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7.1k. Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc (Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc on PhilPapers)

Aizawa, Kenneth (2002). Cognitive architecture. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Aizawa, Kenneth (1993). Cognitive science. In Reflections on Philosophy. New York: St Martin's Press.   (Google)
Anderson, Michael L. (2006). Cognitive science and epistemic openness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2):125-154.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: b>. Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism
Bealer, George (1987). The boundary between philosophy and cognitive science. Journal of Philosophy 84 (10):553-55.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bechtel, William P. (online). Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on the sciences of cognition and the brain.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. The Naturalistic Turn in Philosophy of Science 2. The Framework of Mechanistic Explanation: Parts, Operations, and Organization 3. Representing and Reasoning About Mechanisms 4. Mental Mechanisms: Mechanisms that Process Information 5. Discovering Mental Mechanisms 6 . Summary
Bickhard, Mark H. (online). The biological foundations of cognitive science.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Boden, Margaret A. (2001). The philosopgt of cognitive science. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophy at the New Millennium. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Branquinho, João (ed.) (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: Given the controversial nature of most issues in the foundations of cognitive science, it could hardly be expected from a description of the territory that ...
Brook, Andrew (2003). Kant and cognitive science. Teleskop.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Some of Kant's ideas about the mind have had a huge influence on cognitive science, in particular his view that sensory input has to be worked up using concepts or concept-like states and his conception of the mind as a system of cognitive functions. We explore these influences in the first part of the paper. Other ideas of Kant's about the mind have not been assimilated into cognitive science, including important ideas about processes of synthesis, mental unity, and consciousness and self-consciousness. They are the topic of the second part of the paper
Casati, Roberto (ed.) (1994). Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993). Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Google)
Chater, Nick & Vitanyi, P. (2003). Simplicity: A unifying principle in cognitive science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:19-22.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Chemero, Tony & Silberstein, Michael, After the philosophy of mind: Replacing scholasticism with science.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal--environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, inter-level mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends
Christensen, Wayne (online). Cognition as high-order control.   (Google)
Abstract: In order to investigate cognition fundamental assumptions must be made about what, in general terms, it is. In cognitive science it is usually assumed that cognition is computational and representational. There have been well known disputes over these assumptions, with rival claims that cognition is dynamical, situated and embodied. In this paper I emphasize the relations between cognition and control. I present a model of cognition that makes the claim that it is a form of high-order control, and I argue that viewing cognition as high-order control could be a useful framework assumption for cognitive science. Cognition has many aspects and different concepts can emphasize different aspects of it. Computational and representational assumptions have been very productive, and dynamical and embodied assumptions have also been productive, though to a much lesser extent so far. Control, however, has received insufficient attention in cognition science. The model I propose is based on a point that few will dispute, namely that control of behavior is the ultimate function of cognition. Bringing this to the foreground can be productive by highlighting the ways in which cognition is structured in relation to this control function. If this perspective is valuable it will be because the control function has a highly structuring effect on cognition. As a result a control-based perspective will predict many features of cognition and yield a coherent, integrated picture
Christensen, Wayne D. (2004). Self-directedness: A process approach to cognition. Axiomathes 14 (1-3):157-175.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Standard approaches to cognition emphasise structures (representations and rules) much more than processes, in part because this appears to be necessary to capture the normative features of cognition. However the resultant models are in?exible and face the problem of computational intractability. I argue that the ability of real world cognition to cope with complexity results from deep and subtle coupling between cognitive and non-cognitive processes. In order to capture this, theories of cognition must shift from a structural rule-de?ned conception of cognition to a thoroughgoing embedded process approach
Clark, Andy (2001). Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 137 | Google)
Abstract: Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science invites readers to join in up-to-the-minute conceptual discussions of the fundamental issues, problems, and opportunities in cognitive science. Written by one of the most renowned scholars in the field, this vivid and engaging introductory text relates the story of the search for a cognitive scientific understanding of mind. This search is presented as a no-holds-barred journey from early work in artificial intelligence, through connectionist (artificial neural network) counter-visions, and on to neuroscience, artificial life, dynamics, and robotics. The journey ends with some wide-ranging and provocative speculation about the complex coadaptive dance between mind, culture, and technology. Each chapter opens with a brief sketch of a major research tradition or perspective, followed by short yet substantial critical discussions dealing with key topics and problems. Ranging across both standard philosophical territory and the landscape of cutting-edge cognitive science, Clark highlights challenging issues in an effort to engage readers in active debate. Topics covered include mental causation; machine intelligence; the nature and status of folk psychology; the hardware/software distinction; emergence; relations between life and mind; the nature of perception, cognition, and action; and the continuity (or otherwise) of high-level human intelligence with other forms of adaptive response. Numerous illustrations, text boxes, and extensive suggestions for further reading enhance the text's utility. Helpful appendices provide background information on dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, consciousness, and more. An exceptional text for introductory and more advanced courses in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, Mindware is also essential reading for anyone interested in these fascinating and ever-changing fields
Cooper, Richard P. (2006). Cognitive architectures as Lakatosian research programs: Two case studies. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):199-220.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive architectures - task-general theories of the structure and function of the complete cognitive system - are sometimes argued to be more akin to frameworks or belief systems than scientific theories. The argument stems from the apparent non-falsifiability of existing cognitive architectures. Newell was aware of this criticism and argued that architectures should be viewed not as theories subject to Popperian falsification, but rather as Lakatosian research programs based on cumulative growth. Newell's argument is undermined because he failed to demonstrate that the development of Soar, his own candidate architecture, adhered to Lakatosian principles. This paper presents detailed case studies of the development of two cognitive architectures, Soar and ACT-R, from a Lakatosian perspective. It is demonstrated that both are broadly Lakatosian, but that in both cases there have been theoretical progressions that, according to Lakatosian criteria, are pseudo-scientific. Thus, Newell's defense of Soar as a scientific rather than pseudo-scientific theory is not supported in practice. The ACT series of architectures has fewer pseudo-scientific progressions than Soar, but it too is vulnerable to accusations of pseudo-science. From this analysis, it is argued that successive versions of theories of the human cognitive architecture must explicitly address five questions to maintain scientific credibility
Cummins, Fred (forthcoming). Phenomenal worlds and nervous system activity. In Proceedings of the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.   (Google)
Abstract: The epistemological situation of a single cell is considered. In chemotaxis, the relation between perception and action is found to be lawful and bidirectional. Consideration of the perception/action relation allows a characterization of the phe- nomenal world of the cell. This phenomenal world is grounded in perceptual distinctions that are relevant to the sustained vi- ability of the cell. Moving up the phylogenetic chain, this lawfulness, and its relation to the phenomenal world of ex- perience, is found to be essentially unchanged in multicellular organisms. Nervous systems add some innovation, in allow- ing distal responses and the non-linear combination of infor- mation, but from cell to human, the differentiation of the phe- nomenal world is found to arise from the lawfulness of the perception/action relation, which in turn reflects the biologi- cal constitution of the organism, and not a pre-given objec- tive world. This recognition suggests that rather than looking within the nervous system for representations of pre-given, ex- ternal, entities, one might do better to explore the fit between the function of the nervous system and the phenomenal, mean- ingful, world encountered by the organism in experience.
Davies, Martin (2005). An approach to the philosophy of cognitive science. In Frank Jackson & Michael A. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Expanded version of a chapter to appear in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
Davies, Martin (2005). Cognitive science. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press New York.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The so-called ‘cognitive revolution’ (Gardner, 1985) in American psychology owed much to developments in adjacent disciplines, especially theoretical linguistics and computer science. Indeed, the cognitive revolution brought forth, not only a change in the conception of psychology, but also an inter-disciplinary approach to understanding the mind, involving philosophy, anthropology and neuroscience along with computer science, linguistics and psychology. Many commentators agree in dating the conception of this inter-disciplinary approach, cognitive science, to 11 September 1956, the second day of a symposium on information theory held at MIT (Miller, 2003). Over the next twenty years or so, cognitive science developed an institutional presence through research centres, conferences, journals, and a substantial infusion of funds from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
Davies, Martin (1989). Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states. In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
De Jaegher, Hanne & Froese, Tom (2009). On the role of social interaction in individual agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.   (Google)
Abstract: Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as both a characteristic of individual agents and of social interaction processes. We then propose a number of ways in which interactional autonomy can influence individuals. Then we discuss recent work in modeling on the one hand and psychological investigations on the other that support and illustrate this claim. Finally, we discuss some implications for research on social and individual agency.
Dupuy, Jean-Pierre (2000). The Mechanization of the Mind: On the Origins of Cognitive Science. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Erneling, Christina E. (2004). The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Clearly the Cartesian ontological commitments that have dominated the scientific study of the mind up to the present have not been helpful. ...
Fetzer, James H. (1991). Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Paragon House.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingelkurts, Alexander A. (2004). Making Complexity Simpler: Multivariability and Metastability in the Brain. The International Journal of Neuroscience 114 (7):843 - 862.   (Google)
Abstract: This article provides a retrospective, current and prospective overview on developments in brain research and neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies are considered, with emphasis in the concept of multivariability and metastability in the brain. In this new view on the human brain, the potential multivariability of the neuronal networks appears to be far from continuous in time, but confined by the dynamics of short-term local and global metastable brain states. The article closes by suggesting some of the implications of this view in future multidisciplinary brain research.
Flanagan, Owen J. (1984). The Science of the Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 128 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness emerges as the key topic in this second edition of Owen Flanagan's popular introduction to cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology....
Fodor, Jerry A. (2000). In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 114 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2004). Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):162-174.   (Google | More links)
Garfield, Jay L. (1990). Foundations of Cognitive Science: The Essential Readings. New York: Paragon House.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Garnham, Alan (1993). Is logicist cognitive science possible? Mind and Language 8 (1):49-71.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Garfield, Jay L. (1999). Just what is cognitive science anyway? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):1075-1082.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gardner, Howard (1987). The Mind's New Science: A History Of The Cognitive Revolution. Basic Books.   (Cited by 1215 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1992). Unpacking the Black box of cognition. Inquiry 35 (3-4):463-472.   (Google)
Goldman, Alvin (1987). Cognitive science and metaphysics. Journal of Philosophy 84 (October):537-544.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goldman, Alvin I. (1993). Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science. Westview Press.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most fruitful interdisciplinary boundaries in contemporary scholarship is that between philosophy and cognitive science. Now that solid empirical results about the activities of the human mind are available, it is no longer necessary for philosophers to practice armchair psychology.In this short, accessible, and entertaining book, Alvin Goldman presents a masterly survey of recent work in cognitive science that has particular relevance to philosophy. Besides providing a valuable review of the most suggestive work in cognitive and social psychology, Goldman demonstrates conclusively that the best work in philosophy in a surprising number of different fields—including philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics as well as philosophy of mind—must take into account empirical breakthroughs in psychology.One of those rare texts that will also be useful for professionals, Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science is appropriate for students in a wide range of philosophy courses. It will also interest researchers and students in psychology who are intrigued by the wider theoretical implications of their work
Goldman, Alvin (1993). Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection of readings shows how cognitive science can influence most of the primary branches of philosophy, as well as how philosophy critically examines...
Griffiths, Paul E. & Stotz, Karola (2000). How the mind grows: A developmental perspective on the biology of cognition. Synthese 122 (1-2):29-51.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The `developmental systems'' perspective in biology is intended to replace the idea of a genetic program. This new perspective is strongly convergent with recent work in psychology on situated/embodied cognition and on the role of external `scaffolding'' in cognitive development. Cognitive processes, including those which can be explained in evolutionary terms, are not `inherited'' or produced in accordance with an inherited program. Instead, they are constructed in each generation through the interaction of a range of developmental resources. The attractors which emerge during development and explain robust and/or widespread outcomes are themselves constructed during the process. At no stage is there an explanatory stopping point where some resources control or program the rest of the developmental cascade. `Human nature'' is a description of how things generally turn out, not an explanation of why they turn out that way. Finally, we suggest that what is distinctive about human development is its degree of reliance on external scaffolding
Gross, Steven (2009). Review of Ray Jackendoff, Language, Consciousness, Culture. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 20095 (5).   (Google | More links)
Grush, Rick (1995). Emulation and Cognition. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Grush, Rick (online). The philosophy of cognitive science.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophy interfaces with cognitive science in three distinct but related areas. First, there is the usual set of issues that fall under the heading of philosophy of science (explanation, reduction, etc.), applied to the special case of cognitive science. Second, there is the endeavor of taking results from cognitive science as bearing upon traditional philosophical questions about the mind, such as the nature of mental representation, consciousness, free will, perception, emotions, memory, etc. Third
Hamlyn, David W. (1990). In and Out of the Black Box: On the Philosophy of Cognition. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1996). How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science. SUNY Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Abstract: What is required to be an interdisciplinary theory in cognitive science is for it to span more than one traditional domain. Generally speaking, as I discuss ...
Harnad, Stevan (1982). Neoconstructivism: A unifying constraint for the cognitive sciences. In Thomas W. Simon & Robert J. Scholes (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Behavioral scientists studied behavior; cognitive scientists study what generates behavior. Cognitive science is hence theoretical behaviorism (or behaviorism is experimental cognitivism). Behavior is data for a cognitive theorist. What counts as a theory of behavior? In this paper, a methodological constraint on theory construction -- "neoconstructivism" -- will be proposed (by analogy with constructivism in mathematics): Cognitive theory must be computable; given an encoding of the input to a behaving system, a theory must be able to compute (an encoding of) its outputs. It is a mistake to conclude, however, that this constraint requires cognitive theory to be computational, or that it follows from this that cognition is computation
Harnad, Stevan (2005). To Cognize is to Categorize: Cognition is Categorization. In C. Lefebvre & H. Cohen (eds.), Handbook of Categorization. Elsevier.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 2. Invariant Sensorimotor Features ("Affordances"). To say this is not to declare oneself a Gibsonian, whatever that means. It is merely to point out that what a sensorimotor system can do is determined by what can be extracted from its motor interactions with its sensory input. If you lack sonar sensors, then your sensorimotor system cannot do what a bat's can do, at least not without the help of instruments. Light stimulation affords color vision for those of us with the right sensory apparatus, but not for those of us who are color-blind. The geometric fact that, when we move, the "shadows" cast on our retina by nearby objects move faster than the shadows of further objects means that, for those of us with normal vision, our visual input affords depth perception. From more complicated facts of projective and solid geometry it follows that a 3-dimensional shape, such as, say, a boomerang, can be recognized as being the same shape Ð and the same size Ð even though the size and shape of its shadow on our retinas changes as we move in relation to it or it moves in relation to us. Its shape is said to be invariant under these sensorimotor transformations, and our visual systems can detect and extract that invariance, and translate it into a visual constancy. So we keep seeing a boomerang of the same shape and size even though the shape and size of its retinal shadows keep changing
Hattiangadi, Jagdish (2004). The mind as an object of scientific study. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Haugeland, John (1978). The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1:215-26.   (Cited by 91 | Google)
Hooker, Cliff A. (1975). The information-processing approach to the brain-mind and its philosophical ramifications. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September):1-15.   (Google | More links)
Hornsby, Jennifer (2000). Personal and sub-personal: A defence of Dennett's early distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub-personal' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti-physicalistic, anti-dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub-personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level
Jeffares, Ben (online). The Evolution of Technical Competence: Economic and Strategic Thinking. ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper will outline a series of changes in the archaeological record related to Hominins. I argue that these changes underlie the emergence of the capacity for strategic thinking. The paper will start by examining the foundation of technical skills found in primates, and then work through various phases of the archaeological and paleontological record. I argue that the key driver for the development of strategic thinking was the need to expand range sizes and cope with increasingly heterogeneous environments.
Jordaan, Wilhelm J. (1993). Cognitive science: From information-processing to acts of meaning. South African Journal of Philosophy 12 (4):91-102.   (Google)
Keeley, Brian L. (2000). Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science. Philosophy of Science 60 (3):404-418.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Keith, William (1990). Cognitive science on a wing and a prayer. Social Epistemology 343 (October-December):343-355.   (Google)
Lakoff, George (1989). Philosophical speculation and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):55-76.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Leiber, Justin (1991). An Invitation To Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Lloyd, Dan (1989). Simple Minds. MIT Press.   (Cited by 52 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.
Millikan, Ruth G. (online). What is behavior?   (Google)
Morris, William E. & Richardson, Robert C. (1995). How not to demarcate cognitive science and folk psychology: A response to Pickering and Chater. Minds and Machines 5 (3):339-355.   (Google)
Abstract:   Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an independent enterprise, with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C''s case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude that P&C do not so muchdiscover ascreate the gap they find between folk psychology and cognitive science. It is an artifact of their implausible and unmotivated attempt to demarcate the two areas, and of the excessively narrow accounts they give of each
O'Nuillain, S. (1995). The Search for Mind: A New Foundation for Cognitive Science. Ablex.   (Google)
Peterson, Gregory R. (1997). Cognitive science: What one needs to know. Zygon 32 (4):615-627.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Pettinelli, Mark (2007). The Psychology Of Emotions, Feelings and Thoughts. Mark Pettinelli.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This book puts forth the idea that life is divided into three groups, emotion, thinking, and feeling.
Pickering, Martin J. & Chater, Nick (1995). Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology. Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is often assumed that cognitive science is built upon folk psychology, and that challenges to folk psychology are therefore challenges to cognitive science itself. We argue that, in practice, cognitive science and folk psychology treat entirely non-overlapping domains: cognitive science considers aspects of mental life which do not depend on general knowledge, whereas folk psychology considers aspects of mental life which do depend on general knowledge. We back up our argument on theoretical grounds, and also illustrate the separation between cognitive scientific and folk psychological phenomena in a number of cognitive domains. We consider the methodological and theoretical significance of our arguments for cognitive science research
Pinker, Steven (2005). So how does the mind work? Mind and Language 20 (1):1-38.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In my book How the Mind Works, I defended the theory that the human mind is a naturally selected system of organs of computation. Jerry Fodor claims that 'the mind doesn't work that way'(in a book with that title) because (1) Turing Machines cannot duplicate humans' ability to perform abduction (inference to the best explanation); (2) though a massively modular system could succeed at abduction, such a system is implausible on other grounds; and (3) evolution adds nothing to our understanding of the mind. In this review I show that these arguments are flawed. First, my claim that the mind is a computational system is different from the claim Fodor attacks (that the mind has the architecture of a Turing Machine); therefore the practical limitations of Turing Machines are irrelevant. Second, Fodor identifies abduction with the cumulative accomplishments of the scientific community over millennia. This is very different from the accomplishments of human common sense, so the supposed gap between human cognition and computational models may be illusory. Third, my claim about biological specialization, as seen in organ systems, is distinct from Fodor's own notion of encapsulated modules, so the limitations of the latter are irrelevant. Fourth, Fodor's arguments dismissing of the relevance of evolution to psychology are unsound
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (online). Spring and fall fashions in cognitive science.   (Google)
Abstract: This is indeed an auspicious time for Cognitive Science. I stand here before you this evening as the first Chair to give a presidential address to this austere body, to place on record before you what you are to accept as the Society's official view on the new science of the mind
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (online). What is cognitive science?   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Neuroscientists have an advantage on us dry Cognitive Scientists: They always have impressive color slides of PET or fMRI images showing the exact location of whatever they wish to discuss --” the soul or the locus of sinful thoughts or the center of consciousness. If one were to go by popular science articles on the brain one would have to conclude that we know where everything is located in the brain and therefore we know everything about it except how it manages to do things like think. Yet I believe that what we do here at the Center for Cognitive Science is precisely that we study what is in the mind, even if we do not know where it is in the brain (and in fact even if there is no answer to the question where it is in the brain --“ which is indeed the case for any interesting mental mechanism or mental state). Let me explain
Robb, David (2003). Dualism. In Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Vol. 1. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Ross, Don & Spurrett, David (2004). The cognitive and behavioral sciences: Real patterns, real unity, real causes, but no-supervenience - response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):637-647.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Our response amplifies our case for scientific realism and the unity of science and clarifies our commitments to scientific unity, nonreductionism, behaviorism, and our rejection of talk of “emergence.” We acknowledge support from commentators for our view of physics and, responding to pressure and suggestions from commentators, deny the generality supervenience and explain what this involves. We close by reflecting on the relationship between philosophy and science
Rupert, Robert D. (ms). Against Group Cognitive States.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (2010). Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Review essay contrasting Adams and Aizawa's approach to cognition with a functionalist, systems-based view.
Silberstein, Michael & Chemero, Anthony (web). After philosophy of mind: Replacing scholasticism with science. Philosophy of Science.   (Google)
Abstract: We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal--environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, inter-level mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends
Slezak, Peter (online). Is cognitive science relevant to science teaching?   (Google)
Abstract: The Relevance of Cognitive Science to Teaching, Proceedings of the 6th International History, Philosophy & Science Teaching Conference (IHPST), Denver, Colorado, November 7-10, 2001. (PDF)
Smith, Barry (1994). Topological foundations of cognitive science. Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This is a revised version of the introductory essay in C. Eschenbach, C. Habel and B. Smith (eds.), Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, Hamburg: Graduiertenkolleg Kognitionswissenschaft, 1994, the text of a talk delivered at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science in Buffalo in July 1994
Solso, Robert L. (ed.) (1999). Mind and Brain Sciences in the 21st Century. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Abstract: In these essays, all but one written for this book, many of those who have helped to shape the fields of neurocognition, cognitive science, and psychology give...
Sperry, Roger W. (1993). The impact and promise of the cognitive revolution. American Psychologist 48 (8):878-885.   (Cited by 56 | Google)
Stainton, Robert J. (2006). Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions.
Sun, Ron (2004). Desiderata for cognitive architectures. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):341-373.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article addresses issues in developing cognitive architectures--generic computational models of cognition. Cognitive architectures are believed to be essential in advancing understanding of the mind, and therefore, developing cognitive architectures is an extremely important enterprise in cognitive science. The article proposes a set of essential desiderata for developing cognitive architectures. It then moves on to discuss in detail some of these desiderata and their associated concepts and ideas relevant to developing better cognitive architectures. It argues for the importance of taking into full consideration these desiderata in developing future architectures that are more cognitively and ecologically realistic. A brief and preliminary evaluation of existing cognitive architectures is attempted on the basis of these ideas
Sun, Ron; Coward, Andrew & Zenzen, Michael J. (2005). On levels of cognitive modeling. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):613-637.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The article first addresses the importance of cognitive modeling, in terms of its value to cognitive science (as well as other social and behavioral sciences). In particular, it emphasizes the use of cognitive architectures in this undertaking. Based on this approach, the article addresses, in detail, the idea of a multi-level approach that ranges from social to neural levels. In physical sciences, a rigorous set of theories is a hierarchy of descriptions/explanations, in which causal relationships among entities at a high level can be reduced to causal relationships among simpler entities at a more detailed level. We argue that a similar hierarchy makes possible an equally productive approach toward cognitive modeling. The levels of models that we conceive in relation to cognition include, at the highest level, sociological/anthropological models of collective human behavior, behavioral models of individual performance, cognitive models involving detailed mechanisms, representations, and processes, as well as biological/physiological models of neural circuits, brain regions, and other detailed biological processes
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Abstract:   The actual approaches of Cognitive Science offer a partial explanation of cognition. In this paper, our main point is to catch some key elements from these approaches, that can be taken together in a future perspective for a better explanation of cognition. The key elements (levels of analysis, primitives, processes, structures, threshold,self-organisation, bidirectionality, emergency, habituation, tasks, theinteraction between levels and also the interactions between the elements of the cognitive system and the environment) help us to stress the need of the representations. Then, we arediscussing the following dichotomies: procedural-declarative,consciousness-unconsciousness, implicit-explicit. Finally, we will try to motivate the necessity of an abstract theory of representation in Cognitive Science. ``The sensitive things aren't, but the ideas are''
van Gelder, Tim (1998). The roles of philosophy in cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):117-36.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When the various disciplines participating in cognitive science are listed, philosophy almost always gets a guernsey. Yet, a couple of years ago at the conference of the Cognitive Science Society in Boulder (USA), there was no philosophy or philosopher with any prominence on the program. When queried on this point, the organizer (one of the "superstars" of the field) claimed it was partly an accident, but partly also due to an impression among members of the committee that philosophy is basically a waste of time. Philosophy, they thought, is mostly obscure bullshit that does little to help, and much to hinder, real progress in cognitive science
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