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7.1f. Animal Cognition (Animal Cognition on PhilPapers)

See also:
Allen, Colin (1999). Animal concepts revisited: The use of self-monitoring as an empirical approach. Erkenntnis 51 (1):537-544.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Many psychologists and philosophers believe that the close correlation between human language and human concepts makes the attribution of concepts to nonhuman animals highly questionable. I argue for a three-part approach to attributing concepts to animals. The approach goes beyond the usual discrimination tests by seeking evidence for self-monitoring of discrimination errors. Such evidence can be collected without relying on language and, I argue, the capacity for error-detection can only be explained by attributing a kind of internal representation that is reasonably identified as a concept. Thus I hope to have shown that worries about the empirical intractability of concepts in languageless animals are misplaced
Allen, Colin & Hauser, Marc D. (1991). Concept attribution in nonhuman animals: Theoretical and methodological problems in ascribing complex mental processes. Philosophy of Science 58 (2):221-240.   (Google | More links)
Allen, Colin & Bekoff, Marc (1995). Cognitive ethology and the intentionality of animal behavior. Mind and Language 10 (4):313-328.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Allen, Colin & Bekoff, Marc (1992). On aims and methods of cognitive ethology. Philosophy of Science Association 1992:110-124.   (Google)
Allen, Colin & Bekoff, Marc (1997). Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 147 | Google)
Abstract: The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition.
Andrews, Kristin (online). Animal cognition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Draft entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy
Andrews, Kristin (2007). Critter psychology. In Daniel Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Springer.   (Google)
Andrews, Kristin (2005). Chimpanzee theory of mind: Looking in all the wrong places? Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept this new approach, and that experiments which offer subjects the opportunity to look for explanations for anomalous behavior should be explored
Andrews, Kristin (2009). Politics or metaphysics? On attributing psychological properties to animals. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Biology and Philosophy, forthcoming. Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable to self-ascribe due to an early stage of development or impairment, and can be used to describe social and emotional development as well as personality. I describe how instruments such as the Child Behavior Checklist, which relies on intersubjective expert opinion, could be modified to assess other species subjects. The measures are validated via the accuracy of the predictions that are derived, which is an example of the functionality of attribution. I respond to theoretical criticisms against use of this method, and argue that if the method counts as good science for infant cognition research, then it should count as good science for animal cognition research as well. Correspondingly, if the method doesn’t count as good science for animal cognition research, then we must be very skeptical of its use with nonverbal humans
Beer, C. G. (1992). Conceptual issues in cognitive ethology. Advances in the Study of Behavior 21:69-109.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Beisecker, David (1999). The importance of being erroneous: Prospects for animal intentionality. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states to non-linguistic brutes, no matter how natural it comes to us, would be grossly anthropomorphic. In the face of these challenges some friends of animal intentionality have attempted to show that at least a few animals (chimpanzees, vervet monkeys, honeybees) are capable of engaging in quasi-linguistic, communicative practices that ought to be accorded at least a minimal degree of intentionality. Others have questioned the foes’ necessity claims; linguistic ability, claim these animal friends, isn’t required for sensitivity to intensional contexts, surprise, or belief about belief after all, or if it is, then these features aren’t really requisite for mental capacity. Indeed, if we focus exclusively upon linguistic ability, then we are apt to miss the primitive kinds of mental capacities from which our own full-blooded intentional capacities likely evolved. Animals certainly seem to interact intelligently with their surroundings, so much so that we ought to follow our natural (brute?) anthropomorphic inclinations to credit them with minds. Failing to recognize their genuine intentional capacities would be "brutishly" anthropocentric
Bekoff, Marc (1999). Social cognition: Exchanging and sharing information on the run. Erkenntnis 51 (1):617-632.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this essay I consider various aspects of the rapidly growing field of cognitive ethology, concentrating mainly on evolutionary and comparative discussion of the notion of intentionality. I am not concerned with consciousness, per se, for a concentration on consciousness deflects attention from other, and in many cases more interesting, problems in the study of animal cognition. I consider how, when, where, and (attempt to discuss) why individuals from different taxa exchange social information concerning their beliefs, desires, and goals. My main examples come from studies of social play in mammals and antipredator behavior in birds. Basically, I argue that although not all individuals always display behavior patterns that are best explained by appeals to intentionality, it is misleading to argue that such explanations have no place in the study of animal cognition
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2006). Animal reasoning and proto-logic. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2003). Ascribing thoughts to non-linguistic creatures. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):313-34.   (Google)
Bosco, Francesca M. & Tirassa, Maurizio (1998). Sharedness as an innate basis for communication in the infant. In M. A. Gernsbacher & S. J. Derry (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. In order to solve the resulting dilemma, we propose that certain specific components of an agent's cognitive architecture (namely, a peculiar version of sharedness and communicative intention), are necessary and sufficient to explain infant communication in a mentalist framework. We also argue that these components are innate in the human species
Boysen, Sarah T. (2006). Effects of symbols on chimpanzee cognition. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Call, Josep (2006). Descartes' two errors: Reason and reflection in the great apes. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Chater, Nick & Heyes, Cecilia M. (1994). Animal concepts: Content and discontent. Mind and Language 9 (3):209-246.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Chadha, Monima (2007). No speech, never mind! Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):641 – 657.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In a series of classic papers, Donald Davidson put forward an ingenious argument to challenge the ascription of minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's conclusions have been mercilessly demolished in the literature by cognitive ethologists, but none of them have directly addressed Davidson's argument. First, this paper is an attempt to elucidate and evaluate Davidson's central argument for denying minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's central argument puts forth a challenge to those of us who want to attribute minds to nonlinguistic animals. Second, this paper uses counterexamples offered in the cognitive ethology literature to meet Davidson's challenge directly
Clark, Stephen R. L. (2003). Non-personal minds. In Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clark, Stephen R. L. (1987). The description and evaluation of animal emotion. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Google)
Cockburn, David (1994). Human beings and giant squids (on ascribing human sensations and emotions to non-human creatures). Philosophy 69:135-50.   (Google)
Crisp, Roger (1996). Evolution and psychological unity. In Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.), Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Currie, Gregory (2006). Rationality, decentring, and the evidence for pretence in nonhuman animals. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Davidson, Donald (1982). Rational animals. Dialectica 36:317-28.   (Cited by 85 | Google | More links)
Dawkins, Marian S. (1990). From an animal's point of view: Motivation, fitness, and animal welfare. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.   (Cited by 165 | Google)
Dawkins, Marian S. (1987). Minding and mattering. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
de Laguna, Grace A. (1919). Dualism and animal psychology: A rejoinder. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (11):296-300.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
de Laguna, Grace A. (1918). Dualism in animal psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (23):617-627.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1989). Cognitive ethology. In Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals. Unwin Hyman.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Abstract: The field of Artificial Intelligence has produced so many new concepts--or at least vivid and more structured versions of old concepts--that it would be surprising if none of them turned out to be of value to students of animal behavior. Which will be most valuable? I will resist the temptation to engage in either prophecy or salesmanship; instead of attempting to answer the question: "How might Artificial Intelligence inform the study of animal behavior?" I will concentrate on the obverse: "How might the study of animal behavior inform research in Artificial Intelligence?"
Dennett, Daniel C. (1995). Do animals have beliefs? In H. Roitblat & Jean-Arcady Meyer (eds.), Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Herbert Roitblat, ed., _Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Sciences_ , MIT Press, 1995. Daniel C. Dennett
Do Animals Have Beliefs?
According to one more or less standard mythology, behaviorism, the ideology and methodology that reigned in experimental psychology for most of the century, has been overthrown by a new ideology and methodology: cognitivism. Behaviorists, one is told, didn't take the mind seriously. They ignored--or even denied the existence of--mental states such as beliefs and desires, and mental processes such as imagination and reasoning; behaviorists concentrated exclusively on external, publicly observable behavior, and the (external, publicly observable) conditions under which such behavior was elicited. Cognitivists, in contrast, take the mind seriously, and develop theories, models, explanations, that invoke, as real items, these internal, mental, goings-on. People (and at least some other animals) have minds after all--they are
Dennett, Daniel C. (1983). Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:343-90.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Dreckmann, F. (1999). Animal beliefs and their contents. Erkenntnis 51 (1):597-615.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper investigates whether, or not, the behavior of animals without speech can manifest beliefs and desires. Criteria for the attribution of such beliefs and desires are worked out with reference to Jonathan Bennett's theory of cognitive teleology: A particular ability for learning justifies attributing such beliefs and desires. The conceptual analysis is illustrated by examinations of cognitive ethology and considers higher-order intentionality. It is argued that the behavioral evidence only supports the attribution of first order beliefs and that languageless animals therefore could not possess higher-order intentionality. They are only capable of forming simple, i.e., first-order beliefs about their environment
Fellows, Roger (2000). Animal belief. Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Non language-using animals cannot have beliefs, because believing entails the ability to distinguish true from false beliefs and also the ability to distinguish changes in belief from changes in the world. For these abilities we need both the fixation of belief and counter-factual thought, for both of which language is necessary. The argument of the paper extends Davidson's argument to the same conclusion (which is found wanting). But denying beliefs to animals has no moral implications
Floy Washburn, Margaret (1919). Dualism in animal psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (2):41-44.   (Google | More links)
Gaita, Raimond (1992). Animal thoughts. Philosophical Investigations 15 (3):227-44.   (Google)
Gardner, R. Allen (2005). Animal cognition meets evo-devo. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):699-700.   (Google)
Abstract: Sound comparative psychology and modern evolutionary and developmental biology (often called evo-devo) emphasize powerful effects of developmental conditions on the expression of genetic endowment. Both demand that evolutionary theorists recognize these effects. Instead, Tomasello et al. compares studies of normal human children with studies of chimpanzees reared and maintained in cognitively deprived conditions, while ignoring studies of chimpanzees in cognitively appropriate environments
Glock, H. J. (2000). Animals, thoughts and concepts. Synthese 123 (1):35-104.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   There are three main positions on animalthought: lingualism denies that non-linguistic animalshave any thoughts; mentalism maintains that theirthoughts differ from ours only in degree, due totheir different perceptual inputs; an intermediateposition, occupied by common sense and Wittgenstein,maintains that animals can have thoughts of a simplekind. This paper argues in favor of an intermediateposition. It considers the most important arguments infavor of lingualism, namely those inspired byDavidson: the argument from the intensional nature ofthought (Section 1); the idea that thoughts involveconcepts (Sections 2–3); the argument from the holisticnature of thought (Section 4); and the claim that beliefrequires the concept of belief (Sections 5–6). The lastargument (which Davidson favors) is uncompelling, butthe first three shed valuable light on the extent towhich thought requires language. However, none of themprecludes animals from having simple thoughts. Even ifone adopts the kind of third-person perspective onthought Davidson shares with Wittgenstein, the resultis a version of the intermediate position, albeit oneenriched by Davidson''s insights concerningintensionality, concepts and holism (Section 7). We canonly ascribe simple thoughts to animals, and even thatascription is incongruous in that the rich idiom weemploy has conceptual connections that go beyond thephenomena to which it is applied
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003). Folk psychology under stress: Comments on Susan Hurley's Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):266-272.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   My commentary on Hurley is concerned with foundational issues. Hurley's investigation of animal cognition is cast within a particular framework—basically, a philosophically refined version of folk psychology. Her discussion has a complicated relationship to unresolved debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, especially debates about the extent to which folk psychological categories are aimed at picking out features of the causal organization of the mind
Gould, J. L. & Gould, C. G. (1982). The insect mind: Physics or metaphysics? In Donald R. Griffin (ed.), Animal Mind -- Human Mind. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Griffin, Donald R. (ed.) (1982). Animal Mind -- Human Mind. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Griffin, Donald R. (1984). Animal Thinking. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 112 | Google)
Harrison, P. (1991). Do animals feel pain? Philosophy 66 (January):25-40.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Heil, John (1982). Speechless brutes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):400-406.   (Google | More links)
Hendrichs, H. (1999). Different roots of human intentionality in mammalian mentality. Erkenntnis 51 (1):649-668.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Five mental components of human intentionality are distinguished and related to different properties of mammalian orientation. It is proposed that, in the course of evolution, these old properties became integrated and thereby allowed for the development of a new quality: human orientation. The existence of more than 4,000 mammal species with their various forms and levels of mental organization, offering a panorama of different combinations of differently developed components of mentality, provide ample opportunities for comparative studies. The difficulties in assessing specific types are outlined, drawing on over 40 years of observation. Based on this knowledge, an argument is made for the importance of staying in contact with the empirical objects and of considering their ontological status when rising the standards of precision of formal analysis
Heyes, Cecilia M. (1987). Contrasting approaches to the legitimation of intentional language within comparative psychology. Behaviorism 15:41-50.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Hilbert, David R. (1993). Comments on anthropomorphism. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):123-127.   (Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nick K. (1976). How monkeys acquire a new way of seeing. Perception 5 (1):51-6.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract. In an experiment on perceptual learning, monkeys were given the opportunity to watch on television the `private behaviour' of another monkey (which did not know it was being watched). The subjects were shown monkey X for twenty sessions in a row, followed by monkey Y for twenty sessions, followed by monkey X again for twenty sessions. The subjects' `interest' in the
Hurley, Susan L. (2003). Animal action in the space of reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have contextbound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or social contexts, and connections are made to simulationist accounts of cognitive skills
Hurley, Susan L. (2003). Making sense of animals: Interpretation vs. architecture. Mind and Language 18 (3):273-280.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: i>: We should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have specific, context-bound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent’s reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or social contexts, and connections are made to simulationist accounts of cognitive skills
Hurley, Susan L. & Nudds, Matthew (2006). The questions of animal rationality: Theory and evidence. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Purpura Jr, Gary J. (2006). In search of human uniqueness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):443 – 461.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Typically in the philosophical literature, kinds of minds are differentiated by the range of cognitive tasks animals accomplish as opposed to the means by which they accomplish the tasks. Drawing on progress in cognitive ethology (the study of animal cognition), I argue that such an approach provides bad directions for uncovering the mark of the human mind. If the goal is to determine what makes the human mind unique, philosophers should focus on the means by which animals interact with objects in their environments, and not on the sorts of tasks they are able to accomplish
Lloyd Morgan, C. (1886). On the study of animal intelligence. Mind 11 (42):174-185.   (Google | More links)
Lovibond, Sabina (2006). Practical reason and its animal precursors. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):262–273.   (Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1973). Thoughtless brutes. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 46 (September):5-20.   (Cited by 24 | Google)
Mameli, Matteo & Bortolotti, Lisa (2006). Animal rights, animal minds, and human mindreading. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):84-89.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the evolution and cognitive structure of mindreading indicates that human ascriptions of mental states to non-human animals are very inaccurate. The accuracy of human mindreading can be improved with the help of scientific studies of animal minds. But the scientific studies by themselves do not by themselves solve the problem of how to map psychological similarities (and differences) between humans and animals onto a distinction between morally relevant and morally irrelevant mental properties. The current limitations of human mindreading – whether scientifically aided or not – have practical consequences for the rational justification of claims about which rights (if any) non-human animals should be accorded.
Montminy, Martin (2005). What use is Morgan's canon? Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):399-414.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Morgan's canon can be construed as claiming that an intentional explanation of a behavior should be ruled out if there exists an explanation of this behavior in terms of 'lower' mechanisms. Unfortunately, Morgan's conception of higher and lower faculties is based on dubious evolutionary considerations. I examine alternative interpretations of the terms 'higher' and 'lower', and show that none can turn the canon into a principle that is both correct and useful in drawing the line between thinkers and non-thinkers. In the process, I identify a number of problems that an adequate formulation of the canon should avoid. I then consider two more recent versions of the canon, proposed by Elliott Sober and Jonathan Bennett. Both are found unsatisfactory, but I argue that a version of Bennett's unity condition that is restricted to the attribution of recognitional concepts is on the right track
Morris, David (2005). Animals and humans, thinking and nature. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Studies that compare human and animal behaviour suspend prejudices about mind, body and their relation, by approaching thinking in terms of behaviour. Yet comparative approaches typically engage another prejudice, motivated by human social and bodily experience: taking the lone animal as the unit of comparison. This prejudice informs Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s comparative studies, and conceals something important: that animals moving as a group in an environment can develop new sorts of “sense.” The study of animal group-life suggests a new way of thinking about the creation of sense, about the body, the brain, and the relation between thinking and nature
Nelson, J. (1983). Do animals propositionally know? Do they propositionally believe? American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (April):149-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Penn, Derek C. & Povinelli, Daniel J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a 'theory of mind'. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):731-744.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Povinelli, Daniel J. (2000). Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee's Theory of How the World Works. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 371 | Google)
Povinelli, Daniel J. & Vonk, Jennifer (2004). We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind. Mind and Language 19 (1):1-28.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The question of whether chimpanzees, like humans, reason about unobservable mental states remains highly controversial. On one account, chimpanzees are seen as possessing a psychological system for social cognition that represents and reasons about behaviors alone. A competing account allows that the chimpanzee's social cognition system additionally construes the behaviors it represents in terms of mental states. Because the range of behaviors that each of the two systems can generate is not currently known, and because the latter system depends upon the former, determining the presence of this latter system in chimpanzees is a far more difficult task than has been assumed. We call for recognition of this problem, and a shift from experimental paradigms that cannot resolve this question, to ones that might allow researchers to intelligently determine when it is necessary to postulate the presence of a system which reasons about both behavior and mental states
Povinelli, Daniel J. & Vonk, Jennifer (2006). We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Premack, David & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:515-629.   (Cited by 1144 | Google)
Proust, Joelle (2006). Metacognition and animal rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Purpura, G. J. (2006). In search of human uniqueness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):443-461.   (Google | More links)
Radner, Daisie M. (1993). Directed action and animal communication. Ration 6 (2):135-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Radner, Daisie M. (1999). Mind and function in animal communication. Erkenntnis 51 (1):633-648.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Functional hypotheses about animal signalling often refer to mental states of the sender or the receiver. Mental states are functional categorizations of neurophysiological states. Functional questions about animal signals are intertwined with causal questions. This interrelationship is illustrated in regard to avian distraction displays. In purposive signalling, the sender has a goal of influencing the behavior of the receiver. Purposive signalling is innovative if the sender's goal is unrelated to the biological function of the signal. This may be the case in some instances of false alarm calling. Biological functionalism differs from philosophical functionalism in its concept of identity and in the specification of relevant inputs and outputs
Rescorla, Michael (forthcoming). Chrysippus's Dog as a Case Study in Non-Linguistic Cognition. In Robert Lurz (ed.), Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: I critique an ancient argument for the possibility of non-linguistic deductive inference. The argument, attributed to Chrysippus, describes a dog whose behavior supposedly reflects disjunctive syllogistic reasoning. Drawing on contemporary robotics, I urge that we can equally well explain the dog's behavior by citing probabilistic reasoning over cognitive maps. I then critique various experimentally-based arguments from scientific psychology that echo Chrysippus's anecdotal presentation.
Ristau, C. A. (ed.) (1991). Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 51 | Google)
Romanes, George J. (1886). Prof. Lloyd Morgan on the study of animal intelligence. Mind 11 (43):454-456.   (Google | More links)
Routley, R. (1982). Alleged problems in attributing beliefs, and intentionality, to animals. Inquiry 24 (4):385-417.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: The ordinary attribution of intentionality to (nonhuman) animals raises serious problems for fashionable linguistic accounts of belief and of intentionality generally; and many of the alleged problems arise from such linguistic theories of mind. Another deeper source of alleged problems is the apartness thesis, that there is a significant difference in kind, with substantial moral import, between humans and other animals; for the last lines of defence of this erroneous thesis consist in making out that there are significant intentional differences. A wide range of recent arguments against assigning intentionality (in the full sense) to animals are criticized in detail: those of Stich and Williams, in terms of animals lacking effective or specifiable concepts (concepts now replacing souls); those of Stich and Davidson based on the requirement for beliefs of an isomorphic belief network; those based on the usual opacity of intentionality; those of Descartes and Davidson and others based on the requirement of, or arguments to the essentiality of, language use for attributions of intentionality; arguments based on the requirement of capacity for pretence or awareness of error; and arguments used by Vendler and Malcolm. Several different arguments for assigning intentionality to animals are then advanced, arguments from cerebral organization, exteriorization arguments, and interiorization arguments from the semantical analysis of intentionality. The main arguments advanced are not analogical; they are not anthropocentric, or the result of personifying languageless animals; and the attributions of intentionality they lead to are not impoverished or of reduced status
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Sober, Elliott (2001). The principle of conservatism in cognitive ethology. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Stebbins, Sarah (1993). Anthropomorphism. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):113-122.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Stephan, Achim (1999). Are animals capable of concepts? Erkenntnis 51 (1):583-596.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Often, the behavior of animals can be better explained and predicted, it seems, if we ascribe the capacity to have beliefs, intentions, and concepts to them. Whether we really can do so, however, is a debated issue. Particularly, Donald Davidson maintains that there is no basis in fact for ascribing propositional attitudes or concepts to animals. I will consider his and rival views, such as Colin Allen's three-part approach, for determining whether animals possess concepts. To avoid pure theoretical debate, however, I will test these criteria using characteristic examples from ethology that depict a broad range of animal behavior. This will allow us to detect a series of gradations in animals' capacities, in the course of which we can think over what would count for or against an attribution of concepts and propositional attitudes to them in each single case. Self-conceit is our natural hereditary disease. Of all creatures man is the most wretched and fragile, and at once the most supercilious. ... It is by this conceit that man arrogates to himself ... divine properties, that he segregates himself from the mass of other creatures and raises himself above them ..
Sterelny, Kim (1990). Animals and individualism. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.   (Google)
Stegmann, Ulrich E. (2009). A consumer‐based teleosemantics for animal signals. Philosophy of Science 76 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Ethological theory standardly attributes representational content to animal signals. In this article I first assess whether Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic theory accounts for the content of animal signals. I conclude that it does not, because many signals do not exhibit the required sort of cooperation between signal‐producing and signal‐consuming devices. It is then argued that Kim Sterelny’s proposal, while not requiring cooperation, sometimes yields the wrong content. Finally, I outline an alternative view, according to which consumers alone are responsible for conferring representational status and determining content. I suggest that consumer‐based teleosemantics reconstruct the content of both cooperative and noncooperative signals and explain how a given trait can mean different things to different consumers. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, U.K.; e‐mail:
Sterelny, Kim (1995). Basic minds. Philosophical Perspectives 9:251-70.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Sterelny, Kim (2003). Charting control-space: Comments on Susan Hurley's Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):257-265.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Hurley is right to reject the dichotomy between intentional agents and mere stimulus/response habit machines, and she is also right in thinking that it is important to map the space of systems for the adaptive control of behaviour. So there is much in this paper with which I agree. My disagreement concerns folk psychology. Hurley thinks that control space can be charted by asking whether and to what extent animals are intentional agents. In contrast, I doubt that the concepts of folk psychology, especially folk psychology construed as an interpretative practice, are the right mapping tools. If the main function of folk psychology is to make sense of one another, coordinate joint action, or make decisions about moral and legal responsibility, then there is no point in applying folk psychological notions to nonhuman minds. These interpretative functions simply do not arise for our interaction with nonhuman minds, and if folk psychology serves largely as a social tool serving them, there is no need to apply it to nonhumans, nor is there a reasonable expectation that we can usefully do so. If folk psychology does not even carve our sensing and control mechanisms at the joints, if it is not a good theory of human cognitive architecture, then it is not likely to be wellsuited for describing those of nonhuman agents
Stephan, Achim (1999). Introduction: Animal beliefs, concepts, and communication. Erkenntnis 51 (1):1-6.   (Google | More links)
Stevenson, Leslie F. (2002). Six levels of mentality. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Examination of recent debates about belief shows the need to distinguish: (a) non-linguistic informational states in animal perception; (b) the uncritical use of language, e.g. by children; (c) adult humans' reasoned judgments. If we also distinguish between mind-directed and object-directed mental states, we have: Perceptual 'beliefs' of animals and infants about their material environment. 'Beliefs' of animals and infants about the mental states of others. Linguistically-expressible beliefs about the world, resulting from e.g. the uncritical tendency to believe what we are told. Uncritically-formed beliefs about the mental states. Beliefs about the material world arrived at by the weighing of evidence. Beliefs about mental states formed by critical assessment
Stich, Stephen P. (1979). Do animals have beliefs? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (March):15-28.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Thorndike, Edward L. (1911). Animal intelligence. Psych Revmonog.   (Cited by 1132 | Google | More links)
Thompson, Nicholas S. & Derr, Patrick G. (1993). The intentionality of some ethological terms. Behavior and Philosophy 2 (21):15-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Tomasello, Michael & Call, Josep (2006). Do chimpanzees know what others see - or only what they are looking at? In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
von Cranach, Mario (1976). Methods Of Inference From Animal To Human Behaviour. The Hague: Mouton.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ward, Andrew (1988). Davidson, animals and believings. Philosophia 18 (April):97-106.   (Google)
Ward, Andrew (1988). Davidson on attributions of beliefs to animals. Philosophia 18 (1).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Weiss, Donald D. (1975). Professor Malcolm on animal intelligence. Philosophical Review 84 (January):88-95.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Whiten, Andrew (2001). Theory of mind in non-verbal apes: Conceptual issues and the critical experiments. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wilson, Margaret D. (1995). Animal ideas. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69 (2):7-25.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Wilder, Hugh T. (1996). Interpretative cognitive ethology. In Colin Allen & D. Jamison (eds.), Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Yerkes, Robert M. (1905). Animal psychology and criteria of the psychic. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (6):141-149.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Yerkes, Robert M. (1913). Comparative psychology: A question of definitions. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (21):580-582.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

7.1f.1 Animal Emotion

Aydede, Murat (2000). Emotions or emotional feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23:192-194.   (Google)
Abstract: It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only bats, but also a great portion of the animal kingdom, perhaps all animal species except humans, turn out to lack phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, even human babies, and perhaps infants before the early stages of acquiring their first language, are likely to lack such consciousness, if one considers the level of conceptual sophistication required by the HOLT hypothesis. In order to have a higher-order thought, one needs to have the concept of a
Bekoff, Marc (2006). Animal passions and beastly virtues: Cognitive ethology as the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals. Zygon 41 (1):71-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Dixon, Beth (2001). Animal emotion. Ethics and the Environment 6 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: : Recent work in the area of ethics and animals suggests that it is philosophically legitimate to ascribe emotions to nonhuman animals. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that emotionality is a morally relevant psychological state shared by humans and nonhumans. What is missing from the philosophical literature that makes reference to emotions in nonhuman animals is an attempt to clarify and defend some particular account of the nature of emotion, and the role that emotions play in a characterization of human nature. I argue in this paper that some analyses of emotion are more credible than others. Because this is so, the thesis that humans and nonhumans share emotions may well be a more difficult case to make than has been recognized thus far
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):30-80.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Roberts, Robert C. (1996). Propositions and animal emotion. Philosophy 71 (275):147-56.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Helm, Bennett W. (1994). Significance, Emotions, and Objectivity: Some Limits of Animal Thought. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh   (Google)

7.1f.2 Animal Language

Bechtel, William P. (1993). Decomposing intentionality: Perspectives on intentionality drawn from language research with two species of chimpanzees. Biology and Philosophy 8 (1):1-32.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In philosophy the term intentionality refers to the feature possessed by mental states of beingabout things others than themselves. A serious question has been how to explain the intentionality of mental states. This paper starts with linguistic representations, and explores how an organism might use linguistic symbols to represent other things. Two research projects of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, one explicity teaching twopan troglodytes to use lexigrams intentionally, and the other exploring the ability of several members ofpan paniscus to learn lexigram use and comprehension of English speech spontaneously when raised in an appropriate environment, are examined to explore the acquisition process. Although it is controversial whether intentionality of mental states or linguistic symbols is primary, it is argued that the intentionality of linguistic symbols is primary and that studying how organisms learn to use linguistic symbols provides an avenue to understanding how intentionality is acquired by cognitive systems
Gauker, Christopher (1990). How to learn language like a chimpanzee. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):139-46.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Gross, Steven (2010). Origins of human communication - by Michael Tomasello. Mind and Language 25 (2):237-246.   (Google)
Lloyd, Elisabeth A. (2004). Kanzi, evolution, and language. Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):577-88.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Premack, David (1986). Gavagai! Or the Future History of the Animal Language Controversy. MIT Press.   (Cited by 88 | Google)
Savage-Rumbaugh, Sue & Brakke, K. E. (1996). Animal language: Methodological and interpretative issues. In Colin Allen & D. Jamison (eds.), Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S.; Rumbaugh, Duane M. & Boysen, Sarah T. (1980). Do apes use language? American Scientist 68:49-61.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Sebeok, Thomas A. & Umiker-Sebeok, J. (1980). Speaking of Apes: A Critical Anthology of Two-Way Communication with Man. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, E.; Rumbaugh, Duane M. & Fields, William M. (2006). Language as a window on rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Google)

7.1f.3 Animal Cognition, Misc

Allen, Colin (1997). Animal cognition and animal minds. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: Psychology, according to a standard dictionary definition, is the science of mind and behavior. For a major part of the twentieth century, (nonhuman) animal psychology was on a behavioristic track that explicitly denied the possibility of a science of animal mind. While many comparative psychologists remain wedded to behavioristic methods, they have more recently adopted a cognitive, information-processing approach that does not adhere to the strictures of stimulus-response explanations of animal behavior. Cognitive ethologists are typically willing to go much further than comparative psychologists by adopting folk-psychological terms to explain the behavior of nonhuman animals. This different attitudes of many scientists presupposes a distinction between cognitive and mental state attributions that is not commonly articulated. This paper seeks to understand that distinction
Allen, Colin, Conditioned anti-anthropomorphism.   (Google)
Abstract: How should scientists react to anthropomorphism (defined for the purposes of this paper as the attribution of mental states or properties to nonhuman animals)? Many thoughtful scientists have attempted to accommodate some measure of anthropomorphism in their approaches to animal behavior. But Wynne will have none of it. We reject his argument against anthropomorphism and argue that he does not pay sufficient attention to the historical facts or to the details of alternative approaches
Allen, Colin (2006). Transitive inference in animals: Reasoning or conditioned associations? In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Beer, Colin G. (1999). Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson, eds., Readings in animal cognition, cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1996, XV + 379 pp., $30.00 (paper), ISBN 0-262-52208-X. Minds and Machines 9 (1).   (Google)
Bekoff, Marc & Jamieson, Dale W. (eds.) (1996). Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 80 | Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2008). What does Fido believe? Think 7 (19):7-15.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1996). Kinds of Minds. Basic Books.   (Cited by 417 | Google | More links)