Javascript Menu by
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
click here for help on how to search

7.2. Philosophy of Neuroscience (Philosophy of Neuroscience on PhilPapers)

See also:
Allhoff, Fritz, Neuroscience and metaphysics.   (Google)
Abstract: In “Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge In- The assumption at issue here is the assumption that the formed by Genetics,” Judy Illes and Eric Racine (see this ismind literally is the brain (i.e., is numerically identical to sue) argue that “traditional bioethics analysis” (TBA), as de-
A. M. Jeannotte, K. N. Schiller; L. M. Reeves, E. G. DeRenzo & D. K. McBride, (2010). Neurotechnology as a public good. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Thompson, Evan; Lutz, A. & Cosmelli, D. (2005). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Baldwin, James Mark (1940). Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Including Many of the Principal Conceptions of Ethics, Logic, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion, Mental Pathology, Anthropology, Biology, Neurology, Physiology, Economics, Political and Social Philosophy, Philology, Physical Science, and Education, and Giving a Terminology in English, French, German, and Italian. New York, P. Smith.   (Google)
Bara, Bruno G. & Tirassa, Maurizio (2000). Neuropragmatics: Brain and communication. Cogprints.   (Google)
Bara, Bruno G.; Cutica, Ilaria & Tirassa, Maurizio (2001). Neuropragmatics: Extralinguistic communication after closed head injury. Cogprints.   (Google)
Abstract: This work is concerned with the decay of communicative abilities after head trauma. A protocol composed of 16 videotaped scenes was devised in order to investigate the comprehension of several types of communicative actions realized with extralinguistic means, like pointing or clapping. The protocol was administered to 30 closed head injured individuals. The results showed a decreasing performance from simple standard acts, to complex standard acts, deceits, and ironies. The subjects' performance was worse with the scenes reproducing failing, rather than successful, communicative actions. The results are compared with those we previously obtained with a linguistic protocol. A theory of the cognitive processes underlying intentional communication is outlined and used to explain the results
Bara, Bruno G.; Tirassa, Maurizio & Zettin, Marina (1997). Neuropragmatics: Neuropsychological constraints on formal theories of dialogue. Cogprints.   (Google)
Abstract: We are interested in the validation of a cognitive theory of human communication, grounded in a speech acts perspective. The theory we refer to is outlined, and a number of predictions are drawn from it. We report a series of protocols administered to 13 brain-injured subjects and to a comparable control group. The tasks included direct and indirect speech acts, irony, deceits, failures of communication, and theory of mind inferences. All the predicted trends of difficulty are consistently verified; in particular, difficulty increases from direct/indirect speech acts to irony, from irony to deceits, and from deceits to failure recovery. This trend symmetrically shows both in the successful situation and in the failure situation. Further, failure situations prove more difficult to handle than the relevant successful situation. In sharp contrast with previous literature, there is no difference between the subjects' comprehension of direct and indirect speech acts. The results are discussed in the light of our theoretical approach
Churchland, P. M. (2010). Toward a cognitive neurobiology of the moral virtues. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Colombo, Matteo (2010). How “authentic intentionality” can be enabled: A neurocomputational hypothesis. Minds and Machines 20 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: According to John Haugeland, the capacity for “authentic intentionality” depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland’s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand “authentic intentionality”. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect the statistical structure of the environments where brain sensory systems evolved and develop. The objection that I equivocate on what Haugeland means by “commitment to standards” is rebutted by introducing the notion of “florid, self-conscious representing”. Were the hypothesis presented plausible, computational neuroscience would offer a promising framework for a better understanding of the conditions for meaningful representation
Crawford, M. B. (2010). The limits of neuro-talk. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Deacon, Terrence W. (2005). Language as an emergent function: Some radical neurological and evolutionary implications. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (3):269-286.   (Google)
Abstract: Language is a spontaneously evolved emergent adaptation, not a formal computational system. Its structure does not derive from either innate or social instruction but rather self-organization and selection. Its quasi-universal features emerge from the interactions among semiotic constraints, neural processing limitations, and social transmission dynamics. The neurological processing of sentence structure is more analogous to embryonic differentiation than to algorithmic computation. The biological basis of this unprecedented adaptation is not located in some unique neurologieal structure nor the result of any single mutation, but is vested in the synergistic interaction of numerous coevolved neurological biases and social dynamics
Dyck, Arthur J. & Padilla, Carlos (2009). The empathic emotions and self-love in Bishop Joseph Butler and the neurosciences. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (4):577-612.   (Google)
Abstract: In Joseph Butler, we have an account of human beings as moral beings that is, as this essay demonstrates, being supported by the recently emerging findings of the neurosciences. This applies particularly to Butler's portrayal of our empathic emotions. Butler discovered their moral significance for motivating and guiding moral decisions and actions before the neurosciences did. Butler has, in essence, added a sixth sense to our five senses: this is the moral sense by means of which we perceive what we ought or ought not do. The moral sense yields relatively reliable moral perceptions when we love our neighbors as ourselves, and when our love for ourselves is genuine. Accurate moral perceptions will be thwarted by self-deceit—that is, by a self-partiality devoid of neighbor love, a condition that thwarts genuine self-love. This essay explores the parallels between Butler's understanding of self-deceit and Robert J. Lifton's understanding of "doubling."
Figdor, Carrie (2010). Neuroscience and the multiple realization of cognitive functions. Philosophy of Science 77 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one‐to‐one structure‐function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience‐based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised December 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 260 English‐Philosophy Building, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; e‐mail: carrie‐
FitzGerald, K. & Wurzman, R. (2010). Neurogenetics and ethics. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hall, Stephen S. (2010). Wisdom: From Philosophy to Neuroscience. Alfred A. Knopf.   (Google)
Abstract: Wisdom defined (sort of) What is wisdom? ; The wisest man in the world : the philosophical roots of wisdom ; Heart and mind : the psychological roots of wisdom -- Eight neural pillars of wisdom. Emotional regulation : the art of coping ; Knowing what's important : the neural mechanism of establishing value and making a judgment ; Moral reasoning : the biology of judging right from wrong ; Compassion : the biology of loving-kindness and empathy ; Humility : the gift of perspective ; Altruism : social justice, fairness, and the wisdom of punishment ; Patience : temptation, delayed gratification, and the biology of learning to wait for larger rewards ; Dealing with uncertainty : change, "meta-wisdom," and the vulcanization of the human brain -- Becoming wise. Youth, adversity, and resilience : the seeds of wisdom ; Older and wiser : the wisdom of aging ; Classroom, board room, bedroom, back room : everyday wisdom in our everyday world ; Dare to be wise : does wisdom have a future?
Hanson, Philip P. (2004). Idealism, scepticism, and internal relations: Remarks on Hymers's philosophy and its epistemic neuroses. Dialogue 43 (3):577-586.   (Google)
Öhman, Arne; Flykt, Anders & Lundqvist, Daniel (2000). Unconscious emotion: Evolutionary perspectives, psychophysiological data and neuropsychological mechanisms. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel & G. L. Ahern (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Series in Affective Science. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hymers, Michael (2004). Précis of philosophy and its epistemic neuroses. Dialogue 43 (3):569-576.   (Google)
Jäckel, Achim (1990). Das neurophysiologische korrelat Des induktiven denkens. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 5 (1):141-148.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents a new theory of connection between neurophysiological facts and the psychological inductive method. Based on the nature of synaptic transmission as a fundamental principle, this theory offers an explanation of abstraction, inductive thinking and any form of learning
Jeffers, Carol S. (2010). A still life is really a moving life: The role of mirror neurons and empathy in animating aesthetic response. Journal of Aesthetic Education 44 (2):pp. 31-39.   (Google)
Jensen, Jeppe Sinding (2010). Language as an emergent function : Some radical neurological and evolutionary implications. In Armin W. Geertz & Jeppe Sinding Jensen (eds.), Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture: Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative. Equinox Pub. Ltd..   (Google)
Klein, Colin (2010). Images are not the evidence in neuroimaging. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: fMRI promises to uncover the functional structure of the brain. I argue, however, that pictures of ‘brain activity' associated with fMRI experiments are poor evidence for functional claims. These neuroimages present the results of null hypothesis significance tests performed on fMRI data. Significance tests alone cannot provide evidence about the functional structure of causally dense systems, including the brain. Instead, neuroimages should be seen as indicating regions where further data analysis is warranted. This additional analysis rarely involves simple significance testing, and so justified skepticism about neuroimages does not provide reason for skepticism about fMRI more generally. 1 Introduction 2 Neuroimages Are Statistical Maps 3 The Skeptical Argument 3.1 Evidence and neuroimages 3.2 The problem of causal density 3.3 The problem of arbitrary thresholds 3.4 The problem of vague alternatives 4 Skepticism Is Due to NHST 5 Neuroimages versus Neuroimaging CiteULike Connotea What's this?
Kohls, N. & Benedikter, R. (2010). The origins of the modern concept of "neuroscience". In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Lewis, Marc D. (2005). An emerging dialogue among social scientists and neuroscientists on the causal bases of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):223-234.   (Google)
Abstract: The target article developed a dynamic systems framework that viewed the causal basis of emotion as a self-organizing process giving rise to cognitive appraisal concurrently. Commentators on the article evaluated this framework and the principles and mechanisms it incorporated. They also suggested additional principles, mechanisms, modeling strategies, and phenomena related to emotion and appraisal, in place of or extending from those already proposed. There was general agreement that nonlinear causal processes are fundamental to the psychology and neurobiology of emotion
Lewis, Marc D. (2005). Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):169-194.   (Google)
Abstract: Efforts to bridge emotion theory with neurobiology can be facilitated by dynamic systems (DS) modeling. DS principles stipulate higher-order wholes emerging from lower-order constituents through bidirectional causal processes – offering a common language for psychological and neurobiological models. After identifying some limitations of mainstream emotion theory, I apply DS principles to emotion–cognition relations. I then present a psychological model based on this reconceptualization, identifying trigger, self-amplification, and self-stabilization phases of emotion-appraisal states, leading to consolidating traits. The article goes on to describe neural structures and functions involved in appraisal and emotion, as well as DS mechanisms of integration by which they interact. These mechanisms include nested feedback interactions, global effects of neuromodulation, vertical integration, action-monitoring, and synaptic plasticity, and they are modeled in terms of both functional integration and temporal synchronization. I end by elaborating the psychological model of emotion–appraisal states with reference to neural processes. Key Words: appraisal; bidirectional causality; cognition; dynamic systems; emotion; neurobiology; part–whole relations; self-organization
Lieberman, Matthew D. (ms). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes.   (Google)
Abstract:      Social cognitive neuroscience examines social phenomena and processes using cognitive neuroscience research tools such as neuroimaging and neuropsychology. This review examines four broad areas of research within social cognitive neuroscience: (a) understanding others, (b) understanding oneself, (c) controlling oneself, and (d) the processes that occur at the interface of self and others. In addition, this review highlights two core-processing distinctions that can be neurocognitively identified across all of these domains. The distinction between automatic versus controlled processes has long been important to social psychological theory and can be dissociated in the neural regions contributing to social cognition. Alternatively, the differentiation between internally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's mental interior and externally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's visible features and actions is a new distinction. This latter distinction emerges from social cognitive neuroscience investigations rather than from existing psychological theories demonstrating that social cognitive neuroscience can both draw on and contribute to social psychological theory
Lizardo, Omar (2007). "Mirror neurons," collective objects and the problem of transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner's critique of practice theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (3):319–350.   (Google | More links)
Locher, Paul (2007). Evolutionary And Neurocognitive Approaches to Aesthetics, Creativity And the Arts. Baywood Publishing Company.   (Google)
Abstract: In this book, well-known scholars describe new and exciting approaches to aesthetics, creativity, and psychology of the arts, approaching these topics from a point of view that is biological or related to biology and answering new questions with new methods and theories. All known societies produce and enjoy arts such as literature, music, and visual decoration or depiction. Judging from prehistoric archaeological evidence, this arose very early in human development. Furthermore, Darwin was explicit in attributing aesthetic sensitivity to lower animals. These considerations lead us to wonder whether the arts might not be evolutionarily based. Although such an evolutionary basis is not obvious on the face of it, the idea has recently elicited considerable attention. The book begins with a consideration of ten theories on the evolutionary function of the arts, and this is followed by several chapters that consider the possible evolutionary function of specific arts such as music and literature. The theory of evolution was first drawn up in biology, but evolution is not confined to biology: genuinely evolutionary theories of sociocultural change can be formulated. That they need to be formulated is shown in several chapters that discuss regular trends in literature and scientific writings. Psychologists have recently rediscovered the obvious fact that thought and perception occur in the brain, so cognitive science moves ever closer to neuroscience. Several chapters give overviews of neurocognitive and neural network approaches to creativity and aesthetic appreciation. The book concludes with two exciting chapters describing brain-scan research on what happens in the brain during creativity and presenting a close examination of the relationship between genetically transmitted mental disorder and creativity.
Logothetis, Nikos (ms). Neuroimage volume 39, issue , 1 february 2008, pages 1081-1093 Font size:.   (Google)
Abstract: - selected Article Figures/Tables References Purchase PDF (2699 K) doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.09.038..
Lohmar, Dieter (2006). Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):5-16.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The neurological discovery of mirror neurons is of eminent importance for the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how these neurological findings might be “translated” phenomenologically into our own experienced sensations, feelings and volitions
Lohmar, Dieter (2005). On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological, psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology
Lombardo, Michael V.; Chakrabarti, Bhismadev & Baron-Cohen, Simon (2009). What neuroimaging and perceptions of self-other similarity can tell us about the mechanism underlying mentalizing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):152-153.   (Google)
Lowy, Adam (1998). Donald mender. The myth of neuropsychiatry. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (2).   (Google)
Lunstroth, John & Goldman, Jan (2007). Ethical intelligence from neuroscience: Is it possible? American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):18 – 20.   (Google)
Lyvers, Michael (2003). The neurochemistry of psychedelic experiences. Science and Consciousness Review 1.   (Google | More links)
Maasen, Sabine (2007). Selves in turmoil - neurocognitive and societal challenges of the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):252-270.   (Google)
Abstract: As the cognitive neurosciences set out to challenge our understanding of consciousness, the existing conceptual panoply of meanings attached to the term remains largely unaccounted for. By way of bibliometric analysis, the following study first reveals the breadth and shift of meanings over the last decades, the main tendency being a more 'brainy' concept of consciousness. On this basis, the emergence of consciousness studies is regarded as a 'trading zone' (Galison) in which experimental, philosophical and experiential accounts are dialectically engaged. Outside of academic discourse, a neurocognitive concept of consciousness is embraced by popular self-help literature that sweepingly adopts this new discourse and the novel neuropharmacological tools in the self-help toolbox. Consciousness studies are hence not only the product of epistemological and methodological struggles (scientific dimension) but also part of the current re-alignments regarding the notion of consciously acting selves in society (societal dimension)
Macknik, Stephen L. & Martinez-Conde, Susana (2004). Dichoptic visual masking reveals that early binocular neurons exhibit weak interocular suppression: Implications for binocular vision and visual awareness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (6):1049-1059.   (Google)
MacLennan, Bruce (1999). Neurophenomenological constraints and pushing back the subjectivity barrier. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):961-963.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first part of this commentary I argue that a neurophenomenological analysis of color reveals additional asymmetries that preclude undetectable color transformations, without appealing to weak arguments based on Basic Color Categories (BCCs); that is, I suggest additional factors that must be included in “an empirically accurate model of color experience,” and which break the remaining asymmetries. In the second part I discuss the “isomorphism constraint” and the extent to which we may predict the subjective quality of experience from its neurological correlates. Protophenomena are discussed as a way of capturing in a relational structure all of qualitative experience except for the bare fact of subjectivity
Mallgrave, Harry Francis (2010). The Architect's Brain: Neuroscience, Creativity, and Architecture. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Historical essays -- The humanist brain : Alberti, Vitruvius, and Leonardo -- The enlightened brain : Perrault, Laugier, and Le Roy -- The sensational brain : Burke, Price, and Knight -- The transcendental brain : Kant and Schopenhauer -- The animate brain : Schinkel, Bötticher, and Semper -- The empathetic brain : Vischer, Wölfflin, and Göller -- The gestalt brain : the dynamics of the sensory field -- The neurological brain : Hayek, Hebb, and Neutra -- The phenomenal brain : Merleau-Ponty, Rasmussen, and Pallasmaa -- Neuroscience and architecture -- Anatomy : architecture of the brain -- Ambiguity : architecture of vision -- Metaphor : architecture of embodiment -- Hapticity : architecture of the senses -- Epilogue: The architect's brain.
Maquet, Pierre; Ruby, P.; Maudoux, A.; Albouy, G.; Sterpenich, V.; Dan-Vu, T.; Desseilles, M.; Boly, Melanie; Perrin, Fabien; Peigneux, Philippe & Laureys, Steven (2006). Human cognition during Rem sleep and the activity profile within frontal and parietal cortices. A reappraisal of functional neuroimaging data. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Google)
Martin, Nadine (2003). Cognitive neuropsychological evidence for common processes underlying generation and storage of language representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):747-748.   (Google)
Abstract: Ruchkin et al. offer a compelling case for a model of short-term storage without a separate buffer. Here, I discuss some cognitive neuropsychological data that have been offered in support of and against their model. Additionally, I discuss briefly some new directions in cognitive neuropsychological research that bear on the role of attention in Ruchkin et al.'s model
Martindale, Colin (2000). Localist representations are a desirable emergent property of neurologically plausible neural networks. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):485-486.   (Google)
Abstract: Page has done connectionist researchers a valuable service in this target article. He points out that connectionist models using localized representations often work as well or better than models using distributed representations. I point out that models using distributed representations are difficult to understand and often lack parsimony and plausibility. In conclusion, I give an example – the case of the missing fundamental in music – that can easily be explained by a model using localist representations but can be explained only with great difficulty and implausibility by a model using distributed representations
Markic, Olga (2009). Neuroscience and the image of the mind. In Eva Zerovnik, Olga Markič & A. Ule (eds.), Philosophical Insights About Modern Science. Nova Science Publishers, Inc..   (Google)
Marconi, Diego, Neuropsychological data, intuitions, and semantic theories.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. The issue - The reflection I am proposing was stimulated by some recent research on the mental processing of proper names. However, the issue I am raising is independent of both the particular nature of such results and the fact that they are accepted as well established. The question I would like to ask is whether (neuro)psychological results on the mental processing of language can falsify (or confirm) semantic theses about natural language. By a semantic thesis I mean something like any of the following
Masters, Robert E. L. (1994). Neurospeak: Transforms Your Body, While You Read. Quest Books.   (Google)
Mathews, Debra J. H.; Bok, Hilary & Rabins, Peter V. (eds.) (2009). Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book brings together some of the best minds in neurology and philosophy to discuss the concept of personal identity and the moral dimensions of treating ...
Maxwell, Nicholas (ms). Is science neurotic?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as a basic aim of science is represented to be to improve knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science does not suffer too much from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences, and of academic inquiry more generally. Freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far reaching, beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences
Mayo, J. Patrick & Sommer, Marc A. (2008). Neuronal adaptation: Delay compensation at the level of single neurons? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):210-212.   (Google)
McCauley, Robert N. (1993). Brainwork: A review of Paul Churchland's a neurocomputational perspective. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):81 – 96.   (Google)
Abstract: Taking inspiration from developments in neurocomputational modeling, Paul Church-land develops his positions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. Concerning the former, Churchland relaxes his eliminativism at various points and seems to endorse a traditional identity account of sensory qualia. Although he remains unsympathetic to folk psychology, he no longer seeks the elimination of normative epistemology, but rather its transformation to a philosophical enterprise informed by current developments in the relevant sciences. Churchland supplies suggestive discussions of the character of knowledge, simplicity, explanation, theory, and conceptual change. Many of his treatments turn on his prototype activation model of neural representation, which looks to the notion of a 'prototype' as it is employed in the psychological literature on concept representation, however, this and other features of Churchland's neurocomputational program do not square well with some of his views about cross-scientific relations
McCabe, Kevin A. (2008). Neuroeconomics and the economic sciences. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):345-368.   (Google)
McCormick, Cheryl M. (2007). Practicing safe stress : A selective overview of the neuroscience research. In Henri Cohen & Brigitte Stemmer (eds.), Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain. Elxevier Academic Press.   (Google)
McCauley, Robert (online). Reduction: Models of cross-scientific relations and their implications for the psychology-neuroscience interface.   (Google)
Abstract: University Abstract Philosophers have sought to improve upon the logical empiricists’ model of scientific reduction. While opportunities for integration between the cognitive and the neural sciences have increased, most philosophers, appealing to the multiple realizability of mental states and the irreducibility of consciousness, object to psychoneural reduction. New Wave reductionists offer a continuum of comparative goodness of intertheoretic mapping for assessing reductions. Their insistence on a unified view of intertheoretic relations obscures epistemically significant crossscientific relations and engenders dismissive conclusions about psychology. Richer, more sensitive accounts of explanatory pluralism and mechanistic explanation in science advocate multi-level approaches in cross-scientific settings and criticize the distance of the standard philosophical objections from working scientists’ practices and discoveries. The Heuristic Identity Theory, a new, scientifically informed version of the psycho-physical identity theory, incorporates these insights, showing how multiple realizability is an argument for (not against) identities in science and why, therefore, consciousness is not irreducible
McCollum, Gin (2002). Systems of logical systems: Neuroscience and quantum logic. Foundations of Science 7 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Nervous systems are intricately organized on many levels of analysis.The intricate organization invites the development of mathematicalsystems that reflect its logical structure. Particular logical structures and choices of invariants within those structures narrowthe ranges of perceptions that are possible and sensorimotorcoordination that may be selected. As in quantum logic, choicesaffect outcomes.Some of the mathematical tools in use in quantum logic havealready also been used in neurobiology, including the mathematicsof ordered structures and a product like a tensor product. Astheoretical neurobiology is developed on its own foundation, wemay expect a rich dialogue between theoretical neurobiology andquantum logic
Mcewen, Fiona (2007). Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science - edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater. Mind and Language 22 (2):207–213.   (Google | More links)
McGlynn, S. M. & Schacter, Daniel L. (1989). Unawareness of deficits in neuropsychological syndromes. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 11:143-205.   (Cited by 214 | Google | More links)
McGeer, Victoria (forthcoming). Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A priori considerations about (cognitive) multiple realisability challenge the thesis on philosophical grounds, and neuroscientific findings from developmental disorders substantiate that challenge empirically. The conclusion is that behavioural evidence alone is inadequate for scientific progress since appearances of modularity can be thoroughly deceptive, obscuring both the dynamic processes of neural development and the endstate network architecture of real cognitive systems
Meegan, Daniel V. (2008). Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (1):9 – 20.   (Google)
Abstract: There is considerable interest in the use of neuroimaging techniques for forensic purposes. Memory detection techniques, including the well-publicized Brain Fingerprinting technique (Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc., Seattle WA), exploit the fact that the brain responds differently to sensory stimuli to which it has been exposed before. When a stimulus is specifically associated with a crime, the resulting brain activity should differentiate between someone who was present at the crime and someone who was not. This article reviews the scientific literature on three such techniques: priming, old/new, and P300 effects. The forensic potential of these techniques is evaluated based on four criteria: specificity, automaticity, encoding flexibility, and longevity. This article concludes that none of the techniques are devoid of forensic potential, although much research is yet to be done. Ethical issues, including rights to privacy and against self-incrimination, are discussed. A discussion of legal issues concludes that current memory detection techniques do not yet meet United States standards of legal admissibility
Meehl, Paul E. (1978). Precognitive telepathy II: Some neurophysiological conjectures and metaphysical speculations. Noûs 12 (4):371-395.   (Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (2007). Review of John Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).   (Google)
Michael, John, Mirror neurons and social cognition: An expanded simulationist framework.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I critically assess the thesis that the discovery of mirror neuron systems (MNSs) provides empirical support for the simulation theory (ST) of social cognition. This thesis can be analyzed into two claims: (i) that MNSs are involved in understanding others’ intentions or emotions; and (ii) that the way in which they do so supports a simulationist viewpoint. I will be giving qualified support to both claims. Starting with (i), I will present theoretical and empirical points in support of the view that MNSs play a substantial role and are perhaps neces¬sary although not sufficient for understanding at least some intentions or emo¬tions. Turning to (ii), I will argue that the work on MNSs best supports a fairly weak version of ST, according to which social cognition involves simulation simply because conceptual thought in gen¬eral has a simulationist component. In elucidating this idea, I appeal to Law¬rence Barsalou’s embodied theory of concepts (1999, 2005). Crucially, the term “simula¬tion” here refers not to simulations of a target agent’s experience, nor even spe¬cifically to one’s own experience in a similar counterfactual situation, but to simulations of experience in general - activating sensory, motor, proprioceptive, affective, and introspective representations that match representations one would have when perceiving, carrying out actions, experiencing emotions, etc. I then sketch an expanded simulationist framework for understanding the contribution of MNSs to social cognition. The ap¬peal to empirical work on MNSs in support of ST is therefore a two-edged sword; making this appeal persuasive requires us to modify our understanding of simulation to make it line up with the empirical work
Migotti, Mark (2004). Discussion of Hymers's philosophy and its epistemic neuroses. Dialogue 43 (3):587-594.   (Google)
Miranda, E. N. (1997). How good are formal neurons for modelling real ones? Acta Biotheoretica 45 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: A formal neuron has been studied mathematically. The spiking behaviour of a single neuron has been considered and the influence of the other neurons has been replaced by an average activity level. Four different kinds of spiking behaviour are predicted by the model: B (bursts), C (continuous), P (periodic) and S (silent) neurons and several real neurons can be classified within these four categories. Some properties of the spiking neuron are calculated: 1) the time between spikes, 2) the spike train length and 3) the silent time. Because these magnitudes can be measured in the laboratory, an experimental validation of the model is proposed
Miu, Andrei C. (2005). Asymmetrical behavior without an asymmetrical brain: Corpus callosum and neuroplasticity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):608-609.   (Google)
Abstract: The theory put forward by Vallortigara & Rogers (V&R) to explain the versatility of directional asymmetries at the population level argues that the strength of lateralization is controlled by social learning. This shaping of behavioral asymmetries by a non-stationary pressure probably involves a marked degree of neuroplasticity. I discuss the limits of neuroplasticity along with the evolution of the corpus callosum
Müller, Ralph-Axel (2000). A big “housing” problem and a trace of neuroimaging: Broca's area is more than a transformation center. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):42-42.   (Google)
Abstract: Grodzinsky presents interesting data on Broca's aphasia, but because of obsolete ideas about neurofunctional organization and an inadequate review of the neuroimaging literature, he fails to put these data into perspective. Rather than supporting a specific linguistic function of Broca's area, the findings should be viewed in terms of working memory functions of the inferior frontal cortex
Müller, Franz-Josef; Loring, Jeanne F. & Baier, Paul Christian (2009). Reflections on stem cells usage in restoring neurodegenerative damage. In Eva Zerovnik, Olga Markič & A. Ule (eds.), Philosophical Insights About Modern Science. Nova Science Publishers, Inc..   (Google)
Molinari, Gaeton (2007). Hardwired behavior: What neuroscience reveals about morality. Review of Metaphysics 60 (3):691-693.   (Google)
Monte, Suzanne M.; Hutchins, Grover M. & Moore, G. William (1984). Compensatory neoplasia: Chronic erythrocytosis and neuroblastic tumors. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 5 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: There are a large number of exogenous biological and chemical substances with known neoplastic or carcinogenic potential. However, it has also been postulated that external stimuli can influence the body's internal milieu, and thereby induce compensatory excessive growth of cells in the form of hyperplasia or neoplasia. In a recent study, we observed a strong association between chronic hypoxic states and the occurrence of peripheral neuroblastic tumors, a relatively uncommon group of neural neoplasms. In this report we review those findings and formulate an hypothesis to explain why conditions which lead to chronic erythrocytosis may also cause compensatory neoplasia of neural tissues
Moore, David R. & King, Andrew J. (1998). What can auditory neuroethology tell us about speech processing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):276-277.   (Google)
Abstract: A systematic relationship between the acoustic structure and phonemic content of speech raises the possibility that processing strategies similar to those described in animals with highly specialized hearing may also operate in the human brain. This idea could be tested by analyzing animal communication calls into locus equations and using those as stimulus tools in neurophysiological studies of auditory neurons
Morin, Alain (2004). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness. Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Morrison, Glenn (2008). Human experience: Philosophy, neurosis and the elements of everyday life. By John Russon. Heythrop Journal 49 (3):535–536.   (Google | More links)
Mortensen, Chris (1989). Mental images: Should cognitive science learn from neurophysiology? In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Morrison, Robert G. & Cho, Soohyun (2008). Neurocognitive process constraints on analogy: What changes to allow children to reason like adults? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):391-392.   (Google)
Morris, David (2006). The open figure of experience and mind: Review essay of John russon's human experience: Philosophy, neurosis, and the elements of everyday life. Dialogue 45:315-326.   (Google)
Abstract: This review of John Russon's Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life focuses on Russon's position that experience is open (having a developmental, situated and dynamic, rather than fixed, structure) and figured (having a structure inseparable from forms of bodily function), and that mind is something learned in the process of working out experience as figured and open. These themes are drawn together in relation to recent scientific discussions (e.g., of bodily dynamics, mirror neurons, robotic systems and thermodynamics), to show how Russon's view challenges deep philosophical assumptions in prevailing accounts of mind, body and experience
Moss, Melvin L. (1972). An introduction to the neurobiology of oro-facial growth. Acta Biotheoretica 21 (3-4).   (Google)
Mouchet, Patrick & Yelnik, Jerôme (2004). A biophysical model of neuronal dendrites' integrative properties: Relations to morphological data. Acta Biotheoretica 52 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: We used a biophysical model to probe the basic integrative properties of primate pallidal neurons in order to obtain a better understanding of Basal Ganglia physiology. The first results we present here deal mainly with the way dendritic morphology influences these properties. Neuronal morphology has been quantitatatively analyzed in 3D. Single fast excitatory synaptic inputs resulting in AMPA receptors activations have been simulated, without regenerative voltage dependent conductances. Dendrites of both pallidal segments (GPi and GPe) showed a strong dependence of the synaptic efficacy upon distance from soma, but even the most distal dendritic synaptic sites were able to substantially depolarize the cell body. The mean synaptic efficacy was the same in both populations, but the attenuation of propagated post-synaptic potentials was higher in GPi neurons. All these features were very dependent on the dendritic diameters which appear to constitute a key parameter in these neuronal populations both with respect to the integration of afferent information and to the differences between cells in performing this task
Mouras, Harold (2007). Central role of somatosensory processes in sexual arousal as identified by neuroimaging techniques. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):217-217.   (Google)
Moulyn, Adrian C. (1952). Reflections on the problem of time in relation to neurophysiology and psychology. Philosophy of Science 19 (1):33-49.   (Google | More links)
Moutoussis, K.; Maier, Alexander; Zeki, Semir & Logothetis, Nikos K. (2005). Seeing invisible motion: Responses of area v5 neurons in the awake-behaving macaque. Soc. For Neurosci. Abstr 390 (11).   (Google)
Abstract: Moutoussis, K., A. Maier, S. Zeki and N. K. Logothetis: Seeing invisible motion: responses of area V5 neurons in the awake-behaving macaque. Soc. for Neurosci. Abstr. 390.11, 1 (11 2005) Abstract
Mouras, Harold (2006). The investigation of neural correlates of monetary reward by using functional neuroimaging techniques. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):191-191.   (Google)
Abstract: Money is a specifically human incentive. However, functional imaging techniques bring striking evidence that neural circuits pertaining to more “natural” addictive and rewarding processes are involved in response to monetary reward. Main results are evoked here, with specific brain responses demonstrated along the different stages of the process. (Published Online April 5 2006)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1975). Neurophysiological reduction, psychological explanation and neuropsychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5 (3).   (Google)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1974). The identity thesis and neuropsychology. Noûs 8 (November):327-42.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Mundale, Jennifer & Bechtel, William P. (1996). Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function. Minds and Machines 6 (4):481-505.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory
Mundy, Peter (2005). Motivation, self-regulation, and the neurodevelopment of intention sharing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):709-710.   (Google)
Abstract: Research on the affective and neurodevelopmental correlates of infant joint attention skills support several of the hypotheses raised by Tomasello et al. regarding the development of the capacity to share intention with others. In addition, research and theory suggests that self-awareness and self-regulatory processes may play a role in the development of this vital human ability domain
Munsat, Stanley (1999). Neurobiology: Linguistics' millennium bug? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):845-846.   (Google)
Abstract: Gold & Stoljar pose a dilemma for linguistics should neurobiology win out as the science of mind. The dilemma can be avoided by reestablishing linguistics as an autonomous discipline, rather than a branch of the science of mind. Independent considerations for doing this are presented
Musacchio, J. M. (2002). Dissolving the explanatory gap: Neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge. Brain and Mind 3 (3):331-365.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous system is unable to provide theknowledge of a ``color experience'' (Jackson,1982). The implication is that physicalism isincomplete or false because it leaves somethingunexplained. The problem with Jackson'sargument is that physical information has theform of highly symbolic propositional knowledgewhereas phenomenal knowledge consists in innateneurophysiological processes. In addition totheir fundamental epistemological differences,clinical, anatomical, pathological and brainimaging studies demonstrate that phenomenal andpropositional knowledge are fundamentallydifferent neurobiological processes. Propositional knowledge is phylogeneticallynew, highly symbolic, culturally acquired,exclusively human and expressible in differentnatural and artificial languages. By contrast,phenomenal knowledge (i.e.: knowingwhat-it-is-like to see a color) consists inqualitative experiences and phenomenal conceptsthat provide an internal, language-independentreference to the properties of objects and theneeds of the organism. Language andpropositional knowledge are exclusively humanattributes implemented in specific regions ofthe dominant hemisphere. This contrastssharply with the phylogenicallysensory areas that are common to animals andhumans, which implement qualitativeexperiences. Experiences are hard-wiredneurobiological processes that can neither betransmitted nor re-created through thesymbolism of propositions. Thus, I concludethat the fallacy in the explanatory gap and inthe knowledge argument is a fallacy ofequivocation that results from ignoringfundamental neurobiological differences betweenphenomenal and propositional knowledge
Mü, Ralph-Axel & Ller, (1999). Homology, neurogenetic imprecision, and lesional complexity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):573-574.   (Google)
Abstract: The two commentaries appear supportive of the target article. Ujhelyi's commentary can be complemented with recent evidence supporting continuity of language and cognitive evolution in hominids. Gow & Rodkin's caveats regarding “pathonormal inference” and the single-case methodology are discussed from a developmental neurobiological perspective. Early structural brain lesion and developmental disorders can serve as pathological models of normal neurofunctional variability resulting from neurodevelopmental imprecision. A final point concerns the advantages of integrating multiple structural and functional imaging modalities in neuropsychological studies
Mü, Horst M. & Ller, (1999). The lexicon from a neurophysiological view. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):50-51.   (Google)
Abstract: (1) Reaction time (RT) studies give only a partial picture of language processing, hence it may be risky to use the output of the computational model to inspire neurophysiological investigations instead of seeking further neurophysiological data to adjust the RT based theory. (2) There is neurophysiological evidence for differences in the cortical representation of different word categories; this could be integrated into a future version of the Levelt model. (3) EEG/MEG coherence analysis allows the monitoring of synchronous electrical activity in large groups of neurons in the cortex; this is especially interesting for activation based network models
Nachson, Israel (1999). Self-deception in neurological syndromes. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (2):117-132.   (Google)
Nassehi, Armin (2007). Governing the will in a neurochemical age. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-?-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan.   (Google)
Nesbitt, Maurice (1966). Where No Fear Was: A Study in Neurotic Psychology Related to the Christian Experience. London, Epworth P..   (Google)
Netter, Petra; Reuter, Martin & Hennig, Juergen (2005). Specificity of affiliation supported by neurotransmitter challenge tests and molecular genetics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):359-360.   (Google)
Abstract: Support for a neurobiological distinction between affiliation (Attachment) and agency (Achievement) was achieved by comparing responses to a dopaminergic (DA) and a serotonergic (5-HT) challenge test. DA responses were similar, but a 5-HT modulation of DA emerged for Achievement and not for Attachment. Molecular genetics performed on Panksepp's dimension “Care” revealed an association with a polymorphism of the DA catabolizing enzyme COMT that was not associated with separation distress
Newberg, Andrew B. & D'Aquili, Eugene G. (2000). The neuropsychology of religious and spiritual experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):251-266.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Nichols, Christopher (1983). Neurobiology and social theory: Some common and persistent problems. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 13 (2).   (Google)
Nijhawan, Romi (2008). Visual prediction: Psychophysics and neurophysiology of compensation for time delays. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):179-198.   (Google)
Nofzinger, Eric A. (2000). Insights from functional neuroimaging studies of behavioral state regulation in healthy and depressed subjects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):979-980.   (Google)
Abstract: New data are presented showing excellent replicability and test-retest reliability of REM sleep findings from functional brain imaging studies in healthy subjects on which newer brain-based models of human dreaming have been constructed. Preliminary region-of-interest findings related to bottom-up versus dissociable brain systems mediating REM sleep and dreaming are also presented. [Hobson et al.; Solms]>
Northoff, Georg (2008). Are our emotional feelings relational? A neurophilosophical investigation of the james–lange theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings; this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person–environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. Since the person–environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the “relational” or the “embodied” concept of emotional feeling. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. Such intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural coding may have implications for the characterization of emotional feeling with regard to phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. I therefore conclude that the here advanced relational concept of emotional feeling may be considered neurophilosophically more plausible and better compatible with current neuroscientific data than the embodied concept as presupposed in the James–Lange theory and its modern neuroscientific and philosophical versions
Northoff, Georg (2000). Are "q-memories" empirically realistic? A neurophilosophical approach. Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):191-211.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: "Quasi-memories," necessarily presupposing a distinction between an "experiencing" and a "remembering" person, are considered by Parfit and Shoemaker as necessary and/or sufficient criteria for personal identity. However, the concept of "q-memories" is rejected by Schechtman since, according to her, neither "content" and "experience" can be separated from each other in "q-memories" ("principal inseparability") nor can they be distinguished from delusions/confabulations ("principal indistinguishability"). The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that, relying on a neurophilosophical approach, both arguments can be rejected. Neuropsychological research shows that "contents" of memories are classified according to the accompanying psychological state such that the same "content" can be classified either as auto- or heterobiographical by the respective "experience." Since "content" and "experience" can be separated from each other, the argument of "principal inseparability" must be rejected on empirical grounds. In addition, as demonstrated in an example of a schizophrenic patient, "q-memories" can be distinguished from delusions/confabulations considering the ability to distinguish between different sources of autobiographical memories as a differential criterion. In conclusion, both arguments by Schechtman against the concept of "q-memories" have to be rejected on the basis of neurophilosophical considerations. Consequently, the concept of "q-memories" can be considered as compatible with current empirical knowledge
Northoff, Georg (2008). Is appraisal 'embodied' and 'embedded'? A neurophilosophical investigation of emotions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):68-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotion theories in present philosophical discussion propose different models of relationship between feeling and appraisal. The multicomponent model considers appraisal as separate component and distinguishes it from feeling and physiological body changes thus presupposing what may be called 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational. The recently emerged concept of enactment, in contrast, argues that appraisal is closely linked to feeling and physiological body changes presupposing what can be called 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal as relational. The aim of the paper is to investigate which concept of appraisal, the 'disembedded' or the 'embedded' one, is better compatible with current neuroimaging data on emotion processing and thus neurophilosophically more tenable. The 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' concept implies distinct and independent brain regions underlying feeling and appraisal whereas 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal implies overlapping and dependent brain regions. Recent neuroimaging studies demonstrate that medial and lateral prefrontal cortical regions are involved in both feeling and appraisal and that there seems to be reciprocal modulation between these regions. Though preliminary, these data suggest that feeling and appraisal are associated with different patterns of neural activity across overlapping and interdependent brain regions. I therefore conclude that current neuroscientific evidence is rather in favor of the 'embodied' and 'embedded' concept of appraisal as relational than the one of 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational that is presupposed in current multicomponent theories of emotions
Northoff, Georg (2002). What catatonia can tell us about “top-down modulation”: A neuropsychiatric hypothesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):555-577.   (Google)
Abstract: Differential diagnosis of motor symptoms, for example, akinesia, may be difficult in clinical neuropsychiatry. Symptoms may be either of neurologic origin, for example, Parkinson's disease, or of psychiatric origin, for example, catatonia, leading to a so-called “conflict of paradigms.” Despite their different origins, symptoms may appear more or less clinically similar. Possibility of dissociation between origin and clinical appearance may reflect functional brain organisation in general, and cortical-cortical/subcortical relations in particular. It is therefore hypothesized that similarities and differences between Parkinson's disease and catatonia may be accounted for by distinct kinds of modulation between cortico-cortical and cortico-subcortical relations. Catatonia can be characterized by concurrent motor, emotional, and behavioural symptoms. The different symptoms may be accounted for by dysfunction in orbitofrontal-prefrontal/parietal cortical connectivity reflecting “horizontal modulation” of cortico-cortical relation. Furthermore, alteration in “top-down modulation” reflecting “vertical modulation” of caudate and other basal ganglia by GABA-ergic mediated orbitofrontal cortical deficits may account for motor symptoms in catatonia. Parkinson's disease, in contrast, can be characterized by predominant motor symptoms. Motor symptoms may be accounted for by altered “bottom-up modulation” between dopaminergic mediated deficits in striatum and premotor/motor cortex. Clinical similarities between Parkinson's disease and catatonia with respect to akinesia may be related with involvement of the basal ganglia in both disorders. Clinical differences with respect to emotional and behavioural symptoms may be related with involvement of different cortical areas, that is, orbitofrontal/parietal and premotor/motor cortex implying distinct kinds of modulation – “vertical” and “horizontal” modulation, respectively. Key Words: Bottom-up modulation; catatonia; horizontal modulation; Parkinson's disease; top-down modulation; vertical modulation
Nunez, Paul L. (1997). Synchronization, binding, multiscale dynamic processing, and neuron sociology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):694-695.   (Google)
Abstract: Well-posed questions about information processing may require physiologically based, quantitative models of large scale neocortical dynamic function. “Synchronization” of this dynamics can be viewed in different contexts of the binding problem
Oberman, Lindsay M. & Pascual-Leone, Alvaro (2008). Cortical plasticity: A proposed mechanism by which genomic factors lead to the behavioral and neurological phenotype of autism spectrum and psychotic-spectrum disorders. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):276-277.   (Google)
Occhionero, M. & Esposito, M. J. (2000). Toward a new neuropsychological isomorphism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):980-981.   (Google)
Abstract: The deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is likely to be essential for generating some characteristics of the dream. The heterogeneous nature of NREM sleep makes it difficult to assume that there are different NREM dream triggers. Different cortical and subcortical neurophysiological conditions modulate mentation both in waking and in sleeping without any specific direct triggering factor. [Solms]
Ohman, A.; Flykt, Anders & Lundqvist, Daniel (2000). Unconscious emotion: Evolutionary perspectives, psychophysiological data and neuropsychological mechanisms. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel & G. L. Ahern (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Okuda, Jiro (2007). Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):328-329.   (Google)
O'Meara, J. Tim (1999). Begging the question of causation in a critique of the neuron doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):846-846.   (Google)
Abstract: Gold & Stoljar's argument rejecting the “explanatory sufficiency” of the radical neuron doctrine depends on distinguishing it from the trivial neuron doctrine. This distinction depends on the thesis of “supervenience,” which depends on Hume's regularity theory of causation. In contrast, the radical neuron doctrine depends on a physical theory of causation, which denies the supervenience thesis. Insofar as the target article argues by drawing implications from the premise of Humean causation, whereas the radical doctrine depends on the competing premise of physical causation, the resulting critique of the neuron doctrine amounts largely to begging the question of causation
Oomen, Palmyre M. F. (2003). On brain, soul, self, and freedom: An essay in bridging neuroscience and faith. Zygon 38 (2):377-392.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Orden, Guy C. & Paap, Kenneth R. (unknown). Functional neuroimages fail to discover pieces of mind in the parts of the brain. .   (Google)
Ortmann, Andreas (2008). Prospecting neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):431-448.   (Google)
Ott, Ulrich (2007). States of absorption: In search of neurobiological foundations. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pachalska, Maria & MacQueen, Bruce Duncan (2010). The microgenetic revolution in contemporary neuropsychology and neurolinguistics. In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Padoa-Schioppa, Camillo (2008). The syllogism of neuro-economics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):449-457.   (Google)
Pagel, James F. (2005). Neurosignals – incorporating CNS electrophysiology into cognitive process. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):75-76.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary reviews electrophysiological research suggesting that oscillatory electrical potentials recorded by the EEG could have function at cellular and DNA levels. Evidence supporting the potential functional significance of sleep-state-specific frequencies includes psychoactive neurochemical alteration of CNS electrophysiology, and sleep-state-specific alteration of dreaming. As Walker proposes, physiologic electrical fields are likely to have a functional role in the consolidation of memory
Palencik, Joseph T. (2007). Amusement and the philosophy of emotion: A neuroanatomical approach. Dialogue 46 (3):419-434.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers who discuss the emotions have usually treated amusement as a non-emotional mental state. Two prominent philosophers making this claim are Henri Bergson and John Morreall, who maintain that amusement is too abstract and intellectual to qualify as an emotion. Here, the merit of this claim is assessed. Through recent work in neuroanatomy there is reason to doubt the legitimacy of dichotomies that separate emotion and the intellect. Findings suggest that the neuroanatomical structure of amusement is similar to other commonly recognized emotion states. On the basis of these it is argued that amusement should be considered an emotion. Les philosophes qui adressent la question des émotions traitent généralement l’état d’amusement comme un êtat mental excluant l’émotion. Parmi les philosophes importants à défendre cette thèse, Henri Bergson et John Morreall soutiennent que l’amusement est trop abstrait et intellectuel pour être tenu pour une émotion. Nous réévaluons cette thèse. De récents travaux en neuroanatomie fournissent des raisons de douter de la légitimité de la dichotomie entre émotion et intellect. Certaines autres découvertes suggèrent que la structure neuroanatomique de l’amusement est très similaire à d’autres états émotifs. Sur la base de ces travaux, nous argumentons que l’amusement doit être considéré comme une émotion
Panksepp, Jaak (2007). Affective neuroscience and the ancestral sources of human feelings. In Henri Cohen & Brigitte Stemmer (eds.), Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain. Elxevier Academic Press.   (Google)
Panksepp, Jaak (2007). Emotional feelings originate below the neocortex: Toward a neurobiology of the soul. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):101-103.   (Google)
Abstract: Disregard of primary-process consciousness is endemic in mind science. Most neuroscientists subscribe to ruthless reductionism whereby mental qualities are discarded in preference for neuronal functions. Such ideas often lead to envisioning other animals, and all too often other humans, as unfeeling zombies. Merker correctly highlights how the roots of consciousness exist in ancient neural territories we share, remarkably homologously, with all the other vertebrates. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). On the neuro-evolutionary nature of social pain, support, and empathy. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Google)
Panksepp, Jaak (2006). The affective neuroeconomics of social brains: One man's cruelty is another's suffering. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (3):234-235.   (Google)
Abstract: Cruelty does not emerge from a single emotional system of the brain. Its many cognitive aspects are intermeshed inextricably with the nature of negative affects ranging from fear to suffering. The rewards of cruelty may be counteracted by a variety of neurochemical factors as well as novel social policies
Pardo, Michael S. (ms). Neuroscience evidence, legal culture, and criminal procedure.   (Google)
Abstract:      Proposed lie-detection technology based on neuroscience poses significant challenges for the law. The law must respond to the science with an adequate understanding of such evidence, its significance, and its limitations. This paper makes three contributions toward those ends. First, it provides an account of the preliminary neuroscience research underlying this proposed evidence. Second, it discusses the nature and significance of such evidence, how such evidence would fit with legal practices and concepts, and its potential admissibility. Finally, it analyzes the constitutional protections that may limit the compelled production of such evidence
Parker, A. (1998). Primate cognitive neuroscience: What are the useful questions? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):128-128.   (Google)
Abstract: Study of “theory of mind” in nonhuman primates is hampered both by the lack of rigorous methodology that Heyes stresses and by our lack of knowledge of the cognitive neuroscience of nonhuman primate conceptual structure. Recent advances in this field indicate that progress can be made by first asking simpler research questions
Parsell, Mitch (2009). Steven M. Platek, Julian Paul Keenan and Todd K. Shackelford (eds), evolutionary cognitive neuroscience. Minds and Machines 19 (2).   (Google)
Pascual-Leone, Juan (2005). Not a bridge but an organismic (general and causal) neuropsychology should make a difference in emotion theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):213-214.   (Google)
Abstract: Does Lewis imply that brain processes might be used to replace an as-yet-unavailable substantive organismic neuropsychology? To counteract this reductionist idea I argue for distinguishing between affects and emotions, and discuss a real-life example of implicit emotional appraisal. Failure to use organismic units of processing such as schemes or schemas makes the bridging attempt fall under a reductionist “mereological fallacy.”
Patel, Aniruddh D. (2008). A neurobiological strategy for exploring links between emotion recognition in music and speech. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):589-590.   (Google)
Patterson, Dennis (ms). Book review, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker, philosophical foundations of neuroscience.   (Google)
Abstract:      Review of Bennett, M.R. and Hacker, P.M.S., *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience,* 2003, Blackwell Publishing, 480pp, $39.95 (pbk), ISBN 140510838X
Patterson, Dennis (2003). Review of M.r. Bennett, P.m.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (9).   (Google)
Pepperberg, Irene M. (2005). An avian parallel to primate mirror neurons and language evolution? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):141-141.   (Google)
Abstract: Arbib presents a reasoned explanation for language evolution from nonhuman to human primates, one that I argue can be equally applied to animals trained in forms of interspecies communication. I apply his criteria for language readiness and language (in actuality, protolanguage) to the behavior of a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) taught to communicate with humans using rudiments of English speech
Peper, M. (2000). Awareness of emotions: A neuropsychological perspective. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins Publishing Company.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Perovic, Slobodan (2007). Nicholas Maxwell • is science neurotic? • London: Imperial college press, 2004 • hardback price $48/£29 • isbn 1860945007. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2).   (Google)
Perry, E. K. & Piggott, M. A. (2000). Neurotransmitter mechanisms of dreaming: Implication of modulatory systems based on dream intensity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):990-992.   (Google)
Abstract: Based on increasing dream intensity and alterations in neurophysiological activity from waking, through NREM to REM sleep, dreaming appears to correlate with sustained midbrain dopaminergic and basal forebrain cholinergic, in conjunction with decreasing brainstem 5-HT and noradrenergic neuronal activities. This, model, with features in common with the modulatory transmitter models of Hobson et al. and Solms, is consistent with some clinical observations on drug induced alterations in dreaming and transmitter correlates of delusions. [Hobson et al.; Solms]
Perring, Christian (1999). The neuron doctrine in psychiatry. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):846-847.   (Google)
Abstract: Gold & Stoljar's target article is important because it shows the limitations of neurobiological theories of the mind more powerfully than previous philosophical criticisms, especially those that focus on the subjective nature of experience and those that use considerations from philosophy of language to argue for the holism of the mental. They use less controversial assumptions and clearer arguments, the conclusions of which are applicable to the whole of neuroscience. Their conclusions can be applied to psychiatry to argue that, contrary to many researchers' assumptions, the approaches to both understanding and treating mental disorders must be interdisciplinary
Petit, Jean-Luc (1999). Constitution by movement: Husserl in light of recent neurobiological findings. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Petitot, Jean (2003). Neurogeometry of v1 and Kanizsa contours. Axiomathes 13 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract:   We present a neuro-geometrical model for generating the shape of Kanizsa's modal subjective contours which is based on the functional architecture of the primary areas of the visual cortex. We focus on V1 and its pinwheel structure and model it as a discrete approximation of a continuous fibration π: R × P → P with base space the space of the retina R and fiber the projective line P of the orientations of the plane. The horizontal cortico-cortical connections of V1 implement what the geometers call the contact structure of the fibration π, and defines therefore an integrability condition which can be shown to correspond to Field's, Hayes', and Hess' psychophysical concept of association field. We present then a variational model of curved modal illusory contours (in the spirit of previous models due to Ullman, Horn, and Mumford) based on the idea that virtual contours are “geodetic” integral curves of the contact structure
Petit, Jean-Luc (2003). On the relation between recent neurobiological data on perception (and action) and the Husserlian theory of constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   The phenomenological theory of constitution promises a solution for the problem of consciousness insofar as it changes the traditional terms of this problem by systematically correlating subject and object in the unifying context of intentional acts. I argue that embodied constitution must depend upon the role of kinesthesia as a constitutive operator. In pursuing the path of intentionality in its descent from an idealistic level of pure constitution to this fully embodied kinesthetic constitution, we are able to gain access to different ontological regions such as physical thing, owned body and shared world. Neuroscience brings to light the somatological correlates of noemata. Bridging the gap between incarnation and naturalisation represents the best way of realizing the foundational program of transcendental phenomenology
Phelps, Elizabeth A. (2007). The neuroscience of a person network. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):49 – 50.   (Google)
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2007). Computational explanation and mechanistic explanation of mind. In Francesco Ferretti, Massimo Marraffa & Mario De Caro (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface between Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Springer.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), mental capacities are explained by inner computations, which in biological organisms are realized in the brain. Computational explanation is so popular and entrenched that it’s common for scientists and philosophers to assume CTM without argument.
Poirier, Pierre, Du stimulus à la science, neurocomputationnellement.   (Google)
Abstract: À Harvard durant l’année académique 1940-41, les philosophes-mathématiciens Quine, Tarski et Carnap débattaient de la possibilité d’établir une distinction entre les énoncés analytiques et synthétiques qui soit suffisamment mordante pour dégager un statut spécial à l’épistémologie. Quine et Tarski s’objectaient à la distinction et l’objection de Quine verra notamment le jour sous le titre fameux « Les deux dogmes de l’empirisme ». Carnap, dans son autobiographie intellectuelle, se souvient avoir alors craint : « are we now back to John Stuart Mill? ». Carnap avait compris qu’une épistémologie antipsychologiste comme celle du Cercle de Vienne ne peut subsister sans la présence d’une distinction de principe entre des énoncés analytiques et synthétiques. Il avait compris qu’un rejet de la distinction signifiait, à court ou moyen terme, un retour à l’épistémologie comme « psychologie de la science » telle que la pratiquait Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill et Ernst Mach
Poirier, Pierre & Ratte, Martin (2007). Et pourquoi PAS une explication non représentationnelle de l'action motrice?: Considérations neurophénoménologiques. Dialogue 46 (2):353-360.   (Google)
Prabhakaran, Vivek & Rypma, Bart (2007). P-FIT and the neuroscience of intelligence: How well does P fit? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):166-167.   (Google)
Preston, John (2008). Cognition and the brain: The philosophy and neuroscience movement - edited by Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins. Philosophical Books 49 (1):68-71.   (Google)
Pribram, Karl (2008). It's high time: Cognitive neuroscience lives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):343-344.   (Google)
Prinz, Wolfgang (2003). Neurons don't represent. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):572-573.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Protevi, John, Evolution, neuroscience, and prosocial behavior in disasters.   (Google)
Abstract: Sociologists have known for some time of the widespread incidence of prosocial behavior in the aftermath of disasters (research summarized in Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006). They have also criticized the role of media in spreading “disaster myths” which include the idea of widespread anti-social behavior (Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006). In this essay I will investigate the evolutionary theory and neuroscience needed to account for such prosocial behavior, as well as to discuss the political entailments and consequence of media framing emphasizing if not inventing widespread antisocial behavior
Prochukhanov, R. A. & Ravkin, I. A. (1979). Morpho-functional principle of neuroendocrine system analysis. Acta Biotheoretica 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: A new approach to the analysis of the neuroendocrine system (NES) is suggested. It is based on the fact of structural and metabolic determination of any effect on cell and cell aggregates. The principle of a common communication channel in the NES is formulated and a possible method of its formalization is proposed
Protopapas, Athanassios & Tallal, Paula (1998). On the ontogeny of combination-sensitive neurons in speech perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):280-281.   (Google)
Abstract: The arguments for the orderly output constraint concern phylogenetic matters and do not address the ontogeny of combination-specific neurons and the corresponding processing mechanisms. Locus equations are too variable to be strongly predetermined and too inconsistent to be easily learned. Findings on the development of speech perception and underlying auditory processing must be taken into account in the formulation of neural encoding theories
Provine, Robert R. (2006). Velocity and direction in neurobehavioral evolution: The centripetal prospective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):21-22.   (Google)
Abstract: Selection for or against muscle initiates a cascade of centripetal (outside-in), trophically mediated, neurological events through which the environment programs heritable neuromuscular and neuroneuronal connections in a rapid and specific fashion. The velocity, direction, and efficiency of this process are a consequence of the environment acting directly on muscle, the organ of action, and behavioral interface between organism and environment
Pulvermü, Friedemann & Ller, (1999). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):307-327.   (Google)
Abstract: In this response to multidisciplinary commentaries on the target article, “Words in the brain's language,” additional features of the cell-assembly model are reviewed, as demanded by some of the commentators. Subsequently, methodological considerations on how to perform additional tests of neurobiological language models as well as a discussion of recent data from neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and other behavioral studies in speakers of spoken and sign languages follow. Special emphasis is put on the explanatory power of the cell-assembly model regarding neuropsychological double dissociations. Future perspectives on neural network simulations, neuronal mechanisms of syntax and semantics, and the interaction of attention mechanisms and cell assemblies are pointed out in the final paragraphs
Purushothaman, Gopathy; Bedell, Harold E.; Öğmen, Haluk & Patel, Saumil S. (2008). Neurophysiology of compensation for time delays: Visual prediction is off track. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):214-214.   (Google)
Quartz, Steven R. (2008). From cognitive science to cognitive neuroscience to neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):459-471.   (Google)
Quartz, Steven; Sullivan, Jackie; Machamer, Peter & Scarantino, Andrea, Session 5: Development, neuroscience and evolutionary psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Workshop in History and Philosophy of Biology, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, March 23-24 2001 Session 5: Development, Neuroscience and Evolutionary Psychology
Rabins, Peter V. & Blass, David M. (2009). Toward a neurobiology of personal identity. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Radford, Colin (2000). Neuroscience and anna; a reply to Glenn Hartz. Philosophy 75 (3):437-440.   (Google)
Abstract: Glen Hartz argues, that neuroscience reveals that persons moved or frightened by fictional characters believe that they are real, so such behaviour is not irrational. But these beliefs, if they exist, are not rational and, in any case inconsistent with our conscious rational beliefs that fictional characters are not real. So his argument fails to establish that we are not irrational or incoherent when moved or frightened by such characters. It powerfully reinforces the contrary view
Radeau, Monique & Colin, Cécile (2004). On ventriloquism, audiovisual neurons, neonates, and the senses. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):889-890.   (Google)
Abstract: The analogy between the rules that subtend ventriloquism and bimodal neurons responding suggests a possible neural mechanism for audiovisual interactions in spatial scene analysis. Perinatal data, such as those on synesthesia, sensory deprivation, and sensory surstimulation, as well as neuroanatomical evidence for transitory intersensory connections in the brain support the view that audition and vision are bound together at birth
Raffone, Antonino; Wolters, Gezinus & Murre, Jacob M. (2001). A neurophysioiogical account of working memory limits: Between-item segregation and within-chunk integration. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):139-141.   (Google)
Abstract: We suggest a neurophysiological account of the short-term memory capacity limit based on a model of visual working memory (Raffone & Wolters, in press). Simulations have revealed a critical capacity limit of about four independent patterns. The model mechanisms may be applicable to working memory in general and they allow a reinterpretation of some of the issues discussed by Cowan
Rafalovich, Adam (2001). Psychodynamic and neurological perspectives on ADHD: Exploring strategies for defining a phenomenon. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (4):397–418.   (Google | More links)
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S., Apotemnophilia: A neurological disorder.   (Google)
Abstract: Apotemnophilia, a disorder that blurs the distinction between neurology and psychiatry, is characterized by the intense and longstanding desire for amputation of a speci¢c limb. Here we present evidence from two individuals suggestive that this condition, long thought to be entirely psychological in origin, actually has a neurological basis. We found heightened skin conductance response..
Ramachandran, V. S., Apraxia, metaphor and mirror neurons.   (Google)
Abstract: Summary Ideomotor apraxia is a cognitive disorder in which the patient loses the ability to accurately perform learned, skilled actions. This is despite normal limb power and coordination. It has long been known that left supramarginal gyrus lesions cause bilateral upper limb apraxia and it was proposed that this area stored a visualkinaesthetic image of the skilled action, which was translated elsewhere in the brain into the pre-requisite movement formula. We hypothesise that, rather than these two functions occurring separately, both are complementary functions of chains of ‘‘mirror neurons’’ within the left inferior parietal lobe. We go on to propose that this neural mechanism in the supramarginal gyrus and its projection zones, which originally evolved to allow the creation of a direct map between vision and movement, was subsequently exapted to allow other sorts of cross-domain mapping and in particular those sorts of abstract re-conceptualisation, such as metaphor, that make mankind unique
Ramachandran, V. S., Neurocase.   (Google)
Abstract: First Published on: 21 June 2007 To cite this Article: Ramachandran, Vilayanur S., McGeoch, Paul D., Williams, Lisa and Arcilla, Gerard (2007) 'Rapid Relief of Thalamic Pain Syndrome Induced by Vestibular Caloric Stimulation', Neurocase, 13:3, 185 - 188 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13554790701450446 URL:
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2002). Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that the sciences constitute a derivative means of disclosing the world and our place within it, as opposed to an ontologically and epistemologically privileged domain of inquiry
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2008). John Hick the new frontier of religion and science: Religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Pp. XII+228. £53.00 (hbk), £17.99 (pbk). ISBN 0230507700 (hbk); 0230507719 (pbk). Religious Studies 44 (3):353-357.   (Google)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2003). Scientific naturalism and the neurology of religious experience. Religious Studies 39 (3):323-345.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran's in-principle agnosticism concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during religious experiences. Contra Ramachandran, I argue that it is by no means obvious that agnosticism is the proper scientific attitude to adopt in relation to this claim. I go on to show how the questions of whether it is (1) a scientifically testable claim and (2) a plausible hypothesis, serve to open up some important philosophical issues concerning interpretive backgrounds that are presupposed in the assessment of scientific hypotheses. More specifically, I argue that naturalism or scientific objectivism in its various forms is not simply a neutral or default methodological backdrop for empirical inquiry but involves acceptance of a specific ontology, which functions as an implicit and unargued constitutive commitment. Hence, these neurological studies can be employed as a lever with which to disclose something of the ways in which different frameworks of interpretation, both theistic and atheistic, serve differently to structure and give meaning to empirical findings
Ravenscroft, Ian (1998). Neuroscience and the mind. Mind and Language 13 (1):132-137.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ravven, H. M. (2003). Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):257-290.   (Google)
Abstract: Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation
Rebekka A., Klein, The (neuro-)biology of altruistic punishment a philosophical investigation of a concept of human social behavior.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract This paper deals with the experimental model of altruistic punishment and social norm enforcement which has been created in the research field of neuroeconomics recently. By use of this model, neurobiologists and economists investigate the close relationship between neurobiological mechanisms in the brain and specific patterns of human social behavior. They have experimentally shown that the implementation of a punishment tool in social interaction experiments gives empirical evidence for the great impact of non-selfish behavior on social group interaction and individual strategies of cooperation, competition and collective action. The interpretation of this evidence and their impact on social theory is critically questioned in this paper from a philosophical point of view
Rees, Geraint (2001). Neuroimaging of visual awareness in patients and normal subjects. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11 (2):150-156.   (Cited by 96 | Google | More links)
Revonsuo, Antti (1999). Neuroscience and the explanation of psychological phenomena. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):847-849.   (Google)
Abstract: Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena
Ribeiro, Anna Christina (online). Do mirror neurons support a simulation theory of mind-reading?   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Both macaque monkeys and humans have been shown to have what are called ‘mirror neurons’, a class of neurons that respond to goal-related motor-actions, both when these actions are performed by the subject and when they are performed by another individual observed by the subject. Gallese and Goldman (1998) contend that mirror neurons may be seen as ‘a part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind- reading ability’, and that of the two competing theories of mind-reading, mirror neurons lend support to simulation theory. I here offer four reasons why I think mirror neurons do not provide support for simulation theory over its contender, theory theory
Richardson, Pamela (2004). Agricultural ethics, neurotic natures and emotional encounters: An application of actor-network theory. Ethics, Place and Environment 7 (3):195 – 201.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fieldwork experiences in the summer of 2003 resulted in confusion regarding the ethical positioning of myself (the interviewer) in relation to the multiple 'actants' that constituted the research subject(s). This paper explores some of these personal issues and conflicts in order to clarify, gain perspective on and critique the nature (and indeed the 'Nature') of my fieldwork. The multiple positioning of participants within networks of agricultural and social ethics is addressed. I borrow Lewis Holloway's idea of relational ethical identity, in order to resituate and rethink the interviews in terms of actor-network theory. This paper argues that ethical identities and ethical 'natures' can be understood as relationally constructed and constituted within networks. The ways in which notions of (un)ethical agricultural relations shaped each interview experience are also explored. Specifically, how did my ideas of (un)ethical farming influence my 'ethical take' on how different farmers operated? I also argue that all encounters are ethically charged and, as such, encounters result in emotional tensions
Rietveld, Erik (2008). The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics. Theory & Psychology 18 (3):341-361.   (Google)
Abstract: For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual’s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.
Riva, Prof G. (2006). Being-in-the-world-with: Presence meets social and cognitive neuroscience. In Riva, Prof. G. (2006) Being-in-the-World-With: Presence Meets Social and Cognitive Neuroscience. [Book Chapter].   (Google)
Abstract: In this chapter we will discuss the concepts of “presence” (Inner Presence) and “social presence” (Co-presence) within a cognitive and ecological perspective. Specifically, we claim that the concepts of “presence” and “social presence” are the possible links between self, action, communication and culture. In the first section we will provide a capsule view of Heidegger’s work by examining the two main features of the Heideggerian concept of “being”: spatiality and “being with”. We argue that different visions from social and cognitive sciences – Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Enactive Approach, Situated Simulation, Covert Imitation - and discoveries from neuroscience – Mirror and Canonical Neurons - have many contact points with this view. In particular, these data suggest that our conceptual system dynamically produces contextualized representations (simulations) that support grounded action in different situations. This is allowed by a common coding – the motor code – shared by perception, action and concepts. This common coding also allows the subject for natively recognizing actions done by other selves within the phenomenological contents. In this picture we argue that the role of presence and social presence is to allow the process of self-identification through the separation between “self” and “other,” and between “internal” and “external”. Finally, implications of this position for communication and media studies are discussed by way of conclusion
Rizzolatti, Giacomo (1998). What happened to homo habilis? (Language and mirror neurons). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):527-528.   (Google)
Abstract: The evolutionary continuity between the prespeech functions of premotor cortex and its new linguistic functions, the main thesis of MacNeilage's target article, is confirmed by the recent discovery of “mirror” neurons in monkeys and a corresponding action-observation/action-execution matching system in humans. Physiological data (and other considerations) appear to indicate, however, that brachiomanual gestures played a greater role in language evolution than MacNeilage would like to admit
Roberts, Bill; Cordo, Paul & Harnad, Stevan (1997). Controversies in neuroscience V: Persistent pain: Neuronal mechanisms and clinical implications: Introduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):0-0.   (Google)
Robinson, Daniel N. (2004). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience by M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker oxford: Blackwell publishing; 2003. XVII +461pp. Philosophy 79 (1):141-146.   (Google)
Rocha, M.; Furtado, D. A.; Menezes, J. R. L. & Hedin-Pereira, C. (2003). Form and function: A neuronal dialog. Brain and Mind 4 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The emergence of functional maturity in the brain relies upon the interplay between form and function during its developmental history. This interaction continues throughout life and changes in neuronal function lead to changes in diverse structural scales in the brain. Both regulatory genes, which define compartments in the nervous system, and activity-dependent processes cooperate to determine neuronal phenotype and tissue structure. The influence of electrical activity as a regulator of early developmental events such as proliferation and migration is being considered. Spontaneous neuronal activity may influence early axonal and dendritic arbor formation and activity blockade alters branch density both for axon arbors and dendrites. Although large-scale changes in axon morphology may occur until late stages of development, the remodeling of axon and dendrite morphology in terms of their terminal arborization area is less pronounced than initially thought. Electrical (or neural ) activity is important for synapse stabilization and circuit formation and sensory experience performs a refinement of neuronal shape. This fine-tuning appears to be a dynamical process sustained into adulthood, with smaller scale changes occurring mainly at the dendritic spine level. These subcellular compartments are now believed to restrict biochemical changes in dendrites to particular synapses during (or undergoing ) synaptic plasticity. Events at dendritic spines underlie alterations in the morphology of individual neurons that will ultimately affect the function of complex neuronal networks
Rocha, James (forthcoming). Sean A. Spence, the actor's brain: Exploring the cognitive neuroscience of free will. Journal of Value Inquiry.   (Google)
Ros, Arno (1996). Bemerkungen zum verhältnis zwischen neurophysiologie und psychologie. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 27 (1).   (Google)
Rosenberg, Alex, Lessons for cognitive science from neurogenomics.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. From developmental molecular biology to neurogenomics 2. More than you wanted to know about short term and long term implicit memory 3. How are explicit memories stored? 4. How the brain recalls memories 5. Each explicit memory is just a lot of implicit memories 6. Is ‘knowledge how’ computable? 7. Computationalism and neuroscience..
Ross, Helen E. (2003). Neurological models of size scaling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):425-425.   (Google)
Abstract: Lehar argues that a simple Neuron Doctrine cannot explain perceptual phenomena such as size constancy but he fails to discuss existing, more complex neurological models. Size models that rely purely on scaling for distance are sparse, but several models are also concerned with other aspects of size perception such as geometrical illusions, relative size, adaptation, perceptual learning, and size discrimination
Rosenberger, Robert (2009). Quick-freezing philosophy: An analysis of imaging technologies in neurobiology. In Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger & Søren Riis (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Rose, J. D. (2002). The neurobehavioral nature of fishes and the question of awareness and pain. Reviews in Fisheries Science 10:1-38.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Ross, Don (2008). Two styles of neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):473-483.   (Google)
Rothenberger, Aribert; Roessner, Veit & Banaschewski, Tobias (2006). Habit formation in tourette syndrome with associated obsessive-compulsive behavior: At the crossroads of neurobiological modelling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (6):627-628.   (Google)
Abstract: Tourette Syndrome (TS) and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) are highly associated and often it is difficult to differentiate their symptomatology. In TS, habit forming neuronal systems may form habits of their own – sometimes similar to ritualized behavior. However, whereas in OCD merely the “affect-loop” is touched, in TS the “sensorimotor-loop” plays the major role, although some overlap can be seen in the clinical spectrum between TS and OCD. The latter is mainly related to the “just-right” phenomenon which shows a clear developmental course. An analogous behavioral model for TS and OCD with reference to “just-right” is suggested. (Published Online February 8 2007)
Rubinstein, Ariel (2008). Comments on neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):485-494.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neuroeconomics is examined critically using data on the response times of subjects who were asked to express their preferences in the context of the Allais Paradox. Different patterns of choice are found among the fast and slow responders. This suggests that we try to identify types of economic agents by the time they take to make their choices. Nevertheless, it is argued that it is far from clear if and how neuroeconomics will change economics
Russell, Robert J. (ed.) (2002). Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Center for Ttheology and the Natural Sciences.   (Google)
Ryder, Dan (2002). Neurosemantics: A Theory. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ryder, Dan (online). Neurosemantics: A theory (book in progress).   (Google)
Abstract: Chapter 1: Discussion of my a posteriori strategy and the nature of representation in models. Chapter 2: Presentation of the SINBAD theory of the cerebral cortex. Chapter 3: Demonstration of how SINBAD networks develop into genuinely representational models. Application of the theory to equivocal representation, misrepresentation, empty representation, and twin cases. Chapter 4: Representata as sources of correlation, a solution to the problem of teleological indeterminacy, useful vs. true representation, objectivity. Chapter 5: The non-representational use of representations in the brain in occurrent belief (i.e. judgement) and occurrent desire, Swampman, propositional content, the non-occurrent attitudes, inference and psychological explanation. Chapter 6: SINBAD representation as a kind of mental representation, summary & conclusion
Ryder, Dan (2006). On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective. In David Papineau & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oup.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ryder, Dan (2004). Review essay: Meditations on first neuroscience: Critical notice of mark Changizi's the brain from 25,000 feet. Synthese 141 (2).   (Google)
Rypma, Bart & Gabrieli, John D. E. (2001). Functional neuroimaging of short-term memory: The neural mechanisms of mental storage. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):143-144.   (Google)
Abstract: Cowan argues that the true short-term memory (STM) capacity limit is about 4 items. Functional neuroimaging data converge with this conclusion, indicating distinct neural activity patterns depending on whether or not memory task-demands exceed this limit. STM for verbal information within that capacity invokes focal prefrontal cortical activation that increases with memory load. STM for verbal information exceeding that capacity invokes widespread prefrontal activation in regions associated with executive and attentional processes that may mediate chunking processes to accommodate STM capacity limits
Sagoff, Mark (2007). Further thoughts about the human neuron mouse. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):51 – 52.   (Google)
Samuels, Richard (1998). What brains won't tell us about the mind: A critique of the neurobiological argument against representational nativism. Mind and Language 13 (4):548-570.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Sarpeshkar, Rahul (1998). Analog versus digital: Extrapolating from electronics to neurobiology. Neural Computation 10 (7):1601--1638.   (Google)
Abstract: We review the pros and cons of analog and digital computation. We propose that computation that is most efficient in its use of resources is neither analog computation nor digital computation but, rather, a mixture of the two forms. For maximum efficiency, the information and information-processing resources of the hybrid form must be distributed over many wires, with an optimal signal-to-noise ratio per wire. Our results suggest that it is likely that the brain computes in a hybrid fashion and that an underappreciated and important reason for the efficiency of the human brain, which consumes only 12 W, is the hybrid and distributed nature of its architecture.
Schulkin, Jay (2006). Aesthetic experience and the neurobiology of inquiry. In John R. Shook & Joseph Margolis (eds.), A Companion to Pragmatism. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Schore, Allan N. (2005). Developmental affective neuroscience describes mechanisms at the core of dynamic systems theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):217-218.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis describes the developmental core of dynamic systems theory. I offer recent data from developmental neuroscience on the sequential experience-dependent maturation of components of the limbic system over the stages of infancy. Increasing interconnectivity within the vertically integrated limbic system allows for more complex appraisals of emotional value. The earliest organization of limbic structures has an enduring impact on all later emotional processing
Schmaus, Warren, Evolutionary and neuroscience approaches to the study of cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: There is a lack of connection between the cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary approaches to the study of the mind, in philosophy as well as the sciences. For instance, although Millikan may display a thorough understanding of evolutionary theory in her arguments for the adaptive value of substance concepts, she gives scant attention to what could be the neural substrates of these concepts. Neuroscience research calls into question her assumption that substance concepts play a role in practical skills and suggests that conceptual knowledge in the brain may be organized by perceptual features rather than by individuals and natural kinds
Schulkin, Jay (2007). Effort and will: A cognitive neuroscience perspective. Mind and Matter 5 (1):111-126.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Earlier views associated cognition with the cortex, and the will with sub-cortical non-cognitive structures. But an emerging perspective is that cognition runs throughout the central nervous sys- tem, including areas typically linked to motor control. It is an important realization that perceptual/effector systems are pregnant with cognitive resources. Staying the course to achieve one 's goals amidst diverse pulls is the primary function of the will. One adaptation is to pre-commit oneself to future recursive actions consistent with one's plans. Diverse brain regions are tied to the conflicts of competing interests that require willpower to persevere towards our longer-term goals. While it is debatable to what extent we are conscious of our willpower and its causal efficacy, the concept of the will is a fundamental category in understanding our mental architecture and a piece of our evolutionary history
Schlosser, Markus E. (2008). Review of "Freedom and neurobiology: Reflections on free will, language, and political power", by John R. Searle. Mind 117 (468):1127-30.   (Google)
Schilhab, Theresa (2007). Interactional expertise through the looking glass: A Peek at mirror neurons. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.   (Google)
Schreiner, Christoph E. (1998). Input limitations for cortical combination-sensitive neurons coding stop-consonants? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):284-284.   (Google)
Abstract: A tendency of auditory cortical neurons to respond at the beginning of major transitions in sounds rather than providing a continuously updated spectral-temporal profile may impede the generation of combination-sensitivity for certain classes of stimuli. Potential consequences of the cortical encoding of voiced stop-consonants on representational principles derived from orderly output constraints are discussed
Schacter, Daniel L. (1995). Implicit memory: A new frontier for cognitive neuroscience. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Google)
Schacter, Daniel (1996). Illusory memories: A cognitive neuroscience analysis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93:13527-13533.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Schulkin, Jay (2005). Moral sensibility,visceral representations,and social cohesion: A behavioral neuroscience perspective. Mind and Matter 3 (1):31-56.   (Google)
Abstract: The moral sentiments adumbrated by Adam Smith and Charles Darwin reflect some of our basic social appraisals of each other. One set of moral appraisals reflects disgust and withdrawal, a form of contempt. Another set of moral appraisals reflects active concern responses, an appreciation of the experiences (sympathy for some- one)of other individuals and approach related behaviors. While no one set of neural structures is designed for only moral appraisals, a diverse set of neural regions that include the gustatory/visceral neural axis, basal ganglia and iverse neocortical sites underlie moral judgment
Schick, Ari (2005). Neuro exceptionalism? American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):36 – 38.   (Google)
Schipper, Burkhard C. (2008). On an evolutionary foundation of neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):495-513.   (Google)
Schacter, Daniel L. (1990). Toward a cognitive neuropsychology of awareness: Implicit knowledge and anosognosia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 12:155-78.   (Cited by 82 | Google)
Schaffner, Kenneth F. (2008). Theories, models, and equations in biology: The heuristic search for emergent simplifications in neurobiology. Philosophy of Science 75 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article considers claims that biology should seek general theories similar to those found in physics but argues for an alternative framework for biological theories as collections of prototypical interlevel models that can be extrapolated by analogy to different organisms. This position is exemplified in the development of the Hodgkin‐Huxley giant squid model for action potentials, which uses equations in specialized ways. This model is viewed as an “emergent unifier.” Such unifiers, which require various simplifications, involve the types of heuristics discussed in Wimsatt’s writings on reduction, but with a twist. Here, the heuristics are used to generate emergent rather than reductive explanations. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail:
Schouten, Maurice Kenneth Davy & Looren de Jong, Huibert (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: The Matter of the Mind addresses and illuminates the relationship between psychology and neuroscience by focusing on the topic of reduction. Written by leading philosophers in the field Discusses recent theorizing in the mind-brain sciences and reviews and weighs the evidence in favour of reductionism against the backdrop of recent important advances within psychology and the neurosciences Collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behaviour, reward systems, consciousness, and social cognition
Schore, Allan N. (2001). The right brain as the neurobiological substratum of Freud's dynamic unconscious. In David E. Scharff (ed.), The Psychoanalytic Century: Freud's Legacy for the Future. Other Press.   (Google)
Seltzer, Benjamin; Vasterling, Jennifer J.; Mathias, Charles W. & Brennan, Angela (2001). Clinical and neuropsychological correlates of impaired awareness of deficits in alzheimer disease and Parkinson disease: A comparative study. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, and Behavioral Neurology 14 (2):122-129.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Seltzer, Leslie J. & Pollak, Seth D. (2009). Neuroendocrine features of attachment in infants and nonhuman primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):41-42.   (Google)
Semin, G. R. & Smith, Eliot R. (eds.) (2008). Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years there has been an increasing awareness that a comprehensive understanding of language, cognitive and affective processes, and social and interpersonal phenomena cannot be achieved without understanding the ways these processes are grounded in bodily states. The term ‘embodiment’ captures the common denominator of these developments, which come from several disciplinary perspectives ranging from neuroscience, cognitive science, social psychology, and affective sciences. For the first time, this volume brings together these varied developments under one umbrella and furnishes a comprehensive overview of this intellectual movement in the cognitive-behavioral sciences
Semenza, Carlo (2009). The neuropsychology of proper names. Mind and Language 24 (4):347-369.   (Google)
Abstract: The difference between common and proper names seems to derive from specific semantic characteristics of proper names. In particular, proper names refer to specific individual entities or events, and unlike common names, rarely map onto more general semantic characteristics (attributes, concepts, categories). This fact makes the link proper names have with their reference particularly fragile. Processing proper names seems, as a consequence, to require special cognitive and neural resources. Neuropsychological findings show that proper names and common names follow functionally distinct processing pathways. These pathways are neurally distinct and differently sensitive to focal or generalized brain damage, cognitive changes with age or lack of organic resources. Their precise location, depending on specific tasks, is still partly unknown
Semenza, Carlo (2004). Unconscious how? Concluding remarks to the new York meeting on the "unconscious in cognitive neuroscience and psychoanalysis". Neuro-Psychoanalysis 6 (1):87-89.   (Google)
Sewards, Terence V. & Sewards, Mark A. (2000). Visual awareness due to neuronal activities in subcortical structures: A proposal. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):86-116.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been shown that visual awareness in the blind hemifield of hemianopic cats that have undergone unilateral ablations of visual cortex can be restored by sectioning the commissure of the superior colliculus or by destroying a portion of the substantia nigra contralateral to the cortical lesion (the Sprague effect). We propose that the visual awareness that is recovered is due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the superior colliculus ipsilateral to the cortical lesion. These oscillatory activities are normally partially suppressed by the inhibitory, GABAergic contralateral nigrotectal projection, and the destruction of the substantia nigra, or the sectioning of the collicular commissure, disinhibits the collicular neurons, causing an increase in the extent of oscillatory activity and/or synchronization between activities at different sites. This increase in the oscillatory and synchronized character is sufficient for the activities to give rise to visual awareness. We argue that in rodents and lower vertebrates, normal visual awareness is partly due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the optic tectum and partly due to similar activities in visual cortex. It is only in carnivores and primates that visual awareness is wholly due to cortical activities. Based on von Baerian recapitulation theory, we propose that, even in humans, there is a period in early infancy when visual awareness is partially due to activities in the superior colliculus, but that this awareness gradually disappears as the nigrotectal projection matures
Shaw, Christopher A. (2002). Do neurodegenerative cascades in Parkinson's disease really reflect bottom-up processing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):591-591.   (Google)
Abstract: The target article suggests that the neurological disorders catatonia and Parkinson's disease share similar behavioral features that nevertheless reflect different forms of abnormal information processing. However, emerging research on Parkinson's disease and related age-dependent neurodegenerative disorders suggests that no simplistic notions about processing will be correct for all stages of the disease
Shapiro, Lawrence (2009). Making sense of mirror neurons. Synthese 167 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The discovery of mirror neurons has been hailed as one of the most exciting developments in neuroscience in the past few decades. These neurons discharge in response to the observation of others’ actions. But how are we to understand the function of these neurons? In this paper I defend the idea that mirror neurons are best conceived as components of a sensory system that has the function to perceive action. In short, mirror neurons are part of a hitherto unrecognized “sixth sense”. In this spirit, research should move toward developing a psychophysics of mirror neurons
Shalom, Albert (1985). The Body-Mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Sherer, Mark; Hart, Tessa; Whyte, John; Nick, Toad G. & Yablon, Stuart A. (2005). Neuroanatomic basis of impaired self-awareness after traumatic brain injury: Findings from early computed tomography. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation. Special Issue 20 (4):287-300.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Shields, George W. (2010). Panexperientialism, quantum theory, and neuroplasticity. In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):313-323.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal lobe function. By integrating these domains and issues, significant progress could be made toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition
Siddall, Philip J. (1997). Central inhibitory dysfunctions in neuropathic pain: What is the relationship between basic science and clinical practice? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):465-465.   (Google)
Silverstein, Steven M. & Phillips, William A. (2003). Cognitive coordination and its neurobiological bases: A new continent to explore. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):110-125.   (Google)
Abstract: The additional arguments and evidence supplied by the commentaries strengthen the hypothesis that underactivity of NMDA receptors produces impaired cognitive coordination in schizophrenia. This encourages the hope that though the distance from molecules to mind is great, it can nevertheless be traversed. We therefore predict that in this decade or the next molecular psychology will be seen to be as fundamental to our understanding of mind as molecular biology is to our understanding of life
Simons, Daniel J.; Hannula, Deborah E.; Warren, David E. & Day, Steven W. (2007). Behavioral, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological approaches to implicit perception. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Sinigaglia, Corrado (2008). Mirror neurons: This is the question. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):70-92.   (Google)
Abstract: Despite the impressive body of evidence supporting the existence of a mirror neuron (MN) system for action, the original claim regarding its crucial role in action understanding remains controversial. Emma Borg has recently launched a sharp attack on this claim, with the aim of demonstrating that neither the original version nor the subsequent revisions of the MN hypothesis tell us very much about how intentional attribution actually works. In this article I take up the challenge she issues in the title of her paper (If Mirror Neurons are the Answer, What was the Question?) and argue that what MNs offer is not as Borg claims 'an extremely limited' picture of action understanding but rather an enriched picture that brings to light aspects of social cognition hitherto ignored in the mind-reading literature, showing how intentional motor components of action can shape social cognition prior to and apart from any forms of deliberate mentalizing
Sirois, Sylvain; Spratling, Michael; Thomas, Michael S. C.; Westermann, Gert; Mareschal, Denis & Johnson, Mark H. (2008). Précis of neuroconstructivism: How the brain constructs cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):321-331.   (Google)
Skoyles, Dr John R. (2008). Why our brains cherish humanity: Mirror neurons and colamus humanitatem. Cogprints.   (Google)
Abstract: Commonsense says we are isolated. After all, our bodies are physically separate. But Seneca’s colamus humanitatem, and John Donne’s observation that “no man is an island” suggests we are neither entirely isolated nor separate. A recent discovery in neuroscience—that of mirror neurons—argues that the brain and the mind is neither built nor functions remote from what happens in other individuals. What are mirror neurons? They are brain cells that process both what happens to or is done by an individual, and, as it were, its perceived “refl ection,” when that same thing happens or is done by another individual. Thus, mirror neurons are both activated when an individual does a particular action, and when that individual perceives that same action done by another. The discovery of mirror neurons suggests we need to radically revise our notions of human nature since they offer a means by which we may not be so separated as we think. Humans unlike other apes are adapted to mirror interact nonverbally when together. Notably, our faces have been evolved to display agile and nimble movements. While this is usually explained as enabling nonverbal communication, a better description would be nonverbal commune based upon mirror neurons. I argue we cherish humanity, colamus humanitatem, because mirror neurons and our adapted mirror interpersonal interface blur the physical boundaries that separate us
Snead, Carter (2007). Neuroimaging, entrapment, and the predisposition to crime. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):60 – 61.   (Google)
Sokolov, Evgeni N. (2002). Neuronal basis of imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):210-210.   (Google)
Abstract: The depiction of pictures as specified points in a functional space is achieved by vector encoding. Picture-selective neurons are added to the declarative memory in the process of learning. New neurons are recruited from stem cells through their proliferation and differentiation. Electrical stimulation of the temporo-parietal cortex produces subjective scenes of the past similar to imagery
Solms, Mark (2000). A psychoanalytic contribution to contemporary neuroscience. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Solignac, Pierre (1982). The Christian Neurosis. Crossroad.   (Google)
Soosaar, Andres (ms). Review of Bennett and Hacker, philosophical foundations of neuroscience.   (Google)
Abstract: This review tries to give overview of key issues of Bennett and Hacker's neurophilosophy and theoretical physiology attempt and to estimate possibilities of that neurophilosophy to be accepted by real neuro and life sciences
Sorrell, Martin & Halpin, David M. G. (1991). Art and neurology. British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (3).   (Google)
Spence, Sean A. (2001). Alien control: From phenomenology to cognitive neurobiology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):163-172.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Spiegler, Ran (2008). Comments on the potential significance of neuroeconomics for economic theory. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):515-521.   (Google)
Sporns, Olaf (2000). Synthetic approaches to cognitive neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):548-549.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognition and behavior are the result of neural processes occurring at multiple levels of organization. Synthetic computational approaches are capable of bridging the gaps between multiple organizational levels and contribute to our understanding of how neural structures give rise to specific dynamical states. Such approaches are indispensable for formulating the theoretical foundations of cognitive neuroscience
Sprevak, Mark, Commentary on 'conceptual challenges in the neuroimaging of psychiatric disorders'.   (Google)
Abstract: Kanaan and McGuire elegantly describe three challenges facing the use of fMRI to uncover cognitive mechanisms. They shows how these challenges ramify in the case of identifying the mechanisms responsible for psychiatric disorders. In this commentary, I would like to raise another difficulty for fMRI that also appears to ramify in similar cases. This is that there are good reasons for doubting one of the assumptions on which many fMRI studies are based: that neural mechanisms are always and everywhere sufficient for cognition. I suggest that in the case of the mechanisms underlying psychiatric disorders, this assumption should be doubted. I do not dispute that a malfunctioning neural mechanism is likely to be a necessary component of a psychiatric disorder—as Kanaan and McGuire say, the experimental evidence from cognitive neuropsychiatry gives us excellent reasons to think that this is so. My question is whether a story only in terms of these neural mechanisms is sufficient to explain the mechanism of a psychiatric disorder. Is the reduction, projected by cognitive neuropsychiatry, of psychiatric disorders to disorders in neural functioning even in principle possible? Drawing on recent concerns about the location of mental states, I argue that such a reduction is likely to fail. Even if the considerable problems raised by Kanaan and McGuire for fMRI could be addressed, we have no reason to think that the mechanisms involved in psychiatric disorders are entirely neural, and that fMRI, or even a perfect science-fiction brain-scanner, would be capable of uncovering them. Psychiatric disorders, like numerous other cognitive processes, are liable to cross the brain–world boundary in such a promiscuous way as to be resistant to neural reduction
Staiti, Andrea (2010). Dieter Lohmar, phänomenologie der schwachen phantasie. Untersuchungen der psychologie, cognitive science, neurologie und phänomenologie zur funktion der phantasie in der wahrnehmung. Husserl Studies 26 (2).   (Google)
Stapp, Henry, Philosophical foundations of neuroscience.   (Google)
Abstract: The problem at issue here is the nature of connection between the features of the experiments described in psychological/mentalistic terms and the features described in spacio-temporally-based physical terms. This question is an aspect of the long-standing problem of the relationship between mind and matter, which has a history dating back to the time of the ancient Greeks. The issue was rekindled by the rise of Newtonian physics during the seventeenth century, and it generated a huge body of speculation and argumentation during the second half of the twentieth century. It is neither appropriate nor feasible try to review or explain here the complexities of contemporary philosophical opinions on this question, except to say that the reigning view is “materialism,” and that: (1), there is no agreement among its proponents as to how to make rational good sense of this doctrine (Horgan, 1994); and (2), the doctrine, and its supporters, seem, nevertheless, to have strongly influenced the thinking of many neuroscientists. The central thesis of materialism is that: “The human body is a causally complete physico-chemical system: although the body is highly susceptible to external causal influences, all physical events in the body, and all bodily movements are fully explainable in physico-chemical terms.” (Horgan, 1994:472)
Stapp, Henry P. (ms). Physics in neuroscience.   (Google)
Abstract: Classical physics is a theory of nature that originated with the work of Isaac Newton in the seventeenth century and was advanced by the contributions of James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein. Newton based his theory on the work of Johannes Kepler, who found that the planets appeared to move in accordance with a simple mathematical law, and in ways wholly determined by their spatial relationships to other objects. Those motions were apparently independent of our human observations of them
Stapp, Henry P. (2005). Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: A neurophysical model of mind €“brain interaction. Philosophical Transactions-Royal Society of London. Biological Sciences 360 (1458):1309-1327.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. ‘feeling’, ‘knowing’ and ‘effort’) are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function..
Stapp, Henry P. (online). "The observer" in physics and neuroscience.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neuroscience is an important component of the scientific attack on the problem of consciousness. However, most neuroscientists, viewing our discussions, see only conflict and discord, and no reason why quantum theory has any great relevance the dynamics of the conscious brain. It is therefore worthwhile, in this first plenary talk of the 2003 Tucson conference on “Quantum Approaches to the Understanding of Consciousness,” to focus on the central issue, which is the crucial role of “The Observer,” and specifically, “The Mind of The Observer” in contemporary physical theory. I shall therefore review here this radical departure of present-day basic physics from the principles of classical physics, and then spell out some of its ramifications for neuroscience
Steriade, Mircea (2004). Brainstem-thalamic neurons implicated in hallucinations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):806-807.   (Google)
Abstract: I propose that hyperactivity (or increased numbers) of neurons in the brainstem reticular core promote hallucinations by excessive excitation, coupled with disinhibition, of target thalamocortical neurons. This idea stems from animal experiments using kainate-induced overexcitation of midbrain reticular neurons leading to hallucinatory-type behavior during wakefulness, as well as from data in schizophrenic patients showing an increased number of neurons in mesopontine cholinergic neurons
Steinmetz, Joseph E.; Britton, Gabrielle B. & Green, John T. (2000). How is the feed-forward Pavlovian control system instantiated in neurobiology? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):267-267.   (Google)
Abstract: While feed-forward mechanisms may be ubiquitous in biological systems that form the substrates of Pavlovian conditioning, the control system proposed by Domjan, Cusato & Villarreal seems too elaborate for Pavlovian conditioning of simple skeletal muscle responses. We discuss here how the known neural substrates of classical eyeblink conditioning can be described in feed-forward terms, but argue that the monitor/comparator part of the system is not necessary and perhaps could even be detrimental to simple, nonsocial forms of Pavlovian conditioning
Østergaard, Sven (2009). Imitation, mirror neurons, and meta-cognition. In Wolfgang Wildgen & Barend van Heusden (eds.), Metarepresentation, Self-Organization and Art. Peter Lang.   (Google)
Sternberg, Eliezer J. (2010). My Brain Made Me Do It: The Rise of Neuroscience and the Threat to Moral Responsibility. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- The mischievous neuron -- The shadow of determinism -- The essential freedom -- A tempest in the brain -- Neurological disturbance -- The seat of the will -- The somatic-marker hypothesis -- The readiness potential -- The grand illusion -- Neuronal destiny -- The revolution of the brain -- Seeds of corruption -- Morality's end -- The depths of consciousness -- A challenge for experience -- The boundlessness of reason -- Rise of the moral agent -- The palace of the mind.
Steriade, M. (2000). Neuronal basis of dreaming and mentation during slow-wave (non-REM) sleep. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1009-1011.   (Google)
Abstract: Although the cerebral cortex is deprived of messages from the external world in REM sleep and because these messages are inhibited in the thalamus, cortical neurons display high rates of spontaneous firing and preserve their synaptic excitability to internally generated signals during this sleep stage. The rich activity of neocortical neurons during NREM sleep consists of prolonged spike-trains that impose rhythmic excitation onto connected cells in the network, eventually leading to a progressive increase in their synaptic responsiveness, as in plasticity processes. Thus, NREM sleep may be implicated in the consolidation of memory traces acquired during wakefulness. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Vertes & Eastman]
Stemmer, Brigitte & Schönle, Paul Walter (2000). Neuropragmatics in the 21st century. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the great challenges of the new millennium is the continuing search of how the mind works. Although a relatively young field, the study of neuropragmatics can greatly contribute to this search by its interdisciplinary nature, the possibility to be applied to different research meth-ods and by the opportunity to study its nature by taking vastly different perspectives
Stein, Dan J.; Solms, Mark & van Honk, Jack (2006). The cognitive-affective neuroscience of the unconscious. CNS Spectrums 11 (8):580-583.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stieg, Chuck, Neuroethical considerations regarding transcranial magnetic stimulation.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Along with advances in brain technologies comes the ability to enhance the cognitive and affective states of normal people. In this essay, I examine a relatively young technology used in cognitive neuroscience called transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). I explain what it is, how it works and what some of its applications are. I suggest that a potential source of reservation one might have regarding brain-altering enhancement is the threat it seemingly poses to the subjective importance of mental states. I then consider the possibility of its being used as an enhancement device and question the authenticity of abilities of individuals that are enhanced by use of TMS. I conclude that judgments regarding the appropriateness of such neurocognitive enhancements should be considered on a case by case basis
Stoljar, Daniel, A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely held that a successful theory of the mind will be neuroscientific. In this paper we ask, first, what this claim means, and, secondly, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we argue that the claim is ambiguous between two views–one plausible but unsubstantive, and one substantive but highly controversial. In answer to the second question, we argue that neither the evidence from neuroscience itself nor from other scientific and philosophical considerations supports the controversial view
Stone, Tony & Davies, Martin (2000). Autonomous psychology and the moderate neuron doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):849-850.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _Two notions of autonomy are distinguished. The respective_ _denials that psychology is autonomous from neurobiology are neuron_ _doctrines, moderate and radical. According to the moderate neuron_ _doctrine, inter-disciplinary interaction need not aim at reduction. It is_ _proposed that it is more plausible that there is slippage from the_ _moderate to the radical neuron doctrine than that there is confusion_ _between the radical neuron doctrine and the trivial version._
Stone, Anna; Valentine, Tim & Davis, Rob (2001). Face recognition and emotional Valence: Processing without awareness by neurologically intact participants does not simulate Covert recognition in prosopagnosia. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 1 (2):183-191.   (Google)
Stokes, Douglas M. (1993). Mind, matter, and death: Cognitive neuroscience and the problem of survival. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 87:41-84.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stoop, R.; Schindler, K. & Bunimovich, L. A. (2000). Noise-driven neocortical interaction: A simple generation mechanism for complex neuron spiking. Acta Biotheoretica 48 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: We discuss a generic scenario along which complex spiking behavior evolves in biologically realistic neural networks. Our nonlinear dynamics approach is based directly on rat neocortical in vitro recordings. Using this experimental data, we obtain a full overview on the possible spiking behaviors of pyramidal neurons that are engaged in binary interactions. Universality arguments imply that the observed spiking behaviors are largely independent from the specific properties of individual neurons; theoretical arguments and numerical experiments indicate that they should be observable in in vivo neocortical neuron networks
Stoljar, Daniel & Gold, Ian (1998). On biological and cognitive neuroscience. Mind and Language 13 (1):110-31.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Stohr, Karen (2007). Review of Leslie Paul Thiele, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).   (Google)
Stoet, Gijsbert & Snyder, Lawrence (2008). Task-switching in human and nonhuman primates: Understanding rule encoding and control from behavior to single neurons. In Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Stoerig, Petra (2001). The neuroanatomy of phenomenal vision: A psychological perspective. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:176-94.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra & Brandt, Stephan (1993). The visual system and levels of perception: Properties of neuromental organization. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: To see whether the mental and the neural have common attributes that could resolve some of the traditional dichotomies, we review neuroscientific data on the visual system. The results show that neuronal and perceptual function share a parallel and hierarchical architecture which is manifest not only in the anatomy and physiology of the visual system, but also in normal perception and in the deficits caused by lesions in different parts of the system. Based on the description of parallel hierarchical levels of active information processing in the visual brain, we suggest a concept of dissociable levels of perception, advocating that the phenomenal perception and recognition is realized in the functional integrity of a network of reciprocal cortico-cortical connections. The properties shared by neuronal and perceptional functions provide a basis for a neuromental monism in which both functions are attributed a causal role
Striedter, Georg F. (2006). Evolutionary neuroscience: Limitations and prospects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):25-31.   (Google)
Abstract: Overall, most of the reviewers agree that Principles of Brain Evolution was a welcome addition to the field, and kindly describe it as carefully researched and lucidly written. Thereafter, they note some gaps – principally, adaptive scenarios, microevolutionary studies, and computational models. I here admit to those deficiencies but explain why they exist and how they might be filled. In addition, one commentator criticizes my analysis of hominin brain evolution, and another finds my principle of “large equals well-connected” to be inconsistent with the data. I rebut those two critiques. Hopefully, this process of critique and counterpoint will stimulate some readers to pursue the mentioned thoughts and to engage in new research
Streri, Arlette & Sann, Coralie (2007). The multiple relations between vision and touch: Neonatal behavioral evidence and adult neuroimaging data. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):220-221.   (Google)
Stuart, Susan (2009). Alvin I. Goldman, simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mindreading. Minds and Machines 19 (2).   (Google)
Stuhr, John J. (2006). Some experiences, some values, and some philosophies: On Russon's account of experience, neurosis, and philosophy. Dialogue 45 (2):337-345.   (Google)
Sullivan, Jacqueline A. (2009). The multiplicity of experimental protocols: A challenge to reductionist and non-reductionist models of the unity of neuroscience. Synthese 167 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., Bechtel, Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007; Bickle, Philosophy and neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2003; Bickle, Synthese, 151, 411–434, 2006; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and with them new understandings of the experimental practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models are culled, and argue that the multiplicity of experimental protocols used in these research areas presents specific challenges for both models. In my view, these challenges have been overlooked largely because philosophers have hitherto failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental features of experimental practice. I demonstrate that when we do pay attention to such features, evidence for reduction and integrative unity in neuroscience is simply not borne out. I end by suggesting some new directions for the philosophy of neuroscience that pertain to taking a closer look at the nature of neuroscientific experiments
Susa, Isabella & Martiel, Jean-Louis (1995). Modelling nonlinear integration of synaptic signals by neurones. Acta Biotheoretica 43 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Neurones with active conductance on dendrites integrate synaptic signals and modulate generation of axon spikes in a nonlinear way. Owing to experimental difficulties, modelling provides invaluable insight for the comprehension of neurone behaviour particularly when dendrites are excitable. We used experimental data obtained for the Anterior Gastric Receptor neurone (AGR neurone), which controls the lobster gastric mill activity, to derive a set of partial differential equations for the membrane voltage. Simulation showed that upon varying the intensity of stimulation on the dendrite, the response pattern between dendrites and axon activity continuously changes. In addition, when only half of the dendritic tree is active, axon firing exhibits regular oscillations and bursting activity. We discuss these results in relation with the experimental work done on the AGR neurone
Sutton, John (1999). The churchlands' neuron doctrine: Both cognitive and reductionist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):850-851.   (Google)
Abstract: According to Gold & Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the argument from unification as reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine
Swaab, D. F. (2010). Developments in neuroscience. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Symons, John (ms). Systems of visual identification in neuroscience: Lessons from epistemic logic.   (Google)
Abstract: The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the “where” and “what” systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory
Symons, John (2001). What can neuroscience explain? Brain and Mind 2 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Horgan’s perceptive discussion of Freudian psychology, Prozac and evolutionary biology cannot mitigate the problems that seriously weaken his book (Horgan, 1999). While he certainly manages to deflate some of the more outrageous hype surrounding the scientific and often not-so-scientific study of the mind, his criticism of the brain and behavioral sciences contains a number of flaws, some of which I will address below. My response focuses on his discussion of neuroscience. As we shall see, the three mysteries that Horgan believes cripple neuroscience are certainly not as serious as he insists
Szasz, Thomas S. (2002). The Meaning of Mind: Language, Morality, and Neuroscience. Syracuse University Press.   (Google | More links)
Szymanik, Jakub (2007). A Note on some Neuroimaging Study of Natural Language Quantifiers Comprehension. Neuropsychologia 45 (9):2158-2160.   (Google)
Taliaferro, Charles (1997). Saving our souls: Hacking's archaeology and Churchland's neurology. Inquiry 40 (1):73 – 94.   (Google)
Tallis, Raymond C. (2004). Why the Mind Is Not a Computer: A Pocket Lexicon of Neuromythology. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Taking a series of key words such as calculation, language, information and memory, Professor Tallis shows how their misuse has lured a whole generation into...
Tamburrini, Guglielmo & Datteri, Edoardo (2005). Machine experiments and theoretical modelling: From cybernetic methodology to neuro-robotics. Minds and Machines 15 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract:   Cybernetics promoted machine-supported investigations of adaptive sensorimotor behaviours observed in biological systems. This methodological approach receives renewed attention in contemporary robotics, cognitive ethology, and the cognitive neurosciences. Its distinctive features concern machine experiments, and their role in testing behavioural models and explanations flowing from them. Cybernetic explanations of behavioural events, regularities, and capacities rely on multiply realizable mechanism schemata, and strike a sensible balance between causal and unifying constraints. The multiple realizability of cybernetic mechanism schemata paves the way to principled comparisons between biological systems and machines. Various methodological issues involved in the transition from mechanism schemata to their machine instantiations are addressed here, by reference to a simple sensorimotor coordination task. These concern the proper treatment of ceteris paribus clauses in experimental settings, the significance of running experiments with correct but incomplete machine instantiations of mechanism schemata, and the advantage of operating with real machines ??? as opposed to simulated ones ??? immersed in real environments
Tart, Charles T. (1981). Transpersonal realities or neurophysiological illusions. In The Metaphors Of Consciousness. New York: Plenum Press.   (Google)
Temple, Elise (2002). The developmental cognitive neuroscience approach to the study of developmental disorders. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):771-771.   (Google)
Abstract: Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of developmental disorders and normal cognition that include children are becoming increasingly common and represent part of a newly expanding field of developmental cognitive neuroscience. These studies have illustrated the importance of the process of development in understanding brain mechanisms underlying cognition and including children in the study of the etiology of developmental disorders
Tersman, Folke (2008). The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (e.g., by Peter Singer) that these results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and therefore provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight (such as the idea of reflective equilibrium). I distinguish between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a sceptical attitude towards intuitions. I argue that, given the first version of the challenge, the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings. As for the second version of the challenge, I argue that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general
Thai, N. J. & Talcott, J. B. (2009). Considerations for pediatric neuroimaging at the translational coalface. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):18 – 20.   (Google)
Thayer, Julian F. & Lane, Richard D. (2005). The importance of inhibition in dynamical systems models of emotion and neurobiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):218-219.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis makes a compelling case for a dynamical systems approach to emotion and neurobiology. These models involve both excitatory and inhibitory processes. It appears that a critical role for inhibitory processes is implied but not emphasized in Lewis's model. We suggest that a greater understanding of inhibitory processes both at the psychological and neurobiological levels might further enhance Lewis's model
Thagard, Paul (2007). The moral psychology of conflicts of interest: Insights from affective neuroscience. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4):367–380.   (Google | More links)
Thiele, Leslie Paul (2006). The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The Heart of Judgment explores the nature, historical significance, and contemporary relevance of practical wisdom. Primarily a work in moral and political thought, it also relies extensively on the latest research in cognitive neuroscience to confirm and extend our understanding of the faculty of judgment. Ever since the ancient Greeks first discussed practical wisdom, the faculty of judgment has been an important topic for philosophers and political theorists. It remains one of the virtues most demanded of our public officials. The greater the liberties and responsibilities accorded to citizens in democratic regimes, the more the health and welfare of society rest upon their exercise of good judgment. While giving full credit to the roles played by reason and deliberation in good judgment, the book underlines the central importance of intuition, emotion, and worldly experience
Thorp, John (1980). Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism. Routledge.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Thompson, Evan (2004). Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):381-398.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis
Théoret, Hugo & Fecteau, Shirley (2005). Making a case for mirror-neuron system involvement in language development: What about autism and blindness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):145-146.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion that manual gestures played an important role in the evolution of human language was strengthened by the discovery of mirror neurons in monkey area F5, the proposed homologue of human Broca's area. This idea is central to the thesis developed by Arbib, and lending further support to a link between motor resonance mechanisms and language/communication development is the case of autism and congenital blindness. We provide an account of how these conditions may relate to the aforementioned theory
Thompson, Evan (forthcoming). Neurophenomenology and contemplative experience. In Philip Clayton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oup.   (Google)
Abstract: Scientific investigation of the mind, known since the nineteen-seventies as ‘cognitive science’, is an interdisciplinary field of research comprising psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind. The presence of philosophy in this list is telling. Cognitive science, although institutionally well established, is not a theoretically settled field, unlike molecular biology or high-energy physics. Rather, it includes a variety of competing research programmes - the computational theory of mind (also known as classical cognitive science), connectionism, and dynamical and embodied approaches - whose underlying conceptions of mentality and its relation to biology, on the one hand, and to culture, on the other, are often strikingly different (see Clark, 2001, for a useful overview)
Tiitinen, Hannu (2001). How to interface cognitive psychology with cognitive neuroscience? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):148-149.   (Google)
Abstract: Cowan's analysis of human short-term memory (STM) and attention in terms of processing limits in the range of 4 items (or “chunks”) is discussed from the point of view of cognitive neuroscience. Although, Cowan already provides many important theoretical insights, we need to learn more about how to build further bridges between cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience
Todorovic, Dejan (1998). In defense of neuro-perceptual isomorphism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):774-775.   (Google)
Abstract: It is argued that the notion of bridge locus is compatible with distributed representation and brain interconnectivity. Isomorphism is not a dogmatic condition on explanatory adequacy but a refutable hypothesis, superior to Dennett's proposed alternatives. The assumption of type-type neuro-perceptual correspondences is more parsimonious than multiple realizability
Tolbert, Leslie P.; Oland, Lynne A.; Christensen, Thomas C. & Goriely, Anita R. (2003). Neuronal and glial morphology in olfactory systems: Significance for information-processing and underlying developmental mechanisms. Brain and Mind 4 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The shapes of neurons and glial cells dictate many important aspects of their functions. In olfactory systems, certain architectural features are characteristics of these two cell types across a wide variety of species. The accumulated evidence suggests that these common features may play fundamental roles in olfactoryinformation processing. For instance, the primary olfactory neuropil in most vertebrate and invertebrate olfactory systems is organized into discrete modules called glomeruli. Inside each glomerulus, sensory axons and CNS neurons branch and synapse in patterns that are repeated across species. In many species, moreover, the glomeruli are enveloped by a thin and ordered layer of glial processes. Theglomerular arrangement reflects the processing of odor information in modules that encode the discrete molecular attributes of odorant stimuli being processed. Recent studies of the mechanisms that guide the development of olfactory neurons and glial cells have revealed complex reciprocal interactions between these two cell types, which may be necessary for the establishment of modular compartments. Collectively, the findings reviewed here suggest that specialized cellular architecture plays key functional roles in the detection, analysis, and discrimination of odors at early steps in olfactory processing
Tomasino, Barbara; Corradi-Dell'Acqua, Corrado; Tessari, Alessia; Spiezio, Caterina & Rumiati, Raffaella Ida (2004). A neuropsychological approach to motor control and imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):419-419.   (Google)
Abstract: In his article Grush proposes a potentially useful framework for explaining motor control, imagery, and perception. In our commentary we will address two issues that the model does not seem to deal with appropriately: one concerns motor control, and the other, the visual and motor imagery domains. We will consider these two aspects in turn
Toombs, E. (2003). Harmony, explanatory coherence and the debate between the reticular theory and neuron theory of nerve cell structure: Echo's resolution of a quiet revolution. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 34 (4):615-632.   (Google)
Abstract: During the latter part of the nineteenth century our description of nerve cell structure underwent a relatively unrecognized, though fundamental, transformation-a quiet revolution of sorts. The central problem facing scientists in neurology (the study of the nervous system) was a related pair: are nerve cells continuous with each other or not, and how is information conducted? Microscope resolution and staining techniques were inadequate at the time to yield definitive proof either way. I contend that explanatory coherence provides a means to elucidate this instance of theory change in the history of science. The means of elucidation will be Thagard's computational model of explanatory coherence, ECHO ()
Tovino, Stacey A. (2007). Functional neuroimaging and the law: Trends and directions for future scholarship. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):44 – 56.   (Google)
Abstract: Under the umbrella of the burgeoning neurotransdisciplines, scholars are using the principles and research methodologies of their primary and secondary fields to examine developments in neuroimaging, neuromodulation and psychopharmacology. The path for advanced scholarship at the intersection of law and neuroscience may clear if work across the disciplines is collected and reviewed and outstanding and debated issues are identified and clarified. In this article, I organize, examine and refine a narrow class of the burgeoning neurotransdiscipline scholarship; that is, scholarship at the interface of law and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
Trappenberg, Thomas P. & Klein, Raymond M. (1999). Generating oculomotor and neuronal behavior in a neural field model of the superior colliculus. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):700-701.   (Google)
Abstract: The functional schema in the Findlay & Walker target article presents an understanding of oculomotor behavior primarily at an algorithmic level of analysis. Although such an analysis is an important first step, present knowledge of the neuroscientific substrate for oculomotor behavior is sufficiently advanced to support, if not warrant, computationally explicit models explaining how oculomotor behavior is implemented by this substrate. The literature contains a growing number of examples of this strategy, which we illustrate using our work
Tranel, Daniel & Damasio, Antonio R. (1999). The neurobiology of knowledge retrieval. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):303-303.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent investigations have explored how large-scale systems in the brain operate in the processes of retrieving knowledge for words and concepts. Much of the crucial evidence derives from lesion studies, because word retrieval and concept retrieval can be clearly dissociated in brain-damaged individuals. We discuss these findings from the perspective of our neurobiological framework, which is cited in Pulvermüller's target article
Trillenberg, P. & Wessel, K. (1997). Detection of input sequences in the cerebellum: Clinical and neuroimaging aspects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):267-267.   (Google)
Truog, Franklin G. Miller Robert D. (2009). The incoherence of determining death by neurological criteria: Reply to John Lizza. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (4):pp. 397-399.   (Google)
Turner, Mark, Imagination and creativity: Lectures at the college de France, 4: The cognitive neuroscience of creativity (l'imagination et la créativité: Confèrences au collège de France, 4: La neuroscience cognitive de la créativité).   (Google)
Abstract:      The fourth of four lectures at the Collège de France in 2000 on the subject of conceptual mappings and conceptual structure
Turner, Stephen P. (2007). Mirror neurons and practices: A response to Lizardo. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (3):351–371.   (Google | More links)
Ullman, Michael T. (1999). The functional neuroanatomy of inflectional morphology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):1041-1042.   (Google)
Abstract: Clahsen has presented an impressive range of psycholinguistic data from German regular and irregular inflection to support the view that lexical memory and the combinatorial operations of grammar are subserved by distinct mental mechanisms. Most of the data are convincing and important. I particularly applaud Clahsen's effort to extend this lexical/grammatical dichotomy from mind to brain. Here I discuss some problems with the evidence presented by Clahsen in support of a neural lexical/grammatical dichotomy, and offer some additional evidence to reinforce this neural distinction
[author unknown] (ms). Phenomenology as another toolbox for neuroscientists?   (Google)
Abstract: “[I]t has become next to impossible for a single mind fully to command more than a small specialized portion of it. I can see no other escape from this dilemma […] than that some of us should venture to..
[author unknown] (ms). Phenomenology, neuroscience and impairment.   (Google)
Abstract: As a young medical student, I was frustrated by the rather mechanistic, though undoubtedly therapeutic, way in which I was taught. It seemed to want me to approach patients clinically, and though with respect also with a distance which reduced simple human contact. We were not expected to be interested in what it was like to be ill, but rather to elicit the correct signs and symptoms in order to diagnose. At the time I was also reading more widely, within literature and philosophy, searching – in part – for a more humane perspective. Much philosophy was beyond me – and still is – but then, as a young man I found myself sympathetic to the phenomenological approach. In medicine, by day, I learnt lists of diseases and their presentation, whilst by night I would read of other approaches respectful of the first person experience, which might help me reach what it was like to live, say, with a chronic neurological impairment
Urban, Laszlo A. (1997). Sympathetic component of neuropathic pain: Animal models and clinical diagnosis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):468-469.   (Google)
Usher, Matthew (2004). Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations? Mind and Language 19 (2):241-248.   (Google | More links)
van Gelder, Tim, Brave neurocomputational world.   (Google)
Abstract: A Neurocomputational Perspective , it comes of age as philosophy of mind as well. This book demands to be read by connectionists who wish to understand the philosophical context and ramifications of their work, and by philosophers who wish to understand connectionism and the nature of mind more generally
van den Bosch, Alexander P. M. (1999). Inference to the best manipulation – a case study of qualitative reasoning in neuropharmacy. Foundations of Science 4 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: How can new drug lead suggestions beinferred from neurophysiological models? This paperaddresses this question based on a case study ofresearch into Parkinson''s disease at the GroningenUniversity Department of Pharmacy. It is argued thatneurophysiological box-and-arrow models can beunderstood as qualitative differential equationmodels. An inference task is defined to helpunderstand and possibly aid the discovery andexplanation of new drug lead suggestions
VanMeter, J. (2010). Neuroimaging. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
van Hooff, Johanna C. (2008). Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (1):25 – 26.   (Google)
Varela, F. (1995). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.   (Cited by 248 | Annotation | Google)
Verleger, Rolf (1998). Toward an integration of p3 research with cognitive neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):150-152.   (Google)
Abstract: In this response, I will first summarize my 1988 argument on the issue of expectancy. Second, I will re-evaluate that argument in the light of the findings made by Sommer et al. and by others. Third, I will describe some other problems with the 1988 views. Fourth, I will outline the direction in which I feel that a hypothesis on the P3 complex should be pursued further
Viamontes, George I. & Beitman, Bernard D. (2007). This issue: The neurobiology of the unconscious. Psychiatric Annals 37 (4):222-224.   (Google)
Vickery, Richard M. (1999). Synaptic plasticity is complex; neurobiologists are not. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):853-854.   (Google)
Abstract: The complexity of modern neurobiology in even a comparatively restricted area such as use-dependent synaptic plasticity is underestimated by the authors. This leads them to reject a neurobiological model of learning as conceptually parasitic on the psychology of conditioning, on the basis of objections that are shown to be unsustainable. An argument is also advanced that neurobiologists hold an intermediate version of the neuron doctrine rather than a conflated one. In this version, neurobiologists believe that psychology will eventually be underpinned by neurobiology but are agnostic about the extent of upheaval that this will produce in psychology
Vincent, Nicole A. (2009). Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Abstract: Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility
Vladusich, Tony (2008). Towards a computational neuroscience of autism-psychosis spectrum disorders. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):282-283.   (Google)
von Stein, Astrid & Sarnthein, Johannes (2000). EEG frequency and the size of cognitive neuronal assemblies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (3):413-414.   (Google)
Abstract: We have performed a set of experiments that correlate EEG spectral parameters with cognitive functions. The tasks (visual perception, supramodal object recognition, short-term memory) were chosen so that the cortical area involved extended over different length scales. The extent of the cognitive neuronal assemblies correlated inversely with the frequency where EEG synchronization was found. This provides a further relation between experiment and the theory put forward in the Nunez target article
Wachbroit, Robert (2008). The prospects for neuro-exceptionalism: Transparent lies, naked minds. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (1):3 – 8.   (Google)
Wallis, Jonathan D. (2008). Single neuron activity underlying behavior-guiding rules. In Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Warmbr, Ken (1991). Behaviourism, neuroscience and translational indeterminacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):67 – 81.   (Google)
Warmbrōd, Ken (1991). Behaviourism, neuroscience and translational indeterminacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):67 – 81.   (Google)
Weber, Marcel (2008). Causes without mechanisms: Experimental regularities, physical laws, and neuroscientific explanation. Philosophy of Science 75 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article examines the role of experimental generalizations and physical laws in neuroscientific explanations, using Hodgkin and Huxley’s electrophysiological model from 1952 as a test case. I show that the fact that the model was partly fitted to experimental data did not affect its explanatory status, nor did the false mechanistic assumptions made by Hodgkin and Huxley. The model satisfies two important criteria of explanatory status: it contains invariant generalizations and it is modular (both in James Woodward’s sense). Further, I argue that there is a sense in which the explanatory heteronomy thesis holds true for this case. †To contact the author, please write to: SNF‐Professorship for Philosophy of Science, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 21, 4003 Basel, Switzerland; e‐mail:
Weber, Marcel, Indeterminism in neurobiology: Some good and some bad news.   (Google)
Abstract: I examine some philosophical arguments as well as current empirical research in molecular neurobiology in order to throw some new light on the question of whether neurological processes are deterministic or indeterministic. I begin by showing that the idea of an autonomous biological indeterminism violates the principle of the supervenience of biological properties on physical properties. If supervenience is accepted, quantum mechanics is the only hope for the neuro-indeterminist. But this would require that indeterministic quantum-mechanical effects play a role in the functioning of the nervous system. I examine several candidates of molecular processes where this could, in theory, be the case. It turns out that there is good news from recent work on ion channels. Unfortunately (for the indeterminist), this good news is neutralised at once by bad news
Weiss, Sabine & Mueller, Horst M. (2003). Neuronal synchronization accompanying memory processing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):759-760.   (Google)
Abstract: In their target article, Ruchkin et al. propose sustained neuronal interaction of prefrontal and posterior cortex involved in memory-storage mechanisms with respect to electrophysiological findings on the relationship of short-term and long-term memory processes. We will evaluate this claim in light of recent evidence from our laboratory on EEG coherence analysis of memory processes accompanying language comprehension
Weitze, Marc-Denis (1997). Searle, Edelman und die evolution Des bewusstseins: Mit neurobiologischen argumenten. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Wenstrup, Jeffrey J. (1998). Combination-sensitive neurons: A flexible neural strategy for analyzing correlated elements in sounds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):286-287.   (Google)
Abstract: Combination-sensitive neurons serve as the fundamental processing unit in Sussman and colleagues' proposal for the neural representation of stop consonants. This commentary describes recent studies in the mustached bat that show how ubiquitous and flexible this neural strategy can be. Sussman et al.'s proposal is an important contribution to a neuroethological consideration of speech perception
Werning, Markus & Werning, M. (online). Conceptual fingerprints: Lexical decomposition by means of frames – a neuro-cognitive model.   (Google)
Werner, M. D. Gerhard (2004). Siren call of metaphor: Subverting the proper task of system neuroscience. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press).   (Google)
Abstract: Under the assumption that nervous systems form a distinct category among the objects in Nature, applying metaphors of psychological and behavioral science disciplines is flawed and invites confusion. Moreover, such practices obscure and detract from the primary task of Neurophysiology: to investigate the intrinsic properties of nervous systems, uncontaminated with concepts borrowed from other disciplines. A comprehensive fundamental theory of nervous systems is expected to have the character of high dimensional nonlinear systems in which state space transitions, set in motion by external influences, self-organize to dynamic state space configuration with consequences for behavior
White, Elliott (1992). The End of the Empty Organism: Neurobiology and the Sciences of Human Action. Praeger.   (Google)
, Ross (ed.) (2010). What is Addiction? MIT Press.   (Google)
Wilczynski, Walter (2001). Brain allometry: Correlated variation in cytoarchitectonics and neurochemistry? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):297-298.   (Google)
Wilkins, Lee (2008). Connecting care and duty : How neuroscience and feminist ethics can contribute to understanding professional moral development. In Stephen J. A. Ward & Herman Wasserman (eds.), Media Ethics Beyond Borders: A Global Perspective. Heinemann.   (Google)
Wilke, Marko (2006). How relevant are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental neuroscientist's perspective on a new model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):143-143.   (Google)
Abstract: Blair boldly proposes a model integrating different aspects of intelligence. Its real-life value can be put to the test by using programs designed to develop children's abilities in areas predicted to be crucial for minimizing adverse outcome. Until support from such programs is available, the model is an interesting hypothesis, albeit with remarkable possible repercussions. As such, it seems worthy of further development. (Published Online April 5 2006)
Williams, Justin H. G.; Whiten, Andrew; Suddendorf, Thomas & Perrett, David I. (2001). Imitation, mirror neurons and autism. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google)
Abstract: Various deficits in the cognitive functioning of people with autism have been documented in recent years but these provide only partial explanations for the condition. We focus instead on an imitative disturbance involving difficulties both in copying actions and in inhibiting more stereotyped mimicking, such as echolalia. A candidate for the neural basis of this disturbance may be found in a recently discovered class of neurons in frontal cortex, 'mirror neurons' (MNs). These neurons show activity in relation both to specific actions performed by self and matching actions performed by others, providing a potential bridge between minds. MN systems exist in primates without imitative and ‘theory of mind’ abilities and we suggest that in order for them to have become utilized to perform social cognitive functions, sophisticated cortical neuronal systems have evolved in which MNs function as key elements. Early developmental failures of MN systems are likely to result in a consequent cascade of developmental impairments characterised by the clinical syndrome of autism
Wilson, Stephen (ed.) (2003). The Bloomsbury Book of the Mind: Key Writings on the Mind From Plato and the Buddha Through Shakespeare, Descartes, and Freud to the Latest Discoveries of Neuroscience. Bloomsbury.   (Google)
Wilson, Daniel R. (1994). The Darwinian roots of human neurosis. Acta Biotheoretica 42 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper offers contextual and integrating comments about sex, evolution and psychopathology as a point of departure toward a new and more scientific understanding of human neurosis. The evolved roots of neurotic behavior are firmly linked to theorems of evolution, which is emerging as the basic science of psychopathology. Evolutionary tenets serve to: 1) redefine key aspects of neuroses, 2) place neurotic behavior in a broad and integrated evolutionary context, and 3) pose basic questions for all psychopathology. Readers who wish to expand, clarify or confirm elements of might well consult basic books in either field as a passing familiarity with psychiatry and biology is assumed
Wilke, Marko (2007). The neuronal basis of intelligence: A Riddle, wrapped in a mystery? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):172-173.   (Google)
Wollheim, Richard (1975). Neurosis and the artist. Leonardo 8 (2):155--157.   (Google)
Wolf, Susan M. (2008). Neurolaw: The big question. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (1):21 – 22.   (Google)
Wolpe, Paul Root; Foster, Kenneth R. & Langleben, Daniel D. (2005). Response to commentators on "emerging neurotechnologies for lie-detection: Promises and perils?". American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):W5.   (Google)
Wood, Rachel & Stuart, Susan A. J. (2009). Aplasic phantoms and the mirror neuron system: An enactive, developmental perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):487-504.   (Google)
Abstract: Phantom limb experiences demonstrate an unexpected degree of fragility inherent in our self-perceptions. This is perhaps most extreme when congenitally absent limbs are experienced as phantoms. Aplasic phantoms highlight fundamental questions about the physiological bases of self-experience and the ontogeny of a physical, embodied sense of the self. Some of the most intriguing of these questions concern the role of mirror neurons in supporting the development of self–other mappings and hence the emergence of phantom experiences of congenitally absent limbs. In this paper, we will examine the hypothesis that aplasic phantom limb experience is the result of an ontogenetic interplay between body schemas and mirror neuron activity and that this interplay is founded on embedding in a social context. Phantom limb experience has been associated with the persistence of subjective experience of a part of the body after deafferentation through surgical or traumatic removal. We maintain that limited association is inconsistent with the extent to which phantom limb experience is reported by aplasic individuals
Woody, J. Melvin & Phillips, Jamie L. (1995). Freud's project for a scientific psychology after 100 years: The unconscious mind in the era of cognitive neuroscience. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2:123-34.   (Google)
Wood, Jacqueline N. (2004). Social cognitive neuroscience: The perspective shift in progress. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):360-361.   (Google)
Abstract: Krueger & Funder (K&F) describe social cognitive research as being flawed by its emphasis on performance errors and biases. They argue that a perspective shift is necessary to give balance to the field. However, such a shift may already be occurring with the emergence of social cognitive neuroscience leading to new theories and research that focus on normal social cognition
Wright, J. J. (1997). Local attractor dynamics will introduce further information to synchronous neuronal fields. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):701-702.   (Google)
Abstract: Simulations and analytic considerations show that synchronisation occurs in delay neural networks at the surrounds of externally driven sites. In the synchronous fields, network transmission has a static transfer function and H(X|R,C) is minimal. But when autonomous local states with attractor dynamics develop in the network, H(X|R,C) is not minimized. Physiological realism may therefore require some modifications in application of coherent infomax
Wright, Gordon Herbert (2007). The Anatomy of Metaphor: A Neurological Analysis of Language or, More Pretentiously, Principia Neurologica Philosophiae. G.H. Wright.   (Google)
Wu, Kevin Chien-Chang (2008). Soul-making in neuroimaging? American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):21 – 22.   (Google)
Wynn, Jonathan K. & Green, Michael F. (2006). Backward masking in schizophrenia: Neuropsychological, electrophysiological, and functional neuroimaging findings. In gmen, Haluk; Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. (Pp. 171-184). Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. Xi, 410 Pp.   (Google)
Yagisawa, Takashi (1994). Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's The Language-of-Thought Relation and its Implications. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):287-96.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Young, Andrew W. (1995). Neuropsychology of awareness. In Antti Revonsuo & M. Kampinnen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Young, Andrew W. (2000). Wondrous strange: The neuropsychology of abnormal beliefs. Mind and Language 15 (1):47–73.   (Google | More links)
Zaidel, Dahlia W. (1999). Neuronal connectivity, regional differentiation, and brain damage in humans. [Journal (Paginated)] 22 (5):854-855.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When circumscribed brain regions are damaged in humans, highly specific iimpairments in language, memory, problem solving, and cognition are observed. Neurosurgery such as "split brain" or hemispherectomy, for example has shown that encompassing regions, the left and right cerebral hemispheres each control human behavior in unique ways. Observations stretching over 100 years of patients with unilateral focal brain damage have revealed, withouth the theoretical benefits of "cognitive neuroscience" or "cognitive psychology," that human behavior is indeed controlled by the brain and its neurons
Zegura, Stephen L. (1997). Color categories and biology: Considerations from molecular genetics, neurobiology, and evolutionary theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):211-212.   (Google)
Zigmond, Michael J. (2003). Implementing ethics in the professions: Preparing guidelines on scientific communication for the society for neuroscience. Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  In 1994, the governing council of the Society for Neuroscience was asked to make a brief statement on an issue regarding responsible conduct in publishing. The present article reviews how that initial request grew over the next four years into a lengthy document. Drawing on that experience, which was presided over by the author, comments are made about the potential impact of such guidelines, the lessons learned, and the proper role of professional societies in promoting responsible conduct in research

7.2a Imaging and Localization

Anderson, Michael L. (2007). Massive redeployment, exaptation, and the functional integration of cognitive operations. Synthese 159 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components-originally developed to serve some specific purpose-were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses three such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them. Then, using this account as a background, the essay considers the implications of these findings for an account of the functional integration of cognitive operations. For instance, MRH suggests that in order to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice in cognitive neuroscience. This change of methodology will motivate (even perhaps necessitate) the development of a new, domain-neutral vocabulary for characterizing the contribution of individual brain areas to larger functional complexes, and direct particular attention to the question of how these various area roles are integrated and coordinated to result in the observed cognitive effect. Finally, the details of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports should tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing evidence of the role of “motor” areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of “language” areas like Broca’s area in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control
Anderson, Michael L. (2007). The massive redeployment hypothesis and the functional topography of the brain. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):143-174.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies of redeployment, and compared and contrasted with other theories of the localization of function
Avison, M. J. (2002). Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Absolutely nothing. Brain and Mind 3:367-73.   (Google)
Bechtel, William P. (2001). Decomposing and localizing vision: An exemplar for cognitive neuroscience. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Bechtel, William P. (2002). Decomposing the brain: A long term pursuit. Brain and Mind 3 (1):229-242.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends cognitive neuroscience’s project of developing mechanistic explan- ations of cognitive processes through decomposition and localization against objections raised by William Uttal in The New Phrenology. The key issue between Uttal and researchers pursuing cognitive neuroscience is that Uttal bets against the possibility of decomposing mental operations into component elementary operations which are localized in distinct brain regions. The paper argues that it is through advancing and revising what are likely to be overly simplistic and incorrect decompositions that the goals of cognitive neuroscience are likely to be achieved
Bechtel, William P. & Stufflebeam, Robert S. (1997). PET: Exploring the myth and the method. Philosophy Of Science 64 (4).   (Google)
Berridge, Kent C. (2009). Wanting and liking: Observations from the neuroscience and psychology laboratory. Inquiry 52 (4):378 – 398.   (Google)
Abstract: Different brain mechanisms seem to mediate wanting and liking for the same reward. This may have implications for the modular nature of mental processes, and for understanding addictions, compulsions, free will and other aspects of desire. A few wanting and liking phenomena are presented here, together with discussion of some of these implications
Blair, James R. & Perschardt, Karina S. (2001). Empathy: A unitary circuit or a set of dissociable neuro-cognitive systems? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):27-28.   (Google)
Abstract: We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder
Bogen, James (2002). Experiment and observation. In The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Bogen, James (2002). Epistemological custard pies from functional brain imaging. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):S59-S71.   (Google | More links)
Bogen, James (2001). Functional imaging evidence: Some epistemic hotspots. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Buller, David J. & Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2000). Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity. Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result from it are adaptive responses to local conditions, not past evolutionary environments. If different individuals share common environ- ments, however, they may develop similar “modules,” and this process can mimic the development of genetically specified modules in the evolutionary psychologist’s sense
Burock, Marc, Over‐interpreting functional neuroimages.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive neuroscientists use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure properties of a participant’s brain during a cognitive task. These imaging results are transformed into compelling pictures of brain activity using statistical models. I will argue that, for a broad class of experiments, neuroimaging experts have a tendency to over‐interpret the functional significance of their data. This over‐interpretation appears to follow from contentious theoretical assumptions about the mind‐brain connection, and from a propensity to conflate the anatomical location of a statistically‐significant correlation with knowledge of the mechanistic functioning at that location
Celone, Kim & Stern, Chantal (2009). A neuroimaging perspective on the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) in educational and legal systems. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):28 – 29.   (Google)
Chaminade, Thierry & Decety, Jean (2001). A common framework for perception and action: Neuroimaging evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):879-882.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years, neurophysiological evidence has accumulated in favor of a common coding between perception and execution of action. We review findings from recent neuroimaging experiments in the action domain with three complementary perspectives: perception of action, covert action triggered by perception, and reproduction of perceived action (imitation). All studies point to the parietal cortex as a key region for body movement representation, both observed and performed
Cleeremans, Axel & Maia, Tiago V. (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):397-404.   (Google)
Abstract: Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the ‘enabling factors’ for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-
Cleeremans, Axel (2006). Computational Correlates of Consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology: Progress in Brain Research. Elsevier.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Over the past few years numerous proposals have appeared that attempt to characterize consciousness in terms of what could be called its computational correlates: Principles of information processing with which to characterize the differences between conscious and unconscious processing. Proposed computational correlates include architectural specialization (such as the involvement of specific regions of the brain in conscious processing), properties of representations (such as their stability in time or their strength), and properties of specific processes (such as resonance, synchrony, interactivity, or information integration). In exactly the same way as one can engage in a search for the neural correlates of consciousness, one can thus search for the computational correlates of consciousness. The most direct way of doing is to contrast models of conscious versus unconscious information processing. In this paper, I review these developments and illustrate how computational modeling of specific cognitive processes can be useful in exploring and in formulating putative computational principles through which to capture the differences between conscious and unconscious cognition. What can be gained from such approaches to the problem of consciousness is an understanding of the function it plays in information processing and of the mechanisms that subtend it. Here, I suggest that the central function of consciousness is to make it possible for cognitive agents to exert ?exible, adaptive control over behavior. From this perspective, consciousness is best characterized as involving (1) a graded continuum de?ned over quality of representation, such that availability to consciousness and to cognitive control correlates with properties of representation, and (2) the implication of systems of meta-representations
Cranford, Ronald E. & Killpatrick, Barbara (1981). Tests in the diagnosis of brain death: The role of the radioisotope brain scan. Bioethics Quarterly 3:67-72.   (Google | More links)
Crusio, Wim E. (1997). Neuropsychological inference using a microphrenological approach does not need a locality assumption. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):517-518.   (Google)
Downie, Jocelyn & Hadskis, Michael (2005). Finding the right compass for issue-mapping in neuroimaging. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):27 – 29.   (Google)
Ford, Paul J. & Kubu, Cynthia S. (2005). Caution in leaping from functional imaging to functional neurosurgery. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):23 – 25.   (Google)
Foster, Jonathan K. (1997). The “locality assumption”: Lessons from history and neuroscience? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):518-519.   (Google)
Gerrans, Philip & Stone, Valerie E. (2008). Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and theory of mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity Developmental Components of ToM The Analogy with Modularity of Language Dissociations without Modules The Evidence from Neuroscience Conclusion CiteULike Connotea What's this?
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray & Stewart, C. Matthew (2005). Localization in the brain and other illusions. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray & Stewart, C. Matthew (2004). Neuroscience and the art of single-cell recordings. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):195-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article examines how scientists move from physical measurementsto actual observation of single-cell recordings in the brain. We highlight how easy it is to change the fundamental nature of ourobservations using accepted methodological techniques for manipulatingraw data. Collecting single-cell data is thoroughly pragmatic. Weconclude that there is no deep or interesting difference betweenaccounting for observations by measurements and accounting forobservations by theories
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray & Stewart, C. Matthew (2002). What do brain data really show? Philosophy of Science 69 (3):572-582.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Johnson, Kevin A.; Kozel, F. Andrew; Laken, Steven J. & George, Mark S. (2007). The neuroscience of functional magnetic resonance imaging fmri for deception detection. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):58 – 60.   (Google)
Kennedy, Donald (2005). Neuroimaging: Revolutionary research tool or a post-modern phrenology? American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):19.   (Google)
Klein, Colin (2010). Philosophical issues in neuroimaging. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):186-198.   (Google)
Abstract: Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including the differences between brain scans and ordinary images, the legitimacy of forward inference and reverse inference, and deductive versus probabilistic accounts of NI evidence. I conclude with a discussion of fMRI as exploratory rather than confirmatory evidence, linking this debate to the growing literature on cognitive ontology
Klein, Colin (forthcoming). The dual track theory of moral decision-making: A critique of the neuroimaging evidence. Neuroethics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The dual-track theory of moral reasoning has received considerable attention due to the neuroimaging work of Greene et al. Greene et al. claimed that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are functionally specific: each is active in a wide variety of both cognitive and emotional tasks. I further argue that distinct activation across conditions is not strong evidence for dissociation. This undermines support for the dual-track hypothesis. I further argue that moral decision-making appears to activate a common network that underlies self-projection : the ability to imagine oneself from a variety of viewpoints in a variety of situations. I argue that the utilization of self-projection indicates a continuity between moral decision-making and other kinds of complex social deliberation. This may have normative consequences, but teasing them out will require careful attention to both empirical and philosophical concerns
Landreth, Anthony & Richardson, Robert C. (2004). Localization and the new phrenology: A review essay on William Uttal's the new phrenology. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):107-123.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: William Uttal's The new phrenology is a broad attack on localization in cognitive neuroscience. He argues that even though the brain is a highly differentiated organ, "high level cognitive functions" should not be localized in specific brain regions. First, he argues that psychological processes are not well-defined. Second, he criticizes the methods used to localize psychological processes, including imaging technology: he argues that variation among individuals compromises localization, and that the statistical methods used to construct activation maps are flawed. Neither criticism is compelling. First, as we illustrate, there are behavioral measures which offer at least weak constraints on psychological attribution. Second, though imaging does face methodological difficulties associated with variation among individuals, these are broadly acknowledged; moreover, his specific criticisms of the imaging work, and in particular of fMRI, misrepresent the methodology. In concluding, we suggest a way of framing the issues that might allow us to resolve differences between localizationist models and more distributed models empirically
Leo, John R. & Cohen, D. (2003). Broken brains or flawed studies? A critical review of ADHD neuroimaging research. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):29-55.   (Google)
Lloyd, Dan (2002). Studying the mind from the inside out. Brain and Mind 3 (1):243-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Good research requires, among other virtues,(i) methods that yield stable experimentalobservations without arbitrary (post hoc)assumptions, (ii) logical interpretations ofthe sources of observations, and (iii) soundinferences to general causal mechanismsexplaining experimental results by placing themin larger explanatory contexts. In TheNew Phrenology , William Uttal examines theresearch tradition of localization, and findsit deficient in all three virtues, whetherbased on lesion studies or on new technologiesfor functional brain imaging. In this paper Iconsider just the arguments concerning brainimaging, especially functional MagneticResonance Imaging. I think that Uttal is tooharsh in his methodological critique, butcorrect in his assessment of the conceptuallimitations of localist evidence. I proposeinstead a data-driven test for assessingrelative modularity in brain images, and showits use in a secondary analysis of fMRI datafrom the National fMRI Data Center( Although the analysis is alimited pilot study, it offers additionalempirical challenge to localism
Lloyd, Dan (2000). Terra cognita: From functional neuroimaging to the map of the mind. Brain and Mind 1 (1):93-116.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For more than a century the paradigm inspiringcognitive neuroscience has been modular and localist.Contemporary research in functional brain imaginggenerally relies on methods favorable to localizingparticular functions in one or more specific brainregions. Meanwhile, connectionist cognitive scientistshave celebrated the computational powers ofdistributed processing, and pioneered methods forinterpreting distributed representations. This papertakes a connectionist approach to functionalneuroimaging. A tabulation of 35 PET (positronemission tomography) experiments strongly indicatesdistributed function for at least the ''medium sized''anatomical units, the cortical Brodmann areas. Moreimportant, when these PET experiments were interpretedas distributed representations, multidimensionalscaling revealed a ''brain activation space'' with asalient structure organized primarily by the sensorymodality of the stimulus, and secondarily by the typeof motor response. These results suggest that currentanalytical techniques in functional neuroimagingshould be augmented by distributed processinganalyses, and that these analyses may lead to manydiscoveries about the structure of ''inner space.''
Mole, Christopher; Kubatzky, Corey; Plate, Jan; Waller, Rawdon; Dobbs, Marilee & Nardone, Marc (2007). Faces and brains: The limitations of brain scanning in cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):197 – 207.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The use of brain scanning now dominates the cognitive sciences, but important questions remain to be answered about what, exactly, scanning can tell us. One corner of cognitive science that has been transformed by the use of neuroimaging, and that a scanning enthusiast might point to as proof of scanning's importance, is the study of face perception. Against this view, we argue that the use of scanning has, in fact, told us rather little about the information processing underlying face perception and that it is not likely to tell us much more
Mundale, Jennifer (2002). Concepts of localization: Balkanization in the brain. Brain and Mind 3 (3):313-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A spate of recent anti-localizationist publications have re-ignited the old debate about the localization of function. Many of the recent attacks on localization, however, are directed at what I will argue to be a narrow and outmoded view of localization, and thus have little conceptual or empirical impact. What I hope to present here is an analysis of functional localization that more adequately reflects the sophistication and complexity of its use in neuroscientific research, both historically and recently. Proceeding first by way of contrast, I examine theanti-localizationist positions of holism andequipotentiationism. Then, I present a four-fold analysis of localization according to physical scope, physical kind, functional scope, and functional kind. Next, I turn to a discussion of the heuristic value oflocalization in deciphering structure-functionrelationships. Finally, I hope to show that the overall view of functional localization that emerges from these considerations constitutes a much more elusive target than its critics assume. It serves to mitigate, and insome instances even defeat, some forms ofanti-localizationist criticisms
Mundale, Jennifer (2001). Neuroanatomical foundations of cognition: Connecting the neuronal level with the study of higher brain areas. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1999). Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong
Opie, Jonathan & O'Brien, Gerard (1999). A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:127-148.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are _dissociable_, and on the other, by the _classical_ computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of _connectionism; _and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: _phenomenal experience consists in the explicit_ _representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks_..
Opie, Jonathan (1998). Consciousness: A Connectionist Perspective. Dissertation, University of Adelaide   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: To my father, who got me thinking, and to Tricia, who provided the love, support, and encouragement that enabled me to see this through
Roskies, Adina L. (2007). Are neuroimages like photographs of the brain? Philosophy of Science 74 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Images come in many varieties, but for evidential purposes, photographs are privileged. Recent advances in neuroimaging provide us with a new type of image that is used as scientific evidence. Brain images are epistemically compelling, in part because they are liable to be viewed as akin to photographs of brain activity. Here I consider features of photography that underlie the evidential status we accord it, and argue that neuroimaging diverges from photography in ways that seriously undermine the photographic analogy. While neuroimaging remains an important source of scientific evidence, proper interpretation of brain images is much more complex than it appears. ‡This work was supported in part by a grant from the Leslie Humanities Center at Dartmouth College. I thank John Kulvicki for helpful comments, and Kim Sterelny, for making it possible for me to spend some time at the ANU with a grant from the Australian Research Council. †To contact the author, please write to: Dartmouth College, Department of Philosophy, Hanover, NH 03755; e-mail:
Roskies, Adina L. (2008). Neuroimaging and inferential distance. Neuroethics 1 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that although neuroimaging does bear important similarities to photography, the details of the generation and analysis of neuroimages significantly complicate the relation of the image to the data. Neuroimages are not inferentially proximate, but their seeming so increases the potential for misinterpretation. This suggests caution in appealing to such images in the public domain
Schutter, D.; van Honk, J. & Panksepp, Jaak (2004). Introducing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and its property of causal inference in investigating brain-function relationships. Synthese 141 (2):155-73.   (Google)
Abstract:   Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a method capable of transiently modulating neural excitability. Depending on the stimulation parameters information processing in the brain can be either enhanced or disrupted. This way the contribution of different brain areas involved in mental processes can be studied, allowing a functional decomposition of cognitive behavior both in the temporal and spatial domain, hence providing a functional resolution of brain/mind processes. The aim of the present paper is to argue that TMS with its ability to draw causal inferences on function and its neural representations is a valuable neurophysiological tool for investigating the causal basis of neuronal functions and can provide substantive insight into the modern interdisciplinary and (anti)reductionist neurophilosophical debates concerning the relationships between brain functions and mental abilities. Thus, TMS can serve as a heuristic method for resolving causal issues in an arena where only correlative tools have traditionally been available
Stinson, Catherine (2009). Searching for the Source of Executive Attention. PSYCHE 15 (1):137-154.   (Google)
Abstract: William James presaged, and Alan Allport voiced criticisms of cause theories of executive attention for involving a homunculus who directs attention. I review discussions of this problem, and argue that existing philosophical denials of the problem depend on equivocations between different senses of “Cartesian error”. Another sort of denial tries to get around the problem by offering empirical evidence that such an executive attention director exists in prefrontal cortex. I argue that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that an executive director can be localized in prefrontal cortex unless dubious assumptions are made, and that computational models purporting to support these assumptions either beg the question, or fail to model executive attention in terms of cause theories.
Stufflebeam, Robert S. & Bechtel, William P. (1997). PET: Exploring the myth and the method. Philsophy of Science 64 (4):95-106.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Trehub, Arnold (1991). The Cognitive Brain. MIT Press.   (Google)
Uttal, William R. (2002). Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Plenty, but not everything. Brain and Mind 3:375-79.   (Google)
Uttal, William R. (2002). Response to Bechtel and Lloyd. Brain and Mind 3 (1):261-273.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The field of cognitive imaging is explodingboth in terms of the amount of our scientificresources dedicated to it and the associatedpublication rate. However, all of this effortis based on a critical question – Do cognitivemodules exist? Both of the reviewers of my book(Uttal, 2001) and I agree that this questionhas not yet been satisfactorily answered and,depending on the ultimate answer, the cognitiveimaging approach as well as some other parts ofthe quest for mechanistic models of mind mightnot be successful. Our views of how our scienceshould respond to this serious problem,however, are quite different. Both ProfessorBechtel and Lloyd argue for an optimisticattack on the problem of the localization ofcognitive processes in the brain based on thehistory of other sciences. I argue that arealistic appreciation of the limits of thisapproach should temper the enthusiasm for whatultimately will go the way of other attempts tounravel the mind-brain problem
Uttal, William R. (2001). The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. MIT Press.   (Cited by 181 | Google)
van Orden, G. C. (1997). Functional neuroimages fail to discover pieces of mind in the parts of the brain. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):85-94.   (Google)
Zawidski, Tadeusz & Bechtel, William P. (2004). Gall's legacy revisited: Decomposition and localization in cognitive neuroscience. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)

7.2b Representation in Neuroscience

Akins, Kathleen (1996). Of sensory systems and the "aboutness" of mental states. Journal of Philosophy 93 (7).   (Google)
Atmanspacher, Harald, Interpreting neurodynamics: Concepts and facts.   (Google)
Abstract: The dynamics of neuronal systems, briefly neurodynamics, has developed into an attractive and influential research branch within neuroscience. In this paper, we discuss a number of conceptual issues in neurodynamics that are important for an appropriate interpretation and evaluation of its results. We demonstrate their relevance for selected topics of theoretical and empirical work. In particular, we refer to the notions of determinacy and stochasticity in neurodynamics across levels of microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic descriptions. The issue of correlations between neural, mental and behavioral states is also addressed in some detail. We propose an informed discussion of conceptual foundations with respect to neurobiological results as a viable step to a fruitful future philosophy of neuroscience
Atmanspacher, Harald (ms). The significance of causally coupled, stable neuronal assemblies for the psychological time arrow.   (Google)
Abstract: Stable neuronal assemblies are generally regarded as neural correlates of mental representations. Their temporal sequence corresponds to the experience of a direction of time, sometimes called the psychological time arrow. We show that the stability of particular, biophysically motivated models of neuronal assemblies, called coupled map lattices, is supported by causal interactions among neurons and obstructed by non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons. This surprising relation between causality and stability suggests that those neuronal assemblies that are stable due to causal neuronal interactions, and thus correlated with mental representations, generate a psychological time arrow. Yet this impact of causal interactions among neurons on the directed sequence of mental representations does not rule out the possibility of mentally less efficacious non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons
Baianu, I. C.; Brown, R.; Georgescu, G. & Glazebrook, J. F. (2006). Complex non-linear biodynamics in categories, higher dimensional algebra and łukasiewicz–moisil topos: Transformations of neuronal, genetic and neoplastic networks. Axiomathes 16 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract:   A categorical, higher dimensional algebra and generalized topos framework for Łukasiewicz–Moisil Algebraic–Logic models of non-linear dynamics in complex functional genomes and cell interactomes is proposed. Łukasiewicz–Moisil Algebraic–Logic models of neural, genetic and neoplastic cell networks, as well as signaling pathways in cells are formulated in terms of non-linear dynamic systems with n-state components that allow for the generalization of previous logical models of both genetic activities and neural networks. An algebraic formulation of variable ‘next-state functions’ is extended to a Łukasiewicz–Moisil Topos with an n-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil Algebraic Logic subobject classifier description that represents non-random and non-linear network activities as well as their transformations in developmental processes and carcinogenesis. The unification of the theories of organismic sets, molecular sets and Robert Rosen’s (M,R)-systems is also considered here in terms of natural transformations of organismal structures which generate higher dimensional algebras based on consistent axioms, thus avoiding well known logical paradoxes occurring with sets. Quantum bionetworks, such as quantum neural nets and quantum genetic networks, are also discussed and their underlying, non-commutative quantum logics are considered in the context of an emerging Quantum Relational Biology
Banerjee, Arunava (2001). The roles played by external input and synaptic modulations in the dynamics of neuronal systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):811-812.   (Google)
Abstract: The framework within which Tsuda proposes his solution for transitory dynamics between attractor states is flawed from a neurological perspective. We present a more genuine framework and discuss the roles that external input and synaptic modulations play in the evolution of the dynamics of neuronal systems. Chaotic itinerancy, it is argued, is not necessary for transitory dynamics
Beaman, C. Philip (2000). Neurons amongst the symbols? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):468-470.   (Google)
Abstract: Page's target article presents an argument for the use of localist, connectionist models in future psychological theorising. The “manifesto” marshalls a set of arguments in favour of localist connectionism and against distributed connectionism, but in doing so misses a larger argument concerning the level of psychological explanation that is appropriate to a given domain
Borisyuk, Roman (2001). The puzzle of chaotic neurodynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):812-813.   (Google)
Abstract: Experimental evidence and mathematical/computational models show that in many cases chaotic, nonregular oscillations are adequate to describe the dynamical behaviour of neural systems. Further work is needed to understand the meaning of this dynamical regime for modelling information processing in the brain
Breidbach, Olaf (1999). Internal representations--a prelude for neurosemantics. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):403-419.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brown, Richard (2006). What is a brain state? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain
Cappuccio, Massimiliano (2009). Constructing the space of action: From bio-robotics to mirror neurons. World Futures 65 (2):126 – 132.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article distinguishes three archetypal ways of articulating spatial cognition: (1) via metric representation of objective geometry, (2) via somatosensory constitution of the peripersonal environment, and (3) via pragmatic comprehension of the finalistic sense of action. The last one is documented by neuroscientific studies concerning mirror neurons. Bio-robotic experiments implementing mirror functions confirm the constitutive role of goal-oriented actions in spatial processes
Christoff, Kalina & Keramatian, Kamyar (2008). Abstraction of mental representations : Theoretical considerations and neuroscientific evidence. In Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1986). Cognitive neurobiology: A computational hypothesis for laminar cortex. Biology and Philosophy 1 (1):25-51.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper outlines the functional capacities of a novel scheme for cognitive representation and computation, and it explores the possible implementation of this scheme in the massively parallel organization of the empirical brain. The suggestion is that the brain represents reality by means of positions in suitably constitutes phase spaces; and the brain performs computations on these representations by means of coordinate transformations from one phase space to another. This scheme may be implemented in the brain in two distinct forms: (1) as a phase-space sandwich, which may explain certain laminar structures, such as cerebral cortex and the superior colliculus; and (2) as a neural matrix, which may explain other structures, such as the beautifully orthogonal architecture of the cerebellum
Churchland, Patricia S. & Sejnowski, Terrence J. (1989). Neural representation and neural computation. In L. Nadel (ed.), Neural Connections, Mental Computations. MIT Press.   (Cited by 78 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cliff, D. (1990). Computational Neuroethology: A Provisional Manifesto. In Jean-Arcady Meyer & Stewart W. Wilson (eds.), From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of The First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems). Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 103 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Collins, Mike (2009). The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems. Dissertation, City University of New York   (Google)
Abstract: I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms of teleofunction, explicated in terms of natural selection. To explain (ii), we begin by recognizing that representational states do not have content, that is, they are neither true nor false except insofar as they both “point to” or “refer” to something, as well as “say” something regarding whatever it is they are about. To distinguish veridical from false representations, there must be a way for these separate aspects to come apart; hence, we explain (ii) by providing independent theories of what I call f-reference and f-predication (the ‘f’ simply connotes ‘fundamental’, to distinguish these things from their natural language counterparts). Causal theories of representation typically founder on error, or on what Fodor has called the disjunction problem. Resemblance or isomorphism theories typically founder on what I’ve called the non-uniqueness problem, which is that isomorphisms and resemblance are practically unconstrained and so representational content cannot be uniquely determined. These traditional problems provide the motivation for my theory, the structural preservation theory, as follows. F-reference, like reference, is a specific, asymmetric relation, as is causation. F-predication, like predication, is a non-specific relation, as predicates typically apply to many things, just as many relational systems can be isomorphic to any given relational system. Putting these observations together, a promising strategy is to explain f-reference via causal history and f-predication via something like isomorphism between relational systems. This dissertation should be conceptualized as having three parts. After motivating and characterizing the problem in chapter 1, the first part is the negative project, where I review and critique Dretske’s, Fodor’s, and Millikan’s theories in chapters 2-4. Second, I construct my theory about the nature of representation in chapter 5 and defend it from objections in chapter 6. In chapters 7-8, which constitute the third and final part, I address the question of how representation is implemented in biological systems. In chapter 7 I argue that single-cell intracortical recordings taken from awake Macaque monkeys performing a cognitive task provide empirical evidence for structural preservation theory, and in chapter 8 I use the empirical results to illustrate, clarify, and refine the theory.
Coulter, Jeff (1995). The informed neuron: Issues in the use of information theory in the behavioral sciences. Minds and Machines 5 (4):583-96.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Eliasmith, Chris (2000). How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content. Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content
Freeman, Walter J. (1997). Nonlinear neurodynamics of intentionality. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (2-3):291-304.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Friederici, Angela D. & von Cramon, D. Yves (2000). Syntax in the brain: Linguistic versus neuroanatomical specificity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):32-33.   (Google)
Abstract: We criticize the lack of neuroanatomical precision in the Grodzinsky target article. We propose a more precise neuroanatomical characterization of syntactic processing and suggest that syntactic procedures are supported by the left frontal operculum in addition to the anterior part of the superior temporal gyrus, which appears to be associated with syntactic knowledge representation
Garson, James W. (2003). The introduction of information into neurobiology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):926-936.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The first use of the term “information” to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrian's The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrian's use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic information. I suggest that Adrian's concept of information can be to derive a concept of arbitrariness or semioticity in representation. This in turn provides one way of resolving some of the challenges that confront recent attempts in the philosophy of biology to restrict the notion of information to those causal connections that can in some sense be referred to as arbitrary or semiotic
Garson, Justin, The introduction of information into neurobiology.   (Google)
Abstract: The first use of the term "information" to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs 20 years prior to Shannon`s (1948) work, in Edgar Adrian`s The Basis of Sensation (1928). Although, at least throughout the 1920s and early 30s, the term "information" does not appear in Adrian`s scientific writings to describe the content of nervous impulse, the notion that the structure of nervous impulse constitutes a type of message subject to certain constraints plays an important role in all of his writings throughout the period. The appearance of the concept of information in Adrian`s work raises at least two important questions: (i) what were the relevant factors that motivated Adrian`s use of the concept of information? (ii) What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The first question involves an account of the application of communications technology in neurobiology as well as the historical and scientific background of Adrian`s major scientific achievement, which was the recording of the action potential of a single sensory neuron. The response to the second question involves an explication of Adrian`s concept of information and an evaluation of how it may be situated in relation to more contemporary philosophical explications of a semantic concept of information. I suggest that Adrian`s concept of information places limitations on the sorts of systems that are referred to as information carriers by causal and functional accounts of information
Grush, Rick (2003). In defense of some "cartesian" assumption concerning the brain and its operation. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):53-92.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland's bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by dynamical systems theory and situated robotics to the effect that cognitive activity does not involve representations. Both of these strands depend not only on a shift of emphasis from higher cognitive functions to things like sensorimotor processes, but also depend on a certain understanding of how sensorimotor processes are implemented - as closed-loop control systems. I describe a much more sophisticated model of sensorimotor processing that is not only more powerful and robust than simple closed-loop control, but for which there is great evidence that it is implemented in the nervous system. The is the emulation theory of representation, according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensorimotor counterfactuals. I then show that the emulation framework is immune to the radical arguments, and makes apparent why the brain is a component in the cognitive activity, and exactly what the representations are in sensorimotor control
Grush, Rick (2001). The semantic challenge to computational neuroscience. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Held, Carsten; Knauff, Markus & Vosgerau, Gottfried (eds.) (2006). Mental Models and the Mind: Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: "Cognitive psychology," "cognitive neuroscience," and "philosophy of mind" are names for three very different scientific fields, but they label aspects of the same scientific goal: to understand the nature of mental phenomena. Today, the three disciplines strongly overlap under the roof of the cognitive sciences. The book's purpose is to present views from the different disciplines on one of the central theories in cognitive science: the theory of mental models. Cognitive psychologists report their research on the representation and processing of mental models in human memory. Cognitive neuroscientists demonstrate how the brain processes visual and spatial mental models and which neural processes underlie visual and spatial thinking. Philosophers report their ideas about the role of mental models in relation to perception, emotion, representation, and intentionality. The single articles have different and mutually complementing goals: to introduce new empirical methods and approaches, to report new experimental results, and to locate competing approaches for their interpretation in the cross-disciplinary debate. The book is strongly interdisciplinary in character. It is especially addressed to researchers in any field related to mental models theory as both a reference book and an overview of present research on the topic in other disciplines. However, it is also an ideal reader for a specialized graduate course
Howard, Harry (2004). Neuromimetic Semantics: Coordination, Quantification, and Collective Predicates. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: This book attempts to marry truth-conditional semantics with cognitive linguistics in the church of computational neuroscience. To this end, it examines the truth-conditional meanings of coordinators, quantifiers, and collective predicates as neurophysiological phenomena that are amenable to a neurocomputational analysis. Drawing inspiration from work on visual processing, and especially the simple/complex cell distinction in early vision (V1), we claim that a similar two-layer architecture is sufficient to learn the truth-conditional meanings of the logical coordinators and logical quantifiers. As a prerequisite, much discussion is given over to what a neurologically plausible representation of the meanings of these items would look like. We eventually settle on a representation in terms of correlation, so that, for instance, the semantic input to the universal operators (e.g. and, all)is represented as maximally correlated, while the semantic input to the universal negative operators (e.g. nor, no)is represented as maximally anticorrelated. On the basis this representation, the hypothesis can be offered that the function of the logical operators is to extract an invariant feature from natural situations, that of degree of correlation between parts of the situation. This result sets up an elegant formal analogy to recent models of visual processing, which argue that the function of early vision is to reduce the redundancy inherent in natural images. Computational simulations are designed in which the logical operators are learned by associating their phonological form with some degree of correlation in the inputs, so that the overall function of the system is as a simple kind of pattern recognition. Several learning rules are assayed, especially those of the Hebbian sort, which are the ones with the most neurological support. Learning vector quantization (LVQ) is shown to be a perspicuous and efficient means of learning the patterns that are of interest. We draw a formal parallelism between the initial, competitive layer of LVQ and the simple cell layer in V1, and between the final, linear layer of LVQ and the complex cell layer in V1, in that the initial layers are both selective, while the final layers both generalize. It is also shown how the representations argued for can be used to draw the traditionally-recognized inferences arising from coordination and quantification, and why the inference of subalternacy breaks down for collective predicates. Finally, the analogies between early vision and the logical operators allow us to advance the claim of cognitive linguistics that language is not processed by proprietary algorithms, but rather by algorithms that are general to the entire brain. Thus in the debate between objectivist and experiential metaphysics, this book falls squarely into the camp of the latter. Yet it does so by means of a rigorous formal, mathematical, and neurological exposition – in contradiction of the experiential claim that formal analysis has no place in the understanding of cognition. To make our own counter-claim as explicit as possible, we present a sketch of the LVQ structure in terms of mereotopology, in which the initial layer of the network performs topological operations, while the final layer performs mereological operations. The book is meant to be self-contained, in the sense that it does not assume any prior knowledge of any of the many areas that are touched upon. It therefore contains mini-summaries of biological visual processing, especially the retinocortical and ventral /what?/ parvocellular pathways computational models of neural signaling, and in particular the reduction of the Hodgkin-Huxley equations to the connectionist and integrate-and-fire neurons Hebbian learning rules and the elaboration of learning vector quantization the linguistic pathway in the left hemisphere memory and the hippocampus truth-conditional vs. image-schematic semantics objectivist vs. experiential metaphysics and mereotopology. All of the simulations are implemented in MATLAB, and the code is available from the book’s website. • The discovery of several algorithmic similarities between visison and semantics. • The support of all of this by means of simulations, and the packaging of all of this in a coherent theoretical framework
Jacobson, Anne Jaap (2003). Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and neuroscience puts in. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):189-204.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If there are indeed two different kinds of representations, and the non-standard ones are the ones referred to in some areas of cognitive neuroscience, then we will have to give up the idea that appealing to inner representations with intentional contents is the defining distinction between cognitive neuroscience and behaviorist psychology (Montgomery, 1995). Further, if the conclusions of this paper are correct, many general accounts of how neural states represent are either false or theoretically ill-motivated
Kayser, Christoph & Logothetis, Nicos (2006). Vision: Stimulating your attention. Current Biology 16 (15):R581-R583.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Attentional selection biases the processing of higher visual areas to particular parts of a scene. Recent experiments show how stimulation of neurons in the frontal eye fields can mimic this process.
Keeley, Brian L. (1999). Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception. Biology and Philosophy 14 (3):395-430.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Kentridge, Robert W. (1995). Symbols, neurons, soap-bubbles and the neural computation underlying cognition. Minds and Machines 4 (4).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A wide range of systems appear to perform computation: what common features do they share? I consider three examples, a digital computer, a neural network and an analogue route finding system based on soap-bubbles. The common feature of these systems is that they have autonomous dynamics — their states will change over time without additional external influence. We can take advantage of these dynamics if we understand them well enough to map a problem we want to solve onto them. Programming consists of arranging the starting state of a system so that the effects of the system''s dynamics on some of its variables corresponds to the effects of the equations which describe the problem to be solved on their variables. The measured dynamics of a system, and hence the computation it may be performing, depend on the variables of the system we choose to attend to. Although we cannot determine which are the appropriate variables to measure in a system whose computation basis is unknown to us I go on to discuss how grammatical classifications of computational tasks and symbolic machine reconstruction techniques may allow us to rule out some measurements of a system from contributing to computation of particular tasks. Finally I suggest that these arguments and techniques imply that symbolic descriptions of the computation underlying cognition should be stochastic and that symbols in these descriptions may not be atomic but may have contents in alternative descriptions
Mandik, Pete (2005). Action-oriented representation. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Often, sensory input underdetermines perception. One such example is the perception of illusory contours. In illusory contour perception, the content of the percept includes the presence of a contour that is absent from the informational content of the sensation. (By “sensation” I mean merely information-bearing events at the transducer level. I intend no further commitment such as the identification of sensations with qualia.) I call instances of perception underdetermined by sensation “underdetermined perception.” The perception of illusory contours is just one kind of underdetermined perception. The focus of this chapter is another kind of underdetermined perception: what I shall call "active perception". Active perception occurs in cases in which the percept, while underdetermined by sensation, is determined by a combination of sensation and action. The phenomenon of active perception has been used by several to argue against the positing of representations in explanations of sensory experience, either by arguing that no representations need be posited or that far fewer than previously thought need be posited. Such views include, but are not limited to those of Gibson (1966, 1986), Churchland
Vereschagin, Alex; Collins, Mike & Mandik, Pete (2007). Evolving artificial minds and brains. In Drew Khlentzos & Andrea Schalley (eds.), Mental States Volume 1: Evolution, function, nature. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: We explicate representational content by addressing how representations that ex- plain intelligent behavior might be acquired through processes of Darwinian evo- lution. We present the results of computer simulations of evolved neural network controllers and discuss the similarity of the simulations to real-world examples of neural network control of animal behavior. We argue that focusing on the simplest cases of evolved intelligent behavior, in both simulated and real organisms, reveals that evolved representations must carry information about the creature’s environ- ments and further can do so only if their neural states are appropriately isomor- phic to environmental states. Further, these informational and isomorphism rela- tions are what are tracked by content attributions in folk-psychological and cognitive scientific explanations of these intelligent behaviors
Mandik, Pete (2002). Synthetic neuroethology. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are used to conduct prosthetically enhanced thought experiments concerning the evolvability of mental representations. Central to this essay is a discussion of the computer simulation and evolution of three-dimensional synthetic animals with neural network controllers. The minimally cognitive behavior of finding food by exhibit- ing positive chemotaxis is simulated with swimming and walking creatures. These simulations form the basis of a discussion of the evolutionary and neurocomputa- tional bases of the incremental emergence of more complex forms of cognition. Other related work has been used to attack computational and representational theories of cognition. In contrast, I argue that the proper understanding of the evolutionary emergence of minimally cognitive behaviors is computational and representational through and through
Mandik, Pete (2003). Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):95-130.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper I discuss one of the key issuesin the philosophy of neuroscience:neurosemantics. The project of neurosemanticsinvolves explaining what it means for states ofneurons and neural systems to haverepresentational contents. Neurosemantics thusinvolves issues of common concern between thephilosophy of neuroscience and philosophy ofmind. I discuss a problem that arises foraccounts of representational content that Icall ``the economy problem'': the problem ofshowing that a candidate theory of mentalrepresentation can bear the work requiredwithin in the causal economy of a mind and anorganism. My approach in the current paper isto explore this and other key themes inneurosemantics through the use of computermodels of neural networks embodied and evolvedin virtual organisms. The models allow for thelaying bare of the causal economies of entireyet simple artificial organisms so that therelations between the neural bases of, forinstance, representation in perception andmemory can be regarded in the context of anentire organism. On the basis of thesesimulations, I argue for an account ofneurosemantics adequate for the solution of theeconomy problem
Ross, William D. (1998). Filling-in while finding out: Guiding behavior by representing information. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):770-771.   (Google)
Abstract: Discriminating behavior depends on neural representations in which the sensory activity patterns guiding different responses are decorrelated from one another. Visual information can often be parsimoniously transformed into these behavioral bridge-locus representations within neuro-computational visuo-spatial maps. Isomorphic inverse-optical world representation is not the goal. Nevertheless, such useful transformations can involve neural filling-in. Such a subpersonal representation of information is consistent with personal-level vision theory
Ryder, Dan (2004). SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation. Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Ryder, Dan & Favorov, Oleg (2001). The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of the cerebral cortex. Brain and Mind 2 (2):161-194.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The ability to predict is the most importantability of the brain. Somehow, the cortex isable to extract regularities from theenvironment and use those regularities as abasis for prediction. This is a most remarkableskill, considering that behaviourallysignificant environmental regularities are noteasy to discern: they operate not only betweenpairs of simple environmental conditions, astraditional associationism has assumed, butamong complex functions of conditions that areorders of complexity removed from raw sensoryinputs. We propose that the brain's basicmechanism for discovering such complexregularities is implemented in the dendritictrees of individual pyramidal cells in thecerebral cortex. Pyramidal cells have 5–8principal dendrites, each of which is capableof learning nonlinear input-to-outputtransfer functions. We propose that eachdendrite is trained, in learning its transferfunction, by all the other principal dendritesof the same cell. These dendrites teach eachother to respond to their separate inputs with matching outputs. Exposed to differentbut related information about the sensoryenvironment, principal dendrites of the samecell tune to functions over environmentalconditions that, while different, are correlated . As a result, the cell as awhole tunes to the source of the regularitiesdiscovered by the cooperating dendrites,creating a new representation. When organizedinto feed-forward/feedback layers, pyramidalcells can build their discoveries on thediscoveries of other cells, graduallyuncovering nature's hidden order. Theresulting associative network is powerfulenough to meet a troubling traditionalobjection to associationism: that it is toosimple an architecture to implement rationalprocesses
Stufflebeam, Robert S. (2001). Brain matters: A case against representations in the brain. In William P. Bechtel, P. M, Valerie , Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Trehub, Arnold (1991). The Cognitive Brain. MIT Press.   (Google)

7.2c Explanation in Neuroscience

Abraham, Tara H. (2003). From theory to data: Representing neurons in the 1940s. Biology and Philosophy 18 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Recent literature on the role of pictorial representation in the life sciences has focused on the relationship between detailed representations of empirical data and more abstract, formal representations of theory. The standard argument is that in both a historical and epistemic sense, this relationship is a directional one: beginning with raw, unmediated images and moving towards diagrams that are more interpreted and more theoretically rich. Using the neural network diagrams of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts as a case study, I argue that while in the empirical sciences, pictorial representation tends to move from data to theory, in areas of the life sciences that are predominantly theoretical, when abstraction occurs at the outset, the relationship between detail and abstraction in pictorial representations can be of a different character
Allen, Colin (ms). Macaque mirror neurons.   (Google)
Abstract: Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view
Amos, A. J. & Wynne, C. D. L. (2000). The organization of organization: Neuronal scaffold or cognitive straitjacket? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):533-534.   (Google)
Abstract: We praise Arbib et al.'s Neural organization for its support of the integration of different levels of analysis, while noting that it does not always achieve what it advocates. We extend this approach into an area of neuropsychological activity in need of the structure offered by Organization at the intersection of the conflated fields of executive function and frontal lobe function
Arbib, Michael A. (1989). Modularity, schemas and neurons: A critique of Fodor. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer.   (Annotation | Google)
Aronson, Jerrold L. (1976). Some dubious neurological assumptions of radical behaviourism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 6 (1):49–60.   (Google | More links)
Atmanspacher, Harald, Interpreting neurodynamics: Concepts and facts.   (Google)
Abstract: The dynamics of neuronal systems, briefly neurodynamics, has developed into an attractive and influential research branch within neuroscience. In this paper, we discuss a number of conceptual issues in neurodynamics that are important for an appropriate interpretation and evaluation of its results. We demonstrate their relevance for selected topics of theoretical and empirical work. In particular, we refer to the notions of determinacy and stochasticity in neurodynamics across levels of microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic descriptions. The issue of correlations between neural, mental and behavioral states is also addressed in some detail. We propose an informed discussion of conceptual foundations with respect to neurobiological results as a viable step to a fruitful future philosophy of neuroscience
Bechtel, William P. (1983). A bridge between cognitive science and neuroscience: The functional architecture of mind. Philosophical Studies 44 (November):319-30.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bechtel, William P. (2002). Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: Why is it important? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):548-558.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The need to align multiple experimental procedures and produce converging results so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon under investigation is real and not an artifact is a commonplace both in scientific practice and discussions of scientific methodology (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Wimsatt 1981). Although sometimes this is the purpose of aligning techniques, often there is a different purpose—multiple techniques are sought to supply different perspectives on the phenomena under investigation that need to be integrated to answer the questions scientists are asking. After introducing this function, I will illustrate it by considering three of the major techniques in cognitive neuroscience for linking cognitive function with neural structure
Bechtel, William P. (2001). Cognitive neuroscienec: Relating neural mechanisms and cognition. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Google)
Bechtel, William P. & Mundale, Jennifer (1996). Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function. Minds And Machines 6 (4):481-505.   (Google)
Abstract: The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory
Bechtel, William P. (online). Mental mechanisms: What are the operations?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: trying to explain these reactions in terms of changes in ele- began trying to characterize physiological processes in
Bechtel, William P. (2005). The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms underlying behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 84:313-325.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neuroscience and cognitive science seek to explain behavioral regularities in terms of underlying mechanisms. An important element of a mechanistic explanation is a characterization of the operations of the parts of the mechanism. The challenge in characterizing such operations is illustrated by an example from the history of physiological chemistry in which some investigators tried to characterize the internal operations in the same terms as the overall physiological system while others appealed to elemental chemistry. In order for biochemistry to become successful, researchers had to identify a new level of operations involving operations over molecular groups. Existing attempts at mechanistic explanation of behavior are in a situation comparable to earlier approaches to physiological chemistry, drawing their inspiration either from overall psychology activities or from low-level neural processes. Successful mechanistic explanations of behavior require the discovery of the appropriate component operations. Such discovery is a daunting challenge but one on which success will be beneficial to both behavioral scientists and cognitive and neuroscientists
Blumenthal, Terry & Schirillo, James (1999). Biological neuroscience is only as radical as the evolution of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):831-831.   (Google)
Abstract: A biological neuroscientific theory must acknowledge that the function of a neurological system is to produce behaviors that promote survival. Thus, unlike what Gold & Stoljar claim, function and behavior are the province of neurobiology and cannot be relegated to the field of psychological phenomena, which would then trivialize the radical doctrine if accepted. One possible advantage of adopting such a (correctly revised) radical doctrine is that it might ultimately produce a successful, evolutionarily based, theory of mind
Boyle, Noel (2008). Neurobiology and phenomenology: Towards a three-tiered intertheoretic model of explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):34-58.   (Google)
Abstract: Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these two philosophical traditions. The first part briefly describes the existing literature which works across the analytic- phenomenology divide, situating my work within it as a focus on analytic physicalism and phenomenal explanation. In the longer second part, I sketch a model for explanation embedded simultaneously in both traditions. Hopefully, a theoretical framework emerges that the unlikely combination of Maurice Merleau- Ponty and Patricia Churchland could accept. In the third part, I apply the three-tiered model to a discussion of plasticity and suggest that the model both reflects existing research across three levels of analysis and can be a fruitful way to approach future research. My suggestion for a three-tiered model is quite tentative. Much less tentative is my claim that constructive dialogue between phenomeno- logical and physicalist study of consciousness is long-overdue, illuminating, and practical
Brothers, Leslie (1999). The logic of interests in neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):831-832.   (Google)
Abstract: Logical problems inherent in claims that biological neuroscience can ultimately explain mind are not anomalous: They result from underlying social interests. Neuroscientists are currently making a successful bid to fill a vacuum of authority created by the demise of Freudian theory in popular culture. The conflations described in the Gold & Stoljar target article are the result of alliances between certain apologist-philosophers, neuroscientists, and institutions, for the purpose of commanding authority and resources. Social analysis has a role to play in addressing logical issues in the philosophy of neuroscience
Carlos, & René, Campis (2008). DID I DO IT? -YEAH, YOU DID! Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences:34- 37.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we analyze Libet’s conclusions on «free will» (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein’s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet’s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein´s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article´s conclusion is part of an ongoing research.
Cliff, D. (1990). Computational Neuroethology: A Provisional Manifesto. In Jean-Arcady Meyer & Stewart W. Wilson (eds.), From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of The First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems). Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 103 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Coltheart, Max & Davies, Martin (2003). Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology. Cortex 39 (1):188-191.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or even about psychology in general. It is a familiar point about all science
Coulter, Jeff (1995). The informed neuron: Issues in the use of information theory in the behavioral sciences. Minds and Machines 5 (4):583-96.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Craver, Carl F. & Darden, Lindley (2001). Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory. In P.K. Machamer, Rick Grush & Peter McLaughlin (eds.), Theory and Method in Neuroscience. Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
Craver, Carl F. (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.   (Google)
Craver, Carl F. (2002). Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory. Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume 69 (3):S83-S97.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Craver, Carl F. (2008). Physical law and mechanistic explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential. Philosophy of Science 75 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Hodgkin and Huxley’s model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering‐law explanation in biology. The model includes laws of physics and chemistry that, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, can be used to derive features of the action potential. Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model is not an explanation. This suggests either that subsuming a phenomenon under physical laws is insufficient to explain it or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong. I defend Hodgkin and Huxley against Weber’s heteronomy thesis and argue that explanations are descriptions of mechanisms. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Philosophy‐Neuroscience‐Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, Wilson Hall, St. Louis, MO 63130; e‐mail:
Craver, Carl F. (2001). Role functions, mechanisms, and hierarchy. Philosophy of Science 68 (1):53-74.   (Google | More links)
Craver, Carl F. & Bechtel, William (2007). Top-down causation without top-down causes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel causes can be translated into mechanistically mediated effects, the posited relationship is intelligible and should raise no special philosophical objections. When they cannot, they are suspect
Craver, Carl F. (2003). The making of a memory mechanism. Journal of the History of Biology 36 (1):153-95.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Craver, Carl, Why the Hodgkin and huxely model does not explain the action potential.   (Google)
Abstract: Hodgkin and Huxley’s 1952 model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering-law explanation. The model appeals to general laws of physics and chemistry (specifically, Ohm’s law and the Nernst equation), and the laws, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, entail many of the significant properties of the action potential. However, Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model falls short of an explanation. This historical fact suggests either that there is more to explaining the action potential than subsuming it under a general laws or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong about the explanatory import of their model. In this paper, I defend Hodgkin and Huxley’s view that their model alone does not explain the action potential (contra Weber 2005). I argue further that neuroscientists lacked crucial explanatory details about the action potential until they could describe the molecular and ionic mechanisms by virtue of which their model holds (see Bogen 2005). Mathematical generalizations are important epistemic tools for assessing mechanistic explanations, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for adequate explanations, even at the lowest levels of organization where biological phenomena are integrated with physics and chemistry
Cruse, H. (2001). The explanatory power and limits of simulation models in the neurosciences. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Delcomyn, Fred (2001). Biorobotic models can contribute to neurobiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1056-1057.   (Google)
Abstract: The idea that biorobots can be used as a testbed for the evaluation of hypotheses about how an animal functions is supported. Generation of realistic feedback is a major advantage of biorobotic models. Nevertheless, skeptics can only be convinced that this approach is valid if significant biological insights are generated from its application
den Bosch, & P., M. (2005). Structures in neuropharmacology. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):343-359.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores structuralism as a way to model theories from scientific practice. As a case study I analyzed a theory about the dynamics of the basal ganglia, a part of the brain that is involved in Parkinson's disease. After introducing the case study I explore how to structurally represent qualitative assumptions about disease, intervention and dynamical systems in general. I further explicate the structure of the basal ganglia theory in detail, how it explains Parkinson's disease and how it implies treatments. I close with a consideration of how a structuralist representation could be useful in practice to explore and develop theories with the aid of a computer
Elliott, T. & Shadbolt, N. R. (1997). Neurotrophic factors, neuronal selectionism, and neuronal proliferation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):561-562.   (Google)
Abstract: Quartz & Sejnowski (Q&S) disregard evidence that suggests that their view of dendrites is inadequate and they ignore recent results concerning the role of neurotrophic factors in synaptic remodelling. They misrepresent neuronal selectionism and thus erect a straw-man argument. Finally, the results discussed in section 4.2 require neuronal proliferation, but this does not occur during the period of neuronal development of relevance here. Footnotes1 Address correspondence to TE at
Freeman, Walter J. (1997). Nonlinear neurodynamics of intentionality. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (2-3):291-304.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Gerrans, Philip & Stone, Valerie E. (2008). Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and theory of mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity Developmental Components of ToM The Analogy with Modularity of Language Dissociations without Modules The Evidence from Neuroscience Conclusion CiteULike Connotea What's this?
Gerrans, Philip (2003). Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):41-52.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Nativists about syntactic processing have argued that linguisticprocessing, understood as the implementation of a rule-basedcomputational architecture, is spared in Williams syndrome, (WMS)subjects – and hence that it provides evidence for a geneticallyspecified language module. This argument is bolstered by treatingSpecific Language Impairments (SLI) and WMS as a developmental doubledissociation which identifies a syntax module. Neuroconstructivists haveargued that the cognitive deficits of a developmental disorder cannot beadequately distinguished using the standard gross behavioural tests ofneuropsychology and that the linguistic abilities of the WMS subject canbe equally well explained by a constructivist strategy of neurallearning in the individual, with linguisitic functions implemented in anassociationist architecture. The neuroconstructivist interpretation ofWMS undermines the hypothesis of a double dissociation between SLI andWMS, leaving unresolved the question of nativism about syntax. Theapparent linguistic virtuosity of WMS subjects is an artefact ofenhanced phonological processing, a fact which is easier to demonstratevia the associationist computational model embraced byneuroconstructivism
Gerrans, Philip (2002). Nativism, neuroconstructivism, and developmental disorder. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):757-758.   (Google)
Abstract: Either genetically specified modular cognitive architecture for syntactic processing does not exist (neuroconstructivism), or there is a module but its development is so abnormal in Williams syndrome (WS) that no conclusion can be drawn about its normal architecture (moderate nativism). Radical nativism, which holds that WS is a case of intact syntax, is untenable. Specific Language Impairment and WS create a dilemma that radical nativism cannot accommodate
Gold, Ian & Stoljar, Daniel (1999). Interpreting neuroscience and explaining the mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):856-866.   (Google)
Abstract: Although a wide variety of questions were raised about different aspects of the target article, most of them fall into one of five categories each of which deals with a general question. These questions are (1) Is the radical neuron doctrine really radical? (2) Is the trivial neuron doctrine really trivial? (3) Were we sufficiently critical of the radical neuron doctrine? (4) Is there a distinction to be drawn at all between the two doctrines? and (5) How does our argument bear on related issues in the ontology of mind? Our replies to the objections and observations presented are organized around these five questions
Hartmann, Stephan (2001). Mechanisms, coherence, and the place of psychology. In Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press.   (Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2008). Review of Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).   (Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray & Stewart, C. Matthew (2001). Theory structure in neuroscience. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Google)
Heinke, D. (2000). A dynamical system theory approach to cognitive neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):543-543.   (Google)
Abstract: Neural organization contains a wealth of facts from all areas of brain research and provides a useful overview of physiological data for those working outside the immediate field. Furthermore, it gives a good example that the approach of dynamical system theory together with the concepts of cooperative and competitive interaction can be fruitful for an interdisciplinary approach to cognition
Hurley, Susan L. (online). The shared circuits model. How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation and mind reading.   (Google)
Keil, Frank (ms). The seductive allure of neuroscience explanations.   (Google)
Abstract: & Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to genervs. with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience inate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific..
Krebs, Peter R., Models of cognition: Neurological possibility does not indicate neurological plausibility.   (Google)
Abstract: Many activities in Cognitive Science involve complex computer models and simulations of both theoretical and real entities. Artificial Intelligence and the study of artificial neural nets in particular, are seen as major contributors in the quest for understanding the human mind. Computational models serve as objects of experimentation, and results from these virtual experiments are tacitly included in the framework of empirical science. Cognitive functions, like learning to speak, or discovering syntactical structures in language, have been modeled and these models are the basis for many claims about human cognitive capacities. Artificial neural nets (ANNs) have had some successes in the field of Artificial Intelligence, but the results from experiments with simple ANNs may have little value in explaining cognitive functions. The problem seems to be in relating cognitive concepts that belong in the `top-down' approach to models grounded in the `bottom-up' connectionist methodology. Merging the two fundamentally different paradigms within a single model can obfuscate what is really modeled. When the tools (simple artificial neural networks) to solve the problems (explaining aspects of higher cognitive functions) are mismatched, models with little value in terms of explaining functions of the human mind are produced. The ability to learn functions from data-points makes ANNs very attractive analytical tools. These tools can be developed into valuable models, if the data is adequate and a meaningful interpretation of the data is possible. The problem is, that with appropriate data and labels that fit the desired level of description, almost any function can be modeled. It is my argument that small networks offer a universal framework for modeling any conceivable cognitive theory, so that neurological possibility can be demonstrated easily with relatively simple models. However, a model demonstrating the possibility of implementation of a cognitive function using a distributed methodology, does not necessarily add support to any claims or assumptions that the cognitive function in question, is neurologically plausible
Levy, Arnon (2009). Explaining what? Review of explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience by Carl F. Craver. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Carl Craver’s recent book offers an account of the explanatory and theoretical structure of neuroscience. It depicts it as centered around the idea of achieving mechanistic understanding, i.e., obtaining knowledge of how a set of underlying components interacts to produce a given function of the brain. Its core account of mechanistic explanation and relevance is causal-manipulationist in spirit, and offers substantial insight into casual explanation in brain science and the associated notion of levels of explanation. However, the focus on mechanistic explanation leaves some open questions regarding the role of computation and cognition
Lyons, Jack C. (2003). Lesion studies, spared performance, and cognitive systems. Cortex 39 (1):145-7.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The term ‘module’ has – to my ear – too many associations with Fodor’s (1983) seminal book, and I will concentrate here on the more general notion of a cognitive system. The latter, as I will understand the term, is – roughly – a computational mechanism which can operate independently of all other computational mechanisms (for a much fuller and more precise treatment, see Lyons, 2001). To say that there is a face recognition system, for example, is to say, at least in part, that there is a mechanism which by itself is capable of effecting a transformation from some set of inputs to face identification outputs. If there is one such system, there are likely to be several. Since systems may contain various subsystems, it is generally impossible to specify a system uniquely without specifying a set of inputs. The largest system that would count as a face recognition system would be the one that takes retinal irradiation arrays as inputs and delivers face identifications as outputs, but the last subsystem in this system would map high level representations to face identifications. For any task (where a task is construed as an input/output mapping), take away all cortical regions whose absence does not affect the ability of what is left to perform the task, and you are left with the system that performs that task
Machamer, Peter K.; Darden, Lindley & Craver, Carl F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy Of Science 67 (1):1-25.   (Cited by 207 | Google | More links)
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2006). Computational explanation in neuroscience. Synthese 153 (3):343-353.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to some philosophers, computational explanation is proprietary
to psychology—it does not belong in neuroscience. But neuroscientists routinely offer computational explanations of cognitive phenomena. In fact, computational explanation was initially imported from computability theory into the science of mind by neuroscientists, who justified this move on neurophysiological grounds. Establishing the legitimacy and importance of computational explanation in neuroscience is one thing; shedding light on it is another. I raise some philosophical questions pertaining to computational explanation and outline some promising answers that are being developed by a number of authors.
Revonsuo, Antti (2001). On the nature of explanation in the neurosciences. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh wPress.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Skarda, S. (1986). Explaining behavior: Bringing the brain back in. Inquiry 29 (June):187-201.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Stinson, Catherine (2009). Searching for the Source of Executive Attention. PSYCHE 15 (1):137-154.   (Google)
Abstract: William James presaged, and Alan Allport voiced criticisms of cause theories of executive attention for involving a homunculus who directs attention. I review discussions of this problem, and argue that existing philosophical denials of the problem depend on equivocations between different senses of “Cartesian error”. Another sort of denial tries to get around the problem by offering empirical evidence that such an executive attention director exists in prefrontal cortex. I argue that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that an executive director can be localized in prefrontal cortex unless dubious assumptions are made, and that computational models purporting to support these assumptions either beg the question, or fail to model executive attention in terms of cause theories.
Tyler, Lorraine K. & Moss, Helen E. (2001). Concepts and categories: What is the evidence for neural specialisation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):495-496.   (Google)
Abstract: Humphreys and Forde argue that semantic memory is divided into separate substores for different kinds of information. However, the neuro-imaging results cited in support of this view are inconsistent and often methodologically and statistically unreliable. Our own data indicate no regional specialisation as a function of semantic category or domain and support instead a distributed unitary account
Poland, Jeffrey S. & Von Eckardt, Barbara (2004). Mechanism and explanation in cognitive neuroscience. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):972-984.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the usefulness of the Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) mechanism approach to gaining an understanding of explanation in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that although the mechanism approach can capture many aspects of explanation in cognitive neuroscience, it cannot capture everything. In particular, it cannot completely capture all aspects of the content and significance of mental representations or the evaluative features constitutive of psychopathology
Wright, Cory D. & Bechtel, William P. (2007). Mechanisms and psychological explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than reduce them, as well as the different ways in which mechanisms are discovered. Finally, we offer a more detailed example of an important psychological phenomenon for which mechanistic explanation has provided the main source of scientific understanding

7.2d Neurophilosophy

Adams, Fred (2007). Review of Andrew Brook, Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).   (Google)
Andrews, Kristin (2003). Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.   (Google)
Antoine, Lutz; Thompson E., Lutz & Cosmelli, D. (online). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers in cognition and the brain : The philosophy and neuroscience movement.   (Google)
Bechtel, William P. & McCauley, Robert N. (1999). Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience. In Martin Hahn & S.C. Stoness (eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Abstract: Functionalists in philosophy of mind traditionally raise two major arguments against the type identity theory: (1) psychological states are _multiply realizable_ so that there are no one-to-one mappings of psychological states onto neural states and (2) the most that evidence could ever establish is the _correlation_ of psychological and neural states, not their identity. We defend a variant on the traditional type identity theory which we call _heuristic identity theory_ (HIT) against both of these objections. Drawing its inspiration from scientific practice, heuristic identity theory construes identity claims as hypotheses that guide subsequent inquiry, not as conclusions of the research
Bickle, John (1997). From sensory neuroscience to neurophilosophy: Reflections on llinas and Churchland's mind-brain continuum. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a “bottom-up” approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level theorists about the mind ignore results like these from current neuroscience at their own peril, at least from the point of view of discourse worthy of serious attention as the sciences of the mind/brain push forward into the 21st century
Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Neurophilosophy at work • by Paul Churchland. Analysis 69 (1).   (Google)
Brain, Walter R. (1951). Mind, Perception And Science. Blackwell Scientific.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Briscoe, Robert (2009). Egocentric spatial representation in action and perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency
Burton, Robert G. (1999). A neurocomputational approach to abduction. Minds and Machines 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Recent developments in the cognitive sciences and artificial intelligence suggest ways of answering the most serious challenge to Peirce's notion of abduction. Either there is no such logical process as abduction or, if abduction is a form of inference, it is essentially unconscious and therefore beyond rational control so that it lacks any normative significance. Peirce himself anticipates and attempts to answer this challenge. Peirce argues that abduction is both a source of creative insight and a form of logical inference subject to a degree of conscious control. In this paper I shall sketch a developing account of abduction that is suggested by the work of Paul Churchland, Paul Thagard, Chris Eliasmith, William Wimsatt, Owen Flanagan, and others. I shall argue that a credible account of abduction will require that we approach the phenomenon from both higher and lower levels as represented by these approaches
Campbell, Charles A. (1953). Philosophy and brain physiology. Philosophical Quarterly 3 (January):51-56.   (Google | More links)
Changeux, Jean-Pierre & Ricoeur, Paul (2002). What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue About Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. Princeton.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In a remarkable exchange between neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux and philosopher Paul Ricoeur, this book explores the vexed territory between these...
Chemero, Anthony (2007). Asking what's inside the head: Neurophilosophy meets the extended mind. Minds and Machines 17 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing its name, one that truly came of age in 1999 when Kath- leen Akins won a million-dollar fellowship to begin the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. The McDonnell Project put neurophilosophy at the forefront of philosophy of mind and cogni- tive science, yielding proliferating articles, conferences, special journal issues and books. In two major new books, neurophilosophers Patricia Churchland (2002) and John Bickle (2003) clearly feel this newfound prominence: Churchland mocks those who do not apply findings in neuroscience to philosophical problems as “no-brainers”; Bickle mocks anyone with traditional philosophical concerns, including “naturalistic philosophers of mind” and other neurophilosophers
Chessick, Richard D. (1953). Neurological studies and philosophical problems. Philosophy of Science 20 (October):300-312.   (Google)
Chessick, Richard D. (1953). The application of neurological studies in an approach to some philosophical problems. Philosophy of Science 20 (4):300-312.   (Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 465 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...
Churchland, Patricia S. (1980). A perspective on mind-brain research. Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (2002). Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. MIT Press.   (Cited by 79 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (2005). Chimerical colors: Some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself
Churchland, Patricia S. (1987). Epistemology in the age of neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84 (October):546-53.   (Cited by 25 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1990). Is neuroscience relevant to philosophy? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 323:323-341.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (2006). Into the brain: Where philosophy should go from here. Topoi 25 (1-2):29-32.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The maturation of the cognitive neurosciences will throw light on many central philosophical issues. Among them: semantic theory, perception, learning, social and moral knowledge, and practical reasoning and decision making. As contemporary medicine cannot do without the achievements of modern biology, philosophy would be pitiful if it disregarded the achievements of brain research
Churchland, Paul M. (2007). Neurophilosophy at Work. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this collection of essays, Paul Churchland explores the unfolding impact of the several empirical sciences of the mind, especially cognitive neurobiology and computational neuroscience on a variety of traditional issues central to the discipline of philosophy. Representing Churchland's most recent research, they continue his research program, launched over thirty years ago, and which has evolved into the field of neurophilosophy
Churchland, Patricia S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.   (Cited by 964 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1988). Replies. Biology and Philosophy 3 (3).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1986). Replies to comments to symposium on Patricia Smith Churchland's neurophilosophy. Inquiry 29 (June):241-272.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1988). Replies to reviews of Psychology's Place in the Science of the Mind/Brain. Biology and Philosophy 3 (July):393-402.   (Google)
Churchland, Patricia Smith, The impact of neuroscience on philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophy, in its traditional guise, addresses questions where experimental science has not yet nailed down plausible explanatory theories. Thus, the ancient Greeks pondered the nature of life, the sun, and tides, but also how we learn and make decisions. The history of science can be seen as a gradual process whereby speculative philosophy cedes intellectual space to increasingly wellgrounded experimental disciplines—first astronomy, but followed by physics, chemistry, geology, biology, archaeology, and more recently, ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Science now encompasses plausible theories in many domains, including large-scale theories about the cosmos, life, matter, and energy. The mind’s turn has now come. The classical ‘‘mind’’ questions center on free will, the self, consciousness, how thoughts can have meaning and ‘‘aboutness,’’ and how we learn and use knowledge. All these matters interlace with questions about morality: where values come from, the roles of reason and emotion in choice, and the wherefore of responsibility and punishment. The vintage mind/body problem is a legacy of Descartes: if the mind is a completely nonphysical substance, as he thought, how can it interact causally with the physical brain? Since the weight of evidence indicates that mental processes actually are processes of the brain, Descartes’ problem has disappeared. The classical mind/ body problem has been replaced with a range of questions: what brain mechanisms explain learning, decision making, self-deception, and so on. The replacement for ‘‘the mind-body problem’’ is not a single problem; it is the vast research program of cognitive neuroscience. The dominant methodology of philosophy of mind and morals in the twentieth..
Churchland, Paul M. (1998). The neural representation of the social world. In The Digital Phoenix. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Collins, Mike (2009). The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems. Dissertation, City University of New York   (Google)
Abstract: I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms of teleofunction, explicated in terms of natural selection. To explain (ii), we begin by recognizing that representational states do not have content, that is, they are neither true nor false except insofar as they both “point to” or “refer” to something, as well as “say” something regarding whatever it is they are about. To distinguish veridical from false representations, there must be a way for these separate aspects to come apart; hence, we explain (ii) by providing independent theories of what I call f-reference and f-predication (the ‘f’ simply connotes ‘fundamental’, to distinguish these things from their natural language counterparts). Causal theories of representation typically founder on error, or on what Fodor has called the disjunction problem. Resemblance or isomorphism theories typically founder on what I’ve called the non-uniqueness problem, which is that isomorphisms and resemblance are practically unconstrained and so representational content cannot be uniquely determined. These traditional problems provide the motivation for my theory, the structural preservation theory, as follows. F-reference, like reference, is a specific, asymmetric relation, as is causation. F-predication, like predication, is a non-specific relation, as predicates typically apply to many things, just as many relational systems can be isomorphic to any given relational system. Putting these observations together, a promising strategy is to explain f-reference via causal history and f-predication via something like isomorphism between relational systems. This dissertation should be conceptualized as having three parts. After motivating and characterizing the problem in chapter 1, the first part is the negative project, where I review and critique Dretske’s, Fodor’s, and Millikan’s theories in chapters 2-4. Second, I construct my theory about the nature of representation in chapter 5 and defend it from objections in chapter 6. In chapters 7-8, which constitute the third and final part, I address the question of how representation is implemented in biological systems. In chapter 7 I argue that single-cell intracortical recordings taken from awake Macaque monkeys performing a cognitive task provide empirical evidence for structural preservation theory, and in chapter 8 I use the empirical results to illustrate, clarify, and refine the theory.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Neves, Carlos F. H. (2009). Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum. In Robert Kozma & John Caulfield (eds.), Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday. World Scientific.   (Google)
Abstract: In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain activity organization, and what mediates between them. Implications for linguistic semantics, self-organized distributed computing algorithms, artificial machine consciousness, and diagnosis of dynamic brain diseases will be discussed briefly.
Gillett, Grant R. (1991). The neurophilosophy of pain. Philosophy 66 (April):191-206.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Giordano, J. J. (2010). From a neurophilosophy of pain to a neuroethics of pain care. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary (1988). Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and empirical constraints. Cognitive Neuropsychology 5:723-46.   (Google)
Klagge, James C. (1989). Wittgenstein and neuroscience. Synthese 78 (March):319-43.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2006). Cognitive scientific challenges to morality. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):567 – 587.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and suggest possible lines of reply to them. I divide these replies into two groups: we might confront the threat, showing that it does not have the claimed implications for morality; or we might bite the bullet, accepting that the claims have moral implications, but incorporating these claims into morality. I suggest that unless we are able to bite the bullet, when confronted by cognitive scientific challenges, there is a real possibility that morality will be threatened. This fact gives us a weighty reason to adopt a metaethics that makes it relatively easy to bite cognitive scientific bullets. Moral constructivism, in one of its many forms, makes these bullets more palatable; therefore, the cognitive scientific challenges provide us with an additional reason to adopt a constructivist metaethics
Lloyd, Dan (ms). A neuro-noir journey to the centre of the mind.   (Google)
Abstract: It wasn't that hard to be a polymath in ancient Greece. All it meant, when you come down to it, was that you could write a poem, speak classical Greek (not very difficult in the circumstances) and understand the mechanics of the Archimedes' screw. Today it's not so easy. Arts and sciences have, for the most part, diverged to an alarming extent, with those on the arts side likely to be as hard-pressed to explain the technologies that increasingly govern our world as a member of a "lost" tribe in the Brazilian rainforest
Lowenhard, Percy (1989). The mind-body problem: Some neurobiological reflections in reductionism and systems theory. In The Life Sciences: Some Problems and Perspectives. Norwell: Kluwer.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness. Psycoloquy 11 (35).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1)
Lutz, Antoine & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.   (Cited by 55 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper foocuses on_ _neurophenomenology in relation to three challenging methodological issues_ _about incorporating first-person data into cognitive neuroscience: (i) first-person_ _reports can be biased or inaccurate; (ii) the process of generating first-person_ _reports about an experience can modify that experience; and (iii) there is an ‘ex-_ _planatory gap’ in our understanding of how to relate first-person, phenomeno-_ _logical data to third-person, biobehavioural data._
Lutz, Antoine (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A first empirical case study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):133-67.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of neurophenomenology in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human experience as it is mobilized in itself in such methodology. In this view, generative passages define the type of circulation which explicitly roots the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biological emergent process
Madell, Geoffrey C. (1986). Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response. Inquiry 29 (June):153-168.   (Google)
Mandik, Pete (ms). Fine-grained supervenience, cognitive neuroscience, and the future of functionalism.   (Google | More links)
Mandik, Pete (2002). Synthetic neuroethology. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are used to conduct prosthetically enhanced thought experiments concerning the evolvability of mental representations. Central to this essay is a discussion of the computer simulation and evolution of three-dimensional synthetic animals with neural network controllers. The minimally cognitive behavior of finding food by exhibit- ing positive chemotaxis is simulated with swimming and walking creatures. These simulations form the basis of a discussion of the evolutionary and neurocomputa- tional bases of the incremental emergence of more complex forms of cognition. Other related work has been used to attack computational and representational theories of cognition. In contrast, I argue that the proper understanding of the evolutionary emergence of minimally cognitive behaviors is computational and representational through and through
Mandik, Pete (2006). The introspectibility of brain states as such. In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental
Mandik, Pete (2007). The neurophilosophy of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the core philosophical issues of phenomenal conscious construe consciousness largely in terms of representations in neural networks associated with certain processes of attention and memory
Mandik, Pete (2009). The neurophilosophy of subjectivity. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism
Minsky, Marvin L. (online). Interior grounding, reflection, and self-consciousness.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Some computer programs are expert at some games. Other programs can recognize some words. Yet other programs are highly competent at solving certain technical problems. However, each of those programs is specialized, and no existing program today shows the common sense or resourcefulness of a typical two-year-old child—and certainly, no program can yet understand a typical sentence from a child’s first-grade storybook. Nor can any program today can look around a room and then identify the things that meet its eyes
Morin, Alain (2003). The self and its brain: A critical examination of The Face in the Mirror. Science and Consciousness Review 1.   (Google)
Abstract: Where is the self located in the brain? This is a question that has intrigued philosophers and scientists for quite some time. Four centuries ago, the French philosopher René Descartes thought that the self resided in the pineal gland, a small structure centrally positioned in the lower brain
Myin, Erik (2000). Direct self-consciousness. Psycoloquy.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view
Northoff, Georg (2002). Neurophysiology, neuropsychiatry and neurophilosophy of catatonia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):592-599.   (Google)
Abstract: The excellent and highly interesting commentaries address the following concerns: (1) neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of catatonia; (2) cognitive-motor deficits in catatonia; (3) conceptual issues; (4) general methodology in neuropsychiatric research; and (5) neurophilosophical implications. The specific problems, issues, and aspects raised by the different commentators are grouped under these categories in Table R1 presented below. These five areas of concern are then discussed in the order listed in the five sections of the Response
Northoff, Georg (2004). What is neurophilosophy? A methodological account. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The term ``neurophilosophy'' is often used either implicitly or explicitly for characterizing the investigation of philosophical theories in relation to neuroscientific hypotheses. The exact methodological principles and systematic rules for a linkage between philosophical theories and neuroscientific hypothesis, however, remain to be clarified. The present contribution focuses on these principles, as well as on the relation between ontology and epistemology and the characterization of hypothesis in neurophilosophy. Principles of transdisciplinary methodology include the `principle of asymmetry', the `principle of bi-directionality' and the `principle of transdisciplinary circularity'. The `principle of asymmetry' points to an asymmetric relationship between logical and natural conditions. The `principle of bi-directionality' claims for the necessity of bi-directional linkage between natural and logical conditions. The `principle of transdisciplinary circularity' describes systematic rules for mutual comparison and cross-conditional exchange between philosophical theory and neuroscientific hypotheses. The relation between ontology and epistemology no longer is determined by ontological presuppositions i.e. ``ontological primacy''. Instead, there is correspondence between different `epistemological capacities' and different kinds of ontology which consecutively results in ``epistemic primacy'' and ``ontological pluralism''. The present contribution concludes by rejecting some so-called `standard-arguments' including the `argument of circularity', the `argument of categorical fallacy', the `argument of validity' and the `argument of necessity'
O'Keefe, John (1993). Kant and the sea-horse: An essay in the neurophilosophy of space. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Roskies, Adina L. (2002). Neuroethics for the new millennium. Neuron 35 (1):21-23.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem- plate how progress in each will affect the other. The past several months have seen heightened interest
_The Ethics of Neuroscience_
in the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided popular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May
Saidel, Eric (1992). What price neurophilosophy? Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Sereno, Martin (1986). A program for the neurobiology of mind. Inquiry 29 (June):217-240.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Smith, A. (1986). Brain-mind philosophy. Inquiry 29 (June):203-15.   (Google)
Walter, Henrik (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Walter, Henrik (2002). Neurophilosophy of free will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1986). Nemo psychologus nisi physiologus. Inquiry 29 (June):168-185.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Young, J. Z. (1951). Doubt And Certainty In Science. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 31 | Google)

7.2e Philosophy of Neuroscience, Misc

Abraham, Tara H. (2003). From theory to data: Representing neurons in the 1940s. Biology and Philosophy 18 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Recent literature on the role of pictorial representation in the life sciences has focused on the relationship between detailed representations of empirical data and more abstract, formal representations of theory. The standard argument is that in both a historical and epistemic sense, this relationship is a directional one: beginning with raw, unmediated images and moving towards diagrams that are more interpreted and more theoretically rich. Using the neural network diagrams of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts as a case study, I argue that while in the empirical sciences, pictorial representation tends to move from data to theory, in areas of the life sciences that are predominantly theoretical, when abstraction occurs at the outset, the relationship between detail and abstraction in pictorial representations can be of a different character
Adams, Fred (2007). Review of Andrew Brook, Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).   (Google)
Adolphs, Ralph (2004). Could a robot have emotions? Theoretical perspectives from social cognitive neuroscience. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Akins, Kathleen & Gerrans, Philip (2003). Introduction. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1).   (Google)
Albergato, Maria (2006). A review of: "The mind and the brain neuroplasticity and the power of mental force". World Futures 62 (5):406 – 408.   (Google)
Allman, John & Woodward, Jim (2008). What are moral intuitions and why should we care about them? A neurobiological perspective. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):164-185.   (Google)
Anderson, Michael C. & Levy, Benjamin J. (2006). Encouraging the nascent cognitive neuroscience of repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):511-513.   (Google)
Abstract: Repression has remained controversial for nearly a century on account of the lack of well-controlled evidence validating it. Here we argue that the conceptual and methodological tools now exist for a rigorous scientific examination of repression, and that a nascent cognitive neuroscience of repression is emerging. We review progress in this area and highlight important questions for this field to address
Arbib, Michael A. (2005). From monkey-like action recognition to human language: An evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):105-124.   (Google)
Abstract: The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a “mirror system” active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 and Broca's area are homologous brain regions. This grounded the mirror system hypothesis of Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) which offers the mirror system for grasping as a key neural “missing link” between the abilities of our nonhuman ancestors of 20 million years ago and modern human language, with manual gestures rather than a system for vocal communication providing the initial seed for this evolutionary process. The present article, however, goes “beyond the mirror” to offer hypotheses on evolutionary changes within and outside the mirror systems which may have occurred to equip Homo sapiens with a language-ready brain. Crucial to the early stages of this progression is the mirror system for grasping and its extension to permit imitation. Imitation is seen as evolving via a so-called simple system such as that found in chimpanzees (which allows imitation of complex “object-oriented” sequences but only as the result of extensive practice) to a so-called complex system found in humans (which allows rapid imitation even of complex sequences, under appropriate conditions) which supports pantomime. This is hypothesized to have provided the substrate for the development of protosign, a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures, which then provides the scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech (which thus owes little to nonhuman vocalizations), with protosign and protospeech then developing in an expanding spiral. It is argued that these stages involve biological evolution of both brain and body. By contrast, it is argued that the progression from protosign and protospeech to languages with full-blown syntax and compositional semantics was a historical phenomenon in the development of Homo sapiens, involving few if any further biological changes. Key Words: gestures; hominids; language evolution; mirror system; neurolinguistics; primates; protolanguage; sign language; speech; vocalization
Arshavsky, Yuri I. (2003). When did mozart become a mozart? Neurophysiological insight into behavioral genetics. Brain and Mind 4 (3):327-339.   (Google)
Abstract: The prevailing concept in modern cognitive neuroscience is that cognitive functions are performed predominantly at the network level, whereas the role of individual neurons is unlikely to extend beyond forming the simple basic elements of these networks. Within this conceptual framework, individuals of outstanding cognitive abilities appear as a result of a favorable configuration of the microarchitecture of the cognitive-implicated networks, whose final formation in ontogenesis may occur in a relatively random way. Here I suggest an alternative concept, which is based on neurological data and on data from human behavioral genetics. I hypothesize that cognitive functions are performed mainly at the intracellular, probably at the molecular level. Central to this hypothesis is the idea that the neurons forming the networks involved in cognitive processes are complex elements whose functions are not limited to generating electrical potentials and releasing neurotransmitters. According to this hypothesis, individuals of outstanding abilities are so due to a lucky combination of specific genes that determine the intrinsic properties of neurons involved in cognitive functions of the brain
Atkinson, Anthony P. & Wheeler, M. (2003). Evolutionary psychology's grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning. In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Ballieux, Rudy E. (1994). The mind and the immune system. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 15 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Stress-induced brain-mediated immunoregulation is effected by two pathways: autonomic outflow and (neuro)endocrine outflow. Particular attention is given to the interaction-effects of chronic an acute stress. Recent data have established that cells of the immune system produce neuro-peptides and hormones. In concert with cytokines released by these immune cells the brain can be informed on the nature of ongoing immune activity. The significance of conditioning of immune responses is discussed
Barbour, Ian G. (1999). Neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and human nature: Theological and philosophical reflections. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Barton, Robert A. (2006). Neuroscientists need to be evolutionarily challenged. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):13-14.   (Google)
Abstract: Evolutionary theory and methods are central to understanding the design of organisms, including their brains. This book does much to demonstrate the value of evolutionary neuroscience. Further work is needed to clarify the ways that neural systems evolved in general (specifically, the interaction between mosaic and coordinated evolution of brain components), and phylogenetic methods should be given a more prominent role in the analysis of comparative data
Barresi, John (online). The neuroscience of social understanding.   (Google)
Abstract: In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (Eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, in press
Bechtel, William P. & Stufflebeam, Robert S. (2001). Epistemic issues in procuring evidence about the brain: The importance of research instruments and techniques. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bechtel, William P.; Mandik, Pete; Mundale, Jennifer & Stufflebeam, Robert S. (eds.) (2001). Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas
Bechtel, William; Mandik, Pete & Mundale, Jennifer (2001). Philosophy meets the neurosciences. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Bechtel, William P. (forthcoming). The epistemology of evidence in cognitive neuroscience. In R. Skipper Jr., C. Allen, R. A. Ankeny, C. F. Craver, L. Darden, G. Mikkelson & and R. Richardson (eds.), Philosophy and the Life Sciences: A Reader. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is no secret that scientists argue. They argue about theories. But even more, they argue about the evidence for theories. Is the evidence itself trustworthy? This is a bit surprising from the perspective of traditional empiricist accounts of scientific methodology according to which the evidence for scientific theories stems from observation, especially observation with the naked eye. These accounts portray the testing of scientific theories as a matter of comparing the predictions of the theory with the data generated by these observations, which are taken to provide an objective link to reality
Bennett, M. R. (2003). Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Bertone, Armando; Mottron, Laurent & Faubert, Jocelyn (2004). Autism and schizophrenia: Similar perceptual consequence, different neurobiological etiology? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):592-593.   (Google)
Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein (P&S, 2003) propose that NMDA-receptor dysfunction may be the fundamental neurobiological mechanism underlying and associating impaired holistic perception and cognitive coordination with schizophrenic psychopathology. We discuss how the P&S hypothesis shares different aspects of the weak central coherence account of autism from both theoretical and experimental perspectives. Specifically, we believe that neither those persons with autism nor those with schizophrenia integrate visuo-perceptual information efficiently, resulting in incongruous internal representations of their external world. However, although NMDA-hypofunction may be responsible for perceptual impairments in schizophrenia and possibly autism, we suggest that it is highly unlikely that NMDA-hypofunction is specifically responsible for the autistic behavioral symptomology, as described by P&S in their target article
Bergstrom, R. M. (1967). Neural macrostates. Synthese 17 (December):425-443.   (Google | More links)
Beretta, Alan (2000). Why the TDH fails to contribute to a neurology of syntax. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):23-23.   (Google)
Abstract: An important part of Grodzinsky's claim regarding the neurology of syntax depends on agrammatic data partitioned by the Trace Deletion Hypothesis (TDH), which is a combination of trace-deletion and default strategy. However, there is convincing evidence that the default strategy is consistently avoided by agrammatics. The TDH, therefore, is in no position to support claims about agrammatic data or the neurology of syntax
Bickerton, Derek (2005). Beyond the mirror neuron – the smoke neuron? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):126-126.   (Google)
Abstract: Mirror neurons form a poor basis for Arbib's account of language evolution, failing to explain the creativity that must precede imitation, and requiring capacities (improbable in hominids) for categorizing situations and unambiguously miming them. They also commit Arbib to an implausible holophrastic protolanguage. His model is further vitiated by failure to address the origins of symbolization and the real nature of syntax
Bickle, John (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Bickle, John; Mandik, Pete & Landreth, Anthony (online). The philosophy of neuroscience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Blair, Clancy (2006). How similar are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental neuroscience perspective on fluid cognition as an aspect of human cognitive ability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):109-125.   (Google)
Abstract: This target article considers the relation of fluid cognitive functioning to general intelligence. A neurobiological model differentiating working memory/executive function cognitive processes of the prefrontal cortex from aspects of psychometrically defined general intelligence is presented. Work examining the rise in mean intelligence-test performance between normative cohorts, the neuropsychology and neuroscience of cognitive function in typically and atypically developing human populations, and stress, brain development, and corticolimbic connectivity in human and nonhuman animal models is reviewed and found to provide evidence of mechanisms through which early experience affects the development of an aspect of cognition closely related to, but distinct from, general intelligence. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of emotion in fluid cognition and on research indicating fluid cognitive deficits associated with early hippocampal pathology and with dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis stress-response system. Findings are seen to be consistent with the idea of an independent fluid cognitive construct and to assist with the interpretation of findings from the study of early compensatory education for children facing psychosocial adversity and from behavior genetic research on intelligence. It is concluded that ongoing development of neurobiologically grounded measures of fluid cognitive skills appropriate for young children will play a key role in understanding early mental development and the adaptive success to which it is related, particularly for young children facing social and economic disadvantage. Specifically, in the evaluation of the efficacy of compensatory education efforts such as Head Start and the readiness for school of children from diverse backgrounds, it is important to distinguish fluid cognition from psychometrically defined general intelligence. (Published Online April 5 2006) Key Words: cognition; cognition-emotion reciprocity; developmental disorders; emotion; fluid cognition; Flynn effect; general intelligence; limbic system; neuroscience; phenylketonuria; prefrontal cortex; psychometrics; schizophrenia
Bánréti, Zoltán (2000). Which grammar has been chosen for neurological feasibility? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):21-22.   (Google)
Abstract: Grodzinsky's hypotheses need different theories of grammar for comprehension and for production. These predictions are undesirable. Hungarian data are incompatible with the Trace Deletion Hypothesis
Bogen, Jim, 'Two as good as one hundred'--poorly replicated evidence is some 19th century neuroscientific research.   (Google)
Abstract: According to a received doctrine, espoused, by Karl Popper and Harry Collins, and taken for granted by many others, poorly replicated evidence should be epistemically defective and incapable of persuading scientists to accept the views it is used to argue for. But John Hughlings Jackson used poorly replicated clinical and post-mortem evidence to mount rationally compelling and influential arguments for a highly progressive theory of the organization of the brain and its functions. This paper sets out a number of Jackson's arguments from his evidence and argues that they constitute a counter example against the received doctrine
Bogen, J. (2001). `Two as good as a hundred': Poorly replicated evidence in some nineteenth-century neuroscientific research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 32 (3):491-533.   (Google)
Borisyuk, Roman (2000). Encyclopedia of computational neuroscience: The end of the second millennium. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):534-535.   (Google)
Abstract: Arbib et al. describe mathematical and computational models in neuroscience as well as neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of several important brain structures. This is a useful guide to mathematical and computational modelling of the structure and function of nervous system. The book highlights the need to develop a theory of brain functioning, and it offers some useful approaches and concepts
Borg, Emma (2007). If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds
Borenstein, Elhanan & Ruppin, Eytan (2005). The evolutionary link between mirror neurons and imitation: An evolutionary adaptive agents model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):127-128.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary validates the fundamental evolutionary interconnection between the emergence of imitation and the mirror system. We present a novel computational framework for studying the evolutionary origins of imitative behavior and examining the emerging underlying mechanisms. Evolutionary adaptive agents that evolved in this framework demonstrate the emergence of neural “mirror” mechanisms analogous to those found in biological systems
Bracha, Dr H. Stefan (2006). Human brain evolution and the "neuroevolutionary time-depth principle:" Implications for the reclassification of fear-circuitry-related traits in dsm-V and for studying resilience to warzone-related posttraumatic stress disorder. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The DSM-III, DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 have judiciously minimized discussion of etiologies to distance clinical psychiatry from Freudian psychoanalysis. With this goal mostly achieved, discussion of etiological factors should be reintroduced into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V). A research agenda for the DSM-V advocated the "development of a pathophysiologically based classification system". The author critically reviews the neuroevolutionary literature on stress-induced and fear circuitry disorders and related amygdala-driven, species-atypical fear behaviors of clinical severity in adult humans. Over 30 empirically testable/falsifiable predictions are presented. It is noted that in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, the classification of stress and fear circuitry disorders is neither mode-of-acquisition-based nor brain-evolution-based. For example, snake phobia (innate) and dog phobia (overconsolidational) are clustered together. Similarly, research on blood-injection-injury-type-specific phobia clusters two fears different in their innateness: 1) an arguably ontogenetic memory-trace-overconsolidation-based fear (hospital phobia) and 2) a hardwired (innate) fear of the sight of one's blood or a sharp object penetrating one's skin. Genetic architecture-charting of fear-circuitry-related traits has been challenging. Various, non-phenotype-based architectures can serve as targets for research. In this article, the author will propose one such alternative genetic architecture. This article was inspired by the following: A) Nesse's "Smoke-Detector Principle", B) the increasing suspicion that the "smooth" rather than "lumpy" distribution of complex psychiatric phenotypes (including fear-circuitry disorders) may in some cases be accounted for by oligogenic (and not necessarily polygenic) transmission, and C) insights from the initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium published in late 2005. Neuroevolutionary insights relevant to fear circuitry symptoms that primarily emerge overconsolidationally (especially Combat related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) are presented. Also introduced is a human-evolution-based principle for clustering innate fear traits. The "Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle" of innate fears proposed in this article may be useful in the development of a neuroevolution-based taxonomic re-clustering of stress-triggered and fear-circuitry disorders in DSM-V. Four broad clusters of evolved fear circuits are proposed based on their time-depths: 1) Mesozoic (mammalian-wide) circuits hardwired by wild-type alleles driven to fixation by Mesozoic selective sweeps; 2) Cenozoic (simian-wide) circuits relevant to many specific phobias; 3) mid Paleolithic and upper Paleolithic (Homo sapiens-specific) circuits (arguably resulting mostly from mate-choice-driven stabilizing selection); 4) Neolithic circuits (arguably mostly related to stabilizing selection driven by gene-culture co-evolution). More importantly, the author presents evolutionary perspectives on warzone-related PTSD, Combat-Stress Reaction, Combat-related Stress, Operational-Stress, and other deployment-stress-induced symptoms. The Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle presented in this article may help explain the dissimilar stress-resilience levels following different types of acute threat to survival of oneself or one's progency (aka DSM-III and DSM-V PTSD Criterion-A events). PTSD rates following exposure to lethal inter-group violence (combat, warzone exposure or intentionally caused disasters such as terrorism) are usually 5-10 times higher than rates following large-scale natural disasters such as forest fires, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. The author predicts that both intentionally-caused large-scale bioevent-disasters, as well as natural bioevents such as SARS and avian flu pandemics will be an exception and are likely to be followed by PTSD rates approaching those that follow warzone exposure. During bioevents, Amygdala-driven and locus-coeruleus-driven epidemic pseudosomatic symptoms may be an order of magnitude more common than infection-caused cytokine-driven symptoms. Implications for the red cross and FEMA are discussed. It is also argued that hospital phobia as well as dog phobia, bird phobia and bat phobia require re-taxonomization in DSM-V in a new "overconsolidational disorders" category anchored around PTSD. The overconsolidational spectrum category may be conceptualized as straddling the fear circuitry spectrum disorders and the affective spectrum disorders categories, and may be a category for which Pitman's secondary prevention propranolol regimen may be specifically indicated as a "morning after pill" intervention. Predictions are presented regarding obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (e.g., female-pattern hoarding vs. male-pattern hoarding) and "culture-bound" acute anxiety symptoms (taijin-kyofusho, koro, shuk yang, shook yong, suo yang, rok-joo, jinjinia-bemar, karoshi, gwarosa, Voodoo death). Also discussed are insights relevant to pseudoneurological symptoms and to the forthcoming Dissociative-Conversive disorders category in DSM-V, including what the author terms fright-triggered acute pseudo-localized symptoms (i.e., pseudoparalysis, pseudocerebellar imbalance, psychogenic blindness, pseudoseizures, and epidemic sociogenic illness). Speculations based on studies of the human abnormal-spindle-like, microcephaly-associated (ASPM) gene, the microcephaly primary autosomal recessive (MCPH) gene, and the forkhead box p2 (FOXP2) gene are made and incorporated into what is termed "The pre-FOXP2 Hypothesis of Blood-Injection-Injury Phobia." Finally, the author argues for a non-reductionistic fusion of "distal (evolutionary) neurobiology" with clinical "proximal neurobiology," utilizing neurological heuristics. It is noted that the value of re-clustering fear traits based on behavioral ethology, human-phylogenomics-derived endophenotypes and on ontogenomics (gene-environment interactions) can be confirmed or disconfirmed using epidemiological or twin studies and psychiatric genomics
Braten, Stein (2004). Hominin infant decentration hypothesis: Mirror neurons system adapted to subserve mother-centered participation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):508-509.   (Google)
Abstract: Falk's hominin mother-infant model presupposes an emerging infant capacity to perceive and learn from afforded gestures and vocalizations. Unlike back-riding offspring of other primates, who were in no need to decenter their own body-centered perspective, a mirror neurons system may have been adapted in hominin infants to subserve the kind of (m)other-centered mirroring we now see manifested by human infants soon after birth
Bresjanac, Maja & Repov, Grega (2009). Neuroplasticity or the importance of having a plastic brain. In Eva Zerovnik, Olga Markič & A. Ule (eds.), Philosophical Insights About Modern Science. Nova Science Publishers, Inc..   (Google)
Brooks, Sidney C. (1984). Biomolecular information analysis in neurotransmitter systems. Acta Biotheoretica 33 (1).   (Google)
Brook, Andrew & Akins, Kathleen (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in this volume are clustered around five major themes: data and theory in neuroscience; neural representation and computation; visuomotor transformations; color vision; and consciousness
Bub, Jeffrey (1994). Is cognitive neuropsychology possible? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1:417-427.   (Google | More links)
Bub, Jeffrey (1994). Testing models of cognition through the analysis of brain-damaged patients. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):837-55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of cognitive neuropsychology is to articulate the functional architecture underlying normal cognition, on the basis of congnitive performance data involving brain-damaged subjects. Throughout the history of the subject, questions have been raised as to whether the methods of neuropsychology are adequate to its goals. The question has been reopened by Glymour [1994], who formulates a discovery problem for cognitive neuropsychology, in the sense of formal learning theory, concerning the existence of a reliable methodology. It appears that the discovery problem may be insoluble in principle! I propose a modified formulation of Glymour's discovery problem and argue that a sceptical conclusion about the possiblity of cognitive neuropsychology as an empirical science is not warranted
Buford, Chris & Allhoff, Fritz (2005). Neuroscience and metaphysics. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):34 – 36.   (Google)
Burgess, Gregory C.; Braver, Todd S. & Gray, Jeremy R. (2006). Exactly how are fluid intelligence, working memory, and executive function related? Cognitive neuroscience approaches to investigating the mechanisms of fluid cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):128-129.   (Google)
Abstract: Blair proposes that fluid intelligence, working memory, and executive function form a unitary construct: fluid cognition. Recently, our group has utilized a combined correlational–experimental cognitive neuroscience approach, which we argue is beneficial for investigating relationships among these individual differences in terms of neural mechanisms underlying them. Our data do not completely support Blair's strong position. (Published Online April 5 2006)
Burgess, Neil (2002). Spatial models of imagery for remembered scenes are more likely to advance (neuro)science than symbolic ones. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):185-186.   (Google)
Abstract: Hemispatial neglect in imagery implies a spatially organised representation. Reaction times in memory for arrays of locations from shifted viewpoints indicate processes analogous to actual bodily movement through space. Behavioral data indicate a privileged role for this process in memory. A proposed spatial mechanism makes contact with direct recordings of the representations of location and orientation in the mammalian brain
Burrow, Trigant (1943). The neurodynamics of behavior. A phylobiological foreword. Philosophy of Science 10 (4):271-288.   (Google | More links)
Burrow, Trigant (1949). The social neurosis: A study in "clinical anthropology". Philosophy of Science 16 (1):25-40.   (Google | More links)
Cairney, Sherre & Maruff, Paul (2007). Petrol sniffing, the brain, and aboriginal culture : Between sorcery and neuroscience. In Henri Cohen & Brigitte Stemmer (eds.), Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain. Elxevier Academic Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2006). Review of Alvin I. Goldman, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (11).   (Google)
Chatterjee, Anjan (2007). Cosmetic neurology and cosmetic surgery: Parallels, predictions, and challenges. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (2):129-137.   (Google)
Chatterjee, Anjan (2006). The promise and predicament of cosmetic neurology. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):110-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cheyne, J. A.; Rueffer, S. D. & Newby-Clark, I. R. (1999). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis: Neurological and cultural construction of the night-Mare. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):319-337.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences (HHEs) accompanying sleep paralysis (SP) are often cited as sources of accounts of supernatural nocturnal assaults and paranormal experiences. Descriptions of such experiences are remarkably consistent across time and cultures and consistent also with known mechanisms of REM states. A three-factor structural model of HHEs based on their relations both to cultural narratives and REM neurophysiology is developed and tested with several large samples. One factor, labeled Intruder, consisting of sensed presence, fear, and auditory and visual hallucinations, is conjectured to originate in a hypervigilant state initiated in the midbrain. Another factor, Incubus, comprising pressure on the chest, breathing difficulties, and pain, is attributed to effects of hyperpolarization of motoneurons on perceptions of respiration. These two factors have in common an implied alien ''other'' consistent with occult narratives identified in numerous contemporary and historical cultures. A third factor, labeled Unusual Bodily Experiences, consisting of floating/flying sensations, out-of-body experiences, and feelings of bliss, is related to physically impossible experiences generated by conflicts of endogenous and exogenous activation related to body position, orientation, and movement. Implications of this last factor for understanding of orientational primacy in self-consciousness are considered. Central features of the model developed here are consistent with recent work on hallucinations associated with hypnosis and schizophrenia
Cherniak, Christopher, Large-scale optimization of neuron arbors.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: At the global as well as local scales, some of the geometry of types of neuron arbors—both dendrites and axons—appears to be self-organizing: Their morphogenesis behaves like flowing water, that is, fluid dynamically; waterflow in branching networks in turn acts like a tree composed of cords under tension, that is, vector mechanically. Branch diameters and angles and junction sites conform significantly to this model. The result is that such neuron tree samples globally minimize their total volume—rather than, for example, surface area or branch length. In addition, the arbors perform well at generating the cheapest topology interconnecting their terminals: their large-scale layouts are among the best of all such possible connecting patterns, approaching 5% of optimum. This model also applies comparably to arterial and river networks. S1063-651X 99 16205-6..
Cherniak, Christopher (1991). Meta-neuroanatomy: The myth of the unbounded mind/brain. In Evandro Agazzi & Alberto Cordero (eds.), Philosophy and the Origin and Evolution of the Universe. Norwell: Kluwer.   (Google)
Cherniak, Christopher (1995). Neural component placement. Trends in Neurosciences 18 (12):522-527.   (Cited by 89 | Google | More links)
Cherniak, Christopher, Optimal-wiring models of neuroanatomy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Combinatorial network optimization appears to fit well as a model of brain structure: connections in the brain are a critically constrained resource, hence their deployment in a wide range of cases is finely optimized to “‘save wire". This review focuses on minimization of large-scale costs, such as total volume for mammal dendrite and axon arbors and total wirelength for positioning of connected neural components such as roundworm ganglia (and also mammal cortex areas). Phenomena of good optimization raise questions about mechanisms for their achievement: the examples of optimized neuroanatomy here turn out to include candidates for some of the most complex biological structures known to be derivable purely from simple physical energy minimization processes. Part of the functional role of such fine-tuned wiring optimization may be as a compact strategy for generating self-organizing complex neuroanatomical..
Cherniak, Christopher (1994). Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):89-107.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cherniak, Christopher (1990). The bounded brain: Toward quantitative neuroanatomy. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (1).   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (2002). Outer space and inner space: The new epistemology. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76 (2):25-48.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1995). The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain. MIT Press.   (Cited by 486 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the uninitiated, there are two major tendencies in the modeling of human cognition. The older, tradtional school believes, in essence, that full human cognition can be modeled by dividing the world up into distinct entities -- called __symbol s__-- such as “dog”, “cat”, “run”, “bite”, “happy”, “tumbleweed”, and so on, and then manipulating this vast set of symbols by a very complex and very subtle set of rules. The opposing school claims that this system, while it might be good at concluding that Paris is the capital of France or that there must be blood flowing in the left-rear leg of a cow, can never capture the full measure -- indeed, the essence -- of human cognition. For them, the essential features of cognition emerge from the combined effects of myriad, tiny actions far below the surface of consciousness. This is the camp to which Paul Churchland belongs
Clancey, William J. (2000). Conceptual coordination bridges information processing and neurophysiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):919-922.   (Google)
Abstract: Information processing theories of memory and skills can be reformulated in terms of how categories are physically and temporally related, a process called conceptual coordination. Dreaming can then be understood as a story-understanding process in which two mechanisms found in everyday comprehension are missing: conceiving sequences (chunking categories in time as a higher-order categorization) and coordinating across modalities (e.g., relating the sound of a word and the image of its meaning). On this basis, we can readily identify isomorphisms between dream phenomenology and neurophysiology, and explain the function of dreaming as facilitating future coordination of sequential, cross-modal categorization (i.e., REM sleep lowers activation thresholds, “unlearning”). [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Clayton, Philip (1999). Neuroscience, the person, and God: An emergentist account. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Clancy, Barbara (2006). Practical use of evolutionary neuroscience principles. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):14-15.   (Google)
Abstract: As Striedter explores the concerted principles that drive brain evolution and the departures that create uniqueness, he scrutinizes and ultimately supports the (unnecessarily controversial) Finlay/Darlington model in which mathematical relationships across mammalian neural development are identified (Finlay & Darlington 1995). Pragmatic impact includes the ability to make novel comparisons across developing species, including humans
Clancey, William J. (1993). Situated action: A neuropsychological interpretation (response to Vera and simon). [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Symbols in computer programs are not necessarily isomorphic in form or capability to neural processes. Representations in our models are stored descriptions of the world and human behavior, created by a human interpreter; representations in the brain are neither immutable forms nor encoded in some language. Although the term "symbol" can be usefully applied to describe words, smoke signals, neural maps, and graphic icons, a science of symbol processing requires distinguishing between the structural, developmental, and interactive nature of different forms of representing
Cleeremans, Axel, Harder, better, faster, stronger: A review of “computational explorations in cognitive neuroscience”.   (Google)
Abstract: Just like the sequel to a successful movie, O’Reilly and Munakata’s “Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience” aims to follow up and expand on the original 1986 “Parallel Distributed Processing” volumes edited by James McClelland, David Rumelhart and the PDP research group. This kinship, which is explicitly recognized by the authors as the book is prefaced by Jay McClelland, is perceptible throughout Computational Explorations: Not only does this volume visit many of the problems and paradigms that the original books were focused on (so making Computational Explorations feel more like a remake than like a sequel), but there also is an instantly recognizable, and clearly “psychological” approach to the role of computational modelling in the cognitive neurosciences. The result is a highly effective, wonderful introduction to the ideas, methods, and problems that characterize this still burgeoning domain
Cleeremans, Axel, Letter to neuroscience letter to neuroscience.   (Google)
Abstract: One function of sleep is hypothesized to be the reprocessparticipate in the optimization of the network that subing and consolidation of memory traces (Smith, 1995; Gais tends subject's visuo^motor response. The optimization of et al., 2000; McGaugh, 2000; Stickgold et al., 2000). At..
Cock, Josephine; Fordham, Claire; Cockburn, Janet & Haggard, Patrick (2003). Who knows best? Awareness of divided attention difficulty in a neurological rehabilitation setting. Brain Injury 17 (7):561-574.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Coderre, Terence J. & Katz, Joel (1997). What exactly is central to the role of central neuroplasticity in persistent pain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):483-486.   (Google)
Cohen, Cynthia B. (2007). Beyond the human neuron mouse to the NAS guidelines. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):46 – 49.   (Google)
Coplan, Amy (2008). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading by Goldman, Alvin. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (1):94–97.   (Google | More links)
Cory, Gerald A. (2002). Maclean's evolutionary neuroscience, the csn model and Hamilton's rule: Some developmental, clinical, and social policy implications. Brain and Mind 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Paul MacLean, founder and long-time chief ofthe Laboratory of Brain Evolution and Behavior,National Institutes of Health, is a pioneeringfigure in the emergent field of evolutionaryneuroscience. His influence has been widelyfelt in the development of biologicalpsychiatry and has led to a considerableliterature on evolutionary approaches toclinical issues. MacLean's work is alsoenjoying a resurgence of interest in academicareas of neuroscience and evolutionarypsychology which have previously shown littleinterest or knowledge of his extensive work. This chapter builds on MacLean's work to bringtogether new insights into the neuralarchitecture of human development, hierarchy,conflict behavior, and reciprocity in the formof the Conflict Systems Neurobehavioral (CSN)Model. Hamilton's rule of kinship altruism orinclusive fitness is proposed to be the gene'seye complement to MacLean's evolutionaryneuroscience and the CSN Model derivedtherefrom. Hierarchy, conflict behavior andreciprocity are also central issues in healthydevelopment as well as in clinical syndromes ofdepression, mania, and other socialmaladjustments. The emerging insights permitthe integration of the concept of inclusivefitness underpinning evolutionary psychologywith MacLean's perspective on evolutionaryneuroscience as well as the definition of newchallenges for mental health and socialstability. The policy implications areindicated
Courchesne, Eric (1997). Prediction and preparation: Anticipatory role of the cerebellum in diverse neurobehavioral functions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):248-249.   (Google)
Craver, Carl F. (2004). Dissociable realization and kind splitting. Philosophy Of Science 71 (5):960-971.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion
Craver, Carl F. (2005). Functions and mechanisms in contemporary neuroscience. In Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher, Eric Racine & E. Ennan (eds.), Des Neurones A La Conscience: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences. Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Craver, Carl F. (2003). The making of a memory mechanism. Journal of the History of Biology 36 (1):153-95.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Smith, Joel (forthcoming). Can Transcendental Intersubjectivity be Naturalised? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss Husserl's account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. I focus on the problem of perceived similarity. I argue that recent work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, concerning intermodal representation and the mirror neuron system, fails to constitute a naturalistic solution to the problem. This can be seen via a comparison between the Husserlian project, on the one hand, and Molyneux's Question on the other.
Dale, J. Alexander; Hyatt, Janyce & Hollerman, Jeff (2007). The neuroscience of dance and the dance of neuroscience: Defining a path of inquiry. Journal of Aesthetic Education 41 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : This paper represents the authors' attempt to provide a useful framework for discussing and investigating the links between the apparently disparate disciplines of neuroscience and dance. This attempt arose from an interdisciplinary course offering on this topic. A clear need apparent in preparing for an exploration of such uncharted territory was for some definition of the relevant landmarks in the form of a conceptual framework. The current status of that developing framework is presented here, as we consider the historical context that contributed to the cultural distance between neuroscience and dance as disciplines; the conceptual and technical obstacles to collaborative work between these disciplines; and the recent developments, both conceptual and technological, that make the interface between neuroscience and dance a particularly fruitful source of inspiration not only for dancers and neuroscientists but potentially for a wide variety of disciplines touching on health and education in general
Damasio, Antonio R. (2001). Reflections on the neurobiology of emotion and feeling. In The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Daniel, Steven G. (1999). How trivial is the “trivial neuron doctrine”? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):834-835.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that Gold & Stoljar's “trivial neuron doctrine” is not in fact trivial. Many familiar positions in the philosophy of mind run afoul of it, and it is unclear that even those whom Gold & Stoljar identify as adherents of the trivial neuron doctrine can be comfortably described as such
Daugman, J. G. (2001). Brain metaphor and brain theory. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Davis, Hank (2001). Too early for a neuropsychology of empathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):32-33.   (Google)
Abstract: To date, a wide range of interdisciplinary scholarship has done little to clarify either the why or the how of empathy. Preston & de Waal (P&deW) attempt to remedy this, although it remains unclear whether empathy consists of two discrete processes, or whether a perceptual and motor component are joined in some sort of behavioral inevitability. Although it is appealing to offer a neuroanatomy of empathy, the present level of neuropsychology may not support such reductionism
Decety, Jean & Grèzes, Julie (1998). A neurobiological approach to imitation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):688-689.   (Google)
Abstract: To explore the neural mechanisms engaged by the perception of action with the intent to imitate, positron emission tomographic activation studies were performed in healthy human subjects. We discuss the results in light of the framework proposed by Byrne & Russon, especially the distinction between mechanisms subserving action-level and program-level imitation
Decety, Jean & Sommerville, Jessica A. (2009). Action representation as the bedrock of social cognition: A developmental neuroscience perspective. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Decety, J. (2002). Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Decety, J. & Chaminade, T. (2003). When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):577-596.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging explorations of the neurophysiological substrate of shared representations between the self and others, using various ecological paradigms such as mentally representing one's own actions versus others' actions, watching the actions executed by others, imitating the others' actions versus being imitated by others. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in the essential ability to distinguish the self from others, and in the way the self represents the other. Interestingly, the right hemisphere develops its functions earlier than the left
Dehaene-Lambertz, G. & Dehaene, Stanislas (1997). In defense of learning by selection: Neurobiological and behavioral evidence revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):560-561.   (Google)
Abstract: Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) constructivist manifesto promotes a return to an extreme form of empiricism. In defense of learning by selection, we argue that at the neurobiological level all the data presented by Q&S in support of their constructive model are in fact compatible with a model comprising multiple overlapping stages of synaptic overproduction and selection. We briefly review developmental studies at the behavioral level in humans providing evidence in favor of a selectionist view of development
De Jong, Willem P. & Van Galen, Gerard P. (1997). Are speed/accuracy trade-offs caused by neuromotor noise, or not? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):306-307.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2007). Philosophy as naive anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker. In M. Bennett, D. C. Dennett, P. M. S. Hacker & J. R. & Searle (eds.), Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Bennett and Hacker’s _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), a collaboration between a philosopher (Hacker) and a neuroscientist (Bennett), is an ambitious attempt to reformulate the research agenda of cognitive neuroscience by demonstrating that cognitive scientists and other theorists, myself among them, have been bewitching each other by misusing language in a systematically “incoherent” and conceptually “confused” way. In both style and substance, the book harks back to Oxford in the early 1960's, when Ordinary Language Philosophy ruled, and Ryle and Wittgenstein were the authorities on the meanings of our everyday mentalistic or psychological terms. I myself am a product of that time and place (as is Searle, for that matter), and I find much to agree with in their goals and presuppositions, and before turning to my criticisms, which will be severe, I want to highlight what I think is exactly right in their approach–the oft-forgotten lessons of Ordinary Language Philosophy
Depue, Richard A. & Morrone-Strupinsky, Jeannine V. (2005). A neurobehavioral model of affiliative bonding: Implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):313-350.   (Google)
Abstract: Because little is known about the human trait of affiliation, we provide a novel neurobehavioral model of affiliative bonding. Discussion is organized around processes of reward and memory formation that occur during approach and consummatory phases of affiliation. Appetitive and consummatory reward processes are mediated independently by the activity of the ventral tegmental area (VTA) dopamine (DA)–nucleus accumbens shell (NAS) pathway and the central corticolimbic projections of the u-opiate system of the medial basal arcuate nucleus, respectively, although these two projection systems functionally interact across time. We next explicate the manner in which DA and glutamate interact in both the VTA and NAS to form incentive-encoded contextual memory ensembles that are predictive of reward derived from affiliative objects. Affiliative stimuli, in particular, are incorporated within contextual ensembles predictive of affiliative reward via: (a) the binding of affiliative stimuli in the rostral circuit of the medial extended amygdala and subsequent transmission to the NAS shell; (b) affiliative stimulus-induced opiate potentiation of DA processes in the VTA and NAS; and (c) permissive or facilitatory effects of gonadal steroids, oxytocin (in interaction with DA), and vasopressin on (i) sensory, perceptual, and attentional processing of affiliative stimuli and (ii) formation of social memories. Among these various processes, we propose that the capacity to experience affiliative reward via opiate functioning has a disproportionate weight in determining individual differences in affiliation. We delineate sources of these individual differences, and provide the first human data that support an association between opiate functioning and variation in trait affiliation. Key Words: affiliation corticolimbic-striatal networks; appetitive and consummatory reward; dopamine; oxytocin; personality; social bonds; social memory; u-opiates
Depue, Richard A. & Collins, Paul F. (1999). Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):491-517.   (Google)
de preester, helena (2006). The self in neuroscience and psychiatry. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1).   (Google)
Dietrich, A. (2004). Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):746-61.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Doricchi, Fabrizio & Violani, Cristiano (2000). Mesolimbic dopamine and the neuropsychology of dreaming: Some caution and reconsiderations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):930-931.   (Google)
Abstract: New findings point to a role for mesolimbic DA circuits in the generation of dreaming. We disagree with Solms about these structures having an exclusive role in generating dreams. We review data suggesting that dreaming can be interrupted at different levels of processing and that anterior-subcortical lesions associated with dream cessation are unlikely to produce selective hypodopaminergic dynamic impairments. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Dror, Itiel & Thomas, Robin (2004). The cognitive neuroscience laboratory: A framework for the science of mind. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Eccles, John C. (1970). Facing Reality: Philosophical Adventures by a Brain Scientist. New York,Springer-Verlag.   (Google)
Egan, Frances & Matthews, Robert J. (2006). Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third way. Synthese 153 (3):377-391.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches
Ehrenstein, Walter H.; Spillmann, Lothar & Sarris, Viktor (2003). Gestalt issues in modern neuroscience. Axiomathes 13 (3-4).   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We present select examples of how visual phenomena can serve as tools to uncoverbrain mechanisms. Specifically, receptive field organization is proposed as a Gestalt-like neural mechanism of perceptual organization. Appropriate phenomena, such as brightness and orientation contrast, subjective contours, filling-in, and aperture-viewed motion, allow for a quantitative comparison between receptive fields and their psychophysical counterparts, perceptive fields. Phenomenology might thus be extended from the study of perceptual qualities to their transphenomenal substrates, including memory functions. In conclusion, classic issues of Gestalt psychology can now be related to modern
Eliasmith, Chris (forthcoming). Computational neuroscience. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Keywords: computational neuroscience, neural coding, brain function, neural modeling, cognitive modeling, computation, representation, neuroscience, neuropsychology, semantics, theoretical psychology, theoretical neuroscience
Eliasmith, Chris (forthcoming). How to build a brain: From function to implementation. Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: To have a fully integrated understanding of neurobiological systems, we must address two fundamental questions: 1. What do brains do (what is their function)? and 2. How do brains do whatever it is that they do (how is that function implemented)? I begin by arguing that these questions are necessarily inter-related. Thus, addressing one without consideration of an answer to the other, as is often done, is a mistake. I then describe what I take to be the best available approach to addressing both questions. Specifically, to address 2, I adopt the Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) of Eliasmith & Anderson [Neural engineering: Computation representation and dynamics in neurobiological systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003] which identifies implementational principles for neural models. To address 1, I suggest that adopting statistical modeling methods for perception and action will be functionally sufficient for capturing biological behavior. I show how these two answers will be mutually constraining, since the process of model selection for the statistical method in this approach can be informed by known anatomical and physiological properties of the brain, captured by the NEF. Similarly, the application of the NEF must be informed by functional hypotheses, captured by the statistical modeling approach
Elliott, Terry (2001). D'Arcy wentworth Thompson, interindividual variation, and postnatal neuronal growth. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):284-284.   (Google)
Ellis, R. (2000). Review of “affective neuroscience” by Jaak Panksepp. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):313-318.   (Google | More links)
Estes, David & Bartsch, Karen (1997). Constraining the brain: The role of developmental psychology in developmental cognitive neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):562-563.   (Google)
Abstract: Developmental psychology should play an essential constraining role in developmental cognitive neuroscience. Theories of neural development must account explicitly for the early emergence of knowledge and abilities in infants and young children documented in developmental research. Especially in need of explanation at the neural level is the early emergence of meta-representation
Farram, Freda (1935). I. the relation of ascendance-submission tendencies to neurosis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):228 – 232.   (Google)
Farah, Martha J. (1988). Is visual imagery really visual: Some overlooked evidence from neuropsychology. Psychological Review 95:307-17.   (Cited by 150 | Google | More links)
Farah, Martha J. (2000). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Vision. Blackwell Publishers.   (Cited by 129 | Google)
Abstract: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Vision begins by introducing the reader to the anatomy of the eye and visual cortex and then proceeds to discuss image and...
Feinberg, Todd E. (1997). Some interesting perturbations of the self in neurology. Seminars in Neurology 17:129-35.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Ferber, Sari Goldstein (2008). The concept of coregulation between neurobehavioral subsystems: The logic interplay between excitatory and inhibitory ends. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):337-338.   (Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 45 (7):14521462.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition

and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to

the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences

between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,

beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
Flanagan, Owen (2009). One enchanted being: Neuroexistentialism and meaning. Zygon 44 (1):41-49.   (Google)
Abstract: The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World is my attempt to explain whether and how existential meaning is possible in a material world, and how such meaning is best conceived naturalistically. Neuroexistentialism conceives of our predicament in accordance with Darwin plus neuroscience. The prospects for our kind of being-in-the-world are limited by our natures as smart but fully embodied short-lived animals. Many find this picture disenchanting, even depressing. I respond to four criticisms of my relentless upbeat naturalism: that naturalism can make no room for norms, for values; that I overvalue truth at the expense of happiness; that I underestimate the extent to which supernaturalism has made peace with naturalism; and that I can give no account for why humans as finite animals should want to overcome our given natures and seek impersonal, self-transcendent value
Flanagan, Owen J. (1996). Self-expression in sleep: Neuroscience and dreams. In Self-Expressions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Flinn, Mark; Baerwald, Charles; Decker, Seamus & England, Barry (1998). Evolutionary functions of neuroendocrine response to social environment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (3):372-374.   (Google)
Flinn, Mark V.; Muehlenbein, Michael P. & Ponzi, Davide (2009). Evolution of neuroendocrine mechanisms linking attachment and life history: The social neuroendocrinology of middle childhood. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):27-28.   (Google)
Foss, Jeffrey (1997). Irresistible environment meets immovable neurons. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):565-566.   (Google)
Abstract: Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) main accomplishment is the presentation of increasing complexity in the developing brain. Although this cuts a colorful swath through current theories of learning, it leaves the central question untouched: How does the environment direct neural structure? In answer, Q&S offer us only Hebb's half-century-old suggestion once again
Foster, Jonathan; van Eekelen, Anke & Mattes, Eugen (2008). Neuroconstructivism: Evidence for later maturation of prefrontally mediated executive functioning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):338-339.   (Google)
Fosse, R. (2000). Rem mentation in narcoleptics and normals: An empirical test of two neurocognitive theories. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):488-509.   (Google)
Abstract: This study tested the two main neurocognitive models of dreaming by using cognitive data elicited from REM sleep in normals and narcoleptics. The two models were the ''activation-only'' view which holds that, in the context of sleep, overall activation of the brain is sufficient for consciousness to proceed in the manner of dreaming (e.g., Antrobus, 1991; Foulkes, 1993; Vogel, 1978); and the Activation, Input source, Modulation (AIM model), which predicts that not only brain activation level but also neurochemical modulatory systems exert widespread effects upon dreaming (Hobson & McCarley, 1977; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000). Mental activity was studied in nocturnal REM in 15 narcoleptics and 9 normal healthy persons and in REM at the onset of daytime naps and nighttime sleep (SOREM) in narcoleptics. The study was performed in the subjects' homes, using instrumental awakenings and ambulatory polysomnographic techniques, and focused upon visual vividness, mentation report length, improbable and discontinuous bizarre features, and reflective consciousness. Within each subject group, most cognitive variables tended to fluctuate in line with expected variations in circadian activation level. When comparing the cognitive variables between the two groups, reflective consciousness was clearly highest in narcoleptics, whereas improbabilities and discontinuities were lower, with mentation report length and visual vividness differing less between the groups. These findings are consistent with the AIM model of sleep mentation, but not with the activation-only model
Freeman, Walter J. & Skarda, Christine A. (1991). Mind/brain science. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Freud, Sigmund (2009). Religion as neurosis. In Daniel L. Pals (ed.), Introducing Religion: Readings From the Classic Theorists. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Frigg, Roman & Howard, Catherine, Fact and fiction in the neuropsychology of art.   (Google)
Abstract: The time honoured philosophical issue of how to resolve the mind/body problem has taken a more scientific turn of late. Instead of discussing issues of the soul and emotion and person and their reduction to a physical form, we now ask ourselves how well-understood cognitive and social concepts fit into the growing and changing field of neuropsychology. One of the many projects that have come out of this new scientific endeavour is Zaidel’s (2005) inquiry into the neuropsychological bases of art
Gallese, Vittorio & Keysers, Christian (2001). Mirror neurons: A sensorimotor representation system. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):983-984.   (Google)
Abstract: Positing the importance of sensorimotor contingencies for perception is by no means denying the presence and importance of representations. Using the evidence of mirror neurons we will show the intrinsic relationship between action control and representation within the logic of forward models
Gallagher, Shaun (ms). The neuronal platonist.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isnÂ’t all itÂ’s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum , a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We donÂ’t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they arenÂ’t all that bad. We think weÂ’re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
Gallese, Vittorio (2001). The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.   (Cited by 143 | Google)
Garzon, Fernando (2008). A neuroscientific approach and the God image. In Glendon Moriarty & Louis Hoffman (eds.), God Image Handbook for Spiritual Counseling and Psychotherapy: Research, Theory, and Practice. Haworth Pastoral Press.   (Google)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (2003). Editorial: Philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. Dialectica 57 (1):3–6.   (Google | More links)
Garnar, Andrew & Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2004). Neurobiological models: An unnecessary divide--neural models in psychiatry. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Genovesio, Aldo & Wise, Steven P. (2008). The neurophysiology of abstract response strategies. In Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (1993). Social causation and cognitive neuroscience. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1):27–45.   (Google | More links)
Givon, T. (1998). Toward a neurology of grammar. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):154-155.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary makes a case for a connection between the hierarchically organized skills emphasized in Greenfield's (1991t) target article and rhythmic skills utilized in music. It also links hierarchical organization with automated processing. Implicit is the notion that lower levels of a hierarchy become automatic, as they go under control of higher levels of organization
Glymour, C. (1994). On the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):815-35.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Contemporary cognitive neuropsychology attempts to infer unobserved features of normal human cognition, or ?cognitive architecture?, from experiments with normals and with brain-damaged subjects in whom certain normal cognitive capacities are altered, diminished, or absent. Fundamental methodological issues about the enterprise of cognitive neuropsychology concern the characterization of methods by which features of normal cognitive architecture can be identified from such data, the assumptions upon which the reliability of such methods are premised, and the limits of such methods?even granting their assumptions?in resolving uncertainties about that architecture. With some idealization, the question of the capacities of various experimental designs in cognitive neuropsychology to uncover cognitive architecture can be reduced to comparatively simple questions about the prior assumptions investigators are willing to make. This paper presents some of simplest of those reductions. 1Research for this paper was made possible by a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and by grant number SBE-9212264 from the National Science Foundation. I thank Martha Farah for teaching me what little I know of cognitive neuropsychology, Jeffrey Bub for stimulating me to think about these issues and for commenting on drafts of this paper, and Peter Slezak for additional comments. Alfonso Caramazza and Michael McCloskey provided very helpful comments on a second draft
Goel, Vinod (2004). Can there be a cognitive neuroscience of central cognitive systems? In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Goldenberg, Georg (2002). Loss of visual imagery: Neuropsychological evidence in search for a theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):191-191.   (Google)
Abstract: Observations on patients who lost visual imagery after brain damage call into question the notion that the knowledge subserving visual imagery is “tacit.” Dissociations between deficient imagery and preserved recognition of objects suggest that imagery is exclusively based on explicit knowledge, whereas retrieval of “tacit” visual knowledge is bound to the presence of the object and the task of recognizing it
Goldberg, Gary & Brooks, Roberta (1998). Premotor systems, language-related neurodynamics, and cetacean communication. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):517-518.   (Google)
Abstract: The frame/content theory of speech production is restricted to output mechanisms in the target article; we suggest that these ideas might best be viewed in the context of language production proceeding as a coordinated dynamical whole. The role of the medial premotor system in generating frames matches the important role it may play in the internally dependent timing of motor acts. The proposed coevolution of cortical architectonics and language production mechanisms suggests a significant divergence between primate and cetacean species corresponding to major differences in areal differentiation trends in cerebral cortex
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis
Goldman, Alvin (2009). Simulation theory and cognitive neuroscience. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.   (Google)
Goswami, Usha (2008). Principles of learning, implications for teaching: A cognitive neuroscience perspective. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (3-4):381-399.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive neuroscience aims to improve our understanding of aspects of human learning and performance by combining data acquired with the new brain imaging technologies with data acquired in cognitive psychology paradigms. Both neuroscience and psychology use the philosophical assumptions underpinning the natural sciences, namely the scientific method, whereby hypotheses are proposed and tested using quantitative approaches. The relevance of 'brain science' for the classroom has proved controversial with some educators, perhaps because of distrust of the applicability of so-called 'medical models' to education. Nevertheless, the brain is the main organ of learning, and so a deeper understanding of the brain would appear highly relevant to education. Modern science is revealing the crucial role of biology in every aspect of human experience and performance. This does not mean that biology determines outcomes. Rather, there is a complex interplay between biology and environments. Improved knowledge about how the brain learns should assist educators in creating optimal learning environments. Neuroscience can also identify 'biomarkers' of educational risk, and provide new methodologies to test the effects of educational interventions
Griffiths, Paul E. (1989). Folk, functional and neurochemical aspects of mood. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):17-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: It has been suggested that moods are higher order-dispositions. This proposal is considered, and various shortcomings uncovered. The notion of a higher-order disposition is replaced by the more general notion of a higher-order functional state. An account is given in which moods are higher-order functional states, and the overall system of moods is a higher-order functional description of the mind. This proposal is defended in two ways. First, it is shown to capture some central features of our pre-scientific conception of moods. Secondly, it is argued that the account is more likely to be psychologically realistic (in a sense to be defined) than accounts which are behaviourally equivalent, but which do not employ a hierarchy of functional descriptions. It is suggested that the hierarchical structure of the model mirrors a feature of the physical states that realise moods and emotions
Griffin, Richard (ms). The intentional stance: Developmental and neurocognitive perspectives.   (Google)
Abstract: Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often ill understood by scientists working in this area, a great deal of empirical progress has already been made. We have Dan Dennett to thank for this extraordinary dialogue between these disciplines
Grossberg, Stephen (2005). STaRT: A bridge between emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic system modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):207-208.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis proposes a “reconceptualization” of how to link the psychology and neurobiology of emotion and cognitive-emotional interactions. His main proposed themes have actually been actively and quantitatively developed in the neural modeling literature for more than 30 years. This commentary summarizes some of these themes and points to areas of particularly active research in this area
Grunewald, Alexander (1999). Neurophysiology indicates cognitive penetration of the visual system. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):379-380.   (Google)
Abstract: Short-term memory, nonattentional task effects and nonspatial extraretinal representations in the visual system are signs of cognitive penetration. All of these have been found physiologically, arguing against the cognitive impenetrability of vision as a whole. Instead, parallel subcircuits in the brain, each subserving a different competency including sensory and cognitive (and in some cases motor) aspects, may have cognitively impenetrable components
Gunderson, Keith (1999). What neuron doctrines might never explain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):837-838.   (Google)
Abstract: My focus is on the inability of neuron doctrines to provide an explanatory context for aspects of consciousness that give rise to the mind–body and other minds problem(s). Neuroscience and related psychological sciences may be viewed as richly contributing to our taxonomic understanding of the mind and conditions underlying consciousness, without illuminating mind–body and other minds perplexities
Gustafson, Don (2007). Neurosciences of action and noncausal theories. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):367–374.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional alternative to causal analyses of intentional action is not threatened by the putative scientific findings. This, in turn, is ironic in that defenders of the noncausal accounts of action were thought to be in opposition to the natural sciences of action whereas the analyses in the causal style were "on the side of physicalism." This result is also assessed in what follows
Hacker, P. M. S. & Bennett, M. R. (2003). Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.   (Google)
Hadreas, P. (1999). Intentionality and the neurobiology of pleasure. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 30 (2):219-236.   (Google)
Hammond, Michael (2003). The enhancement imperative: The evolutionary neurophysiology of Durkheimian solidarity. Sociological Theory 21 (4):359-374.   (Google | More links)
Harnad, Stevan (1993). L'ancrage Des symboles dans le monde analogique a l'aide de reseaux neuronaux: Un modele hybride. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google)
Abstract: Le modele d'ancrage propose ici est simple a recapituler. Les projections sensorielles analogiques sont les intrants des reseaux neuronaux qui doivent apprendre a connecter certaines des projections avec certains symboles (le nom de leur categorie) et certaines autres projections avec d'autres symboles (les noms d'autres categories pouvant se confondre les unes aux autres), en trouvant et en utilisant les invariants qui les representent de facon a favoriser l'accomplissement d'une categorisation juste. Les symboles ancres sont alors enfiles dans des combinaisons d'ordre superieur (descriptions symboliques ancrees) par un deuxieme processus combinatoire qui presente une difference critique a l'egard de la manipulation symbolique classique. Dans la manipulation symbolique standard (non ancree), la syntaxe est la seule contrainte a laquelle les combinaisons de symboles sont soumises et elle s'applique a la configuration (arbitraire) des symboles. Dans un systeme symbolique ancre, on doit tenir compte d'une deuxieme contrainte, celle de la forme non arbitraire des invariants sensoriels qui connectent le symbole a la projection sensorielle analogique de l'objet auquel il se rapporte. Je ne peux m'etendre sur la nature de ces systemes symboliques ancres a double contrainte , si ce n'est que pour indiquer que la perception categorielle humaine peut apporter quelques indices quant a la nature de cette interaction entre les contraintes analogiques et syntaxiques
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2007). Neurobiology. In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray & Stewart, C. Matthew (2004). Neuroscience and the art of single-cell recordings. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):195-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article examines how scientists move from physical measurementsto actual observation of single-cell recordings in the brain. We highlight how easy it is to change the fundamental nature of ourobservations using accepted methodological techniques for manipulatingraw data. Collecting single-cell data is thoroughly pragmatic. Weconclude that there is no deep or interesting difference betweenaccounting for observations by measurements and accounting forobservations by theories
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1999). The nontrivial doctrine of cognitive neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):839-839.   (Google)
Abstract: Gold & Stoljar's “trivial” neuron doctrine is neither a truism in cognitive science nor trivial; it has serious consequences for the future direction of the mind/brain sciences. Not everyone would agree that these consequences are desirable. The authors' “radical” doctrine is not so radical; their division between cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology is largely artificial. Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between cognitive neuroscience and other areas of the brain sciences
Hatfield, Gary (2000). The brain's 'new' science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):388-404.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hauser, Marc; Young, Liane & Tranel, Daniel, Does emotion mediate the effect of an action's moral status on its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence.   (Google)
Abstract: Studies of normal individuals reveal an asymmetry in the folk concept of intentional action: an action is more likely to be thought of as intentional when it is morally bad than when it is morally good. One interpretation of these results comes from the hypothesis that emotion plays a critical mediating role in the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status. According to this hypothesis, the negative emotional response triggered by a morally bad action drives the attribution of intent to the actor, or the judgment that the actor acted intentionally. We test this hypothesis by presenting cases of morally bad and morally good action to seven individuals with deficits in emotional processing resulting from damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). If normal emotional processing is necessary for the observed asymmetry, then individuals with VMPC lesions should show no asymmetry. Our results provide no support for this hypothesis: like normal individuals, those with VMPC lesions showed the same asymmetry, tending to judge that an action was intentional when it was morally bad but not when it was morally good. Based on this finding, we suggest that normal emotional processing is not responsible for the observed asymmetry of intentional attributions and thus does not mediate the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status
Hellman, K. M. (1991). Anosognosia: Possible neuropsychological mechanisms. In G. P. Prigatono & Daniel L. Schacter (eds.), Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury: Clinical and Theoretical Issues. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Herrmann, Uta & Soechting, John F. (1997). Neuronal and muscular correlates consistent with Plamondon's theory: Velocity coding and temporal activation patterns. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):311-312.   (Google)
Herzberg, Alexander (1931). Neuropsyche und hirnrinde I. Erkenntnis 2 (1).   (Google)
Hick, John (2007). The New Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience, Neuroscience, and the Transcendent. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This is the first major response to the new challenge of neuroscience to religion. There have been limited responses from a purely Christian point of view, but this takes account of eastern as well as western forms of religious experience. It challenges the prevailing naturalistic assumption of our culture, including the idea that the mind is either identical with or a temporary by-product of brain activity. It also discusses religion as institutions and religion as inner experience of the Transcendent, and suggests a form of spirituality for today
Hintikka, Jaakko (1990). The cartesian cogito, epistemic logic and neuroscience: Some surprising interrelations. Synthese 83 (1).   (Google)
Hoffman, Ralph E. (2000). Studies of synaptic elimination identify an intersection of neurocomputational and neurodevelopmental perspectives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):543-544.   (Google)
Abstract: In order to reach a better understanding of brain function, conceptual synergies linking empirical neurobiological studies and neurocomputational studies should be pursued. I describe an example of a potential synergy based on studies of neural network pruning. Simulations demonstrate that selective elimination of connections enhances the computational capacity of networks capable of temporal processing. These findings may shed light on the functional significance of postnatal neuro-developmental pruning of cortical connections that occurs in mammals
Hohwy, Jakob (2007). Functional integration and the mind. Synthese 159 (3):315-328.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that may unify many of the debates surrounding functional integration and the mind; and I briefly introduce each of the contributions
Hollingsworth, Andrea (2008). Implications of interpersonal neurobiology for a spirituality of compassion. Zygon 43 (4):837-860.   (Google)
Abstract: Interpersonal neurobiology (IPNB) is a burgeoning interdisciplinary field that focuses on ways in which relationships shape and transform the architecture and functioning of the human brain. IPNB points to four specific conditions that appear to encourage the emergence of empathy. Further, these conditions, when gathered together, may constitute the core components of a spirituality of compassion. Following definitions and a discussion of interdisciplinary method, this essay delineates IPNB's main tenets and demonstrates ways in which IPNB sheds light on important aspects of human empathy and compassion. Drawing on this analysis, it introduces the four conditions that encourage the emergence of empathy in individuals and groups and shows why they may be central elements of a spirituality of compassion. A case study, in which the Native American Ojibwe practice of the talking circle is described and assessed through the lens of the IPNB-derived spirituality of compassion, demonstrates the evaluative usefulness of this set of conditions
Horacio Fabrega Jr, (2005). Biological evolution of cognition and culture: Off Arbib's mirror-neuron system stage? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):131-132.   (Google)
Abstract: Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture “is” and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self
Houdé, Olivier (ed.) (2004). Dictionary of Cognitive Science: Neuroscience, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Linguistics, and Philosophy. Psychology Press.   (Google)
Abstract: A translation of the renowned French reference book, Vocabulaire de sciences cognitives , the Dictionary of Cognitive Science presents comprehensive definitions of more than 120 terms. The editor and advisory board of specialists have brought together 60 internationally recognized scholars to give the reader a comprehensive understanding of the most current and dynamic thinking in cognitive science. Topics range from Abduction to Writing, and each entry covers its subject from as many perspectives as possible within the domains of psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, philosophy, and linguistics. This multidisciplinary work is an invaluable resource for all collections
Howard, Harry (2003). Four challenges for cognitive neuroscience and the cortico-hippocampal division of memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):681-682.   (Google)
Abstract: Jackendoff's criticisms of the current state of theorization in cognitive neuroscience are defused by recent work on the computational complementarity of the hippocampus and neocortex. Such considerations lead to a grounding of Jackendoff's processing model in the complementary methods of pattern analysis effected by independent component analysis (ICA) and principle component analysis (PCA)
Howard-jones, Paul (2008). Philosophical challenges for researchers at the interface between neuroscience and education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (3-4):361-380.   (Google)
Abstract: This article examines how discussions around the new interdisciplinary research area combining neuroscience and education have brought into sharp relief differences in the philosophies of learning in these two areas. It considers the difficulties faced by those working at the interface between these two areas and, in particular, it focuses on the challenge of avoiding 'non-sense' when attempting to include the brain in educational argument. The paper relates common transgressions in sense-making with dualist and monist notions of the mind-brain relationship. It then extends a brain-mind-behaviour model from cognitive neuroscience to include a greater emphasis on social interaction and construction. This creates a tool for examining the potentially complex interrelationships between the different learning philosophies in this emerging new field
H., M. (2003). Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):257-290.   (Google)
Abstract: Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation
Humphreys, Glyn W. & Forde, Emer M. E. (2001). Hierarchies, similarity, and interactivity in object recognition: “Category-specific” neuropsychological deficits. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):453-476.   (Google)
Abstract: Category-specific impairments of object recognition and naming are among the most intriguing disorders in neuropsychology, affecting the retrieval of knowledge about either living or nonliving things. They can give us insight into the nature of our representations of objects: Have we evolved different neural systems for recognizing different categories of object? What kinds of knowledge are important for recognizing particular objects? How does visual similarity within a category influence object recognition and representation? What is the nature of our semantic knowledge about different objects? We review the evidence on category-specific impairments, arguing that deficits even for one class of object (e.g., living things) cannot be accounted for in terms of a single information processing disorder across all patients; problems arise at contrasting loci in different patients. The same apparent pattern of impairment can be produced by damage to different loci. According to a new processing framework for object recognition and naming, the hierarchical interactive theory (HIT), we have a hierarchy of highly interactive stored representations. HIT explains the variety of patients in terms of (1) lesions at different levels of processing and (2) different forms of stored knowledge used both for particular tasks and for particular categories of object. Key Words: category-specific deficits; functional imaging; hierarchical models; interactive activation models; neuropsychology; object recognition; perceptual and functional knowledge
Hundert, Edward M. (1989). Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Neuroscience: Three Approaches to the Mind: A Synthetic Analysis of the Varieties of Human Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this book Hundert proposes a new, unified view of the mind, one that integrates the insights of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists. Through a detailed discussion of major theories from these and related disciplines, he gradually reveals links between what were previously unconnected approaches to human thought and experience
Jacob, Pierre (2008). What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language 23 (2):190–223.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent’s brain and this resonance process retrodictively generates a representation of the agent’s intention from a perception of her movement. In this paper, I criticize both assumptions and I argue instead that the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain is enhanced by a prior representation of the agent’s intention and that their task is to predictively compute the best motor command suitable to satisfy the agent’s intention
Jackman, Henry (online). Wittgenstein & James's Stream of Thought.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: William James has been characterized as “the major whipping boy of the later Wittgenstein,” and the currency of this impression of the relation between James and Wittgenstein is understandable. Reading Wittgenstein and his commentators can leave one with the impression that James was a badly muddled “exponent of the tradition in the philosophy of mind that [Wittgenstein] was opposing.” There have been recent attempts to resist this trend, but even these tend to focus on the affinities between the two philosophers, still accepting the prevailing view that Wittgenstein was often critical of James, and that in such cases Wittgenstein was always right and James was always wrong. By contrast, by focusing on Wittgenstein’s discussion of James’s “if-feeling”, it will be argued that Wittgenstein’s criticisms of James are often not as damaging, or even as extensive, as has often been assumed
Pereira, Alfredo (2001). Coexisting spatio-temporalsscales in neuroscience. Minds and Machines 11 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In this study I propose an epistemological discussion of multiple spatio-temporal scales in neuroscience. Are such scales merely convenient levels of description of structure and function, or do they correspond to irreducible levels of brain organization? What criteria should we employ in order to reduce one level to another, or to identify levels that are not reducible to others? Should we think of these criteria as based on empirical and/or theoretical reasons? Beginning with an empirical criterion – the necessity of different experimental methodologies for the measurement of different phenomena in the same system – I summarize spatial and temporal scales currently used in neuroscience and discuss the possibility of a more general theoretical criterion. I conclude that multiscaling should be recognized as a central concept in the epistemology of neuroscience
Job, Remo & Surian, Luca (1998). A neurocognitive mechanism for folk biology? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):577-578.   (Google)
Abstract: Atran's putative module for folk biology is evaluated with respect to evidence from patients showing category-specific impairments for living kinds. Existing neuropsychological evidence provides no support for the primacy of categorization at the generic species level. We outline reasons for this and emphasize that such claims should be tested using inductive reasoning tasks
Johnson, Gregory (2008). LeDoux's Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):739 - 757.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.
Jung, Rex E. & Haier, Richard J. (2007). The parieto-frontal integration theory (P-FIT) of intelligence: Converging neuroimaging evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):135-154.   (Google)
Kaag, John (2009). The neurological dynamics of the imagination. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This article examines the imagination by way of various studies in cognitive science. It opens by examining the neural correlates of bodily metaphors. It assumes a basic knowledge of metaphor studies, or the primary finding that has emerged from this field: that large swathes of human conceptualization are structured by bodily relations. I examine the neural correlates of metaphor, concentrating on the relation between the sensory motor cortices and linguistic conceptualization. This discussion, however, leaves many questions unanswered. If it is the case that the sensory motor cortices are appropriated in language acquisition, how does this process occur at the neural level? What neural preconditions exist such that this appropriation is possible? It is with these questions in mind that I will turn my attention to studies of neural plasticity, degeneracy and the mirror neuron activation. Whereas some scholarship in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience has aimed to identify the neurological correlates of consciousness, examining plasticity, degeneracy and activation shifts the discussion away from a study of correlates toward an exploration of the neurological dynamics of thought. This shift seems appropriate if we are to examine the processes of the “imagination.”
Kantor, Jacob Robert (1922). The nervous system, psychological fact or fiction? Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):38-49.   (Google | More links)
Keestra, Machiel & Cowley, Stephen (2009). Foundationalism and neuroscience; silence and language. Language Sciences 31:531-552.   (Google)
Abstract: Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language, perception and action. Since it also shows many functions to be highly distributed, interconnected and dependent on mechanisms at different levels of processing, it challenges concepts that are traditionally used to describe these functions. The question is how to accommodate these concepts to the recent evidence. A recent proposal, made in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) by Bennett and Hacker, is that concepts play a foundational role in neuroscience, that empirical research needs to presuppose them and that changing concepts is a philosophical task. In defending this perspective, PFN shows much neuroscientific writing to be dualistic in nature due to our poor grasp of its foundations. In our review article we take a different approach. Instead of foundationalism we plead for a mild coherentism, which allows for a gradual and continuous alteration of concepts in light of new evidence. Following this approach it is also easier to deal with some neurological conditions (like blindsight, synaesthesia) that pose difficulties for our concepts. Finally, although words and concepts seem to seduce us to thinking that many skills and tasks function separately, it is language skill that – as neuroscientific evidence shows – co-emerges with action/perception cycles and thus seems to require revision of some of our central concepts.
Keeley, Brian L. (2000). Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science. Philosophy of Science 60 (3):404-418.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kemmerer, David (2003). Neuropsychological evidence for the distinction between grammatically relevant and irrelevant components of meaning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):684-685.   (Google)
Abstract: Jackendoff (2002) argues that grammatically relevant and irrelevant components of meaning do not occupy distinct levels of the semantic system. However, neuropsychological studies have found that the two components doubly dissociate in brain-damaged subjects, suggesting that they are in fact segregated. Neural regionalization of these multidimensional semantic subsystems might take place during language development
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1980). Brain-based limitations on mind. In Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kincaid, Harold & Sullivan, Jacqueline A. (2010). Medical Models of Addiction. In Ross (ed.), What is Addiction?   (Google)
Abstract: Biomedical science has been remarkably successful in explaining illness by categorizing diseases and then by identifying localizable lesions such as a virus and neoplasm in the body that cause those diseases. Not surprisingly, researchers have aspired to apply this powerful paradigm to addiction. So, for example, in a review of the neuroscience of addiction literature, Hyman and Malenka (2001, p. 695) acknowledge a general consensus among addiction researchers that “[a]ddiction can appropriately be considered as a chronic medical illness.” Like other diseases, “Once addiction has taken hold, it tends to follow a chronic course.” (Koob and La Moal 2006, p. ?). Working from this perspective, much effort has gone into characterizing the symptomology of addiction and the brain changes that underlie them. Evidence for involvement of dopamine transmission changes in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and nucleus accumbens (NAc) have received the greatest attention. Kauer and Malenka (2007, p. 844) put it well: “drugs of abuse can co-opt synaptic plasticity mechanisms in brain circuits involved in reinforcement and reward processing”. Our goal in this chapter to provide an explicit description of the assumptions of medical models, the different forms they may take, and the challenges they face in providing explanations with solid evidence of addiction.
Knauff, M. (2006). A neuro-cognitive theory of relational reasoning with mental models and visual images. In Carsten Held, Markus Knauff & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.), Mental Models and the Mind: Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Elsevier.   (Google)
Knudsen, Thorbjørn & Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2006). Cultural evolution is more than neurological evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):356-357.   (Google)
Abstract: Advancing a general Darwinian framework to explain culture is an exciting endeavor. It requires that we face up to the challenge of identifying the specific components that are effective in replication processes in culture. This challenge includes the unsolved problem of explaining cultural inheritance, both at the level of individuals and at the level of social organizations and institutions. (Published Online November 9 2006)
Kornmesser, Stephan (2008). Theoretizität im logischen empirismus und im strukturalismus – erläutert am fallbeispiel Des neurobiologischen konstruktivismus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this article I will compare two approaches for defining theoretical terms, that of Logical Empirism (especially the approach of R. Carnap) and that of Structuralism (according to the works of J. Sneed and W. Stegmüller). I will determine explicitly the accounts of theoreticity in both Logical Empirism and Structuralism, and compare them by means of a case study: a structuralistic reconstruction of Neurobiological Constructivism (according to the theory of G. Roth). I will point out that the structuralistic criticism on the account of theoreticity of Logical Empirism is insufficient and that the structuralistic criterion of theoreticity does not satisfy the requirements of demarcation for theoretical terms demanded by Logical Empirism
Kurthen, Martin (1999). Semantic typing via neuronal assemblies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):296-297.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the main aspects of a neurobiological theory of language is the problem of meaning (or semantic content) in the brain. A full explanation of meaning requires a combined approach to semantic typing and the semantic success of cerebral states or processes. Pulvermüller presents his Hebbian model of language in the brain (HML) as an account of semantic success. If his proposal turns out to be viable, however, it may also promote a theory of semantic typing
Laming, Donald R. J. (2000). On the behavioural interpretation of neurophysiological observation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):209-209.   (Google)