MindPapers: 7.1c. The Simulation Theory

Adams, Frederick R. (2001). Empathy, neural imaging and the theory versus simulation debate. Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bernier, Paul (2002). From simulation to theory. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Biggs, Stephen (2007). The phenomenal mindreader: A case for phenomenal simulation. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper specifies two hypotheses that are intimated in recent research on empathy and mindreading. The first, the phenomenal simulation hypothesis, holds that those attributing mental states (i.e., mindreaders) sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). The second, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis, holds that this phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some mental state attributions. After explicating these hypotheses, the paper focuses on the first. It argues that neuropsychological experiments on empathy and behavioral experiments on imitation provide good reason to think that mindreaders sometimes simulate targets' phenomenal states. Accordingly, the paper concludes, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis merits consideration

Borg, Emma (2007). If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds

Campbell, J. (2002). Joint attention and simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Child, William (2002). Reply to Alvin I. Goldman. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Child, William (2002). Reply to Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Cruz, Joe (online). A Humean psychological alternative to Kant and Wittgenstein: Comments on Stueber's Importance of Simulation for Understanding Linguistic and Rational Agency. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Let me begin by saying that I am sympathetic to the simulation theory, especially where it is conceived of as a crucial and central addition alongside the theory-theory as the explanation of our capacity to attribute mental states, rather than as an exclusive and exhaustive account by itself.1 I part company with Professor Stueber, however, in that I view the recent simulation theory/theory- theory controversy as subject to resolution primarily through empirical findings. Still, it cannot be denied that Stueber has helped to crystallize elements of the simulation theory/theory-theory debate that have been lurking all along, and has illuminated an important avenue of inquiry into the status of simulation

Currie, Gregory & Ravenscroft, Ian (1997). Mental simulation and motor imagery. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-80. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links | Edit)

Currie, Gregory (1996). Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from autism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 17 | Google | Edit)

Currie, Gregory (1995). Visual imagery as the simulation of vision. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44. (Cited by 26 | Google | Edit)

Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (1998). Folk psychology and mental simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.¹ At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?

Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (eds.) (1995). Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell. (Cited by 164 | Google | Edit)

Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2001). Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Philosophical Topics 29:127-73. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in apparent contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But amongst theory theorists, and amongst simulation theorists, there are significant differences of approach

Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2000). Simulation theory. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses, or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding of the thoughts, decisions or emotions of another

Davies, Martin (1994). The mental simulation debate. Philosophical Issues 5:189-218. (Cited by 20 | Google | More links | Edit)

Davies, Martin (1994). The mental simulation debate. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. (Cited by 20 | Google | More links | Edit)

Decety, J. (2002). Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Dokic, Jérôme (2002). Reply to 'the scope and limit of mental simulation'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Dokic, Jérôme & Proust, Joëlle (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)

Fisher, Justin C. (ms). Does simulation theory really involve simulation? (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the cognitive processes involved when one person predicts a target person's behavior and/or attributes a mental state to that target person. According to simulation theory, a person typically performs these tasks by employing some part of her brain as a simulation of what is going on in a corresponding part of the brain of the target person. I propose a general intuitive analysis of what 'simulation' means. Simulation is a particular way of using one process to acquire knowledge about another process. What distinguishes simulation from other ways of acquiring knowledge is that simulation requires, for its non-accidental success, that the simulating process reflect significant aspects of the simulated process. This conceptual work is of independent philosophical interest, but it also enables me to argue for two conclusions that are of great significance to the debate about mental simulation theory. First, I argue that, in order to stake a non-trivial claim, simulation theory must hold that mental simulation involves what I call concretely similar processes. Second, I argue for the surprising conclusion that a significant class of cases that simulation theorists have claimed as intuitive cases of simulation do not actually involve simulation, after all. I close by sketching an alternative account that might handle these problematic cases

Fuller, Gary (1995). Simulation and psychological concepts. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 13 | Google | Edit)

Galgut, Elisa (2005). Simulation and irrationality. Philosophical Papers 34 (1):25-44. (Google | Edit)

Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do their best to avoid the theoretical stance by using their own experience as the measure of everyone else's. When it comes to explaining how we understand other people some of the very best contemporary philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists are simulationists. For example, Vittorio Gallese, Alvin Goldman, Robert Gordon, Jane Heal, Susan Hurley, and Marc Jeannerod. This short list of simulationists, however, already involves some problems. Not everyone on this list understands simulation in the same way. In effect, there are different simulation theories, and although it is important to distinguish them, and I will do so before I go much further, I will in the end argue against all of them. For several reasons I don't think that the concept of simulation explains our primary and pervasive way of understanding others, any more than theory theory does

Gallagher, Shaun (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems

Gallagher, Shaun (2001). The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gallese, Vittorio (2007). Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gallese, Vittorio (2001). The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50. (Cited by 143 | Google | More links | Edit)

Garson, James W. (2003). Simulation and connectionism: What is the connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Simulation has emerged as an increasingly popular account of folk psychological (FP) talents at mind-reading: predicting and explaining human mental states. Where its rival (the theory-theory) postulates that these abilities are explained by mastery of laws describing the connections between beliefs, desires, and action, simulation theory proposes that we mind-read by "putting ourselves in another's shoes." This paper concerns connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory (ST) and the theory-theory (TT). It is only natural to associate TT with classical architectures where rule governed operations apply to explicit propositional representations. On the other hand, ST would seem better tuned to procedurally oriented non-symbolic structures found in connectionist models. This paper explores the possible alignment between ST and connectionist architecture. Joe Cruz argues that connectionist models with distributed non-symbolic representations are particularly well suited to simulation theory. The purported linkage between connectionist architecture and simulation theory is criticized in this paper. The conclusion is that there are reasons for thinking that connectionist forms of representation are the enemy of both TT and ST. So the contribution of connectionism may be to suggest the need for an alternative to both views

Gianfranco, S. (2002). Reply to 'from simulation to theory'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Goldman, A. (2000). Folk psychology and mental concepts. Protosociology 14:4-25. (Cited by 12 | Google | Edit)

Goldman, A. (1992). In defense of the simulation theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119. (Cited by 119 | Google | Edit)

Goldman, A. (1989). Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language 4:161-85. (Cited by 163 | Google | Edit)

Goldman, A. (1996). Simulation and interpersonal utility. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)

Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google | More links | Edit)

Goldman, A. (2002). Simulation theory and mental concepts. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 10 | Google | Edit)

Goldman, A. (2002). The mentalizing folk. Protosociology 16:7-34. (Cited by 32 | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. & Barker, John A. (1994). Autism and the "theory of mind" debate. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press. (Cited by 16 | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language 1:158-71. (Cited by 350 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. (online). Representing minds. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: investigation).^{1} We project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, . . . even into what from his behavior we imagine a mouse's state of mind to have been, and dramatize it as a belief, wish or striving, verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us in the state thus

Gordon, Robert M. (1996). 'Radical' simulationism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 56 | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Perner and Howes. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):98-103. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97. (Cited by 10 | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. (2001). Simulation and reason explanation: The radical view. Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):175-192. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Alvin Goldman's early work in action theory and theory of knowledge was a major influence on my own thinking and writing about emotions. For that reason and others, it was a very happy moment in my professional life when I learned, in 1988, that in his presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Goldman endorsed and defended the “simulation” theory I had put forward in a 1986 article. I discovered afterward that we share a strong conviction that empirical evidence is relevant to a full assessment of the theory. We both find the burgeoning evidence from cognitive neuroscience to be of particular interest, I believe, in part because it makes possible a major departure for the philosophy of mind: turning its attention from

(a)
the neural basis of mental states,

to

Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Simulation and the explanation of action. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. (1996). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 32 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. & Cruz, Joe (2002). Simulation theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory

Gordon, Robert M. (1995). Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 81 | Google | Edit)

Gordon, Robert M. (1992). The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34. (Cited by 60 | Google | Edit)

Greenwood, John D. (1999). Simulation, theory-theory and cognitive penetration: No 'instance of the fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Harris, P. F. (1992). From simulation to folk psychology: The case for development. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):120-144. (Cited by 131 | Google | Edit)

Heal, Jane (1998). Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach. Mind and Language 13 (4):477-498. (Cited by 21 | Google | More links | Edit)

Heal, Jane (1995). How to think about thinking. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 26 | Google | Edit)

Heal, Jane (2000). Other minds, rationality, and analogy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):1-19. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Heal, Jane (1986). Replication and functionalism. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 67 | Google | Edit)

Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation and cognitive penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67. (Cited by 24 | Google | Edit)

Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation, theory, and content. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google | Edit)

Heal, Jane (1994). Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue? In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 21 | Google | Edit)

Heal, Jane (2000). Understanding other minds from the inside. Protosociology 14:39-55. (Cited by 21 | Google | Edit)

Henderson, David K. & Horgan, Terence E. (2000). Simulation and epistemic competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy

Hoerl, Christoph (2002). Reply to Neurophysiological Evidence for Simulation and Action. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Hutto, Daniel D. (online). Minding our language: The role of simulation in linguistic interpretation. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Historically, the philosophy of language has held pride of place in the analytical tradition. In fact, it would be safe to say that for a long time it had been unquestioningly regarded as first philosophy. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, many analytical philosophers held (and many still hold) that we could only get at the underlying nature of our world by understanding the nature of thought. And secondly, they held (and many still hold) that we could only understand the nature of thought by "an analysis of its linguistic expression" (Dummett, 1993, p. 154). Dummett recently goes so far as to tells us that the latter assumption is the fundamental axiom of analytical philosophy

Jacob, Pierre (2002). The scope and limit of mental simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)

Jarrold, Chris; Carruthers, Peter; Boucher, Jill & Smith, Peter K. (1994). Pretend play. Mind and Language 9 (4). (Cited by 36 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Children’s ability to pretend, and the apparent lack of pretence in children with autism, have become important issues in current research on ‘theory of mind’, on the assumption that pretend play may be an early indicator of metarepresentational abilities

Jeannerod, Marc & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146. (Cited by 29 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution

Kuehberger, Anton; Kogler, Christoph; Hug, Angelika & Moesl, Evelyne (2006). The role of the position effect in theory and simulation. Mind and Language 21 (5):610-625. (Google | Edit)

Kuhberger, A.; Perner, Josef; Schulte, M. & Leingruber, R. (1995). Choice or no choice: Is the Langer effect evidence against simulation? Mind and Language 10 (4):423-36. (Cited by 10 | Google | Edit)

Kuipers, Theo A. F. (2005). Verstehen, einfühlen and mental simulation: Reply to Anne Rugh Mackor. In Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. New York: Rodopi NY. (Google | More links | Edit)

Lebar, M. (2001). Simulation, theory, and emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423-434. (Google | More links | Edit)<

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