MindPapers: 6.5a. Computationalism in Cognitive Science

Agre, Philip E. (2002). The practical logic of computer work. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Antony, Louise M. (1997). Feeling fine about the mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):381-87. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Bickhard, Mark H. (1996). Troubles with computationalism. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Block, Ned (1990). The computer model of mind. In Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)

Block, Ned (1995). The mind as the software of the brain. In Daniel N. Osherson, Lila Gleitman, Stephen M. Kosslyn, S. Smith & Saadya Sternberg (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)

Boden, Margaret A. (1988). Computer Models On Mind: Computational Approaches In Theoretical Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 64 | Google | More links)

Boden, Margaret A. (1981). Minds And Mechanisms: Philosophical Psychology And Computational Models. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Boden, Margaret A. (1979). The computational metaphor in psychology. In Philosophical Problems In Psychology. London: Methuen. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Boden, Margaret A. (1984). What is computational psychology? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:17-35. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Boden, Margaret A. (1984). What is computational psychology, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 17:17-36. (Google)

Bringsjord, Selmer (1994). Computation, among other things, is beneath us. Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)

Bringsjord, Selmer & Zenzen, Michael J. (1997). Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility. Synthese 113 (2):285-320. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Bringsjord, Selmer (2000). Clarifying the logic of anti-computationalism: Reply to Hauser. Minds and Machines 10 (1):111-113. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Bringsjord, Selmer (2001). In computation, parallel is nothing, physical everything. Minds and Machines 11 (1):95-99. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Bringsjord, Selmer (2004). The modal argument for hypercomputing minds. Theoretical Computer Science 317. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)

Bryant, Antony (2003). Cognitive informatics, distributed representation and embodiment. Brain and Mind 4 (2):215-228. (Google | More links)

Buller, David J. (1993). Confirmation and the computational paradigm, or, why do you think they call it artificial intelligence? Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Cantwell Smith, Brian (2002). The foundations of computing. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Cela-Conde, Camilo J. & Marty, Gisèle (1997). Mind architecture and brain architecture. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):327-340. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Chalmers, David J. (1994). A computational foundation for the study of cognition. PNP Technical Report. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Cherniak, Christopher (1988). Undebuggability and cognitive science. Communications Of The ACM 31 (4):402-416. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)

Clark, Austen (1984). Seeing and summing: Implications of computational theories of vision. Cognition and Brain Theory 7 (1):1-23. (Google | More links)

Clarke, J. J. (1972). Turing machines and the mind-body problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (February):1-12. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Copeland, Jack (2002). Narrow versus wide mechanism. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. (Cited by 42 | Google)

Copeland, Jack (1994). Turing, Wittgenstein, and the science of the mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):497-519. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Cummins, Robert E. (1977). Programs in the explanation of behavior. Philosophy of Science 44 (June):269-87. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)

Demopoulos, William (1987). On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism. Synthese 70 (January):79-96. (Cited by 9 | Google | Annotation)

Dietrich, Eric (1990). Computationalism. Social Epistemology 4 (2):135-154. (Cited by 58 | Google | Annotation)

Dietrich, Eric (2000). Cognitive science and the mechanistic forces of darkness. TechnC) 5 (2). (Google)

Dietrich, Eric (2001). It does so: Review of The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. AI Magazine 22 (4):141-144. (Google | More links)

Dietrich, Eric (1990). Replies to my computational commentators. Social Epistemology 369 (October-December):369-375. (Google)

Dietrich, Eric (1989). Semantics and the computational paradigm in computational psychology. Synthese 79 (April):119-41. (Cited by 44 | Google | Annotation)

Double, Richard (1987). The computational model of the mind and philosophical functionalism. Behaviorism 15:131-39. (Google)

Dreyfus, Hubert L. & Haugeland, John (1974). The computer as a mistaken model of the mind. In Philosophy Of Psychology. Macmillan. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Eliasmith, Chris (2000). Is the brain analog or digital?: The solution and its consequences for cognitive science. Cognitive Science Quarterly 1 (2):147-170. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Ernandes, Marco (2005). Artificial intelligence & games: Should computational psychology be revalued? Topoi 24 (2):229-242. (Google | More links)

Fellows, Roger (1995). Welcome to wales: Searle on the computational theory of mind. In Philosophy and Technology. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Fernandez, Jordi (2003). Explanation by computer simulation in cognitive science. Minds And Machines 13 (2):269-284. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Fetzer, James H. (2000). Computing is at best a special kind of thinking. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. (Google)

Fetzer, James H. (1994). Mental algorithms: Are minds computational systems? Pragmatics and Cognition 21:1-29. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Fetzer, James H. (1997). Thinking and computing: Computers as special kinds of signs. Minds and Machines 7 (3):345-364. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)

Fodor, Jerry A. (1978). Computation and reduction. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Fodor, Jerry A. (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press. (Cited by 224 | Google | More links)

Garson, James W. (1993). Mice in mirrored mazes and the mind. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):123-34. (Google | Annotation)

George, F. H. (1962). The Brain As A Computer. Addison-Wesley. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Green, Christopher D. (2000). Is AI the right method for cognitive science? Psycoloquy 11 (61). (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)

Grush, Rick & Churchland, Patricia S. (1998). Computation and the brain. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (MITECS). MIT Press. (Google)

Harnad, Stevan (1994). Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; cognition isn't. Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90. (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)

Haugeland, John (2002). Authentic intentionality. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. (Google)

Hershfield, Jeffrey (1998). Cognitivism and explanatory relativity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):505-526. (Google)

Hershfield, Jeffrey (2005). Is there life after the death of the computational theory of mind? Minds and Machines 15 (2):183-194. (Google | More links)

Higginbotham, James T. (1986). Comments on Peacocke's explanation in computational psychology. Mind and Language 1:358-361. (Google)

Horgan, Terence E. (2002). Themes in my philosophical work. In Johannes L Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Horst, Steven (1999). Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind. Minds and Machines 9 (3):347-381. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Horst, Steven (1996). Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. University of California Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Horst, Steven (online). The computational theory of mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Humphreys, Glyn W. & Quinlan, Philip T. (1986). Comments on Peacocke's explanation in computational psychology. Mind and Language 1:355-357. (Google)

Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2006). Formal operations and simulated thought. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):221-234. (Google | More links)

Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2006). Two concepts of "form" and the so-called computational theory of mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821. (Google | More links)

Lih, Ko-wei (1995). Should we care if the brain is a computer? In Mind and Cognition. Taipei: Inst Euro-Amer Stud. (Google)

McDermott, Drew (2001). The digital computer as red Herring. Psycoloquy 12 (54). (Google)

Mellor, D. H. (1989). How much of the mind is a computer. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer. (Cited by 5 | Google | Annotation)

Mellor, D. H. (1984). What is computational psychology? II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:37-53. (Google)

Moor, James H. (2000). Thinking must be computation of the right kind. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Nelson, Raymond J. (1987). Machine models for cognitive science. Philosophy of Science 54 (September):391-408. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Peacocke, Christopher (1986). Reply to Humphreys, Quinlan, Higginbotham, Schiffer and Soames's comments on Peacocke's Explanation in Computational Psychology. Mind and Language 1:388-402. (Google)

Piccinini, Gualtiero (2003). Computations and Computers in the Sciences of Mind and Brain. Dissertation. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)

Piccinini, Gualtiero (online). Computational explanation and mechanistic explanation of mind. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Piccinini, Gualtiero (2006). Computational explanation in neuroscience. Synthese 153 (3):343-353. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Piccinini, Gualtiero (2004). Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)

Piccinini, Gualtiero (2004). Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35 (4):811-833. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Piccinini, Gualtiero (online). Symbols, strings, and spikes. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Piccinini, Gualtiero (online). The mind as neural software. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Pietroski, Paul M. (1996). Experiencing the facts: Critical notice of Mind and World, by John McDowell. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:613-36. (Google | More links)

Pollock, John L. (1989). How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon. MIT Press. (Cited by 40 | Google)

Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1980). Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:111-32. (Cited by 111 | Google)

Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1984). Computation and Cognition. MIT Press. (Cited by 1190 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1989). Computing and cognitive science. In Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 61 | Google | More links | Annotation)

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