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5.4b.5. Incompatibilism (Incompatibilism on PhilPapers)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2008). The irrelevance of the consequence argument. Analysis 68 (297):13–22.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has offered two versions of an influential argument that has come to be called ‘the Consequence Argument’. The Consequence Argument purports to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with free will.1 It aims to show that, if we assume determinism, we are committed to the claim that, for all propositions p, no one has or ever had any choice about p. Unfortunately, the original Consequence Argument employed an inference rule (the β-rule) that was shown to be invalid. (McKay and Johnson 1996) In response, van Inwagen revised his argument. I shall argue that the conclusion of the revised Consequence Argument is wholly independent of the premiss of determinism, and hence that the revised Consequence Argument is useless in showing that determinism is incompatible with free will
Beebee, Helen (2002). Reply to Huemer on the consequence argument. Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2006). The myth of source. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free agents need to possess and exercise can be secured without metaphysical excess. If there is a free will problem, it is the one G. E. Moore addressed in 1912. He concluded that persons can act otherwise in a deterministic world. We should continue to try to figure out whether he was right or wrong
Blum, Alex (2003). The core of the consequence argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boardman, William, Discussion of Peter Van Inwagen's "the incompatibility of free will and determinism".   (Google)
Abstract: I think that van Inwagen's argument is invalid because it equivocates on the modal auxiliaries. To give a quick idea of what I think has gone wrong, consider for comparison two arguments which are transparently invalid, though they superficially resemble Modus Tollens arguments: (a) If Lincoln was honest, he couldn't have pocketed the penny (such taking being dishonest). (b) But it is false that Lincoln could not have pocketed the penny: after all, he was not paralyzed and did not fail to realize that the penny was (slightly) valuable and would be his for the taking. (c) Therefore, Lincoln was not honest. (a') If determinism is correct, then if various past events had occurred earlier, the judge could not have raised his hand at the time of the execution (since doing so would be inconsistent with the behavior issuing from and predictable from those earlier events). (b') But it is false that the judge could not have raised his hand at the time of the execution: for he was not paralyzed or unconscious-- he certainly possessed the power to move his hand. (c') Therefore, since the various past events did occur earlier, determinism is not correct
Bradley, M. C. (1974). Kenny on hard determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):202-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Joseph Keim (2006). Farewell to direct source incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. This paper is a critique of a kind of source incompatibilism, namely, direct source incompatibilism. Direct source incompatibilists reject PAP on the basis of Frankfurt-style examples. Since PAP is one of two premises in the traditional argument for INC, direct source incompatibilists opt for a version of the direct argument, which argues for INC with the aid of some non-responsibility transfer principle. I demonstrate that this option is not available, for there is a tension between the following two claims
Campbell, Joseph K. (2010). Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Canfield, John V. (1961). Determinism, free will and the ace predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.   (Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1963). Free will and determinism: A reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.   (Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2003). Counterexamples to principle beta: A response to Crisp and Warfield. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2000). Incompatibilism and the transfer of power necessity. Noûs 34 (2):277-290.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Erik (2003). On a new argument for incompatibilism. Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Contrastive rational explanation of free choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Coffman, E. J. & Warfield, Ted A. (2005). Deliberation and metaphysical freedom. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):25-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Crisp, Thomas M. & Warfield, Ted A. (2000). The irrelevance of indeterministic counterexamples to principle beta. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-185.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Danto, Arthur C. & Morgenbesser, Sidney (1957). Character and free will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (16):493-505.   (Google | More links)
de Caro, Mario (forthcoming). Is freedom really a mystery? In The Claims of Naturalism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper the problem of free will is examined
Dennett, Daniel C. & Taylor, Christopher (ms). Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: There is no doctrine about determinism and freedom that has proved to be as resilient over the past century as that of Compatibilism. It is, of course, the doctrine that we can be both free and also subject to a real determinism. If it goes back at least to Hobbes and Hume, it was strengthened and refurbished throughout the 1900's. Part of its strength has been the extent to which it has satisfied theses that in fact seem to be the very substance of the doctrine opposed to it. This is Incompatibilism. What follows here is the most recent and the very best attempt to steal what has appeared to be the thunder of Incompatibilism. Professors Taylor and Dennett make use of a certain amount of technicality in giving sense, on the assumption of determinism, to the ideas that we can nevertheless do otherwise than we actually do and we can also really take credit for things. It is not my own view, but it is one that must be reckoned with by all who struggle with the problem. Put in some effort with the formalism if you have to, find out a little about possible worlds. It is certainly worth the effort
Double, Richard (1991). Determinism and the experience of freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (March):1-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Double, Richard (1988). Fear of sphexishness. Analysis 48 (January):20-26.   (Google)
Downes, Chauncey (1969). Can a determinist deliberate? Mind 78 (312):588-590.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1991). Ethical consequences of recent work on incompatibilism. Philosophical Inquiry 13 (3-4):22-42.   (Google)
Feltz, Adam; Cokely, Edward T. & Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2009). Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Abstract: In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far
Ficsher, J. M. (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (January):127-37.   (Google)
Fine, A. (1993). Indeterminism and the freedom of the will. In John Earman (ed.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External World. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Finch, Alicia & Warfield, Ted A. (1998). The mind argument and libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1996). Free will and the modal principle. Philosophical Studies 3 (3):213-30.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (1).   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1998). Moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will: Reply to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):215-220.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2000). Problems with actual-sequence incompatibilism. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):323-328.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fish, William C. (1999). Problems with actual-sequence incompatibilism. Philosophical Writings 12:47-52.   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (ms). The transfer of non-responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: In ancient times--some fifteen years ago--I suggested that Frankfurt-type examples call into question the Principle of Transfer of Non-Responsibility (which I then called, a bit too narrowly, the “Principle of Transfer of Blamelessness,” following John Taurek’s usage in his fascinating Ph.D. dissertation at UCLA in 1972).[i] In the introductory essay to my anthology, Moral Responsibility, I presented a somewhat informal version of Van Inwagen’s modal principle (which he called Principle ‘B’), and (following Van Inwagen) explained how it could be employed as part of a “direct” argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility (i.e., an argument for the incompatibility claim that does not employ the claim that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities)
Fischer, John Martin (1986). Van Inwagen on free will. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):252-260.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1992). When the will is free. Philosophical Perspectives 6:423-51.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Foley, Richard (1980). Reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 40 (March):101-103.   (Google)
Francken, Patrick (1993). Incompatibilism, nondeterministic causation, and the real problem of free will. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:37-63.   (Google)
Furlong, F. W. (1981). Determinism and free will: Review of the literature. American Journal of Psychiatry 138:435-39.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gallois, André (1977). Van Inwagen on free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):99-105.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1983). In defense of incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1980). The conditional analysis of freedom. In P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Graham, Peter A. (2008). The standard argument for blame incompatibilism. Noûs 42 (4):697-726.   (Google)
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1976). Wiggins on historical inevitability and incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 29 (April):235-247.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Griffiths, A. Phillips (1989). Is free will incompatible with something or other? Philosophy 24:101-19.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2003). Determinism and its threat to the moral sentiments. The Monist 86 (2):242-260.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2009). Incompatibilism's threat to worldly value: Source incompatibilism, desert, and pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):621-645.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque & Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2004). Moral responsibility and the problem of manipulation reconsidered. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):439 – 464.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent's awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling cases of manipulation, psychological elements such as desires and beliefs, among other things, are acquired via causal routes that are deviant relative to causal routes deemed normal or baseline. We develop and defend rudiments of a baseline that is acceptable independently of whether one has compatibilist or incompatibilist leanings
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2008). Reflections on the incompatibilist's direct argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes
Harris, James A. (2005). Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eighteenth century was a time of brilliant philosophical innovation in Britain. In Of Liberty and Necessity James A. Harris presents the first comprehensive account of the period's discussion of what remains a central problem of philosophy, the question of the freedom of the will. He offers new interpretations of contributions to the free will debate made by canonical figures such as Locke, Hume, Edwards, and Reid, and also discusses in detail the arguments of some less familiar writers. Harris puts the eighteenth-century debate about the will and its freedom in the context of the period's concern with applying what Hume calls the "experimental method of reasoning" to the human mind. His book will be of substantial interest to historians of philosophy and anyone concerned with the free will problem
Heinaman, Robert (1986). Incompatibilism without the principle of alternative possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):266-76.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Henden, Edmund (forthcoming). Deliberation Incompatibilism. Dialectica.   (Google)
Abstract: Deliberation incompatibilism is the view that an agent being rational and deliberating about which of (mutually excluding) actions to perform is incompatible with her believing that there exist prior conditions that render impossible the performance of either one of these actions. However, the main argument for this view, associated most prominently with Peter van Inwagen, appears to have been widely rejected by contemporary authors on free will. In this paper I argue, first, that a closer examination of van Inwagen’s argument shows that the standard objections are based on a misunderstanding of the notion of ‘deliberation’ presupposed in this argument. Second, I attempt to strengthen the case for deliberation incompatibilism by offering a different argument in its support.
Hetherington, Stephen (2006). So-far incompatibilism and the so-far consequence argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.   (Google)
Abstract: The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far consequence argument — may thus be derived
Hill, Christopher S. (1992). Van Inwagen on the consequence argument. Analysis 52 (2):49-55.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (ms). The Conway-kochen 'free will theorem' and unscientific determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: One has it that earlier circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely determine later circumstances, and the other has it that past present and future all exist tenselessly in a ‘block universe,’ so that the passage of time and associated changes in the world are illusions or at best merely apparent
Honderich, Ted (online). After compatibilism and incompatibilism.   (Google)
Abstract: A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run up against a conviction owed to reflecting on your own past life. The conviction is that an attitude akin to one tied to indeterminism, a way of holding yourself morally responsible, has some basis despite the truth of determinism. We need to look for radical ideas here, as radical as Consciousness as Existence with the problem of perceptual consciousness. Could that doctrine help with determinism and freedom? Could a problem about causation and explanation do so?
Honderich, Ted (2006). Compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem. The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy Website.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1996). Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the Smart aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):855-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (2002). Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (ms). Determinism's consequences -- the mistakes of compatibilism and incompatibilism, and what is to be done now.   (Google)
Abstract: From before the time of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th Century, right up to John Searle's impertinent piece in Journal of Consciousness Studies a few months ago, and a major conference in Idaho in April, philosophers of determinism and freedom have divided into Compatibilists and Incompatibilists. The first regiment says that determinism is logically compatible with freedom. The second says it is logically incompatible. They can do this. In a way it is easy-peasy. The first regiment achieves its end by defining free decisions and actions as voluntary: owed to certain causes rather than others -- causes somehow internal to the agent rather than external or constraining causes. The second regiment satisfies itself by defining free decisions and actions as not only voluntary but also originated -- where an originated event, however mysterious, is definitely not a causally necessitated one
Honderich, Ted (online). Free will, determinism, and moral responsibility: The whole thing in brief.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (2002). How free are you? The determinism problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Abstract: In this fully revised and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic, he offers a concise and lively introduction to free will and the problem of determinism, advancing the debate on this key area of moral philosophy. Honderich sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question, "Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?" and asks instead if there is such a clear version of free will. He goes on to address the question of whether determinism is true and finally asks, "What can we conclude about our lives if determinism is true?"
Huemer, Michael (ms). The objectivist theory of free will.   (Google)
Abstract: Imagine we are at a murder trial. Randy Smith is accused of killing his Aunt Millie. The defense admits that on the night of the murder, Smith had an argument with his Aunt, that he took a pistol out of his jacket and shot her. She died of the gunshot wound. Smith knew that the gun was loaded, that Millie was directly in front of it, and that he was pulling the trigger. He was not insane at the time, there were no abnormal chemicals in his brain, and he was not acting in self-defense. He killed her knowingly, intentionally, and unjustifiably
Huemer, Michael (2000). Van Inwagen's consequence argument. Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
[, Eddy Nahmias . (2007). Is incompatibilism intuitive? In Joshua Knobe (ed.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kang, Sung-Hak (2003). Free will and distributive justice: A reply to Smilansky. Philosophia 31 (1-2).   (Google)
Kane, Robert (2008). Incompatibilism. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Non-constraining control and the threat of social conditioning. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):401-403.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kane, Robert H. (1989). Two kinds of incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (December):219-54.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The present essay is about this problem of the intelligibility of incompatibilist freedom. I do not think Kant, Nagel and Strawson are right in thinking that incompatibilist theories cannot be made intelligible to theoretical reason, nor are those many others right who think that incompatibilist accounts of freedom must be essentially mysterious or terminally obscure. I doubt if I can say enough in one short paper to convince anyone of these claims who is not already persuaded. But I hope to persuade some readers that new ways of thinking about the problem are necessary and, more to the point, that new ways of thinking about the problem are possible. As Nagel says, "nothing approaching the truth has yet been said on this subject." Parts V and VI of this paper present one new way of thinking about the problem. Parts II through IV prepare for this way by distinguishing and discussing two kinds of incompatibilist theories.
Kapitan, Tomis (2000). Autonomy and manipulated freedom. Philosopical Perspectives 14:81-104.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, compatibilism has been the target of two powerful challenges. According to the consequence argument, if everything we do and think is a consequence of factors beyond our control (past events and the laws of nature), and the consequences of what is beyond our control are themselves beyond our control, then no one has control over what they do or think and no one is responsible for anything. Hence, determinism rules out responsibility. A different challenge--here called the manipulation argument--is that by allowing agents to be fully determined compatibilist accounts of practical freedom and responsibility are unable to preclude those who are subject to global manipulation from being free and responsible
Kapitan, Tomis (2002). A master argument for incompatibilism? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The past 25 years have witnessed a vigorous discussion of an argument directed against the compatibilist approach to free will and responsibility. This reasoning, variously called the “consequence argument,” the “incompatibility argument,” and the “unavoidability argument,” may be expressed informally as follows: If determinism is true then whatever happens is a consequence of past events and laws over which we have no control and which we are unable to prevent. But whatever is a consequence of what’s beyond our control is not itself under our control. Therefore, if determinism is true then nothing that happens is under our control, including our own actions and thoughts. Instead, everything we do and think, everything that happens to us and within us, is akin to the vibration of a piano string upon being struck, with the past as pianist, and could not be otherwise than it is. While a number of philosophers take this reasoning to crush the prospects of compatibilism, others challenge its assumption that unavoidability “transfers” from sufficient condition to necessary condition or from cause to effect. The ensuing debate has occasionally been vitriolic— Hume once remarked that the free will issue is “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science”—yet undeniably fruitful in generating more detailed examinations of ability and practical freedom. Whether we incline towards compatibilism or 2 incompatibilism, this latter development is likely to be of lasting value. As a compatibilist, I believe that the consequence argument fails to prove incompatibilism, and here I will develop criticisms of it that, for the most part, are already in the existing literature. Although a short essay cannot provide the theoretical account of practical freedom needed to underpin and justify this compatibilist critique, it will clarify the tasks that lie ahead
Kapitan, Tomis (1986). Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (April):230-51.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By deliberation we understand practical reasoning with an end in view of choosing some course of action. Integral to it is the agent's sense of alternative possibilities, that is, of two or more courses of action he presumes are open for him to undertake or not. Such acts may not actually be open in the sense that the deliberator would do them were he to so intend, but it is evident that he assumes each to be so. One deliberates only by taking it for granted that both performing and refraining from any of the acts under consideration are possible for one, and that which is to be selected is something entirely up to oneself. What is it for a course of action to be presumed as open, or for several courses of action to present themselves as a range of open alternatives? Answering these questions is essential for an understanding of deliberation and choice and, indeed, for the entire issue of free will and responsibility. According to one common view, a deliberator takes the considered options to be open only by assuming he is free to undertake any of them and, consequently, that whichever he does undertake is, as yet, a wholly undetermined matter. Built into the structure of deliberation, on this theory, is an indeterministic bias relative to which any deliberator with deterministic beliefs is either inconsistent or condemned to a fatalistic limbo. An unmistakable challenge is thereby posed: is there an alternative conception of the presuppositions underlying deliberation more congenial to a deterministic perspective yet adequate to the data? Convinced that there is, I develop a partial account of deliberation that, though highly similar to the aforementioned view, diverges at a critical juncture
Kapitan, Tomis (1996). Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities. Analysis 56 (2):102-110.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Kapitan, Tomis (1996). Modal principles in the metaphysics of free will. Philosophical Perspectives 10:419-45.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Discussions of free will have frequently centered on principles concerning ability, control, unavoidability and other practical modalities. Some assert the closure of the latter over various propositional operations and relations, for example, that the consequences of what is beyond one's control are themselves beyond one's control.1 This principle has been featured in the unavoidability argument for incompatibilism: if everything we do is determined by factors which are not under our control, then, by the principle, we are unable to act and choose other than we actually did. A second family of principles concerns the fixity of the past and the laws of nature. If no one is able to alter the past or violate the laws it seems but a small step to conclude that no one can do anything such that if they did it then the past would be altered or the laws violated. Accordingly, if an agent's performing an act is necessitated by the past and laws, then the agent is unable to refrain from that act at that time. Generalizing, determinism precludes anyone from doing anything other than what he or she did.2
Keim Campbell, Joseph (2007). Free will and the necessity of the past. Analysis 67 (294):105–111.   (Google | More links)
Kremer, Michael (2004). How not to argue for incompatibilism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers over possible worlds. I conclude that the modal-logical apparatus used by Warfield obscures rather than clarifies, and distracts from the real philosophical issues involved in the metaphysical debate. These issues cannot be settled by logic alone
Laan, David Vander (2001). A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 103 (2).   (Google)
Lamb, James W. (1977). On a proof of incompatibilism. Philosophical Review 86 (January):20-35.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (online). Closing the door on the belief in ability thesis.   (Google)
Abstract: It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic openness that is entirely compatible with determinism (Dennett 1984; Kapitan 1986). Since, however, the claim that deliberation presupposes freedom is accepted by all sides in the free will debate, it ought to be possible to frame a minimal version that is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism, and which therefore can be accepted by everyone. Peter van Inwagen has advanced the best-known such claim: ‘all philosophers who have thought about deliberation agree on one point: one cannot deliberate about whether to perform a certain act unless one believes it is possible for one to perform it’ (van Inwagen 1983: 154). It is the purpose of this paper to argue that van Inwagen, and the many philosophers who have followed him in this regard, is wrong
Locke, Don (1980). Digging deeper into determinism. Mind 89 (January):87-89.   (Google | More links)
Loss, Roberto (2009). Free will and the necessity of the present. Analysis 69 (1).   (Google)
Mackie, Penelope (2003). Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Macintosh, Douglas C. (1940). Responsibility, freedom and causality: Or, the dilemma of determinism or indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 37 (January):42-51.   (Google | More links)
Slater, Matthew H. (online). How necessary is the past? Reply to Campbell.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: [ draft, later version under review ] Joe Campbell has identified an apparent flaw in van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. It apparently derives a metaphysically necessary conclusion from what Campbell argues is a contingent premise: that the past is in some sense necessary. I criticise Campbell’s examples attempting to show that this is not the case (in the requisite sense) and suggest some directions along which an incompatibilist could reconstruct her argument so as to remain immune to Campbell’s worries
McKenna, Michael S. (2005). Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
McKenna, Michael S. (2001). Source incompatibilism, ultimacy, and the transfer of non-responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). Agnostic autonomism revisited. In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2005). A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism. Analysis 65 (285):75-80.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nahmias, Eddy; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason (2006). Is incompatibilism intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28–53.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing of pretheoretical judgments about relevant cases. We then present the results of our empirical studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Next, we consider and respond to potential objections to our approach. We conclude that our data suggest that incompatibilism is not as intuitive as incompatibilists have traditionally assumed, though more work is required to determine what ordinary intuitions about free will and moral responsibility actually are and to understand what role these intuitions should play in the debate
Nahmias, Eddy A.; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason (2005). Surveying freedom: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561–584.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people’s prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research
Nathan, N. M. L. (1984). A new incompatibilism. Mind 93 (369):39-55.   (Google | More links)
Nelkin, Dana K. (2001). The consequence argument and the "mind" argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Nelkin, Dana K. & Rickless, Samuel C. (2002). Warfield's new argument for incompatibilism. Analysis 62 (2):104-107.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun (online). After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: From the first time I encountered the problem of free will in college, it struck me that a clear-eyed view of free will and moral responsibility demanded some form of nihilism. Libertarianism seemed delusional, and compatibilism seemed in bad faith. Hence I threw my lot in with philosophers like Paul d’Holbach, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom who conclude that no one is truly moral responsible. But after two decades of self- identifying as a nihilist, it occurred to me that I had continued to treat my friends
O'Connor, Timothy (1993). On the transfer of necessity. Noûs 27 (2):204-18.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Otsuka, Michael (1998). Incompatibilism and the avoidability of blame. Ethics 108 (4):685-701.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Paprzycka, Katarzyna (2002). Flickers of freedom and Frankfurt-style cases in the light of the new incompatibilism of the stit theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her ability to perform the contrary action, must be dropped. In its stead, they propose the weaker requirement of guidance control, which only demands the agent’s causal control over the action for which she is to be held responsible
Paske, Gerald H. (1970). Responsibility and the incompatibility principle. Personalist 51:477-485.   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (1995). Determinism al dente. Noûs 29 (1):21-45.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2005). Defending hard incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, but it is not credible given our best physical theories. Hence we must take seriously the prospect that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility. I call the resulting view _hard incompatibilism_. Furthermore, contrary to widespread belief, a conception of life without free will would not at all be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial
Pereboom, Derk (web). Defending hard incompatibilism again. In N. Trakakis & D. Cohen (eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Abstract: forthcoming in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen, eds., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press
Pereboom, Derk (2007). Hard incompatibilism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (2009). Hard incompatibilism and its rivals. Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision
Pereboom, Derk (2002). Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 100 | Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (2007). On Alfred Mele's free will and luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism
Pereboom, Derk (2003). Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The claim that moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have done otherwise is surely attractive. Moreover, it seems reasonable to contend that a requirement of this sort is not merely a necessary condition of little consequence, but that it plays a decisive role in explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. For if an agent is to be blameworthy for an action, it seems crucial that she could have done something to avoid this blameworthiness. If she is to be praiseworthy for an action, it seems important that at least she could have done something less admirable. Libertarians, in particular, have often grounded their incompatibilism precisely in such intuitions. By contrast, I shall argue that the availability of alternative possibilities is in a significant sense irrelevant to explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. At the same time I do not want to disavow incompatibilism, but rather to defend a version in which the pivotal explanatory role is assigned to features of the causal history of the action, and not to the availability of alternative possibilities.(2)
Plantinga, Alvin (1970). The incompatibility of freedom with determinism: A reply. Philosophical Forum 2:141-148.   (Google)
Pojman, Louis P. (1987). Freedom and determinism: A contemporary discussion. Zygon 22 (December):397-417.   (Google)
Pruss, Alexander R. (online). Freedom, determinism and Gale's principle.   (Google)
Abstract: In simplified form, the argument that I am defending holds that the incompatibility of our freedom with determinism follows from the conjunction of (1) a plausible supervenience claim which says that whether a human agent is free depends only on what happens during the agent’s life and (2) a freedom-cancellation principle of Richard Gale which says that an agent is not free if all of her actions are intentionally brought about by another agent. Improved versions of (1) and (2) are also considered
Rosen, Gideon (2002). The case for incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):699-706.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Russell, Paul (forthcoming). Free will, art and morality. Journal of Ethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject
S. Bobzien, (1998). The inadvertent conception and late birth of the free-will problem. Phronesis 43 (2):133-175.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the "discovery" of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century A.D. It undergoes several developments, absorbing Epictetan, Middle-Platonist, and Peripatetic ideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision and an exposition of the "free-will problem" in Alexander of Aphrodisias' On Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample. American Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In defending this counterexample, I show that van Inwagen's technical notion of being partly responsible for a state of affairs, which figures in his statement of the principle, is problematic.
Shabo, Seth (2007). Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe. Philosophia 35 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, they can be used to buttress the ultimacy argument, another important argument for incompatibilism
Shabo, Seth (2010). Uncompromising source incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.   (Google)
Abstract: In what follows, I defend the uncompromising position against both Kane’s compromise source position and the traditional, "leeway" view. In sections 1 and 2, I take up Kane’s argument that uncompromising source incompatibilists go too far in their rejection of avoidability. In seeing where this argument goes wrong, we will also see why the compromise position is untenable.
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities, arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’ purposes.
Sipfle, David A. (1969). Free action and determinism. Ratio 11 (June):62-68.   (Google)
Slote, Michael A. (1982). Selective necessity and the free will problem. Journal of Philosophy 79 (January):5-24.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1998). Puzzles for the Will. University of Toronto Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Sommers, Tamler (2009). More work for hard incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.   (Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (2006). Determinism and inevitability. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):535-563.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper discusses one of the central arguments in Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, an argument designed to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. It suggests that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. A second interpretation is then developed, but it is argued that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, it can deliver only a significantly qualified version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. Moreover, the new argument depends upon an intermediate conclusion which, on the face of it, looks to be self-contradictory. Dennett is able to avoid the appearance of self-contradiction only by utilising a possible-worlds framework for the understanding of “could have done otherwise” judgements which is argued to be unsatisfactory. It is suggested that a different framework might hold the key to understanding how better to defend these same judgements from purported threats from determinism
Stoica, Ovidiu Cristinel, Convergence and free-will.   (Google)
Abstract: If our mind is just an algorithm running on a flesh hardware, then it seems that there is no place for the free-will. An algorithm decides everything based on deterministic computations, or on random inputs, but neither inevitability nor pure hazard is free choice. Hopefully, some day, Science will be able to understand, monitor and simulate all the mind processes. Even then, it will still be a possibility for the free-will to exist, based on the convergence of the initial data. I propose a crucial experiment to test this hypothesis
Strawson, Galen (1986). On the inevitability of freedom (from the compatibilist point of view). American Philosophical Quarterly 23:393-400.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
Strawson, Galen (2000). The unhelpfulness of determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-56.   (Google)
Stump, Eleonore (2000). The direct argument for incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Stump, Eleonore & Fischer, John Martin (2000). Transfer principles and moral responsibility. Philosopical Perspectives 14:47-56.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Suster, Danilo (2004). Incompatibilism and the logic of transfer. Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.   (Google)
Taylor, Robin (2000). Freedom: Magill versus the incompatibilists. Ratio 13 (1):83-91.   (Google | More links)
Timpe, Kevin (2007). Source incompatibilism and its alternatives. American Philosophical Quarterly.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In current debates about moral responsibility, it is common to differentiate two fundamentally different incompatibilist positions: Leeway Incompatibilism and Source Incompatibilism. The present paper argues that this is a bad dichotomy. Those forms of Leeway Incompatibilism that have no appeal to ‘origination’ or ‘ultimacy’ are problematic, which suggests that incompatibilists should prefer Source Incompatibilism. Two sub-classifications of Source Incompatibilism are then differentiated: Narrow Source Incompatibilism holds that alternative possibilities are outside the scope of what is required for moral responsibility, and Wide Source Incompatibilism holds that while ultimacy is most fundamental to moral responsibility, an agent meeting the ultimacy condition will also have alternative possibilities, thereby also satisfying an alternative possibilities condition. The present paper argues that the most promising incompatibilist positions will be versions of Wide Source Incompatibilism
Todd, Patrick (forthcoming). A new approach to manipulation arguments. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I aim to unveil their real power
Turner, Jason (online). The incompatibility of free will and naturalism.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defense of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the world — that is, that libertarian free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those pro- vided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview, since the Consequence Argument has a sis- ter argument — I call it the Supervenience Argument — which cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question
šuster, Danilo (2004). Incompatibilism and the logic of transfer. Acta Analytica 19 (33).   (Google)
Abstract: Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample to agglomerativity; (ii) replace Beta with a logically stronger principle Beta 2. I argue that the second strategy fails because the strengthened principle and Agglomeration together entail Beta. So this strategy makes sense only if Beta 2 is applied without Agglomeration. But if Beta 2 is used without Agglomeration, then the incompatibilist will undercut the rationale for the premise of his argument. I illustrate this point with the analysis of Warfield (1996) and his use of Beta 2 in the so called direct argument for incompatibilism
van Inwagen, Peter (1974). A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism. Theoria 24:9-22.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Vander-Laan, D. (2001). A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201-215.   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter (unknown). Free will remains a mystery: The eighth philosophical perspectives lecture. .   (Google)
van Inwagen, Peter, How to think about the problem of free will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if they are indeed unanswerable) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with determinism. And there are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if indeed . . . ) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. But if free will is incompatible both with..
van Inwagen, Peter (1999). Moral responsibility, determinism, and the ability to do otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this
van Inwagen, Peter (1975). The incompatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call 'determinism', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do (i.e., is incompatible with 'free will'). Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call 'determinism', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called 'determinism' without historical impropriety is incompatible with free will. I shall, however, assume without argument that what I call 'determinism' is legitimately so called. In Part I, I shall explain what I mean by 'determinism'. In Part II, I shall make some remarks about 'can'. In Part III, I shall argue that free will and determinism are incompatible. In Part IV, I shall examine some possible objections to the argument of Part III. I shall not attempt to establish the truth or falsity of determinism, or the existence or nonexistence of free will.
Vargas, Manuel R. (ms). Libertarianism and skepticism about free will: Some arguments against both.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: On one way of putting things, incompatibilism is the view that in some important sense free will (and/or moral responsibility) is incompatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is typically taken to come in two species: libertarianism, which holds that we are free and responsible (and correspondingly, that determinism does not hold), and skeptical incompatibilism.1 The latter includes views such as hard determinism, which hold that we are not free (and/or responsible) and views that argue that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, among others. In this paper, I attempt to provide positive arguments against both of the primary strands of incompatibilism. The first aim of this paper is to take some steps toward filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail—the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say “take some steps” because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic
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Waller, Bruce N. (2003). A metacompatibilist account of free will: Making compatibilists and incompatibilist more compatible. Philosophical Studies 112 (3):209-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over free will has pittedlibertarian insistence on open alternativesagainst the compatibilist view that authenticcommitments can preserve free will in adetermined world. A second schism in the freewill debate sets rationalist belief in thecentrality of reason against nonrationalistswho regard reason as inessential or even animpediment to free will. By looking deeperinto what motivates each of these perspectivesit is possible to find common ground thataccommodates insights from all those competingviews. The resulting metacompatibilist view offree will bridges some of the differencesbetween compatibilists and incompatibilists aswell as between rationalists andnonrationalists, and results in a free willtheory that is both more philosophicallyinclusive and more firmly connected tocontemporary research in psychology andbiology
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Warfield, Ted A. (1996). Determinism and moral responsiblity are incompatible. Philosophical Topics 24:215-26.   (Google)
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White, V. Alan (1990). How to mind one's ethics: A reply to Van Inwagen. Analysis 50 (1):33-35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Analysis shows that statements of ability are disguised conditionals. More exactly, the correct analysis of 'X could have done A' is 'If X h decided (chosen, willed ...) to do A, X would have done A'. Therefore having acted freely--having been able to act otherwise than one fact did--is compatible with determinism (with the causal determination of one's acts)
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Abstract: There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding the second controversy, I will argue that Kant's solution to the free will problem is not a success because his effort in making the effects of freedom part of the field of appearance has made his solution incoherent and ambiguous. Despite this, I argue that Kant's attempt to solve the free will problem is groundbreaking because he at least has separated freedom from the dominance of determinism
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Zimmerman, Marvin (1966). Is free will incompatible with determinism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March):415-420.   (Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (ms). The consequence argument.   (Google)
Abstract: In a book I once wrote about free will, I contended that the best and most important argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism was “the Consequence Argument.” I gave the following brief sketch of the Consequence Argument as a prelude to several more careful and detailed statements of the argument: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.[i] The reading that follows this one, Reading 41, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom,” contains a statement of the Consequence Argument. The argument is contained in the paragraph (p. xxx) that starts, “As Carl Ginet has said . . . .” But, as you will see if you compare the “brief sketch” with that paragraph, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom” presents the Consequence Argument in a disguise that is not easy to penetrate. Some teachers of philosophy who have used the first edition of Metaphysics: The Big Questions as a textbook have asked for a more straightforward statement of the Consequence Argument (since much of the recent discussion of the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism in the philosophical literature has taken the form of criticisms of the Consequence Argument that are rather hard to apply to the argument in the form in which it is presented in Reading 41). This essay is an attempt to meet this request