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5.4b.7. Semi-Compatibilism (Semi-Compatibilism on PhilPapers)

Buss, Sarah (1997). Review of John Fischer's Metaphysics of Free Will. Philosophical Books 38 (2):117-121.   (Google)
Della Rocca, Michael (1998). Frankfurt, Fischer and flickers. Noûs 32 (1):99-105.   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2000). Chicken soup for the semi-compatibilist soul: Replies to Haji and Kane. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):404-407.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Fischer, John Martin (2004). Free will and moral responsibility. In D. Copps (ed.), Handbook on Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Much has been written recently about free will and moral responsibility. In this paper I will focus on the relationship between free will, on the one hand, and various notions that fall under the rubric of “morality,” broadly construed, on the other: deliberation and practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and ethical notions such as “ought,” “right,” “wrong,” “good,” and “bad.” I shall begin by laying out a natural understanding of freedom of the will. Next I develop some challenges to the common-sense view that we have this sort of freedom. I will go on to explore the implications of this challenge for deliberation, moral responsibility, and the central ethical notions
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1998). Morally responsible people without freedom. In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this brief concluding chapter we first wish to present the overall argument of the book in a concise, nontechnical way. We hope this will provide a clear view of the argument. We shall then point to some of the distinctive--and attractive--features of our approach. Finally, we shall offer some preliminary thoughts about extending the account of moral responsibility to apply to emotions
Fischer, John Martin (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. The essays seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression
Fischer, John Martin (2009). Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction: "meaning in life and death : our stories" -- John Martin Fischer and Anthony B rueckner, "Why is death bad?", Philosophical studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (September 1986) -- "Death, badness, and the impossibility of experience," Journal of ethics -- John Martin Fischer and Daniel Speak, "Death and the psychological conception of personal identity," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 24 -- "Earlier birth and later death : symmetry through thick and thin," Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, eds., The good, the right, life and death (Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing, 2006) -- "Why immortality is not so bad," International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (September 1994) -- John Martin Fischer and Ruth Curl, "Philosophical models of immortality in science fiction," in George Slusser et. al., eds., Immortal engines : life extension and immortality in science fiction and fantasy (Athens, Ga. : University of Georgia Press, 1996) -- "Epicureanism about death and immortality," Journal of ethics, vol. 10, no. 4 -- "Stories," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 20 -- "Free will, death, and immortality : the role of narrative," Philosophical papers (Special issue : meaning in life) volume 34, number 3, November 2005 -- "Stories and the meaning of life," revised and expanded version of "A reply to Pereboom, Zimmerman, and Smith," part of a book symposium on John Martin Fischer, my way : essays on moral responsibility, philosophical books, vol. 47, no. 3.
Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 193 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism
Fischer, John Martin (2005). Reply: The free will revolution. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):145 – 156.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2006). The free will revolution (continued). Journal of Ethics 10 (3):315-345.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji. In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas
Fischer, John Martin (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Study of Control. Blackwell.   (Cited by 85 | Google)
Franklin, Christopher Evan (2006). Plausibility, manipulation, and Fischer and Ravizza. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):173-192.   (Google)
Glannon, W. (1999). Responsibility and control: Fischer's and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility. Law and Philosophy 18 (2):187-213.   (Google | More links)
Glannon, Walter (1997). Semicompatibilism and anomalous monism. Philosophical Papers 26 (3):211-231.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Introduction: Semi-compatibilism, reasons-responsiveness, and ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):91 – 93.   (Google | More links)
Judisch, Neal (2005). Responsibility, manipulation and ownership: Reflections on the fischer/ravizza program. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):115-130.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have constructed a theory of moral responsibility according to which agents are responsible only if they take responsibility in a particular way. Crucial to taking responsibility is coming to adopt a certain set of beliefs about oneself, such as the belief that one is a legitimate target of attitudes like gratitude and resentment, praise and blame. Moreover, agents must come to adopt this belief in a way that is 'appropriately based' upon their evidence, if they are to be genuinely responsible for what they do. In this paper I argue that agents need not meet these conditions in order to be morally responsible. I offer a case in which the agent thinks of himself as responsible, appears to be responsible, but fails to take responsibility in Fischer and Ravizza's sense. I then argue that Fischer and Ravizza's account of responsibility for consequences is in conflict with their contention that individuals who reject the justifiability of responsibility ascriptions fail, thereby, to be morally responsible agents
Kane, Robert H. (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2007). Agents and mechanisms: Fischer's way. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):123–130.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2002). Excusing responsibility for the inevitable. Philosophical Studies 111 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   It is by now well established that the fact that an action or aconsequence was inevitable does not excuse the agent from responsibilityfor it, so long as the counterfactual intervention which ensures thatthe act will take place is not actualized. However, in this paper I demonstrate that there is one exception to this principle: when theagent is aware of the counterfactual intervener and the role she wouldplay in some alternative scenario, she might be excused, despite the fact that in the actual scenario she acts, as we say, of her own freewill. I illustrate this contention by way of a critique of Fischer andRavizza''s well-known account of responsibility for consequences
McKenna, Michael S. (2005). Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Pike, Nelson (1984). Fischer on freedom and foreknowledge. Philosophical Review 93 (October):599-614.   (Google | More links)
Ravizza, Mark (1994). Semi-compatibilism and the transfer of non-responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):61-93.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (2005). Fischer and Ravizza on history and ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):103-114.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (2007). Review of J. M. Fischer's My Way. The Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (3):353-357.   (Google)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1998). Critical notice of John Martin Fischer's the metaphysics of free will: An essay in control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):95-117.   (Google)
Speak, Daniel James (1999). Fischer and avoidability: A reply to Widerker and Katzoff. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):239-247.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Speak, Daniel James (2005). Semi-compatibilism and stalemate. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):95-102.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (2008). Moral responsibility and the irrelevance of physics: Fischer's semi-compatibilism vs. anti-fundamentalism. Journal of Ethics 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected
Taylor, James Stacey (2001). John Martin Fischer and mark Ravizza, responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (1).   (Google)
Todd, Patrick & Tognazzini, Neal A. (2008). A problem for guidance control. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):685-692.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Central to Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility is the concept of guidance control, which involves two conditions: (1) moderate reasons-responsiveness, and (2) mechanism ownership. We raise a worry for Fischer and Ravizza's account of (1). If an agent acts contrary to reasons which he could not recognize, this should lead us to conclude that he is not morally responsible for his behaviour; but according to Fischer and Ravizza's account, he satisfies the conditions for guidance control and is therefore morally responsible. We consider ways in which the account of guidance control might be mended
Vihvelin, Kadri (1998). John Martin Fischer, the metaphysics of free will. Noûs 32 (3):406-420.   (Google | More links)
Vihvelin, Kadri (1998). John Martin Fischer, the metaphysics of free will (oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Noûs 32 (3):406–420.   (Google | More links)
Watson, Gary (1998). Some Worries About Semi-Compatibilism. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):135-143.   (Google)
Yaffe, Gideon (2000). Review of John Fischer and mark Ravizza's responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Erkenntnis 53 (3).   (Google)
Zimmerman, D. (1994). Acts, omissions, and semi-compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):209-23.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)