Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

5.4a.2. Free Will and Neuroscience (Free Will and Neuroscience on PhilPapers)

Alavi, Roksana (2005). Robert Kane, free will, and neuro-indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.   (Google)
Anderson, Joel (2007). Introduction: Free will, neuroscience, and the participant perspective. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):3 – 11.   (Google)
Andrews, Kristin (2003). Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.   (Google)
Balaguer, Mark (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Mit Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Formulating the problem of free will -- The old formulation of the problem of free will -- Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will -- The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will -- Some remarks on libertarianism -- Synopsis of the book -- Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant -- What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, assuming the OL view is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, even if the OL view isn't correct -- The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question -- The coherence question -- The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting) -- Generalizing the argument -- Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question -- Where we stand and where we're going next -- An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question -- The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question -- The moral responsibility question -- Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy -- Preliminaries -- Torn decisions -- Indeterminacy -- Appropriate non-randomness -- The argument -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them -- The argument from token-token identity -- The argument from phenomenology -- Objections -- Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control -- Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free -- Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions -- Where we stand -- Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)? -- An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism) -- An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism) -- Empirical arguments -- Arguments for universal determinism -- Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism -- Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism -- Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision -- Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism -- The argument from Tegmark's work -- The argument from Libet's work -- Arguments from psychology -- Where we stand.
Banks, William P. & Pockett, Susan (2007). Benjamin Libet's work on the neuroscience of free will. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Batthyany, Alexander (2009). Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency. In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.   (Google)
Abstract: There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation. But in recent years, Libet‘s experiment on readiness potentials (Libet, Wright, and Gleason 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983), and a more recent replication by a research team led by John Dylan Haynes (Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.-D. [2008]) are often singled out because they appear to demonstrate empirically that consciousness is not causally involved in our choices and actions. In this paper, an alternative interpretation of these studies is offered; one which is in accordance both with the empirical evidence and also with the phenomenology of the will, demonstrating that the two opposing views of agency – both the ones that deny the reality of free will and the ones that affirm it – are equally compatible with the outcomes of these two experiments. On this basis, it is shown that the claim that the results on the timing of readiness potential tip the scales in favour of one or the other view cannot be justified - neither from a neurological, nor from a philosophical perspective.
Baumeister, Roy F.; Mele, Alfred R. & Vohs, Kathleen D. (eds.) (2010). Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
Berridge, Kent C. (2009). Wanting and liking: Observations from the neuroscience and psychology laboratory. Inquiry 52 (4):378 – 398.   (Google)
Abstract: Different brain mechanisms seem to mediate wanting and liking for the same reward. This may have implications for the modular nature of mental processes, and for understanding addictions, compulsions, free will and other aspects of desire. A few wanting and liking phenomena are presented here, together with discussion of some of these implications
Bielfeldt, Dennis (2009). Freedom and neurobiology: Reflections on free will, language, and political power. By John R. Searle. Zygon 44 (4):999-1002.   (Google)
Burns, Jean E. (1999). Volition and physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):27-47.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Cairns-Smith, Graham; Clark, Thomas W.; Gomatam, Ravi; Kane, Robert H.; Maxwell, Nicholas; Smart, J. J. C.; Spence, Sean A. & Stapp, Henry P. (2005). Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a plain person's free will". Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):20-75.   (Google)
Abstract: REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry Stapp
Carlos, & René, Campis (2008). DID I DO IT? -YEAH, YOU DID! Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences:34- 37.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we analyze Libet’s conclusions on «free will» (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein’s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet’s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein´s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article´s conclusion is part of an ongoing research.
Churchland, Patricia (ms). The big questions: Do we have free will?   (Google)
Abstract: As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous system must also reflect our social need for a working concept of responsibility
Clark, Thomas W. (1997). Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain. In Libet, B., Freeman, A., Sutherland & K. (eds.), The Volitional Brain:Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Crusio, Wim E. (1999). Behavioral neurogenetics beyond determinism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):890-891.   (Google)
Abstract: Rose's Lifelines justifiably attacks the rigid genetic determinism that pervades the popular press and even some scientific writing. Genes do not equate with destiny. However, Rose's argument should not be taken too far: genes do influence behavior, in animals as well as in man
Dyer, Michael G. (1994). Quantum physics and consciousness, creativity, computers: A commentary on Goswami's quantum-based theory of consciousness and free will. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):265-90.   (Google)
Eccles, John C. (1976). Brain and free will. In Gordon G. Globus (ed.), Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Edmonds, Bruce (online). Towards implementing free-will.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some practical criteria for free-will are suggested where free-will is a matter of degree. It is argued that these are more appropriate than some extremely idealised conceptions. Thus although the paper takes lessons from philosophy it avoids idealistic approaches as irrelevant. A mechanism for allowing an agent to meet these criteria is suggested: that of facilitating the gradual emergence of free-will in the brain via an internal evolutionary process. This meets the requirement that not only must the choice of action be free but also choice in the method of choice, and choice in the method of choice of the method of choice etc. This is directly analogous to the emergence of life from non-life. Such an emergence of indeterminism with respect to the conditions of the agent fits well with the `Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis' which posits that our intelligence evolved (at least partially) to enable us to deal with social complexity and modelling `arms races'. There is a clear evolutionary advantage in being internally coherent in seeking to fulfil ones goals and unpredictable by ones peers. To fully achieve this vision several other aspects of cognition are necessary: open-ended strategy development; the meta-evolution of the evolutionary process; the facility to anticipate the results of strategies; and the situating of this process in a society of competitive peers. Finally the requirement that reports of the deliberations that lead to actions need to be socially acceptable leads to the suggestion that the language that the strategies are developed within be subject to a normative process in parallel with the development of free-will. An appendix outlines a philosophical position in support of my position
Fisher, C. M. (2001). If there were no free will. Medical Hypotheses 56:364-366.   (Google | More links)
Freeman, Walter J. (1999). Neurogenetic determinism is a theological doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):893-894.   (Google)
Abstract: In “Lifelines” Steven Rose constructs a case against neurogenetic determinism based on experimental data from biology and in favor of a significant degree of self determination. Two philosophical errors in the case favoring neurogenetic determinism are illustrated by Rose: category mistakes and an excessively narrow view of causality restricted to the linear form
Frith, Christopher D. (1996). Commentary on free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):91-93.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Consciousness and free will. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39:7-16.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Intentionality and intentional action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.   (Google | More links)
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (2001). Free will and events in the brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):287-310.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Glannon, Walter (2005). Neurobiology, neuroimaging, and free will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):68-82.   (Google | More links)
Gomes, Gilberto (2005). What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43.   (Google)
Haggard, Patrick; Catledge, P.; Dafydd, M. & Oakley, David A. (2004). Anomalous control: When "free will" is not conscious. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Hansen, Jorgen (ms). Do We Really Have Control? New Problems Facing Libertarian Free Will.   (Google)
Abstract: Newly emerging neuroscientific evidence has important ramifications for the metaphysics of free will. In light of this new evidence, I examine the two most common notions of Libertarianism. I argue that advocates for both the agent-causation and causal indeterminist models of libertarian free will suppose a misguided depiction of what constitutes a free decision. In order to retain a consistent standpoint, I argue that libertarians must view the conscious decision-making process as one of an Architectural nature. Libertarians suppose (depending on their notion) that humans are either the primary cause of their actions, or that they at least have the option to do otherwise. For either of these claims to be necessarily the case, I argue that libertarians must regard humans as having the ability to create their decisions. This ability is a requirement of the Architectural framework, which I explain in detail. I continue my case against libertarian free will, by demonstrating that the Architectural conception is also mistaken, and that the conscious decision-making process is instead one of an Archaeological nature. In this new paradigm, our conscious minds simply discover decisions, rather than create them. I show that both neuroscientific and philosophical evidence support this new model of conscious decision making and I examine how this Archaeological view of conscious discovery significantly undermines libertarian free will.
Hartmann, Dirk (2004). Neurophysiology and freedom of the will. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):275-284.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first two sections of the paper, some basic terminological distinctions regarding “freedom of the will” as a philosophical problem are expounded and discussed. On this basis, the third section focuses on the examination of two neurophysiological experiments (one by Benjamin Libet and one by William Grey Walter), which in recent times are often interpreted as providing an empirical vindication of determinism and, accordingly, a refutation of positions maintaining freedom of the will. It will be argued that both experiments fall short in this respect, and that in general—for methodical reasons—the prospects of ever deciding the dispute about freedom of the will through empirical research are rather poor
Hodgson, David (2002). Consciousness, quantum physics, and free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (1991). The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: In this book, Hodgson presents a clear and compelling case against today's orthodox mechanistic view of the brain-mind, and in favor of the view that "the mind matters." In the course of the argument he ranges over such topics as consciousness, informal reasoning, computers, evolution, and quantum indeterminancy and non-locality. Although written from a philosophical viewpoint, the book has important implications for the sciences concerned with the brain-mind problem. At the same time, it is largely non-technical, and thus accessible to the non-specialist reader
Honderich, Ted (1988). A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Kaposy, Chris (2009). Will neuroscientific discoveries about free will and selfhood change our ethical practices? Neuroethics 2 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a “self” is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral blame, or of recognizing others as persons rather than as objects, will change as a result of neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and the concept of the self. I contest suggestions that neuroscience’s conclusions about the illusory nature of free will and the self will cause significant change in our practices. I argue that we have self-interested reasons to resist allowing neuroscience to determine core beliefs about ourselves
Labooy, Guus (2004). Freedom and neurobiology: A scotistic account. Zygon 39 (4):919-932.   (Google | More links)
Larmer, Robert A. (1986). Free will, hegemony and neurophysiological indeterminism. Philosophia 16 (August):177-189.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Donald (2003). Neural holism and free will. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Both libertarian and compatibilist approaches have been unsuccessful in providing an acceptable account of free will. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, including the connectionist theory of mind and empirical findings regarding modularity and integration of brain functions, provide the basis for a new approach: neural holism. This approach locates free will in fully integrated behavior in which all of a person's beliefs and desires, implicitly represented in the brain, automatically contribute to an act. Deliberation, the experience of volition, and cognitive and behavioral shortcomings are easily understood under this model. Assigning moral praise and blame, often seen as grounded in the notion that a person has the ability to have done otherwise, will be shown to reflect instead important aspects of signaling in social interactions. Thus, important aspects of the traditional notion of free will can be accounted for within the proposed model, which has interesting implications for lifelong cognitive development
Libet, Benjamin W. (2001). Consciousness, free action and the brain: Commentary on John Searle's article (with reply from Searle). Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):59-65.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1996). Commentary on free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1999). Do we have free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:47-57.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (2002). Do we have free will? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W.; Freeman, Anthony & Sutherland, Keith (1999). The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely accepted in science that the universe is a closed deterministic system in which everything can, ultimately, be explained by purely physical...
Locke, Don (1974). Action, movement, and neurophysiology. Inquiry 17 (1-4):23 – 42.   (Google)
Abstract: Action is to be distinguished from (mere) bodily movement not by reference to an agent's intentions, or his conscious control of his movements (Sect. I), but by reference to the agent as cause of those movements, though this needs to be understood in a way which destroys the alleged distinction between agent-causation and event-causation (Sect. II). It also raises the question of the relation between an agent and his neurophysiology (Sect. III), and eventually the question of the compatibility of purposive and mechanistic accounts of human behaviour (Sect. IV). For the two to be compatible it is necessary that, e.g., intentions and brain states be not merely co-existent but also causal equivalents, in a way which allows for the mechanical explanation of teleological states — or vice versa
Maasen, Sabine (2006). Neurosociety ahead? Debating free will in the media. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
Mayr, Ulrich (2004). Conflict, consciousness, and control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):145-148.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free will: Theories, analysis, and data. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2010). Testing free will. Neuroethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This article describes three experiments that would advance our understanding of the import of data already generated by scientific work on free will and related issues. All three can be conducted with existing technology. The first concerns how reliable a predictor of behavior a certain segment of type I and type II RPs is. The second focuses on the timing of conscious experiences in Libet-style studies. The third concerns the effectiveness of conscious implementation intentions. The discussion of first two experiments highlights some important problems with certain inferences made on the basis of existing data in scientific work on free will. The discussion of the third calls attention to powerful evidence that conscious intentions sometimes are among the causes of corresponding actions. This evidence has been largely ignored in the literature on free will
Morris, Stephen G. (2007). Neuroscience and the free will conundrum. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):20 – 22.   (Google)
Muñoz-Suárez, Carlos Mario & Campis, René J. (2008). Did I do It? Yeah, You did! On Wittgenstein and Libet on Free Will. In Hannes Leitgeb & Alexander Hieke (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we analyze Libet’s conclusions on «free will» (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein’s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet’s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein´s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article´s conclusions are part of an ongoing research.
Murphy, Nancey C. (2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: New approaches to knotty old problems -- Avoiding Cartesian materialism -- From causal reductionism to self-directed systems -- From mindless to intelligent action -- How can neural nets mean? -- How does reason get its grip on the brain? -- Who's responsible? -- Neurobiological reductionism and free will.
Newton, Natika (2003). A critical review of Nicholas Maxwell's the human world in the physical universe: Consciousness, free will, and evolution. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):149 – 156.   (Google)
Abstract: Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires firm and nuanced arguments to support it. Here Maxwell's work is weakest; his arguments for contingent mind-body identity and for free will, on which his larger theory depends, are inadequate. The book is valuable both for its comprehensive view of the human condition and its mysteries, and for its demonstration of the difficulties in making such a view coherent
Pirtoek, Zvezdan (2009). The concept of free will entering the field of neurological sciences. In Eva Zerovnik, Olga Markič & A. Ule (eds.), Philosophical Insights About Modern Science. Nova Science Publishers, Inc..   (Google)
Pockett, Susan (2002). Backward referral, flash-lags, and quantum free will: A response to commentaries on articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and trevena and Miller. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.   (Google)
Roskies, Adina L. (online). Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: phenomena that are hallmarks of what it is to be human free will whether or not the universe is deterministic, many [1,2,4,26]. There is now a widespread and industrious people think that freedom can yet be salvaged if the scientific community, whose aim is to understand the universe is indeterministic, for they favor a Libertarian mechanisms underlying these phenomena [7,9,10, account which posits an agent as an uncaused cause 27–32]. The underlying worry is that those things that [17,18]. In that case, trouble arises if the universe is once seemed to be forever beyond the reach of science deterministic. might soon succumb to it: neuroscience will lead us to see the ‘universe within’ as just part and parcel of the
Rossi, E. L. (1988). Paradoxes of time, consciousness, and free will: Integrating Bohm, Jung, and Libet on ethics. Psychological Perspectives 19:50-55.   (Google)
Searle, John R. (2000). Consciousness, free action and the brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):3-22.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Searle, John R. (2001). Free will as a problem in neurobiology. Philosophy 76 (298):491-514.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The problem of free will arises because of the conflict between two inconsistent impulses, the experience of freedom and the conviction of determinism. Perhaps we can resolve these by examining neurobiological correlates of the experience of freedom. If free will is not to be an illusion, it must have a corresponding neurobiological reality. An explanation of this issue leads us to an account of rationality and the self, as well as how consciousness can move bodies at all. I explore two hypotheses. On the first, freedom is a complete illusion. On the second, it is not an illusion, and there is a corresponding indeterminism at the neurobiological level. This can only occur if there is in fact a quantum mechanical element in the fundamental neurobiology of consciousness
Searle, John R. (2007). Neuroscience, intentionality and free will: Reply to Habermas. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):69 – 76.   (Google)
Shariff, Azim F. & Peterson, Jordan B. (2005). Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's Veto and a close-enough theory of free will. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2010). The bcn challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2008). The real challenge to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.   (Google)
Abstract: Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most significantly challenged by the recent discoveries. Those discoveries show that it is not as obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons as it seems. Hence, we have to rethink our concept of reasons-responsiveness
Smart, J. J. C. (2005). Comments on Hodgson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):58-64.   (Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1979). Consciousness, free will and personal identity. In David A. Oakley & H.C. Plotkin (eds.), Brain, Behaviour, and Evolution. Methuen and Company.   (Google)
Spence, Sean A. (1996). Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):75-90.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Thalberg, Irving (1970). New light on brain physiology and free will? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (4):379-383.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Usher, Matthew (2006). Control, choice, and the convergence/divergence dynamics: A compatibilistic probabilistic theory of free will. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):188-213.   (Google | More links)
Velmans, Max (2004). Why conscious free will both is and isn't an illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain
Walter, Henrik (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Walter, Henrik (2002). Neurophilosophy of free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Weil, Vivian M. (1980). Neurophysiological determinism and human action. Mind 89 (January):90-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)