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5.4b.4. Identification Theories (Identification Theories on PhilPapers)

Bergmann, Frithjof (1977). On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (1983). Socialization and autonomy. Mind 92 (January):120-123.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Boysen, Thomas (2004). Death of a compatibilistic intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.   (Google | More links)
Bratman, Michael E. (2003). A desire of one's own. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the hierarchical model. Indeed, it seems that, normally, if an agent's relevant higher-order attitudes are not to some extent shaped by her evaluative reflections and judgments her agency will be flawed. But this suggests a Platonic challenge to the hierarchical account of ownership. The challenge is to explain why we should not see such evaluative judgments---rather than broadly Frankfurtian higher-order attitudes---as the fundamental basis of ownership or rejection of desire. I do think that a systematic absence of connection between higher-order Frankfurtian attitude and evaluative judgment would be a breakdown in proper functioning. But I want to explain how we can grant this point and still block the Platonic challenge.
Bratman, Michael (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. The essays offer extensive discussions of related views by, among others, Donald Davidson, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Christine Korsgaard, Harry Frankfurt, and P. F. Strawson. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students
Dworkin, Gerald B. (1970). Acting freely. Noûs 4 (November):367-83.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (January):5-20.   (Cited by 699 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
Greenspan, P. S. (1999). Impulse and self-reflection: Frankfurtian responsibility versus free will. Journal of Ethics 3 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt''s early work makes an important distinction between moral responsibility and free will. Frankfurt begins by focusing on the notion of responsibility, as supplying counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities; he then turns to an apparently independent account of free will, in terms of his well-known hierarchy of desires. But the two notions seem to reestablish contact in Frankfurt''s later discussion of issues and cases. The present article sets up a putative Frankfurtian account of moral responsibility that involves the potential for free will, as suggested by some of Frankfurt''s later remarks about taking responsibility. While correcting what seem to be some common misinterpretations of Frankfurt''s view, the article attempts to extract some reasons for dissatisfaction with it from consideration of cases of unfreedom, particularly cases involving addiction
Hopkins, Jasper, Freedom of the will : Parallels between Frankfurt and Augustine.   (Google)
Abstract: At first glance it seems strange to compare the views of two philosophers from such different contexts as are Harry G. Frankfurt1 and Aurelius Augustinus. After all, Frankfurt makes virtually no use of Augustine, virtually no mention of his philosophical doctrines—whether on free will or anything else.2 And yet, the two have more to do with each other than initially meets the eye. For in their own ways both of them sketch a respective theory of freedom that is similarly insightful; moreover, the theories of both lapse into paradox (paradox of which each author is aware but from which neither seeks to escape). Of course, Frankfurt's articulation of his theory is more systematic, more focused than is Augustine's. Indeed, Augustine seems to make most of his points as if en passant; even in De Libero Arbitrio he shows little interest in sustained treatment of the topic heralded in the title. So what links Frankfurt and Augustine is not their philosophical style but rather (1) their putative triumph over the philosophical elusiveness and the conceptual impenetrability of the notion of freedom-of-will and (2) the fact that in coming to cognate conclusions, they share similar strategies. Thus, they admit of plausible comparison
Hussain, Waheed (2010). Autonomy, Frankfurt, and the nature of reflective endorsement. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1).   (Google)
Frankfurt, Harry (1987). Identification and Wholeheartedness. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsiblity, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (2003). Identification and responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Real-self accounts of moral responsibility distinguish between various types of motivational elements. They claim that an agent is responsible for acts suitably related to elements that constitute the agent's real self. While such accounts have certain advantages from a compatibilist perspective, they are problematic in various ways. First, in it, authority and authenticity conceptions of the real self are often inadequately distinguished. Both of these conceptions inform discourse on identification, but only the former is relevant to moral responsibility. Second, authority and authenticity real-self theories are unable to accommodate cases in which the agent neither identifies nor disidentifies with his action and yet seems morally responsible for what he does. Third, authority and authenticity real-self theories are vulnerable to counterexamples in which the provenance of the agent's real self undermines responsibility
Sankowski, Edward T. (1980). Freedom, determinism and character. Mind 89 (January):106-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Slote, Michael A. (1980). Understanding free will. Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):136-51.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Stump, Eleonore (2002). Control and causal determinism. In S. Buss & L. Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1996). Persons, identification, and freedom. Philosophical Topics 24:183-214.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1988). Sanctification, hardening of the heart, and Frankfurt's concept of free will. Journal of Philosophy 85 (8):395-420.   (Google | More links)
Watson, Gary (1975). Free agency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.   (Cited by 114 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action.
Watson, Gary (1987). Free action and free will. Mind 96 (April):154-72.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Wolf, Susan (1987). Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane.
Zimmerman, D. (1981). Hierarchical motivation and the freedom of the will. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (October):354-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zimmerman, D. (2003). That was then, this is now: Personal history vs. psychological structure in compatibilist theories of autonomy. Noûs 37 (4):638-671.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)