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5.4c.4. Fatalism (Fatalism on PhilPapers)

Acevedo, Gabriel A. (2005). Turning anomie on its head: Fatalism as Durkheim's concealed and multidimensional alienation theory. Sociological Theory 23 (1):75-85.   (Google | More links)
Aune, Bruce (1962). Fatalism and professor Taylor. Philosophical Review 71 (4):512-519.   (Google | More links)
Beedle, Andrew (1996). Modal fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):488-495.   (Google | More links)
Benstein, M. (1992). Fatalism. University of Nebraska Press.   (Google)
Bernstein, M. (2002). Fatalism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark (1989). Fatalism, tense, and changing the past. Philosophical Studies 56 (2).   (Google)
Bhattacharji, Sukumari (1982). Fatalism — its roots and effects. Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (2).   (Google)
Sophie Botros, (1985). Freedom, causality, fatalism and early stoic philosophy. Phronesis 30 (3):274-304.   (Google)
Bradley, R. D. (1963). Causality, fatalism, and morality. Mind 72 (288):591-594.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Charles D. (1965). Fallacies in Taylor's "fatalism". Journal of Philosophy 62 (13):349-353.   (Google | More links)
Buller, David (ms). On the "standard" argument for fatalism.   (Google)
Abstract: What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the argument continues to exercise fine contemporary minds (e.g. Schlesinger 1993)
Campbell, Joseph K. (2010). Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Carroll, John (online). Context, conditionals, fatalism, freedom & time travel.   (Google)
Carroll, John (2010). Context, conditionals, fatalism, time travel, and freedom. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.   (Google)
Cargile, James (1996). Some comments on fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):1-11.   (Google | More links)
Diekemper, Joseph (2007). B-theory, fixity, and fatalism. Noûs 41 (3):429–452.   (Google | More links)
Diekemper, Joseph (2004). Temporal necessity and logical fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: first, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one
Eaton, Ralph M. (1921). Social fatalism. Philosophical Review 30 (4):380-392.   (Google | More links)
Foster, Lewis (1971). Fatalism and precognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):341-351.   (Google | More links)
Gaskin, Richard (1998). Fatalism, bivalence and the past. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):83-88.   (Google | More links)
Gaskin, Richard (1998). Middle knowledge, fatalism and comparative similarity of worlds. Religious Studies 34 (2):189-203.   (Google)
Gelven, Michael (1991). Why Me?: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Fate. Northern Illinois University Press.   (Google)
Gruen, William (1936). Determinism, fatalism, and historical materialism. Journal of Philosophy 33 (23):617-628.   (Google | More links)
Haack, Susan (1974). On a theological argument for fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.   (Google | More links)
Haack, Susan (1975). On "on theological fatalism again" again. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (99):159-161.   (Google | More links)
Hasker, William (1988). Hard facts and theological fatalism. Noûs 22 (3):419-436.   (Google | More links)
Hay, William H. (1983). Explaining philosophical illusion: Mill on necessity and fatalism. Metaphilosophy 14 (1):40–45.   (Google | More links)
Helm, Paul (1975). Fatalism once more. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (101):355-356.   (Google | More links)
Helm, Paul (1974). On theological fatalism again. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (97):360-362.   (Google | More links)
Herrick, C. Judson (1927). Fatalism or Freedom. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd..   (Google)
Hooper, Charles E. (1930). The Fallacies of Fatalism. London, Watts & Co..   (Google)
Johnson, David Kyle (2009). God, fatalism, and temporal ontology. Religious Studies 45 (4):435-454.   (Google)
Kenny, Mary Lorena (2002). Drought, clientalism, fatalism and fear in northeast Brazil. Ethics, Place and Environment 5 (2):123 – 134.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Northeast Brazil has been targeted for remedial projects to combat drought for more than 100 years, although drought mitigation policies have been mostly ineffective in reducing vulnerability for the majority of the population. In this paper I review some of the historical and contemporary approaches to drought mitigation and examine the efficacy of mitigation through the aperture of contemporary clientalism and the persistence of asymmetric power relations in democratic Brazil. Although the abertura , political opening, and end of a 20-year military dictatorship allowed for improved civil and political rights and public demonstrations, this 'low-intensity' democracy has had few social and economic reforms that have hampered elite interests, minimized inequity, or empowered the poor. Patronage continues to be the dominant tool for survival, especially in the drought-ridden Northeast, where access to scarce state services is extremely competitive and personal connections determine or facilitate access
Kvanvig, Jonathan (1992). Hasker on fatalism. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2).   (Google)
Langer, Susanne K. (1936). On a fallacy in "scientific fatalism". International Journal of Ethics 46 (4):473-483.   (Google | More links)
Loss, Roberto (2010). Fatalism and the necessity of the present: Reply to Campbell. Analysis 70 (1).   (Google)
Mackie, Penelope (2003). Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Martin, Adrienne (2008). No Virtue in Fatalism: Conservative Bioethics and Eric Cohen's *In the Shadow of Progress*. Science Progress.   (Google)
Abstract: Refusing to pursue recent and possible future developments in medical research is itself a morally momentous decision—and that inaction has consequences Cohen and other right-wing thinkers refuse to acknowledge.
Merricks, Trenton (2009). Truth and freedom. Philosophical Review 118 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all. Instead, those arguments are built on an uncontroversial understanding of the idea that truth depends on the world. In the final section of the article, those arguments are extended to show that foreknowledge of an action does not threaten that action's freedom
Moyal, Georges J. D. (1985). Another difficulty in Taylor's argument for fatalism. Mind 94 (373):104-107.   (Google | More links)
Rea, Michael C. (2006). Presentism and fatalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely believed that presentism is compatible with both a libertarian view of human freedom and an unrestricted principle of bivalence. I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom
Rice, Hugh (online). Fatalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Rogers, Katherin A. (2007). The necessity of the present and Anselm's eternalist response to the problem of theological fatalism. Religious Studies 43 (1):25-47.   (Google)
Abstract: It is often argued that the eternalist solution to the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma fails. If God's knowledge of your choices is eternally fixed, your choices are necessary and cannot be free. Anselm of Canterbury proposes an eternalist view which entails that all of time is equally real and truly present to God. God's knowledge of your choices entails only a ‘consequent’ necessity which does not conflict with libertarian freedom. I argue this by showing that if consequent necessity does conflict with libertarian freedom then God's knowledge in the present would conflict with the freedom of a present choice. Absurd. (Published Online January 15 2007)
Russell, Paul (2000). Compatibilist fatalism. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that recognizes the _legitimacy_ of (pessimistic) concerns about the origination of character and conduct. On this basis I argue that any plausible compatibilist position must concede that determinism has fatalistic implications of some significant and relevant kind, and thus must allow that agents may be legitimately held responsible in circumstances where they are subject to fate. The position generated by these compatibilist concessions to incompatibilism will be called 'compatibilist-fatalism'
Saunders, John Turk (1965). Fatalism and ordinary language. Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):211-222.   (Google | More links)
Sharvy, Richard (1964). Tautology and fatalism. Journal of Philosophy 61 (10):293-295.   (Google | More links)
Sobel, Jordan Howard (1966). Dummett on fatalism. Philosophical Review 75 (1):78-90.   (Google | More links)
Solomon, Robert C., Nietzsche on fatalism and "free will".   (Google)
Solomon, Robert C. (2003). On fate and fatalism. Philosophy East and West 53 (4):435-454.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: : Fate and fatalism have been powerful notions in many societies, from Homer's Iliad, the Greek moira, the South Asian karma, and the Chinese ming in the ancient world to the modern concept of "destiny." But fate and fatalism are now treated with philosophical disdain or as a clearly inferior version of what is better considered as "determinism." The concepts of fate and fatalism are defended here, and fatalism is clearly distinguished from determinism. Reference is made to the ancient Greek and Chinese versions to explore the various dimensions of these ideas
Sorensen, R. (2006). Sharp edges from Hedges: Fatalism, vagueness and epistemic possibility. Philosophical Studies 131 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy
Stallknecht, Newton P. (1937). Fatalism, determinism, and indeterminism. International Journal of Ethics 47 (2):231-233.   (Google | More links)
Strong, C. A. (1918). Fate and free will. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (1):5-9.   (Google | More links)
Talbott, Thomas (1993). Theological fatalism and modal confusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (2).   (Google)
Taylor, Richard (1963). A note on fatalism. Philosophical Review 72 (4):497-499.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, Richard (1962). Fatalism. Philosophical Review 71 (1):56-66.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, Richard (1964). Tautology and fatalism: Fatalistic arguments: Comment. Journal of Philosophy 61 (10):305-307.   (Google | More links)
Tomberlin, James E. (1971). The sea battle tomorrow and fatalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):352-357.   (Google | More links)
van Rensselaer Wilson, H. (1955). Causal discontinuity in fatalism and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 52:134-58.   (Google)
Waller, Bruce N. (1989). Uneven starts and just deserts (fatalism and free will). Analysis 49:209-13.   (Google)
White, V. Alan (ms). Determinism is not fatalism.   (Google)
Abstract: After learning about the concept of determinism, a natural tendency is to conclude that if anyone actually believed in the determinism of human nature, then all future human actions are "set out for us" or "cut and dried" and, in some sense, utterly unavoidable. Another way of referring to such inevitability is that human action appears to be..
White, Michael J. (1981). Fatalism and causal determinism: An aristotelian essay. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (124):231-241.   (Google | More links)
Wilsovann, H. Rensselaer (1955). Causal discontinuity in fatalism and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 52 (February):70-71.   (Google | More links)