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5.4b. Theories of Free Will (Theories of Free Will on PhilPapers)

5.4b.1 Agent Causation

Allen, Robert F. (online). Agent causation and ultimate responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: Positions taken in the current debate over free will can be seen as responses to the following conditional: If every action is caused solely by another event and a cause necessitates its effect, then there is no action to which there is an alternative. The Libertarian, who believes that alternatives are a requirement of free will, responds by denying the right conjunct of C’s antecedent, maintaining that some actions are caused, either mediately or immediately, by events whose effects could be different, even if they were to recur under identical circumstances. We have here a denial of Laplacian Determinism (LD), according to which the condition of the world at any instant makes only one state possible at any other instant.<sup>1</sup> One prominent defender of this view, Robert Kane, holds that unless an agent’s neural mechanisms operated indeterministicly in forming her character she is not responsible for its manifestations.<sup>2</sup> This requirement is entailed by the principle of “ultimate responsibility” (UR) according to which an act is freely willed only if (a) its agent is personally responsible for its performance in the sense of having caused it to occur by voluntarily doing something that was avoidable and (b)
Balaguer, Mark (2002). A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will. Noûs 36 (3):379-406.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bishop, John D. (1983). Agent-causation. Mind 92 (January):61-79.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Bishop, John D. (1986). Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive? Synthese 67 (May):225-47.   (Google)
Bishop, John D. (2003). Prospects for a naturalist libertarianism: O'Connor's persons and causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
BonJour, Laurence A. (1976). Deeterminism, libertarianism, and agent causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14:145-56.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court.   (Cited by 177 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Agent causation and event causation in the production of free action. Philosophical Topics 24:19-48.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2005). Agent causation and the problem of luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1993). Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will. Noûs 27 (2):191-203.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1983). Agent causation, chance, and determinism. Philosophical Inquiry 5:29-42.   (Google)
Feldman, Richard H. & Buckareff, Andrei A. (2003). Reasons explanations and pure agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism
Fischer, John Martin (2001). Book review. Persons and causes: The metaphysics of free will Timothy O'Connor. Mind 110 (438).   (Google)
Griffith, Meghan E. (2005). Does free will remain a mystery? A response to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it
Griffith, Meghan (2007). Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions. Acta Analytica 22 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that trying is the locus of freedom and moral responsibility. Thus, any plausible view of free and responsible action must accommodate and account for free tryings. I then consider a version of agent causation whereby the agent directly causes her tryings. On this view, the agent is afforded direct control over her efforts and there is no need to posit—as other agent-causal theorists do—an uncaused event. I discuss the potential advantages of this sort of view, and its challenges
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2004). Active control, agent-causation and free action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation
Hurst, T. L. (ms). Causation and Free Will.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper looks at the basic philosophic positions on the problem of free will and suggests that there is a difference in usage of the term "determinism" between hard and soft determinists. The term "freewillism" is introduced, which is defined as the view that events can be caused by willed choices. Instead of "soft determinism", "hard determinism" and "libertarianism" the terms "soft freewillism", "(hard) determinism" and "hard freewillism" are used. Hence there is only one form of determinism, and the issue is resolved.

This change is allied to an expansion of the questions by which the philosophic positions are distinguished to allow a correlation between the questions on free will and questions on causality. This suggests a mapping of the main philosophic positions on free will to the types of causation:

- (Hard) determinism correlates to event-event causation, and is not compatible with free will.
- Indeterminism correlates to random causation, which is also incompatible with free will.
- Hard freewillism (libertarianism) allows all three types of causation (event-event, random and agent), and indeterminate (libertarian) free will.
Soft freewillism (soft determinism) allows event-event and agent causation, and determinate free will.

The evidence supporting the three types of causation is then considered.
Hurst, T. L. (ms). The Demise of Compatibilism?   (Google)
Abstract: This paper suggests that compatibilism is incoherent because determinism allows neither causal input to your choices and actions, nor a sound form of moral responsibility. Free will requires, at least, moral responsibility, if not causal input. Hence, it is not possible to be compatible with both determinism and free will, as they are not compatible with each other.

A form of free will is identified in which our choices are determinate at the time we make them, because they are determined by our natures. However, our natures can change over time, and the unique ability of sentient beings to reflect on choices, actions and events allows input to that process. Thus giving us input to future choices.

This form of free will is not compatible with determinism because our choices are not fixed for all time by events in the distant past, but instead become fixed over time as choices are made and events unfold. The term "soft freewillism" is used for the philosophic position that allows this form of determinate free will.
Lowe, E. J. (2001). Event causation and agent causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:1-20.   (Google)
Markosian, Ned (1999). A compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Here is a question about (physical) mereological simples that I raised in a recent paper. The Simple Question: What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object’s being a simple? And here is the answer to this question that I defended...
O'Connor, Timothy (1995). Agent causation. In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In what follows, I will contend that the commonsense view of ourselves as fundamental causal agents - for which some have used the term “unmoved movers" but which I think might more accurately be expressed as “not wholly moved movers” - is theoretically understandable, internally consistent, and consistent with what we have thus far come to know about the nature and workings of the natural world. In the section that follows, I try to show how the concept of ‘agent’ causation can be understood as a distinct species (from ‘event’ causation) of the primitive idea, which I’ll term “causal production”, underlying realist or non-Humean conceptions of event causation. In section III, I respond to a number of contemporary objections to the theory of agent causation. Sections IV-V are devoted to showing that the theory is compatible with ordinary reasons explanations of action, which then places me in a position to respond, in the final section, to the contention that we could never know, in principle, whether the agency theory actually describes a significant portion of human activity.
O'Connor, Timothy (2000). Causality, mind, and free will. Noûs.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One familiar affirmative answer to this question holds that these facts suffice to entail that Descartes' picture of the human mind must be mistaken. On Descartes' view, our mind or soul (the only essential part of ourselves) has no spatial location. Yet it directly interacts with but one physical object, the brain of that body with which it is, 'as it were, intermingled,' so as to 'form one unit.' The radical disparity posited between a nonspatial mind, whose intentional and conscious properties are had by no physical object, and a spatial body, all of whose properties are had by no mind, has prompted some to conclude that, pace Descartes, causal interaction between the two is impossible. Jaegwon Kim has recently given a new twist to this old line of thought.(1) In the present essay, I will use Kim's argument as a springboard for motivating my own favored picture of the metaphysics of mind and body and then discussing how an often vilified account of freedom of the will may be realized within it
O'Connor, Timothy (2001). Dualist and agent-causal theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oup.   (Google)
Abstract: I Introduction This essay will canvass recent philosophical accounts of human agency that deploy a notion of 'self' (or 'agent') causation. Some of these accounts try to explicate this notion, whereas others only hint at its nature by way of contrast with the causality exhibited by impersonal physical systems. In these latter theories, the authors' main argumentative burden is that the apparent fundamental differences between personal and impersonal causal activity strongly suggest mind-body dualism. I begin by noting two distinct, yet not commonly distinguished, philosophical motivations for pursuing an agent-causal account of human agency. In the course of discussing the accounts that some philosophers have developed in response to these considerations, I reconsider both the linkage of agent causation with mind-body dualism and its sharp cleavage from impersonal (or 'event') causation
O’Connor, Timothy (2005). Freedom with a human face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: As good a definition as any of a _philosophical_ conundrum is a problem all of whose possible solutions are unsatisfactory. The problem of understanding the springs of action for morally responsible agents is commonly recognized to be such a problem. The origin, nature, and explanation of freely-willed actions puzzle us today as they did the ancients Greeks, and for much the same reasons. However, one can carry this ‘perennial-puzzle’ sentiment too far. The unsatisfactory nature of philosophical theories is a more or less matter, and some of them have admitted of improvement over time. This, at any rate, is what we self-selecting metaphysicians tend to suppose, and I will pursue that high calling by suggesting a few improvements to a theory of metaphysical freedom, or freedom of the will
O'Connor, Timothy (2005). Freedom With a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:207-227.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1993). Indeterminism and free agency: Three recent views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-26.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a commonplace of philosophy that the notion of free will is a hard nut to crack. A simple, compelling argument can be made to show that behavior for which an agent is morally responsible cannot be the outcome of prior determining causal factors.1 Yet the smug satisfaction with which we incompatibilists are prone to trot out this argument has a tendency to turn to embarrassment when we're asked to explain just how it is that morally responsible action might obtain under the assumption of indeterminism. Despair over the prospect of giving a satisfactory answer to this question has led some contemporary philosophers to a position rarely, if ever, held in the history of philosophy: free, responsible action is an incoherent concept.2
O'Connor, Timothy (2007). Is it all just a matter of luck? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A central argument of Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck (2006) is that the problem of luck poses essentially the same problem for all the main indeterministic accounts of free will. Consequently, there is no advantage is certain theories (notably, agent-causal theories) in their capacity to respond to the problem of luck. I argue that Mele has not made a persuasive case for these claims
O'Connor, Timothy (2002). Libertarian views: Dualist and agent-causal theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 77 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This provocative book refurbishes the traditional account of freedom of will as reasons-guided "agent" causation, situating its account within a general metaphysics. O'Connor's discussion of the general concept of causation and of ontological reductionism v. emergence will specially interest metaphysicians and philosophers of mind
O'Connor, Timothy & Churchill, John (2006). Reasons Explanation And Agent Control: In Search Of An Integrated Account. Philosophical Topics 32:241-256.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1996). Why agent causation? Philosophical Topics 24:143-58.   (Google)
Abstract: I Introduction The question of this paper is, what would it be to act with freedom of the will? What kind of control is inchoately in view when we speak, pretheoretically, of being ‘self- determining’ beings, of ‘freely making choices in view of consciously considered reasons’ (pro and con) - of its being ‘up to us’ how we shall act? My question here is not whether we have (or have any reason to think we have) such freedom, or what is the most robust account of our freedom compatible with late twentieth-century science. Many contemporary philosophers are all too ready to settle for a deflationary account of freedom and declare victory, with some brief remarks reminding us that we were created a little lower than the angels. I am not so sanguine about the ability of such accounts to leave reasonably intact our judgments about human autonomy, dignity, and responsibility. But, as I’ve said, that’s not my concern here. Instead, I want to revisit the question of what exactly ‘self-determination’, on our ordinary conception, comes to
Pereboom, Derk (forthcoming). Is our concept of agent-causation coherent? Philosophical Topics.   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (2007). On Alfred Mele's free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism
Rowe, William L. (2006). Free will, moral responsibility, and the problem of OOMPH. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):295-313.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral responsibility. In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist, agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility
Rowe, William L. (1991). Responsibility, agent-causation, and freedom: An eighteenth-century view. Ethics 101 (2):237-257.   (Google | More links)
Schlosser, Markus E. (2008). Agent-causation and agential control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3 – 21.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the proponents of the agent-causal approach, that substance-causation is possible, as I will argue against that theory on the ground that it fails as a theory of agency. I will argue that the non-reductive agent-causal theory fails to account for agency, because it fails to account for agential control: it cannot explain why the stipulated irreducible relation between the agent and an action constitutes the agent's exercise of control over the action. This objection, I will argue, applies to the agent-causal theory in particular, and to the non-reductive approach in general
Silvers, Stuart (2003). Agent causation, functional explanation, and epiphenomenal engines: Can conscious mental events be causally efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.   (Google)
Stone, Jim (1998). Free will as a gift from God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Tucker, Chris (2007). Agent causation and the alleged impossibility of rational free action. Erkenntnis 67 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Galen Strawson has claimed that “the impossibility of free will and ultimate moral responsibility can be proved with complete certainty.” Strawson, I take it, thinks that this conclusion can be established by one argument which he has developed. In this argument, he claims that rational free actions would require an infinite regress of rational choices, which is, of course, impossible for human beings. In my paper, I argue that agent causation theorists need not be worried by Strawson’s argument. For agent causation theorists are able to deny a key principle which drives the regress. Oversimplifying things a bit, the principle states that if one is responsible for her rational actions, then she was antecedently responsible for the reasons on which she acted
von Wachter, Daniel (2003). Agent causation before and after the ontological turn. In Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbvhpt.   (Google)
Abstract: Chisholm's theory of agent causation is criticised. An alternative theory of agent causation is proposed.
von Wachter, Daniel (2003). Free agents as cause. In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.   (Google | More links)
Widerker, David (2005). Agent-causation and control. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Xu, Xiangdong (ms). Does Agent-Causation Theory Explain Free Agency?   (Google)
Zuriff, G. E. (2004). Conscious will and agent causation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):678-679.   (Google)
Abstract: Wegner (2002) fails to (1) distinguish conscious will and voluntariness; (2) account for everyday willed acts; and (3) individuate thoughts and acts. Wegner incorrectly implies that (4) we experience acts as willed only when they are caused by unwilled thoughts; (5) thoughts are never true causes of actions; and (6) we experience ourselves as first performing mental acts which then cause our intentional actions

5.4b.2 Compatibilism

Abbruzzese, John (2000). Garrett on the theological objection to Hume's compatibilism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):345 – 352.   (Google | More links)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1976). 'Soft' determinism. In Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Oriel Press.   (Google)
Aune, Bruce (1963). Abilities, modalities, and free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Aune, Bruce (1970). Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1991). Free-will and determinism. In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.   (Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1954). Freedom and necessity. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophical Essays. St.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Ayer, A. J. (1980). Free will and rationality. In Z. van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Bahm, Archie J. (1965). The freedom-determinism controversy. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 9 (January):48-55.   (Google)
Bain, A. (1880). Dr. ward on free-will. Mind 5 (17):116-124.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder, What is human freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theoretical significance
Balsillie, D. (1911). Prof. Bergson on time and free will. Mind 20 (79):357-378.   (Google | More links)
Balaguer, Mark, The metaphysical irrelevance of the compatibilism debate (and, more generally, of conceptual analysis).   (Google)
Abstract: It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes-for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will-except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questionsnamely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility-are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings
Bassoff, Bruce (1964). Free will and determinism. Journal of Existentialism 4:259-262.   (Google)
Beckermann, Ansgar (2005). Free will in a natural order of the world. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Beckermann, Ansgar (ms). Would biological determinism rule outthe possibility of freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: I shall disclose the answer to the title question straight away, and the answer is “NO, it would not”. If it turned out that we really are neurobi- ologically determined beings, this result would not necessitate any change in our idea of humanity – it would not affect the idea that we are free and responsible human beings. Or at any rate, it would not do so under certain conditions of which I am sure that, as a matter of fact, they are satisfied. But let us first ask the question, “Whence the opposite con- viction, according to which it would prove a disaster for our self-image and the idea that we are free and responsible beings if it emerged that everything we do, think or feel is completely determined by biological factors?”
Beebee, Helen & Mele, Alfred R. (2002). Humean compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a false premiss. We also display some striking similarities between Humean compatibilism and libertarianism, an incompatibilist view. For example, standard libertarians face a problem about luck, and we show that Humean compatibilists face a very similar problem
Beebee, Helen (2003). Local miracle compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Beebee, Helen (2008). Smilansky's alleged refutation of compatibilism. Analysis 68 (299):258–260.   (Google | More links)
Benson, S. (1994). Free agency and self-worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Benson, S. (1987). Freedom and value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Ben-Menahem, Yemima (1986). Newcomb's paradox and compatibilism. Erkenntnis 25 (2).   (Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (2005). Can we ever be really, truly, ultimately, free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2010). Free will and the mind–body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As bona fide laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). Global control and freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, the global controller nullifies freedom because she is an agent, whereas natural forces are at work in conventional deterministic worlds. Other key differences that undermine the analogy are identified. It is also shown that the argument begs the question against the classical compatibilist, who believes that determinism does not preclude alternative possibilities
Berofsky, Bernard (2002). Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (1995). Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This is the most detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy currently available. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A sustained critique of concepts such as moral autonomy, self-realisation, ideal autonomy, and identification is offered. The author replaces these with an alternative model that reveals how spontaneity, vitality and competence enable human beings to act in the real world
Bergmann, Frithjof (1977). On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bernecker, Sven (2006). Prospects for epistemic compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Berofsky, Bernard (2000). Ultimate rsponsibility in a determined world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.   (Google)
Bishop, John D. (1993). Compatibilism and the free will defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.   (Google)
Bobzien, Susanne (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today
Bok, Hilary (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I do?" and sifting through alternatives to find the most justifiable course of action--we have reason to hold ourselves responsible for what we do. But when we engage in theoretical reasoning--searching for causal explanations of events--we have no reason to apply concepts like freedom and responsibility. Bok contends that libertarians' arguments against "compatibilist" justifications of moral responsibility fail because they describe human actions only from the standpoint of theoretical reasoning. To establish this claim, she examines which conceptions of freedom of the will and moral responsibility are relevant to practical reasoning and shows that these conceptions are not vulnerable to many objections that libertarians have directed against compatibilists. Bok concludes that the truth or falsity of the claim that we are free and responsible agents in the sense those conceptions spell out is ultimately independent of deterministic accounts of the causes of human actions.Clearly written and powerfully argued, Freedom and Responsibility is a major addition to current debate about some of philosophy's oldest and deepest questions.
Boysen, Thomas (2004). Death of a compatibilistic intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.   (Google | More links)
Bregant, Janez (2003). The problem of causal exclusion and Horgan's causal compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.   (Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Compatibilism and doxastic control. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable
Byrd, Jeremy (2008). Kant's compatibilism in the new eludication of the first principles of metaphysical cognition. Kant-Studien 99 (1).   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (1997). A compatibilist theory of alternate possibilities. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):339-44.   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2005). Compatibilist alternatives. Canadian Journal Of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: _If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in whose shadow Wittgenstein ought to be standing,_ _considered the matter. He pointed out that even if determinism is true, there remains a sense in which you_ _can still do otherwise than you do: you will do otherwise if you so choose. That, on reflection, is consistent_ _with determinism. The doctrine of the compatibility of freedom and determinism is saved. Joseph Keim_ _Campbell, strong philosopher at Washington State University, provides the latest thinking on this seemingly_ _unavoidable dispute. You do not have to agree that either compatibilism or incompatibilism must be true in_ _order to appreciate the carefulness of his reasoning in this piece of ongoing American philosophy. It_ _requires and repays attention._
Canfield, John V. (1961). Determinism, free will and the ace predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1963). Free will and determinism: A reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1962). The compatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Review 71 (July):352-368.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Chappell, Vere (ms). Descartes’s compatibilism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilism is the doctrine that the doctrine of determinism is logically consistent with the doctrine of libertarianism. Determinism is the doctrine that every being and event is brought about by causes other than itself. Libertarianism is the doctrine that some human actions are free. Was Descartes a compatibilist? There is no doubt that he was a libertarian: his works are full of professions of freedom, human as well as divine. And though he held that God has no cause other than himself, Descartes thought that everything apart from God is externally caused: he was a determinist with respect to the created universe. So it appears, assuming him consistent with himself, that Descartes must have been a compatibilist. And indeed, there are passages in his writings in which he appears explicitly to affirm that he is. Since both Descartes’s libertarianism and his determinism are complex doctrines, however, his view of the relation between them is complex as well
Clarke, Randolph (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points of dispute concerning free will.
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2007). Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument
Crissman, Paul (1942). Freedom in determinism. Journal of Philosophy 39 (September):520-526.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2006). The trouble with externalist compatibilist autonomy. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve the CNC manipulation problem. After briefly reflecting on the present status of responses to the manipulation problem in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists of various stripes, I will draw the over-all pessimistic conclusion that no party deals with this problem satisfactorily
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2004). The trouble with Harry: Compatibilist free will internalism and manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Danto, Arthur C. & Morgenbesser, Sidney (1957). Character and free will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (16):493-505.   (Google | More links)
Davison, Scott A. (1994). Dretske on the metaphysics of freedom. Analysis 54 (2):115-123.   (Google)
Davidson, Donald (1973). Freedom to act. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Deery, Oisín (2007). Extending compatibilism: Control, responsibility, and blame. Res Publica 13 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. MIT Press.   (Cited by 473 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel Clement (2003). Freedom Evolves. Viking.   (Google)
Abstract: Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems of moral and political freedom. Like the planet's atmosphere on which life depends, the conditions on which our freedom depends had to evolve, and like the atmosphere, they continue to evolve-and could be extinguished. According to Dennett, biology provides the perspective from which we can distinguish the varieties of freedom that matter. Throughout the history of life on this planet, an interacting web and internal and external conditions have provided the frameworks for the design of agents that are more free than their parts-from the unwitting gropings of the simplest life forms to the more informed activities of animals to the moral dilemmas that confront human beings living in societies. As in his previous books, Dennett weaves a richly detailed narrative enlivened by analogies as entertaining as they are challenging. Here is the story of how we came to be different from all other creatures, how our early ancestors mindlessly created human culture, and then, how culture gave us our minds, our visions, our moral problems-in a nutshell, our freedom
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Natural freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-458.   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. & Taylor, Christopher (ms). Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is no doctrine about determinism and freedom that has proved to be as resilient over the past century as that of Compatibilism. It is, of course, the doctrine that we can be both free and also subject to a real determinism. If it goes back at least to Hobbes and Hume, it was strengthened and refurbished throughout the 1900's. Part of its strength has been the extent to which it has satisfied theses that in fact seem to be the very substance of the doctrine opposed to it. This is Incompatibilism. What follows here is the most recent and the very best attempt to steal what has appeared to be the thunder of Incompatibilism. Professors Taylor and Dennett make use of a certain amount of technicality in giving sense, on the assumption of determinism, to the ideas that we can nevertheless do otherwise than we actually do and we can also really take credit for things. It is not my own view, but it is one that must be reckoned with by all who struggle with the problem. Put in some effort with the formalism if you have to, find out a little about possible worlds. It is certainly worth the effort
Dänzer, Lars (2008). A neglected argument for compatibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):211-218.   (Google)
Dore, Clement (1963). Is free will compatible with determinism? Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1996). Honderich on the consequences of determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):847-854.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1988). Meta-compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):323-329.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dworkin, Gerald B. (1970). Acting freely. Noûs 4 (November):367-83.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Eggerman, Richard W. (1976). The language of soft determinism. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7:91-99.   (Google)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (1998). Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation
Everson, Stephen (1990). Aristotle's compatibilism in the nicomachean ethics. Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):81-103.   (Google)
Fales, Evan (1984). Davidson's compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):227-246.   (Google | More links)
Falk, Arthur E. (1981). On some modal confusions in compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):141-48.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fara, Michael (2008). Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind 117 (468).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of agential abilities in terms of dispositions. The analysis is shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to incompatibilism about free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the “master argument” for incompatibilism is unsound
Feltz, Adam; Cokely, Edward T. & Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2009). Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Abstract: In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far
Ferraiolo, William (2004). Against compatibilism: Compulsion, free agency and moral responsibility. Sorites 15 (December):67-72.   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1996). A new compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24:49-66.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2007). Compatibilism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2005). Dennett on the basic argument. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Christopher Taylor has greatly clarified my thinking on this topic and shown me how to launch a deeper and more radical campaign in support of my earlier claims to this effect, and our coauthored paper (Taylor and Dennett 2001) provides more technical detail than is needed here. Here I will attempt a gentler version of our argument, highlighting the main points so that non-philosophers can at least see what the points of contention are, and how we propose to settle them, while leaving out almost all the logical formulae. Philosophers should consult the full-dress version, of course, to see if we have actually tied off the loose ends, and closed the loopholes that are passed by without mention in this telling. (Dennett
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-style compatibilism. In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Abstract: In this essay I shall begin by sketching a "Frankfurt-type example." I shall then lay out a disturbing challenge to the claim I have made above that these examples help us to make significant progress in the debates about the relationship between moral responsibility and causal determinism. I then will provide a reply to this challenge, and the reply will point toward a more refined formulation of the important contribution I believe Frankfurt has made to defending a certain sort of compatibilism.
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Flint, Thomas P. (1987). Compatibilism and the argument from unavoidability. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):423-40.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1978). Compatibilism. Kind 87 (July):421-28.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1979). Compatibilism and control over the past. Analysis 39 (March):70-74.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1981). Compatibilism: A reply to Shaw. Mind 90 (April):287-288.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1980). Reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 40 (March):101-103.   (Google)
Foot, Philippa (1957). Free will as involving determinism. Philosophical Review 66 (October):439-50.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Fowler, C. A. (1996). A pragmatic defense of free will. Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):247-60.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Intentionality and intentional action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.   (Google | More links)
Garvey, Brian (2008). Free will, compatibilism and the human nature wars. .   (Google)
Abstract: There has been much controversy over whether the claims of evolutionary psychologists, if true, imply that we humans are significantly less free than has traditionally been thought. This in turn gives rise to the concern that excuses are being given to philanderers and other ne’er-do-wells for their behaviour. Evolutionary psychologists themselves often respond to this concern by claiming that it presupposes that they believe in genetic determinism, which they do not. Philosophers, such as Janet Radcliffe Richards in Human Nature after Darwin, respond by appealing to compatibilist accounts of free will. The thought is that whether or not our behaviour is caused by evolved mental mechanisms, has no bearing on whether or not it is free. The present paper takes issue with this use of compatibilist arguments. Compatibilist accounts of free will do not just say that an action can be determined and still free; they also distinguish between situations where we are free and ones where we are not. The latter includes not just situations of external coercion, but also situations where there are internal obstacles such as compulsion, addiction or self-deception. While not attempting to outline a full account of what it is to be free, this paper will outline one set of conditions which are sufficient for our freedom to be said to be restricted – conditions which are shared by situations of addiction, self-deception, etc. But a central pillar of evolutionary psychology is that the mind consists wholly or largely of modules whose operation is mandatory. The outputs of these modules are often characterised as desires or goals. It will be argued that this implies internal obstacles to free will that are relevantly similar to the obstacles of addiction, self-deception, etc. It is ultimately a scientific question, and hence outside the scope of this paper, whether the relevant evolutionary-psychological claims are true or not. However, they are central to the discipline, and this paper will argue that if they are true that has negative consequences for how free we are. Hence, the view that evolutionary psychology implies that we are less free than has traditionally been thought is not without foundation
Gert, Bernard & Duggan, Timothy J. (1979). Free will as the ability to will. Noûs 13 (2):197-217.   (Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1993). Freedom of the will and mental content. Ratio 6 (2):89-107.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1980). The conditional analysis of freedom. In P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Glossop, Ronald J. (1969). Freedom, determinism, and mechanism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7:181-186.   (Google)
Goldstick, D. (1989). But could I have wanted to do that. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (June):99-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goldman, A. (1969). The compatibility of mechanism and purpose. Philosophical Review 78 (October):468-82.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Graham, Peter A. (2008). A defense of local miracle compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 140 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2002). Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Haji, By Ishtiyaque (2008). Dispositional compatibilism and Frankfurt-type examples. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):226–241.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article critically examines Kadri Vihvelin's proposal that to have free will is to have the ability to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to have this ability is to have a bundle of dispositions that can be exercised in more than one way. It is argued that partisans of Frankfurt examples can still make a powerful case for the view that being able to do otherwise, even on Vihvelin's compatibilist explication of ‘could have done otherwise,’ is not required for moral responsibility
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Introduction: Semi-compatibilism, reasons-responsiveness, and ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):91 – 93.   (Google | More links)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (1998). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility
Hannan, Barbara & Lehrer, Keith (1989). Compatibilism, determinism, and the identity theory. Inquiry 32 (March):49-54.   (Google)
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Hannaford, Robert V. (1976). Who's in control here? Philosophy 51 (October):421-430.   (Google)
Harding, Gregory (1997). Free will and determinism: Why compatibilism is false. Erkenntnis 47 (3):311-349.   (Google | More links)
Harris, James A. (2005). Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eighteenth century was a time of brilliant philosophical innovation in Britain. In Of Liberty and Necessity James A. Harris presents the first comprehensive account of the period's discussion of what remains a central problem of philosophy, the question of the freedom of the will. He offers new interpretations of contributions to the free will debate made by canonical figures such as Locke, Hume, Edwards, and Reid, and also discusses in detail the arguments of some less familiar writers. Harris puts the eighteenth-century debate about the will and its freedom in the context of the period's concern with applying what Hume calls the "experimental method of reasoning" to the human mind. His book will be of substantial interest to historians of philosophy and anyone concerned with the free will problem
Hausman, D. B. (1975). Compatibilism again. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (March):509-514.   (Google)
Helm, Paul (2010). God, compatibilism, and the authorship of sin. Religious Studies 46 (1):115-124.   (Google)
Heller, M. (1996). The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-37.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hobart, R. E. (1934). Free will as involving determinism and inconceivable without it. Mind 43 (169):1-27.   (Google | More links)
Hodgson, Shadworth H. (1885). Free-will and compulsory determinism: A dialogue. Mind 10 (40):532-556.   (Google | More links)
Holton, Richard (2007). Freedom, coercion and discursive control. In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If moral and political philosophy is to be of any use, it had better be concerned with real people. The focus need not be exclusively on people as they are; but it should surely not extend beyond how they would be under laws as they might be. It is one of the strengths of Philip Pettit’s work that it is concerned with real people and the ways that they think: with the commonplace mind. In this paper I examine Pettit’s recent work on free will.2 Much of my concern will be to see how his contentions fit with empirical findings about human psychology. Pettit is a compatibilist about free will: he holds that it is compatible with determinism. But he finds fault with existing compatibilist accounts, and then proposes his own amendment. My aim is to challenge his grounds for finding fault; and then to raise some questions about his own positive account
Holmstrom, Nancy (1977). Firming up soft determinism. Personalist 58 (January):39-51.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Holton, Richard (2009). Determinism, self-efficacy, and the phenomenology of free will. Inquiry 52 (4):412 – 428.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible. I suggest a different explanation, and in doing so try to shed some light on the phenomenology of free will. I contend that one aspect of the phenomenology is our impression that maintaining a resolution requires effort—an impression well supported by a range of psychological data. Determinism can easily be interpreted as showing that such effort will be futile: in effect determinism is conflated with fatalism, in a way that is reminiscent of the Lazy argument used against the Stoics. If this interpretation is right, it explains how belief in determinism undermines moral motivation without needing to attribute sophisticated incompatibilist beliefs to subjects; it works by undermining subjects' self-efficacy. It also provides indirect support for the contention that this is one of the sources of the phenomenology of free will
Holton, Richard (forthcoming). Response to 'free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William crescioni and Jessica L. alquist. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (2006). The act of choice. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (3):1-15.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Choice is one of the central elements in the experience of free will, but it has not received a good account from either compatibilists or libertarians. This paper develops an account of choice based around three features: (i) choice is an action; (ii) choice is not determined by one's prior beliefs and desires; (iii) once the question of what to do has arisen, choice is typically both necessary and sufficient for moving to action. These features might appear to support a libertarian account, but they do not. Instead it is argued that all three features can be accommodated within a compatibilist account, where choice is needed because of agents' inabilities to arrive at judgements about what is best. Choice differs though from random picking: in choosing, agents frequently (though not always) deploy abilities that enable them to make good choices. In such cases, judgements about what is best will frequently follow the choice. Finally choice is distinguished from agency, and, on the basis of the distinction, the claim that choice is an action is made good.
Honderich, Ted (online). After compatibilism and incompatibilism.   (Google)
Abstract: A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run up against a conviction owed to reflecting on your own past life. The conviction is that an attitude akin to one tied to indeterminism, a way of holding yourself morally responsible, has some basis despite the truth of determinism. We need to look for radical ideas here, as radical as Consciousness as Existence with the problem of perceptual consciousness. Could that doctrine help with determinism and freedom? Could a problem about causation and explanation do so?
Honderich, Ted (2006). Compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem. The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy Website.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1996). Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the Smart aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):855-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (2002). Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (ms). Determinism's consequences -- the mistakes of compatibilism and incompatibilism, and what is to be done now.   (Google)
Abstract: From before the time of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th Century, right up to John Searle's impertinent piece in Journal of Consciousness Studies a few months ago, and a major conference in Idaho in April, philosophers of determinism and freedom have divided into Compatibilists and Incompatibilists. The first regiment says that determinism is logically compatible with freedom. The second says it is logically incompatible. They can do this. In a way it is easy-peasy. The first regiment achieves its end by defining free decisions and actions as voluntary: owed to certain causes rather than others -- causes somehow internal to the agent rather than external or constraining causes. The second regiment satisfies itself by defining free decisions and actions as not only voluntary but also originated -- where an originated event, however mysterious, is definitely not a causally necessitated one
Honderich, Ted (2002). How free are you? The determinism problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Abstract: In this fully revised and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic, he offers a concise and lively introduction to free will and the problem of determinism, advancing the debate on this key area of moral philosophy. Honderich sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question, "Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?" and asks instead if there is such a clear version of free will. He goes on to address the question of whether determinism is true and finally asks, "What can we conclude about our lives if determinism is true?"
Honderich, Ted (online). Thomas Hobbes: Causation, determinism, and their compatibility with freedom.   (Google)
Abstract: _What Thomas Hobbes has to say of the nature of causation itself in_ _Entire Causes_ _and Their Only Possible Effects_ _is carried further in the first of the two excerpts here_ _-- although not at its start. His second subject in this imperfectly sequential piece of_ _writing is determinism itself -- a deterministic philosophy of mind. In the mind, as_ _elsewhere, each event has a 'necessary cause' -- a cause that necessitates the event._ _His third subject in the first excerpt is freedom, this being voluntariness, and its_ _relation to the determinism. He gives a statement of what is now known as_ _Compatibilism -- roughly the doctrine that determinism and freedom properly_ _understood do not conflict with but are consistent with one another. We can be_ _entirely subject to determinism or 'necessity' and also be perfectly free. Certainly a_ _distinction between freedom as 'the absence of opposition', which can co-exist with_ _determinism, and some other kind of freedom, had been made before Hobbes. But it_ _will take a better historian than me to say if he was anticipated by someone else who_ _said that the particular freedom consistent with determinism is all that we can_ _properly mean by the term 'freedom'. Certainly he got in ahead of lovely_
Horgan, Terence E. (1985). Compatibilism and the consequence argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Howsepian, A. A. (2004). A libertarian-friendly theory of compatibilist free action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):453-480.   (Google)
Howsepian, A. A. (2007). Compatibilism, evil, and the free-will defense. Sophia 46 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical compatibilism
Hudson, Hud (1994). Kant's Compatibilism. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Hume, David (online). Our freedom reconciled with determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness since the first origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression; and that that disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other
Hurst, T. L. (ms). The Demise of Compatibilism?   (Google)
Abstract: This paper suggests that compatibilism is incoherent because determinism allows neither causal input to your choices and actions, nor a sound form of moral responsibility. Free will requires, at least, moral responsibility, if not causal input. Hence, it is not possible to be compatible with both determinism and free will, as they are not compatible with each other.

A form of free will is identified in which our choices are determinate at the time we make them, because they are determined by our natures. However, our natures can change over time, and the unique ability of sentient beings to reflect on choices, actions and events allows input to that process. Thus giving us input to future choices.

This form of free will is not compatible with determinism because our choices are not fixed for all time by events in the distant past, but instead become fixed over time as choices are made and events unfold. The term "soft freewillism" is used for the philosophic position that allows this form of determinate free will.
Jennings, Ian (1997). Autonomy and hierarchical compatibilism. South African Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):44-50.   (Google)
Jones, David H. (1968). Deliberation and determinism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 6:255-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Judisch, Neal (2007). Reasons-responsive compatibilism and the consequences of belief. Journal of Ethics 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility
Kane, Robert (2002). Responsibility, reactive attitudes and free will: Reflections on Wallace's theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):693–698.   (Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kapitan, Tomis (1991). Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The use of predicate and sentential operators to express the practical modalities -- ability, control, openness, etc. -- has given new life to a fatalistic argument against determinist theories of responsible agency. A familiar version employs the following principle: the consequences of what is unavoidable (beyond one's control) are themselves unavoidable. Accordingly, if determinism is true, whatever happens is the consequence of events in the remote past, or, of such events together with the laws of nature. But laws and the remote past are not under our control and, by the principle, neither are their consequences. Therefore, none of our choices and actions, nor anything that results from them, is under our control.1 Whether refinements of the closure principle underlying this unavoidability argument are acceptable depends upon the precise sense of 'consequence' and 'unavoidable' involved. Roughly, a proposition P is a consequence of a set of propositions M iff it is impossible that P be false when each member of M is true, or, conversely, when M necessitates P. Since P is unavoidable for S when P is true and S is (was) unable to prevent P from being true, it might seem that if P is unavoidable the same should hold of what is necessitated by P. There is, in fact, 1 an easy defense of the principle which utilizes the incompatibilist condition that S is able to do action K only if it is as yet undetermined whether or not S will K. With it, there is no question but that one is unable to accomplish what is already determined by what one was unable to prevent. Of course, this reasoning is unlikely to impress the compatibilist who rejects the condition outright and, expectedly, it is not the procedure of the proponents of the unavoidability argument. The latter might rest content with appeals to intuition, but more significant are defenses of the closure principle and independent derivations of the unavoidability argument that rely upon distinct principles concerning the logic of the practical modalities, for example, closure of ability under entailment (Cross 1986, Brown 1988) or, claims about the "fixity of the past" and the "inescapability of laws" (Ginet 1990)..
Kapitan, Tomis (2000). Autonomy and manipulated freedom. Philosopical Perspectives 14:81-104.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, compatibilism has been the target of two powerful challenges. According to the consequence argument, if everything we do and think is a consequence of factors beyond our control (past events and the laws of nature), and the consequences of what is beyond our control are themselves beyond our control, then no one has control over what they do or think and no one is responsible for anything. Hence, determinism rules out responsibility. A different challenge--here called the manipulation argument--is that by allowing agents to be fully determined compatibilist accounts of practical freedom and responsibility are unable to preclude those who are subject to global manipulation from being free and responsible
Kapitan, Tomis (1986). Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (April):230-51.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By deliberation we understand practical reasoning with an end in view of choosing some course of action. Integral to it is the agent's sense of alternative possibilities, that is, of two or more courses of action he presumes are open for him to undertake or not. Such acts may not actually be open in the sense that the deliberator would do them were he to so intend, but it is evident that he assumes each to be so. One deliberates only by taking it for granted that both performing and refraining from any of the acts under consideration are possible for one, and that which is to be selected is something entirely up to oneself. What is it for a course of action to be presumed as open, or for several courses of action to present themselves as a range of open alternatives? Answering these questions is essential for an understanding of deliberation and choice and, indeed, for the entire issue of free will and responsibility. According to one common view, a deliberator takes the considered options to be open only by assuming he is free to undertake any of them and, consequently, that whichever he does undertake is, as yet, a wholly undetermined matter. Built into the structure of deliberation, on this theory, is an indeterministic bias relative to which any deliberator with deterministic beliefs is either inconsistent or condemned to a fatalistic limbo. An unmistakable challenge is thereby posed: is there an alternative conception of the presuppositions underlying deliberation more congenial to a deterministic perspective yet adequate to the data? Convinced that there is, I develop a partial account of deliberation that, though highly similar to the aforementioned view, diverges at a critical juncture
Kearns, Stephen (2008). Compatibilism can resist prepunishment: A reply to Smilansky. Analysis 68 (299):250–253.   (Google | More links)
Klein, M. (1990). Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book casts new light on the traditional disagreement between those who hold that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions if they are causally determined, and those who deny this. Klein suggests that reflection on the relation between justice and deprivation offers a way out of this perplexity
Koons, Jeremy Randel (2002). Is hard determinism a form of compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free will. Assuming the correctness of this concession, that leaves compatibilism and hard determinism as the only remaining choices in the free will debate. In this paper, I will argue that hard determinism turns out to be a form of compatibilism, and therefore, compatibilism is the only remaining position in the free will debate. I will attempt to establish this conclusion by arguing that hard determinists will end up punishing or rewarding the same acts (and omissions) that the compatibilists punish and reward. Next, I will respond to several objections that attempt to pry apart hard determinism and compatibilism. It will emerge not only that hard determinism and compatibilism are identical at the practical level, but also that the key terms employed by the hard determinist have the same meaning as equivalent terms ("free," "morally responsible," and "retributive punishment") employed by the compatibilist. I conclude that hard determinism genuinely is a form of compatibilism
Lamb, James W. (1993). Evaluative compatibilism and the principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 60 (10):517-27.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Langsam, Harold (2000). Kant's compatibilism and his two conceptions of truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):164–188.   (Google | More links)
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Lenman, James (2006). Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility. Ethics 117 (1).   (Google)
Lenman, James (2002). On the alleged shallowness of compatibilism: A critical study of Saul Smilansky: Free will and illusion. Iyyun 51 (January):63-79.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The millionaire’s idle, talentless and self-centered daughter inherits a large sum of money that she does not really deserve. The victim of kidnapping rots in a cell in 1980s Beirut in a captivity that springs not from any wrong he has done but from his ill-fortune in being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The hard-working, brilliant and self-denying Nobel Prize-winning scientist receives a large cheque for his extraordinarily productive labours. The murderer spends decades in jail for the terrible crimes he has freely committed. The first two cases are cases where justice seems ill-served, where someone’s good or ill-fortune reflects not what they deserve but mere luck. The second two are cases where justice seems to be honoured: what befalls Scientist and Murderer reflects not their good or bad luck but their merits and deserts
Levin, Michael (2007). Compatibilism and special relativity. Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):433-463.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (online). Closing the door on the belief in ability thesis.   (Google)
Abstract: It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic openness that is entirely compatible with determinism (Dennett 1984; Kapitan 1986). Since, however, the claim that deliberation presupposes freedom is accepted by all sides in the free will debate, it ought to be possible to frame a minimal version that is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism, and which therefore can be accepted by everyone. Peter van Inwagen has advanced the best-known such claim: ‘all philosophers who have thought about deliberation agree on one point: one cannot deliberate about whether to perform a certain act unless one believes it is possible for one to perform it’ (van Inwagen 1983: 154). It is the purpose of this paper to argue that van Inwagen, and the many philosophers who have followed him in this regard, is wrong
Levy, Neil (2009). Luck and history-sensitive compatibilism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote – constitutive – luck
Levy, Neil (2006). On determinism and freedom. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):310-312.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (forthcoming). Restrictivism is a Covert compatibilism. In N. Trakakis (ed.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Abstract: _Libertarian restrictivists hold that agents are rarely directly free. However, they seek to reconcile their views_ _with common intuitions by arguing that moral responsibility, or indirect freedom (depending on the version of_ _restrictivism) is much more common than direct freedom. I argue that restrictivists must give up either the_ _claim that agents are rarely free, or the claim that indirect freedom or responsibility is much more common_ _than direct freedom. Focusing on Kane’s version of restrictivism, I show that the view holds people responsible_ _for actions when (merely) compatibilist conditions are met. Since this is unacceptable by libertarian lights,_ _they must either accept that compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are sufficient, or make their_ _restrictivism more extreme than it already is._
Levy, Neil & Mckenna, Michael (2007). Symposium on free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):151 – 152.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (online). The luck problem for compatibilists.   (Google)
Abstract: Libertarianism in all its varieties is widely taken to be vulnerable to a serious problem of present luck, inasmuch as it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to action. Genuine indeterminism entails luck, and lack of control over the ensuing action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is generally taken to be free of the problem of present luck, inasmuch as it does not require indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. Taken by itself, the compatibilist problem with present luck is less serious than the analogous problem confronting libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for the entire account of freedom: the present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the compatibilist response to distant – constitutive – luck
Lewis, David (1981). Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47:113-21.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism.
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Lomasky, Loren E. (1975). Are compatibilism and the free will defense compatible? Personalist 56:385-388.   (Google)
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Lycan, William G. (2003). Free will and the burden of proof. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defense of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyze such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into event-causation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven’t done this, and if all the same you do believe such things as that I raised my arm and that Jolns [sic] killed his uncle, and if moreover you still think it’s a joke to talk about the agent as cause, then, I’m afraid, the joke is entirely on you.’)
Lyons, Edward C. (ms). All the freedom you can want: The purported collapse of the problem of free will.   (Google)
Abstract:      Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable for its consequences. The standard argument against free choice asserts that free choice cannot exist because determinism, as a property of laws governing the cosmos, excludes such a possibility. This contingent factual claim, however, has always proven problematic. Contemporary discussions - no doubt aware of this disputed factual premise - draw upon a more novel, and arguably more devastating critique: free will must be rejected because its very conception is incoherent. Rather than assuming the existence of determinism and attempting to show its incompatibility with free will, this argument begins with consideration of the idea of free choice and concludes that, if it is to have any sense at all, it must be compatible with determinism. Obviously, no single treatment of the free will problem could address all its nuances. This Article more modestly offers one possible approach to the question. Part I elaborates in more detail the view that the traditional conception of free choice is incoherent and, thus, inevitably undermines the very responsibility it is asserted to constitute; Part II considers the resulting effort to develop a model of human freedom compatible with determinism; and Part III, drawing upon the prior discussions, describes - in terms of classical action theory - a conception of free choice justifying personal moral and legal responsibility that avoids both the incoherence of "uncaused freedom" as well as the shortcomings of determinism
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Abstract: People generally are so common in one’s experience that it is natural to take them for granted, as presenting no puzzle or mystery, and to think only of such practical problems as arise in one’s relationships to them, as fish must take other fish for granted, or as we take for granted the air around us and the stones at our feet . . . but some philosophic spirits, sometimes, are overwhelmed by a seeming discontinuity between themselves and the rest of physical nature, and they are sufficiently tormented by this apparent contrast to want to understand it and see what it implies
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
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Abstract: P.F. Strawson defends compatibilism by appeal to our natural commitment to the interpersonal community and the reactive attitudes. While Strawson''s compatibilist project has much to recommend it, his account of moral agency appears incomplete. Gary Watson has attempted to fortify Strawson''s theory by appeal to the notion of moral address. Watson then proceeds to argue, however, that Strawson''s theory of moral responsibility (so fortified) would commit Strawson to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. Watson also argues that the reactive attitudes do not lend unequivocal support to Strawsonian compatibilism and that the reactive attitudes are sometimes sensitive to considerations which suggest an incompatibilist or skeptical diagnosis. Watson attempts to provide a Strawsonian defense against these difficulties, but he ultimately concludes that the skeptical threats raised against Strawsonian compatibilism cannot be sufficiently silenced. I believe that Watson has done Strawsonian compatibilism a great service by drawing upon the notion of moral address. In this paper I attempt to defend the Strawsonian compatibilist position, as Watson has cast it, against the problems raised by Watson. I argue against Watson that Strawson''s theory of responsibility, as well as the notion of moral address, does not commit the Strawsonian to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. I also argue that Watson misinterprets the point of certain reactive attitudes and thereby wrongly assumes that these attitudes are evidence against Strawsonian compatibilism
Mele, Alfred R. (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 156 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). Agnostic autonomism revisited. In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (2007). Free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (forthcoming). Manipulation, compatibilism, and moral responsibility. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus
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Abstract: Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed
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Abstract: Any satisfactory account of freedom must capture, or at least permit, the mysteriousness of freedom—a “sweet” mystery involving a certain kind of ignorance rather than a “sour” mystery of unintelligibility, incoherence, or unjustifiedness. I argue that compatibilism can capture the sweet mystery of freedom. I argue first that an action is free if and only if a certain “rationality constraint” is satisfied, and that nothing in standard libertarian accounts of freedom entails its satisfaction. Satisfaction of this constraint is consistent with the universal causal predetermination of action (UCP). If UCP is true and the rationality constraint satisfied, there’s a sense in which our actions are explanatorily (though not necessarily causally) overdetermined. While it seems plausible (given UCP) that our actions are so overdetermined, it seems utterly mysterious why they should be so overdetermined. Compatibilism’s capacity to accommodate this mystery is a mark in its favor
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Abstract:   Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make one unpredictable to opponents and may therefore be rational. Similarly, playing a game with a mixed strategy may have an unpredictable outcome in every single play, but the strategy is rational, in that it is meant to maximize the expected value of an objective, be it private or social. As to whether the outcome of such behaviour is genuinely unpredictable as in quantum mechanics, or predictable by a hypothetical outside observer knowing all natural laws, it is argued that it makes no difference in practice, as long as it is not humanly predictable. Thus we have a new version of libertarianism which is compatible with determinism
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Abstract: Incompatibilists about free will and responsibility often maintain that incompatibilism is the intuitive, commonsense position. Recently, this claim has come under unfavorable scrutiny from naturalistic philosophers who have surveyed philosophically uneducated undergraduates.1 But there is a much older problem for the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive – if incompatibilism is intuitive, why is compatibilism so popular in the history of philosophy? In this paper I will try to answer this question by pursuing a rather different naturalistic methodology. The idea is to look not at the responses of the philosophically naïve, but at the views of the most sophisticated – the philosophers..
Normore, Calvin G. (1983). Compatibilism and contingency in Aquinas. Journal of Philosophy 80 (10):650-652.   (Google | More links)
Oakley, S. (2006). Defending Lewis's local miracle compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349.   (Google)
Abstract: Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC), allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism of the Consequence Argument fails
Ofstad, Harald (1967). Recent work on the free-will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):179-207.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Leary-Hawthorne, John & Pettit, Philip (1996). Strategies for free will compatibilists. Analysis 56 (4):191-201.   (Google | More links)
Pendleton, Robert (ms). Time and free will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In spite of the inherent oddity of the notion that the human soul might be constrained by its own lawlike will, it is not likely that the arguments I have advanced against that notion will be entirely convincing to committed incompatibilists. I should expect that the point of view will soon be reaffirmed that, in some sense, human beings, because of the lawlike behavior of their wills, cannot be free. It is to this puzzling intractability of the ‘free-will’ debate that I turn in this paper. By my own arguments (See note \5/ on R. Pendleton) it is logically possible that human beings might be construed as ‘constrained’ by their own wills. All we have to do is define the constrained human self so as to exclude the willing faculty. But does it make any sense to construe the human self in such a way? Can the human will itself be conceived as an ‘alienable’ property capable of constraining, in a meaningful way, the human self?
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Perry, John (2004). Compatibilist options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilism is the thesis that an act may be both free and determined by previous events and the laws of nature. I assume that in normal cases a condition of a person's performing an act freely is that the person is able to refrain from performing the act. Thus, I accept that if determinism entails that agents do not have this ability, we must give up compatibilism. In this paper I try to contribute to the rethinking of compatibilism by distinguishing between strong and weak accounts of laws and strong and weak accounts of ability. I argue that compatibilism is a tenable position when combined with either a weak account of laws, or a weak account of ability, or both. I shall concentrate on influential arguments for incompatibilism due to Peter van Inwagen, often called collectively the "consequence argument".
Perry, John & Kapitan, Tomis (ms). Is there hope for compatibilism?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: …those who accept that responsibility for a situation implies an ability to bring it about and, perhaps, an ability to prevent it, must explain how agents are able to do other than they are caused to do. Without it, they can give no defense of their counterexamples. With it, they can be confident that
Perszyk, Kenneth J. (2000). Molinism and compatibilism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1).   (Google)
Pippin, Robert B. (1999). Naturalness and mindedness: Hegel' compatibilism. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):194–212.   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of freedom in modern philosophy has three basic components: (i) what is freedom, or what would it be to act freely? (ii) Is it possible so to act? (iii) And how important is leading a free life?1 Hegel proposed unprecedented and highly controversial answers to these questions
Pojman, Louis P. (1987). Freedom and determinism: A contemporary discussion. Zygon 22 (December):397-417.   (Google)
Quante, Michael (2007). Habermas on compatibilism and ontological monism: Some problems. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):59–68.   (Google)
Raphael, D. Daiches (1952). Causation and free will. Philosophical Quarterly 2 (January):13-30.   (Google | More links)
Ravizza, Mark (1994). Semi-compatibilism and the transfer of non-responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):61-93.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Ritchie, Jack (2005). Causal compatibilism -- what chance? Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation
Rogers, Katherin A. (2004). Augustine's compatibilism. Religious Studies 40 (4):415-435.   (Google)
Abstract: In analysing Augustine's views on freedom it is standard to draw two distinctions; one between an earlier emphasis on human freedom and a later insistence that God alone governs human destiny, and another between pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian freedom. These distinctions are real and important, but underlying them is a more fundamental consistency. Augustine is a compatibilist from his earliest work on freedom through his final anti-Pelagian writings, and the freedom possessed by the un-fallen and the fallen will is a compatibilist freedom. This leaves Augustine open to the charge that he makes God the ultimate cause of sin
Rosell, Sergi (online). On an attempt to undermine reason-responsive compatibilism by appealing to moral luck. Reply to Gerald K. Harrison.   (Google)
Russell, Paul (1988). Causation, compulsion, and compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):313-321.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Russell, Paul (ms). Free will and irreligion in Hume's treatise.   (Google)
Abstract: Hume’s views on free will have been enormously influential and are widely regarded as representing “the best-known classical statement of what is now known as compatibilism”.1 There are a number of valuable studies that consider his contribution on this subject from a contemporary, critical perspective, but this will not be my particular concern in this paper.2 My primary interest, consistent with the specific aims and objectives of this volume, is to explain the way that Hume’s arguments in T, 2.3.1-2 relate to his fundamental intentions in the Treatise as a whole. Contrary to what is generally supposed, I will show that Hume’s arguments in these two sections are significantly concerned with problems of religion. More specifically, Hume’s necessitarian commitments, I argue, contain features that are systematically irreligious in character. These features of Hume’s views on this subject are indicative of his deeper and wider irreligious intentions throughout the Treatise
Russell, Paul (forthcoming). Free will, art and morality. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject
Russell, Paul, Hobbes, bramhall, and the free will problem.   (Google)
Abstract: Thomas Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy in ways that still structure and resonate within the contemporary debate. It was Hobbes’s central aim, particularly as expressed in the Leviathan, to make moral philosophy genuinely ‘scientific’, where this term is understood as science had developed and evolved in the first half of the seventeenth century. Specifically, it was Hobbes’s aim to provide a thoroughly naturalistic description of human beings in terms of the basic categories and laws of matter and motion. By analyzing the individual and society in these terms, Hobbes proposed to identify and describe a set of moral laws that are eternal and immutable, and can be known to all those who are capable of reason and science (L, 15.40). Even more ambitiously, it was Hobbes’s further hope that these ‘theorems of moral doctrine’ would be put into practical use by public authorities with a view to maintaining a peaceful, stable social order (L, 31.41)
Russell, Paul (online). Hume on free will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..
Russel, Paul (1983). On the naturalism of Hume's 'reconciling project'. Mind 92 (October):593-600.   (Google | More links)
Russell, Paul (2002). Pessimists, pollyannas, and the new compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: If a man is a pessimist, he is born a pessimist, and emotionally you cannot make him an optimist. And if he is an optimist, you can tell him nothing to make him a pessimist. - Clarence Darrow..
Russell, Paul (web). Selective hard compatibilism. In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke and Harry Silverstein, eds., Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming
Ryan, Sharon (2003). Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2).   (Google)
Salles, Ricardo (2001). Compatibilism: Stoic and modern. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 83 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: It is agreed by most scholars that the Stoics were compatibilists regarding the relation between responsibility and determinism. On this view, the Stoics depart from two other positions. Unlike some eliminative determinists — labelled in modern discussions “hard-determinists”, but already active in Antiquity — they assert that, despite determinism, there are things that “depend on us”, or are : things for which we are genuinely responsible and for which, therefore, we may justifiably be praised or blamed. But the Stoics also depart from the libertarian or “anti-determinist” 2 a position championed by the Epicureans in the early Hellenistic period and by Alexander of Aphrodisias on behalf of the Peripatetics, towards the end of the second century AD. Unlike the libertarian, who agrees on the incompatibility alleged by the hard-determinist, but preserves responsibility by rejectin necessitation, the Stoics preserve both responsibility and necessitation
Salles, Ricardo (2005). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ashgate Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: The basis of stoic determinism (a) : everything has a cause -- The basis of stoic determinism (b) : causation is necessitating -- The threat of external determination -- Reflection and responsibility -- The three compatibilist theories of Chrysippus -- Epictetus on responsibility for unreflective action.
Sattig, Thomas (2010). Compatibilism about coincidence. Philosophical Review 119 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of counterexamples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular kinds of ordinary object. Since both the anticoincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples flow from the folk conception of ordinary objects, the paradoxes threaten this conception with inconsistency. Typical approaches to the paradoxes reject the anticoincidence principle or some portion of the assumptions driving the counterexamples, thereby partially revising our common conception of the world around us. This essay offers a compatibilist solution to the paradoxes that sustains the folk conception of ordinary objects in its entirety. According to this solution, the various cases of distinct coincidents do not clash with the anticoincidence principle since the cases and the principle manifest different yet compatible perspectives on the world. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this?
Schnieder, Benjamin S. (2004). Compatibilism and the notion of rendering something false. Philosophical Studies 117 (3):409-428.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In my paper I am concerned with Peter van Inwagen''s Consequence Argument. I focus on its probably best known version. In this form it crucially employs the notion of rendering a proposition false, anotion that has never been made sufficiently clear. The main aim of my paper is to shed light on thisnotion. The explications offered so far in thedebate all are based on modal concepts. Iargue that for sufficient results a ``stronger'''',hyper-intensional concept is needed, namely theconcept expressed by the word ``because''''. I show that my analysis is superior to the prior ones. On the basis of this analysis I further explain why van Inwagen''s argument fails
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Schroeder, Timothy (2007). Reflection, reason, and free will. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):77 – 84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ju¨rgen Habermas has a familiar style of compatibilism to offer, according to which a person has free will insofar as that person responds appropriately to her reasons. But because of the ways in which Habermas understands reasons and causes, he sees a special objection to his style of compatibilism: it is not clear that our reasons can suitably cause our responses. This objection, however, takes us out of the realm of free will and into the realm of mental causation. In this response to Habermas, I focus on the details of his style of compatibilism. I suggest that, while the basic picture is appealing, three key details of it are problematic
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Siderits, Mark (2008). Paleo-compatibilism and buddhist reductionism. Sophia 47 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects
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Abstract: Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise
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Smilansky, Saul (2003). Compatibilism: The argument from shallowness. Philosophical Studies 115 (3):257-82.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The compatibility question lies at the center of the free will problem. Compatibilists think that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and the concomitant notions, while incompatibilists think that it is not. The topic of this paper is a particular form of charge against compatibilism: that it is shallow. This is not the typical sort of argument against compatibilism: most of the debate has attempted to discredit compatibilism completely. The Argument From Shallowness maintains that the compatibilists do have a case. However, this case is only partial, and shallow. This limited aim proves itself more powerful against compatibilists than previous all-or-nothing attempts. It connects to the valid instincts of compatibilists, making room for them, and hence is harder for compatibilists to ignore
Smilansky, Saul (2007). Determinism and prepunishment: The radical nature of compatibilism. Analysis 67 (296):347–349.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I shall argue that compatibilism cannot resist in a principled way the temptation to prepunish people. Compatibilism thus emerges as a much more radical view than it is typically presented and perceived, and is seen to be at odds with fundamental moral intuitions
Smilansky, Saul (1991). The contrariety of compatibilist positions. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:293-309.   (Google)
Sommers, Tamler, The illusion of freedom evolves.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. “All Theory is Against Free Will…” Powerful arguments have been leveled against the concepts of free will and moral responsibility since the Greeks and perhaps earlier. Some—the hard determinists—aim to show that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is true. Therefore there is no free will. Others, the “no-free-will-either-way-theorists,” agree that determinism is incompatible with free will, but add that indeterminism, especially the variety posited by quantum physicists, is also incompatible with free will. Therefore there is no free will. Finally, there are the a priori arguments against free will. These arguments conclude that it makes no difference what metaphysical commitments we hold: free will and ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts. Why? Because in order to have free will and ultimate moral responsibility we would have to be causa sui, or ‘cause of oneself.’ And it is logically impossible to be self-caused in this way. Here, for example, is Nietzsche on the causa sui
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Sterba, James P. (1981). How to complete the compatibilist account of free action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (June):508-523.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (2008). Moral responsibility and the irrelevance of physics: Fischer's semi-compatibilism vs. anti-fundamentalism. Journal of Ethics 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected
Steward, Helen (2009). The truth in compatibilism and the truth of libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper offers the outlines of a response to the often-made suggestion that it is impossible to see how indeterminism could possibly provide us with anything that we might want in the way of freedom, anything that could really amount to control, as opposed merely to an openness in the flow of reality that would constitute the injection of chance, or randomness, into the unfolding of the processes which underlie our activity. It is suggested that the best first move for the libertarian is to make a number of important concessions to the compatibilist. It should be conceded, in particular, that certain sorts of alternative possibilities are neither truly available to real, worldly agents nor required in order that those agents act freely; and it should be admitted also that it is the compatibilist who tends to give the most plausible sorts of analyses of many of the 'can' and 'could have' statements which seem to need to be assertible of those agents we regard as free. But these concessions do not bring compatibilism itself in their wake. The most promising version of libertarianism, it is argued, is based on the idea that agency itself (and not merely some special instances of it which we might designate with the honorific appellation 'free') is inconsistent with determinism. This version of libertarianism, it is claimed, can avoid the objection that indeterminism is as difficult to square with true agential control as determinism can sometimes seem to be
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Abstract: This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
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Abstract: Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions
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Abstract: Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence "I could have done otherwise," and (2) in such universes, one can never really take credit for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe's birth. Throughout the free will
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Abstract: Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions
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Abstract: There are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if they are indeed unanswerable) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with determinism. And there are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if indeed . . . ) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. But if free will is incompatible both with..
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Abstract: This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility
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Abstract: Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is inclined to care about them. The problem with the resulting conception, as we have seen, is that it entails the normative judgment that one ought to be inclined to care about the specified features, on pain of irrationality, and this normative judgment requires justification. The advantage of internalism is that it avoids these normative commitments. It says that things count as reasons for someone only if he is inclined to care about them, and so it leaves the normative question of whether to care about them entirely open. Yet if we try to leave this question open, by defining things as reasons only for those inclined to care about them, we'll end up with a definition that's relativized to the inclinations of particular agents—won't we? Not necessarily. For suppose that all reasons for acting are features of a single kind, whose influence depends on a single inclination. And suppose that the inclination on which the influence of reasons depends is, not an inclination that distinguishes some agents from others, but rather an inclination that distinguishes agents from nonagents. In that case, to say that these features count as reasons only for those who are inclined to care about them will be to say that they count as reasons only for agents—which will be to say no less than that they are reasons for acting, period, since applying only to agents is already part of the concept of reasons for acting. The restriction on the application of reasons will drop away from our definition, since it restricts their application, not to some proper subset of agents, but rather to the set of all agents, which is simply the universe of application for reasons to act
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Vilhauer, Ben (2004). Can we interpret Kant as a compatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):719 – 730.   (Google)
Waller, Bruce N. (2003). A metacompatibilist account of free will: Making compatibilists and incompatibilist more compatible. Philosophical Studies 112 (3):209-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over free will has pittedlibertarian insistence on open alternativesagainst the compatibilist view that authenticcommitments can preserve free will in adetermined world. A second schism in the freewill debate sets rationalist belief in thecentrality of reason against nonrationalistswho regard reason as inessential or even animpediment to free will. By looking deeperinto what motivates each of these perspectivesit is possible to find common ground thataccommodates insights from all those competingviews. The resulting metacompatibilist view offree will bridges some of the differencesbetween compatibilists and incompatibilists aswell as between rationalists andnonrationalists, and results in a free willtheory that is both more philosophicallyinclusive and more firmly connected tocontemporary research in psychology andbiology
Waller, Bruce N. (1990). Freedom Without Responsibility. Temple University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Walter, Henrik (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Walter, Edward F. & Minton, Arthur (1975). Soft determinism, freedom, and rationality. Personalist 56:364-384.   (Google)
Warfield, Ted (2003). Compatibilism and incompatibilism : Some arguments. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Watson, Gary (2001). Reasons and responsibility. Ethics 111 (2):374-394.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Watson, Gary (1999). Soft libertarianism and hard compatibilism. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane''s work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options
Watson, Gary (1998). Some Worries About Semi-Compatibilism. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):135-143.   (Google)
Wekstrom, Laura (2008). Free will and luck - by Alfred Mele. Philosophical Books 49 (1):71-73.   (Google)
Westen, Peter (2005). Getting the fly out of the bottle: The false problem of free will and determinism. Buffalo Criminal Law Review 8:101-54.   (Google | More links)
Wilson, J. (1958). Freedom and compulsion. Mind 67 (January):60-69.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Wood, Ledger (1941). The free-will controversy. Philosophy 16 (October):386-397.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Xie, Simon Shengjian (2009). What is Kant: A compatibilist or an incompatibilist? A new interpretation of Kant's solution to the free will problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding the second controversy, I will argue that Kant's solution to the free will problem is not a success because his effort in making the effects of freedom part of the field of appearance has made his solution incoherent and ambiguous. Despite this, I argue that Kant's attempt to solve the free will problem is groundbreaking because he at least has separated freedom from the dominance of determinism
Young, Robert M. (1979). Compatibilism and conditioning. Noûs 13 (September):361-378.   (Google | More links)
Young, Robert M. (1974). Compatibilism and freedom. Mind 83 (January):19-42.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Young, Robert M. (1976). Omnipotence and compatibilism. Philosophia 6 (March):49-67.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Zimmerman, D. (1994). Acts, omissions, and semi-compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):209-23.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Zimmerman, Michael (1981). 'Can', compatibilism, and possible worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):679-692.   (Google)

5.4b.3 Free Will Skepticism

Beckermann, Ansgar (2005). Free will in a natural order of the world. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bok, Hilary (2001). Review of Metaphilosophy and free will by Richard Double. Mind 110 (438):452-455.   (Google)
Bradley, M. C. (1974). Kenny on hard determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):202-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Burns, Jean E. (1999). Volition and physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):27-47.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Cohen, Daniel (2006). Openness, accidentality and responsibility. Philosophical Studies 127 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   In this paper, I present a novel argument for scepticism about moral responsibility. Unlike traditional arguments, this argument doesn’t depend on contingent empirical claims about the truth or falsity of causal determinism. Rather, it is argued that the conceptual conditions of responsibility are jointly incompatible. In short, when an agent is responsible for an action, it must be true both that the action was non-accidental, and that it was open to the agent not to perform that action. However, as I argue, an action is only non-accidental in those cases where it isn’t open to the agent not to perform it
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2004). The trouble with Harry: Compatibilist free will internalism and manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Double, Richard (1996). Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Abstract: Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed
Double, Richard (2002). Metaethics, metaphilosophy, and free will subjectivism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Double, Richard (2004). The ethical advantages of free will subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1991). The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Abstract: The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion
Duus-Otterström, Göran (2008). Betting against hard determinism. Res Publica 14 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument
Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Fisher, C. M. (2001). If there were no free will. Medical Hypotheses 56:364-366.   (Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl (2002). Living without free will by Derk Pereboom. Journal of Ethics 6 (3).   (Google)
Harrison, Gerald (2009). Hooray! We're not morally responsible! Think 8 (23):87-95.   (Google)
Abstract: Being morally responsible means being blameworthy and deserving of punishment if we do wrong and praiseworthy and deserving reward if we do right. In what follows I shall argue that in all likelihood we're not morally responsible. None of us. Ever.
Hurley, Susan L. (2000). Is responsibility essentially impossible? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):229-268.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies these considerations to responsibility in particular. Theimpossibility of regressive choice or control is explained. It is arguedthat this impossibility does not support the claim that no one is everresponsible on either context-driven or theory-driven accounts of`responsibility''
Mele, Alfred R. (2003). Review of Derk Pereboom's Living without free will. Mind 112 (446):375-378.   (Google)
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (online). Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: During the past two decades, an interest among philosophers in fictitious and illusory beliefs has sprung up in fields ranging anywhere from mathematics and modality to morality.1 In this paper, we focus primarily on the view that Saul Smilansky has dubbed “free will illusionism”—i.e., the purportedly descriptive claim that most people have illusory beliefs concerning the existence of libertarian free will, coupled with the normative claim that because dispelling these illusory beliefs would produce negative personal and societal consequences, those of us who happen to know the dangerous and gloomy truth about the non-existence of libertarian free will should simply keep quiet in the name of the common good
Nowell-Smith, P. H. (1954). Determinists and libertarians. Mind 63 (July):317-337.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1997). Is Free Will Just Another Chaotic Process? (Review of Three Books). Times Literary Supplement (Dec.5).   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2003). Review of Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will. Philosophical Quarterly 53:308-310.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2003). Understanding free will: Might we double-think? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.   (Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge Univ Pr.   (Cited by 100 | Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2002). Meaning in life without free will. Philosophic Exchange 33:19-34.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent article Gary Watson instructively distinguishes two faces or aspects of responsibility. The first is the self-disclosing sense, which is concerned centrally with aretaic or excellence-relevant evaluations of agents. An agent is responsible for an action in this respect when it is an action that is inescapably the agent’s own, if, as a declaration of her adopted ends, it expresses what the agent is about, her identity as an agent. An action for which the agent is responsible in this sense expresses what the agent is ready to stand up for, to defend, to affirm, to answer for. (1996: 233-4) . The second face of responsibility has perhaps had a more explicit role in debates about free will — it concerns control and accountability. Watson argues that when one is skeptical about the second "accountability" face, one need not also be skeptical about responsibility as self-disclosure. I agree, and in my view, this helps us see why maintaining that determinism precludes accountability need not also commit one to the view that determinism precludes responsibility in a way that threatens meaning in life. Part of the reason for this is that when responsibility as accountability is undermined, less of what we deem valuable needs to be relinquished than often believed. But in addition, it turns out that the kind of accountability precluded by determinism is not nearly as important to what is most significant in human life as is responsibility as self-disclosure. Indeed, it may be that an unfortunate fusing of these two notions underlies the concern that if determinism imperils accountability, it also threatens what most fundamentally makes our lives meaningful
Smilansky, Saul (2001). Free will: From nature to illusion. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):71-95.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sir Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was a landmark in the philosophical understanding of the free will problem. Building upon it, I attempt to defend a novel position, which purports to provide, in outline, the next step forward. The position presented is based on the descriptively central and normatively crucial role of illusion in the issue of free will. Illusion, I claim, is the vital but neglected key to the free will problem. The proposed position, which may be called ‘Illusionism’, is shown to follow both from the strengths and from the weaknesses of Strawson’s position
Smilansky, Saul (ms). Free will: Two radical proposals.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The free will problem and the basic alternative ways of dealing with it have been known for some 2000 years, and have engaged the greatest philosophers through the ages. In the last 50 years much philosophical progress has been added on top of that ancient cumulative understanding. Hence it would be natural to wonder why I think that any new proposal can be made on this classic problem, let alone two radical proposals
Smilansky, Saul (1999). Free will: The positive role of illusion. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.   (Google)
Sommers, Tamler (ms). Darrow and determinism: Giving up ultimate responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: This year marks the 80 th anniversary of Clarence Darrow’s brilliant and passionate defense of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, two wealthy teenagers who pled guilty to the kidnapping and murder of 14 year old Bobby Franks. On August 22, 1924 Darrow gave his famous twelve hour closing statement, bringing tears to the eyes of the presiding judge and saving his clients from the death penalty. Here are two excerpts from the summation
Strawson, Galen (1989). Consciousness, free will, and the unimportance of determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Strawson, Galen (2002). Dreams of final responsibility. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Strawson, Galen (1986). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 102 | Google)
Abstract: On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the nature, causes, and consequences of our deep commitment to belief in freedom
Strawson, Galen (2002). The Bounds of freedom. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Strawson, Galen (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Vargas, Manuel R. (ms). Libertarianism and skepticism about free will: Some arguments against both.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: On one way of putting things, incompatibilism is the view that in some important sense free will (and/or moral responsibility) is incompatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is typically taken to come in two species: libertarianism, which holds that we are free and responsible (and correspondingly, that determinism does not hold), and skeptical incompatibilism.1 The latter includes views such as hard determinism, which hold that we are not free (and/or responsible) and views that argue that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, among others. In this paper, I attempt to provide positive arguments against both of the primary strands of incompatibilism. The first aim of this paper is to take some steps toward filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail—the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say “take some steps” because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic
Vargas, Manuel R. (2004). Responsibility and the aims of theory: Strawson and revisionism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Vilhauer, Benjamin (2009). Free will skepticism and personhood as a desert base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.   (Google)
Vilhauer, Ben (2004). Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):547-564.   (Google)

5.4b.4 Identification Theories

Bergmann, Frithjof (1977). On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (1983). Socialization and autonomy. Mind 92 (January):120-123.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Boysen, Thomas (2004). Death of a compatibilistic intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.   (Google | More links)
Bratman, Michael E. (2003). A desire of one's own. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the hierarchical model. Indeed, it seems that, normally, if an agent's relevant higher-order attitudes are not to some extent shaped by her evaluative reflections and judgments her agency will be flawed. But this suggests a Platonic challenge to the hierarchical account of ownership. The challenge is to explain why we should not see such evaluative judgments---rather than broadly Frankfurtian higher-order attitudes---as the fundamental basis of ownership or rejection of desire. I do think that a systematic absence of connection between higher-order Frankfurtian attitude and evaluative judgment would be a breakdown in proper functioning. But I want to explain how we can grant this point and still block the Platonic challenge.
Bratman, Michael (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. The essays offer extensive discussions of related views by, among others, Donald Davidson, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Christine Korsgaard, Harry Frankfurt, and P. F. Strawson. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students
Dworkin, Gerald B. (1970). Acting freely. Noûs 4 (November):367-83.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (January):5-20.   (Cited by 699 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
Greenspan, P. S. (1999). Impulse and self-reflection: Frankfurtian responsibility versus free will. Journal of Ethics 3 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt''s early work makes an important distinction between moral responsibility and free will. Frankfurt begins by focusing on the notion of responsibility, as supplying counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities; he then turns to an apparently independent account of free will, in terms of his well-known hierarchy of desires. But the two notions seem to reestablish contact in Frankfurt''s later discussion of issues and cases. The present article sets up a putative Frankfurtian account of moral responsibility that involves the potential for free will, as suggested by some of Frankfurt''s later remarks about taking responsibility. While correcting what seem to be some common misinterpretations of Frankfurt''s view, the article attempts to extract some reasons for dissatisfaction with it from consideration of cases of unfreedom, particularly cases involving addiction
Hopkins, Jasper, Freedom of the will : Parallels between Frankfurt and Augustine.   (Google)
Abstract: At first glance it seems strange to compare the views of two philosophers from such different contexts as are Harry G. Frankfurt1 and Aurelius Augustinus. After all, Frankfurt makes virtually no use of Augustine, virtually no mention of his philosophical doctrines—whether on free will or anything else.2 And yet, the two have more to do with each other than initially meets the eye. For in their own ways both of them sketch a respective theory of freedom that is similarly insightful; moreover, the theories of both lapse into paradox (paradox of which each author is aware but from which neither seeks to escape). Of course, Frankfurt's articulation of his theory is more systematic, more focused than is Augustine's. Indeed, Augustine seems to make most of his points as if en passant; even in De Libero Arbitrio he shows little interest in sustained treatment of the topic heralded in the title. So what links Frankfurt and Augustine is not their philosophical style but rather (1) their putative triumph over the philosophical elusiveness and the conceptual impenetrability of the notion of freedom-of-will and (2) the fact that in coming to cognate conclusions, they share similar strategies. Thus, they admit of plausible comparison
Hussain, Waheed (2010). Autonomy, Frankfurt, and the nature of reflective endorsement. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1).   (Google)
Frankfurt, Harry (1987). Identification and Wholeheartedness. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsiblity, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (2003). Identification and responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Real-self accounts of moral responsibility distinguish between various types of motivational elements. They claim that an agent is responsible for acts suitably related to elements that constitute the agent's real self. While such accounts have certain advantages from a compatibilist perspective, they are problematic in various ways. First, in it, authority and authenticity conceptions of the real self are often inadequately distinguished. Both of these conceptions inform discourse on identification, but only the former is relevant to moral responsibility. Second, authority and authenticity real-self theories are unable to accommodate cases in which the agent neither identifies nor disidentifies with his action and yet seems morally responsible for what he does. Third, authority and authenticity real-self theories are vulnerable to counterexamples in which the provenance of the agent's real self undermines responsibility
Sankowski, Edward T. (1980). Freedom, determinism and character. Mind 89 (January):106-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Slote, Michael A. (1980). Understanding free will. Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):136-51.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Stump, Eleonore (2002). Control and causal determinism. In S. Buss & L. Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1996). Persons, identification, and freedom. Philosophical Topics 24:183-214.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1988). Sanctification, hardening of the heart, and Frankfurt's concept of free will. Journal of Philosophy 85 (8):395-420.   (Google | More links)
Watson, Gary (1975). Free agency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.   (Cited by 114 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action.
Watson, Gary (1987). Free action and free will. Mind 96 (April):154-72.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Wolf, Susan (1987). Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane.
Zimmerman, D. (1981). Hierarchical motivation and the freedom of the will. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (October):354-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zimmerman, D. (2003). That was then, this is now: Personal history vs. psychological structure in compatibilist theories of autonomy. Noûs 37 (4):638-671.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

5.4b.5 Incompatibilism

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2008). The irrelevance of the consequence argument. Analysis 68 (297):13–22.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has offered two versions of an influential argument that has come to be called ‘the Consequence Argument’. The Consequence Argument purports to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with free will.1 It aims to show that, if we assume determinism, we are committed to the claim that, for all propositions p, no one has or ever had any choice about p. Unfortunately, the original Consequence Argument employed an inference rule (the β-rule) that was shown to be invalid. (McKay and Johnson 1996) In response, van Inwagen revised his argument. I shall argue that the conclusion of the revised Consequence Argument is wholly independent of the premiss of determinism, and hence that the revised Consequence Argument is useless in showing that determinism is incompatible with free will
Beebee, Helen (2002). Reply to Huemer on the consequence argument. Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). The myth of source. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free agents need to possess and exercise can be secured without metaphysical excess. If there is a free will problem, it is the one G. E. Moore addressed in 1912. He concluded that persons can act otherwise in a deterministic world. We should continue to try to figure out whether he was right or wrong
Blum, Alex (2003). The core of the consequence argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boardman, William, Discussion of Peter Van Inwagen's "the incompatibility of free will and determinism".   (Google)
Abstract: I think that van Inwagen's argument is invalid because it equivocates on the modal auxiliaries. To give a quick idea of what I think has gone wrong, consider for comparison two arguments which are transparently invalid, though they superficially resemble Modus Tollens arguments: (a) If Lincoln was honest, he couldn't have pocketed the penny (such taking being dishonest). (b) But it is false that Lincoln could not have pocketed the penny: after all, he was not paralyzed and did not fail to realize that the penny was (slightly) valuable and would be his for the taking. (c) Therefore, Lincoln was not honest. (a') If determinism is correct, then if various past events had occurred earlier, the judge could not have raised his hand at the time of the execution (since doing so would be inconsistent with the behavior issuing from and predictable from those earlier events). (b') But it is false that the judge could not have raised his hand at the time of the execution: for he was not paralyzed or unconscious-- he certainly possessed the power to move his hand. (c') Therefore, since the various past events did occur earlier, determinism is not correct
Bradley, M. C. (1974). Kenny on hard determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):202-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Joseph Keim (2006). Farewell to direct source incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. This paper is a critique of a kind of source incompatibilism, namely, direct source incompatibilism. Direct source incompatibilists reject PAP on the basis of Frankfurt-style examples. Since PAP is one of two premises in the traditional argument for INC, direct source incompatibilists opt for a version of the direct argument, which argues for INC with the aid of some non-responsibility transfer principle. I demonstrate that this option is not available, for there is a tension between the following two claims
Campbell, Joseph K. (2010). Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
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Canfield, John V. (1963). Free will and determinism: A reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.   (Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2003). Counterexamples to principle beta: A response to Crisp and Warfield. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2000). Incompatibilism and the transfer of power necessity. Noûs 34 (2):277-290.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2003). On a new argument for incompatibilism. Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Contrastive rational explanation of free choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2005). Deliberation and metaphysical freedom. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):25-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Crisp, Thomas M. & Warfield, Ted A. (2000). The irrelevance of indeterministic counterexamples to principle beta. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-185.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Danto, Arthur C. & Morgenbesser, Sidney (1957). Character and free will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (16):493-505.   (Google | More links)
de Caro, Mario (forthcoming). Is freedom really a mystery? In The Claims of Naturalism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper the problem of free will is examined
Dennett, Daniel C. & Taylor, Christopher (ms). Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is no doctrine about determinism and freedom that has proved to be as resilient over the past century as that of Compatibilism. It is, of course, the doctrine that we can be both free and also subject to a real determinism. If it goes back at least to Hobbes and Hume, it was strengthened and refurbished throughout the 1900's. Part of its strength has been the extent to which it has satisfied theses that in fact seem to be the very substance of the doctrine opposed to it. This is Incompatibilism. What follows here is the most recent and the very best attempt to steal what has appeared to be the thunder of Incompatibilism. Professors Taylor and Dennett make use of a certain amount of technicality in giving sense, on the assumption of determinism, to the ideas that we can nevertheless do otherwise than we actually do and we can also really take credit for things. It is not my own view, but it is one that must be reckoned with by all who struggle with the problem. Put in some effort with the formalism if you have to, find out a little about possible worlds. It is certainly worth the effort
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Feltz, Adam; Cokely, Edward T. & Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2009). Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Abstract: In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far
Ficsher, J. M. (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (January):127-37.   (Google)
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Finch, Alicia & Warfield, Ted A. (1998). The mind argument and libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1996). Free will and the modal principle. Philosophical Studies 3 (3):213-30.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (1).   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1998). Moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will: Reply to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):215-220.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2000). Problems with actual-sequence incompatibilism. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):323-328.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Fischer, John Martin (ms). The transfer of non-responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: In ancient times--some fifteen years ago--I suggested that Frankfurt-type examples call into question the Principle of Transfer of Non-Responsibility (which I then called, a bit too narrowly, the “Principle of Transfer of Blamelessness,” following John Taurek’s usage in his fascinating Ph.D. dissertation at UCLA in 1972).[i] In the introductory essay to my anthology, Moral Responsibility, I presented a somewhat informal version of Van Inwagen’s modal principle (which he called Principle ‘B’), and (following Van Inwagen) explained how it could be employed as part of a “direct” argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility (i.e., an argument for the incompatibility claim that does not employ the claim that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities)
Fischer, John Martin (1986). Van Inwagen on free will. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):252-260.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1992). When the will is free. Philosophical Perspectives 6:423-51.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1980). Reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 40 (March):101-103.   (Google)
Francken, Patrick (1993). Incompatibilism, nondeterministic causation, and the real problem of free will. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:37-63.   (Google)
Furlong, F. W. (1981). Determinism and free will: Review of the literature. American Journal of Psychiatry 138:435-39.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gallois, André (1977). Van Inwagen on free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):99-105.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1983). In defense of incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1980). The conditional analysis of freedom. In P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Graham, Peter A. (2008). The standard argument for blame incompatibilism. Noûs 42 (4):697-726.   (Google)
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Griffiths, A. Phillips (1989). Is free will incompatible with something or other? Philosophy 24:101-19.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2003). Determinism and its threat to the moral sentiments. The Monist 86 (2):242-260.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2009). Incompatibilism's threat to worldly value: Source incompatibilism, desert, and pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):621-645.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque & Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2004). Moral responsibility and the problem of manipulation reconsidered. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):439 – 464.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent's awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling cases of manipulation, psychological elements such as desires and beliefs, among other things, are acquired via causal routes that are deviant relative to causal routes deemed normal or baseline. We develop and defend rudiments of a baseline that is acceptable independently of whether one has compatibilist or incompatibilist leanings
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2008). Reflections on the incompatibilist's direct argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes
Harris, James A. (2005). Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eighteenth century was a time of brilliant philosophical innovation in Britain. In Of Liberty and Necessity James A. Harris presents the first comprehensive account of the period's discussion of what remains a central problem of philosophy, the question of the freedom of the will. He offers new interpretations of contributions to the free will debate made by canonical figures such as Locke, Hume, Edwards, and Reid, and also discusses in detail the arguments of some less familiar writers. Harris puts the eighteenth-century debate about the will and its freedom in the context of the period's concern with applying what Hume calls the "experimental method of reasoning" to the human mind. His book will be of substantial interest to historians of philosophy and anyone concerned with the free will problem
Heinaman, Robert (1986). Incompatibilism without the principle of alternative possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):266-76.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Henden, Edmund (forthcoming). Deliberation Incompatibilism. Dialectica.   (Google)
Abstract: Deliberation incompatibilism is the view that an agent being rational and deliberating about which of (mutually excluding) actions to perform is incompatible with her believing that there exist prior conditions that render impossible the performance of either one of these actions. However, the main argument for this view, associated most prominently with Peter van Inwagen, appears to have been widely rejected by contemporary authors on free will. In this paper I argue, first, that a closer examination of van Inwagen’s argument shows that the standard objections are based on a misunderstanding of the notion of ‘deliberation’ presupposed in this argument. Second, I attempt to strengthen the case for deliberation incompatibilism by offering a different argument in its support.
Hetherington, Stephen (2006). So-far incompatibilism and the so-far consequence argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.   (Google)
Abstract: The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far consequence argument — may thus be derived
Hill, Christopher S. (1992). Van Inwagen on the consequence argument. Analysis 52 (2):49-55.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (ms). The Conway-kochen 'free will theorem' and unscientific determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: One has it that earlier circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely determine later circumstances, and the other has it that past present and future all exist tenselessly in a ‘block universe,’ so that the passage of time and associated changes in the world are illusions or at best merely apparent
Honderich, Ted (online). After compatibilism and incompatibilism.   (Google)
Abstract: A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run up against a conviction owed to reflecting on your own past life. The conviction is that an attitude akin to one tied to indeterminism, a way of holding yourself morally responsible, has some basis despite the truth of determinism. We need to look for radical ideas here, as radical as Consciousness as Existence with the problem of perceptual consciousness. Could that doctrine help with determinism and freedom? Could a problem about causation and explanation do so?
Honderich, Ted (2006). Compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem. The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy Website.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1996). Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the Smart aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):855-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (2002). Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (ms). Determinism's consequences -- the mistakes of compatibilism and incompatibilism, and what is to be done now.   (Google)
Abstract: From before the time of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th Century, right up to John Searle's impertinent piece in Journal of Consciousness Studies a few months ago, and a major conference in Idaho in April, philosophers of determinism and freedom have divided into Compatibilists and Incompatibilists. The first regiment says that determinism is logically compatible with freedom. The second says it is logically incompatible. They can do this. In a way it is easy-peasy. The first regiment achieves its end by defining free decisions and actions as voluntary: owed to certain causes rather than others -- causes somehow internal to the agent rather than external or constraining causes. The second regiment satisfies itself by defining free decisions and actions as not only voluntary but also originated -- where an originated event, however mysterious, is definitely not a causally necessitated one
Honderich, Ted (online). Free will, determinism, and moral responsibility: The whole thing in brief.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (2002). How free are you? The determinism problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Abstract: In this fully revised and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic, he offers a concise and lively introduction to free will and the problem of determinism, advancing the debate on this key area of moral philosophy. Honderich sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question, "Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?" and asks instead if there is such a clear version of free will. He goes on to address the question of whether determinism is true and finally asks, "What can we conclude about our lives if determinism is true?"
Huemer, Michael (ms). The objectivist theory of free will.   (Google)
Abstract: Imagine we are at a murder trial. Randy Smith is accused of killing his Aunt Millie. The defense admits that on the night of the murder, Smith had an argument with his Aunt, that he took a pistol out of his jacket and shot her. She died of the gunshot wound. Smith knew that the gun was loaded, that Millie was directly in front of it, and that he was pulling the trigger. He was not insane at the time, there were no abnormal chemicals in his brain, and he was not acting in self-defense. He killed her knowingly, intentionally, and unjustifiably
Huemer, Michael (2000). Van Inwagen's consequence argument. Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
[, Eddy Nahmias . (2007). Is incompatibilism intuitive? In Joshua Knobe (ed.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kang, Sung-Hak (2003). Free will and distributive justice: A reply to Smilansky. Philosophia 31 (1-2).   (Google)
Kane, Robert (2008). Incompatibilism. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Non-constraining control and the threat of social conditioning. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):401-403.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kane, Robert H. (1989). Two kinds of incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (December):219-54.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The present essay is about this problem of the intelligibility of incompatibilist freedom. I do not think Kant, Nagel and Strawson are right in thinking that incompatibilist theories cannot be made intelligible to theoretical reason, nor are those many others right who think that incompatibilist accounts of freedom must be essentially mysterious or terminally obscure. I doubt if I can say enough in one short paper to convince anyone of these claims who is not already persuaded. But I hope to persuade some readers that new ways of thinking about the problem are necessary and, more to the point, that new ways of thinking about the problem are possible. As Nagel says, "nothing approaching the truth has yet been said on this subject." Parts V and VI of this paper present one new way of thinking about the problem. Parts II through IV prepare for this way by distinguishing and discussing two kinds of incompatibilist theories.
Kapitan, Tomis (2000). Autonomy and manipulated freedom. Philosopical Perspectives 14:81-104.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, compatibilism has been the target of two powerful challenges. According to the consequence argument, if everything we do and think is a consequence of factors beyond our control (past events and the laws of nature), and the consequences of what is beyond our control are themselves beyond our control, then no one has control over what they do or think and no one is responsible for anything. Hence, determinism rules out responsibility. A different challenge--here called the manipulation argument--is that by allowing agents to be fully determined compatibilist accounts of practical freedom and responsibility are unable to preclude those who are subject to global manipulation from being free and responsible
Kapitan, Tomis (2002). A master argument for incompatibilism? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The past 25 years have witnessed a vigorous discussion of an argument directed against the compatibilist approach to free will and responsibility. This reasoning, variously called the “consequence argument,” the “incompatibility argument,” and the “unavoidability argument,” may be expressed informally as follows: If determinism is true then whatever happens is a consequence of past events and laws over which we have no control and which we are unable to prevent. But whatever is a consequence of what’s beyond our control is not itself under our control. Therefore, if determinism is true then nothing that happens is under our control, including our own actions and thoughts. Instead, everything we do and think, everything that happens to us and within us, is akin to the vibration of a piano string upon being struck, with the past as pianist, and could not be otherwise than it is. While a number of philosophers take this reasoning to crush the prospects of compatibilism, others challenge its assumption that unavoidability “transfers” from sufficient condition to necessary condition or from cause to effect. The ensuing debate has occasionally been vitriolic— Hume once remarked that the free will issue is “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science”—yet undeniably fruitful in generating more detailed examinations of ability and practical freedom. Whether we incline towards compatibilism or 2 incompatibilism, this latter development is likely to be of lasting value. As a compatibilist, I believe that the consequence argument fails to prove incompatibilism, and here I will develop criticisms of it that, for the most part, are already in the existing literature. Although a short essay cannot provide the theoretical account of practical freedom needed to underpin and justify this compatibilist critique, it will clarify the tasks that lie ahead
Kapitan, Tomis (1986). Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (April):230-51.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By deliberation we understand practical reasoning with an end in view of choosing some course of action. Integral to it is the agent's sense of alternative possibilities, that is, of two or more courses of action he presumes are open for him to undertake or not. Such acts may not actually be open in the sense that the deliberator would do them were he to so intend, but it is evident that he assumes each to be so. One deliberates only by taking it for granted that both performing and refraining from any of the acts under consideration are possible for one, and that which is to be selected is something entirely up to oneself. What is it for a course of action to be presumed as open, or for several courses of action to present themselves as a range of open alternatives? Answering these questions is essential for an understanding of deliberation and choice and, indeed, for the entire issue of free will and responsibility. According to one common view, a deliberator takes the considered options to be open only by assuming he is free to undertake any of them and, consequently, that whichever he does undertake is, as yet, a wholly undetermined matter. Built into the structure of deliberation, on this theory, is an indeterministic bias relative to which any deliberator with deterministic beliefs is either inconsistent or condemned to a fatalistic limbo. An unmistakable challenge is thereby posed: is there an alternative conception of the presuppositions underlying deliberation more congenial to a deterministic perspective yet adequate to the data? Convinced that there is, I develop a partial account of deliberation that, though highly similar to the aforementioned view, diverges at a critical juncture
Kapitan, Tomis (1996). Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities. Analysis 56 (2):102-110.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Kapitan, Tomis (1996). Modal principles in the metaphysics of free will. Philosophical Perspectives 10:419-45.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Discussions of free will have frequently centered on principles concerning ability, control, unavoidability and other practical modalities. Some assert the closure of the latter over various propositional operations and relations, for example, that the consequences of what is beyond one's control are themselves beyond one's control.1 This principle has been featured in the unavoidability argument for incompatibilism: if everything we do is determined by factors which are not under our control, then, by the principle, we are unable to act and choose other than we actually did. A second family of principles concerns the fixity of the past and the laws of nature. If no one is able to alter the past or violate the laws it seems but a small step to conclude that no one can do anything such that if they did it then the past would be altered or the laws violated. Accordingly, if an agent's performing an act is necessitated by the past and laws, then the agent is unable to refrain from that act at that time. Generalizing, determinism precludes anyone from doing anything other than what he or she did.2
Keim Campbell, Joseph (2007). Free will and the necessity of the past. Analysis 67 (294):105–111.   (Google | More links)
Kremer, Michael (2004). How not to argue for incompatibilism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers over possible worlds. I conclude that the modal-logical apparatus used by Warfield obscures rather than clarifies, and distracts from the real philosophical issues involved in the metaphysical debate. These issues cannot be settled by logic alone
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Levy, Neil (online). Closing the door on the belief in ability thesis.   (Google)
Abstract: It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic openness that is entirely compatible with determinism (Dennett 1984; Kapitan 1986). Since, however, the claim that deliberation presupposes freedom is accepted by all sides in the free will debate, it ought to be possible to frame a minimal version that is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism, and which therefore can be accepted by everyone. Peter van Inwagen has advanced the best-known such claim: ‘all philosophers who have thought about deliberation agree on one point: one cannot deliberate about whether to perform a certain act unless one believes it is possible for one to perform it’ (van Inwagen 1983: 154). It is the purpose of this paper to argue that van Inwagen, and the many philosophers who have followed him in this regard, is wrong
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Loss, Roberto (2009). Free will and the necessity of the present. Analysis 69 (1).   (Google)
Mackie, Penelope (2003). Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Macintosh, Douglas C. (1940). Responsibility, freedom and causality: Or, the dilemma of determinism or indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 37 (January):42-51.   (Google | More links)
Slater, Matthew H. (online). How necessary is the past? Reply to Campbell.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: [ draft, later version under review ] Joe Campbell has identified an apparent flaw in van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. It apparently derives a metaphysically necessary conclusion from what Campbell argues is a contingent premise: that the past is in some sense necessary. I criticise Campbell’s examples attempting to show that this is not the case (in the requisite sense) and suggest some directions along which an incompatibilist could reconstruct her argument so as to remain immune to Campbell’s worries
McKenna, Michael S. (2005). Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
McKenna, Michael S. (2001). Source incompatibilism, ultimacy, and the transfer of non-responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). Agnostic autonomism revisited. In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
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Nahmias, Eddy; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason (2006). Is incompatibilism intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28–53.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing of pretheoretical judgments about relevant cases. We then present the results of our empirical studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Next, we consider and respond to potential objections to our approach. We conclude that our data suggest that incompatibilism is not as intuitive as incompatibilists have traditionally assumed, though more work is required to determine what ordinary intuitions about free will and moral responsibility actually are and to understand what role these intuitions should play in the debate
Nahmias, Eddy A.; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason (2005). Surveying freedom: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561–584.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people’s prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research
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Nelkin, Dana K. (2001). The consequence argument and the "mind" argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Nelkin, Dana K. & Rickless, Samuel C. (2002). Warfield's new argument for incompatibilism. Analysis 62 (2):104-107.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun (online). After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: From the first time I encountered the problem of free will in college, it struck me that a clear-eyed view of free will and moral responsibility demanded some form of nihilism. Libertarianism seemed delusional, and compatibilism seemed in bad faith. Hence I threw my lot in with philosophers like Paul d’Holbach, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom who conclude that no one is truly moral responsible. But after two decades of self- identifying as a nihilist, it occurred to me that I had continued to treat my friends
O'Connor, Timothy (1993). On the transfer of necessity. Noûs 27 (2):204-18.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Otsuka, Michael (1998). Incompatibilism and the avoidability of blame. Ethics 108 (4):685-701.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Paprzycka, Katarzyna (2002). Flickers of freedom and Frankfurt-style cases in the light of the new incompatibilism of the stit theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her ability to perform the contrary action, must be dropped. In its stead, they propose the weaker requirement of guidance control, which only demands the agent’s causal control over the action for which she is to be held responsible
Paske, Gerald H. (1970). Responsibility and the incompatibility principle. Personalist 51:477-485.   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (1995). Determinism al dente. Noûs 29 (1):21-45.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2005). Defending hard incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, but it is not credible given our best physical theories. Hence we must take seriously the prospect that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility. I call the resulting view _hard incompatibilism_. Furthermore, contrary to widespread belief, a conception of life without free will would not at all be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial
Pereboom, Derk (web). Defending hard incompatibilism again. In N. Trakakis & D. Cohen (eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Abstract: forthcoming in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen, eds., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press
Pereboom, Derk (2007). Hard incompatibilism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (2009). Hard incompatibilism and its rivals. Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision
Pereboom, Derk (2002). Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 100 | Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2007). On Alfred Mele's free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism
Pereboom, Derk (2003). Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The claim that moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have done otherwise is surely attractive. Moreover, it seems reasonable to contend that a requirement of this sort is not merely a necessary condition of little consequence, but that it plays a decisive role in explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. For if an agent is to be blameworthy for an action, it seems crucial that she could have done something to avoid this blameworthiness. If she is to be praiseworthy for an action, it seems important that at least she could have done something less admirable. Libertarians, in particular, have often grounded their incompatibilism precisely in such intuitions. By contrast, I shall argue that the availability of alternative possibilities is in a significant sense irrelevant to explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. At the same time I do not want to disavow incompatibilism, but rather to defend a version in which the pivotal explanatory role is assigned to features of the causal history of the action, and not to the availability of alternative possibilities.(2)
Plantinga, Alvin (1970). The incompatibility of freedom with determinism: A reply. Philosophical Forum 2:141-148.   (Google)
Pojman, Louis P. (1987). Freedom and determinism: A contemporary discussion. Zygon 22 (December):397-417.   (Google)
Pruss, Alexander R. (online). Freedom, determinism and Gale's principle.   (Google)
Abstract: In simplified form, the argument that I am defending holds that the incompatibility of our freedom with determinism follows from the conjunction of (1) a plausible supervenience claim which says that whether a human agent is free depends only on what happens during the agent’s life and (2) a freedom-cancellation principle of Richard Gale which says that an agent is not free if all of her actions are intentionally brought about by another agent. Improved versions of (1) and (2) are also considered
Rosen, Gideon (2002). The case for incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):699-706.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Russell, Paul (forthcoming). Free will, art and morality. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject
S. Bobzien, (1998). The inadvertent conception and late birth of the free-will problem. Phronesis 43 (2):133-175.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the "discovery" of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century A.D. It undergoes several developments, absorbing Epictetan, Middle-Platonist, and Peripatetic ideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision and an exposition of the "free-will problem" in Alexander of Aphrodisias' On Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample. American Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In defending this counterexample, I show that van Inwagen's technical notion of being partly responsible for a state of affairs, which figures in his statement of the principle, is problematic.
Shabo, Seth (2007). Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe. Philosophia 35 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, they can be used to buttress the ultimacy argument, another important argument for incompatibilism
Shabo, Seth (2010). Uncompromising source incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.   (Google)
Abstract: In what follows, I defend the uncompromising position against both Kane’s compromise source position and the traditional, "leeway" view. In sections 1 and 2, I take up Kane’s argument that uncompromising source incompatibilists go too far in their rejection of avoidability. In seeing where this argument goes wrong, we will also see why the compromise position is untenable.
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities, arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’ purposes.
Sipfle, David A. (1969). Free action and determinism. Ratio 11 (June):62-68.   (Google)
Slote, Michael A. (1982). Selective necessity and the free will problem. Journal of Philosophy 79 (January):5-24.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1998). Puzzles for the Will. University of Toronto Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Sommers, Tamler (2009). More work for hard incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.   (Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (2006). Determinism and inevitability. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):535-563.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper discusses one of the central arguments in Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, an argument designed to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. It suggests that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. A second interpretation is then developed, but it is argued that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, it can deliver only a significantly qualified version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. Moreover, the new argument depends upon an intermediate conclusion which, on the face of it, looks to be self-contradictory. Dennett is able to avoid the appearance of self-contradiction only by utilising a possible-worlds framework for the understanding of “could have done otherwise” judgements which is argued to be unsatisfactory. It is suggested that a different framework might hold the key to understanding how better to defend these same judgements from purported threats from determinism
Stoica, Ovidiu Cristinel, Convergence and free-will.   (Google)
Abstract: If our mind is just an algorithm running on a flesh hardware, then it seems that there is no place for the free-will. An algorithm decides everything based on deterministic computations, or on random inputs, but neither inevitability nor pure hazard is free choice. Hopefully, some day, Science will be able to understand, monitor and simulate all the mind processes. Even then, it will still be a possibility for the free-will to exist, based on the convergence of the initial data. I propose a crucial experiment to test this hypothesis
Strawson, Galen (1986). On the inevitability of freedom (from the compatibilist point of view). American Philosophical Quarterly 23:393-400.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
Strawson, Galen (2000). The unhelpfulness of determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-56.   (Google)
Stump, Eleonore (2000). The direct argument for incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Stump, Eleonore & Fischer, John Martin (2000). Transfer principles and moral responsibility. Philosopical Perspectives 14:47-56.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Suster, Danilo (2004). Incompatibilism and the logic of transfer. Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.   (Google)
Taylor, Robin (2000). Freedom: Magill versus the incompatibilists. Ratio 13 (1):83-91.   (Google | More links)
Timpe, Kevin (2007). Source incompatibilism and its alternatives. American Philosophical Quarterly.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In current debates about moral responsibility, it is common to differentiate two fundamentally different incompatibilist positions: Leeway Incompatibilism and Source Incompatibilism. The present paper argues that this is a bad dichotomy. Those forms of Leeway Incompatibilism that have no appeal to ‘origination’ or ‘ultimacy’ are problematic, which suggests that incompatibilists should prefer Source Incompatibilism. Two sub-classifications of Source Incompatibilism are then differentiated: Narrow Source Incompatibilism holds that alternative possibilities are outside the scope of what is required for moral responsibility, and Wide Source Incompatibilism holds that while ultimacy is most fundamental to moral responsibility, an agent meeting the ultimacy condition will also have alternative possibilities, thereby also satisfying an alternative possibilities condition. The present paper argues that the most promising incompatibilist positions will be versions of Wide Source Incompatibilism
Todd, Patrick (forthcoming). A new approach to manipulation arguments. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I aim to unveil their real power
Turner, Jason (online). The incompatibility of free will and naturalism.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defense of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the world — that is, that libertarian free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those pro- vided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview, since the Consequence Argument has a sis- ter argument — I call it the Supervenience Argument — which cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question
šuster, Danilo (2004). Incompatibilism and the logic of transfer. Acta Analytica 19 (33).   (Google)
Abstract: Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample to agglomerativity; (ii) replace Beta with a logically stronger principle Beta 2. I argue that the second strategy fails because the strengthened principle and Agglomeration together entail Beta. So this strategy makes sense only if Beta 2 is applied without Agglomeration. But if Beta 2 is used without Agglomeration, then the incompatibilist will undercut the rationale for the premise of his argument. I illustrate this point with the analysis of Warfield (1996) and his use of Beta 2 in the so called direct argument for incompatibilism
van Inwagen, Peter (1974). A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism. Theoria 24:9-22.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Vander-Laan, D. (2001). A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201-215.   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (unknown). Free will remains a mystery: The eighth philosophical perspectives lecture. .   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter, How to think about the problem of free will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if they are indeed unanswerable) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with determinism. And there are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if indeed . . . ) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. But if free will is incompatible both with..
van Inwagen, Peter (1999). Moral responsibility, determinism, and the ability to do otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this
van Inwagen, Peter (1975). The incompatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call 'determinism', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do (i.e., is incompatible with 'free will'). Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call 'determinism', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called 'determinism' without historical impropriety is incompatible with free will. I shall, however, assume without argument that what I call 'determinism' is legitimately so called. In Part I, I shall explain what I mean by 'determinism'. In Part II, I shall make some remarks about 'can'. In Part III, I shall argue that free will and determinism are incompatible. In Part IV, I shall examine some possible objections to the argument of Part III. I shall not attempt to establish the truth or falsity of determinism, or the existence or nonexistence of free will.
Vargas, Manuel R. (ms). Libertarianism and skepticism about free will: Some arguments against both.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: On one way of putting things, incompatibilism is the view that in some important sense free will (and/or moral responsibility) is incompatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is typically taken to come in two species: libertarianism, which holds that we are free and responsible (and correspondingly, that determinism does not hold), and skeptical incompatibilism.1 The latter includes views such as hard determinism, which hold that we are not free (and/or responsible) and views that argue that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, among others. In this paper, I attempt to provide positive arguments against both of the primary strands of incompatibilism. The first aim of this paper is to take some steps toward filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail—the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say “take some steps” because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic
Vihvelin, Kadri (online). Arguments for incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Vihvelin, Kadri (online). Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism.   (Google)
Vihvelin, Kadri (1988). The modal argument for incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Waller, Bruce N. (2003). A metacompatibilist account of free will: Making compatibilists and incompatibilist more compatible. Philosophical Studies 112 (3):209-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over free will has pittedlibertarian insistence on open alternativesagainst the compatibilist view that authenticcommitments can preserve free will in adetermined world. A second schism in the freewill debate sets rationalist belief in thecentrality of reason against nonrationalistswho regard reason as inessential or even animpediment to free will. By looking deeperinto what motivates each of these perspectivesit is possible to find common ground thataccommodates insights from all those competingviews. The resulting metacompatibilist view offree will bridges some of the differencesbetween compatibilists and incompatibilists aswell as between rationalists andnonrationalists, and results in a free willtheory that is both more philosophicallyinclusive and more firmly connected tocontemporary research in psychology andbiology
Waller, Bruce N. (1990). Freedom Without Responsibility. Temple University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Warfield, Ted (2003). Compatibilism and incompatibilism : Some arguments. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Warfield, Ted A. (2000). Causal determinism and human freedom are incompatible: A new argument for incompatibilism. Philosopical Perspectives 14:167-180.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Warfield, Ted A. (1996). Determinism and moral responsiblity are incompatible. Philosophical Topics 24:215-26.   (Google)
Westphal, Jonathan (2003). A new way with the consequence argument, and the fixity of the laws. Analysis 63 (3):208-212.   (Google | More links)
White, V. Alan (1990). How to mind one's ethics: A reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 50 (1):33-35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Analysis shows that statements of ability are disguised conditionals. More exactly, the correct analysis of 'X could have done A' is 'If X h decided (chosen, willed ...) to do A, X would have done A'. Therefore having acted freely--having been able to act otherwise than one fact did--is compatible with determinism (with the causal determination of one's acts)
Widerker, David (2002). Farewell to the direct argument. Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316-324.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Widerker, David (1987). On an argument for incompatibilism. Analysis 47 (January):37-41.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Wood, Ledger (1941). The free-will controversy. Philosophy 16 (October):386-397.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Xie, Simon Shengjian (2009). What is Kant: A compatibilist or an incompatibilist? A new interpretation of Kant's solution to the free will problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding the second controversy, I will argue that Kant's solution to the free will problem is not a success because his effort in making the effects of freedom part of the field of appearance has made his solution incoherent and ambiguous. Despite this, I argue that Kant's attempt to solve the free will problem is groundbreaking because he at least has separated freedom from the dominance of determinism
Yadin, Ariel (2004). Assuming determinism, free will can only be an illusion: An argument for incompatibilism. Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.   (Google)
Zimmerman, Marvin (1966). Is free will incompatible with determinism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March):415-420.   (Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (ms). The consequence argument.   (Google)
Abstract: In a book I once wrote about free will, I contended that the best and most important argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism was “the Consequence Argument.” I gave the following brief sketch of the Consequence Argument as a prelude to several more careful and detailed statements of the argument: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.[i] The reading that follows this one, Reading 41, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom,” contains a statement of the Consequence Argument. The argument is contained in the paragraph (p. xxx) that starts, “As Carl Ginet has said . . . .” But, as you will see if you compare the “brief sketch” with that paragraph, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom” presents the Consequence Argument in a disguise that is not easy to penetrate. Some teachers of philosophy who have used the first edition of Metaphysics: The Big Questions as a textbook have asked for a more straightforward statement of the Consequence Argument (since much of the recent discussion of the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism in the philosophical literature has taken the form of criticisms of the Consequence Argument that are rather hard to apply to the argument in the form in which it is presented in Reading 41). This essay is an attempt to meet this request

5.4b.6 Libertarianism about Free Will

Acworth, Richard (1963). Smart on free-will. Mind 72 (286):271-272.   (Google | More links)
Alavi, Roksana (2005). Robert Kane, free will, and neuro-indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.   (Google)
Allen, Robert F. (2005). Free will and indeterminism: Robert Kane's libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.   (Google)
Abstract: Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.1 That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of decisions that she could have rationally avoided making. That one’s character is the product of such decisions entails ultimate responsibility for its manifestations, engendering a free will
Almeida, M. & Bernstein, M. (2003). Lucky libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):93-119.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an agent''s character can still be under the control of, or up to, the agent. The luck problem has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a detailed account of how this problem can be resolved. Although Kane''s theory is innovative, insightful, and more resourceful than most of his critics believe, it ultimately cannot account for the type of control that moral responsibility and (ultimate) agency legitimately require
Anglin, W. S. (1990). Free Will and the Christian Faith. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God
Balaguer, Mark (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Mit Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Formulating the problem of free will -- The old formulation of the problem of free will -- Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will -- The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will -- Some remarks on libertarianism -- Synopsis of the book -- Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant -- What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, assuming the OL view is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, even if the OL view isn't correct -- The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question -- The coherence question -- The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting) -- Generalizing the argument -- Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question -- Where we stand and where we're going next -- An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question -- The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question -- The moral responsibility question -- Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy -- Preliminaries -- Torn decisions -- Indeterminacy -- Appropriate non-randomness -- The argument -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them -- The argument from token-token identity -- The argument from phenomenology -- Objections -- Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control -- Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free -- Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions -- Where we stand -- Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)? -- An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism) -- An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism) -- Empirical arguments -- Arguments for universal determinism -- Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism -- Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism -- Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision -- Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism -- The argument from Tegmark's work -- The argument from Libet's work -- Arguments from psychology -- Where we stand.
Balaguer, Mark (1999). Libertarianism as a scientifically respectable view. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):189-211.   (Google)
Balaguer, Mark (2009). Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism. Synthese 168 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger
Belnap, Nuel, Branching histories approach to indeterminism and free will.   (Google)
Abstract: An informal sketch is offered of some chief ideas of the (formal) ``branching histories'' theory of objective possibility, free will and indeterminism. Reference is made to ``branching time'' and to ``branching space-times,'' with emphasis on a theme that they share: Objective possibilities are in Our World, organized by the relation of causal order
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). Global control and freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, the global controller nullifies freedom because she is an agent, whereas natural forces are at work in conventional deterministic worlds. Other key differences that undermine the analogy are identified. It is also shown that the argument begs the question against the classical compatibilist, who believes that determinism does not preclude alternative possibilities
Bernstein, M. (1995). Kanean libertarianism. Southwest Philosophical Review 11 (1):151-57.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (2000). Ultimate rsponsibility in a determined world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.   (Google)
Cairns-Smith, Graham; Clark, Thomas W.; Gomatam, Ravi; Kane, Robert H.; Maxwell, Nicholas; Smart, J. J. C.; Spence, Sean A. & Stapp, Henry P. (2005). Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a plain person's free will". Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):20-75.   (Google)
Abstract: REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry Stapp
Campbell, C. A. (1958). Free will: A reply to mr. R. D. Bradley. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):46 – 56.   (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1967). In Defence Of Free Will, With Other Philosophical Essays. London,: Allen &Amp; Unwin.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Abstract: More particularly, I have been influenced by a conviction that the present state of philosophical opinion on free will is, for certain definitely assignable ...
Capes, Justin A. (2010). Can 'downward causation' save free will? Philosophia 38 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with assumptions implicit in his broader ontology, commit him to the implausible conclusion that determinism is incompatible with the existence of human persons
Carlson, E. (2002). In defense of the mind argument. Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.   (Google)
Carlson, Erik (1998). Van Inwagen on determinism and moral responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2).   (Google)
Ciocchi, David M. (2002). The religious adequacy of free-will theism. Religious Studies 38 (1):45-61.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I question the claim that the increasingly popular position known as ‘free-will theism’ or ‘the open view of God’ supports a rich religious life. To do this I advance a notion of ‘religious adequacy’, and then argue that free-will theism fails to be religiously adequate with respect to one of the principal practices of the religious life – petitionary prayer. Drawing on current work in libertarian free-will theory, I consider what are likely the only two lines of defence free-will theists might use in response to my argument. I argue that these defences either fail or have features that make them unacceptable to free-will theists. I then suggest that this failure with petitionary prayer is an instance of a larger problem for free-will theism, that the position's distinctive views often differ more dramatically from the common beliefs and practices of most believers than is usually recognized or acknowledged. I conclude that free-will theism can support a rich religious life only for those who make the requisite changes in belief and practice, including changing their expectations about petitionary prayer
Clarke, Randolph (1999). Free choice, effort, and wanting more. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines the libertarian account of free choice advanced by Robert Kane in his recent book, The Significance of Free Will. First a rather simple libertarian view is considered, and an objection is raised against it the view fails to provide for any greater degree of agent-control than what could be available in a deterministic world. The basic differences between this simple view and Kane's account are the requirements, on the latter, of efforts of will and of an agent's wanting more to do a certain thing than he wants to do anything else. It is argued here that neither of these features yields any improvement over the simple libertarian view; neither helps to meet the objection that was raised against the simple view. Finally, it is suggested that a modest defense of that view might be available
Clarke, Randolph (1995). Indeterminism and control. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):125-138.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will.
Clarke, Randolph (2000). Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibility. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (2002). Libertarian views: Noncausal and event-causal sccounts of free agency. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2000). Modest libertarianism. Philosopical Perspectives 14:21-46.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1997). On the possibility of rational free action. Philosophical Studies 88 (1):37-57.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2007). Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument
Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). On giving libertarians what they say they want. In Brainstorms. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Dorato, Mauro (2002). Determinism, chance, and freedom. In Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: After a brief but necessary characterization of the notion of determinism, I discuss and critically evaluate four views on the relationship between determinism and free will by taking into account both (i) what matters most to us in terms of a free will worth-wanting and (ii) which capacities can be legitimately attributed to human beings without contradicting what we currently know from natural sciences. The main point of the paper is to argue that the libertarian faces a dilemma: on the one hand, the possibility of ?doing otherwise? ? a necessary condition of a free will according to the libertarian ? requires indeterminism or chance, but any kind of indeterminism has the undesirable consequence of separating our actions from our character and our past. On the other hand, if our character has to be fully expressed by our actions, determinism becomes necessary and we seem to be metaphysically unfree. I conclude by showing that the dispute between compatibilists and libertarians possesses an important but hitherto very neglected pragmatic component as well, dependent on two different ethical attitudes toward a meaningful life
Double, Richard (1988). Libertarianism and rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:431-439.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Double, Richard (1991). The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Abstract: The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion
Double, Richard (1993). The principle of rational explanation defended. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):133-142.   (Google)
Dupre, John (1996). The solution to the problem of freedom of the will. Philosophical Perspectives 10:385-402.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Duus-Otterström, Göran (2008). Betting against hard determinism. Res Publica 14 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument
Ekstrom, Laura W. (2000). Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Westview.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this comprehensive new study of human free agency, Laura Waddell Ekstrom critically surveys contemporary philosophical literature and provides a novel account of the conditions for free action. Ekstrom argues that incompatibilism concerning free will and causal determinism is true and thus the right account of the nature of free action must be indeterminist in nature. She examines a variety of libertarian approaches, ultimately defending an account relying on indeterministic causation among events and appealing to agent causation only in a reducible sense. Written in an engaging style and incorporating recent scholarship, this study is critical reading for scholars and students interested in the topics of motivation, causation, responsibility, and freedom. In broadly covering the important positions of others along with its exposition of the author’s own view, Free Will provides both a significant scholarly contribution and a valuable text for courses in metaphysics and action theory
Ekstrom, Laura W. (2003). Free will, chance, and mystery. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):153-80.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises of his argument for free will–causalindeterminism incompatibilism are true. By use of a particularevent-causal indeterminist account of free action, I support thecase for free will–indeterminism compatibilism
Ekstrom, Laura W. (2002). Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style cases. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (1998). Protecting incompatibilist free action. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):281-91.   (Google)
Esfeld, Michael (2000). Is quantum indeterminism relevant to free will? Philosophia Naturalis 37 (1):177-187.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Quantum indeterminism may make available the option of an interactionism that does not have to pay the price of a force over and above those forces that are acknowledged in physics in order to explain how intentions can be physically effective. I show how this option might work in concrete terms and offer a criticism of it
Farrer, Austin (1960). The Freedom Of The Will. Charles Scribner's Sons.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Feldman, Richard H. & Buckareff, Andrei A. (2003). Reasons explanations and pure agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism
Finch, Alicia & Warfield, Ted A. (1998). The mind argument and libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom
Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Fischer, John Martin (2000). The significance of free will by Robert Kane. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):141-148.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1962). Can the will be caused? Philosophical Review 71 (January):49-55.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1997). Freedom, responsibility, and agency. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):85-98.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O''Connor''s agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O''Connor''s objections to it and offers objections to O''Connor''s view
Ginet, Carl A. (2003). Libertarianism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Ginet, Carl A. (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 101 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book deals with foundational issues in the history of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explanation of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a "simple" mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism
Ginet, Carl A. (2002). Reasons and explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accounts. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Ginet, Carl A. (1989). Reasons explanation of action: An incompatibilist account. Philosophical Perspectives 3:17-46.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Glannon, Walter (1999). The case for libertarian free will. Inquiry 42 (2):285 – 303.   (Google | More links)
Goetz, Stewart C. (1998). Failed solutions to a standard libertarian problem. Philosophical Studies 90 (3):237-244.   (Google | More links)
Gomatam, Ravi (2005). Do Hodgson's propositions uniquely characterize free will? Commentary on Hodgson's paper on plain person's free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12:32-40.   (Google)
Abstract: s view of free will. He also offers detailed justifications that he hopes are philosophically and scientifically respectable. While Hodgson doesn't state anywhere what would count as a "scientifically respectable" proposition, he seems to expect that any scientific theory of consciousness and free will must fully account for his nine propositions, not just explain them away. Or, alternatively, any scientific theory of free will that is incompatible with his nine propositions cannot serve as a possible framework for developing a scientific theory of conscious free will
Gomatam, Ravi (2005). Do Hodgson's propositions uniquely characterize free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):32-40.   (Google)
Gomes, Gilberto (2005). What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43.   (Google)
Graham, Peter J. (2004). Metaphysical libertarianism and the epistemology of testimony. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):37-50.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Reductionism about testimony holds that testimonial warrant or entitlement is just a species of inductive warrant. Anti-Reductionism holds that it is different from inductive but analogous to perceptual or memorial warrant. Perception receives much of its positive epistemic status from being reliably truthconducive in normal conditions. One reason to reject the epistemic analogy is that testimony involves agency – it goes through the will of the speaker – but perception does not. A speaker might always choose to lie or otherwise deliberately mislead. It is argued that the force of this derives (in part) from Libertarianism about agency, and that Libertarianism, if it undermines the Anti-Reductionist explanation of why we are entitled to rely upon testimony, undermines the Reductionist explanation as..
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2001). Control conundrums: Modest libertarianism, responsibility, and explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):178–200.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-type examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2000). Indeterminism, explanation, and luck. Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane''s libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane''s recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane''s theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones''s A-ing butJones*''s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones''s A-ing and Jones*''sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2000). Libertarianism and the luck objection. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):329-337.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque & Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2001). Libertarian free will and CNC manipulation. Dialectica 55 (3):221-238.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Libertarianism, luck, and action explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Harrison, Gerald K. (2008). Modest libertarianism and clandestine control. Dialectica 62 (4):495-507.   (Google)
Abstract: Cases involving clandestine manipulation pose a significant challenge to compatibilist conceptions of free will. But compatibilists often argue that they are not alone and that modest libertarian conceptions of free will are also susceptible to the problem. I take issue with this claim. I argue that agent-causal libertarian views are not susceptible to the problem. I then argue that the compatibilist cannot cite a relevant difference between agent-causal libertarian views and modest libertarian views. Therefore from a compatibilist's perspective modest libertarian views are impervious to the problem of clandestine manipulation
Hodgson, David (2005). A plain person's free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):3-19.   (Google)
Abstract: In my experience, plain persons (here meaning persons who are neither philosophers or cognitive scientists) tend to accept something like a libertarian position on free will, namely that free will exists and is inconsistent with determinism. That position is widely debunked by philosophers and cognitive scientists. My view at present is that something like this plain person's position is not only defensible but likely to be closer to the truth than opposing views. To put this to the test, I have written a simple and straightforward outline of what I hope is a philosophically and scientifically respectable version of the plain person's position on free will, and have offered it for demolition by those who say such a view is untenable. My account of free will is a robust one, explicitly inconsistent with determinism and intended to support equally robust views of personal responsibility for conduct. I see three broad areas of difficulty for this account
Hodgson, David (2002). Consciousness, quantum physics, and free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (2002). Physics, consciousness and free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Hodgson, David (2005). Response to commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):76-95.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I am very grateful to the commentators for their consideration of my target article. I found their comments thought-provoking and challenging, but I am not persuaded that any substantial departure is required from the views I expressed in the article. I will respond to each comment in turn, and then I will briefly review how my nine propositions have fared
Hodgson, David (1991). The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: In this book, Hodgson presents a clear and compelling case against today's orthodox mechanistic view of the brain-mind, and in favor of the view that "the mind matters." In the course of the argument he ranges over such topics as consciousness, informal reasoning, computers, evolution, and quantum indeterminancy and non-locality. Although written from a philosophical viewpoint, the book has important implications for the sciences concerned with the brain-mind problem. At the same time, it is largely non-technical, and thus accessible to the non-specialist reader
Honderich, Ted (2001). Mind the guff. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):62-78.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (I) John Searle's conception of consciousness in the 'Mind the Gap' issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies remains short on content, no advance on either materialism or traditional dualism. Still, it is sufficiently contentful to be self-contradictory. And so his Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels, like materialism and dualism, needs replacing by a radically different conception of consciousness -- such as Consciousness as Existence. (II) From his idea that we can discover 'gaps', seeming absences of causal circumstances, in our experience of deciding and acting, Searle is led to the positing of a self and to mysterious causing. (III) In fact philosophers of determinism and freedom over three centuries have concerned themselves with what are now termed 'gaps'. Searle's advance is a useful terminological one. Compatibilist philosophers of freedom, contrary to what is said, have not missed any point at all. A successor to both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism is needed. (IV) Searle's previous account of deciding and acting in Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels does indeed fail because of its epiphenomenalism. (V) The culmination of his paper, his preferred hypothesis now about deciding and acting, is that down-up causation is true of it but not left-right causation. Quantum Theory as often interpreted doesn't work down-up but does work left-right. The hypothesis is entirely in the tradition of the Incompatibilist and Libertarian philosophers of determinism and freedom, whom Searle has joined, but is factually incredible
Honderich, Ted (ms). Richard double: The moral hardness of libertarianism.   (Google)
Abstract: The following is a criticism designed to apply to most libertarian free will theorists. I argue that most libertarians hold three beliefs that jointly show them to be unsympathetic or hard-hearted to persons whom they hold morally responsible: that persons are morally responsible only because they make libertarian choices, that we should hold persons responsible, and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make such choices. Softhearted persons who held these three beliefs would espouse hard determinism, which exonerates all persons of moral responsibility, or, at least, would not espouse libertarianism. I do not address the view held by some libertarians that we do have epistemic justification for thinking that persons make libertarian choices, a minority position that I believe cannot be sustained
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Kane, Robert H. (2004). Agency, responsibility, and indeterminism: Reflections on libertarian theories of free will. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Google)
Kane, Robert H. (2005). Free agency and laws of nature. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):46-53.   (Google)
Kant, Immanuel (1781). For determinism and indeterminism. In Critique of Pure Reason.   (Google)
Abstract: _One summary of the great Kant's view, to the extent that it can be summed up, is_ _that he takes determinism to be a kind of fact, and indeterminism to be another kind_ _of fact, and our freedom to be a fact too -- but takes this situation to have nothing to_ _do with the kind of compatibility of determinism and freedom proclaimed by such_ _Compatibilists as Hobbes and Hume. Thus Kant does not make freedom consistent_ _with determinism by taking up a definition of freedom as voluntariness -- at bottom,_ _being able to do what you want. This he dismisses as a wretched subterfuge,_ _quibbling about words. Rather, the freedom he seeks to make consistent with_ _determinism does indeed seem to be the freedom of the Incompatibilists --_ _origination. Is he then an Incompatibilist? Well, against that, it can be said he does_ _not allow the existence of origination in what can be called the world we know, as_ _Incompatibilists certainly do._
Kane, Robert H. (1985). Free Will and Values. SUNY Press.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
Kane, Robert H. (2002). Free will, determinism, and indeterminism. In Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kane, Robert H. (1996). Free will, responsibility, and will-setting. Philosophical Topics 24:67-90.   (Google)
Kane, Robert H. (1994). Free will: The illusive ideal. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):25-60.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (2006). Libertarian accounts of free will. Mind 115 (457):136-142.   (Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (1988). Libertarianism and rationality revisited. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:441-60.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kane, Robert H. (1999). New directions on free will. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.   (Google)
Kane, Robert H. (1999). On free will, responsibility and indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):105-121.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper responds to three critical essays on my book, The Significance of Free Will(Oxford, 1996) by Randolph Clarke, Istiyaque Haji and Alfred Mele (which essays appear in this issue and an earlier issue of this journal). This response first explains crucial features of the theory of free will of the book, including the notion of ultimate responsibility.The paper then answers objections of Haji and Mele that the occurrence of undetermined choices would be matters of luck or chance, and so could not be responsible actions. It then responds to concerns of Clarke that indeterminism provides no greater degree of control for defenders of incompatibilist free will and to concerns Clarke has about the notions of "effort" and "willing" in the book. Finally, the paper addresses objections of Haji concerning Frankfurt type-examples and the relation of moral responsibility to the power to act otherwise, and it addresses a concern of Mele's about why we should want a free will that is incompatible with determinism
Kane, Robert H. (1999). Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and determinism. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consider the following principle: (LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action. This principle (which we may call the luck principle, or simply LP) is false, as I shall explain shortly. Yet it seems true.
Kane, Robert H. (ms). Reflections on free will, determinism, and indeterminism.   (Google)
Abstract: _Some say there is no progress in philosophy, and certainly there is one sense in_ _which they are wrong. There are at least significant developments in philosophical_ _doctrines that have been persistently advocated in the past. With confidence I leave_ _you to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of 'significant'. There is no doubt that_ _Robert Kane has made some progress, probably more than any other contemporary_ _philosopher, in the laying out and defending of the doctrine that an understandable_ _freedom is importantly inconsistent with determinism, and that we do have this_ _freedom. If the past is any guide to the present, I myself, with the aid of further_ _study, will come to disagree. But certainly this summation of Kane's views, put_ _together for the Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, is strongly_ _commended to you._
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Replies to Fischer and Haji. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):338-342.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kane, Robert H. (2002). Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kane, Robert H. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 204 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the past quarter-century, there has been a resurgence of interest in philosophical questions about free will. After a clear and broad-reaching survey of these recent debates, Robert Kane presents his own controversial view. Arguing persuasively for a traditional incompatibilist or libertarian conception of free will, Kane demonstrates that such a conception can be made intelligible without appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency and thus can be reconconciled with a contemporary scientific picture of the world
Levy, Neil (2008). Bad luck once again. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event-causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision-making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event-causal libertarianisms. Like the event-causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent's choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom-level control over it
Levy, Neil (2005). Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertarians. Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Against this kind of account, most fully developed by Robert Kane, critics have pressed the demand for contrastive explanations. Kane has responded by arguing that the demand does not need to be met: responsibility for an action does not require that there be a contrastive explanation of that action. However, this response proves too much: it implies that agents are responsible not only for the actions they choose, but also for the counterfactual actions which were equally available to them
Levy, Neil (ms). Closing the door on BAT.   (Google)
Abstract: BAT - the belief in ability thesis - states, roughly, that for an agent to be able rationally to deliberate between two or more alternatives, she must believe that she is metaphysically free to perform each alternative. I show, by way of a counterexample, that BAT is false
Levy, Neil (2006). Determinist deliberations. Dialectica 60 (4):453-459.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (forthcoming). Restrictivism is a Covert compatibilism. In N. Trakakis (ed.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Abstract: _Libertarian restrictivists hold that agents are rarely directly free. However, they seek to reconcile their views_ _with common intuitions by arguing that moral responsibility, or indirect freedom (depending on the version of_ _restrictivism) is much more common than direct freedom. I argue that restrictivists must give up either the_ _claim that agents are rarely free, or the claim that indirect freedom or responsibility is much more common_ _than direct freedom. Focusing on Kane’s version of restrictivism, I show that the view holds people responsible_ _for actions when (merely) compatibilist conditions are met. Since this is unacceptable by libertarian lights,_ _they must either accept that compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are sufficient, or make their_ _restrictivism more extreme than it already is._
Levy, Neil & Mckenna, Michael (2007). Symposium on free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):151 – 152.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Ken (2001). The main problem with USC libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessaryfor free will. They think this in part because they hold both (1) thatmy being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary forfree will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this ``ultimateself-causation''. But seductive and intuitive as this ``USCLibertarianism'' may sound, it is untenable. In the end, nometaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception ofultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivatingthe USC Libertarian is ultimately impossible to fulfill
Machan, Tibor R. (2004). A brief defense of free will. In John R. Burr & Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.   (Google)
McCann, Hugh J., Agency, control, and causation.   (Google)
Abstract: Responsibility for an action requires what Professor McCann calls an exercise of legitimate agency of the part of an agent, a necessary condition for which is libertarian freedom. Free decisions are to be explained teleologically, not causally. Agent causation cannot account for the existence of a free decision, but neither does event causation account for the existence of determined events. The problem of accounting for the existence of a free decision is therefore of a piece with the problem of accounting for the existence of the world itself. All of this, like a related line of argument by Professor McCall to which you can turn, is a long way from what seems to me the continuing arguableness of determinism and the unavoidableness of the proposition that both Incompatibilism and Compatibilism about freedom are false. But we all need to remember, with Cromwell, in our own bowels if not by those of Christ, that we may be mistaken. I guess that given the proportion of false to true views in the world, we need to remember it is arguable that we are all more likely to be mistaken. -- T.H
McCall, Storrs, Controlled indeterministic processes in action theory.   (Google)
Abstract: A common criticism of free will or origination theories is that if what we do is not the result of an unbroken sequence of causes and effects, then it must to some degree be the product of chance. But in what sense can a chance act be intentional or deliberate, in what sense can it be based on reasons, and in what sense can a person be held responsible for it? If free and responsible action is incompatible with determinism, must it not equally well be incompatible with indeterminism? Professor McCall says no. He argues that a new idea, that of a controlled indeterministic process, resolves a variety of classical dilemmas and opens the way to a new understanding of the relationship between actions, reasons, causes, and responsibility. Does he succeed? All of this, like a related line of argument by Professor McCann to which you can turn, is a long way from what seems to me the continuing arguableness of determinism and the unavoidableness of the proposition that both incompatibilism and compatibilism about freedom are false. But we all need to remember, with Cromwell, in our own bowels if not by those of Christ, that we may be mistaken. I guess that given the proportion of false to true views in the world, we need to remember it is arguable that we are more likely to be mistaken
McCall, Storrs (1984). Freedom defined as the power to decide. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (October):329-38.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Mccall, Storrs & Lowe, E. J. (2005). Indeterminist free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):681–690.   (Google | More links)
Mccall, Storrs & Lowe, E. J. (2008). The determinists have run out of luck—for a good reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):745-748.   (Google | More links)
McCann, Hugh J. (1998). The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom. Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Abstract: In these essays, Hugh J. McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of twenty-five years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action; the foundations of action; intention, will, and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action; explores the foundations of action and defends a volitional theory; argues for a libertarian view of both the formation and the execution of intention; and considers the question of consistency in rational intentions, as well as the relationship between practical and theoretical reasoning. Among the original features of McCann's work are his defense of both fine- and coarse-grained actions and his arguments for a noncausal theory of the relation between intention and action. He also suggests that intentions need not be consistent, either with each other or with beliefs about success. And he contends that intention formation is an intrinsically ratiocinative procedure, distinct from reasoning about what action would be best.
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (2007). Free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (1999). Kane, luck, and the significance of free will. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the "Intelligibility" and "Existence" questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls "The Significance Question" about free will: "Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom 'worth wanting'... and, if so, why?" A desire for "objective worth" has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). Libertarianism, luck, and control. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (2007). Review of John Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1998). Review of Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will. The Journal of Philosophy 95 (11):581-584.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1996). Soft libertarianism and Frankfurt-style scenarios. Philosophical Topics 24:123-41.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Monroe, Andrew E. & Malle, Bertram F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate about people's folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: People’s concept of free will is often assumed to be incompatible with the deterministic, scientific model of the universe. Indeed, many scholars treat the folk concept of free will as assuming a special form of nondeterministic causation, possibly the notion of uncaused causes. However, little work to date has directly probed individuals’ beliefs about what it means to have free will. The present studies sought to reconstruct this folk concept of free will by asking people to define the concept (Study 1) and by confronting them with a neuroscientific claim that free will is an illusion (Study 2), which invited them to either reconcile or contrast free will with determinism. The results suggest that the core of people’s concept of free will is a choice that fulfills one’s desires and is free from internal or external constraints. No evidence was found for metaphysical assumptions about dualism or indeterminism.
Moreland, James P. (2002). Timothy O'Connor and the harmony thesis: A critique. Metaphysica 3 (2):5-40.   (Google)
Murphy, Nancey C. (2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: New approaches to knotty old problems -- Avoiding Cartesian materialism -- From causal reductionism to self-directed systems -- From mindless to intelligent action -- How can neural nets mean? -- How does reason get its grip on the brain? -- Who's responsible? -- Neurobiological reductionism and free will.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2007). Good luck to libertarians. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):173 – 184.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this review essay on Mele's Free Will and Luck, I evaluate the 'daring soft libertarian' view presented in the heart of the book, and in particular the way that it provides an answer to the objection that introducing indeterminism into one's view of freedom merely adds an element of luck and so undermines freedom. I also compare the view's strengths and weaknesses to those of traditional libertarian views. Finally, I consider the 'zygote' argument that Mele takes to be his reason for remaining agnostic about whether determinism is compatible with freedom, and argue that if one accepts the main arguments presented earlier in the book, one should not let this argument stand in the way of accepting compatibilism
Nelkin, Dana K. (2001). The consequence argument and the "mind" argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Nowell-Smith, P. H. (1954). Determinists and libertarians. Mind 63 (July):317-337.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (ed.) (1995). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic accounts and to the range of theoretical avenues for pursuing resolutions. The first four essays set out different challenges (from both compatibilists and those skeptical of the possibility of free will) to the adequacy of standard indeterministic theories. The next seven essays meet one or more of these challenges. Each of the fundamental types of approach--simple indeterminism, causal indeterminism, and agent causation--is represented in these novel and sophisticated proposals. The collection finishes with two essays that debate whether compatibilism entails that freedom of choice is a comparatively rare phenomenon within an individual's life. Eloquently presenting some of the most compelling and accessible arguments surrounding this central philosophical issue, Agents, Causes, and Events makes a valuable contribution to courses in free will/action theory and metaphysics
O'Connor, Timothy (2005). Freedom With a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:207-227.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1993). Indeterminism and free agency: Three recent views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-26.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a commonplace of philosophy that the notion of free will is a hard nut to crack. A simple, compelling argument can be made to show that behavior for which an agent is morally responsible cannot be the outcome of prior determining causal factors.1 Yet the smug satisfaction with which we incompatibilists are prone to trot out this argument has a tendency to turn to embarrassment when we're asked to explain just how it is that morally responsible action might obtain under the assumption of indeterminism. Despair over the prospect of giving a satisfactory answer to this question has led some contemporary philosophers to a position rarely, if ever, held in the history of philosophy: free, responsible action is an incoherent concept.2
O'Connor, Timothy (1997). Is Free Will Just Another Chaotic Process? (Review of Three Books). Times Literary Supplement (Dec.5).   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2002). Libertarian views: Dualist and agent-causal theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy & Churchill, John (2006). Reasons Explanation And Agent Control: In Search Of An Integrated Account. Philosophical Topics 32:241-256.   (Google)
Ofstad, Harald (1967). Recent work on the free-will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):179-207.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pereboom, Reviewed by Derk (2000). Robert Kane, the significance of free will. Ethics 110 (2).   (Google)
Pettit, Gordon (2002). Are we rarely free? A response to restrictivism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):219-237.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations in which one is apparently free, and argue directly that these situations are rare – the Inventory Strategy. I conclude that both types of arguments for restrictivism are unconvincing
Pink, Thomas (2004). Free Will: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Every day we seem to make and act upon all kinds of free choices: some trivial, others so consequential that they change the course of one's life, or even the course of history. But are these choices really free, or are we compelled to act the way we do by factors beyond our control? Is the feeling that we could have made different decisions just an illusion? And if our choices are not free, is it legitimate to hold people morally responsible for their actions? Pink looks at the fundamental philosophical question of free will, Engaging in discussion of the claim: 'If our actions are causally determined by events beyond our control, that means that we can never act freely, and so can never be held responsible for our actions
Pink, Thomas (1996). The Psychology of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book presents a new theory of the will - of our capacity for decision making. The book argues that taking a decision to act is something we do, and do freely - as much an action as the actions which our decisions explain - and that our freedom of action depends on this capacity for free decision-making. But decision-making is no ordinary action. Decisions to act also have a special executive function, that of ensuring the rationality of the further actions which they explain. This executive function makes decision-making an action importantly unlike any other, with its own distinctive rationality. Pink's original and highly persuasive study uses this theory of the will to provide new accounts of freedom, action and rational choice. The author argues that, in a tradition that runs from Hobbes to Davidson and Frankfurt, Anglo-American philosophy has misrepresented the common-sense psychology of our freedom and action - a psychology which this book now presents and defends
Plantinga, Alvin (1970). The incompatibility of freedom with determinism: A reply. Philosophical Forum 2:141-148.   (Google)
Rankin, Kenneth W. (1961). Choice And Chance: A Libertarian Analysis. Oxford,: Blackwell.   (Google)
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Roberts, Lawrence D. (1971). Indeterminism, chance, and responsibility. Ratio 13 (December):195-199.   (Google)
Rudder Baker, Lynne (2006). Moral responsibility without libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307–330.   (Google | More links)
Schlosser, Markus E. (2008). Review of "Freedom and neurobiology: Reflections on free will, language, and political power", by John R. Searle. Mind 117 (468):1127-30.   (Google)
Shaw, Daniel J. (1989). Freedom and indeterminism. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C B Martin. Norwell: Kluwer.   (Google)
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Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Free will, praise and blame. Mind 70 (279):291-306.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic.
Smilansky, Saul (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Abstract: Saul Smilansky presents an original new approach to the problem of free will, which lies at the heart of morality and self-understanding. He maintains that the key to the problem is the role played by illusion. Smilansky boldly claims that we could not live adequately with a complete awareness of the truth about human freedom and that illusion lies at the center of the human condition
Smilansky, Saul (1990). Is libertarian free will worth wanting? Philosophical Investigations 13 (3):273-76.   (Google)
Smith, Donald, The fall of the mind argument and some lessons about.   (Google)
Abstract: The so-called Mind argument is the most pressing objection to libertarianism—the view that freedom exists and is incompatible with determinism. In this paper, we develop a new objection to the Mind argument that has several significant ramifications for the metaphysics of freedom
Steward, Helen (2009). Free will. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Stump, Eleonore (2007). Justifying faith : Grace and free will. In Richard L. Velkley (ed.), Freedom and the Human Person. Catholic University of America Press.   (Google)
Talbott, Thomas B. (1979). Indeterminism and chance occurrences. Personalist 60 (July):253-261.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Thorp, John (1980). Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism. Routledge.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Timpe, Kevin (2006). A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue that this discussion also goes some distance to showing that any Frankfurt-libertarian is in a similar position regarding the need for some PAP-like principle. If I am correct, then Frankfurt-libertarians must either renounce their incompatibilism or concede that FSCs fail to show all PAP-like principles to be false
van Inwagen, Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 206 | Google | More links)
Abstract: "This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected
van Inwagen, Peter (2000). Free will remains a mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper has two parts. In the first part, I concede an error in an argument I have given for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. I go on to show how to modify my argument so as to avoid this error, and conclude that the thesis that free will and determinism are compatible continues to be—to say the least—implausible. But if free will is incompatible with determinism, we are faced with a mystery, for free will undeniably exists, and it also seems to be incompatible with indeterminism. In the second part of this paper, I will defend the conclusion that the concept of agent causation is of no use to the philosopher who wants to maintain that free will and indeterminism are compatible. I conclude that free will remains a mystery---that is, that free will undeniably exists and that there is a strong and unanswered prima facie case for its impossibility.
van Inwagen, Peter (unknown). Free will remains a mystery: The eighth philosophical perspectives lecture. .   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (online). On free will.   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (1998). The mystery of metaphysical freedom. In Van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. Metaphysics: The Big Questions.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: _This is an account of his present thinking by an excellent philosopher who has been_ _among the two or three foremost defenders of the doctrine that determinism and_ _freedom are incompatible -- that logically we cannot have both. In his 1983 book,_ _An Essay on Free Will_ _, he laid out with unique clarity and force a fundamental_ _argument for this conclusion. What the argument comes to is that if determinism is_ _true, we are not free, since our actions are effects of causal circumstances in the_ _remote past, and those circumstances are certainly not up to us. To that line of_ _thought, in the article below, by way of the supposition of a world of angels, he adds_ _something new. This is a fundamental difficulty with the freedom that we cannot_ _have if determinism is true. The difficulty, indeed a mystery, is one having to do with_ _the opposite of determinism -- indeterminism._
van Inwagen, Peter (2004). Van Inwagen on free will. In Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (1994). When the will is not free. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):95-113.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Vargas, Manuel R. (ms). Libertarianism and skepticism about free will: Some arguments against both.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: On one way of putting things, incompatibilism is the view that in some important sense free will (and/or moral responsibility) is incompatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is typically taken to come in two species: libertarianism, which holds that we are free and responsible (and correspondingly, that determinism does not hold), and skeptical incompatibilism.1 The latter includes views such as hard determinism, which hold that we are not free (and/or responsible) and views that argue that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, among others. In this paper, I attempt to provide positive arguments against both of the primary strands of incompatibilism. The first aim of this paper is to take some steps toward filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail—the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say “take some steps” because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic
von Wachter, Daniel (2003). Free agents as cause. In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.   (Google | More links)
Wekstrom, Laura (2008). Free will and luck - by Alfred Mele. Philosophical Books 49 (1):71-73.   (Google)
Widerker, David (2006). Libertarianism and the philosophical significance of Frankfurt scenarios. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Widerker, David (2002). Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examples. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Winter, Mr Blake (ms). On incompatibilist free will.   (Google)
Abstract: We consider the possibility of defining some kind of activity which meets the intuitive requirements of incompatibilist free will. Our analysis of this will be done in a fashion which in some ways parallels the work of Pink on this matter. We will then consider the evidence of such free will, both from an introspective perspective and from a scientific perspective. In the latter we consider neurological and psychological evidence
Zagzebski, Linda (2000). Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities? Philosopical Perspectives 14:231-248.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)

5.4b.7 Semi-Compatibilism

Buss, Sarah (1997). Review of John Fischer's Metaphysics of Free Will. Philosophical Books 38 (2):117-121.   (Google)
Della Rocca, Michael (1998). Frankfurt, Fischer and flickers. Noûs 32 (1):99-105.   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2000). Chicken soup for the semi-compatibilist soul: Replies to Haji and Kane. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):404-407.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2004). Free will and moral responsibility. In D. Copps (ed.), Handbook on Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Much has been written recently about free will and moral responsibility. In this paper I will focus on the relationship between free will, on the one hand, and various notions that fall under the rubric of “morality,” broadly construed, on the other: deliberation and practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and ethical notions such as “ought,” “right,” “wrong,” “good,” and “bad.” I shall begin by laying out a natural understanding of freedom of the will. Next I develop some challenges to the common-sense view that we have this sort of freedom. I will go on to explore the implications of this challenge for deliberation, moral responsibility, and the central ethical notions
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1998). Morally responsible people without freedom. In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this brief concluding chapter we first wish to present the overall argument of the book in a concise, nontechnical way. We hope this will provide a clear view of the argument. We shall then point to some of the distinctive--and attractive--features of our approach. Finally, we shall offer some preliminary thoughts about extending the account of moral responsibility to apply to emotions
Fischer, John Martin (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. The essays seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression
Fischer, John Martin (2009). Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: "meaning in life and death : our stories" -- John Martin Fischer and Anthony B rueckner, "Why is death bad?", Philosophical studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (September 1986) -- "Death, badness, and the impossibility of experience," Journal of ethics -- John Martin Fischer and Daniel Speak, "Death and the psychological conception of personal identity," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 24 -- "Earlier birth and later death : symmetry through thick and thin," Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, eds., The good, the right, life and death (Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing, 2006) -- "Why immortality is not so bad," International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (September 1994) -- John Martin Fischer and Ruth Curl, "Philosophical models of immortality in science fiction," in George Slusser et. al., eds., Immortal engines : life extension and immortality in science fiction and fantasy (Athens, Ga. : University of Georgia Press, 1996) -- "Epicureanism about death and immortality," Journal of ethics, vol. 10, no. 4 -- "Stories," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 20 -- "Free will, death, and immortality : the role of narrative," Philosophical papers (Special issue : meaning in life) volume 34, number 3, November 2005 -- "Stories and the meaning of life," revised and expanded version of "A reply to Pereboom, Zimmerman, and Smith," part of a book symposium on John Martin Fischer, my way : essays on moral responsibility, philosophical books, vol. 47, no. 3.
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 193 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism
Fischer, John Martin (2005). Reply: The free will revolution. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):145 – 156.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2006). The free will revolution (continued). Journal of Ethics 10 (3):315-345.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji. In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas
Fischer, John Martin (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Study of Control. Blackwell.   (Cited by 85 | Google)
Franklin, Christopher Evan (2006). Plausibility, manipulation, and Fischer and Ravizza. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):173-192.   (Google)
Glannon, W. (1999). Responsibility and control: Fischer's and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility. Law and Philosophy 18 (2):187-213.   (Google | More links)
Glannon, Walter (1997). Semicompatibilism and anomalous monism. Philosophical Papers 26 (3):211-231.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Introduction: Semi-compatibilism, reasons-responsiveness, and ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):91 – 93.   (Google | More links)
Judisch, Neal (2005). Responsibility, manipulation and ownership: Reflections on the fischer/ravizza program. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):115-130.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have constructed a theory of moral responsibility according to which agents are responsible only if they take responsibility in a particular way. Crucial to taking responsibility is coming to adopt a certain set of beliefs about oneself, such as the belief that one is a legitimate target of attitudes like gratitude and resentment, praise and blame. Moreover, agents must come to adopt this belief in a way that is 'appropriately based' upon their evidence, if they are to be genuinely responsible for what they do. In this paper I argue that agents need not meet these conditions in order to be morally responsible. I offer a case in which the agent thinks of himself as responsible, appears to be responsible, but fails to take responsibility in Fischer and Ravizza's sense. I then argue that Fischer and Ravizza's account of responsibility for consequences is in conflict with their contention that individuals who reject the justifiability of responsibility ascriptions fail, thereby, to be morally responsible agents
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2007). Agents and mechanisms: Fischer's way. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):123–130.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2002). Excusing responsibility for the inevitable. Philosophical Studies 111 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   It is by now well established that the fact that an action or aconsequence was inevitable does not excuse the agent from responsibilityfor it, so long as the counterfactual intervention which ensures thatthe act will take place is not actualized. However, in this paper I demonstrate that there is one exception to this principle: when theagent is aware of the counterfactual intervener and the role she wouldplay in some alternative scenario, she might be excused, despite the fact that in the actual scenario she acts, as we say, of her own freewill. I illustrate this contention by way of a critique of Fischer andRavizza''s well-known account of responsibility for consequences
McKenna, Michael S. (2005). Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Pike, Nelson (1984). Fischer on freedom and foreknowledge. Philosophical Review 93 (October):599-614.   (Google | More links)
Ravizza, Mark (1994). Semi-compatibilism and the transfer of non-responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):61-93.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (2005). Fischer and Ravizza on history and ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):103-114.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (2007). Review of J. M. Fischer's My Way. The Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (3):353-357.   (Google)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1998). Critical notice of John Martin Fischer's the metaphysics of free will: An essay in control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):95-117.   (Google)
Speak, Daniel James (1999). Fischer and avoidability: A reply to Widerker and Katzoff. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):239-247.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Speak, Daniel James (2005). Semi-compatibilism and stalemate. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):95-102.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (2008). Moral responsibility and the irrelevance of physics: Fischer's semi-compatibilism vs. anti-fundamentalism. Journal of Ethics 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected
Taylor, James Stacey (2001). John Martin Fischer and mark Ravizza, responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (1).   (Google)
Todd, Patrick & Tognazzini, Neal A. (2008). A problem for guidance control. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):685-692.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Central to Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility is the concept of guidance control, which involves two conditions: (1) moderate reasons-responsiveness, and (2) mechanism ownership. We raise a worry for Fischer and Ravizza's account of (1). If an agent acts contrary to reasons which he could not recognize, this should lead us to conclude that he is not morally responsible for his behaviour; but according to Fischer and Ravizza's account, he satisfies the conditions for guidance control and is therefore morally responsible. We consider ways in which the account of guidance control might be mended
Vihvelin, Kadri (1998). John Martin Fischer, the metaphysics of free will. Noûs 32 (3):406-420.   (Google | More links)
Vihvelin, Kadri (1998). John Martin Fischer, the metaphysics of free will (oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Noûs 32 (3):406–420.   (Google | More links)
Watson, Gary (1998). Some Worries About Semi-Compatibilism. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):135-143.   (Google)
Yaffe, Gideon (2000). Review of John Fischer and mark Ravizza's responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Erkenntnis 53 (3).   (Google)
Zimmerman, D. (1994). Acts, omissions, and semi-compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):209-23.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

5.4b.8 Theories of Free Will, Misc

Albritton, Rogers (1985). Freedom of the will and freedom of action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59:239-51.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Alter, Torin & Daw, Russell (2001). Free acts and robot cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.   (Google)
Abstract: (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
Ayers, Michael R. (1968). The Refutation of Determinism. Methuen.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (2005). Can we ever be really, truly, ultimately, free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Cain, James (2005). Fred Berthold, jr God, evil, and human learning: A critique and revision of the free will defense in theodicy. (Albany NY: State university of new York press, 2004). Pp. VIII+108. $32.00 (hbk). ISBN 0 7914 6041 X. Religious Studies 41 (4):480-483.   (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1951). Is "free will" a pseudoproblem? Mind 60 (240):441-65.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Contrastive rational explanation of free choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1995). Freedom and determinism. Philosophical Books 36 (1):9-18.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2002). Free will. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Couenhoven, Jesse (2007). Augustine's rejection of the free-will defence: An overview of the late Augustine's theodicy. Religious Studies 43 (3):279-298.   (Google)
Coughlan, Michael J. (forthcoming). The free will defence and natural evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
D'angelo, Edward (1968). The Problem Of Freedom And Determinism. Columbia: University Of Missouri Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dardis, Anthony (2009). Four views on free will. By John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Metaphilosophy 40 (1):147-153.   (Google)
Dilman, Ilham (1999). Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: The debate between free will and its opposing doctrine, determinism, is one of the key issues in philosophy. Ilham Dilman brings together all the dimensions of the problem of free will with examples from literature, ethics and psychoanalysis, and draws out valuable insights from both sides of the freedom-determinism divide. The book provides a comprehensive introduction to this highly important question and examines the contributions made by sixteen of the most outstanding thinkers from the time of early Greece to modern times: Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Freud, Sartre, Weil, Wittgenstein, Moore
Dilley, Frank B. (2004). Robert Kane (ed.), The oxford handbook of free will. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (2).   (Google)
Double, Richard (1992). How rational must free will be? Metaphilosophy 23 (3):268-78.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1997). Misdirection on the free will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question.
Double, Richard (1993). The principle of rational explanation defended. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):133-142.   (Google)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (ed.) (2001). Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Westview.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A companion volume to Free Will: A Philosophical Study , this new anthology collects influential essays on free will, including both well-known contemporary classics and exciting recent work. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom is divided into three parts. The essays in the first section address metaphysical issues concerning free will and causal determinism. The second section groups papers presenting a positive account of the nature of free action, including competing compatibilist and incompatibilist analyses. The third section concerns free will and moral responsibility, including theories of moral responsibility and the challenge to an alternative possibilities condition posed by Frankurt-type scenarios. Distinguished by its balance and consistently high quality, the volume presents papers selected for their significance, innovation, and clarity of expression. Contributors include Harry Frankfurt, Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Elizabeth Anscombe, John Martin Fischer, Michael Bratman, Roderick Chisholm, Robert Kane, Peter Strawson, and Susan Wolf. The anthology serves as an up-to-date resource for scholars as well as a useful text for courses in ethics, philosophy of religion, or metaphysics. In addition, paired with Free Will: A Philosophical Study, it would form an excellent upper-level undergraduate or graduate-level course in free will, responsibility, motivation, or action theory
Furlong, F. W. (1981). Determinism and free will: Review of the literature. American Journal of Psychiatry 138:435-39.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gale, Richard M. (1990). Freedom and the free will defense. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):397-423.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: It is my purpose to explore some of the problems concerning the relation between divine creation and creaturely freedom by criticizing various versions of the Free Will Defense (FWD hereafter).1 The FWD attempts to show how it is possible for God and moral evil to co-exist by describing a possible world in which God is morally justified or exonerated for creating persons who freely go wrong. Each version of the FWD has its own story to tell of how it is possible that God be frustrated in his endeavor to create a universe containing moral good sans moral evil. The value of free will is supposed to be so great that God is morally exonerated under such circumstances for creating the Mr. Rogers type persons you know, the very same people who are good sometimes are bad sometimes. If it is objected that God could not be unlucky in this manner, that it necessarily is within his power to create goody-goody persons, either by supernaturally willing in his own inimitable manner that it be so, which is the theological compatibilist objection, or by a judicious selection of the initial state of the universe and operant causal laws which together entail that every free action be morally right, which is the causal compatibilist objection, the response is that it is logically incompatible that a creaturely free action be determined by God or by anything external to the agent, such as causes outside of the agent
Ginet, Carl & Palmer, David (2010). On Mele and Robb's indeterministic Frankfurt-style case. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.   (Google)
Gregg, John (ms). Free Will.   (Google)
Hall, Roland (1965). Free will--a short bibliography. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (59):179-181.   (Google | More links)
Hawthorne, John (2001). Freedom in context. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):63-79.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Himma, Kenneth Einar (2009). The free-will defence: Evil and the moral value of free will. Religious Studies 45 (4):395-415.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (2010). Disentangling the Will. In Al Mele, Kathleen Vohs & Roy Baumeister (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (New York: OUP, 2010). OUP.   (Google)
Abstract: It is argued that there are at least three things bundled up in the idea of free will: the capacity manifested by agents whenever they act freely; the property possessed by those actions for which an agent in morally responsible; and the ability to do otherwise. This paper attempts some disentangling
Honderich, Ted (1988). A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (1993). How Free Are You? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: _Can attitudes like those that have seemed welded to indeterminism and free will_ _actually go with determinism? Is it not a contradiction to suppose so? The little_ _Oxford University Press book_ _How Free Are You?_ _in its first edition, much_ _translated, was a summary of the indigestible or anyway not widely digested_
Honderich, Ted (ms). Manuel R. Vargas: The revisionist's guide to responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is, roughly, the idea that some aspect of our responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. In this paper, I argue that (1) in spite of being an increasingly prevalent thread in discussions of moral responsibility, revisionism is poorly understood, (2) the limited critical discussion there has been of it does not reflect the complexities and nuances of revisionist theories, and (3) at least one species of revisionismmoderate revisionism- has some advantages over conventional compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. If I am right, one result is that the outcome of prominent debates about the compatibility (or not) of determinism and our commonsense thinking about moral responsibility may be less crucial than they seem
Hook, Sidney (ed.) (1958). Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Collier-Macmillan.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Janew, Claus (2009). How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: The present text is a very abridged version of a book I wrote out of the desire to examine the structure of our reality from a standpoint unbiased by established teachings, be they academic- scientific, popular- esoteric, or religious in nature. We will begin with seemingly simple interactions in our daily lives, examine how they originate on a deeper level, come to understand the essentials of consciousness, and finally recognize that we create our reality in its entirety. In the course of this quest, we will uncover little-heeded paths to accessing our subconscious, other individuals, and that which can be understood by the term "God". And the solution to the classical problem of free will constitutes the gist of the concepts thus revealed.
Janew, Claus (2009). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. In How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every effect exists in the perception of a consciousness. I elaborate on its freedom of choice, in my view the most important source of creativity, in a similarly general way. The problems associated with a really conscious decision do not disappear by mixing determination with a touch of coincidence. Both must enter into a higher unity. In so doing it will emerge that a certain degree of freedom of choice is just as omnipresent as consciousness - an inherent part of reality itself.





























Kane, Robert H. (ed.) (2001). Free Will. Blackwell.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (ed.) (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google)
Abstract: This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as a whole, the Handbook provides an engaging and accessible roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic
Lehrer, Keith (ed.) (1966). Freedom and Determinism. Random House.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Levy, Neil & McKenna, Michael (2009). Recent work on free will and moral responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck
Lyons, Edward C. (ms). All the freedom you can want: The purported collapse of the problem of free will.   (Google)
Abstract:      Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable for its consequences. The standard argument against free choice asserts that free choice cannot exist because determinism, as a property of laws governing the cosmos, excludes such a possibility. This contingent factual claim, however, has always proven problematic. Contemporary discussions - no doubt aware of this disputed factual premise - draw upon a more novel, and arguably more devastating critique: free will must be rejected because its very conception is incoherent. Rather than assuming the existence of determinism and attempting to show its incompatibility with free will, this argument begins with consideration of the idea of free choice and concludes that, if it is to have any sense at all, it must be compatible with determinism. Obviously, no single treatment of the free will problem could address all its nuances. This Article more modestly offers one possible approach to the question. Part I elaborates in more detail the view that the traditional conception of free choice is incoherent and, thus, inevitably undermines the very responsibility it is asserted to constitute; Part II considers the resulting effort to develop a model of human freedom compatible with determinism; and Part III, drawing upon the prior discussions, describes - in terms of classical action theory - a conception of free choice justifying personal moral and legal responsibility that avoids both the incoherence of "uncaused freedom" as well as the shortcomings of determinism
Manis, R. Zachary (2006). On transworld depravity and the heart of the free will defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (3).   (Google)
Mawson, T. J. (2004). The possibility of a free-will defence for the problem of natural evil. Religious Studies 40 (1):23-42.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I consider various arguments to the effect that natural evils are necessary for there to be created agents with free will of the sort that the traditional free-will defence for the problem of moral evil suggests we enjoy – arguments based on the idea that evil-doing requires the doer to use natural means in their agency. I conclude that, despite prima facie plausibility, these arguments do not, in fact, work. I provide my own argument for there being no possible world in which creatures enjoying this sort of freedom exist yet suffer no natural evil, and conclude that the way is thus open for extending the free-will defence to the problem of natural evil. (Published Online February 17 2004)
Meynell, Hugo (2002). Some recent books on free will. Heythrop Journal 43 (4):496–501.   (Google | More links)
Morriston, Wes (2005). Power, liability, and the free-will defence: Reply to Mawson. Religious Studies 41 (1):71-80.   (Google)
Abstract: Tim Mawson argues that the ability to choose what one knows to be morally wrong is a power for some persons in some circumstances, but that it would be a mere liability for God. The lynchpin of Mawson's argument is his claim that a power is an ability that it is good to have. In this rejoinder, I challenge this claim of Mawson's, arguing that choosing a course of action is always an exercise of power, whether or not it is good for one to have that power. I then go on to develop an argument for saying that if (for the reasons presented by Mawson) it is not good for God to have the ability to make evil choices, then it isn't good for us to have it either, in which case the free-will defence is unsustainable
Moser, Paul K. (forthcoming). Natural evil and the free will defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (2005). Free will, evil, and divine providence. In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Pruss, Alexander R. (2008). The essential divine-perfection objection to the free-will defence. Religious Studies 44 (4):433-444.   (Google)
Ratzscdelh, (1981). Tomberlin and McGuinness on Plantinga's free will defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (4).   (Google)
Rieber, Steven (2006). Free will and contextualism. Philosophical Studies 129 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible, the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle
Rowe, William L. (1987). Causality and free will in the controversy between Collins and Clarke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1).   (Google)
Rowe, William L. (1998). In defense of 'the free will defense' response to Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (2):115-120.   (Google)
Schellenberg, J. L. (2004). The atheist's free will offence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (1):1-15.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper criticizes the assumption,omnipresent in contemporary philosophy ofreligion, that a perfectly good and loving Godwould wish to confer on (at least some) finitepersons free will. An alternative mode ofDivine-human relationship is introduced andshown to be as conducive to the realization ofvalue as one involving free will.Certain implications of this result are thenrevealed, to wit, that the theists free willdefence against the problem of evil isunsuccessful, and what is more, that free will,if it exists, provides positive support foratheism
Schoenig, Richard (1998). The free will theodicy. Religious Studies 34 (4):457-470.   (Google)
Shariff, Azim F. & Peterson, Jordan B. (2005). Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's Veto and a close-enough theory of free will. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Sidgwick, H. (1888). The Kantian conception of free will. Mind 13 (51):405-412.   (Google | More links)
Smilansky, Saul (ms). Egalitarianism, free will, and ultimate injustice.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Egalitarianism is a major contemporary position on issues of distributive justice and related public policy. Its major strand can be called “choice-egalitarianism”, broadly, the claim that inequality can be morally justified only when it follows from people’s choices.1 I claim that the choice-egalitarians have failed to recognize a deep sense of injustice, which I call Ultimate Injustice. This form of injustice follows from the implications of the free will problem. Part I of this paper explains what Ultimate Injustice is, explicates egalitarian aims and assumptions, and notes why free