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5.4c.3. Determinism (Determinism on PhilPapers)

Ayers, Michael R. (1968). The Refutation of Determinism. Methuen.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (1971). Determinism. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Berofsky, Bernard (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Bobzien, Susanne (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today
Borovskiĭ, Mikhail Ivanovich[from old catalog] (1974). Determinizm I Nravstvennoe Povedenie Lichnosti.   (Google)
Brennan, Jason (2007). Free will in the Block universe. Philosophia 35 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions. I suggest that what Hoefer may have shown us is that causation, not determinism, was the threat to free will all along. Additionally, Hoefer might avoid the problem of the asymmetry of macroscopic efficacy by noting we have a very small region of space-time completely determined by our choices. However, this move implies our freedom to act is freedom to do very little, given that the region is trivial. I suggest that Hoefer should instead claim that we do have pervasive macroscopic efficacy toward the past, though I am unsure of how well this thesis works. Regardless, there remains a problem that the inside-out perspective requires us to see our choices as brute facts or random occurrences. Attempts to resolve this problem seem to require either a theory of agent causation or a traditional compatibilist argument, making Hoefer’s thesis extraneous, unless he can show us that these require the inside-out perspective. However, Hoefer has not yet shown us this, so there is work to be done
Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 90 (January):99-101.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Cowan, Joseph L. (1969). Deliberation and determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (January):53-61.   (Google)
Crissman, Paul (1942). Freedom in determinism. Journal of Philosophy 39 (September):520-526.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
D'angelo, Edward (1968). The Problem Of Freedom And Determinism. Columbia: University Of Missouri Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Double, Richard (1991). Determinism and the experience of freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (March):1-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Faris, J. A. (1970). A conspectus of determinism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 217:217-234.   (Google)
Fischer, Gilbert R. (1971). The process of determinism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 9:39-48.   (Google)
Gallagher, Kenneth T. (1964). Determinism and argument. Modern Schoolman 41 (January):111-122.   (Google)
Gale, Richard M. (1961). Professor Ducasse on determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (September):92-96.   (Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl & Palmer, David (2010). On Mele and Robb's indeterministic Frankfurt-style case. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.   (Google)
Glossop, Ronald J. (1969). Freedom, determinism, and mechanism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7:181-186.   (Google)
Hannaford, Robert V. (1976). Who's in control here? Philosophy 51 (October):421-430.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1970). A conspectus of determinism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 191:191-216.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1973). On determinism. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays On Freedom Of Action. Routledge & Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Kane, Robert H. (2002). Free will, determinism, and indeterminism. In Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Korolev, Alexandre, The Norton-type lipschitz-indeterministic systems and elastic phenomena: Indeterminism as an artefact of infinite idealizations.   (Google)
Abstract: The singularity arising from the violation of the Lipschitz condition in the simple Newtonian system proposed recently by Norton (2003) is so fragile as to be completely and irreparably destroyed by slightly relaxing certain (infinite) idealizations pertaining to elastic phenomena in this model. I demonstrate that this is also true for several other Lipschitz-indeterministic systems, which, unlike Norton's example, have no surface curvature singularities. As a result, indeterminism in these systems should rather be viewed as an artefact of certain infinite idealizations essential for these models, depriving them of much of their intended metaphysical import
Lehrer, Keith (1966). An empirical disproof of determinism. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Lehrer, Keith (ed.) (1966). Freedom and Determinism. Random House.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Mays, W. (1955). Determinism and free will in Whitehead. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (4):523-534.   (Google | More links)
Munn, Allan Macgregor (1960). Free-Will And Determinism. University Of Toronto Press,.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Popper, Karl R. (1983). Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 92 (January):103-4.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Prior, A. N. (1962). Limited indeterminism. Review of Metaphysics 16 (September):55-61.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1994). Four kinds of determinism and "free will": A response to Viney and Crosby. New Ideas in Psychology 12:143-46.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sayre, Kenneth M. (1977). Moonflight: A Conversation on Determinism. Produced and Distributed on Demand by University Microfilms International.   (Google)
Schacht, Richard (1989). Whither determinism: On Humean beings, human beings, and originators. Inquiry 32 (March):55-77.   (Google)
Sipfle, David A. (1969). Free action and determinism. Ratio 11 (June):62-68.   (Google)
Slote, Michael A. (1969). Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria. Inquiry 12 (1-4):317-38.   (Google)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1975). Determinism: A small point. Dialogue 14 (December):617-621.   (Google)
Swartz, Norman (ms). Lecture notes on free will and determinism.   (Google)
Abstract: For an expansion of the discussion of Sections 2-5 (Logical Determinism, Epistemic Determinism, and Modal Concepts) see Foreknowledge and Free Will ", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Trakakis, Nick (2007). Whither morality in a hard determinist world? Sorites 19.   (Google)
von Spakovsky, Anatol (1963). Freedom, Determinism, Indeterminism. The Hague: Nijhoff.   (Google)
Warfield, Ted A. (1996). Determinism and moral responsiblity are incompatible. Philosophical Topics 24:215-26.   (Google)
Westen, Peter (2005). Getting the fly out of the bottle: The false problem of free will and determinism. Buffalo Criminal Law Review 8:101-54.   (Google | More links)
Williams, Clifford E. (1980). Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue. Hackett.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Young, Robert M. (1991). The implications of determinism. In A Companion to Ethics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)