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5.4b.8. Theories of Free Will, Misc (Theories of Free Will, Misc on PhilPapers)

Albritton, Rogers (1985). Freedom of the will and freedom of action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59:239-51.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Alter, Torin & Daw, Russell (2001). Free acts and robot cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.   (Google)
Abstract: (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
Ayers, Michael R. (1968). The Refutation of Determinism. Methuen.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (2005). Can we ever be really, truly, ultimately, free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Cain, James (2005). Fred Berthold, jr God, evil, and human learning: A critique and revision of the free will defense in theodicy. (Albany NY: State university of new York press, 2004). Pp. VIII+108. $32.00 (hbk). ISBN 0 7914 6041 X. Religious Studies 41 (4):480-483.   (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1951). Is "free will" a pseudoproblem? Mind 60 (240):441-65.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1996). Contrastive rational explanation of free choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Randolph (1995). Freedom and determinism. Philosophical Books 36 (1):9-18.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2002). Free will. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Couenhoven, Jesse (2007). Augustine's rejection of the free-will defence: An overview of the late Augustine's theodicy. Religious Studies 43 (3):279-298.   (Google)
Coughlan, Michael J. (forthcoming). The free will defence and natural evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
D'angelo, Edward (1968). The Problem Of Freedom And Determinism. Columbia: University Of Missouri Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dardis, Anthony (2009). Four views on free will. By John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Metaphilosophy 40 (1):147-153.   (Google)
Dilman, Ilham (1999). Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: The debate between free will and its opposing doctrine, determinism, is one of the key issues in philosophy. Ilham Dilman brings together all the dimensions of the problem of free will with examples from literature, ethics and psychoanalysis, and draws out valuable insights from both sides of the freedom-determinism divide. The book provides a comprehensive introduction to this highly important question and examines the contributions made by sixteen of the most outstanding thinkers from the time of early Greece to modern times: Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Freud, Sartre, Weil, Wittgenstein, Moore
Dilley, Frank B. (2004). Robert Kane (ed.), The oxford handbook of free will. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (2).   (Google)
Double, Richard (1992). How rational must free will be? Metaphilosophy 23 (3):268-78.   (Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1997). Misdirection on the free will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question.
Double, Richard (1993). The principle of rational explanation defended. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):133-142.   (Google)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (ed.) (2001). Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Westview.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A companion volume to Free Will: A Philosophical Study , this new anthology collects influential essays on free will, including both well-known contemporary classics and exciting recent work. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom is divided into three parts. The essays in the first section address metaphysical issues concerning free will and causal determinism. The second section groups papers presenting a positive account of the nature of free action, including competing compatibilist and incompatibilist analyses. The third section concerns free will and moral responsibility, including theories of moral responsibility and the challenge to an alternative possibilities condition posed by Frankurt-type scenarios. Distinguished by its balance and consistently high quality, the volume presents papers selected for their significance, innovation, and clarity of expression. Contributors include Harry Frankfurt, Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Elizabeth Anscombe, John Martin Fischer, Michael Bratman, Roderick Chisholm, Robert Kane, Peter Strawson, and Susan Wolf. The anthology serves as an up-to-date resource for scholars as well as a useful text for courses in ethics, philosophy of religion, or metaphysics. In addition, paired with Free Will: A Philosophical Study, it would form an excellent upper-level undergraduate or graduate-level course in free will, responsibility, motivation, or action theory
Furlong, F. W. (1981). Determinism and free will: Review of the literature. American Journal of Psychiatry 138:435-39.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gale, Richard M. (1990). Freedom and the free will defense. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):397-423.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: It is my purpose to explore some of the problems concerning the relation between divine creation and creaturely freedom by criticizing various versions of the Free Will Defense (FWD hereafter).1 The FWD attempts to show how it is possible for God and moral evil to co-exist by describing a possible world in which God is morally justified or exonerated for creating persons who freely go wrong. Each version of the FWD has its own story to tell of how it is possible that God be frustrated in his endeavor to create a universe containing moral good sans moral evil. The value of free will is supposed to be so great that God is morally exonerated under such circumstances for creating the Mr. Rogers type persons you know, the very same people who are good sometimes are bad sometimes. If it is objected that God could not be unlucky in this manner, that it necessarily is within his power to create goody-goody persons, either by supernaturally willing in his own inimitable manner that it be so, which is the theological compatibilist objection, or by a judicious selection of the initial state of the universe and operant causal laws which together entail that every free action be morally right, which is the causal compatibilist objection, the response is that it is logically incompatible that a creaturely free action be determined by God or by anything external to the agent, such as causes outside of the agent
Ginet, Carl & Palmer, David (2010). On Mele and Robb's indeterministic Frankfurt-style case. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.   (Google)
Gregg, John (ms). Free Will.   (Google)
Hall, Roland (1965). Free will--a short bibliography. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (59):179-181.   (Google | More links)
Hawthorne, John (2001). Freedom in context. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):63-79.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Himma, Kenneth Einar (2009). The free-will defence: Evil and the moral value of free will. Religious Studies 45 (4):395-415.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (2010). Disentangling the Will. In Al Mele, Kathleen Vohs & Roy Baumeister (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (New York: OUP, 2010). OUP.   (Google)
Abstract: It is argued that there are at least three things bundled up in the idea of free will: the capacity manifested by agents whenever they act freely; the property possessed by those actions for which an agent in morally responsible; and the ability to do otherwise. This paper attempts some disentangling
Honderich, Ted (1988). A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (1993). How Free Are You? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: _Can attitudes like those that have seemed welded to indeterminism and free will_ _actually go with determinism? Is it not a contradiction to suppose so? The little_ _Oxford University Press book_ _How Free Are You?_ _in its first edition, much_ _translated, was a summary of the indigestible or anyway not widely digested_
Honderich, Ted (ms). Manuel R. Vargas: The revisionist's guide to responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is, roughly, the idea that some aspect of our responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. In this paper, I argue that (1) in spite of being an increasingly prevalent thread in discussions of moral responsibility, revisionism is poorly understood, (2) the limited critical discussion there has been of it does not reflect the complexities and nuances of revisionist theories, and (3) at least one species of revisionismmoderate revisionism- has some advantages over conventional compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. If I am right, one result is that the outcome of prominent debates about the compatibility (or not) of determinism and our commonsense thinking about moral responsibility may be less crucial than they seem
Hook, Sidney (ed.) (1958). Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Collier-Macmillan.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Janew, Claus (2009). How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: The present text is a very abridged version of a book I wrote out of the desire to examine the structure of our reality from a standpoint unbiased by established teachings, be they academic- scientific, popular- esoteric, or religious in nature. We will begin with seemingly simple interactions in our daily lives, examine how they originate on a deeper level, come to understand the essentials of consciousness, and finally recognize that we create our reality in its entirety. In the course of this quest, we will uncover little-heeded paths to accessing our subconscious, other individuals, and that which can be understood by the term "God". And the solution to the classical problem of free will constitutes the gist of the concepts thus revealed.
Janew, Claus (2009). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. In How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every effect exists in the perception of a consciousness. I elaborate on its freedom of choice, in my view the most important source of creativity, in a similarly general way. The problems associated with a really conscious decision do not disappear by mixing determination with a touch of coincidence. Both must enter into a higher unity. In so doing it will emerge that a certain degree of freedom of choice is just as omnipresent as consciousness - an inherent part of reality itself.





























Kane, Robert H. (ed.) (2001). Free Will. Blackwell.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Kane, Robert H. (ed.) (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google)
Abstract: This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as a whole, the Handbook provides an engaging and accessible roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic
Lehrer, Keith (ed.) (1966). Freedom and Determinism. Random House.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Levy, Neil & McKenna, Michael (2009). Recent work on free will and moral responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck
Lyons, Edward C. (ms). All the freedom you can want: The purported collapse of the problem of free will.   (Google)
Abstract:      Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable for its consequences. The standard argument against free choice asserts that free choice cannot exist because determinism, as a property of laws governing the cosmos, excludes such a possibility. This contingent factual claim, however, has always proven problematic. Contemporary discussions - no doubt aware of this disputed factual premise - draw upon a more novel, and arguably more devastating critique: free will must be rejected because its very conception is incoherent. Rather than assuming the existence of determinism and attempting to show its incompatibility with free will, this argument begins with consideration of the idea of free choice and concludes that, if it is to have any sense at all, it must be compatible with determinism. Obviously, no single treatment of the free will problem could address all its nuances. This Article more modestly offers one possible approach to the question. Part I elaborates in more detail the view that the traditional conception of free choice is incoherent and, thus, inevitably undermines the very responsibility it is asserted to constitute; Part II considers the resulting effort to develop a model of human freedom compatible with determinism; and Part III, drawing upon the prior discussions, describes - in terms of classical action theory - a conception of free choice justifying personal moral and legal responsibility that avoids both the incoherence of "uncaused freedom" as well as the shortcomings of determinism
Manis, R. Zachary (2006). On transworld depravity and the heart of the free will defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (3).   (Google)
Mawson, T. J. (2004). The possibility of a free-will defence for the problem of natural evil. Religious Studies 40 (1):23-42.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I consider various arguments to the effect that natural evils are necessary for there to be created agents with free will of the sort that the traditional free-will defence for the problem of moral evil suggests we enjoy – arguments based on the idea that evil-doing requires the doer to use natural means in their agency. I conclude that, despite prima facie plausibility, these arguments do not, in fact, work. I provide my own argument for there being no possible world in which creatures enjoying this sort of freedom exist yet suffer no natural evil, and conclude that the way is thus open for extending the free-will defence to the problem of natural evil. (Published Online February 17 2004)
Meynell, Hugo (2002). Some recent books on free will. Heythrop Journal 43 (4):496–501.   (Google | More links)
Morriston, Wes (2005). Power, liability, and the free-will defence: Reply to Mawson. Religious Studies 41 (1):71-80.   (Google)
Abstract: Tim Mawson argues that the ability to choose what one knows to be morally wrong is a power for some persons in some circumstances, but that it would be a mere liability for God. The lynchpin of Mawson's argument is his claim that a power is an ability that it is good to have. In this rejoinder, I challenge this claim of Mawson's, arguing that choosing a course of action is always an exercise of power, whether or not it is good for one to have that power. I then go on to develop an argument for saying that if (for the reasons presented by Mawson) it is not good for God to have the ability to make evil choices, then it isn't good for us to have it either, in which case the free-will defence is unsustainable
Moser, Paul K. (forthcoming). Natural evil and the free will defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (2005). Free will, evil, and divine providence. In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Pruss, Alexander R. (2008). The essential divine-perfection objection to the free-will defence. Religious Studies 44 (4):433-444.   (Google)
Ratzscdelh, (1981). Tomberlin and McGuinness on Plantinga's free will defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (4).   (Google)
Rieber, Steven (2006). Free will and contextualism. Philosophical Studies 129 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible, the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle
Rowe, William L. (1987). Causality and free will in the controversy between Collins and Clarke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1).   (Google)
Rowe, William L. (1998). In defense of 'the free will defense' response to Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (2):115-120.   (Google)
Schellenberg, J. L. (2004). The atheist's free will offence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (1):1-15.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper criticizes the assumption,omnipresent in contemporary philosophy ofreligion, that a perfectly good and loving Godwould wish to confer on (at least some) finitepersons free will. An alternative mode ofDivine-human relationship is introduced andshown to be as conducive to the realization ofvalue as one involving free will.Certain implications of this result are thenrevealed, to wit, that the theists free willdefence against the problem of evil isunsuccessful, and what is more, that free will,if it exists, provides positive support foratheism
Schoenig, Richard (1998). The free will theodicy. Religious Studies 34 (4):457-470.   (Google)
Shariff, Azim F. & Peterson, Jordan B. (2005). Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's Veto and a close-enough theory of free will. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Sidgwick, H. (1888). The Kantian conception of free will. Mind 13 (51):405-412.   (Google | More links)
Smilansky, Saul (ms). Egalitarianism, free will, and ultimate injustice.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Egalitarianism is a major contemporary position on issues of distributive justice and related public policy. Its major strand can be called “choice-egalitarianism”, broadly, the claim that inequality can be morally justified only when it follows from people’s choices.1 I claim that the choice-egalitarians have failed to recognize a deep sense of injustice, which I call Ultimate Injustice. This form of injustice follows from the implications of the free will problem. Part I of this paper explains what Ultimate Injustice is, explicates egalitarian aims and assumptions, and notes why free will can be particularly relevant for egalitarians. Part II briefly presents the choice-egalitarian position, in a way that emphasizes it’s free will-related aspects. Part III makes a quick survey of the free will problem and of the major alternatives on it, emphasizing the relation to distributive justice. Part IV presents my arguments for the claim that the choice-egalitarian social order is deeply unjust in terms of Ultimate Injustice. Part V briefly reflects upon some theoretical and practical implications that may follow if I am right
Smilansky, Saul (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Abstract: Saul Smilansky presents an original new approach to the problem of free will, which lies at the heart of morality and self-understanding. He maintains that the key to the problem is the role played by illusion. Smilansky boldly claims that we could not live adequately with a complete awareness of the truth about human freedom and that illusion lies at the center of the human condition
Smilansky, Saul (2005). Free will and respect for persons. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):248-261.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the free will problem about? It is surely about human freedom. But human freedom is a broad and varied topic, and we do not seek to cover all of it when we speak about the free will problem. The concerns of political philosophy with freedom from tyranny, for instance, are largely independent of the philosophical concern with free will (although, as we shall see, there is a connection). Let me then characterize more narrowly the concern that the free will problem addresses: it focuses on people’s control over their own actions rather than on their political or economic freedom. But why do we care about control? The traditional answer is that we care about moral responsibility, and control of our actions is a condi- tion for being morally responsible. A person whose actions are not within her control is not morally responsible. We expect a person to control her actions, and because she can do so, we hold her liable for her actions
Smilanksy, Saul (online). Free will, fundamental dualism, and the centrality of illusion.   (Google)
Smilansky, Saul (2002). Free will, fundamental dualism,and the centrality of illusion. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Steward, Helen (2009). Free will. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Swartz, Norman (ms). Lecture notes on free will and determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: For an expansion of the discussion of Sections 2-5 (Logical Determinism, Epistemic Determinism, and Modal Concepts) see Foreknowledge and Free Will ", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
van Inwagen, Peter, How to think about the problem of free will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if they are indeed unanswerable) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with determinism. And there are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if indeed . . . ) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. But if free will is incompatible both with..
Vargas, Manuel (2009). Revisionism about free will: A statement & defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility
Vargas, Manuel R. (2004). Responsibility and the aims of theory: Strawson and revisionism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Vargas, Manuel R. (2005). The revisionist's guide to responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories
Watson, Gary (ed.) (1982). Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 64 | Google)
Abstract: The new edition of this highly successful text will once again provide the ideal introduction to free will. This volume brings together some of the most influential contributions to the topic of free will during the past 50 years, as well as some notable recent work
Weisberger, A. M. (1995). Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 31 (3):375-390.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most vexing problems in the philosophy of religion is the existence of moral evil in light of an omnipotent and wholly good deity. A popular mode of diffusing the argument from evil lies in the appeal to free will. Traditionally it is argued that there is a strong connection, even a necessary one, between the ability to exercise free will and the occurrence of wrong-doing. Transworld depravity, as characterized by Alvin Plantinga, is a concept which has gone far to explain this relationship. Essentially, the notion of transworld depravity involves the claim that in any world where a person is significantly free that person would, on some occasion, act morally wrongly, or as Plantinga phrases it: ‘If S' were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A’ (where S' is a possible world, P is a person and A is an action). Not only, Plantinga claims, is it possible that there are persons who suffer from transworld depravity, but ‘it is possible that everybody suffers from it’. If transworld depravity obtains, Plantinga notes, God ‘might have been able to create worlds in which moral evil is very considerably outweighed by moral good; but it was not within His power to create worlds containing moral good but no moral evil – and this despite the fact that He is omnipotent’. On this view, God could not instantiate perfect-person essences who would not ever sin. Although Plantinga argues that these instantiated beings are significantly free in that they could have done otherwise (i.e. not sinned), it does seem that his claim about transworld depravity amounts to a claim about transworld depravity amounts to a claim about the existence of a necessary connection obtaining between freedom and evil. For even though it makes sense to claim that an individual may have unactualized dispositions, to claim that everyone, past, present and future, has unactualized dispositions seems to be a significantly different claim. It is therefore difficult to see how this latter claim differs in substance from the claim of a necessary connection obtaining between the capacity for free will and the commission of evil acts.
Wilson, J. (1958). Freedom and compulsion. Mind 67 (January):60-69.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Wolf, Susan (1980). Asymmetrical freedom. Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):151-66.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Wolf, Susan (1990). Freedom Within Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers typically see the issue of free will and determinism in terms of a debate between two standard positions. Incompatibilism holds that freedom and responsibility require causal and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature. According to compatibilism, people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf charts a path between these traditional positions: We are not free and responsible, she argues, for actions that are governed by desires that we cannot help having. But the wish to form our own desires from nothing is both futile and arbitrary. Some of the forces beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it: they endow us with faculties of reason, perception, and imagination, and provide us with the data by which we come to see and appreciate the world for what it is. The independence we want, Wolf argues, is not independence from the world, but independence from forces that prevent or preclude us from choosing how to live in light of a sufficient appreciation of the world. The freedom we want is a freedom within reason and the world
Wolf, Susan (1981). The importance of free will. Mind 90 (February):366-78.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)