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Miscellaneous Philosophy of Mind :: Free Will

See also:
Alavi, Roksana (2005). Robert Kane, free will, and neuro-indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108. (Google)
Albritton, Rogers (1985). Freedom of the will and freedom of action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59:239-51. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Allen, Robert F. (online). Agent causation and ultimate responsibility. (Google | More links)
Allen, Robert F. (online). Free will and evaluation: Remarks on Noel Hendrickson's "free will nihilism and the question of method". (Google)
Allen, Robert F. (2005). Free will and indeterminism: Robert Kane's libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355. (Google | More links)
Almeida, M. & Bernstein, M. (2003). Lucky libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):93-119. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Alter, Torin & Daw, Russell (2001). Free acts and robot cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57. (Google)
Andrew, Wayne K. (1980). Human freedom and the science of psychology. Journal of Mind and Behavior 1:271-290. (Google)
Andrews, Kristin (2003). Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy by Henrik Walter . Philo 6 (1):166-175. (Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1971). Causality and Determinism. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1976). 'Soft' determinism. In Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Oriel Press. (Google)
Audi, Robert N. (1976). B.f. Skinner on freedom, dignity, and the explanation of behavior. Behaviorism 4:163-186. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Audi, Robert N. (1974). Moral responsibility, freedom, and compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Aune, Bruce (1963). Abilities, modalities, and free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Aune, Bruce (1970). Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1991). Free-will and determinism. In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press. (Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1954). Freedom and necessity. In Philosophical Essays. St. (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Ayer, A. J. (1980). Free will and rationality. In Z. van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Ayers, Michael R. (1968). The Refutation of Determinism. Methuen. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bahm, Archie J. (1965). The freedom-determinism controversy. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 9 (January):48-55. (Google)
Balaguer, Mark (2002). A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will. Noûs 38 (3):379-406. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Balaguer, Mark (1999). Libertarianism as a scientifically respectable view. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):189-211. (Google)
Bassoff, Bruce (1964). Free will and determinism. Journal of Existentialism 4:259-262. (Google)
Baxter, Donald L. M. (1989). Free choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):12-24. (Google | More links)
Beckermann, Ansgar (2005). Free will in a natural order of the world. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Beebee, Helen & Mele, Alfred R. (2002). Humean compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Beebee, Helen (2003). Local miracle compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Benn, Stanley I. (1988). A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 60 | Google)
Benson, Paul H. (1987). Ordinary ability and free action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June):307-335. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Benson, S. (1994). Free agency and self-worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Benson, S. (1987). Freedom and value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Benstein, M. (1992). Fatalism. University of Nebraska Press. (Google)
Bergmann, Frithjof (1977). On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bernstein, M. (2002). Fatalism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bernstein, M. (1995). Kanean libertarianism. Southwest Philosophical Review 11 (1):151-57. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (2005). Can we ever be really, truly, ultimately, free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12. (Google | More links)
Bernstein, Mark H. (1981). Moral responsibility and free will. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:1-10. (Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (1983). Socialization and autonomy. Mind 92 (January):120-123. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (1971). Determinism. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (1987). Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility. Routledge. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row. (Cited by 19 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). Global control and freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445. (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2002). Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (2000). Ultimate rsponsibility in a determined world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40. (Google)
Bishop, John D. (1983). Agent-causation. Mind 92 (January):61-79. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Bishop, John D. (1993). Compatibilism and the free will defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20. (Google)
Bishop, John D. (1986). Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive? Synthese 67 (May):225-47. (Google)
Bishop, John D. (2003). Prospects for a naturalist libertarianism: O'Connor's persons and causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bishop, Robert C. (2002). Chaos, indeterminism, and free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Blum, Alex (2000). N. Analysis 60 (3):284-286. (Google)
Blum, Alex (2003). The core of the consequence argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Blumenfeld, David C. (1988). Freedom and mind control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Blumenfeld, David C. (1971). The principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):339-44. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Bok, Hilary (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
BonJour, Laurence A. (1976). Deeterminism, libertarianism, and agent causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14:145-56. (Google)
Bowes, Pratima (1971). Consciousness And Freedom: Three Views. London,: Methuen. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Boysen, Thomas (2004). Death of a compatibilistic intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104. (Google | More links)
Bradley, M. C. (1974). Kenny on hard determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):202-211. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Broad, C. D. (1919). The notion of a general will. Mind 28 (112):502-504. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brown, Vivienne (2006). Choice, moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288. (Google | More links)
Burns, Jean E. (1999). Volition and physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):27-47. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Cairns-Smith, Graham; Clark, Thomas W.; Gomatam, Ravi; Kane, Robert H.; Maxwell, Nicholas; Smart, J. J. C.; Spence, Sean A. & Stapp, Henry P. (2005). Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a plain person's free will". Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):20-75. (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1967). In Defense of Free Will. Allen and Unwin. (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1967). In Defence Of Free Will, With Other Philosophical Essays. London,: Allen &Amp; Unwin. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1951). Is "free will" a pseudoproblem? Mind 60 (240):441-65. (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (1997). A compatibilist theory of alternate possibilities. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):339-44. (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2005). Compatibilist alternatives. Canadian Journal Of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (ed.) (2004). Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1961). Determinism, free will and the ace predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416. (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1963). Free will and determinism: A reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504. (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1962). The compatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Review 71 (July):352-368. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Carlson, E. (2002). In defense of the mind argument. Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400. (Google)
Carlson, Erik (2003). Counterexamples to principle beta: A response to Crisp and Warfield. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Carlson, Erik (2000). Incompatibilism and the transfer of power necessity. Noûs 34 (2):277-290. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2003). On a new argument for incompatibilism. Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164. (Google | More links)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1986). Free will and intentional action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364. (Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 90 (January):99-101. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Clark, Thomas W. (1997). Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain. In Libet, B., Freeman, A., Sutherland & K. (eds.), The Volitional Brain:Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Agent causation and event causation in the production of free action. Philosophical Topics 24:19-48. (Cited by 34 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2005). Agent causation and the problem of luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Contrastive rational explanation of free choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1995). Freedom and determinism. Philosophical Books 36 (1):9-18. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (1999). Free choice, effort, and wanting more. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (2002). Free will. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (1992). Free will and the conditions of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 66 (1):53-72. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (1995). Indeterminism and control. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):125-138. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Cited by 42 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2000). Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibility. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2002). Libertarian views: Noncausal and event-causal sccounts of free agency. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2000). Modest libertarianism. Philosopical Perspectives 14:21-46. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (2005). On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1997). On the possibility of rational free action. Philosophical Studies 88 (1):37-57. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1993). Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will. Noûs 27 (2):191-203. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (2007). The appearance of freedom. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):51 – 57. (Google)
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2007). Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194. (Google | More links)
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2005). Deliberation and metaphysical freedom. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):25-44. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Daniel & Handfield, Toby (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3). (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Costa, Claudio F. (2006). Free will and the soft constraints of reason. Ratio 19 (1):1-23. (Google | More links)
Cover, J. & Hawthorne, John (1996). Free agency and materialism. In Daniel Howard-Snyder & J. Scott Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman and Littlefield. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cowan, Joseph L. (1969). Deliberation and determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (January):53-61. (Google)
Crisp, Thomas M. & Warfield, Ted A. (2000). The irrelevance of indeterministic counterexamples to principle beta. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-185. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Crissman, Paul (1942). Freedom in d