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5.4c.6. Free Will and Foreknowledge (Free Will and Foreknowledge on PhilPapers)

Aiken, Warwick (1973). Predestination and Free Will! [Charlston, S.C..   (Google)
Anglin, W. S. (1990). Free Will and the Christian Faith. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God
Augustine, (2009). God's foreknowledge and free will. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy of Religion: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ben-Menahem, Yemima (1988). Free will and foreknowledge: A fresh approach to a classic problem. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):486-490.   (Google | More links)
Danielson, Dennis (1977). Timelessness, foreknowledge, and free will. Mind 86 (343):430-432.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, John M. (2008). Freedom, foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A reply to Vihvelin. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 327-342.   (Google)
Fulda, Joseph S. (1998). Partially resolving the tension between omniscience and free will: A mathematical argument. Sorites 9 (--):53-55.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We put forward a probability-based theory of temptation with implications for philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind, alike
Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Foreknowledge, freedom, and obligation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):321-339.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hopkins, Jasper (1977). Augustine on foreknowledge and free will. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (2):111-126.   (Google)
Kane, R. (1996). Review. The dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Mind 105 (419).   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1991). Agency and omniscience. Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and direction of divine agency that has long been the lure of certain religious traditions
Pike, Nelson (1984). Fischer on freedom and foreknowledge. Philosophical Review 93 (October):599-614.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Nelson C. (1966). Plantinga on the free will defense: A reply. Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):93-104.   (Google | More links)
Swartz, Norman M. (online). Foreknowledge and free will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will was addressed in a religious context. According to orthodox views in the West, God was claimed to be omniscient (and hence in possession of perfect foreknowledge) and yet God was supposed to have given humankind free will. Attempts to solve the apparent contradiction often involved attributing to God special properties, e.g. being 'outside' of time. However, the trouble with such solutions is that they are generally unsatisfactory on their own terms. Even more serious is the fact that they leave untouched the problem posed not by God's foreknowledge but that of any human being. Do human beings have foreknowledge? Certainly, of at least some events and behaviors. Thus we have a secular counterpart of the original problem. A human being's foreknowledge, exactly as would God's, of another's choices would seem to preclude the exercise of human free will. Various ways of trying to solve the problem – e.g. by putting constraints on the truth-conditions for statements, or by 'tightening' the conditions necessary for knowledge – are examined and shown not to work. Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized, and remedied, the problem evaporates
Vihvelin, Kadri (2008). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and ability to do otherwise: A reply to Fischer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.   (Google)
Wyckoff, Jason (forthcoming). On the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Sophia.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t 1 what an agent S will do at t 2 , is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom is undermined. These cases include those in which certain human actions are logically, rather than causally, foreclosed