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5.4b.2. Compatibilism (Compatibilism on PhilPapers)

Abbruzzese, John (2000). Garrett on the theological objection to Hume's compatibilism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):345 – 352.   (Google | More links)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1976). 'Soft' determinism. In Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Oriel Press.   (Google)
Aune, Bruce (1963). Abilities, modalities, and free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Aune, Bruce (1970). Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1991). Free-will and determinism. In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.   (Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1954). Freedom and necessity. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophical Essays. St.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Ayer, A. J. (1980). Free will and rationality. In Z. van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Bahm, Archie J. (1965). The freedom-determinism controversy. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 9 (January):48-55.   (Google)
Bain, A. (1880). Dr. ward on free-will. Mind 5 (17):116-124.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder, What is human freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theoretical significance
Balsillie, D. (1911). Prof. Bergson on time and free will. Mind 20 (79):357-378.   (Google | More links)
Balaguer, Mark, The metaphysical irrelevance of the compatibilism debate (and, more generally, of conceptual analysis).   (Google)
Abstract: It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes-for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will-except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questionsnamely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility-are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings
Bassoff, Bruce (1964). Free will and determinism. Journal of Existentialism 4:259-262.   (Google)
Beckermann, Ansgar (2005). Free will in a natural order of the world. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Beckermann, Ansgar (ms). Would biological determinism rule outthe possibility of freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: I shall disclose the answer to the title question straight away, and the answer is “NO, it would not”. If it turned out that we really are neurobi- ologically determined beings, this result would not necessitate any change in our idea of humanity – it would not affect the idea that we are free and responsible human beings. Or at any rate, it would not do so under certain conditions of which I am sure that, as a matter of fact, they are satisfied. But let us first ask the question, “Whence the opposite con- viction, according to which it would prove a disaster for our self-image and the idea that we are free and responsible beings if it emerged that everything we do, think or feel is completely determined by biological factors?”
Beebee, Helen & Mele, Alfred R. (2002). Humean compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a false premiss. We also display some striking similarities between Humean compatibilism and libertarianism, an incompatibilist view. For example, standard libertarians face a problem about luck, and we show that Humean compatibilists face a very similar problem
Beebee, Helen (2003). Local miracle compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Beebee, Helen (2008). Smilansky's alleged refutation of compatibilism. Analysis 68 (299):258–260.   (Google | More links)
Benson, S. (1994). Free agency and self-worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Benson, S. (1987). Freedom and value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Ben-Menahem, Yemima (1986). Newcomb's paradox and compatibilism. Erkenntnis 25 (2).   (Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (2005). Can we ever be really, truly, ultimately, free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2010). Free will and the mind–body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As bona fide laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). Global control and freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, the global controller nullifies freedom because she is an agent, whereas natural forces are at work in conventional deterministic worlds. Other key differences that undermine the analogy are identified. It is also shown that the argument begs the question against the classical compatibilist, who believes that determinism does not preclude alternative possibilities
Berofsky, Bernard (2002). Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (1995). Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This is the most detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy currently available. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A sustained critique of concepts such as moral autonomy, self-realisation, ideal autonomy, and identification is offered. The author replaces these with an alternative model that reveals how spontaneity, vitality and competence enable human beings to act in the real world
Bergmann, Frithjof (1977). On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bernecker, Sven (2006). Prospects for epistemic compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Berofsky, Bernard (2000). Ultimate rsponsibility in a determined world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.   (Google)
Bishop, John D. (1993). Compatibilism and the free will defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.   (Google)
Bobzien, Susanne (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today
Bok, Hilary (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I do?" and sifting through alternatives to find the most justifiable course of action--we have reason to hold ourselves responsible for what we do. But when we engage in theoretical reasoning--searching for causal explanations of events--we have no reason to apply concepts like freedom and responsibility. Bok contends that libertarians' arguments against "compatibilist" justifications of moral responsibility fail because they describe human actions only from the standpoint of theoretical reasoning. To establish this claim, she examines which conceptions of freedom of the will and moral responsibility are relevant to practical reasoning and shows that these conceptions are not vulnerable to many objections that libertarians have directed against compatibilists. Bok concludes that the truth or falsity of the claim that we are free and responsible agents in the sense those conceptions spell out is ultimately independent of deterministic accounts of the causes of human actions.Clearly written and powerfully argued, Freedom and Responsibility is a major addition to current debate about some of philosophy's oldest and deepest questions.
Boysen, Thomas (2004). Death of a compatibilistic intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.   (Google | More links)
Bregant, Janez (2003). The problem of causal exclusion and Horgan's causal compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.   (Google)
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2006). Compatibilism and doxastic control. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable
Byrd, Jeremy (2008). Kant's compatibilism in the new eludication of the first principles of metaphysical cognition. Kant-Studien 99 (1).   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (1997). A compatibilist theory of alternate possibilities. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):339-44.   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2005). Compatibilist alternatives. Canadian Journal Of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: _If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in whose shadow Wittgenstein ought to be standing,_ _considered the matter. He pointed out that even if determinism is true, there remains a sense in which you_ _can still do otherwise than you do: you will do otherwise if you so choose. That, on reflection, is consistent_ _with determinism. The doctrine of the compatibility of freedom and determinism is saved. Joseph Keim_ _Campbell, strong philosopher at Washington State University, provides the latest thinking on this seemingly_ _unavoidable dispute. You do not have to agree that either compatibilism or incompatibilism must be true in_ _order to appreciate the carefulness of his reasoning in this piece of ongoing American philosophy. It_ _requires and repays attention._
Canfield, John V. (1961). Determinism, free will and the ace predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1963). Free will and determinism: A reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1962). The compatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Review 71 (July):352-368.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Chappell, Vere (ms). Descartes’s compatibilism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilism is the doctrine that the doctrine of determinism is logically consistent with the doctrine of libertarianism. Determinism is the doctrine that every being and event is brought about by causes other than itself. Libertarianism is the doctrine that some human actions are free. Was Descartes a compatibilist? There is no doubt that he was a libertarian: his works are full of professions of freedom, human as well as divine. And though he held that God has no cause other than himself, Descartes thought that everything apart from God is externally caused: he was a determinist with respect to the created universe. So it appears, assuming him consistent with himself, that Descartes must have been a compatibilist. And indeed, there are passages in his writings in which he appears explicitly to affirm that he is. Since both Descartes’s libertarianism and his determinism are complex doctrines, however, his view of the relation between them is complex as well
Clarke, Randolph (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points of dispute concerning free will.
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2007). Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument
Crissman, Paul (1942). Freedom in determinism. Journal of Philosophy 39 (September):520-526.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2006). The trouble with externalist compatibilist autonomy. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve the CNC manipulation problem. After briefly reflecting on the present status of responses to the manipulation problem in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists of various stripes, I will draw the over-all pessimistic conclusion that no party deals with this problem satisfactorily
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2004). The trouble with Harry: Compatibilist free will internalism and manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Danto, Arthur C. & Morgenbesser, Sidney (1957). Character and free will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (16):493-505.   (Google | More links)
Davison, Scott A. (1994). Dretske on the metaphysics of freedom. Analysis 54 (2):115-123.   (Google)
Davidson, Donald (1973). Freedom to act. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Deery, Oisín (2007). Extending compatibilism: Control, responsibility, and blame. Res Publica 13 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. MIT Press.   (Cited by 473 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel Clement (2003). Freedom Evolves. Viking.   (Google)
Abstract: Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems of moral and political freedom. Like the planet's atmosphere on which life depends, the conditions on which our freedom depends had to evolve, and like the atmosphere, they continue to evolve-and could be extinguished. According to Dennett, biology provides the perspective from which we can distinguish the varieties of freedom that matter. Throughout the history of life on this planet, an interacting web and internal and external conditions have provided the frameworks for the design of agents that are more free than their parts-from the unwitting gropings of the simplest life forms to the more informed activities of animals to the moral dilemmas that confront human beings living in societies. As in his previous books, Dennett weaves a richly detailed narrative enlivened by analogies as entertaining as they are challenging. Here is the story of how we came to be different from all other creatures, how our early ancestors mindlessly created human culture, and then, how culture gave us our minds, our visions, our moral problems-in a nutshell, our freedom
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Natural freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-458.   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. & Taylor, Christopher (ms). Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is no doctrine about determinism and freedom that has proved to be as resilient over the past century as that of Compatibilism. It is, of course, the doctrine that we can be both free and also subject to a real determinism. If it goes back at least to Hobbes and Hume, it was strengthened and refurbished throughout the 1900's. Part of its strength has been the extent to which it has satisfied theses that in fact seem to be the very substance of the doctrine opposed to it. This is Incompatibilism. What follows here is the most recent and the very best attempt to steal what has appeared to be the thunder of Incompatibilism. Professors Taylor and Dennett make use of a certain amount of technicality in giving sense, on the assumption of determinism, to the ideas that we can nevertheless do otherwise than we actually do and we can also really take credit for things. It is not my own view, but it is one that must be reckoned with by all who struggle with the problem. Put in some effort with the formalism if you have to, find out a little about possible worlds. It is certainly worth the effort
Dänzer, Lars (2008). A neglected argument for compatibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):211-218.   (Google)
Dore, Clement (1963). Is free will compatible with determinism? Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1996). Honderich on the consequences of determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):847-854.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1988). Meta-compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):323-329.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dworkin, Gerald B. (1970). Acting freely. Noûs 4 (November):367-83.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Eggerman, Richard W. (1976). The language of soft determinism. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7:91-99.   (Google)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (1998). Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation
Everson, Stephen (1990). Aristotle's compatibilism in the nicomachean ethics. Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):81-103.   (Google)
Fales, Evan (1984). Davidson's compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):227-246.   (Google | More links)
Falk, Arthur E. (1981). On some modal confusions in compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):141-48.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fara, Michael (2008). Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind 117 (468).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of agential abilities in terms of dispositions. The analysis is shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to incompatibilism about free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the “master argument” for incompatibilism is unsound
Feltz, Adam; Cokely, Edward T. & Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2009). Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Abstract: In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far
Ferraiolo, William (2004). Against compatibilism: Compulsion, free agency and moral responsibility. Sorites 15 (December):67-72.   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1996). A new compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24:49-66.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2007). Compatibilism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2005). Dennett on the basic argument. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Christopher Taylor has greatly clarified my thinking on this topic and shown me how to launch a deeper and more radical campaign in support of my earlier claims to this effect, and our coauthored paper (Taylor and Dennett 2001) provides more technical detail than is needed here. Here I will attempt a gentler version of our argument, highlighting the main points so that non-philosophers can at least see what the points of contention are, and how we propose to settle them, while leaving out almost all the logical formulae. Philosophers should consult the full-dress version, of course, to see if we have actually tied off the loose ends, and closed the loopholes that are passed by without mention in this telling. (Dennett
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-style compatibilism. In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Abstract: In this essay I shall begin by sketching a "Frankfurt-type example." I shall then lay out a disturbing challenge to the claim I have made above that these examples help us to make significant progress in the debates about the relationship between moral responsibility and causal determinism. I then will provide a reply to this challenge, and the reply will point toward a more refined formulation of the important contribution I believe Frankfurt has made to defending a certain sort of compatibilism.
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Flint, Thomas P. (1987). Compatibilism and the argument from unavoidability. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):423-40.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1978). Compatibilism. Kind 87 (July):421-28.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1979). Compatibilism and control over the past. Analysis 39 (March):70-74.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1981). Compatibilism: A reply to Shaw. Mind 90 (April):287-288.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1980). Reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 40 (March):101-103.   (Google)
Foot, Philippa (1957). Free will as involving determinism. Philosophical Review 66 (October):439-50.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Fowler, C. A. (1996). A pragmatic defense of free will. Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):247-60.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Intentionality and intentional action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.   (Google | More links)
Garvey, Brian (2008). Free will, compatibilism and the human nature wars. .   (Google)
Abstract: There has been much controversy over whether the claims of evolutionary psychologists, if true, imply that we humans are significantly less free than has traditionally been thought. This in turn gives rise to the concern that excuses are being given to philanderers and other ne’er-do-wells for their behaviour. Evolutionary psychologists themselves often respond to this concern by claiming that it presupposes that they believe in genetic determinism, which they do not. Philosophers, such as Janet Radcliffe Richards in Human Nature after Darwin, respond by appealing to compatibilist accounts of free will. The thought is that whether or not our behaviour is caused by evolved mental mechanisms, has no bearing on whether or not it is free. The present paper takes issue with this use of compatibilist arguments. Compatibilist accounts of free will do not just say that an action can be determined and still free; they also distinguish between situations where we are free and ones where we are not. The latter includes not just situations of external coercion, but also situations where there are internal obstacles such as compulsion, addiction or self-deception. While not attempting to outline a full account of what it is to be free, this paper will outline one set of conditions which are sufficient for our freedom to be said to be restricted – conditions which are shared by situations of addiction, self-deception, etc. But a central pillar of evolutionary psychology is that the mind consists wholly or largely of modules whose operation is mandatory. The outputs of these modules are often characterised as desires or goals. It will be argued that this implies internal obstacles to free will that are relevantly similar to the obstacles of addiction, self-deception, etc. It is ultimately a scientific question, and hence outside the scope of this paper, whether the relevant evolutionary-psychological claims are true or not. However, they are central to the discipline, and this paper will argue that if they are true that has negative consequences for how free we are. Hence, the view that evolutionary psychology implies that we are less free than has traditionally been thought is not without foundation
Gert, Bernard & Duggan, Timothy J. (1979). Free will as the ability to will. Noûs 13 (2):197-217.   (Google | More links)
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Graham, Peter A. (2008). A defense of local miracle compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 140 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2002). Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Haji, By Ishtiyaque (2008). Dispositional compatibilism and Frankfurt-type examples. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):226–241.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article critically examines Kadri Vihvelin's proposal that to have free will is to have the ability to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to have this ability is to have a bundle of dispositions that can be exercised in more than one way. It is argued that partisans of Frankfurt examples can still make a powerful case for the view that being able to do otherwise, even on Vihvelin's compatibilist explication of ‘could have done otherwise,’ is not required for moral responsibility
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Introduction: Semi-compatibilism, reasons-responsiveness, and ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):91 – 93.   (Google | More links)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (1998). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility
Hannan, Barbara & Lehrer, Keith (1989). Compatibilism, determinism, and the identity theory. Inquiry 32 (March):49-54.   (Google)
Hanson, David J. (1970). Science, determinism and free will. Journal of Social Research 13 (March):49-54.   (Google)
Hannaford, Robert V. (1976). Who's in control here? Philosophy 51 (October):421-430.   (Google)
Harding, Gregory (1997). Free will and determinism: Why compatibilism is false. Erkenntnis 47 (3):311-349.   (Google | More links)
Harris, James A. (2005). Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eighteenth century was a time of brilliant philosophical innovation in Britain. In Of Liberty and Necessity James A. Harris presents the first comprehensive account of the period's discussion of what remains a central problem of philosophy, the question of the freedom of the will. He offers new interpretations of contributions to the free will debate made by canonical figures such as Locke, Hume, Edwards, and Reid, and also discusses in detail the arguments of some less familiar writers. Harris puts the eighteenth-century debate about the will and its freedom in the context of the period's concern with applying what Hume calls the "experimental method of reasoning" to the human mind. His book will be of substantial interest to historians of philosophy and anyone concerned with the free will problem
Hausman, D. B. (1975). Compatibilism again. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (March):509-514.   (Google)
Helm, Paul (2010). God, compatibilism, and the authorship of sin. Religious Studies 46 (1):115-124.   (Google)
Heller, M. (1996). The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-37.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hobart, R. E. (1934). Free will as involving determinism and inconceivable without it. Mind 43 (169):1-27.   (Google | More links)
Hodgson, Shadworth H. (1885). Free-will and compulsory determinism: A dialogue. Mind 10 (40):532-556.   (Google | More links)
Holton, Richard (2007). Freedom, coercion and discursive control. In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If moral and political philosophy is to be of any use, it had better be concerned with real people. The focus need not be exclusively on people as they are; but it should surely not extend beyond how they would be under laws as they might be. It is one of the strengths of Philip Pettit’s work that it is concerned with real people and the ways that they think: with the commonplace mind. In this paper I examine Pettit’s recent work on free will.2 Much of my concern will be to see how his contentions fit with empirical findings about human psychology. Pettit is a compatibilist about free will: he holds that it is compatible with determinism. But he finds fault with existing compatibilist accounts, and then proposes his own amendment. My aim is to challenge his grounds for finding fault; and then to raise some questions about his own positive account
Holmstrom, Nancy (1977). Firming up soft determinism. Personalist 58 (January):39-51.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Holton, Richard (2009). Determinism, self-efficacy, and the phenomenology of free will. Inquiry 52 (4):412 – 428.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible. I suggest a different explanation, and in doing so try to shed some light on the phenomenology of free will. I contend that one aspect of the phenomenology is our impression that maintaining a resolution requires effort—an impression well supported by a range of psychological data. Determinism can easily be interpreted as showing that such effort will be futile: in effect determinism is conflated with fatalism, in a way that is reminiscent of the Lazy argument used against the Stoics. If this interpretation is right, it explains how belief in determinism undermines moral motivation without needing to attribute sophisticated incompatibilist beliefs to subjects; it works by undermining subjects' self-efficacy. It also provides indirect support for the contention that this is one of the sources of the phenomenology of free will
Holton, Richard (forthcoming). Response to 'free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William crescioni and Jessica L. alquist. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (2006). The act of choice. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (3):1-15.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Choice is one of the central elements in the experience of free will, but it has not received a good account from either compatibilists or libertarians. This paper develops an account of choice based around three features: (i) choice is an action; (ii) choice is not determined by one's prior beliefs and desires; (iii) once the question of what to do has arisen, choice is typically both necessary and sufficient for moving to action. These features might appear to support a libertarian account, but they do not. Instead it is argued that all three features can be accommodated within a compatibilist account, where choice is needed because of agents' inabilities to arrive at judgements about what is best. Choice differs though from random picking: in choosing, agents frequently (though not always) deploy abilities that enable them to make good choices. In such cases, judgements about what is best will frequently follow the choice. Finally choice is distinguished from agency, and, on the basis of the distinction, the claim that choice is an action is made good.
Honderich, Ted (online). After compatibilism and incompatibilism.   (Google)
Abstract: A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run up against a conviction owed to reflecting on your own past life. The conviction is that an attitude akin to one tied to indeterminism, a way of holding yourself morally responsible, has some basis despite the truth of determinism. We need to look for radical ideas here, as radical as Consciousness as Existence with the problem of perceptual consciousness. Could that doctrine help with determinism and freedom? Could a problem about causation and explanation do so?
Honderich, Ted (2006). Compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem. The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy Website.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1996). Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the Smart aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):855-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (2002). Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (ms). Determinism's consequences -- the mistakes of compatibilism and incompatibilism, and what is to be done now.   (Google)
Abstract: From before the time of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th Century, right up to John Searle's impertinent piece in Journal of Consciousness Studies a few months ago, and a major conference in Idaho in April, philosophers of determinism and freedom have divided into Compatibilists and Incompatibilists. The first regiment says that determinism is logically compatible with freedom. The second says it is logically incompatible. They can do this. In a way it is easy-peasy. The first regiment achieves its end by defining free decisions and actions as voluntary: owed to certain causes rather than others -- causes somehow internal to the agent rather than external or constraining causes. The second regiment satisfies itself by defining free decisions and actions as not only voluntary but also originated -- where an originated event, however mysterious, is definitely not a causally necessitated one
Honderich, Ted (2002). How free are you? The determinism problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Abstract: In this fully revised and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic, he offers a concise and lively introduction to free will and the problem of determinism, advancing the debate on this key area of moral philosophy. Honderich sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question, "Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?" and asks instead if there is such a clear version of free will. He goes on to address the question of whether determinism is true and finally asks, "What can we conclude about our lives if determinism is true?"
Honderich, Ted (online). Thomas Hobbes: Causation, determinism, and their compatibility with freedom.   (Google)
Abstract: _What Thomas Hobbes has to say of the nature of causation itself in_ _Entire Causes_ _and Their Only Possible Effects_ _is carried further in the first of the two excerpts here_ _-- although not at its start. His second subject in this imperfectly sequential piece of_ _writing is determinism itself -- a deterministic philosophy of mind. In the mind, as_ _elsewhere, each event has a 'necessary cause' -- a cause that necessitates the event._ _His third subject in the first excerpt is freedom, this being voluntariness, and its_ _relation to the determinism. He gives a statement of what is now known as_ _Compatibilism -- roughly the doctrine that determinism and freedom properly_ _understood do not conflict with but are consistent with one another. We can be_ _entirely subject to determinism or 'necessity' and also be perfectly free. Certainly a_ _distinction between freedom as 'the absence of opposition', which can co-exist with_ _determinism, and some other kind of freedom, had been made before Hobbes. But it_ _will take a better historian than me to say if he was anticipated by someone else who_ _said that the particular freedom consistent with determinism is all that we can_ _properly mean by the term 'freedom'. Certainly he got in ahead of lovely_
Horgan, Terence E. (1985). Compatibilism and the consequence argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Howsepian, A. A. (2004). A libertarian-friendly theory of compatibilist free action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):453-480.   (Google)
Howsepian, A. A. (2007). Compatibilism, evil, and the free-will defense. Sophia 46 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical compatibilism
Hudson, Hud (1994). Kant's Compatibilism. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Hume, David (online). Our freedom reconciled with determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness since the first origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression; and that that disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other
Hurst, T. L. (ms). The Demise of Compatibilism?   (Google)
Abstract: This paper suggests that compatibilism is incoherent because determinism allows neither causal input to your choices and actions, nor a sound form of moral responsibility. Free will requires, at least, moral responsibility, if not causal input. Hence, it is not possible to be compatible with both determinism and free will, as they are not compatible with each other.

A form of free will is identified in which our choices are determinate at the time we make them, because they are determined by our natures. However, our natures can change over time, and the unique ability of sentient beings to reflect on choices, actions and events allows input to that process. Thus giving us input to future choices.

This form of free will is not compatible with determinism because our choices are not fixed for all time by events in the distant past, but instead become fixed over time as choices are made and events unfold. The term "soft freewillism" is used for the philosophic position that allows this form of determinate free will.
Jennings, Ian (1997). Autonomy and hierarchical compatibilism. South African Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):44-50.   (Google)
Jones, David H. (1968). Deliberation and determinism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 6:255-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Judisch, Neal (2007). Reasons-responsive compatibilism and the consequences of belief. Journal of Ethics 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility
Kane, Robert (2002). Responsibility, reactive attitudes and free will: Reflections on Wallace's theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):693–698.   (Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kapitan, Tomis (1991). Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The use of predicate and sentential operators to express the practical modalities -- ability, control, openness, etc. -- has given new life to a fatalistic argument against determinist theories of responsible agency. A familiar version employs the following principle: the consequences of what is unavoidable (beyond one's control) are themselves unavoidable. Accordingly, if determinism is true, whatever happens is the consequence of events in the remote past, or, of such events together with the laws of nature. But laws and the remote past are not under our control and, by the principle, neither are their consequences. Therefore, none of our choices and actions, nor anything that results from them, is under our control.1 Whether refinements of the closure principle underlying this unavoidability argument are acceptable depends upon the precise sense of 'consequence' and 'unavoidable' involved. Roughly, a proposition P is a consequence of a set of propositions M iff it is impossible that P be false when each member of M is true, or, conversely, when M necessitates P. Since P is unavoidable for S when P is true and S is (was) unable to prevent P from being true, it might seem that if P is unavoidable the same should hold of what is necessitated by P. There is, in fact, 1 an easy defense of the principle which utilizes the incompatibilist condition that S is able to do action K only if it is as yet undetermined whether or not S will K. With it, there is no question but that one is unable to accomplish what is already determined by what one was unable to prevent. Of course, this reasoning is unlikely to impress the compatibilist who rejects the condition outright and, expectedly, it is not the procedure of the proponents of the unavoidability argument. The latter might rest content with appeals to intuition, but more significant are defenses of the closure principle and independent derivations of the unavoidability argument that rely upon distinct principles concerning the logic of the practical modalities, for example, closure of ability under entailment (Cross 1986, Brown 1988) or, claims about the "fixity of the past" and the "inescapability of laws" (Ginet 1990)..
Kapitan, Tomis (2000). Autonomy and manipulated freedom. Philosopical Perspectives 14:81-104.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, compatibilism has been the target of two powerful challenges. According to the consequence argument, if everything we do and think is a consequence of factors beyond our control (past events and the laws of nature), and the consequences of what is beyond our control are themselves beyond our control, then no one has control over what they do or think and no one is responsible for anything. Hence, determinism rules out responsibility. A different challenge--here called the manipulation argument--is that by allowing agents to be fully determined compatibilist accounts of practical freedom and responsibility are unable to preclude those who are subject to global manipulation from being free and responsible
Kapitan, Tomis (1986). Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (April):230-51.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By deliberation we understand practical reasoning with an end in view of choosing some course of action. Integral to it is the agent's sense of alternative possibilities, that is, of two or more courses of action he presumes are open for him to undertake or not. Such acts may not actually be open in the sense that the deliberator would do them were he to so intend, but it is evident that he assumes each to be so. One deliberates only by taking it for granted that both performing and refraining from any of the acts under consideration are possible for one, and that which is to be selected is something entirely up to oneself. What is it for a course of action to be presumed as open, or for several courses of action to present themselves as a range of open alternatives? Answering these questions is essential for an understanding of deliberation and choice and, indeed, for the entire issue of free will and responsibility. According to one common view, a deliberator takes the considered options to be open only by assuming he is free to undertake any of them and, consequently, that whichever he does undertake is, as yet, a wholly undetermined matter. Built into the structure of deliberation, on this theory, is an indeterministic bias relative to which any deliberator with deterministic beliefs is either inconsistent or condemned to a fatalistic limbo. An unmistakable challenge is thereby posed: is there an alternative conception of the presuppositions underlying deliberation more congenial to a deterministic perspective yet adequate to the data? Convinced that there is, I develop a partial account of deliberation that, though highly similar to the aforementioned view, diverges at a critical juncture
Kearns, Stephen (2008). Compatibilism can resist prepunishment: A reply to Smilansky. Analysis 68 (299):250–253.   (Google | More links)
Klein, M. (1990). Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book casts new light on the traditional disagreement between those who hold that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions if they are causally determined, and those who deny this. Klein suggests that reflection on the relation between justice and deprivation offers a way out of this perplexity
Koons, Jeremy Randel (2002). Is hard determinism a form of compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free will. Assuming the correctness of this concession, that leaves compatibilism and hard determinism as the only remaining choices in the free will debate. In this paper, I will argue that hard determinism turns out to be a form of compatibilism, and therefore, compatibilism is the only remaining position in the free will debate. I will attempt to establish this conclusion by arguing that hard determinists will end up punishing or rewarding the same acts (and omissions) that the compatibilists punish and reward. Next, I will respond to several objections that attempt to pry apart hard determinism and compatibilism. It will emerge not only that hard determinism and compatibilism are identical at the practical level, but also that the key terms employed by the hard determinist have the same meaning as equivalent terms ("free," "morally responsible," and "retributive punishment") employed by the compatibilist. I conclude that hard determinism genuinely is a form of compatibilism
Lamb, James W. (1993). Evaluative compatibilism and the principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 60 (10):517-27.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Langsam, Harold (2000). Kant's compatibilism and his two conceptions of truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):164–188.   (Google | More links)
Lehrer, Keith (1976). 'Could' in theory and practice: A possible worlds analysis. In M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel.   (Google)
Lenman, James (2006). Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility. Ethics 117 (1).   (Google)
Lenman, James (2002). On the alleged shallowness of compatibilism: A critical study of Saul Smilansky: Free will and illusion. Iyyun 51 (January):63-79.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The millionaire’s idle, talentless and self-centered daughter inherits a large sum of money that she does not really deserve. The victim of kidnapping rots in a cell in 1980s Beirut in a captivity that springs not from any wrong he has done but from his ill-fortune in being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The hard-working, brilliant and self-denying Nobel Prize-winning scientist receives a large cheque for his extraordinarily productive labours. The murderer spends decades in jail for the terrible crimes he has freely committed. The first two cases are cases where justice seems ill-served, where someone’s good or ill-fortune reflects not what they deserve but mere luck. The second two are cases where justice seems to be honoured: what befalls Scientist and Murderer reflects not their good or bad luck but their merits and deserts
Levin, Michael (2007). Compatibilism and special relativity. Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):433-463.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (online). Closing the door on the belief in ability thesis.   (Google)
Abstract: It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic openness that is entirely compatible with determinism (Dennett 1984; Kapitan 1986). Since, however, the claim that deliberation presupposes freedom is accepted by all sides in the free will debate, it ought to be possible to frame a minimal version that is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism, and which therefore can be accepted by everyone. Peter van Inwagen has advanced the best-known such claim: ‘all philosophers who have thought about deliberation agree on one point: one cannot deliberate about whether to perform a certain act unless one believes it is possible for one to perform it’ (van Inwagen 1983: 154). It is the purpose of this paper to argue that van Inwagen, and the many philosophers who have followed him in this regard, is wrong
Levy, Neil (2009). Luck and history-sensitive compatibilism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote – constitutive – luck
Levy, Neil (2006). On determinism and freedom. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):310-312.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (forthcoming). Restrictivism is a Covert compatibilism. In N. Trakakis (ed.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Abstract: _Libertarian restrictivists hold that agents are rarely directly free. However, they seek to reconcile their views_ _with common intuitions by arguing that moral responsibility, or indirect freedom (depending on the version of_ _restrictivism) is much more common than direct freedom. I argue that restrictivists must give up either the_ _claim that agents are rarely free, or the claim that indirect freedom or responsibility is much more common_ _than direct freedom. Focusing on Kane’s version of restrictivism, I show that the view holds people responsible_ _for actions when (merely) compatibilist conditions are met. Since this is unacceptable by libertarian lights,_ _they must either accept that compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are sufficient, or make their_ _restrictivism more extreme than it already is._
Levy, Neil & Mckenna, Michael (2007). Symposium on free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):151 – 152.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (online). The luck problem for compatibilists.   (Google)
Abstract: Libertarianism in all its varieties is widely taken to be vulnerable to a serious problem of present luck, inasmuch as it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to action. Genuine indeterminism entails luck, and lack of control over the ensuing action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is generally taken to be free of the problem of present luck, inasmuch as it does not require indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. Taken by itself, the compatibilist problem with present luck is less serious than the analogous problem confronting libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for the entire account of freedom: the present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the compatibilist response to distant – constitutive – luck
Lewis, David (1981). Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47:113-21.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism.
Litton, Paul (2007). The insignificance of choice and Wallace's normative approach to responsibility. Law and Philosophy 26 (1):67-93.   (Google | More links)
Lomasky, Loren E. (1975). Are compatibilism and the free will defense compatible? Personalist 56:385-388.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1988). Compatibilism now and forever: A reply to Tomberlin. Philosophical Papers 17 (August):133-139.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2003). Free will and the burden of proof. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defense of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyze such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into event-causation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven’t done this, and if all the same you do believe such things as that I raised my arm and that Jolns [sic] killed his uncle, and if moreover you still think it’s a joke to talk about the agent as cause, then, I’m afraid, the joke is entirely on you.’)
Lyons, Edward C. (ms). All the freedom you can want: The purported collapse of the problem of free will.   (Google)
Abstract:      Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable for its consequences. The standard argument against free choice asserts that free choice cannot exist because determinism, as a property of laws governing the cosmos, excludes such a possibility. This contingent factual claim, however, has always proven problematic. Contemporary discussions - no doubt aware of this disputed factual premise - draw upon a more novel, and arguably more devastating critique: free will must be rejected because its very conception is incoherent. Rather than assuming the existence of determinism and attempting to show its incompatibility with free will, this argument begins with consideration of the idea of free choice and concludes that, if it is to have any sense at all, it must be compatible with determinism. Obviously, no single treatment of the free will problem could address all its nuances. This Article more modestly offers one possible approach to the question. Part I elaborates in more detail the view that the traditional conception of free choice is incoherent and, thus, inevitably undermines the very responsibility it is asserted to constitute; Part II considers the resulting effort to develop a model of human freedom compatible with determinism; and Part III, drawing upon the prior discussions, describes - in terms of classical action theory - a conception of free choice justifying personal moral and legal responsibility that avoids both the incoherence of "uncaused freedom" as well as the shortcomings of determinism
Machina, K. (1994). Challenges for compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):213-22.   (Google)
Mackay, Donald M. (1967). Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Macintosh, Douglas C. (1940). Responsibility, freedom and causality: Or, the dilemma of determinism or indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 37 (January):42-51.   (Google | More links)
Madhok, Bindu (2002). The price of Frankfurt's compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:577-584.   (Google)
Magill, Kevin (1997). Experience and Freedom: Self-Determination Without Illusions. Macmillan.   (Google)
Maier, John, The possibility of freedom.   (Google)
Abstract: People generally are so common in one’s experience that it is natural to take them for granted, as presenting no puzzle or mystery, and to think only of such practical problems as arise in one’s relationships to them, as fish must take other fish for granted, or as we take for granted the air around us and the stones at our feet . . . but some philosophic spirits, sometimes, are overwhelmed by a seeming discontinuity between themselves and the rest of physical nature, and they are sufficiently tormented by this apparent contrast to want to understand it and see what it implies
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
McIntyre, Alison (1994). Compatibilists could have done otherwise: Responsibility and negative agency. Philosophical Review 103 (3):453-488.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
McKenna, Micheal S. (2000). Assessing reasons - responsive compatibilism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (1):89 – 114.   (Google)
McKay, Thomas J. & Johnson, D. (1996). A reconsideration of an argument against compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24:113-22.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
McKenna, Michael (online). Compatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
McKenna, Michael (2009). Compatibilism & desert: Critical comments on four views on free will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
McKenna, Michael S. (1998). Does strong compatibilism survive Frankfurt-style counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 91 (3):259-64.   (Google)
McKenna, Michael S. (1998). Moral theory and modified compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):441-458.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McKenna, Michael S. (1998). The limits of evil and the role of moral address: A defense of Strawsonian compatibilism. Journal of Ethics 2 (2):123-142.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: P.F. Strawson defends compatibilism by appeal to our natural commitment to the interpersonal community and the reactive attitudes. While Strawson''s compatibilist project has much to recommend it, his account of moral agency appears incomplete. Gary Watson has attempted to fortify Strawson''s theory by appeal to the notion of moral address. Watson then proceeds to argue, however, that Strawson''s theory of moral responsibility (so fortified) would commit Strawson to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. Watson also argues that the reactive attitudes do not lend unequivocal support to Strawsonian compatibilism and that the reactive attitudes are sometimes sensitive to considerations which suggest an incompatibilist or skeptical diagnosis. Watson attempts to provide a Strawsonian defense against these difficulties, but he ultimately concludes that the skeptical threats raised against Strawsonian compatibilism cannot be sufficiently silenced. I believe that Watson has done Strawsonian compatibilism a great service by drawing upon the notion of moral address. In this paper I attempt to defend the Strawsonian compatibilist position, as Watson has cast it, against the problems raised by Watson. I argue against Watson that Strawson''s theory of responsibility, as well as the notion of moral address, does not commit the Strawsonian to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. I also argue that Watson misinterprets the point of certain reactive attitudes and thereby wrongly assumes that these attitudes are evidence against Strawsonian compatibilism
Mele, Alfred R. (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 156 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). Agnostic autonomism revisited. In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (2007). Free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Mele, Alfred R. (forthcoming). Manipulation, compatibilism, and moral responsibility. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Abstract: This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus
Mele, Alfred R. (2009). Moral responsibility and history revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed
Mills, Eugene (2006). The sweet mystery of compatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Any satisfactory account of freedom must capture, or at least permit, the mysteriousness of freedom—a “sweet” mystery involving a certain kind of ignorance rather than a “sour” mystery of unintelligibility, incoherence, or unjustifiedness. I argue that compatibilism can capture the sweet mystery of freedom. I argue first that an action is free if and only if a certain “rationality constraint” is satisfied, and that nothing in standard libertarian accounts of freedom entails its satisfaction. Satisfaction of this constraint is consistent with the universal causal predetermination of action (UCP). If UCP is true and the rationality constraint satisfied, there’s a sense in which our actions are explanatorily (though not necessarily causally) overdetermined. While it seems plausible (given UCP) that our actions are so overdetermined, it seems utterly mysterious why they should be so overdetermined. Compatibilism’s capacity to accommodate this mystery is a mark in its favor
Moore, G. E., Free will (chapter 6 from ethics, 1912).   (Google)
Morriston, Wesley (1979). Kenny on compatibilism. Mind 88 (April):266-269.   (Google | More links)
Moreh, J. (1994). Randomness, game theory and free will. Erkenntnis 41 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make one unpredictable to opponents and may therefore be rational. Similarly, playing a game with a mixed strategy may have an unpredictable outcome in every single play, but the strategy is rational, in that it is meant to maximize the expected value of an objective, be it private or social. As to whether the outcome of such behaviour is genuinely unpredictable as in quantum mechanics, or predictable by a hypothetical outside observer knowing all natural laws, it is argued that it makes no difference in practice, as long as it is not humanly predictable. Thus we have a new version of libertarianism which is compatible with determinism
Moya, Carlos J. (1998). Boghossian's reduction of compatibilism. Philosophical Issues 9:243-251.   (Google | More links)
Narveson, Jan F. (1977). Compatibilism defended. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):83-7.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Nathan, N. M. L. (1975). Compatibilism and natural necessity. Mind 84 (April):277-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Neely, Wright (1974). Freedom and desire. Philosophical Review 83 (September):32-54.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Nesbitt, Winston (1981). Compatibilism - reply to Locke. Mind 90 (February):435-440.   (Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun (2007). The rise of compatibilism: A case study in the quantitative history of philosophy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):260-270.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Incompatibilists about free will and responsibility often maintain that incompatibilism is the intuitive, commonsense position. Recently, this claim has come under unfavorable scrutiny from naturalistic philosophers who have surveyed philosophically uneducated undergraduates.1 But there is a much older problem for the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive – if incompatibilism is intuitive, why is compatibilism so popular in the history of philosophy? In this paper I will try to answer this question by pursuing a rather different naturalistic methodology. The idea is to look not at the responses of the philosophically naïve, but at the views of the most sophisticated – the philosophers..
Normore, Calvin G. (1983). Compatibilism and contingency in Aquinas. Journal of Philosophy 80 (10):650-652.   (Google | More links)
Oakley, S. (2006). Defending Lewis's local miracle compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349.   (Google)
Abstract: Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC), allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism of the Consequence Argument fails
Ofstad, Harald (1967). Recent work on the free-will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):179-207.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Leary-Hawthorne, John & Pettit, Philip (1996). Strategies for free will compatibilists. Analysis 56 (4):191-201.   (Google | More links)
Pendleton, Robert (ms). Time and free will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In spite of the inherent oddity of the notion that the human soul might be constrained by its own lawlike will, it is not likely that the arguments I have advanced against that notion will be entirely convincing to committed incompatibilists. I should expect that the point of view will soon be reaffirmed that, in some sense, human beings, because of the lawlike behavior of their wills, cannot be free. It is to this puzzling intractability of the ‘free-will’ debate that I turn in this paper. By my own arguments (See note \5/ on R. Pendleton) it is logically possible that human beings might be construed as ‘constrained’ by their own wills. All we have to do is define the constrained human self so as to exclude the willing faculty. But does it make any sense to construe the human self in such a way? Can the human will itself be conceived as an ‘alienable’ property capable of constraining, in a meaningful way, the human self?
Pereboom, Derk (web). A compatibilist theory of the beliefs required for rational deliberation. Journal of Ethics.   (Google)
Perszyk, Kenneth J. (1999). Compatibilism and the free will defence: A reply to Bishop. Australasian Journal of Philosopy 77 (1):92-105.   (Google | More links)
Perry, John (2004). Compatibilist options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilism is the thesis that an act may be both free and determined by previous events and the laws of nature. I assume that in normal cases a condition of a person's performing an act freely is that the person is able to refrain from performing the act. Thus, I accept that if determinism entails that agents do not have this ability, we must give up compatibilism. In this paper I try to contribute to the rethinking of compatibilism by distinguishing between strong and weak accounts of laws and strong and weak accounts of ability. I argue that compatibilism is a tenable position when combined with either a weak account of laws, or a weak account of ability, or both. I shall concentrate on influential arguments for incompatibilism due to Peter van Inwagen, often called collectively the "consequence argument".
Perry, John & Kapitan, Tomis (ms). Is there hope for compatibilism?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: …those who accept that responsibility for a situation implies an ability to bring it about and, perhaps, an ability to prevent it, must explain how agents are able to do other than they are caused to do. Without it, they can give no defense of their counterexamples. With it, they can be confident that
Perszyk, Kenneth J. (2000). Molinism and compatibilism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1).   (Google)
Pippin, Robert B. (1999). Naturalness and mindedness: Hegel' compatibilism. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):194–212.   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of freedom in modern philosophy has three basic components: (i) what is freedom, or what would it be to act freely? (ii) Is it possible so to act? (iii) And how important is leading a free life?1 Hegel proposed unprecedented and highly controversial answers to these questions
Pojman, Louis P. (1987). Freedom and determinism: A contemporary discussion. Zygon 22 (December):397-417.   (Google)
Quante, Michael (2007). Habermas on compatibilism and ontological monism: Some problems. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):59–68.   (Google)
Raphael, D. Daiches (1952). Causation and free will. Philosophical Quarterly 2 (January):13-30.   (Google | More links)
Ravizza, Mark (1994). Semi-compatibilism and the transfer of non-responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):61-93.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Ritchie, Jack (2005). Causal compatibilism -- what chance? Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation
Rogers, Katherin A. (2004). Augustine's compatibilism. Religious Studies 40 (4):415-435.   (Google)
Abstract: In analysing Augustine's views on freedom it is standard to draw two distinctions; one between an earlier emphasis on human freedom and a later insistence that God alone governs human destiny, and another between pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian freedom. These distinctions are real and important, but underlying them is a more fundamental consistency. Augustine is a compatibilist from his earliest work on freedom through his final anti-Pelagian writings, and the freedom possessed by the un-fallen and the fallen will is a compatibilist freedom. This leaves Augustine open to the charge that he makes God the ultimate cause of sin
Rosell, Sergi (online). On an attempt to undermine reason-responsive compatibilism by appealing to moral luck. Reply to Gerald K. Harrison.   (Google)
Russell, Paul (1988). Causation, compulsion, and compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):313-321.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Russell, Paul (ms). Free will and irreligion in Hume's treatise.   (Google)
Abstract: Hume’s views on free will have been enormously influential and are widely regarded as representing “the best-known classical statement of what is now known as compatibilism”.1 There are a number of valuable studies that consider his contribution on this subject from a contemporary, critical perspective, but this will not be my particular concern in this paper.2 My primary interest, consistent with the specific aims and objectives of this volume, is to explain the way that Hume’s arguments in T, 2.3.1-2 relate to his fundamental intentions in the Treatise as a whole. Contrary to what is generally supposed, I will show that Hume’s arguments in these two sections are significantly concerned with problems of religion. More specifically, Hume’s necessitarian commitments, I argue, contain features that are systematically irreligious in character. These features of Hume’s views on this subject are indicative of his deeper and wider irreligious intentions throughout the Treatise
Russell, Paul (forthcoming). Free will, art and morality. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject
Russell, Paul, Hobbes, bramhall, and the free will problem.   (Google)
Abstract: Thomas Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy in ways that still structure and resonate within the contemporary debate. It was Hobbes’s central aim, particularly as expressed in the Leviathan, to make moral philosophy genuinely ‘scientific’, where this term is understood as science had developed and evolved in the first half of the seventeenth century. Specifically, it was Hobbes’s aim to provide a thoroughly naturalistic description of human beings in terms of the basic categories and laws of matter and motion. By analyzing the individual and society in these terms, Hobbes proposed to identify and describe a set of moral laws that are eternal and immutable, and can be known to all those who are capable of reason and science (L, 15.40). Even more ambitiously, it was Hobbes’s further hope that these ‘theorems of moral doctrine’ would be put into practical use by public authorities with a view to maintaining a peaceful, stable social order (L, 31.41)
Russell, Paul (online). Hume on free will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..
Russel, Paul (1983). On the naturalism of Hume's 'reconciling project'. Mind 92 (October):593-600.   (Google | More links)
Russell, Paul (2002). Pessimists, pollyannas, and the new compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: If a man is a pessimist, he is born a pessimist, and emotionally you cannot make him an optimist. And if he is an optimist, you can tell him nothing to make him a pessimist. - Clarence Darrow..
Russell, Paul (web). Selective hard compatibilism. In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke and Harry Silverstein, eds., Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming
Ryan, Sharon (2003). Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2).   (Google)
Salles, Ricardo (2001). Compatibilism: Stoic and modern. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 83 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: It is agreed by most scholars that the Stoics were compatibilists regarding the relation between responsibility and determinism. On this view, the Stoics depart from two other positions. Unlike some eliminative determinists — labelled in modern discussions “hard-determinists”, but already active in Antiquity — they assert that, despite determinism, there are things that “depend on us”, or are : things for which we are genuinely responsible and for which, therefore, we may justifiably be praised or blamed. But the Stoics also depart from the libertarian or “anti-determinist” 2 a position championed by the Epicureans in the early Hellenistic period and by Alexander of Aphrodisias on behalf of the Peripatetics, towards the end of the second century AD. Unlike the libertarian, who agrees on the incompatibility alleged by the hard-determinist, but preserves responsibility by rejectin necessitation, the Stoics preserve both responsibility and necessitation
Salles, Ricardo (2005). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ashgate Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: The basis of stoic determinism (a) : everything has a cause -- The basis of stoic determinism (b) : causation is necessitating -- The threat of external determination -- Reflection and responsibility -- The three compatibilist theories of Chrysippus -- Epictetus on responsibility for unreflective action.
Sattig, Thomas (2010). Compatibilism about coincidence. Philosophical Review 119 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of counterexamples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular kinds of ordinary object. Since both the anticoincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples flow from the folk conception of ordinary objects, the paradoxes threaten this conception with inconsistency. Typical approaches to the paradoxes reject the anticoincidence principle or some portion of the assumptions driving the counterexamples, thereby partially revising our common conception of the world around us. This essay offers a compatibilist solution to the paradoxes that sustains the folk conception of ordinary objects in its entirety. According to this solution, the various cases of distinct coincidents do not clash with the anticoincidence principle since the cases and the principle manifest different yet compatible perspectives on the world. CiteULike Connotea Digg Reddit Technorati What's this?
Schnieder, Benjamin S. (2004). Compatibilism and the notion of rendering something false. Philosophical Studies 117 (3):409-428.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In my paper I am concerned with Peter van Inwagen''s Consequence Argument. I focus on its probably best known version. In this form it crucially employs the notion of rendering a proposition false, anotion that has never been made sufficiently clear. The main aim of my paper is to shed light on thisnotion. The explications offered so far in thedebate all are based on modal concepts. Iargue that for sufficient results a ``stronger'''',hyper-intensional concept is needed, namely theconcept expressed by the word ``because''''. I show that my analysis is superior to the prior ones. On the basis of this analysis I further explain why van Inwagen''s argument fails
Schopp, Robert (1990). Free will as psychological capacity and the justification of consequences. Philosophical Forum 21 (3):324-342.   (Google)
Schroeder, Timothy (2007). Reflection, reason, and free will. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):77 – 84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ju¨rgen Habermas has a familiar style of compatibilism to offer, according to which a person has free will insofar as that person responds appropriately to her reasons. But because of the ways in which Habermas understands reasons and causes, he sees a special objection to his style of compatibilism: it is not clear that our reasons can suitably cause our responses. This objection, however, takes us out of the realm of free will and into the realm of mental causation. In this response to Habermas, I focus on the details of his style of compatibilism. I suggest that, while the basic picture is appealing, three key details of it are problematic
Settle, Thomas W. (1993). How determinism refutes compatibilism. Religious Studies 29 (3):353-62.   (Google)
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Shatz, David (1988). Compatibilism, values, and “could have done otherwise”. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):151-200.   (Google)
Siderits, Mark (1987). Beyond compatibilism: A buddhist approach to freedom and determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (April):149-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Siderits, Mark (2008). Paleo-compatibilism and buddhist reductionism. Sophia 47 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2010). The bcn challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise
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Smilansky, Saul (2003). Compatibilism: The argument from shallowness. Philosophical Studies 115 (3):257-82.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The compatibility question lies at the center of the free will problem. Compatibilists think that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and the concomitant notions, while incompatibilists think that it is not. The topic of this paper is a particular form of charge against compatibilism: that it is shallow. This is not the typical sort of argument against compatibilism: most of the debate has attempted to discredit compatibilism completely. The Argument From Shallowness maintains that the compatibilists do have a case. However, this case is only partial, and shallow. This limited aim proves itself more powerful against compatibilists than previous all-or-nothing attempts. It connects to the valid instincts of compatibilists, making room for them, and hence is harder for compatibilists to ignore
Smilansky, Saul (2007). Determinism and prepunishment: The radical nature of compatibilism. Analysis 67 (296):347–349.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I shall argue that compatibilism cannot resist in a principled way the temptation to prepunish people. Compatibilism thus emerges as a much more radical view than it is typically presented and perceived, and is seen to be at odds with fundamental moral intuitions
Smilansky, Saul (1991). The contrariety of compatibilist positions. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:293-309.   (Google)
Sommers, Tamler, The illusion of freedom evolves.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. “All Theory is Against Free Will…” Powerful arguments have been leveled against the concepts of free will and moral responsibility since the Greeks and perhaps earlier. Some—the hard determinists—aim to show that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is true. Therefore there is no free will. Others, the “no-free-will-either-way-theorists,” agree that determinism is incompatible with free will, but add that indeterminism, especially the variety posited by quantum physicists, is also incompatible with free will. Therefore there is no free will. Finally, there are the a priori arguments against free will. These arguments conclude that it makes no difference what metaphysical commitments we hold: free will and ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts. Why? Because in order to have free will and ultimate moral responsibility we would have to be causa sui, or ‘cause of oneself.’ And it is logically impossible to be self-caused in this way. Here, for example, is Nietzsche on the causa sui
Speak, Daniel James (2005). Semi-compatibilism and stalemate. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):95-102.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sterba, James P. (1981). How to complete the compatibilist account of free action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (June):508-523.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (2008). Moral responsibility and the irrelevance of physics: Fischer's semi-compatibilism vs. anti-fundamentalism. Journal of Ethics 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected
Steward, Helen (2009). The truth in compatibilism and the truth of libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper offers the outlines of a response to the often-made suggestion that it is impossible to see how indeterminism could possibly provide us with anything that we might want in the way of freedom, anything that could really amount to control, as opposed merely to an openness in the flow of reality that would constitute the injection of chance, or randomness, into the unfolding of the processes which underlie our activity. It is suggested that the best first move for the libertarian is to make a number of important concessions to the compatibilist. It should be conceded, in particular, that certain sorts of alternative possibilities are neither truly available to real, worldly agents nor required in order that those agents act freely; and it should be admitted also that it is the compatibilist who tends to give the most plausible sorts of analyses of many of the 'can' and 'could have' statements which seem to need to be assertible of those agents we regard as free. But these concessions do not bring compatibilism itself in their wake. The most promising version of libertarianism, it is argued, is based on the idea that agency itself (and not merely some special instances of it which we might designate with the honorific appellation 'free') is inconsistent with determinism. This version of libertarianism, it is claimed, can avoid the objection that indeterminism is as difficult to square with true agential control as determinism can sometimes seem to be
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Strawson, Galen (1986). On the inevitability of freedom (from the compatibilist point of view). American Philosophical Quarterly 23:393-400.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
Suster, Danilo (2002). Post-analytic metaphilosophy and the case of compatibilism. In Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi.   (Google)
Abstract: Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions
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Taylor, C. & Dennett, Daniel C. (2002). Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence "I could have done otherwise," and (2) in such universes, one can never really take credit for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe's birth. Throughout the free will
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uster, Danilo (2002). Post-analytic metaphilosophy tnd the case of compatibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):257-272.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions
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van Inwagen, Peter, How to think about the problem of free will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if they are indeed unanswerable) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with determinism. And there are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if indeed . . . ) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. But if free will is incompatible both with..
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Vargas, Manuel (2009). Revisionism about free will: A statement & defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility
Velleman, David (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 113 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is inclined to care about them. The problem with the resulting conception, as we have seen, is that it entails the normative judgment that one ought to be inclined to care about the specified features, on pain of irrationality, and this normative judgment requires justification. The advantage of internalism is that it avoids these normative commitments. It says that things count as reasons for someone only if he is inclined to care about them, and so it leaves the normative question of whether to care about them entirely open. Yet if we try to leave this question open, by defining things as reasons only for those inclined to care about them, we'll end up with a definition that's relativized to the inclinations of particular agents—won't we? Not necessarily. For suppose that all reasons for acting are features of a single kind, whose influence depends on a single inclination. And suppose that the inclination on which the influence of reasons depends is, not an inclination that distinguishes some agents from others, but rather an inclination that distinguishes agents from nonagents. In that case, to say that these features count as reasons only for those who are inclined to care about them will be to say that they count as reasons only for agents—which will be to say no less than that they are reasons for acting, period, since applying only to agents is already part of the concept of reasons for acting. The restriction on the application of reasons will drop away from our definition, since it restricts their application, not to some proper subset of agents, but rather to the set of all agents, which is simply the universe of application for reasons to act
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Waller, Bruce N. (2003). A metacompatibilist account of free will: Making compatibilists and incompatibilist more compatible. Philosophical Studies 112 (3):209-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over free will has pittedlibertarian insistence on open alternativesagainst the compatibilist view that authenticcommitments can preserve free will in adetermined world. A second schism in the freewill debate sets rationalist belief in thecentrality of reason against nonrationalistswho regard reason as inessential or even animpediment to free will. By looking deeperinto what motivates each of these perspectivesit is possible to find common ground thataccommodates insights from all those competingviews. The resulting metacompatibilist view offree will bridges some of the differencesbetween compatibilists and incompatibilists aswell as between rationalists andnonrationalists, and results in a free willtheory that is both more philosophicallyinclusive and more firmly connected tocontemporary research in psychology andbiology
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Walter, Edward F. & Minton, Arthur (1975). Soft determinism, freedom, and rationality. Personalist 56:364-384.   (Google)
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Watson, Gary (1999). Soft libertarianism and hard compatibilism. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane''s work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options
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Xie, Simon Shengjian (2009). What is Kant: A compatibilist or an incompatibilist? A new interpretation of Kant's solution to the free will problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding the second controversy, I will argue that Kant's solution to the free will problem is not a success because his effort in making the effects of freedom part of the field of appearance has made his solution incoherent and ambiguous. Despite this, I argue that Kant's attempt to solve the free will problem is groundbreaking because he at least has separated freedom from the dominance of determinism
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Zimmerman, D. (1994). Acts, omissions, and semi-compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):209-23.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Zimmerman, Michael (1981). 'Can', compatibilism, and possible worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):679-692.   (Google)