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7.1d. Rationality and Cognitive Science (Rationality and Cognitive Science on PhilPapers)

See also:
Atkinson, Anthony P. & Wheeler, M. (2003). Evolutionary psychology's grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning. In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2002). Rationality and psychological explanation without language. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bickhard, Mark H. (1992). How does the environment affect the person? In L. T. Winegar & Jaan Valsiner (eds.), Children's Development Within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Erlbaum.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How Does the Environment Affect the Person? Mark H. Bickhard invited chapter in Children's Development within Social Contexts: Metatheoretical, Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Erlbaum. edited by L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner, in press
Bickhard, Mark H. (ms). Interactivism: A manifesto.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Biro, John I. & Ludwig, Kirk A. (1994). Are there more than minimal a priori limits on irrationality? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):89-102.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2005). Intentionality without rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description
Cain, Bruce E. & Jones, W. T. (1979). Modes of rationality and irrationality. Philosophical Studies 36 (November):333-343.   (Google | More links)
Callaway, H. G. (1992). Does Language Determine our Scientific Ideas? Dialectica 46 (3/4):225-242.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief designed to understand and insure social-institutional conditions of the possibility of knowledge and its growth. A chief argument draws on work of Axelrod concerning the evolution of cooperation.
Carruthers, Peter (2002). The roots of scientific reasoning: Infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This chapter examines the extent to which there are continuities between the cognitive processes and epistemic practices engaged in by human hunter-gatherers, on the one hand, and those which are distinctive of science, on the other. It deploys anthropological evidence against any form of 'no-continuity' view, drawing especially on the cognitive skills involved in the art of tracking. It also argues against the 'child-as-scientist' accounts put forward by some developmental psychologists, which imply that scientific thinking is present in early infancy and universal amongst humans who have sufficient time and resources to devote to it. In contrast, a modularist kind of 'continuity' account is proposed, according to which the innately channelled architecture of human cognition provides all the materials necessary for basic forms of scientific reasoning in older children and adults, needing only the appropriate sorts of external support, social context, and background beliefs and skills in order for science to begin its advance
Chater, Nick & Oaksford, Mike (2002). The rational analysis of human cognition. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.   (Google)
Chater, Nick & Oaksford, Mike (2000). The rational analysis of mind and behavior. Synthese 122 (1-2):93-131.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning leads to a radicalreinterpretation of empirical results which are typically viewed asdemonstrating human irrationality
Cherniak, Christopher (1986). Minimal Rationality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 333 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Minimal Rationality, Christopher Cherniak boldly challenges the myth of Man the the Rational Animal and the central role that the "perfectly rational...
Cherniak, Christopher (1983). Rationality and the structure of memory. Synthese 57 (November):163-86.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   A tacit and highly idealized model of the agent's memory is presupposed in philosophy. The main features of a more psychologically realistic duplex (orn-plex) model are sketched here. It is argued that an adequate understanding of the rationality of an agent's actions is not possible without a satisfactory theory of the agent's memory and of the trade-offs involved in management of the memory, particularly involving compartmentalization of the belief set. The discussion identifies some basic constraints on the organization of knowledge representations in general
Clark, Andy (2006). Author's reply to symposium on Natural-Born Cyborgs. Metascience.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thought happens. Here I sit, sipping coffee, scribbling on paper, accessing files, reading and re-reading those four wonderful, challenging, yet immaculately constructive reviews. And somewhere, and to my eternal surprise, thought happens. But where, amidst the whirl of organization, should we locate the cognitive process? One possibility is that everything worth counting as (all or part) of any genuinely cognitive process hereabouts is firmly located inside the head, safe behind the ancient fortress of skin and skull. All the rest, according to this surgically neat view, is scene setting: preparing and maintaining the pitch upon which the great thinking organ performs
Clark, Andy (2003). Forces, fields, and the role of knowledge in action. Adaptive Behavior 11 (4):270-272.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy & Mandik, Pete (2002). Selective representing and world-making. Minds And Machines 12 (3):383-395.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing — the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing is fully consistent with the realist idea of a mind-independent world. Second, that not only are these two consistent, but that the latter (the realist conception of a mind-independent world) provides the most powerful perspective from which to motivate and understand the differing perceptual and cog- nitive profiles themselves. And third, that the (genuine and important) sense in which organism and environment may together constitute an integrated system of scientific interest poses no additional threat to the realist conception
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:317-370.   (Cited by 401 | Google)
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1979). On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy? Cognition 7 (December):385-407.   (Cited by 30 | Google)
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1986). The Dialogue of Reason. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
Abstract: Johnathan Cohen's book provides a lucid and penetrating treatment of the fundamental issues of contemporary analytical philosophy. This field now spans a greater variety of topics and divergence of opinion than fifty years ago, and Cohen's book addresses the presuppositions implicit to it and the patterns of reasoning on which it relies
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1980). Whose is the fallacy? A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Cognition 8 (March):89-92.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Collins, Arthur W. & Bennett, Daniel C. (1966). Jonathan Bennett on rationality: Two reviews. Journal of Philosophy 63 (May):253-266.   (Google)
Cook, K. S. & Levi, M. (1990). The Limits of Rationality. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 64 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Intended to introduce novices to rational choice theory, this accessible, interdisciplinary book collects writings by leading researchers.
Davidson, Donald (1995). Could there be a science of rationality? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):1-16.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1985). Incoherence and irrationality. Dialectica 39:345-54.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (2004). Rational animals: What the bravest lion won't risk. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (12):365-386.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (2006). Minimal rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Feldman, Richard H. (1988). Rationality, reliability, and natural selection. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Fetzer, James H. (1990). Evolution, rationality and testability. Synthese 82 (3):423-39.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Cosmides, Wason, and Johnson-Laird, among others, have suggested evidence that reasoning abilities tend to be domain specific, insofar as humans do not appear to acquire capacities for logical reasoning that are applicable across different contexts. Unfortunately, the significance of these findings depends upon the specific variety of logical reasoning under consideration. Indeed, there seem to be at least three grounds for doubting such conclusions, since: (1) tests of reasoning involving the use of material conditionals may not be appropriate for representing ordinary thinking, especially when it concerns causal processes involving the use of causal conditionals instead; (2) tests of domain specificity may fail to acknowledge the crucial role fulfilled by rules of inference, such as modus ponens and modus tollens, which appear to be completely general across different contexts; and, (3) tests that focus exclusively upon deductive reasoning may misinterpret findings involving the use of inductive reasoning, which is of primary importance for human evolution
Gardner, Sebastian (1996). Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Abstract: In a reconstruction of the theories of Freud and Klein, Sebastian Gardner asks: what causes irrationality, what must the mind be like for it to be irrational,...
Gibbard, Allan F. (2002). Normative explanations: Invoking rationality to explain happenings. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.   (Google)
Gigerenzer, Gerd (1991). On cognitive illusions and rationality. In Probability and Rationality. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Han, Susan C. & Evans, Suzette M. (2005). Sex and drugs: Do women differ from men in their subjective response to drugs of abuse? In Mitch Earleywine (ed.), Mind-Altering Drugs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Harman, Gilbert (1986). Change in View. MIT Press.   (Cited by 496 | Google)
Abstract: C hange in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book
Heil, John (1993). Going to pieces. In Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Holt, L. (1999). Rationality is still hard work: Some further notes on the disruptive effects of deliberation. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):215-219.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A brief review of recent experimental work by T.D. Wilson et al. on the disruptive effects of deliberation provides an opportunity for extending an alternative interpretation of those effects first offered in this journal [D.L. Holt (1993) Rationality is hard work: an alternative interpretation of the disruptive effects of thinking about reasons, Philosophical Psychology, 6, 251-266]. I therefore propose a thought experiment in which the favored parameters of much social psychological experimentation, including the specific parameters of Wilson et al., are reversed
Holdcroft, David (1985). The variety of rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 163:163-175.   (Google)
Kacelnik, Alex (2006). Meanings of rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Kahneman, Daniel; Slovic, Paul & Tversky, Amos (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4071 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos (1979). On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen. Cognition 7 (December):409-11.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kelly, T. (2002). The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expectedconsequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality ofdoing so. Special attention is given to various ways in whichone might attempt to exert some measure of control over whatone believes and the normative status of the beliefs thatresult from the successful execution of such projects. I arguethat the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we should thinkabout the rationality of a number of other propositional attitudes,such as regret, desire, and fear. Finally,I suggest that a lack of clarity with respect to the relevant issueshas given rise to a number of rather serious philosophical mistakes
Leon, Mark . (1990). The mechanics of rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):343-366.   (Google)
Levi, Isaac (2002). Commitment and change of view. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lowe, E. J. (2002). The rational and the real: Some doubts about the programme of 'rational analysis'. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.   (Google)
Manktelow, K. & Over, David E. (1987). Reasoning and rationality. Mind and Language 2:199-219.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Matthen, Mohan P. (2002). Human rationality and the unique origin constraint. In André Ariew (ed.), Functions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers a new definition of "adaptationism". An evolutionary account is adaptationist, it is suggested, if it allows for multiple independent origins for the same function -- i.e., if it violates the "Unique Origin Constraint". While this account captures much of the position Gould and Lewontin intended to stigmatize, it leaves it open that adaptationist accounts may sometimes be appropriate. However, there are many important cases, including that of human rationality, in which it is not.
Mele, Alfred R. (1987). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 84 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort
Mele, Alfred R. (1988). Irrationality: A precis. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):173-177.   (Cited by 84 | Google | More links)
Abstract: My primary aim in Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control (1987) is to show that and how akratic action and self-deception are possible. The control that normal agents have over their actions and beliefs figures in the analysis and explanation of both phenomena. For that reason, an examination of self-control plays a central role in the book. In addition, I devote a chapter each to akratic belief and the explanation of intentional action. A precis of the book will provide a useful context for the three essays that follow
Mele, Alfred R. (2004). Motivated irrationality. In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Millar, Alan (2001). Rationality and higher-order intentionality. Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Millikan, Ruth G. (2006). Styles of rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Montero, Barbara (2006). Proprioception as an aesthetic sense. Journal Of Aesthetics And Art Criticism 64 (2):231-242.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Morton, Adam (1985). The variety of rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 139:139-162.   (Google)
Moser, Paul K. (1983). Rationality without surprises: Davidson on rational belief. Dialectica 37:221-226.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Nisbett, Richard E. & Ross, Lee (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 2483 | Google)
Nozick, Robert (1993). The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 366 | Google)
Abstract: Throughout, the book combines daring speculations with detailed investigations to portray the nature and status of rationality and the essential role that...
Papineau, David (2003). The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: David Papineau presents a controversial view of human reason, portraying it as a normal part of the natural world, and drawing on the empirical sciences to illuminate its workings. In these six interconnected essays he discusses both theoretical and practical rationality, and shows how evolutionary theory, decision theory, and quantum mechanics offer fresh approaches to some long-standing problems
Penco, Carlo (online). Expressing the Background. Icelandic Philosophical Association (talks).   (Google)
Pollock, John L. (online). Irrationality and cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: The strategy of this paper is to throw light on rational cognition and epistemic justification by examining irrationality. Epistemic irrationality is possible because we are reflexive cognizers, able to reason about and redirect some aspects of our own cognition. One consequence of this is that one cannot give a theory of epistemic rationality or epistemic justification without simultaneously giving a theory of practical rationality. A further consequence is that practical irrationality can affect our epistemic cognition. I argue that practical irrationality derives from a general difficulty we have in overriding built-in shortcut modules aimed at making cognition more efficient, and all epistemic irrationality can be traced to this same source. A consequence of this account is that a theory of rationality is a descriptive theory, describing contingent features of a cognitive architecture, and it forms the core of a general theory of “voluntary” cognition — those aspects of cognition that are under voluntary control. It also follows that most of the so-called “rules for rationality” that philosophers have proposed are really just rules describing default (non- reflexive) cognition. It can be perfectly rational for a reflexive cognizer to break these rules. The “normativity” of rationality is a reflection of a built-in feature of reflexive cognition — when we detect violations of rationality, we have a tendency to desire to correct them. This is just another part of the descriptive theory of rationality. Although theories of rationality are descriptive, the structure of reflexive cognition gives philosophers, as human cognizers, privileged access to certain aspects of rational cognition. Philosophical theories of rationality are really scientific theories, based on inference to the best explanation, that take contingent introspective data as the evidence to be explained.
Pollock, John L. (1992). Rationality, function, and content. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):129-151.   (Google | More links)
Reiner, Richard (1995). Arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality. Minds and Machines 5 (3):373-89.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Many different arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality have appeared in the literature, and these target several different conceptions of perfect rationality. It is not clear how these different conceptions of perfect rationality are related, nor is it clear how the arguments showing their impossibility are related, and it is especially unclear what the impossibility results show when taken together. This paper gives an exposition of the different conceptions of perfect rationality, an the various sorts of argument against them; clarifies which conceptions of perfect rationality are targeted by which arguments; and finally attempts to systematize the results available to date
Rogers, A. K. (1904). Rationality and belief. Philosophical Review 13 (1):30-50.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ross, Jacob Joshua (1974). Rationality and commonsense. Philosophia 4 (4).   (Google | More links)
Rust, John (1990). Delusions, irrationality, and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):123-138.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Samuels, Richard & Stich, Stephen P. (2004). Rationality and psychology. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Scholl, Brian J. (1997). Reasoning, rationality, and architectural resolution. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):451-470.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that performance on reasoning tasks may reflect the operation of a number of distinct cognitive mechanisms and processes. This paper explores the implications of this view of the mind for the descriptive and normative assessment of reasoning. I suggest that descriptive questions such as “Are we equipped to reason using rule X?” and normative questions such as “Are we rational?” are obsolete—they do not possess a fine enough grain of architectural resolution to accurately characterize the mind. I explore how this general lesson can apply to specific experimental interpretations, and suggest that 'rationality' must be evaluated along a number of importantly distinct dimensions
Scott-Kakures, Dion (1996). Self-deception and internal irrationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):31-56.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (2003). Rationality in Action. MIT Press.   (Cited by 199 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of rationality and practical reason, or rationality in action, has been central to Western intellectual culture. In this invigorating book, John Searle lays out six claims of what he calls the Classical Model of rationality and shows why they are false. He then presents an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action. A central point of Searle's theory is that only irrational actions are directly caused by beliefs and desires—for example, the actions of a person in the grip of an obsession or addiction. In most cases of rational action, there is a gap between the motivating desire and the actual decision making. The traditional name for this gap is "freedom of the will." According to Searle, all rational activity presupposes free will. For rationality is possible only where one has a choice among various rational as well as irrational options. Unlike many philosophical tracts, Rationality in Action invites the reader to apply the author's ideas to everyday life. Searle shows, for example, that contrary to the traditional philosophical view, weakness of will is very common. He also points out the absurdity of the claim that rational decision making always starts from a consistent set of desires. Rational decision making, he argues, is often about choosing between conflicting reasons for action. In fact, humans are distinguished by their ability to be rationally motivated by desire-independent reasons for action. Extending his theory of rationality to the self, Searle shows how rational deliberation presupposes an irreducible notion of the self. He also reveals the idea of free will to be essentially a thesis of how the brain works.
Smokrovic, Nenad (1995). Intentionalism and rationality (a criticism of Stich's slippery slope argument). Acta Analytica 14 (14):101-111.   (Google)
Sober, Elliott (1981). The evolution of rationality. Synthese 46 (January):95-120.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Sosa, Ernest & Galloway, David (2001). Man the rational animal? Synthese 122 (1-2):165-78.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper considers well known results of psychological researchinto the fallibility of human reason, and philosophical conclusionsthat some have drawn from these results. Close attention to theexact content of the results casts doubt on the reasoning that leadsto those conclusions
Sterelny, Kim (2005). Cognitive load and human decision. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. Oup.   (Google)
Sterelny, Kim (2006). Folk logic and animal rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oup.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is indeed important to identify the rich variety of systems for the adaptive control of behaviour, rather than squeezing this richness into a few boxes. We need to recognise both the variety of systems for the cognitive control of adaptive behaviour and to chart the relationships between such systems. But I shall argue that these projects are not best pursued by asking about the extent of animal rationality. The argument develops in three stages. The first outlines a picture of the selective regimes that drive the evolution of the sophisticated use of information by animal agents. The second argues that hominid cognition has evolved in response to a somewhat different set of
challenges and that (as a consequence) the transmission of social information and skill has come to be both a critical and an unusual feature of hominid selective and developmental environments. The third draws upon the ideas of Dan Sperber and others in arguing that the social transmission of information introduces (or makes much more important) a vetting problem. I shall suggest that we see rationality as an evolved response to this vetting problem
Stein, Edward (1994). Rationality and reflective equilibrium. Synthese 99 (2):137-72.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Cohen (1981) and others have made an interesting argument for the thesis that humans are rational: normative principles of reasoning and actual human reasoning ability cannot diverge because both are determined by the same process involving our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning as a starting point. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this argument sees reflective equilibrium as the process that determines both what the norms of reasoning are and what actual cognitive competence is. In this essay, I will evaluate both the general argument that humans are rational and the reflective equilibrium argument for the same thesis. While I find both accounts initially appealing, I will argue that neither successfully establishes that humans are rational
Stein, Edward (1996). Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 159 | Google)
Abstract: In this book, Edward Stein offers a clear critical account of the debate about rationality in philosophy and cognitive science. He discusses concepts of rationality--the pictures of rationality on which the debate centers--and assesses the empirical evidence used to argue that humans are irrational. He concludes that the question of human rationality must be answered not conceptually but empirically, using the full resources of an advanced cognitive science. Furthermore, he extends this conclusion to argue that empirical considerations are also relevant to the theory of knowledge--in other words, that epistemology should be naturalized
Stich, Stephen P. (1985). Could man be an irrational animal? Synthese 64 (1):115-35.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Sturdee, P. G. (1995). Irrationality and the dynamic unconscious: The case for wishful thinking. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (2):163-174.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Tweney, Ryan D. & Doherty, Michael E. (1983). Rationality and the psychology of inference. Synthese 57 (November):129-138.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Recent advances in the cognitive psychology of inference have been of great interest to philosophers of science. The present paper reviews one such area, namely studies based upon Wason's 4-card selection task. It is argued that interpretation of the results of the experiments is complex, because a variety of inference strategies may be used by subjects to select evidence needed to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. Empirical evidence suggests that which strategy is used depends in part on the semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic context of the inference problem at hand. Since the factors of importance are also present in real-world science, and similarly complicate its interpretation, the selection task, though it does not present a quick fix, represents a kind of microcosm of great utility for the understanding of science. Several studies which have examined selection strategies in more complex problem-solving environments are also reviewed, in an attempt to determine the limits of generalizability of the simpler selection tasks. Certain interpretational misuses of laboratory research are described, and a claim made that the issue of whether or not scientists are rational should be approached by philosophers and psychologists with appropriate respect for the complexities of the issue
Wason, Peter C. (1966). Reasoning. In New Horizons in Psychology. Penguin.   (Cited by 475 | Google)
Weintraub, Ruth (1995). Psychological determinism and rationality. Erkenntnis 43 (1):67-79.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   There are arguments which purport to rebut psychological determinism by appealing to its alleged incompatibility with rationality. I argue that they all fail. Against Davidson, I argue that rationality does not preclude the existence of psychological laws. Against Popper, I argue that rationality is compatible with the possibility of predicting human actions. Against Schlesinger, I claim that Newcomb's problem cannot be invoked to show that human actions are unpredictable. Having vindicated the possibility of a rationally-based theory of action, I consider the form it might take