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5.4c. Topics in Free Will (Topics in Free Will on PhilPapers)

5.4c.1 The Consequence Argument

Beebee, Helen (2002). Reply to Huemer on the consequence argument. Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2010). Free will and the mind–body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As bona fide laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described
Blum, Alex (2003). The core of the consequence argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2010). Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph Keim (2008). Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 68 (299):264–269.   (Google | More links)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (1998). Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation
Finch, Alicia & Warfield, Ted A. (1998). The mind argument and libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom
Hetherington, Stephen (2006). So-far incompatibilism and the so-far consequence argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.   (Google)
Abstract: The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far consequence argument — may thus be derived
Hill, Christopher S. (1992). Van Inwagen on the consequence argument. Analysis 52 (2):49-55.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1985). Compatibilism and the consequence argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Huemer, Michael (2000). Van Inwagen's consequence argument. Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kapitan, Tomis (2002). A master argument for incompatibilism? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The past 25 years have witnessed a vigorous discussion of an argument directed against the compatibilist approach to free will and responsibility. This reasoning, variously called the “consequence argument,” the “incompatibility argument,” and the “unavoidability argument,” may be expressed informally as follows: If determinism is true then whatever happens is a consequence of past events and laws over which we have no control and which we are unable to prevent. But whatever is a consequence of what’s beyond our control is not itself under our control. Therefore, if determinism is true then nothing that happens is under our control, including our own actions and thoughts. Instead, everything we do and think, everything that happens to us and within us, is akin to the vibration of a piano string upon being struck, with the past as pianist, and could not be otherwise than it is. While a number of philosophers take this reasoning to crush the prospects of compatibilism, others challenge its assumption that unavoidability “transfers” from sufficient condition to necessary condition or from cause to effect. The ensuing debate has occasionally been vitriolic— Hume once remarked that the free will issue is “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science”—yet undeniably fruitful in generating more detailed examinations of ability and practical freedom. Whether we incline towards compatibilism or 2 incompatibilism, this latter development is likely to be of lasting value. As a compatibilist, I believe that the consequence argument fails to prove incompatibilism, and here I will develop criticisms of it that, for the most part, are already in the existing literature. Although a short essay cannot provide the theoretical account of practical freedom needed to underpin and justify this compatibilist critique, it will clarify the tasks that lie ahead
Kearns, Stephen (forthcoming). Responsibility for necessities. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples
Keim Campbell, Joseph (2007). Free will and the necessity of the past. Analysis 67 (294):105–111.   (Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1981). Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47:113-21.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2001). The consequence argument and the "mind" argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, they can be used to buttress the ultimacy argument, another important argument for incompatibilism
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities, arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’ purposes.
Westphal, Jonathan (2003). A new way with the consequence argument, and the fixity of the laws. Analysis 63 (3):208-212.   (Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (ms). The consequence argument.   (Google)
Abstract: In a book I once wrote about free will, I contended that the best and most important argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism was “the Consequence Argument.” I gave the following brief sketch of the Consequence Argument as a prelude to several more careful and detailed statements of the argument: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.[i] The reading that follows this one, Reading 41, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom,” contains a statement of the Consequence Argument. The argument is contained in the paragraph (p. xxx) that starts, “As Carl Ginet has said . . . .” But, as you will see if you compare the “brief sketch” with that paragraph, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom” presents the Consequence Argument in a disguise that is not easy to penetrate. Some teachers of philosophy who have used the first edition of Metaphysics: The Big Questions as a textbook have asked for a more straightforward statement of the Consequence Argument (since much of the recent discussion of the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism in the philosophical literature has taken the form of criticisms of the Consequence Argument that are rather hard to apply to the argument in the form in which it is presented in Reading 41). This essay is an attempt to meet this request

5.4c.2 Alternative Possibilities

Alvarez, Maria (2009). Actions, thought-experiments and the 'principle of alternate possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
Aune, Bruce (1963). Abilities, modalities, and free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Aune, Bruce (1970). Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Black, Sam & Tweedale, Jon (2002). Responsibility and alternative possibilities: The use and abuse of examples. Journal of Ethics 6 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophical debate over the compatibility between causaldeterminism and moral responsibility relies heavily on ourreactions to examples. Although we believe that there is noalternative to this methodology in this area of philosophy, someexamples that feature prominently in the literature are positivelymisleading. In this vein, we criticize the use that incompatibilistsmake of the phenomenon of ``brainwashing,'''' as well as the Frankfurt-styleexamples favored by compatibilists. We provide an instance of thekind of thought experiment that is needed to genuinely test thehypothesis that moral accountability and causal determinism arecompatible
Blumenfeld, David C. (1971). The principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 68 (March):339-44.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Brown, Vivienne (2006). Choice, moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true
Clarke, Randolph (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points of dispute concerning free will.
Copp, David (1997). Defending the principle of alternate possibilities: Blameworthiness and moral responsibility. Noûs 31 (4):441-456.   (Google | More links)
Della Rocca, Michael (1998). Frankfurt, Fischer and flickers. Noûs 32 (1):99-105.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984). I could not have done otherwise--so what? Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):553-565.   (Google)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen notes: "... almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act." Perhaps van Inwagen is right; perhaps most philosophers agree on this. If so, this shared assumption, which I will call CDO (for "could have done otherwise"), is a good candidate for denial, especially since there turns out to be so little to be said in support of it, once it is called in question. I will argue that, just like those people who are famous only for being famous, this assumption owes its traditional high regard to nothing more than its traditional high regard. It is almost never questioned. And the tradition itself, I will claim, is initially motivated by little more than inattentive extrapolation from familiar cases. To engage the issue, I assert that it simply does not matter at all to moral responsibility whether the agent in question could have done otherwise in the circumstances.
Di Nucci, Ezio (forthcoming). Frankfurt counterexample defended. Analysis.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that even if we accept that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario, Frankfurt’s counterexample is still safe because showing that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario does not show that Jones avoids killing Smith, because whether Black intervenes is not up to Jones. I argue that Frankfurt’s counterexample does not depend on the agent acting (let alone doing the same thing) in the counterfactual scenario.
Di Nucci, Ezio (2010). Refuting a Frankfurtian objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’
Ekstrom, Laura W. (2002). Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style cases. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Eshleman, Andrew (1997). Alternative possibilities and the free will defence. Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.   (Google)
Abstract: The free will defence attempts to show that belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God may be rational, despite the existence of evil. At the heart of the free will defence is the claim that it may be impossible, even for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, to bring about certain goods without the accompanying inevitability, or at least overwhelming probability, of evil. The good in question is the existence of free agents, in particular, agents who are sometimes free with respect to morally significant actions and who are thereby responsible, at least in part, for those actions and the personal character which is a function of and exhibited in those actions. The free will defender contends that if an agent is to be truly responsible for her actions, then she must be free to bring about both good and evil, and God cannot be blamed if such agents choose to bring about the latter rather than the former. A number of years ago, Antony Flew objected that God was not forced to choose between creating free agents who might act wrongly and not creating a world with free agents. Instead, God could have created free agents who were wholly good, i.e. who always acted rightly." Freedom and responsibility, Flew argued, are compatible with one’s actions being causally determined by God, thus it was within God’s power to create agents who were both free and responsible yet causally determined to always act rightly. In response, proponents of the free will defence criticized Flew’s conditional analysis of freedom – if S had chosen to do otherwise, she would have been able to do otherwise – maintaining instead that an agent’s freedom consists in her ability at the time in question to both perform the action and refrain from performing the action. Acting freely, on this libertarian view, is incompatible with one’s actions being determined by God, for an agent..
Fara, Michael (2008). Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind 117 (468).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of agential abilities in terms of dispositions. The analysis is shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to incompatibilism about free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the “master argument” for incompatibilism is unsound
Fischer, John Martin & Hoffman, Paul (1994). Alternative possibilities: A reply to Lamb. Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):321-326.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2002). Frankfurt-style compatibilism. In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Abstract: In this essay I shall begin by sketching a "Frankfurt-type example." I shall then lay out a disturbing challenge to the claim I have made above that these examples help us to make significant progress in the debates about the relationship between moral responsibility and causal determinism. I then will provide a reply to this challenge, and the reply will point toward a more refined formulation of the important contribution I believe Frankfurt has made to defending a certain sort of compatibilism.
Fischer, John Martin (2003). ‘Ought-implies-can’, causal determinism and moral responsibility. Analysis 63 (279):244–250.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (1982). Responsibility and control. Journal of Philsophy 79 (January):24-40.   (Cited by 193 | Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2007). The importance of Frankfurt-style argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2009). Ultimacy and alternative possibilities. Philosophical Studies 144 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.   (Cited by 173 | Google | More links)
Franklin, Christopher Evan (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and buffer cases: The new challenge to the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189-207.   (Google)
Abstract: The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that PAP is false, but that it is explanatorily irrelevant. Derk Pereboom and David Hunt’s buffer cases are tailor made to establish this conclusion. In this paper I come to the aid of PAP, showing that buffer cases provide no reason for doubting either its truth or relevance with respect to explaining an agent’s moral responsibility
Funkhouser, Eric (2009). Frankfurt cases and overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In traditional Frankfurt cases some conditions that make an outcome unavoidable fail to bring about that outcome. These are cases of causal preemption. I defend this interpretation of traditional Frankfurt cases, and its application to free will, against a dilemma raised by various libertarians. But I go on to argue that Frankfurt cases involving gen- uine (symmetric) causal overdetermination are even more effective at achieving the compatibilist’s purposes. Such cases avoid the “flicker of freedom” debate and better display the central disagreement with regard to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
Ginet, Carl A. (1997). Freedom, responsibility, and agency. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):85-98.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O''Connor''s agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O''Connor''s objections to it and offers objections to O''Connor''s view
Ginet, Carl A. (1996). In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl & Palmer, David (2010). On Mele and Robb's indeterministic Frankfurt-style case. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.   (Google)
Glannon, Walter (1993). On the revised principle of alternate possibilities. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):49-60.   (Google)
Glatz, Richard M. (2008). The (near) necessity of alternate possibilities for moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored
Goddu, G. C. (2006). More on blameworthiness and alternative possibilities. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The derivation of the generally held Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), roughly ‘you are morally responsible only if you could do otherwise’, from an even more generally held moral principle, K (for Kant), that roughly speaking ‘ought implies can’, has recently been the focus of significant debate. In this paper I shall argue that by focusing on PAP interpreted in terms of commissions alone an alternative derivation of PAP interpreted in terms of omissions is being overlooked. The advantage of the new derivation is that it avoids many of the criticisms directed at the original derivation. Key Words: alternative possibilities • blameworthiness • moral responsibility • omissions
Goetz, Stewart (2002). Alternative Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):131–147.   (Google | More links)
Goetz, Stewart C. (2005). Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Goetz, Stewart (2001). Stump on libertarianism and the principle of alternative possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.   (Google)
Abstract: Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility requires the freedom to act otherwise
Gosselin, Phillip D. (1987). The principle of alternative possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):91-104.   (Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2000). Alternate possibilities and responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (3):259–267.   (Google | More links)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2003). Alternative possibilities, luck, and moral responsibility. Journal of Ethics 7 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I first question whether genuinealternatives are necessary for moralresponsibility by assessing the assumption thataccessibility to such alternatives is vital tohaving the kind of control required forresponsibility. I next suggest that theavailability of genuine alternatives courtsproblems of responsibility-subverting luck foran important class of libertarian theories. Isummarize one such problem and respond torecent replies it has elicited. I then proposethat if this ``luck objection'''' against theidentified class of libertarian theories ispersuasive, a similar objection appears toafflict compatibilist theories as well.Finally, I show that reflections on luck maywell take some bite out of variousFrankfurt-type examples. These are examplesdesigned to establish that an agent can bemorally responsible for an action despiteacting with libertarian free will in theabsence of genuine or pertinent alternatives
Haji, By Ishtiyaque (2008). Dispositional compatibilism and Frankfurt-type examples. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):226–241.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article critically examines Kadri Vihvelin's proposal that to have free will is to have the ability to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to have this ability is to have a bundle of dispositions that can be exercised in more than one way. It is argued that partisans of Frankfurt examples can still make a powerful case for the view that being able to do otherwise, even on Vihvelin's compatibilist explication of ‘could have done otherwise,’ is not required for moral responsibility
Haji, Ishtiyaque & McKenna, Michael S. (2004). Dialectical delicacies in the debate about freedom and alternative possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):299-314.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque & McKenna, Michael S. (2006). Defending Frankfurt's argument in deterministic contexts: A reply to Palmer. Journal of Philosophy 103 (7):363-372.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Haji, Ishtiyaque (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-type examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections
Harrison, Gerald K. (2006). Frankfurt-style cases and improbable alternative possibilities. Philosophical Studies 130 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   It has been argued that a successful counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities must rule out any possibility of the agent making an alternative decision right up to the moment of choice. This paper challenges that assumption. Distinguishing between an ability and an opportunity, this paper presents a Frankfurt-style case in which there is an alternative possibility, but one it is highly improbable that the agent will access. In such a case the agent has only the opportunity, not the ability to do otherwise
Harrison, Bernard (2003). Review: The human world in the physical universe: Consciousness, free will, and evolution. Mind 112 (448).   (Google)
Hay, William H. (1957). Free-will and possibilities. Philosophy of Science 24 (July):207-214.   (Google | More links)
Heinaman, Robert (1986). Incompatibilism without the principle of alternative possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):266-76.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Hoffman, Paul, Locke on the Locked room.   (Google)
Abstract: In his book Liberty Worth the Nd?72€,1 Gideon Yaffe has provided an interpretation of Lock:-z's account of moral responsibility according to which it bears important affinities with the views of contemporary theorists Harry lirankfurt and Susan Wolf. On Yaffe’s reading, Locke, like Frankfurt and Wolf separates moral responsibility from the ability to have acted otherwise; like Wolf, Locke associates freedom with the dependency ofone’s choices on the good. I am going to argue that Yaffe’s interpretation of the key passages underlying his interpretation is suspect. We get a very different perspective in trying to interpret the points Locke is trying to make if instead of looking forward to Frankfurt and Wolf we look backward to Aquinas. The first part of this paper will be concerned with an investi~ gation of Locl
Honderich, Ted (ms). Harry Frankfurt: Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility.   (Google)
Abstract: This enviable piece of philosophy has been as successful as any other in the past three decades of the determinism and freedom debate. It has given rise to a continuing controversy. At its centre is what seems to be a refutation of what seems to be the cast-iron principle that in order for someone to be morally responsible for an action, it must be possible that he or she could have done otherwise. The principle has been assumed by philosophers persuaded that determinism is incompatible with freedom and also by philosophers persuaded that determinism is compatible with freedom. However, Frankfurt's article has mainly been read as lending support to the Compatibilist idea
Huemer, Michael (ms). A proof of free will.   (Google)
Abstract: The _minimal free will thesis_ (MFT) holds that at least some of the time, someone has more than one course of action that he can perform. (1) This is the least that must be true in order for it to be said that there is free will. It may be disputed whether the truth of MFT is _sufficient_ for us to 'have free will,' (2) but there is no doubt that the main philosophical challenge to the belief in free will has come from the thesis of universal determinism, so understood as to exclude MFT. A proof of MFT is therefore of considerable philosophical interest, whether or not it constitutes a full proof of free will. In any case, it is the minimal free will thesis of which I have a proof to offer
Hunt, David P. (2007). Black the libertarian. Acta Analytica 22 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counterexample presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this challenge with a counterexample in which considering an alternative course of action is a necessary condition for deciding to act otherwise, and the agent does not in fact consider the alternative. I call this a “buffer case,” because the morally relevant alternative is “buffered” by the requirement that the agent first consider the alternative. Suppose further that the agent’s considering an alternative action—entering the buffer zone—is what would trigger the counterfactual intervener. Then it would appear that PAP-relevant alternatives are out of reach. I defend this counterexample to PAP against three objections: that considering an alternative is itself a morally relevant alternative; that buffer cases can be shown to contain other alternatives that arguably satisfy PAP; and that even if the agent’s present access to PAP-relevant alternatives were eliminated, PAP could still be satisfied in virtue of earlier alternatives. I conclude that alternative possibilities are a normal symptom, but not an essential constituent, of moral agency
Janew, Claus (2009). How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: The present text is a very abridged version of a book I wrote out of the desire to examine the structure of our reality from a standpoint unbiased by established teachings, be they academic- scientific, popular- esoteric, or religious in nature. We will begin with seemingly simple interactions in our daily lives, examine how they originate on a deeper level, come to understand the essentials of consciousness, and finally recognize that we create our reality in its entirety. In the course of this quest, we will uncover little-heeded paths to accessing our subconscious, other individuals, and that which can be understood by the term "God". And the solution to the classical problem of free will constitutes the gist of the concepts thus revealed.
Kane, Robert H. (2000). The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilities. Philosopical Perspectives 14:57-80.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lehrer, Keith (1964). 'Could' and determinism. Analysis 24 (March):159-60.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1976). 'Could' in theory and practice: A possible worlds analysis. In M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2008). Counterfactual intervention and agents' capacities. Journal of Philosophy 105 (5).   (Google | More links)
Levi, Don (2008). Did God deprive pharaoh of free will? Philosophy and Literature 32 (1):pp. 58-73.   (Google)
Levy, Neil, Frankfurt enablers and Frankfurt disablers.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I introduce the notion of a Frankfurt Enabler, a counterfactual intervener poised, should a signal for intervention be received, to enable an agent to perform a mental or physical action. Frankfurt enablers demonstrate, I claim, that merely counterfactual conditions are sometimes relevant to assessing what capacities agents possess. Since this is the case, we are not entitled to conclude that agents in standard Frankfurt-style cases retain their responsibility-ensuring capacities. There is no principled rationale for bracketing counterfactual interveners in standard Frankfurt-style cases, but admitting their relevance when they are Frankfurt enablers. I argue that the intuition that we ought to bracket counterfactual interveners is, at bottom, an expression of a mistaken internalist view about the mental
Levy, Neil (ms). Why Frankfurt-style cases don't help (much).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frankfurt-style cases are widely taken to show that agents do not need alternative possibilities to be morally responsible for their actions. Many philosophers take these cases to constitute a powerful argument for compatibilism: if we do not need alternative possibilities for moral responsibility, it is hard to see what the attraction of indeterminism might be. I defend the claim that even though Frankfurt-style cases establish that agents can be responsible for their actions despite lacking alternatives, agents can only be responsible if they possess certain powers, and possession of these powers is - arguably - incompatible with determinism. Because this is the case, Frankfurt-style cases fail to advance the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism
Levy, Neil (2004). Why Frankfurt examples don't Beg the question: A reply to Woodward. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):211–215.   (Google | More links)
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (2005). Frankfurt, responsibility, and reflexivity. Philosophia 32 (1-4):369-382.   (Google | More links)
Locke, Don (1980). Digging deeper into determinism. Mind 89 (January):87-89.   (Google | More links)
McKenna, Michael (2008). Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples. Noûs 42 (4):770-793.   (Google)
Abstract: Harry Frankfurt dramatically shaped the debates over freedom and responsibility by arguing that the sort of freedom germane to responsibility does not involve the freedom to do otherwise. His argument turns upon an example meant to disprove the Principle of Alternative Possibilities:   A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Debate over Frankfurt's argument has turned almost exclusively on the success of the example meant to defeat it. But there is more to Frankfurt's argument than the example in question, and this is not widely recognized. Inattention to these other aspects of Frankfurt's argument has distorted the force of it. In this paper I shall explore avenues for both refuting and advancing Frankfurt's argument that look beyond the examples. These further considerations invite us to think in broader terms about moral responsibility's nature and the sort of freedom required for it
McKenna, Michael S. & Widerker, David (eds.) (2002). Freedom, Responsibility, and Action: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate Press.   (Google)
McKenna, Michael S. (2005). Where Frankfurt and Strawson meet. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. & Robb, David (2003). Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-style Cases. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (2000). Responsibility and freedom: The challenge of Frankfurt-style-cases. In M. Betzler & B. Guckes (eds.), Autonomes Handeln: Beitrage Zur Philosophie von Harry G. Frankfurt. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. & Robb, David (1998). Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Almost thirty years ago, in an attempt to undermine what he termed "the principle of alternate possibilities" (the thesis that people are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise), Harry Frankfurt offered an ingenious thought-experiment that has played a major role in subsequent work on moral responsibility and free will. Several philosophers, including David Widerker and Robert Kane, argued recently that this thought-experiment and others like it are fundamentally flawed. This paper develops a new Frankfurt-style example that is immune to their objections. [Reprinted in Laura Waddell Ekstrom, ed., Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom (Westview Press, 2001), pp. 241-54; and in John Martin Fischer, ed., Free Will, Vol. III (Routledge, 2005), pp. 330-42.]
Mele, Alfred R. (1996). Soft libertarianism and Frankfurt-style scenarios. Philosophical Topics 24:123-41.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Meynell, Hugo (2008). Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: Essays on the importance of alternative possibilities. Edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna. Heythrop Journal 49 (3):518–520.   (Google | More links)
Moya Espí, Carlos J. (2003). Blockage cases: No case against Pap. Critica 35 (104):109-120.   (Google)
Moya, Carlos J. (2007). Moral responsibility without alternative possibilities? Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.   (Google | More links)
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2006). Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.   (Google)
Abstract: Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate effectively and control our actions accordingly: the ‘Deliberation and Control’ (DC) condition. The other intuition is that free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some other way. I suggest that intuitions about the AP condition arise when we face ‘close calls,’ situations in which, after deliberating, we still do not know what we really want to do. Indeed, several incompatibilists suggest such close calls are necessary for free will. I challenge this suggestion by describing a ‘confident agent’ who, after deliberating, always feels confident about what to do (and can then control her actions accordingly). Because she maximally satisfies the DC condition, she does not face close calls, and the intuition that the AP condition is essential for free will does not seem to apply to her. I conclude that intuitions about the importance of the AP condition rest on our experiences of close calls and arise precisely to the extent that our deliberations fail to arrive at a clear decision. I then raise and respond to several objections to this thought experiment and its relevance to the free will debate
Naylor, Margery Bedford (1984). Frankfurt on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Studies 46 (September):249-58.   (Google)
Nelkin, Dana K. (2004). Irrelevant alternatives and Frankfurt counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):1-25.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   In rejecting the Principle of AlternatePossibilities (PAP), Harry Frankfurt makes useof a special sort of counterfactual of thefollowing form: ``he wouldn''t have doneotherwise even if he could have''''. Recently,other philosophers (e.g., Susan Hurley (1999,2003) and Michael Zimmerman (2002)) haveappealed to a special class of counterfactualsof this same general form in defending thecompatibility of determinism andresponsibility. In particular, they claim thatit can be true of agents that even if they aredetermined, and so cannot do otherwise, theywouldn''t have done otherwise even if they couldhave. Using as a central case an argument ofSusan Hurley''s, I point out that thecounterfactuals in question are both``interlegal'''' and ``indeterministic'''', and I raisedoubts about whether this special class ofcounterfactuals have clear truth conditions. Finally I suggest that acknowledging thesepoints leads to an appreciation of the realstrength of Frankfurt-style examples
O'Connor, Timothy (1993). Alternative possibilities and responsibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):345-372.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Palmer, David (2006). Moral responsibility, alternative possibilities and determinism: Begging the question in the Frankfurt cases. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):79-86.   (Google)
Palmer, David (2005). New distinctions, same troubles: A reply to Haji and McKenna. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):474-482.   (Google)
Palmer, David (forthcoming). Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001 ; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29:228–247, 2005 ). Pereboom’s case, a variant of what are known as ‘Frankfurt cases,’ is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom’s example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples
Pereboom, Derk (2000). Alternative possibilities and causal histories. Philosopical Perspectives 14:119-138.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Perry, John (2004). Compatibilist options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilism is the thesis that an act may be both free and determined by previous events and the laws of nature. I assume that in normal cases a condition of a person's performing an act freely is that the person is able to refrain from performing the act. Thus, I accept that if determinism entails that agents do not have this ability, we must give up compatibilism. In this paper I try to contribute to the rethinking of compatibilism by distinguishing between strong and weak accounts of laws and strong and weak accounts of ability. I argue that compatibilism is a tenable position when combined with either a weak account of laws, or a weak account of ability, or both. I shall concentrate on influential arguments for incompatibilism due to Peter van Inwagen, often called collectively the "consequence argument".
Pereboom, Derk (2003). Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The claim that moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have done otherwise is surely attractive. Moreover, it seems reasonable to contend that a requirement of this sort is not merely a necessary condition of little consequence, but that it plays a decisive role in explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. For if an agent is to be blameworthy for an action, it seems crucial that she could have done something to avoid this blameworthiness. If she is to be praiseworthy for an action, it seems important that at least she could have done something less admirable. Libertarians, in particular, have often grounded their incompatibilism precisely in such intuitions. By contrast, I shall argue that the availability of alternative possibilities is in a significant sense irrelevant to explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. At the same time I do not want to disavow incompatibilism, but rather to defend a version in which the pivotal explanatory role is assigned to features of the causal history of the action, and not to the availability of alternative possibilities.(2)
Raab, Francis V. (1955). Free will and the ambiguity of "could". Philosophical Review 64 (1):60-77.   (Google | More links)
Ragland, C. P. (2006). Alternative possibilities in Descartes's fourth meditation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (3):379 – 400.   (Google | More links)
Ragland, C. P. (2006). Descartes on the principle of alternative possibilities. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) says that doing something freely implies being able to do otherwise. I show that Descartes consistently believed not only in PAP, but also in clear and distinct determinism (CDD), which claims that we sometimes cannot but judge true what we clearly perceive. Because Descartes thinks judgment is always a free act, PAP and CDD seem contradictory, but Descartes consistently resolved this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between two senses of 'could have done otherwise.' In one sense alternative possibilities are necessary for freedom and in another they are not. I discuss three possible interpretations of the two senses
Rankin, Kenneth W. (1980). Ifs as labels on cans. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (June):257-279.   (Google)
Roush, S. (1998). Alternate possibilities and their entertainment. Philosophy 73 (4):559-571.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper it is argued that Frankfurt's and Strawson's defenses of compatibilism are insufficient due to neglected features of the role of alternate possibilities in assigning moral responsibility. An attempt is made to locate more adequately the genuine source of tension between free will and determinism, in a crowding phenomenon in the view of an action which our concept of responsibility has not grown up coping with. Finally, an argument is made that due to the nature of belief we can believe the thesis of determinism only if it is false, lending support to incompatibilism
Sanford, David H. (1976). What could have happened. Noûs 10 (September):313-326.   (Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (2007). Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe. Philosophia 35 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety
Slezak, Peter (online). Frankfurt examples: The moral of the stories.   (Google)
Speak, Daniel James (1999). Fischer and avoidability: A reply to Widerker and Katzoff. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):239-247.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Speak, Daniel James (2005). Papistry: Another defense. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):262-268.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Speak, Daniel James (2007). The impertinence of Frankfurt-style argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Strasser, Mark (1988). Frankfurt, Aristotle, and Pap. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:235-46.   (Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1999). Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: The flicker of freedom. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):299-324.   (Google)
Abstract: Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one''s-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her
Stump, Eleonore (1990). Intellect, will, and the principle of alternative possibilities. In M. Beaty (ed.), Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1996). Libertarian freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities. In Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Stump, Eleonore (1988). Sanctification, hardening of the heart, and Frankfurt's concept of free will. Journal of Philosophy 85 (8):395-420.   (Google | More links)
Timpe, Kevin (2006). A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue that this discussion also goes some distance to showing that any Frankfurt-libertarian is in a similar position regarding the need for some PAP-like principle. If I am correct, then Frankfurt-libertarians must either renounce their incompatibilism or concede that FSCs fail to show all PAP-like principles to be false
Timpe, Kevin (2009). Causal history matters, but not for individuation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 77-91.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,’ Harry Frankfurt introduces a scenario aimed at showing that the having of alternative possibilities is not required for moral responsibility. According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she could have done otherwise; Frankfurt thinks his scenario shows that PAP is, in fact, false. Frankfurt thinks that the denial of PAP gives credence to compatibilism, the thesis that an agent could both be causally determined in all her actions and yet be morally responsible.1 Since its introduction, Frankfurt’s original ex-
Timpe, Kevin (2006). The dialectic role of the flickers of freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   One well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples is the ‘flicker-of-freedom strategy’. The flicker strategy claims that even in a Frankfurt-style counterexample, there are still morally relevant alternative possibilities. In the present paper, I differentiate between two distinct understandings of the flicker strategy, as the failure to differentiate these two versions has led some philosophers to argue at cross-purposes. I also explore the respective dialectic roles that the two versions of the flicker strategy play in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Building on this discussion, I then suggest a reason why the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate has reached a stalemate
van Inwagen, Peter (1999). Moral responsibility, determinism, and the ability to do otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this
Wee, Cecilia (2006). Descartes and Leibniz on human free-will and the ability to do otherwise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3).   (Google)
White, V. Alan (1998). Frankfurt, failure, and finding fault. Sorites 9 (9):47-52.   (Google)
Widerker, David (2000). Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further look. Philosopical Perspectives 14:181-202.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Widerker, David (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Widerker, David (2006). Libertarianism and the philosophical significance of Frankfurt scenarios. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Widerker, David (2002). Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examples. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Yaffe, Gideon (1999). 'Ought' implies 'can' and the principle of alternate possibilities. Analysis 59 (3):218-222.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Young, Garry (2007). Igniting the flicker of freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt scenario. Philosophia 35 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility

5.4c.3 Determinism

Ayers, Michael R. (1968). The Refutation of Determinism. Methuen.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (1971). Determinism. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Bobzien, Susanne (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today
Borovskiĭ, Mikhail Ivanovich[from old catalog] (1974). Determinizm I Nravstvennoe Povedenie Lichnosti.   (Google)
Brennan, Jason (2007). Free will in the Block universe. Philosophia 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions. I suggest that what Hoefer may have shown us is that causation, not determinism, was the threat to free will all along. Additionally, Hoefer might avoid the problem of the asymmetry of macroscopic efficacy by noting we have a very small region of space-time completely determined by our choices. However, this move implies our freedom to act is freedom to do very little, given that the region is trivial. I suggest that Hoefer should instead claim that we do have pervasive macroscopic efficacy toward the past, though I am unsure of how well this thesis works. Regardless, there remains a problem that the inside-out perspective requires us to see our choices as brute facts or random occurrences. Attempts to resolve this problem seem to require either a theory of agent causation or a traditional compatibilist argument, making Hoefer’s thesis extraneous, unless he can show us that these require the inside-out perspective. However, Hoefer has not yet shown us this, so there is work to be done
Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 90 (January):99-101.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Cowan, Joseph L. (1969). Deliberation and determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (January):53-61.   (Google)
Crissman, Paul (1942). Freedom in determinism. Journal of Philosophy 39 (September):520-526.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
D'angelo, Edward (1968). The Problem Of Freedom And Determinism. Columbia: University Of Missouri Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Double, Richard (1991). Determinism and the experience of freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (March):1-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Faris, J. A. (1970). A conspectus of determinism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 217:217-234.   (Google)
Fischer, Gilbert R. (1971). The process of determinism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 9:39-48.   (Google)
Gallagher, Kenneth T. (1964). Determinism and argument. Modern Schoolman 41 (January):111-122.   (Google)
Gale, Richard M. (1961). Professor Ducasse on determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (September):92-96.   (Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl & Palmer, David (2010). On Mele and Robb's indeterministic Frankfurt-style case. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.   (Google)
Glossop, Ronald J. (1969). Freedom, determinism, and mechanism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7:181-186.   (Google)
Hannaford, Robert V. (1976). Who's in control here? Philosophy 51 (October):421-430.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1970). A conspectus of determinism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 191:191-216.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1973). On determinism. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays On Freedom Of Action. Routledge & Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Kane, Robert H. (2002). Free will, determinism, and indeterminism. In Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Korolev, Alexandre, The Norton-type lipschitz-indeterministic systems and elastic phenomena: Indeterminism as an artefact of infinite idealizations.   (Google)
Abstract: The singularity arising from the violation of the Lipschitz condition in the simple Newtonian system proposed recently by Norton (2003) is so fragile as to be completely and irreparably destroyed by slightly relaxing certain (infinite) idealizations pertaining to elastic phenomena in this model. I demonstrate that this is also true for several other Lipschitz-indeterministic systems, which, unlike Norton's example, have no surface curvature singularities. As a result, indeterminism in these systems should rather be viewed as an artefact of certain infinite idealizations essential for these models, depriving them of much of their intended metaphysical import
Lehrer, Keith (1966). An empirical disproof of determinism. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Lehrer, Keith (ed.) (1966). Freedom and Determinism. Random House.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Mays, W. (1955). Determinism and free will in Whitehead. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (4):523-534.   (Google | More links)
Munn, Allan Macgregor (1960). Free-Will And Determinism. University Of Toronto Press,.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Popper, Karl R. (1983). Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 92 (January):103-4.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Prior, A. N. (1962). Limited indeterminism. Review of Metaphysics 16 (September):55-61.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1994). Four kinds of determinism and "free will": A response to Viney and Crosby. New Ideas in Psychology 12:143-46.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sayre, Kenneth M. (1977). Moonflight: A Conversation on Determinism. Produced and Distributed on Demand by University Microfilms International.   (Google)
Schacht, Richard (1989). Whither determinism: On Humean beings, human beings, and originators. Inquiry 32 (March):55-77.   (Google)
Sipfle, David A. (1969). Free action and determinism. Ratio 11 (June):62-68.   (Google)
Slote, Michael A. (1969). Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria. Inquiry 12 (1-4):317-38.   (Google)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1975). Determinism: A small point. Dialogue 14 (December):617-621.   (Google)
Swartz, Norman (ms). Lecture notes on free will and determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: For an expansion of the discussion of Sections 2-5 (Logical Determinism, Epistemic Determinism, and Modal Concepts) see Foreknowledge and Free Will ", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Trakakis, Nick (2007). Whither morality in a hard determinist world? Sorites 19.   (Google)
von Spakovsky, Anatol (1963). Freedom, Determinism, Indeterminism. The Hague: Nijhoff.   (Google)
Warfield, Ted A. (1996). Determinism and moral responsiblity are incompatible. Philosophical Topics 24:215-26.   (Google)
Westen, Peter (2005). Getting the fly out of the bottle: The false problem of free will and determinism. Buffalo Criminal Law Review 8:101-54.   (Google | More links)
Williams, Clifford E. (1980). Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue. Hackett.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Young, Robert M. (1991). The implications of determinism. In A Companion to Ethics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)

5.4c.4 Fatalism

Acevedo, Gabriel A. (2005). Turning anomie on its head: Fatalism as Durkheim's concealed and multidimensional alienation theory. Sociological Theory 23 (1):75-85.   (Google | More links)
Aune, Bruce (1962). Fatalism and professor Taylor. Philosophical Review 71 (4):512-519.   (Google | More links)
Beedle, Andrew (1996). Modal fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):488-495.   (Google | More links)
Benstein, M. (1992). Fatalism. University of Nebraska Press.   (Google)
Bernstein, M. (2002). Fatalism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark (1989). Fatalism, tense, and changing the past. Philosophical Studies 56 (2).   (Google)
Bhattacharji, Sukumari (1982). Fatalism — its roots and effects. Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (2).   (Google)
Sophie Botros, (1985). Freedom, causality, fatalism and early stoic philosophy. Phronesis 30 (3):274-304.   (Google)
Bradley, R. D. (1963). Causality, fatalism, and morality. Mind 72 (288):591-594.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Charles D. (1965). Fallacies in Taylor's "fatalism". Journal of Philosophy 62 (13):349-353.   (Google | More links)
Buller, David (ms). On the "standard" argument for fatalism.   (Google)
Abstract: What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the argument continues to exercise fine contemporary minds (e.g. Schlesinger 1993)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2010). Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Carroll, John (online). Context, conditionals, fatalism, freedom & time travel.   (Google)
Carroll, John (2010). Context, conditionals, fatalism, time travel, and freedom. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.   (Google)
Cargile, James (1996). Some comments on fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):1-11.   (Google | More links)
Diekemper, Joseph (2007). B-theory, fixity, and fatalism. Noûs 41 (3):429–452.   (Google | More links)
Diekemper, Joseph (2004). Temporal necessity and logical fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: first, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one
Eaton, Ralph M. (1921). Social fatalism. Philosophical Review 30 (4):380-392.   (Google | More links)
Foster, Lewis (1971). Fatalism and precognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):341-351.   (Google | More links)
Gaskin, Richard (1998). Fatalism, bivalence and the past. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):83-88.   (Google | More links)
Gaskin, Richard (1998). Middle knowledge, fatalism and comparative similarity of worlds. Religious Studies 34 (2):189-203.   (Google)
Gelven, Michael (1991). Why Me?: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Fate. Northern Illinois University Press.   (Google)
Gruen, William (1936). Determinism, fatalism, and historical materialism. Journal of Philosophy 33 (23):617-628.   (Google | More links)
Haack, Susan (1974). On a theological argument for fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.   (Google | More links)
Haack, Susan (1975). On "on theological fatalism again" again. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (99):159-161.   (Google | More links)
Hasker, William (1988). Hard facts and theological fatalism. Noûs 22 (3):419-436.   (Google | More links)
Hay, William H. (1983). Explaining philosophical illusion: Mill on necessity and fatalism. Metaphilosophy 14 (1):40–45.   (Google | More links)
Helm, Paul (1975). Fatalism once more. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (101):355-356.   (Google | More links)
Helm, Paul (1974). On theological fatalism again. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (97):360-362.   (Google | More links)
Herrick, C. Judson (1927). Fatalism or Freedom. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd..   (Google)
Hooper, Charles E. (1930). The Fallacies of Fatalism. London, Watts & Co..   (Google)
Johnson, David Kyle (2009). God, fatalism, and temporal ontology. Religious Studies 45 (4):435-454.   (Google)
Kenny, Mary Lorena (2002). Drought, clientalism, fatalism and fear in northeast Brazil. Ethics, Place and Environment 5 (2):123 – 134.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Northeast Brazil has been targeted for remedial projects to combat drought for more than 100 years, although drought mitigation policies have been mostly ineffective in reducing vulnerability for the majority of the population. In this paper I review some of the historical and contemporary approaches to drought mitigation and examine the efficacy of mitigation through the aperture of contemporary clientalism and the persistence of asymmetric power relations in democratic Brazil. Although the abertura , political opening, and end of a 20-year military dictatorship allowed for improved civil and political rights and public demonstrations, this 'low-intensity' democracy has had few social and economic reforms that have hampered elite interests, minimized inequity, or empowered the poor. Patronage continues to be the dominant tool for survival, especially in the drought-ridden Northeast, where access to scarce state services is extremely competitive and personal connections determine or facilitate access
Kvanvig, Jonathan (1992). Hasker on fatalism. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2).   (Google)
Langer, Susanne K. (1936). On a fallacy in "scientific fatalism". International Journal of Ethics 46 (4):473-483.   (Google | More links)
Loss, Roberto (2010). Fatalism and the necessity of the present: Reply to Campbell. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Mackie, Penelope (2003). Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Martin, Adrienne (2008). No Virtue in Fatalism: Conservative Bioethics and Eric Cohen's *In the Shadow of Progress*. Science Progress.   (Google)
Abstract: Refusing to pursue recent and possible future developments in medical research is itself a morally momentous decision—and that inaction has consequences Cohen and other right-wing thinkers refuse to acknowledge.
Merricks, Trenton (2009). Truth and freedom. Philosophical Review 118 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all. Instead, those arguments are built on an uncontroversial understanding of the idea that truth depends on the world. In the final section of the article, those arguments are extended to show that foreknowledge of an action does not threaten that action's freedom
Moyal, Georges J. D. (1985). Another difficulty in Taylor's argument for fatalism. Mind 94 (373):104-107.   (Google | More links)
Rea, Michael C. (2006). Presentism and fatalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that presentism is compatible with both a libertarian view of human freedom and an unrestricted principle of bivalence. I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom
Rice, Hugh (online). Fatalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Rogers, Katherin A. (2007). The necessity of the present and Anselm's eternalist response to the problem of theological fatalism. Religious Studies 43 (1):25-47.   (Google)
Abstract: It is often argued that the eternalist solution to the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma fails. If God's knowledge of your choices is eternally fixed, your choices are necessary and cannot be free. Anselm of Canterbury proposes an eternalist view which entails that all of time is equally real and truly present to God. God's knowledge of your choices entails only a ‘consequent’ necessity which does not conflict with libertarian freedom. I argue this by showing that if consequent necessity does conflict with libertarian freedom then God's knowledge in the present would conflict with the freedom of a present choice. Absurd. (Published Online January 15 2007)
Russell, Paul (2000). Compatibilist fatalism. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that recognizes the _legitimacy_ of (pessimistic) concerns about the origination of character and conduct. On this basis I argue that any plausible compatibilist position must concede that determinism has fatalistic implications of some significant and relevant kind, and thus must allow that agents may be legitimately held responsible in circumstances where they are subject to fate. The position generated by these compatibilist concessions to incompatibilism will be called 'compatibilist-fatalism'
Saunders, John Turk (1965). Fatalism and ordinary language. Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):211-222.   (Google | More links)
Sharvy, Richard (1964). Tautology and fatalism. Journal of Philosophy 61 (10):293-295.   (Google | More links)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1966). Dummett on fatalism. Philosophical Review 75 (1):78-90.   (Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C., Nietzsche on fatalism and "free will".   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). On fate and fatalism. Philosophy East and West 53 (4):435-454.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: : Fate and fatalism have been powerful notions in many societies, from Homer's Iliad, the Greek moira, the South Asian karma, and the Chinese ming in the ancient world to the modern concept of "destiny." But fate and fatalism are now treated with philosophical disdain or as a clearly inferior version of what is better considered as "determinism." The concepts of fate and fatalism are defended here, and fatalism is clearly distinguished from determinism. Reference is made to the ancient Greek and Chinese versions to explore the various dimensions of these ideas
Sorensen, R. (2006). Sharp edges from Hedges: Fatalism, vagueness and epistemic possibility. Philosophical Studies 131 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy
Stallknecht, Newton P. (1937). Fatalism, determinism, and indeterminism. International Journal of Ethics 47 (2):231-233.   (Google | More links)
Strong, C. A. (1918). Fate and free will. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (1):5-9.   (Google | More links)
Talbott, Thomas (1993). Theological fatalism and modal confusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (2).   (Google)
Taylor, Richard (1963). A note on fatalism. Philosophical Review 72 (4):497-499.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, Richard (1962). Fatalism. Philosophical Review 71 (1):56-66.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, Richard (1964). Tautology and fatalism: Fatalistic arguments: Comment. Journal of Philosophy 61 (10):305-307.   (Google | More links)
Tomberlin, James E. (1971). The sea battle tomorrow and fatalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):352-357.   (Google | More links)
van Rensselaer Wilson, H. (1955). Causal discontinuity in fatalism and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 52:134-58.   (Google)
Waller, Bruce N. (1989). Uneven starts and just deserts (fatalism and free will). Analysis 49:209-13.   (Google)
White, V. Alan (ms). Determinism is not fatalism.   (Google)
Abstract: After learning about the concept of determinism, a natural tendency is to conclude that if anyone actually believed in the determinism of human nature, then all future human actions are "set out for us" or "cut and dried" and, in some sense, utterly unavoidable. Another way of referring to such inevitability is that human action appears to be..
White, Michael J. (1981). Fatalism and causal determinism: An aristotelian essay. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (124):231-241.   (Google | More links)
Wilsovann, H. Rensselaer (1955). Causal discontinuity in fatalism and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 52 (February):70-71.   (Google | More links)

5.4c.5 Free Will and Responsibility

Baker, Lynne Rudder, What is human freedom?   (Google)
Abstract: After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theoretical significance
Barnette, R. L. (1979). Brainwashing and Responsible Action. The Personalist 60 (1):61-75.   (Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (1987). Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility. Routledge.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (1981). Moral responsibility and free will. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:1-10.   (Google)
Blumberg, David (1971). Determinism and moral responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (3).   (Google)
Braddock, Matthew C. (2009). Evolutionary psychology's moral implications. Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):531-540.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I critically summarize John Cartwrtight’s Evolution and Human Behavior and evaluate what he says about certain moral implications of Darwinian views of human behavior. He takes a Darwinism-doesn’t-rock-the-boat approach and argues that Darwinism, even if it is allied with evolutionary psychology, does not give us reason to be worried about the alterability of our behavior, nor does it give us reason to think that we may have to change our ordinary practices and views concerning free-will and moral responsibility. In response, I contend that Darwinism, when it is allied with evolutionary psychology, makes for a more potent cocktail than Cartwright suspects
Buss, Sarah (1997). Review of John Fischer's Metaphysics of Free Will. Philosophical Books 38 (2):117-121.   (Google)
Carlson, Erik (1998). Van Inwagen on determinism and moral responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2).   (Google)
Clarke, Randolph (1992). Free will and the conditions of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 66 (1):53-72.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984). I could not have done otherwise--so what? Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):553-565.   (Google)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen notes: "... almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act." Perhaps van Inwagen is right; perhaps most philosophers agree on this. If so, this shared assumption, which I will call CDO (for "could have done otherwise"), is a good candidate for denial, especially since there turns out to be so little to be said in support of it, once it is called in question. I will argue that, just like those people who are famous only for being famous, this assumption owes its traditional high regard to nothing more than its traditional high regard. It is almost never questioned. And the tradition itself, I will claim, is initially motivated by little more than inattentive extrapolation from familiar cases. To engage the issue, I assert that it simply does not matter at all to moral responsibility whether the agent in question could have done otherwise in the circumstances.
Double, Richard (1997). Misdirection on the free will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question.
Dworkin, Gerald B. (ed.) (1970). Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: Of liberty and necessity, by D. Hume.--The doctrine of necessity examined, by C. S. Peirce.--Determinism in history, by E. Nagel.--Some arguments for free will, by T. Reid.--Has the self free will? by C. A. Campbell.--Dialogue on free will, by L. de Valla.--Can the will be caused? by C. Ginet.--Free will, by G. E. Moore.--A modal muddle, by S. N. Thomas.--Determinism, indeterminism, and libertarianism, by C. D. Broad.--An empirical disproof of determinism? by K. Lehrer.--Free will, praise and blame, by J. J. C. Smart.--Bibliographical essay.
Ferraiolo, William (2004). Against compatibilism: Compulsion, free agency and moral responsibility. Sorites 15 (December):67-72.   (Google)
Fischer, John Martin (1998). Moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will: Reply to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):215-220.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John Martin (2003). ‘Ought-implies-can’, causal determinism and moral responsibility. Analysis 63 (279):244–250.   (Google | More links)
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.   (Cited by 173 | Google | More links)
Fulda, Joseph S. (1992). The mathematical pull of temptation. Mind 101 (402):305-307.   (Google | More links)
Fulda, Joseph S. & Milne, Peter (2009). The mathematical pull of temptation revisited. Acta Analytica 24 (2):91-96.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, we defend and extend a (simple) mathematical model of /akrasia/
Grau, Christopher (2000). Moral Responsibility and Wolf's Ability. In den Beld Tovann (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology, (The Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol. 7). Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (online). Why I (still) believe in free will and responsibility.   (Google)
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Hyslop, James H. (1895). Mr. Ritchie on free-will and responsibility. International Journal of Ethics 6 (1):101-103.   (Google | More links)
Velleman, J. David (1989). Epistemic freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.   (Google)
Abstract: Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm anyone of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism. This paper sketches a potential explanation for our feeling of freedom. The freedom that I postulate is not causal but epistemic (in a sense that I shall define), and the result is that it is quite compatible with determinism. I therefore claim that insofar as we feel metaphysically free-free in a sense that would be incompatible with determinism-we are mistaking the epistemic freedom that we have for a kind of freedom that we may lack. This claim will lead me, at the end of the paper, to a projectivist account of moral responsibility. Ascriptions of moral responsibility, I shall suggest, should be treated in the same way as ascriptions of color or other secondary qualities.
Kane, Robert (2000). Free will and responsibility: Ancient dispute, new themes. Journal of Ethics 4 (4).   (Google)
Kearns, Stephen (forthcoming). Responsibility for necessities. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples
Kenny, A. J. P. (1978). Free Will and Responsibility. Routledge.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Levy, Neil & McKenna, Michael (2009). Recent work on free will and moral responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.   (Google)
Abstract: In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck
Maier, Andreas (2008). Weeding in the garden of forking paths - yet another look at alternate possibilities. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):228-235.   (Google)
Mandelbaum, Maurice (1960). Determinism and moral responsibility. Ethics 70 (3):204-219.   (Google | More links)
McIntyre, Alison (1994). Compatibilists could have done otherwise: Responsibility and negative agency. Philosophical Review 103 (3):453-488.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Mele, Alfred R. & Robb, David (2003). Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-style Cases. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.   (Google)
Moya Espí, Carlos J. (2003). Blockage cases: No case against Pap. Critica 35 (104):109-120.   (Google)
Nahmias, Eddy A.; Morris, Stephen G.; Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Turner, Jason (2005). Surveying freedom: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561–584.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people’s prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research
Nahmias, Eddy (2007). Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology. In Massimo Marraffa, Mario Cardeo & Francesco Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: But other threats to autonomy are less often discussed, threats that are not metaphysical or political but psychological. These are threats based on putative facts about human psychology that suggest we do not govern our behavior according to principles we have consciously chosen. For instance, if our behavior were governed primarily by unconscious Freudian desires rather than by our reflectively considered desires, we would be much less autonomous than we presume. Or if our behaviors were the result of a history of Skinnerian reinforcement rather than conscious consideration, our actions would be shaped by our environment more than by our principles. Since the influence of Freud and Skinner has waned, we might feel we have escaped such threats to our autonomy from psychology. But, as I will explain below, more recent and viable theories and evidence from social psychology pose significant threats to autonomous agency.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2005). Freedom, responsibility and the challenge of situationism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In conclusion, then, the situationist literature provides a rich area of exploration for those interested in freedom and responsibility. Interestingly, it does not do so primarily because it is situationist in the sense of supporting the substantive thesis about the role of character traits. Rather it is because it makes us wonder whether we really do act on a regular basis with the particular normative, epistemic,and reactive capacities that are central to our identity as free and responsible agents.
Nichols, Shaun & Knobe, Joshua (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions. Noûs 41 (4):663–685.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way
Nowell-Smith, P. (1948). Freewill and moral responsibility. Mind 57 (225):45-61.   (Google | More links)
O'Connor, Timothy (2001). Causation and Responsibility. In Lawrence Becker & Charlotte Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics. Garland Publishing.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2003). Review of Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will. Philosophical Quarterly 53:308-310.   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (2003). Understanding free will: Might we double-think? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.   (Google | More links)
Palmer, David (forthcoming). Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001 ; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29:228–247, 2005 ). Pereboom’s case, a variant of what are known as ‘Frankfurt cases,’ is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom’s example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples
Pap, Arthur (1946). Determinism and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 43 (12):318-327.   (Google | More links)
Paske, Gerald H. (1970). Responsibility and the incompatibility principle. Personalist 51:477-485.   (Google)
Radcliff, Peter (1971). Matson and Hospers on free will and responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (2):250-258.   (Google | More links)
Ritchie, David G. (1895). Free-will and responsibility. International Journal of Ethics 5 (4):409-431.   (Google | More links)
Ritchie, David G. (1896). Free-will and responsibility. International Journal of Ethics 6 (2):249-250.   (Google | More links)
Roberts, Lawrence D. (1971). Indeterminism, chance, and responsibility. Ratio 13 (December):195-199.   (Google)
Roskies, Adina L. (online). Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: phenomena that are hallmarks of what it is to be human free will whether or not the universe is deterministic, many [1,2,4,26]. There is now a widespread and industrious people think that freedom can yet be salvaged if the scientific community, whose aim is to understand the universe is indeterministic, for they favor a Libertarian mechanisms underlying these phenomena [7,9,10, account which posits an agent as an uncaused cause 27–32]. The underlying worry is that those things that [17,18]. In that case, trouble arises if the universe is once seemed to be forever beyond the reach of science deterministic. might soon succumb to it: neuroscience will lead us to see the ‘universe within’ as just part and parcel of the
Rowe, William L. (2006). Free will, moral responsibility, and the problem of OOMPH. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):295-313.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral responsibility. In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist, agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility
Rudder Baker, Lynne (2006). Moral responsibility without libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307–330.   (Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample. American Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In defending this counterexample, I show that van Inwagen's technical notion of being partly responsible for a state of affairs, which figures in his statement of the principle, is problematic.
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities, arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’ purposes.
Sie, Maureen & Wouters, Arno (2008). The real challenge to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.   (Google)
Abstract: Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most significantly challenged by the recent discoveries. Those discoveries show that it is not as obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons as it seems. Hence, we have to rethink our concept of reasons-responsiveness
Smilansky, Saul (1990). Van Inwagen on the "obviousness" of libertarian moral responsibility. Analysis 50 (1):29-33.   (Google)
Sommers, Tamler (2009). A Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the Curtain. McSweeney's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: A collection of long, detailed interviews with philosophers and scientists who work on issues in ethics and moral psychology. The researchers interviewed include Galen Strawson, Philiip Zimbardo, Stephen Stich, Jonathan Haidt, Frans De Waal, Michael Ruse, Joshua Greene, Liane Young, Joe Henrich, and William Ian Miller.
Sommers, Tamler (2009). More work for hard incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.   (Google | More links)
Steward, Helen (2008). Moral responsibility and the irrelevance of physics: Fischer's semi-compatibilism vs. anti-fundamentalism. Journal of Ethics 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected
Strasser, Mark Philip (1992). Agency, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Hollowbrook.   (Google)
Strawson, Galen (1986). On the inevitability of freedom (from the compatibilist point of view). American Philosophical Quarterly 23:393-400.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
Strawson, Galen (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Todd, Patrick (forthcoming). A new approach to manipulation arguments. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I aim to unveil their real power
Trusted, Jennifer (1984). Free Will and Responsibilty. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Vargas, Manuel R. (2006). Philosophy and the folk. Journal of Cognition and Culture.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: First, unlike a good many philosophical puzzles that absorb the efforts of professional philosophers, the web of problems surrounding free will does not take philosophical training to appreciate. It is a ubiquitously accessible problem discussed at length by novelists, poets, musicians, scientists, religious believers, atheists, and more than a few undergraduates in late- night discussions. At least in the Western philosophical tradition it is also a very old problem: versions of it can be found at least as far back as the Stoics and the Epicureans, and arguably in Aristotle. Taken as a whole, these considerations suggest that at least a significant source of puzzles about free will can be found in aspects of our thinking that are available to us at easily accessible levels of reflection. Second, over the past 30 years or so, the philosophical arsenal of incompatibilists
Vargas, Manuel R. (2005). The revisionist's guide to responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories
Vargas, Manuel (2005). The trouble with tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269–291.   (Google | More links)
Vilhauer, Benjamin (2009). Free will skepticism and personhood as a desert base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.   (Google)
Watson, Gary (1998). Some Worries About Semi-Compatibilism. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):135-143.   (Google)
Wolf, Susan (1987). Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane.

5.4c.6 Free Will and Foreknowledge

Aiken, Warwick (1973). Predestination and Free Will! [Charlston, S.C..   (Google)
Anglin, W. S. (1990). Free Will and the Christian Faith. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God
Augustine, (2009). God's foreknowledge and free will. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy of Religion: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ben-Menahem, Yemima (1988). Free will and foreknowledge: A fresh approach to a classic problem. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):486-490.   (Google | More links)
Danielson, Dennis (1977). Timelessness, foreknowledge, and free will. Mind 86 (343):430-432.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John M. (2008). Freedom, foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A reply to Vihvelin. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 327-342.   (Google)
Fulda, Joseph S. (1998). Partially resolving the tension between omniscience and free will: A mathematical argument. Sorites 9 (--):53-55.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We put forward a probability-based theory of temptation with implications for philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind, alike
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Foreknowledge, freedom, and obligation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):321-339.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hopkins, Jasper (1977). Augustine on foreknowledge and free will. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (2):111-126.   (Google)
Kane, R. (1996). Review. The dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Mind 105 (419).   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1991). Agency and omniscience. Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and direction of divine agency that has long been the lure of certain religious traditions
Pike, Nelson (1984). Fischer on freedom and foreknowledge. Philosophical Review 93 (October):599-614.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Nelson C. (1966). Plantinga on the free will defense: A reply. Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):93-104.   (Google | More links)
Swartz, Norman M. (online). Foreknowledge and free will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will was addressed in a religious context. According to orthodox views in the West, God was claimed to be omniscient (and hence in possession of perfect foreknowledge) and yet God was supposed to have given humankind free will. Attempts to solve the apparent contradiction often involved attributing to God special properties, e.g. being 'outside' of time. However, the trouble with such solutions is that they are generally unsatisfactory on their own terms. Even more serious is the fact that they leave untouched the problem posed not by God's foreknowledge but that of any human being. Do human beings have foreknowledge? Certainly, of at least some events and behaviors. Thus we have a secular counterpart of the original problem. A human being's foreknowledge, exactly as would God's, of another's choices would seem to preclude the exercise of human free will. Various ways of trying to solve the problem – e.g. by putting constraints on the truth-conditions for statements, or by 'tightening' the conditions necessary for knowledge – are examined and shown not to work. Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized, and remedied, the problem evaporates
Vihvelin, Kadri (2008). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and ability to do otherwise: A reply to Fischer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.   (Google)
Wyckoff, Jason (forthcoming). On the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Sophia.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t 1 what an agent S will do at t 2 , is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom is undermined. These cases include those in which certain human actions are logically, rather than causally, foreclosed

5.4c.7 Topics in Free Will, Misc

Barvosa-Carter, Edwina (2007). Mestiza autonomy as relational autonomy: Ambivalence & the social character of free will. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1):1–21.   (Google | More links)
Beale, Nicholas (2009). Freewill, free process, and love. Think 8 (23):115-124.   (Google)
Bennett, Philip W. (1973). Evil, God, and the free will defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):39 – 50.   (Google | More links)
Benson, S. (1994). Free agency and self-worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Benson, S. (1987). Freedom and value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Benson, Paul H. (1987). Ordinary ability and free action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June):307-335.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Botterill, George (1977). Falsification and the existence of God: A discussion of Plantinga's free will defence. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (107):114-134.   (Google | More links)
Cain, James (2004). Free will and the problem of evil. Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the free-will defence, the exercise of free will by creatures is of such value that God is willing to allow the existence of evil which comes from the misuse of free will. A well-known objection holds that the exercise of free will is compatible with determinism and thus, if God exists, God could have predetermined exactly how the will would be exercised; God could even have predetermined that free will would be exercised sinlessly. Thus, it is held, the free-will defence cannot be used as a partial account of why God should have allowed evil to exist. I investigate this objection using Kripke's apparatus for treating modalities and natural kinds to explore the nature of the incompatibilism required by the free-will defence. I show why the objection fails even if the standard arguments for compatibilism are acceptable. This is because the modality involved in the incompatibilism needed by the free-will defence differs from the modality involved in the compatibilism that is supported by standard compatibilist arguments. Finally, an argument is sketched for a variety of incompatibilism of the kind needed by the free-will defence
Caruso, Gregg (2008). Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument from Introspection. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility of consciousness that gives the introspective argument whatever power it possesses. Once we see that consciousness is neither transparent nor infallible, the argument from introspection loses all of its force. I argue that since we do not have direct, infallible access to our own minds, to rely on introspection to infer our own freedom would be a mistake.
Dilley, Frank B. (forthcoming). The free-will defence and worlds without moral evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.   (Google)
Holton, Richard (2007). Freedom, coercion and discursive control. In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If moral and political philosophy is to be of any use, it had better be concerned with real people. The focus need not be exclusively on people as they are; but it should surely not extend beyond how they would be under laws as they might be. It is one of the strengths of Philip Pettit’s work that it is concerned with real people and the ways that they think: with the commonplace mind. In this paper I examine Pettit’s recent work on free will.2 Much of my concern will be to see how his contentions fit with empirical findings about human psychology. Pettit is a compatibilist about free will: he holds that it is compatible with determinism. But he finds fault with existing compatibilist accounts, and then proposes his own amendment. My aim is to challenge his grounds for finding fault; and then to raise some questions about his own positive account
Phillips, Jonathan & Knobe, Joshua (2009). Moral judgments and intuitions about freedom. Psychological Inquiry 20 (1):30-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Reeder’s article offers a new and intriguing approach to the study of people’s ordinary understanding of freedom and constraint. On this approach, people use information about freedom and constraint as part of a quasi-scientific effort to make accurate inferences about an agent’s motives. Their beliefs about the agent’s motives then affect a wide variety of further psychological processes, including the process whereby they arrive at moral judgments. In illustrating this new approach, Reeder cites an elegant study he conducted a number of years ago (Reeder & Spores, 1983). All subjects were given a vignette about a man who goes with his date to a pizza parlor and happens to come across a box that has been designated for charitable donations. In one condition, the man’s date then requests that he make a donation; in the other, she requests that he steal the money that is already in the box. In both conditions, the man chooses to comply with this request. The key question is how subjects will use his behavior to make inferences about whether he is a morally good or morally bad person. The results revealed a marked difference between conditions. When the man donated to charity, subjects were generally disinclined to conclude that he must have been a morally good person. It is as though they were thinking: ‘He didn’t just do this out of the goodness of his heart
Russell, Paul, Hobbes, bramhall, and the free will problem.   (Google)
Abstract: Thomas Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy in ways that still structure and resonate within the contemporary debate. It was Hobbes’s central aim, particularly as expressed in the Leviathan, to make moral philosophy genuinely ‘scientific’, where this term is understood as science had developed and evolved in the first half of the seventeenth century. Specifically, it was Hobbes’s aim to provide a thoroughly naturalistic description of human beings in terms of the basic categories and laws of matter and motion. By analyzing the individual and society in these terms, Hobbes proposed to identify and describe a set of moral laws that are eternal and immutable, and can be known to all those who are capable of reason and science (L, 15.40). Even more ambitiously, it was Hobbes’s further hope that these ‘theorems of moral doctrine’ would be put into practical use by public authorities with a view to maintaining a peaceful, stable social order (L, 31.41)
Vargas, Manuel (2005). The trouble with tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269–291.   (Google | More links)