among others. In this paper, I attempt to provide positive arguments against both of the primary strands of incompatibilism. The first aim of this paper is to take some steps toward filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail—the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say “take some steps” because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic
Vargas, Manuel R. (2004). Responsibility and the aims of theory: Strawson and revisionism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Vilhauer, Benjamin (2009). Free will skepticism and personhood as a desert base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.   (Google)
Vilhauer, Ben (2004). Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):547-564.   (Google)

5.4b.4 Identification Theories

Bergmann, Frithjof (1977). On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (1983). Socialization and autonomy. Mind 92 (January):120-123.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Boysen, Thomas (2004). Death of a compatibilistic intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.   (Google | More links)
Bratman, Michael E. (2003). A desire of one's own. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the hierarchical model. Indeed, it seems that, normally, if an agent's relevant higher-order attitudes are not to some extent shaped by her evaluative reflections and judgments her agency will be flawed. But this suggests a Platonic challenge to the hierarchical account of ownership. The challenge is to explain why we should not see such evaluative judgments---rather than broadly Frankfurtian higher-order attitudes---as the fundamental basis of ownership or rejection of desire. I do think that a systematic absence of connection between higher-order Frankfurtian attitude and evaluative judgment would be a breakdown in proper functioning. But I want to explain how we can grant this point and still block the Platonic challenge.
Bratman, Michael (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. The essays offer extensive discussions of related views by, among others, Donald Davidson, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Christine Korsgaard, Harry Frankfurt, and P. F. Strawson. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students
Dworkin, Gerald B. (1970). Acting freely. Noûs 4 (November):367-83.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (January):5-20.   (Cited by 699 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
Greenspan, P. S. (1999). Impulse and self-reflection: Frankfurtian responsibility versus free will. Journal of Ethics 3 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt''s early work makes an important distinction between moral responsibility and free will. Frankfurt begins by focusing on the notion of responsibility, as supplying counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities; he then turns to an apparently independent account of free will, in terms of his well-known hierarchy of desires. But the two notions seem to reestablish contact in Frankfurt''s later discussion of issues and cases. The present article sets up a putative Frankfurtian account of moral responsibility that involves the potential for free will, as suggested by some of Frankfurt''s later remarks about taking responsibility. While correcting what seem to be some common misinterpretations of Frankfurt''s view, the article attempts to extract some reasons for dissatisfaction with it from consideration of cases of unfreedom, particularly cases involving addiction
Hopkins, Jasper, Freedom of the will : Parallels between Frankfurt and Augustine.   (Google)
Abstract: At first glance it seems strange to compare the views of two philosophers from such different contexts as are Harry G. Frankfurt1 and Aurelius Augustinus. After all, Frankfurt makes virtually no use of Augustine, virtually no mention of his philosophical doctrines—whether on free will or anything else.2 And yet, the two have more to do with each other than initially meets the eye. For in their own ways both of them sketch a respective theory of freedom that is similarly insightful; moreover, the theories of both lapse into paradox (paradox of which each author is aware but from which neither seeks to escape). Of course, Frankfurt's articulation of his theory is more systematic, more focused than is Augustine's. Indeed, Augustine seems to make most of his points as if en passant; even in De Libero Arbitrio he shows little interest in sustained treatment of the topic heralded in the title. So what links Frankfurt and Augustine is not their philosophical style but rather (1) their putative triumph over the philosophical elusiveness and the conceptual impenetrability of the notion of freedom-of-will and (2) the fact that in coming to cognate conclusions, they share similar strategies. Thus, they admit of plausible comparison
Hussain, Waheed (2010). Autonomy, Frankfurt, and the nature of reflective endorsement. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1).   (Google)
Frankfurt, Harry (1987). Identification and Wholeheartedness. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsiblity, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (2003). Identification and responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Real-self accounts of moral responsibility distinguish between various types of motivational elements. They claim that an agent is responsible for acts suitably related to elements that constitute the agent's real self. While such accounts have certain advantages from a compatibilist perspective, they are problematic in various ways. First, in it, authority and authenticity conceptions of the real self are often inadequately distinguished. Both of these conceptions inform discourse on identification, but only the former is relevant to moral responsibility. Second, authority and authenticity real-self theories are unable to accommodate cases in which the agent neither identifies nor disidentifies with his action and yet seems morally responsible for what he does. Third, authority and authenticity real-self theories are vulnerable to counterexamples in which the provenance of the agent's real self undermines responsibility
Sankowski, Edward T. (1980). Freedom, determinism and character. Mind 89 (January):106-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Slote, Michael A. (1980). Understanding free will. Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):136-51.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Stump, Eleonore (2002). Control and causal determinism. In S. Buss & L. Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1996). Persons, identification, and freedom. Philosophical Topics 24:183-214.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1988). Sanctification, hardening of the heart, and Frankfurt's concept of free will. Journal of Philosophy 85 (8):395-420.   (Google | More links)
Watson, Gary (1975). Free agency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.   (Cited by 114 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action.
Watson, Gary (1987). Free action and free will. Mind 96 (April):154-72.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Wolf, Susan (1987). Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane.
Zimmerman, D. (1981). Hierarchical motivation and the freedom of the will. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (October):354-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zimmerman, D. (2003). That was then, this is now: Personal history vs. psychological structure in compatibilist theories of autonomy. Noûs 37 (4):638-671.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

5.4b.5 Incompatibilism

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2008). The irrelevance of the consequence argument. Analysis 68 (297):13–22.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has offered two versions of an influential argument that has come to be called ‘the Consequence Argument’. The Consequence Argument purports to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with free will.1 It aims to show that, if we assume determinism, we are committed to the claim that, for all propositions p, no one has or ever had any choice about p. Unfortunately, the original Consequence Argument employed an inference rule (the β-rule) that was shown to be invalid. (McKay and Johnson 1996) In response, van Inwagen revised his argument. I shall argue that the conclusion of the revised Consequence Argument is wholly independent of the premiss of determinism, and hence that the revised Consequence Argument is useless in showing that determinism is incompatible with free will
Beebee, Helen (2002). Reply to Huemer on the consequence argument. Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). The myth of source. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free agents need to possess and exercise can be secured without metaphysical excess. If there is a free will problem, it is the one G. E. Moore addressed in 1912. He concluded that persons can act otherwise in a deterministic world. We should continue to try to figure out whether he was right or wrong
Blum, Alex (2003). The core of the consequence argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boardman, William, Discussion of Peter Van Inwagen's "the incompatibility of free will and determinism".   (Google)
Abstract: I think that van Inwagen's argument is invalid because it equivocates on the modal auxiliaries. To give a quick idea of what I think has gone wrong, consider for comparison two arguments which are transparently invalid, though they superficially resemble Modus Tollens arguments: (a) If Lincoln was honest, he couldn't have pocketed the penny (such taking being dishonest). (b) But it is false that Lincoln could not have pocketed the penny: after all, he was not paralyzed and did not fail to realize that the penny was (slightly) valuable and would be his for the taking. (c) Therefore, Lincoln was not honest. (a') If determinism is correct, then if various past events had occurred earlier, the judge could not have raised his hand at the time of the execution (since doing so would be inconsistent with the behavior issuing from and predictable from those earlier events). (b') But it is false that the judge could not have raised his hand at the time of the execution: for he was not paralyzed or unconscious-- he certainly possessed the power to move his hand. (c') Therefore, since the various past events did occur earlier, determinism is not correct
Bradley, M. C. (1974). Kenny on hard determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):202-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Joseph Keim (2006). Farewell to direct source incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. This paper is a critique of a kind of source incompatibilism, namely, direct source incompatibilism. Direct source incompatibilists reject PAP on the basis of Frankfurt-style examples. Since PAP is one of two premises in the traditional argument for INC, direct source incompatibilists opt for a version of the direct argument, which argues for INC with the aid of some non-responsibility transfer principle. I demonstrate that this option is not available, for there is a tension between the following two claims
Campbell, Joseph K. (2010). Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Canfield, John V. (1961). Determinism, free will and the ace predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1963). Free will and determinism: A reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.   (Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2003). Counterexamples to principle beta: A response to Crisp and Warfield. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2000). Incompatibilism and the transfer of power necessity. Noûs 34 (2):277-290.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2003). On a new argument for incompatibilism. Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Contrastive rational explanation of free choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2005). Deliberation and metaphysical freedom. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):25-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Crisp, Thomas M. & Warfield, Ted A. (2000). The irrelevance of indeterministic counterexamples to principle beta. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-185.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Danto, Arthur C. & Morgenbesser, Sidney (1957). Character and free will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (16):493-505.   (Google | More links)
de Caro, Mario (forthcoming). Is freedom really a mystery? In The Claims of Naturalism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper the problem of free will is examined
Dennett, Daniel C. & Taylor, Christopher (ms). Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is no doctrine about determinism and freedom that has proved to be as resilient over the past century as that of Compatibilism. It is, of course, the doctrine that we can be both free and also subject to a real determinism. If it goes back at least to Hobbes and Hume, it was strengthened and refurbished throughout the 1900's. Part of its strength has been the extent to which it has satisfied theses that in fact seem to be the very substance of the doctrine opposed to it. This is Incompatibilism. What follows here is the most recent and the very best attempt to steal what has appeared to be the thunder of Incompatibilism. Professors Taylor and Dennett make use of a certain amount of technicality in giving sense, on the assumption of determinism, to the ideas that we can nevertheless do otherwise than we actually do and we can also really take credit for things. It is not my own view, but it is one that must be reckoned with by all who struggle with the problem. Put in some effort with the formalism if you have to, find out a little about possible worlds. It is certainly worth the effort
Double, Richard (1991). Determinism and the experience of freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (March):1-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Double, Richard (1988).