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Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence :: Can Machines Think? :: Machine Consciousness

See also:
Adams, William Y. (online). Intersubjective transparency and artificial consciousness.   (Google | Edit)
Adams, William Y. (2004). Machine consciousness: Plausible idea or semantic distortion? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):46-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Aleksander, Igor L. & Dunmall, B. (2003). Axioms and tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents I: Preamble. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):7-18.   (Cited by 13 | Google | Edit)
Aleksander, Igor L. (2007). Machine consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Aleksander, Igor L. (2006). Machine consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Amoroso, Richard L. (1997). The theoretical foundations for engineering a conscious quantum computer. In M. Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Angel, Leonard (1994). Am I a computer? In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.   (Google | Edit)
Angel, Leonard (1989). How to Build a Conscious Machine. Westview Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Arrabales, R. & Sanchis, A. (forthcoming). Applying machine consciousness models in autonomous situated agents. Pattern Recognition Letters.   (Google | Edit)
Arrabales, R.; Ledezma, A. & Sanchis, A. (online). Modelling consciousness for autonomous robot exploration. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.   (Google | Edit)
Arrington, Robert L. (1999). Machines, consciousness, and thought. Idealistic Studies 29 (3):231-243.   (Google | Edit)
Aydede, Murat & Guzeldere, Guven (2000). Consciousness, intentionality, and intelligence: Some foundational issues for artificial intelligence. Journal Of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):263-277.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Bair, Puran K. (1981). Computer metaphors for consciousness. In The Metaphors Of Consciousness. New York: Plenum Press.   (Google | Edit)
Barnes, E. (1991). The causal history of computational activity: Maudlin and olympia. Journal of Philosophy 88 (6):304-16.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Bell, John L. (online). Algorithmicity and consciousness.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Why should one believe that conscious awareness is solely the result of organizational complexity? What is the connection between consciousness and combinatorics: transformation of quantity into quality? The claim that the former is reducible to the other seems unconvincing—as unlike as chalk and cheese! In his book1 Penrose is at least attempting to compare like with like: the enigma of consciousness with the progress of physics
Birnbacher, Dieter (1995). Artificial consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Google | Edit)
Bringsjord, Selmer (1994). Could, how could we tell if, and should - androids have inner lives? In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | Edit)
Bringsjord, Selmer (2004). On building robot persons: Response to Zlatev. Minds and Machines 14 (3):381-385.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   Zlatev offers surprisingly weak reasoning in support of his view that robots with the right kind of developmental histories can have meaning. We ought nonetheless to praise Zlatev for an impressionistic account of how attending to the psychology of human development can help us build robots that appear to have intentionality
Bringsjord, Selmer (2007). Offer: One billion dollars for a conscious robot; if you're honest, you must decline. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):28-43.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: You are offered one billion dollars to 'simply' produce a proof-of-concept robot that has phenomenal consciousness -- in fact, you can receive a deliciously large portion of the money up front, by simply starting a three-year work plan in good faith. Should you take the money and commence? No. I explain why this refusal is in order, now and into the foreseeable future
Bringsjord, Selmer (1992). What Robots Can and Can't Be. Kluwer.   (Cited by 85 | Google | More links | Edit)
Brockmeier, Scott (1997). Computational architecture and the creation of consciousness. The Dualist 4.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Brown, Geoffrey (1989). Minds, Brains And Machines. St Martin's Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Buttazzo, G. (2001). Artificial consciousness: Utopia or real possibility? Computer 34:24-30.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links | Edit)
Caplain, G. (1995). Is consciousness a computational property? Informatica 19:615-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Caws, Peter (1988). Subjectivity in the machine. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (September):291-308.   (Google | Edit)
Chandler, Keith A. (2002). Artificial intelligence and artificial consciousness. Philosophia 31 (1):32-46.   (Google | Edit)
Chella, Antonio & Manzotti, Riccardo (2007). Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Cherry, Christopher (1989). Reply--the possibility of computers becoming persons: A response to Dolby. Social Epistemology 3 (4):337-348.   (Google | Edit)
Clack, Robert J. (1968). The myth of the conscious robot. Personalist 49:351-369.   (Google | Edit)
Coles, L. S. (1993). Engineering machine consciousness. AI Expert 8:34-41.   (Google | Edit)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Cyberchild: A simulation test-bed for consciousness studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):31-45.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
D'Aquili, Eugene G. & Newberg, Andrew B. (1996). Consciousness and the machine. Zygon 31 (2):235-52.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Danto, Arthur C. (1960). On consciousness in machines. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1997). Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: The best reason for believing that robots might some day become conscious is that we human beings are conscious, and we are a sort of robot ourselves. That is, we are extraordinarily complex self-controlling, self-sustaining physical mechanisms, designed over the eons by natural selection, and operating according to the same well-understood principles that govern all the other physical processes in living things: digestive and metabolic processes, self-repair and reproductive processes, for instance. It may be wildly over-ambitious to suppose that human artificers can repeat Nature's triumph, with variations in material, form, and design process, but this is not a deep objection. It is not as if a conscious machine contradicted any fundamental laws of nature, the way a perpetual motion machine does. Still, many skeptics believe--or in any event want to believe--that it will never be done. I wouldn't wager against them, but my reasons for skepticism are mundane, economic reasons, not theoretical reasons
Dennett, Daniel C. (1994). The practical requirements for making a conscious robot. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 349:133-46.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Arguments about whether a robot could ever be conscious have been conducted up to now in the factually impoverished arena of what is possible "in principle." A team at MIT of which I am a part is now embarking on a longterm project to design and build a humanoid robot, Cog, whose cognitive talents will include speech, eye-coordinated manipulation of objects, and a host of self-protective, self-regulatory and self-exploring activities. The aim of the project is not to make a conscious robot, but to make a robot that can interact with human beings in a robust and versatile manner in real time, take care of itself, and tell its designers things about itself that would otherwise be extremely difficult if not impossible to determine by examination. Many of the details of Cog's "neural" organization will parallel what is known (or presumed known) about their counterparts in the human brain, but the intended realism of Cog as a model is relatively coarse-grained, varying opportunistically as a function of what we think we know, what we think we can build, and what we think doesn't matter. Much of what we think will of course prove to be mistaken; that is one advantage of real experiments over thought experiments
Duch, Wlodizislaw (2005). Brain-inspired conscious computing architecture. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (1-2):1-21.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)
Ettinger, R. C. W. (2004). To be or not to be: The zombie in the computer. In Nick Bostrom, R.C.W. Ettinger & Charles Tandy (eds.), Death and Anti-Death, Volume 2: Two Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing. Palo Alto: Ria University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Farleigh, Peter (2007). The ensemble and the single mind. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Google | Edit)
Farrell, B. A. (1970). On the design of a conscious device. Mind 79 (July):321-346.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Franklin, Stan (2003). A conscious artifact? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.   (Google | Edit)
Franklin, Stan (2003). Ida: A conscious artifact? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):47-66.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links | Edit)
Gunderson, Keith (1969). Cybernetics and mind-body problems. Inquiry 12:406-19.   (Google | Edit)
Gunderson, Keith (1971). Mentality and Machines. Doubleday.   (Cited by 29 | Google | Edit)
Gunderson, Keith (1968). Robots, consciousness and programmed behaviour. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (August):109-22.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Haikonen, & Pentti, O. (2007). Robot Brains: Circuits and Systems for Conscious Machines. Wiley.   (Google | Edit)
Haikonen, Pentti O. A. (2007). Essential issues of conscious machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):72-84.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: The development of conscious machines faces a number of difficult issues such as the apparent immateriality of mind, qualia and self-awareness. Also consciousness-related cognitive processes such as perception, imagination, motivation and inner speech are a technical challenge. It is foreseen that the development of machine consciousness would call for a system approach; the developer of conscious machines should consider complete systems that integrate the cognitive processes seamlessly and process information in a transparent way with representational and non-representational information-processing modes. An overview of the main issues is given and some possible solutions are outlined
Haikonen, Pentti O. A. (2003). The Cognitive Approach to Conscious Machines. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links | Edit)
Harnad, Stevan (2003). Can a machine be conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can only know how they pass the Turing Test, but not how, why or whether that makes them feel
Henley, Tracy B. (1991). Consciousness and aI: A reconsideration of Shanon. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (3):367-370.   (Google | Edit)
Hillis, D. (1998). Can a machine be conscious? In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google | Edit)
Holland, Owen (2007). A strongly embodied approach to machine consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):97-110.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Over sixty years ago, Kenneth Craik noted that, if an organism (or an artificial agent) carried 'a small-scale model of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head', it could use the model to behave intelligently. This paper argues that the possible actions might best be represented by interactions between a model of reality and a model of the agent, and that, in such an arrangement, the internal model of the agent might be a transparent model of the sort recently discussed by Metzinger, and so might offer a useful analogue of a conscious entity. The CRONOS project has built a robot functionally similar to a human that has been provided with an internal model of itself and of the world to be used in the way suggested by Craik; when the system is completed, it will be possible to study its operation from the perspective not only of artificial intelligence, but also of machine consciousness
Holland, Owen (ed.) (2003). Machine Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links | Edit)
Joy, Glenn C. (1989). Gunderson and Searle: A common error about artificial intelligence. Southwest Philosophical Studies 28:28-34.   (Google | Edit)
Kirk, Robert E. (1986). Sentience, causation and some robots. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):308-21.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)
Kiverstein, Julian (2007). Could a robot have a subjective point of view? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):127-139.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Scepticism about the possibility of machine consciousness comes in at least two forms. Some argue that our neurobiology is special, and only something sharing our neurobiology could be a subject of experience. Others argue that a machine couldn't be anything else but a zombie: there could never be something it is like to be a machine. I advance a dynamic sensorimotor account of consciousness which argues against both these varieties of scepticism
Knobe, Joshua (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically-based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to directly define the term intentional, people mention four components of intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness. Study 3 confirms the importance of a fifth component, namely, skill. In light of these findings, the authors propose a model of the folk concept of intentionality and provide a further test in Study 4. The discussion compares the proposed model to past ones and examines its implications for social perception, attribution, and cognitive development
Levy, Donald (2003). How to psychoanalyze a robot: Unconscious cognition and the evolution of intentionality. Minds and Machines 13 (2):203-212.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   According to a common philosophical distinction, the `original' intentionality, or `aboutness' possessed by our thoughts, beliefs and desires, is categorically different from the `derived' intentionality manifested in some of our artifacts –- our words, books and pictures, for example. Those making the distinction claim that the intentionality of our artifacts is `parasitic' on the `genuine' intentionality to be found in members of the former class of things. In Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, Daniel Dennett criticizes that claim and the distinction it rests on, and seeks to show that ``metaphysically original intentionality'' is illusory by working out the implications he sees in the practical possibility of a certain type of robot, i.e., one that generates `utterances' which are `inscrutable to the robot's designers' so that we, and they, must consult the robot to discover the meaning of its utterances. I argue that the implications Dennett finds are erroneous, regardless of whether such a robot is possible, and therefore that the real existence of metaphysically original intentionality has not been undermined by the possibility of the robot Dennett describes
Lucas, John R. (1994). A view of one's own (conscious machines). Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series A 349:147-52.   (Google | Edit)
Lycan, William G. (1998). Qualitative experience in machines. In Terrell Ward Bynum & James H. Moor (eds.), How Computers Are Changing Philosophy. Blackwell.   (Google | Edit)
Mackay, Donald M. (1963). Consciousness and mechanism: A reply to miss Fozzy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (August):157-159.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Mackay, Donald M. (1985). Machines, brains, and persons. Zygon 20 (December):401-412.   (Google | Edit)
Manzotti, Riccardo (2007). From artificial intelligence to artificial consciousness. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Google | Edit)
Margolis, Joseph (1974). Ascribing actions to machines. Behaviorism 2:85-93.   (Google | Edit)
Marras, Ausonio (1993). Pollock on how to build a person. Dialogue 32 (3):595-605.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Maudlin, Tim (1989). Computation and consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 86 (August):407-32.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)