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5.4c.1. The Consequence Argument (The Consequence Argument on PhilPapers)

Beebee, Helen (2002). Reply to Huemer on the consequence argument. Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.   (Google | More links)
Berofsky, Bernard (2010). Free will and the mind–body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As bona fide laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described
Blum, Alex (2003). The core of the consequence argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2010). Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Campbell, Joseph Keim (2008). Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 68 (299):264–269.   (Google | More links)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (1998). Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation
Finch, Alicia & Warfield, Ted A. (1998). The mind argument and libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom
Hetherington, Stephen (2006). So-far incompatibilism and the so-far consequence argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.   (Google)
Abstract: The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far consequence argument — may thus be derived
Hill, Christopher S. (1992). Van Inwagen on the consequence argument. Analysis 52 (2):49-55.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1985). Compatibilism and the consequence argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Huemer, Michael (2000). Van Inwagen's consequence argument. Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kapitan, Tomis (2002). A master argument for incompatibilism? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The past 25 years have witnessed a vigorous discussion of an argument directed against the compatibilist approach to free will and responsibility. This reasoning, variously called the “consequence argument,” the “incompatibility argument,” and the “unavoidability argument,” may be expressed informally as follows: If determinism is true then whatever happens is a consequence of past events and laws over which we have no control and which we are unable to prevent. But whatever is a consequence of what’s beyond our control is not itself under our control. Therefore, if determinism is true then nothing that happens is under our control, including our own actions and thoughts. Instead, everything we do and think, everything that happens to us and within us, is akin to the vibration of a piano string upon being struck, with the past as pianist, and could not be otherwise than it is. While a number of philosophers take this reasoning to crush the prospects of compatibilism, others challenge its assumption that unavoidability “transfers” from sufficient condition to necessary condition or from cause to effect. The ensuing debate has occasionally been vitriolic— Hume once remarked that the free will issue is “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science”—yet undeniably fruitful in generating more detailed examinations of ability and practical freedom. Whether we incline towards compatibilism or 2 incompatibilism, this latter development is likely to be of lasting value. As a compatibilist, I believe that the consequence argument fails to prove incompatibilism, and here I will develop criticisms of it that, for the most part, are already in the existing literature. Although a short essay cannot provide the theoretical account of practical freedom needed to underpin and justify this compatibilist critique, it will clarify the tasks that lie ahead
Kearns, Stephen (forthcoming). Responsibility for necessities. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples
Keim Campbell, Joseph (2007). Free will and the necessity of the past. Analysis 67 (294):105–111.   (Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1981). Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47:113-21.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2001). The consequence argument and the "mind" argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, they can be used to buttress the ultimacy argument, another important argument for incompatibilism
Shabo, Seth (forthcoming). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities, arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’ purposes.
Westphal, Jonathan (2003). A new way with the consequence argument, and the fixity of the laws. Analysis 63 (3):208-212.   (Google | More links)
van Inwagen, Peter (ms). The consequence argument.   (Google)
Abstract: In a book I once wrote about free will, I contended that the best and most important argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism was “the Consequence Argument.” I gave the following brief sketch of the Consequence Argument as a prelude to several more careful and detailed statements of the argument: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.[i] The reading that follows this one, Reading 41, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom,” contains a statement of the Consequence Argument. The argument is contained in the paragraph (p. xxx) that starts, “As Carl Ginet has said . . . .” But, as you will see if you compare the “brief sketch” with that paragraph, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom” presents the Consequence Argument in a disguise that is not easy to penetrate. Some teachers of philosophy who have used the first edition of Metaphysics: The Big Questions as a textbook have asked for a more straightforward statement of the Consequence Argument (since much of the recent discussion of the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism in the philosophical literature has taken the form of criticisms of the Consequence Argument that are rather hard to apply to the argument in the form in which it is presented in Reading 41). This essay is an attempt to meet this request