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7.2e. Philosophy of Neuroscience, Misc (Philosophy of Neuroscience, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Abraham, Tara H. (2003). From theory to data: Representing neurons in the 1940s. Biology and Philosophy 18 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Recent literature on the role of pictorial representation in the life sciences has focused on the relationship between detailed representations of empirical data and more abstract, formal representations of theory. The standard argument is that in both a historical and epistemic sense, this relationship is a directional one: beginning with raw, unmediated images and moving towards diagrams that are more interpreted and more theoretically rich. Using the neural network diagrams of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts as a case study, I argue that while in the empirical sciences, pictorial representation tends to move from data to theory, in areas of the life sciences that are predominantly theoretical, when abstraction occurs at the outset, the relationship between detail and abstraction in pictorial representations can be of a different character
Adams, Fred (2007). Review of Andrew Brook, Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).   (Google)
Adolphs, Ralph (2004). Could a robot have emotions? Theoretical perspectives from social cognitive neuroscience. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Akins, Kathleen & Gerrans, Philip (2003). Introduction. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1).   (Google)
Albergato, Maria (2006). A review of: "The mind and the brain neuroplasticity and the power of mental force". World Futures 62 (5):406 – 408.   (Google)
Allman, John & Woodward, Jim (2008). What are moral intuitions and why should we care about them? A neurobiological perspective. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):164-185.   (Google)
Anderson, Michael C. & Levy, Benjamin J. (2006). Encouraging the nascent cognitive neuroscience of repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):511-513.   (Google)
Abstract: Repression has remained controversial for nearly a century on account of the lack of well-controlled evidence validating it. Here we argue that the conceptual and methodological tools now exist for a rigorous scientific examination of repression, and that a nascent cognitive neuroscience of repression is emerging. We review progress in this area and highlight important questions for this field to address
Arbib, Michael A. (2005). From monkey-like action recognition to human language: An evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):105-124.   (Google)
Abstract: The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a “mirror system” active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 and Broca's area are homologous brain regions. This grounded the mirror system hypothesis of Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) which offers the mirror system for grasping as a key neural “missing link” between the abilities of our nonhuman ancestors of 20 million years ago and modern human language, with manual gestures rather than a system for vocal communication providing the initial seed for this evolutionary process. The present article, however, goes “beyond the mirror” to offer hypotheses on evolutionary changes within and outside the mirror systems which may have occurred to equip Homo sapiens with a language-ready brain. Crucial to the early stages of this progression is the mirror system for grasping and its extension to permit imitation. Imitation is seen as evolving via a so-called simple system such as that found in chimpanzees (which allows imitation of complex “object-oriented” sequences but only as the result of extensive practice) to a so-called complex system found in humans (which allows rapid imitation even of complex sequences, under appropriate conditions) which supports pantomime. This is hypothesized to have provided the substrate for the development of protosign, a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures, which then provides the scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech (which thus owes little to nonhuman vocalizations), with protosign and protospeech then developing in an expanding spiral. It is argued that these stages involve biological evolution of both brain and body. By contrast, it is argued that the progression from protosign and protospeech to languages with full-blown syntax and compositional semantics was a historical phenomenon in the development of Homo sapiens, involving few if any further biological changes. Key Words: gestures; hominids; language evolution; mirror system; neurolinguistics; primates; protolanguage; sign language; speech; vocalization
Arshavsky, Yuri I. (2003). When did mozart become a mozart? Neurophysiological insight into behavioral genetics. Brain and Mind 4 (3):327-339.   (Google)
Abstract: The prevailing concept in modern cognitive neuroscience is that cognitive functions are performed predominantly at the network level, whereas the role of individual neurons is unlikely to extend beyond forming the simple basic elements of these networks. Within this conceptual framework, individuals of outstanding cognitive abilities appear as a result of a favorable configuration of the microarchitecture of the cognitive-implicated networks, whose final formation in ontogenesis may occur in a relatively random way. Here I suggest an alternative concept, which is based on neurological data and on data from human behavioral genetics. I hypothesize that cognitive functions are performed mainly at the intracellular, probably at the molecular level. Central to this hypothesis is the idea that the neurons forming the networks involved in cognitive processes are complex elements whose functions are not limited to generating electrical potentials and releasing neurotransmitters. According to this hypothesis, individuals of outstanding abilities are so due to a lucky combination of specific genes that determine the intrinsic properties of neurons involved in cognitive functions of the brain
Atkinson, Anthony P. & Wheeler, M. (2003). Evolutionary psychology's grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning. In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Ballieux, Rudy E. (1994). The mind and the immune system. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 15 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Stress-induced brain-mediated immunoregulation is effected by two pathways: autonomic outflow and (neuro)endocrine outflow. Particular attention is given to the interaction-effects of chronic an acute stress. Recent data have established that cells of the immune system produce neuro-peptides and hormones. In concert with cytokines released by these immune cells the brain can be informed on the nature of ongoing immune activity. The significance of conditioning of immune responses is discussed
Barbour, Ian G. (1999). Neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and human nature: Theological and philosophical reflections. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Barton, Robert A. (2006). Neuroscientists need to be evolutionarily challenged. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):13-14.   (Google)
Abstract: Evolutionary theory and methods are central to understanding the design of organisms, including their brains. This book does much to demonstrate the value of evolutionary neuroscience. Further work is needed to clarify the ways that neural systems evolved in general (specifically, the interaction between mosaic and coordinated evolution of brain components), and phylogenetic methods should be given a more prominent role in the analysis of comparative data
Barresi, John (online). The neuroscience of social understanding.   (Google)
Abstract: In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (Eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, in press
Bechtel, William P. & Stufflebeam, Robert S. (2001). Epistemic issues in procuring evidence about the brain: The importance of research instruments and techniques. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bechtel, William P.; Mandik, Pete; Mundale, Jennifer & Stufflebeam, Robert S. (eds.) (2001). Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas
Bechtel, William; Mandik, Pete & Mundale, Jennifer (2001). Philosophy meets the neurosciences. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Bechtel, William P. (forthcoming). The epistemology of evidence in cognitive neuroscience. In R. Skipper Jr., C. Allen, R. A. Ankeny, C. F. Craver, L. Darden, G. Mikkelson & and R. Richardson (eds.), Philosophy and the Life Sciences: A Reader. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is no secret that scientists argue. They argue about theories. But even more, they argue about the evidence for theories. Is the evidence itself trustworthy? This is a bit surprising from the perspective of traditional empiricist accounts of scientific methodology according to which the evidence for scientific theories stems from observation, especially observation with the naked eye. These accounts portray the testing of scientific theories as a matter of comparing the predictions of the theory with the data generated by these observations, which are taken to provide an objective link to reality
Bennett, M. R. (2003). Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Bertone, Armando; Mottron, Laurent & Faubert, Jocelyn (2004). Autism and schizophrenia: Similar perceptual consequence, different neurobiological etiology? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):592-593.   (Google)
Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein (P&S, 2003) propose that NMDA-receptor dysfunction may be the fundamental neurobiological mechanism underlying and associating impaired holistic perception and cognitive coordination with schizophrenic psychopathology. We discuss how the P&S hypothesis shares different aspects of the weak central coherence account of autism from both theoretical and experimental perspectives. Specifically, we believe that neither those persons with autism nor those with schizophrenia integrate visuo-perceptual information efficiently, resulting in incongruous internal representations of their external world. However, although NMDA-hypofunction may be responsible for perceptual impairments in schizophrenia and possibly autism, we suggest that it is highly unlikely that NMDA-hypofunction is specifically responsible for the autistic behavioral symptomology, as described by P&S in their target article
Bergstrom, R. M. (1967). Neural macrostates. Synthese 17 (December):425-443.   (Google | More links)
Beretta, Alan (2000). Why the TDH fails to contribute to a neurology of syntax. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):23-23.   (Google)
Abstract: An important part of Grodzinsky's claim regarding the neurology of syntax depends on agrammatic data partitioned by the Trace Deletion Hypothesis (TDH), which is a combination of trace-deletion and default strategy. However, there is convincing evidence that the default strategy is consistently avoided by agrammatics. The TDH, therefore, is in no position to support claims about agrammatic data or the neurology of syntax
Bickerton, Derek (2005). Beyond the mirror neuron – the smoke neuron? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):126-126.   (Google)
Abstract: Mirror neurons form a poor basis for Arbib's account of language evolution, failing to explain the creativity that must precede imitation, and requiring capacities (improbable in hominids) for categorizing situations and unambiguously miming them. They also commit Arbib to an implausible holophrastic protolanguage. His model is further vitiated by failure to address the origins of symbolization and the real nature of syntax
Bickle, John (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Bickle, John; Mandik, Pete & Landreth, Anthony (online). The philosophy of neuroscience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Blair, Clancy (2006). How similar are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental neuroscience perspective on fluid cognition as an aspect of human cognitive ability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):109-125.   (Google)
Abstract: This target article considers the relation of fluid cognitive functioning to general intelligence. A neurobiological model differentiating working memory/executive function cognitive processes of the prefrontal cortex from aspects of psychometrically defined general intelligence is presented. Work examining the rise in mean intelligence-test performance between normative cohorts, the neuropsychology and neuroscience of cognitive function in typically and atypically developing human populations, and stress, brain development, and corticolimbic connectivity in human and nonhuman animal models is reviewed and found to provide evidence of mechanisms through which early experience affects the development of an aspect of cognition closely related to, but distinct from, general intelligence. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of emotion in fluid cognition and on research indicating fluid cognitive deficits associated with early hippocampal pathology and with dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis stress-response system. Findings are seen to be consistent with the idea of an independent fluid cognitive construct and to assist with the interpretation of findings from the study of early compensatory education for children facing psychosocial adversity and from behavior genetic research on intelligence. It is concluded that ongoing development of neurobiologically grounded measures of fluid cognitive skills appropriate for young children will play a key role in understanding early mental development and the adaptive success to which it is related, particularly for young children facing social and economic disadvantage. Specifically, in the evaluation of the efficacy of compensatory education efforts such as Head Start and the readiness for school of children from diverse backgrounds, it is important to distinguish fluid cognition from psychometrically defined general intelligence. (Published Online April 5 2006) Key Words: cognition; cognition-emotion reciprocity; developmental disorders; emotion; fluid cognition; Flynn effect; general intelligence; limbic system; neuroscience; phenylketonuria; prefrontal cortex; psychometrics; schizophrenia
Bánréti, Zoltán (2000). Which grammar has been chosen for neurological feasibility? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):21-22.   (Google)
Abstract: Grodzinsky's hypotheses need different theories of grammar for comprehension and for production. These predictions are undesirable. Hungarian data are incompatible with the Trace Deletion Hypothesis
Bogen, Jim, 'Two as good as one hundred'--poorly replicated evidence is some 19th century neuroscientific research.   (Google)
Abstract: According to a received doctrine, espoused, by Karl Popper and Harry Collins, and taken for granted by many others, poorly replicated evidence should be epistemically defective and incapable of persuading scientists to accept the views it is used to argue for. But John Hughlings Jackson used poorly replicated clinical and post-mortem evidence to mount rationally compelling and influential arguments for a highly progressive theory of the organization of the brain and its functions. This paper sets out a number of Jackson's arguments from his evidence and argues that they constitute a counter example against the received doctrine
Bogen, J. (2001). `Two as good as a hundred': Poorly replicated evidence in some nineteenth-century neuroscientific research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 32 (3):491-533.   (Google)
Borisyuk, Roman (2000). Encyclopedia of computational neuroscience: The end of the second millennium. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):534-535.   (Google)
Abstract: Arbib et al. describe mathematical and computational models in neuroscience as well as neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of several important brain structures. This is a useful guide to mathematical and computational modelling of the structure and function of nervous system. The book highlights the need to develop a theory of brain functioning, and it offers some useful approaches and concepts
Borg, Emma (2007). If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds
Borenstein, Elhanan & Ruppin, Eytan (2005). The evolutionary link between mirror neurons and imitation: An evolutionary adaptive agents model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):127-128.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary validates the fundamental evolutionary interconnection between the emergence of imitation and the mirror system. We present a novel computational framework for studying the evolutionary origins of imitative behavior and examining the emerging underlying mechanisms. Evolutionary adaptive agents that evolved in this framework demonstrate the emergence of neural “mirror” mechanisms analogous to those found in biological systems
Bracha, Dr H. Stefan (2006). Human brain evolution and the "neuroevolutionary time-depth principle:" Implications for the reclassification of fear-circuitry-related traits in dsm-V and for studying resilience to warzone-related posttraumatic stress disorder. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The DSM-III, DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 have judiciously minimized discussion of etiologies to distance clinical psychiatry from Freudian psychoanalysis. With this goal mostly achieved, discussion of etiological factors should be reintroduced into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V). A research agenda for the DSM-V advocated the "development of a pathophysiologically based classification system". The author critically reviews the neuroevolutionary literature on stress-induced and fear circuitry disorders and related amygdala-driven, species-atypical fear behaviors of clinical severity in adult humans. Over 30 empirically testable/falsifiable predictions are presented. It is noted that in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, the classification of stress and fear circuitry disorders is neither mode-of-acquisition-based nor brain-evolution-based. For example, snake phobia (innate) and dog phobia (overconsolidational) are clustered together. Similarly, research on blood-injection-injury-type-specific phobia clusters two fears different in their innateness: 1) an arguably ontogenetic memory-trace-overconsolidation-based fear (hospital phobia) and 2) a hardwired (innate) fear of the sight of one's blood or a sharp object penetrating one's skin. Genetic architecture-charting of fear-circuitry-related traits has been challenging. Various, non-phenotype-based architectures can serve as targets for research. In this article, the author will propose one such alternative genetic architecture. This article was inspired by the following: A) Nesse's "Smoke-Detector Principle", B) the increasing suspicion that the "smooth" rather than "lumpy" distribution of complex psychiatric phenotypes (including fear-circuitry disorders) may in some cases be accounted for by oligogenic (and not necessarily polygenic) transmission, and C) insights from the initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium published in late 2005. Neuroevolutionary insights relevant to fear circuitry symptoms that primarily emerge overconsolidationally (especially Combat related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) are presented. Also introduced is a human-evolution-based principle for clustering innate fear traits. The "Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle" of innate fears proposed in this article may be useful in the development of a neuroevolution-based taxonomic re-clustering of stress-triggered and fear-circuitry disorders in DSM-V. Four broad clusters of evolved fear circuits are proposed based on their time-depths: 1) Mesozoic (mammalian-wide) circuits hardwired by wild-type alleles driven to fixation by Mesozoic selective sweeps; 2) Cenozoic (simian-wide) circuits relevant to many specific phobias; 3) mid Paleolithic and upper Paleolithic (Homo sapiens-specific) circuits (arguably resulting mostly from mate-choice-driven stabilizing selection); 4) Neolithic circuits (arguably mostly related to stabilizing selection driven by gene-culture co-evolution). More importantly, the author presents evolutionary perspectives on warzone-related PTSD, Combat-Stress Reaction, Combat-related Stress, Operational-Stress, and other deployment-stress-induced symptoms. The Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle presented in this article may help explain the dissimilar stress-resilience levels following different types of acute threat to survival of oneself or one's progency (aka DSM-III and DSM-V PTSD Criterion-A events). PTSD rates following exposure to lethal inter-group violence (combat, warzone exposure or intentionally caused disasters such as terrorism) are usually 5-10 times higher than rates following large-scale natural disasters such as forest fires, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. The author predicts that both intentionally-caused large-scale bioevent-disasters, as well as natural bioevents such as SARS and avian flu pandemics will be an exception and are likely to be followed by PTSD rates approaching those that follow warzone exposure. During bioevents, Amygdala-driven and locus-coeruleus-driven epidemic pseudosomatic symptoms may be an order of magnitude more common than infection-caused cytokine-driven symptoms. Implications for the red cross and FEMA are discussed. It is also argued that hospital phobia as well as dog phobia, bird phobia and bat phobia require re-taxonomization in DSM-V in a new "overconsolidational disorders" category anchored around PTSD. The overconsolidational spectrum category may be conceptualized as straddling the fear circuitry spectrum disorders and the affective spectrum disorders categories, and may be a category for which Pitman's secondary prevention propranolol regimen may be specifically indicated as a "morning after pill" intervention. Predictions are presented regarding obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (e.g., female-pattern hoarding vs. male-pattern hoarding) and "culture-bound" acute anxiety symptoms (taijin-kyofusho, koro, shuk yang, shook yong, suo yang, rok-joo, jinjinia-bemar, karoshi, gwarosa, Voodoo death). Also discussed are insights relevant to pseudoneurological symptoms and to the forthcoming Dissociative-Conversive disorders category in DSM-V, including what the author terms fright-triggered acute pseudo-localized symptoms (i.e., pseudoparalysis, pseudocerebellar imbalance, psychogenic blindness, pseudoseizures, and epidemic sociogenic illness). Speculations based on studies of the human abnormal-spindle-like, microcephaly-associated (ASPM) gene, the microcephaly primary autosomal recessive (MCPH) gene, and the forkhead box p2 (FOXP2) gene are made and incorporated into what is termed "The pre-FOXP2 Hypothesis of Blood-Injection-Injury Phobia." Finally, the author argues for a non-reductionistic fusion of "distal (evolutionary) neurobiology" with clinical "proximal neurobiology," utilizing neurological heuristics. It is noted that the value of re-clustering fear traits based on behavioral ethology, human-phylogenomics-derived endophenotypes and on ontogenomics (gene-environment interactions) can be confirmed or disconfirmed using epidemiological or twin studies and psychiatric genomics
Braten, Stein (2004). Hominin infant decentration hypothesis: Mirror neurons system adapted to subserve mother-centered participation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):508-509.   (Google)
Abstract: Falk's hominin mother-infant model presupposes an emerging infant capacity to perceive and learn from afforded gestures and vocalizations. Unlike back-riding offspring of other primates, who were in no need to decenter their own body-centered perspective, a mirror neurons system may have been adapted in hominin infants to subserve the kind of (m)other-centered mirroring we now see manifested by human infants soon after birth
Bresjanac, Maja & Repov, Grega (2009). Neuroplasticity or the importance of having a plastic brain. In Eva Zerovnik, Olga Markič & A. Ule (eds.), Philosophical Insights About Modern Science. Nova Science Publishers, Inc..   (Google)
Brooks, Sidney C. (1984). Biomolecular information analysis in neurotransmitter systems. Acta Biotheoretica 33 (1).   (Google)
Brook, Andrew & Akins, Kathleen (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in this volume are clustered around five major themes: data and theory in neuroscience; neural representation and computation; visuomotor transformations; color vision; and consciousness
Bub, Jeffrey (1994). Is cognitive neuropsychology possible? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1:417-427.   (Google | More links)
Bub, Jeffrey (1994). Testing models of cognition through the analysis of brain-damaged patients. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):837-55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of cognitive neuropsychology is to articulate the functional architecture underlying normal cognition, on the basis of congnitive performance data involving brain-damaged subjects. Throughout the history of the subject, questions have been raised as to whether the methods of neuropsychology are adequate to its goals. The question has been reopened by Glymour [1994], who formulates a discovery problem for cognitive neuropsychology, in the sense of formal learning theory, concerning the existence of a reliable methodology. It appears that the discovery problem may be insoluble in principle! I propose a modified formulation of Glymour's discovery problem and argue that a sceptical conclusion about the possiblity of cognitive neuropsychology as an empirical science is not warranted
Buford, Chris & Allhoff, Fritz (2005). Neuroscience and metaphysics. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):34 – 36.   (Google)
Burgess, Gregory C.; Braver, Todd S. & Gray, Jeremy R. (2006). Exactly how are fluid intelligence, working memory, and executive function related? Cognitive neuroscience approaches to investigating the mechanisms of fluid cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):128-129.   (Google)
Abstract: Blair proposes that fluid intelligence, working memory, and executive function form a unitary construct: fluid cognition. Recently, our group has utilized a combined correlational–experimental cognitive neuroscience approach, which we argue is beneficial for investigating relationships among these individual differences in terms of neural mechanisms underlying them. Our data do not completely support Blair's strong position. (Published Online April 5 2006)
Burgess, Neil (2002). Spatial models of imagery for remembered scenes are more likely to advance (neuro)science than symbolic ones. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):185-186.   (Google)
Abstract: Hemispatial neglect in imagery implies a spatially organised representation. Reaction times in memory for arrays of locations from shifted viewpoints indicate processes analogous to actual bodily movement through space. Behavioral data indicate a privileged role for this process in memory. A proposed spatial mechanism makes contact with direct recordings of the representations of location and orientation in the mammalian brain
Burrow, Trigant (1943). The neurodynamics of behavior. A phylobiological foreword. Philosophy of Science 10 (4):271-288.   (Google | More links)
Burrow, Trigant (1949). The social neurosis: A study in "clinical anthropology". Philosophy of Science 16 (1):25-40.   (Google | More links)
Cairney, Sherre & Maruff, Paul (2007). Petrol sniffing, the brain, and aboriginal culture : Between sorcery and neuroscience. In Henri Cohen & Brigitte Stemmer (eds.), Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain. Elxevier Academic Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2006). Review of Alvin I. Goldman, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (11).   (Google)
Chatterjee, Anjan (2007). Cosmetic neurology and cosmetic surgery: Parallels, predictions, and challenges. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (2):129-137.   (Google)
Chatterjee, Anjan (2006). The promise and predicament of cosmetic neurology. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):110-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cheyne, J. A.; Rueffer, S. D. & Newby-Clark, I. R. (1999). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis: Neurological and cultural construction of the night-Mare. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):319-337.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences (HHEs) accompanying sleep paralysis (SP) are often cited as sources of accounts of supernatural nocturnal assaults and paranormal experiences. Descriptions of such experiences are remarkably consistent across time and cultures and consistent also with known mechanisms of REM states. A three-factor structural model of HHEs based on their relations both to cultural narratives and REM neurophysiology is developed and tested with several large samples. One factor, labeled Intruder, consisting of sensed presence, fear, and auditory and visual hallucinations, is conjectured to originate in a hypervigilant state initiated in the midbrain. Another factor, Incubus, comprising pressure on the chest, breathing difficulties, and pain, is attributed to effects of hyperpolarization of motoneurons on perceptions of respiration. These two factors have in common an implied alien ''other'' consistent with occult narratives identified in numerous contemporary and historical cultures. A third factor, labeled Unusual Bodily Experiences, consisting of floating/flying sensations, out-of-body experiences, and feelings of bliss, is related to physically impossible experiences generated by conflicts of endogenous and exogenous activation related to body position, orientation, and movement. Implications of this last factor for understanding of orientational primacy in self-consciousness are considered. Central features of the model developed here are consistent with recent work on hallucinations associated with hypnosis and schizophrenia
Cherniak, Christopher, Large-scale optimization of neuron arbors.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: At the global as well as local scales, some of the geometry of types of neuron arbors—both dendrites and axons—appears to be self-organizing: Their morphogenesis behaves like flowing water, that is, fluid dynamically; waterflow in branching networks in turn acts like a tree composed of cords under tension, that is, vector mechanically. Branch diameters and angles and junction sites conform significantly to this model. The result is that such neuron tree samples globally minimize their total volume—rather than, for example, surface area or branch length. In addition, the arbors perform well at generating the cheapest topology interconnecting their terminals: their large-scale layouts are among the best of all such possible connecting patterns, approaching 5% of optimum. This model also applies comparably to arterial and river networks. S1063-651X 99 16205-6..
Cherniak, Christopher (1991). Meta-neuroanatomy: The myth of the unbounded mind/brain. In Evandro Agazzi & Alberto Cordero (eds.), Philosophy and the Origin and Evolution of the Universe. Norwell: Kluwer.   (Google)
Cherniak, Christopher (1995). Neural component placement. Trends in Neurosciences 18 (12):522-527.   (Cited by 89 | Google | More links)
Cherniak, Christopher, Optimal-wiring models of neuroanatomy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Combinatorial network optimization appears to fit well as a model of brain structure: connections in the brain are a critically constrained resource, hence their deployment in a wide range of cases is finely optimized to “‘save wire". This review focuses on minimization of large-scale costs, such as total volume for mammal dendrite and axon arbors and total wirelength for positioning of connected neural components such as roundworm ganglia (and also mammal cortex areas). Phenomena of good optimization raise questions about mechanisms for their achievement: the examples of optimized neuroanatomy here turn out to include candidates for some of the most complex biological structures known to be derivable purely from simple physical energy minimization processes. Part of the functional role of such fine-tuned wiring optimization may be as a compact strategy for generating self-organizing complex neuroanatomical..
Cherniak, Christopher (1994). Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):89-107.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cherniak, Christopher (1990). The bounded brain: Toward quantitative neuroanatomy. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (1).   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (2002). Outer space and inner space: The new epistemology. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76 (2):25-48.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1995). The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain. MIT Press.   (Cited by 486 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the uninitiated, there are two major tendencies in the modeling of human cognition. The older, tradtional school believes, in essence, that full human cognition can be modeled by dividing the world up into distinct entities -- called __symbol s__-- such as “dog”, “cat”, “run”, “bite”, “happy”, “tumbleweed”, and so on, and then manipulating this vast set of symbols by a very complex and very subtle set of rules. The opposing school claims that this system, while it might be good at concluding that Paris is the capital of France or that there must be blood flowing in the left-rear leg of a cow, can never capture the full measure -- indeed, the essence -- of human cognition. For them, the essential features of cognition emerge from the combined effects of myriad, tiny actions far below the surface of consciousness. This is the camp to which Paul Churchland belongs
Clancey, William J. (2000). Conceptual coordination bridges information processing and neurophysiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):919-922.   (Google)
Abstract: Information processing theories of memory and skills can be reformulated in terms of how categories are physically and temporally related, a process called conceptual coordination. Dreaming can then be understood as a story-understanding process in which two mechanisms found in everyday comprehension are missing: conceiving sequences (chunking categories in time as a higher-order categorization) and coordinating across modalities (e.g., relating the sound of a word and the image of its meaning). On this basis, we can readily identify isomorphisms between dream phenomenology and neurophysiology, and explain the function of dreaming as facilitating future coordination of sequential, cross-modal categorization (i.e., REM sleep lowers activation thresholds, “unlearning”). [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Clayton, Philip (1999). Neuroscience, the person, and God: An emergentist account. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Clancy, Barbara (2006). Practical use of evolutionary neuroscience principles. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):14-15.   (Google)
Abstract: As Striedter explores the concerted principles that drive brain evolution and the departures that create uniqueness, he scrutinizes and ultimately supports the (unnecessarily controversial) Finlay/Darlington model in which mathematical relationships across mammalian neural development are identified (Finlay & Darlington 1995). Pragmatic impact includes the ability to make novel comparisons across developing species, including humans
Clancey, William J. (1993). Situated action: A neuropsychological interpretation (response to Vera and simon). [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Symbols in computer programs are not necessarily isomorphic in form or capability to neural processes. Representations in our models are stored descriptions of the world and human behavior, created by a human interpreter; representations in the brain are neither immutable forms nor encoded in some language. Although the term "symbol" can be usefully applied to describe words, smoke signals, neural maps, and graphic icons, a science of symbol processing requires distinguishing between the structural, developmental, and interactive nature of different forms of representing
Cleeremans, Axel, Harder, better, faster, stronger: A review of “computational explorations in cognitive neuroscience”.   (Google)
Abstract: Just like the sequel to a successful movie, O’Reilly and Munakata’s “Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience” aims to follow up and expand on the original 1986 “Parallel Distributed Processing” volumes edited by James McClelland, David Rumelhart and the PDP research group. This kinship, which is explicitly recognized by the authors as the book is prefaced by Jay McClelland, is perceptible throughout Computational Explorations: Not only does this volume visit many of the problems and paradigms that the original books were focused on (so making Computational Explorations feel more like a remake than like a sequel), but there also is an instantly recognizable, and clearly “psychological” approach to the role of computational modelling in the cognitive neurosciences. The result is a highly effective, wonderful introduction to the ideas, methods, and problems that characterize this still burgeoning domain
Cleeremans, Axel, Letter to neuroscience letter to neuroscience.   (Google)
Abstract: One function of sleep is hypothesized to be the reprocessparticipate in the optimization of the network that subing and consolidation of memory traces (Smith, 1995; Gais tends subject's visuo^motor response. The optimization of et al., 2000; McGaugh, 2000; Stickgold et al., 2000). At..
Cock, Josephine; Fordham, Claire; Cockburn, Janet & Haggard, Patrick (2003). Who knows best? Awareness of divided attention difficulty in a neurological rehabilitation setting. Brain Injury 17 (7):561-574.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Coderre, Terence J. & Katz, Joel (1997). What exactly is central to the role of central neuroplasticity in persistent pain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):483-486.   (Google)
Cohen, Cynthia B. (2007). Beyond the human neuron mouse to the NAS guidelines. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):46 – 49.   (Google)
Coplan, Amy (2008). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading by Goldman, Alvin. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (1):94–97.   (Google | More links)
Cory, Gerald A. (2002). Maclean's evolutionary neuroscience, the csn model and Hamilton's rule: Some developmental, clinical, and social policy implications. Brain and Mind 3 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Paul MacLean, founder and long-time chief ofthe Laboratory of Brain Evolution and Behavior,National Institutes of Health, is a pioneeringfigure in the emergent field of evolutionaryneuroscience. His influence has been widelyfelt in the development of biologicalpsychiatry and has led to a considerableliterature on evolutionary approaches toclinical issues. MacLean's work is alsoenjoying a resurgence of interest in academicareas of neuroscience and evolutionarypsychology which have previously shown littleinterest or knowledge of his extensive work. This chapter builds on MacLean's work to bringtogether new insights into the neuralarchitecture of human development, hierarchy,conflict behavior, and reciprocity in the formof the Conflict Systems Neurobehavioral (CSN)Model. Hamilton's rule of kinship altruism orinclusive fitness is proposed to be the gene'seye complement to MacLean's evolutionaryneuroscience and the CSN Model derivedtherefrom. Hierarchy, conflict behavior andreciprocity are also central issues in healthydevelopment as well as in clinical syndromes ofdepression, mania, and other socialmaladjustments. The emerging insights permitthe integration of the concept of inclusivefitness underpinning evolutionary psychologywith MacLean's perspective on evolutionaryneuroscience as well as the definition of newchallenges for mental health and socialstability. The policy implications areindicated
Courchesne, Eric (1997). Prediction and preparation: Anticipatory role of the cerebellum in diverse neurobehavioral functions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):248-249.   (Google)
Craver, Carl F. (2004). Dissociable realization and kind splitting. Philosophy Of Science 71 (5):960-971.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion
Craver, Carl F. (2005). Functions and mechanisms in contemporary neuroscience. In Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher, Eric Racine & E. Ennan (eds.), Des Neurones A La Conscience: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences. Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Craver, Carl F. (2003). The making of a memory mechanism. Journal of the History of Biology 36 (1):153-95.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Smith, Joel (forthcoming). Can Transcendental Intersubjectivity be Naturalised? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss Husserl's account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. I focus on the problem of perceived similarity. I argue that recent work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, concerning intermodal representation and the mirror neuron system, fails to constitute a naturalistic solution to the problem. This can be seen via a comparison between the Husserlian project, on the one hand, and Molyneux's Question on the other.
Dale, J. Alexander; Hyatt, Janyce & Hollerman, Jeff (2007). The neuroscience of dance and the dance of neuroscience: Defining a path of inquiry. Journal of Aesthetic Education 41 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : This paper represents the authors' attempt to provide a useful framework for discussing and investigating the links between the apparently disparate disciplines of neuroscience and dance. This attempt arose from an interdisciplinary course offering on this topic. A clear need apparent in preparing for an exploration of such uncharted territory was for some definition of the relevant landmarks in the form of a conceptual framework. The current status of that developing framework is presented here, as we consider the historical context that contributed to the cultural distance between neuroscience and dance as disciplines; the conceptual and technical obstacles to collaborative work between these disciplines; and the recent developments, both conceptual and technological, that make the interface between neuroscience and dance a particularly fruitful source of inspiration not only for dancers and neuroscientists but potentially for a wide variety of disciplines touching on health and education in general
Damasio, Antonio R. (2001). Reflections on the neurobiology of emotion and feeling. In The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Daniel, Steven G. (1999). How trivial is the “trivial neuron doctrine”? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):834-835.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that Gold & Stoljar's “trivial neuron doctrine” is not in fact trivial. Many familiar positions in the philosophy of mind run afoul of it, and it is unclear that even those whom Gold & Stoljar identify as adherents of the trivial neuron doctrine can be comfortably described as such
Daugman, J. G. (2001). Brain metaphor and brain theory. In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Davis, Hank (2001). Too early for a neuropsychology of empathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):32-33.   (Google)
Abstract: To date, a wide range of interdisciplinary scholarship has done little to clarify either the why or the how of empathy. Preston & de Waal (P&deW) attempt to remedy this, although it remains unclear whether empathy consists of two discrete processes, or whether a perceptual and motor component are joined in some sort of behavioral inevitability. Although it is appealing to offer a neuroanatomy of empathy, the present level of neuropsychology may not support such reductionism
Decety, Jean & Grèzes, Julie (1998). A neurobiological approach to imitation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):688-689.   (Google)
Abstract: To explore the neural mechanisms engaged by the perception of action with the intent to imitate, positron emission tomographic activation studies were performed in healthy human subjects. We discuss the results in light of the framework proposed by Byrne & Russon, especially the distinction between mechanisms subserving action-level and program-level imitation
Decety, Jean & Sommerville, Jessica A. (2009). Action representation as the bedrock of social cognition: A developmental neuroscience perspective. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Decety, J. (2002). Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Decety, J. & Chaminade, T. (2003). When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):577-596.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging explorations of the neurophysiological substrate of shared representations between the self and others, using various ecological paradigms such as mentally representing one's own actions versus others' actions, watching the actions executed by others, imitating the others' actions versus being imitated by others. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in the essential ability to distinguish the self from others, and in the way the self represents the other. Interestingly, the right hemisphere develops its functions earlier than the left
Dehaene-Lambertz, G. & Dehaene, Stanislas (1997). In defense of learning by selection: Neurobiological and behavioral evidence revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):560-561.   (Google)
Abstract: Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) constructivist manifesto promotes a return to an extreme form of empiricism. In defense of learning by selection, we argue that at the neurobiological level all the data presented by Q&S in support of their constructive model are in fact compatible with a model comprising multiple overlapping stages of synaptic overproduction and selection. We briefly review developmental studies at the behavioral level in humans providing evidence in favor of a selectionist view of development
De Jong, Willem P. & Van Galen, Gerard P. (1997). Are speed/accuracy trade-offs caused by neuromotor noise, or not? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):306-307.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2007). Philosophy as naive anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker. In M. Bennett, D. C. Dennett, P. M. S. Hacker & J. R. & Searle (eds.), Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Bennett and Hacker’s _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), a collaboration between a philosopher (Hacker) and a neuroscientist (Bennett), is an ambitious attempt to reformulate the research agenda of cognitive neuroscience by demonstrating that cognitive scientists and other theorists, myself among them, have been bewitching each other by misusing language in a systematically “incoherent” and conceptually “confused” way. In both style and substance, the book harks back to Oxford in the early 1960's, when Ordinary Language Philosophy ruled, and Ryle and Wittgenstein were the authorities on the meanings of our everyday mentalistic or psychological terms. I myself am a product of that time and place (as is Searle, for that matter), and I find much to agree with in their goals and presuppositions, and before turning to my criticisms, which will be severe, I want to highlight what I think is exactly right in their approach–the oft-forgotten lessons of Ordinary Language Philosophy
Depue, Richard A. & Morrone-Strupinsky, Jeannine V. (2005). A neurobehavioral model of affiliative bonding: Implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):313-350.   (Google)
Abstract: Because little is known about the human trait of affiliation, we provide a novel neurobehavioral model of affiliative bonding. Discussion is organized around processes of reward and memory formation that occur during approach and consummatory phases of affiliation. Appetitive and consummatory reward processes are mediated independently by the activity of the ventral tegmental area (VTA) dopamine (DA)–nucleus accumbens shell (NAS) pathway and the central corticolimbic projections of the u-opiate system of the medial basal arcuate nucleus, respectively, although these two projection systems functionally interact across time. We next explicate the manner in which DA and glutamate interact in both the VTA and NAS to form incentive-encoded contextual memory ensembles that are predictive of reward derived from affiliative objects. Affiliative stimuli, in particular, are incorporated within contextual ensembles predictive of affiliative reward via: (a) the binding of affiliative stimuli in the rostral circuit of the medial extended amygdala and subsequent transmission to the NAS shell; (b) affiliative stimulus-induced opiate potentiation of DA processes in the VTA and NAS; and (c) permissive or facilitatory effects of gonadal steroids, oxytocin (in interaction with DA), and vasopressin on (i) sensory, perceptual, and attentional processing of affiliative stimuli and (ii) formation of social memories. Among these various processes, we propose that the capacity to experience affiliative reward via opiate functioning has a disproportionate weight in determining individual differences in affiliation. We delineate sources of these individual differences, and provide the first human data that support an association between opiate functioning and variation in trait affiliation. Key Words: affiliation corticolimbic-striatal networks; appetitive and consummatory reward; dopamine; oxytocin; personality; social bonds; social memory; u-opiates
Depue, Richard A. & Collins, Paul F. (1999). Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):491-517.   (Google)
de preester, helena (2006). The self in neuroscience and psychiatry. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1).   (Google)
Dietrich, A. (2004). Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):746-61.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Doricchi, Fabrizio & Violani, Cristiano (2000). Mesolimbic dopamine and the neuropsychology of dreaming: Some caution and reconsiderations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):930-931.   (Google)
Abstract: New findings point to a role for mesolimbic DA circuits in the generation of dreaming. We disagree with Solms about these structures having an exclusive role in generating dreams. We review data suggesting that dreaming can be interrupted at different levels of processing and that anterior-subcortical lesions associated with dream cessation are unlikely to produce selective hypodopaminergic dynamic impairments. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Dror, Itiel & Thomas, Robin (2004). The cognitive neuroscience laboratory: A framework for the science of mind. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Eccles, John C. (1970). Facing Reality: Philosophical Adventures by a Brain Scientist. New York,Springer-Verlag.   (Google)
Egan, Frances & Matthews, Robert J. (2006). Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third way. Synthese 153 (3):377-391.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches
Ehrenstein, Walter H.; Spillmann, Lothar & Sarris, Viktor (2003). Gestalt issues in modern neuroscience. Axiomathes 13 (3-4).   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We present select examples of how visual phenomena can serve as tools to uncoverbrain mechanisms. Specifically, receptive field organization is proposed as a Gestalt-like neural mechanism of perceptual organization. Appropriate phenomena, such as brightness and orientation contrast, subjective contours, filling-in, and aperture-viewed motion, allow for a quantitative comparison between receptive fields and their psychophysical counterparts, perceptive fields. Phenomenology might thus be extended from the study of perceptual qualities to their transphenomenal substrates, including memory functions. In conclusion, classic issues of Gestalt psychology can now be related to modern
Eliasmith, Chris (forthcoming). Computational neuroscience. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Keywords: computational neuroscience, neural coding, brain function, neural modeling, cognitive modeling, computation, representation, neuroscience, neuropsychology, semantics, theoretical psychology, theoretical neuroscience
Eliasmith, Chris (forthcoming). How to build a brain: From function to implementation. Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: To have a fully integrated understanding of neurobiological systems, we must address two fundamental questions: 1. What do brains do (what is their function)? and 2. How do brains do whatever it is that they do (how is that function implemented)? I begin by arguing that these questions are necessarily inter-related. Thus, addressing one without consideration of an answer to the other, as is often done, is a mistake. I then describe what I take to be the best available approach to addressing both questions. Specifically, to address 2, I adopt the Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) of Eliasmith & Anderson [Neural engineering: Computation representation and dynamics in neurobiological systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003] which identifies implementational principles for neural models. To address 1, I suggest that adopting statistical modeling methods for perception and action will be functionally sufficient for capturing biological behavior. I show how these two answers will be mutually constraining, since the process of model selection for the statistical method in this approach can be informed by known anatomical and physiological properties of the brain, captured by the NEF. Similarly, the application of the NEF must be informed by functional hypotheses, captured by the statistical modeling approach
Elliott, Terry (2001). D'Arcy wentworth Thompson, interindividual variation, and postnatal neuronal growth. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):284-284.   (Google)
Ellis, R. (2000). Review of “affective neuroscience” by Jaak Panksepp. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):313-318.   (Google | More links)
Estes, David & Bartsch, Karen (1997). Constraining the brain: The role of developmental psychology in developmental cognitive neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):562-563.   (Google)
Abstract: Developmental psychology should play an essential constraining role in developmental cognitive neuroscience. Theories of neural development must account explicitly for the early emergence of knowledge and abilities in infants and young children documented in developmental research. Especially in need of explanation at the neural level is the early emergence of meta-representation
Farram, Freda (1935). I. the relation of ascendance-submission tendencies to neurosis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):228 – 232.   (Google)
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Farah, Martha J. (2000). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Vision. Blackwell Publishers.   (Cited by 129 | Google)
Abstract: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Vision begins by introducing the reader to the anatomy of the eye and visual cortex and then proceeds to discuss image and...
Feinberg, Todd E. (1997). Some interesting perturbations of the self in neurology. Seminars in Neurology 17:129-35.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Ferber, Sari Goldstein (2008). The concept of coregulation between neurobehavioral subsystems: The logic interplay between excitatory and inhibitory ends. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):337-338.   (Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 45 (7):14521462.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition

and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to

the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences

between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,

beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
Flanagan, Owen (2009). One enchanted being: Neuroexistentialism and meaning. Zygon 44 (1):41-49.   (Google)
Abstract: The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World is my attempt to explain whether and how existential meaning is possible in a material world, and how such meaning is best conceived naturalistically. Neuroexistentialism conceives of our predicament in accordance with Darwin plus neuroscience. The prospects for our kind of being-in-the-world are limited by our natures as smart but fully embodied short-lived animals. Many find this picture disenchanting, even depressing. I respond to four criticisms of my relentless upbeat naturalism: that naturalism can make no room for norms, for values; that I overvalue truth at the expense of happiness; that I underestimate the extent to which supernaturalism has made peace with naturalism; and that I can give no account for why humans as finite animals should want to overcome our given natures and seek impersonal, self-transcendent value
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Flinn, Mark V.; Muehlenbein, Michael P. & Ponzi, Davide (2009). Evolution of neuroendocrine mechanisms linking attachment and life history: The social neuroendocrinology of middle childhood. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):27-28.   (Google)
Foss, Jeffrey (1997). Irresistible environment meets immovable neurons. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):565-566.   (Google)
Abstract: Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) main accomplishment is the presentation of increasing complexity in the developing brain. Although this cuts a colorful swath through current theories of learning, it leaves the central question untouched: How does the environment direct neural structure? In answer, Q&S offer us only Hebb's half-century-old suggestion once again
Foster, Jonathan; van Eekelen, Anke & Mattes, Eugen (2008). Neuroconstructivism: Evidence for later maturation of prefrontally mediated executive functioning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):338-339.   (Google)
Fosse, R. (2000). Rem mentation in narcoleptics and normals: An empirical test of two neurocognitive theories. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):488-509.   (Google)
Abstract: This study tested the two main neurocognitive models of dreaming by using cognitive data elicited from REM sleep in normals and narcoleptics. The two models were the ''activation-only'' view which holds that, in the context of sleep, overall activation of the brain is sufficient for consciousness to proceed in the manner of dreaming (e.g., Antrobus, 1991; Foulkes, 1993; Vogel, 1978); and the Activation, Input source, Modulation (AIM model), which predicts that not only brain activation level but also neurochemical modulatory systems exert widespread effects upon dreaming (Hobson & McCarley, 1977; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000). Mental activity was studied in nocturnal REM in 15 narcoleptics and 9 normal healthy persons and in REM at the onset of daytime naps and nighttime sleep (SOREM) in narcoleptics. The study was performed in the subjects' homes, using instrumental awakenings and ambulatory polysomnographic techniques, and focused upon visual vividness, mentation report length, improbable and discontinuous bizarre features, and reflective consciousness. Within each subject group, most cognitive variables tended to fluctuate in line with expected variations in circadian activation level. When comparing the cognitive variables between the two groups, reflective consciousness was clearly highest in narcoleptics, whereas improbabilities and discontinuities were lower, with mentation report length and visual vividness differing less between the groups. These findings are consistent with the AIM model of sleep mentation, but not with the activation-only model
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Abstract: The time honoured philosophical issue of how to resolve the mind/body problem has taken a more scientific turn of late. Instead of discussing issues of the soul and emotion and person and their reduction to a physical form, we now ask ourselves how well-understood cognitive and social concepts fit into the growing and changing field of neuropsychology. One of the many projects that have come out of this new scientific endeavour is Zaidel’s (2005) inquiry into the neuropsychological bases of art
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Abstract: Positing the importance of sensorimotor contingencies for perception is by no means denying the presence and importance of representations. Using the evidence of mirror neurons we will show the intrinsic relationship between action control and representation within the logic of forward models
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Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isnÂ’t all itÂ’s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum , a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We donÂ’t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they arenÂ’t all that bad. We think weÂ’re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
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Abstract: This commentary makes a case for a connection between the hierarchically organized skills emphasized in Greenfield's (1991t) target article and rhythmic skills utilized in music. It also links hierarchical organization with automated processing. Implicit is the notion that lower levels of a hierarchy become automatic, as they go under control of higher levels of organization
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Abstract: Contemporary cognitive neuropsychology attempts to infer unobserved features of normal human cognition, or ?cognitive architecture?, from experiments with normals and with brain-damaged subjects in whom certain normal cognitive capacities are altered, diminished, or absent. Fundamental methodological issues about the enterprise of cognitive neuropsychology concern the characterization of methods by which features of normal cognitive architecture can be identified from such data, the assumptions upon which the reliability of such methods are premised, and the limits of such methods?even granting their assumptions?in resolving uncertainties about that architecture. With some idealization, the question of the capacities of various experimental designs in cognitive neuropsychology to uncover cognitive architecture can be reduced to comparatively simple questions about the prior assumptions investigators are willing to make. This paper presents some of simplest of those reductions. 1Research for this paper was made possible by a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and by grant number SBE-9212264 from the National Science Foundation. I thank Martha Farah for teaching me what little I know of cognitive neuropsychology, Jeffrey Bub for stimulating me to think about these issues and for commenting on drafts of this paper, and Peter Slezak for additional comments. Alfonso Caramazza and Michael McCloskey provided very helpful comments on a second draft
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Abstract: Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language, perception and action. Since it also shows many functions to be highly distributed, interconnected and dependent on mechanisms at different levels of processing, it challenges concepts that are traditionally used to describe these functions. The question is how to accommodate these concepts to the recent evidence. A recent proposal, made in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) by Bennett and Hacker, is that concepts play a foundational role in neuroscience, that empirical research needs to presuppose them and that changing concepts is a philosophical task. In defending this perspective, PFN shows much neuroscientific writing to be dualistic in nature due to our poor grasp of its foundations. In our review article we take a different approach. Instead of foundationalism we plead for a mild coherentism, which allows for a gradual and continuous alteration of concepts in light of new evidence. Following this approach it is also easier to deal with some neurological conditions (like blindsight, synaesthesia) that pose difficulties for our concepts. Finally, although words and concepts seem to seduce us to thinking that many skills and tasks function separately, it is language skill that – as neuroscientific evidence shows – co-emerges with action/perception cycles and thus seems to require revision of some of our central concepts.
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Abstract: In this article I will compare two approaches for defining theoretical terms, that of Logical Empirism (especially the approach of R. Carnap) and that of Structuralism (according to the works of J. Sneed and W. Stegmüller). I will determine explicitly the accounts of theoreticity in both Logical Empirism and Structuralism, and compare them by means of a case study: a structuralistic reconstruction of Neurobiological Constructivism (according to the theory of G. Roth). I will point out that the structuralistic criticism on the account of theoreticity of Logical Empirism is insufficient and that the structuralistic criterion of theoreticity does not satisfy the requirements of demarcation for theoretical terms demanded by Logical Empirism
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Abstract: One of the main aspects of a neurobiological theory of language is the problem of meaning (or semantic content) in the brain. A full explanation of meaning requires a combined approach to semantic typing and the semantic success of cerebral states or processes. Pulvermüller presents his Hebbian model of language in the brain (HML) as an account of semantic success. If his proposal turns out to be viable, however, it may also promote a theory of semantic typing
Laming, Donald R. J. (2000). On the behavioural interpretation of neurophysiological observation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):209-209.   (Google)
Abstract: Examples of terror generated by an aircraft disaster, of human courtship behaviour, and of the application of laboratory techniques to the commercial training of animals suggest (1) that emotion is simply the subjective counterpart of (objective) motivation (so that separate brain mechanisms would be an embarrassment) and (2) the apparent involvement of reward and punishment is a consequence of the excessively narrow range of experimental procedures used and has no foundation in the design of the brain
Landreth, Anthony & Bickle, John (2008). Neuroeconomics, neurophysiology and the common currency hypothesis. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):419-429.   (Google)
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Laughlin, Charles D. & Throop, C. Jason (2009). Husserlian meditations and anthropological reflections: Toward a cultural neurophenomenology of experience and reality. Anthropology of Consciousness 20 (2):130-170.   (Google)
Abstract: Most of us would agree that the world of our experience is different than the extramental reality of which we are a part. Indeed, the evidence pertaining to cultural cosmologies around the globe suggests that virtually all peoples recognize this distinction—hence the focus upon the "hidden" forces behind everyday events. That said, the struggle to comprehend the relationship between our consciousness and reality, even the reality of ourselves, has led to controversy and debate for centuries in Western philosophy. In this article, we address this problem from an anthropological perspective and argue that the generative route to a solution of the experience–reality "gap" is by way of an anthropologically informed cultural neurophenomenology . By this we mean a perspective and methodology that applies a phenomenology that controls for cultural variation in perception and interpretation, coupled with the latest information from the neurosciences about how the organ of experience—the brain—is structured
Leibovic, K. Nicholas (1997). Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence J. sejnowski, the computational brain, computational neuroscience series, cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1992. Minds and Machines 7 (4).   (Google)
Leslie, P. Tolbert; Lynne, A. Oland; Thomas, C. Christensen & Anita, R. Goriely (2003). Neuronal and glial morphology in olfactory systems: Significance for information-processing and underlying developmental mechanisms. Brain and Mind 4 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The shapes of neurons and glial cells dictate many important aspects of their functions. In olfactory systems, certain architectural features are characteristics of these two cell types across a wide variety of species. The accumulated evidence suggests that these common features may play fundamental roles in olfactoryinformation processing. For instance, the primary olfactory neuropil in most vertebrate and invertebrate olfactory systems is organized into discrete modules called glomeruli. Inside each glomerulus, sensory axons and CNS neurons branch and synapse in patterns that are repeated across species. In many species, moreover, the glomeruli are enveloped by a thin and ordered layer of glial processes. Theglomerular arrangement reflects the processing of odor information in modules that encode the discrete molecular attributes of odorant stimuli being processed. Recent studies of the mechanisms that guide the development of olfactory neurons and glial cells have revealed complex reciprocal interactions between these two cell types, which may be necessary for the establishment of modular compartments. Collectively, the findings reviewed here suggest that specialized cellular architecture plays key functional roles in the detection, analysis, and discrimination of odors at early steps in olfactory processing
Lim, Daniel (2009). Neuroscience and philosophy: Brain, mind, and language. By Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, and John Searle. Zygon 44 (4):1003-1005.   (Google)
Lindemann, Gesa (2009). From experimental interaction to the brain as the epistemic object of neurobiology. Human Studies 32 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This article argues that understanding everyday practices in neurobiological labs requires us to take into account a variety of different action positions: self-conscious social actors, technical artifacts, conscious organisms, and organisms being merely alive. In order to understand the interactions among such diverse entities, highly differentiated conceptual tools are required. Drawing on the theory of the German philosopher and sociologist Helmuth Plessner, the paper analyzes experimenters as self-conscious social persons who recognize monkeys as conscious organisms. Integrating Plessner’s ideas into the stock of concepts used in science and technology studies provides richer descriptions of laboratory life. In particular, this theory allows an understanding of a crucial feature of neurobiological brain research: the construction of the brain as the epistemic object of brain research. As such, the brain must be isolated from the acting and interacting organism in a complicated process
Livingston, Kenneth R. (1996). The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our psychology, it must also replace them for purposes of the evaluation of our theories and explanations, psychological and otherwise. This paper briefly reviews eliminativist arguments for doubting the correctness of sentential accounts of explanation, understanding, and normative evaluation. It then considers Paul Churchland's (1989) proposed alternative norms, which are framed neurocomputationally. The alternative is found wanting in several specific ways. The arguments for eliminating propositionally-based norms are then re-examined and it is suggested that the need for wholesale elimination is overstated. A clear gap in the traditional epistemological story is identified, however, and a more modest set of norms is proposed as a way of filling this gap, rather than as a way of entirely replacing the traditional framework
Machamer, Peter K.; McLaughlin, Peter & Grush, Rick (eds.) (2001). Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Surveys theories in contemporary neuroscience, exploring many of its methodological techniques and problems.
Mandik, Pete (2009). Review of Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).   (Google)
Mandik, Pete & Brook, Andrew (2007). The philosophy and neuroscience movement. Analyze and Kritik 26.   (Google)
Abstract: A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained to deal with. After sketching the history of the movement, we explore the relationships between neuroscience and philosophy and introduce some of the specific issues that have arisen
Maxwell, Nicholas (1985). Methodological problems of neuroscience. In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Northoff, Georg (2001). "Brain-paradox" and "embeddment": Do we need a "philosophy of the brain"? Brain and Mind 195 (2):195-211.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Northoff, Georg (1999). Neuropsychiatry, epistemology, and ontology of the brain: A response to the commentaries. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (3):231-235.   (Google)
Northoff, Georg (2004). Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This novel approach plunges the reader into the depths of our own brain.
Nosal, Czeslaw S. (1991). Neurobiology of subjective probability. In Probability and Rationality. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2004). The first computational theory of mind and brain: A close look at McCulloch and Pitts' Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Synthese 141 (2):175-215.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and computation to understand neural, and thus mental, activity. McCulloch and Pitts's contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata (an important formalism in computability theory), (ii) a technique that inspired the notion of logic design (a fundamental part of modern computer design), (iii) the first use of computation to address the mind–body problem, and (iv) the first modern computational theory of mind and brain.
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Abstract: This paper proposes that neurodynamic system theory may be used to connect structural and functional aspects of neural organization. The paper claims that generalized causal dynamic models are proper tools for describing the self-organizing mechanism of the nervous system. In particular, it is pointed out that ontogeny, development, normal performance, learning, and plasticity, can be treated by coherent concepts and formalism. Taking into account the self-referential character of the brain, autopoiesis, endophysics and hermeneutics are offered as elements of a poststructuralist brain (-mind-computer) theory
Rockwell, W. Teed (1994). On what the mind is identical with. Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):307-23.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: The unity of mind and body need not imply accepting the unity of mind and brain, because the mind-brain identity is something that science has presupposed, not discovered. I cite evidence from modern neuroscience that cognitive activities are distributed throughout the human nervous system, which challenges the 'scientific' assumption (believed by Descartes, among others) that the brain is the seat of the soul, and the rest of the nerves are mere message cables to the brain. Dennett comes close to accepting this point when he criticizes 'Cartesian materialism', and yet he still claims that Vie head is headquarters'. Accepting that the mind is the entire nervous system solves some philosophical problems, for Dennett and others. There is also some evidence that indicates that some cognitive activities may be hormonal rather than neural, which raises some challenging problems for the once obvious distinction between causing a mental state and embodying that state
Rorty, Richard (2004). The brain as hardware, culture as software. Inquiry 47 (3):219-235.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Rose, Steven P. R. & Rose, Hilary (1973). 'Do not adjust your mind, there is a fault in reality'-ideology in neurobiology. Cognition 2:479-502.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenblueth, Arturo (1970). Mind And Brain: A Philosophy Of Science. Cambridge: Mit Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rowe, William L. (1971). Neurophysiological laws and purposive principles. Philosophical Review 80 (October):502-508.   (Google | More links)
Rusk, George Y. (1946). Salvaging physiological psychology. Philosophy of Science 13 (April):123-130.   (Google | More links)
Ryder, Dan & Favorov, Oleg (2001). The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of the cerebral cortex. Brain and Mind 2 (2):161-194.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The ability to predict is the most importantability of the brain. Somehow, the cortex isable to extract regularities from theenvironment and use those regularities as abasis for prediction. This is a most remarkableskill, considering that behaviourallysignificant environmental regularities are noteasy to discern: they operate not only betweenpairs of simple environmental conditions, astraditional associationism has assumed, butamong complex functions of conditions that areorders of complexity removed from raw sensoryinputs. We propose that the brain's basicmechanism for discovering such complexregularities is implemented in the dendritictrees of individual pyramidal cells in thecerebral cortex. Pyramidal cells have 5–8principal dendrites, each of which is capableof learning nonlinear input-to-outputtransfer functions. We propose that eachdendrite is trained, in learning its transferfunction, by all the other principal dendritesof the same cell. These dendrites teach eachother to respond to their separate inputs with matching outputs. Exposed to differentbut related information about the sensoryenvironment, principal dendrites of the samecell tune to functions over environmentalconditions that, while different, are correlated . As a result, the cell as awhole tunes to the source of the regularitiesdiscovered by the cooperating dendrites,creating a new representation. When organizedinto feed-forward/feedback layers, pyramidalcells can build their discoveries on thediscoveries of other cells, graduallyuncovering nature's hidden order. Theresulting associative network is powerfulenough to meet a troubling traditionalobjection to associationism: that it is toosimple an architecture to implement rationalprocesses
Schmaus, Warren (2005). Evolutionary and neuroscience approaches to the study of cognition. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):675-686.   (Google | More links)
Smith, Joel (2005). Review of Bennett & Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Mind 114:391-394.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this long and detailed book Bennett and Hacker set themselves two ambitious tasks. The first is to offer a philosophical critique of, what they argue are, philosophical confusions within contemporary cognitive neuroscience. The second is to present a ‘conceptual reference work for cognitive neuroscientists who wish to check the contour lines of the psychological concept relevant to their investigation’ (p.7). In the process they cover an astonishing amount of material. The first two chapters present a critical history of neuroscience from Aristotle to Sherrington, Eccles and Penfield. Chapter three (to which I shall return), offers the philosophical basis for much of the book. Chapters four to twelve present detailed philosophical criticisms of a wide variety of neuroscientists (and some philosophers) on a large number of topics. These include: Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Marr and Frisby on perception (particularly the primary/secondary quality distinction and the binding problem); Milner, Squire and Kandel on memory; Blakemore and others on mental imagery; LaDoux and Damasio on the emotions; Libet on voluntary movement; and Baars, Crick, Edelman, Damasio, Penrose, Searle, Chalmers, and Nagel on consciousness (with a great deal on qualia and self-consciousness). Chapters thirteen and fourteen, along with the two appendices, contain an elaboration and defence of the book’s methodology and present explicit contrasts with the Churchlands, Dennett and Searle. Bennett and Hacker maintain that whilst neuroscientists have made significant discoveries concerning the workings of the brain, these discoveries have been obscured by their presentation within an incoherent conceptual framework. Their complaints, therefore, are often not with neuroscience itself but with what might be called its philosophical self image
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Talvitie, Vesa & Ihanus, Juhani (2003). On the nature of repressed contents: A working-through of John Searle's critique. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 5 (2):133-142.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Tibbetts, Paul E. (2004). The concept of voluntary motor control in the recent neuroscientific literature. Synthese 141 (2):247-76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The concept of voluntary motor control(VMC) frequently appears in the neuroscientific literature, specifically in the context of cortically-mediated, intentional motor actions. For cognitive scientists, this concept of VMC raises a number of interesting questions:(i) Are there dedicated, modular-like structures within the motor system associated with VMC? Or (ii) is it the case that VMC is distributed over multiple cortical as well as subcortical structures?(iii) Is there any one place within the so-calledhierarchy of motor control where voluntary movements could be said to originate? And (iv) in the current neurological literature how is the adjective voluntary in VMC being used? These questions are here considered in the context of how higher- and lower-levels of motor control, plan, initiate, coordinate, sequence, and modulate goal-directed motor outputs in response to changing internal and external inputs. Particularly relevant are the conceptual implications of current neurological modeling of VMC concerning causal agency
Wassermann, Gerhard D. (1980). Biological aspects of the philosophy of mind. Metaphilosophy 11 (July-October):199-209.   (Google)
Weber, Marcel (2005). Indeterminism in neurobiology. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):663-674.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I examine different arguments that could be used to establish indeterminism of neurological processes. Even though scenarios where single events at the molecular level make the difference in the outcome of such processes are realistic, this falls short of establishing indeterminism, because it is not clear that these molecular events are subject to quantum mechanical uncertainty. Furthermore, attempts to argue for indeterminism autonomously (i.e., independently of quantum mechanics) fail, because both deterministic and indeterministic models can account for the empirically observed behavior of ion channels
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Abstract: Exploring the relevance of biological discovery to philosophical topics such as perception, freedom, determinism, and ethical values, J.Z. Young's provocative book illuminates the significant links between these philosophical concepts and recent developments in biology and the neurosciences. In clear-cut language, Young describes the brain and its functions, examining questions concerning physical makeup versus "real" self, the awareness of our moral sense, and how human consciousness differs from that of other animals. He approaches perception not as a passive process but as an active search for information, suggesting that human knowledge develops from a special process--essential to all organisms--of gathering information for survival