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7.3. Philosophy of Psychology (Philosophy of Psychology on PhilPapers)

Abelson, Raziel (1977). Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology. London: Macmillan.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Adcock, C. J. (1977). Psychology and Theory. Price Milburn for Victoria University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: least this was his later view. He had begun with the more obvious but more naive view that need was the key to the process and that removal of the need ...
Aizawa, Kenneth (1999). Connectionist rules: A rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson's connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):59-85.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Aizawa, Kenneth (1999). Terence Horgan and John Tienson, connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. Minds and Machines 9 (2).   (Google)
Allen, Vernon L. & Scheibe, Karl E. (eds.) (1982). The Social Context of Conduct: Psychological Writings of Theodore Sarbin. Praeger.   (Google)
Allers, Rudolf (2008). Work and Play: Collected Papers on the Philosophy of Psychology, 1939/1962. Marquette University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Notes on Rudolf Allers and his thought -- Introduction -- Cause in psychology -- Irresistible impulses -- Vis cogitativa and evaluation -- The cognitive aspect of emotion -- The limitations of medical psychology -- Intuition and abstraction -- Philosophia-philanthropia -- Ethics and anthropology -- The dialectics of freedom -- Psychiatry and the role of personal belief -- Reflections on co-operation and communication -- Ontoanalysis : a new trend in psychiatry -- Work and play -- The Freud legend.
Anderson, Norman H. (2008). Unified Social Cognition. Psychology Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Unified theory of cognition -- Psychological laws -- Foundations of person cognition -- Functional theory of attitudes -- Attitude integration theories -- Comparisons of attitude theories -- Moral algebra -- Group dynamics -- Cognitive theory of judgment-decision -- General theory -- Experimental methods -- Unified science of psychology.
Badrī, Mālik (1979). The Dilemma of Muslim Psychologists. Mwh London.   (Google)
Beare, John I. (1906). Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition: From Alcmaeon to Aristotle. Martino Pub..   (Google)
Bem, Sacha (2006). Theoretical Issues in Psychology: An Introduction. Sage.   (Google)
Abstract: `This is an exceptionally good textbook. It covers an unusually wide range of issues in an up-to-date and balanced fashion, and is clearly written. It would be invaluable for all students, both undergraduates and postgraduates, who take a genuine interest in the nature of psychology and the theoretical issues it faces' - Professor Graham Richards, Director, British Psychological Society History of Psychology Centre Psychology is understood by many as the `science of the mind', but what is `mind' and what have modern psychology and philosophy to say about its nature? What is `science' and what is a scientific approach to mind? This thoroughly revised edition o the classic textbook explores a wide range of problems in psychology, philosophy, cognitive and brains sciences identifying the major topics, debates and controversies and presenting them in a balanced and accessible manner for students. Key features of this Second Edition include: } A new, ten chapter structure making it ideal for a lecture course; } Contains new content on advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, including neural networks, dynamics systems and situated cognition; } Final chapter focuses on `hot issues' at the interface of psychology and philosophy - making attempts to look forward. } Pedagogical features including chapter summaries and further readings. Brought fully up-to-date with advances in computational, cognitive and neuroscience work on the one hand, and links with philosophy on the other, this book is essential reading for all students needing an understanding of these issues
Bermúdez, José Luis (ed.) (2005). Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings is a comprehensive anthology that includes classic and contemporary readings from leading philosophers. Addressing in depth most major topics within philosophy of psychology, the editor has carefully selected articles under the following headings: pictures of the mind commonsense psychology representation and cognitive architecture Articles by the following philosophers are included: Blackburn, Churchland, Clark, Cummins, Dennett, Davidson, Fodor, Kitcher, Lewis, Lycan, McDowell, McLeod, Rey, Segal, Stich. Each section is includes a helpful introduction by the editor which aims to guide the student gently into the topic. The book is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject, including discussion of the leading philosophers in the field. Ideal for any student of philosophy of psychology or philosophy of mind
Bermúdez, José Luis (2005). Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophy of Psychology i s an introduction to philosophical problems that arise in the scientific study of cognition and behavior. Jose; Luis Bermúdez introduces the philosophy of psychology as an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature and mechanisms of cognition. He charts out four influential "pictures of the mind" and uses them to explore central topics in the philosophical foundations of psychology, covering all the core concepts and themes found in undergraduate courses in philosophy and psychology, including: · Models of psychological explanation · The nature of commonsense psychology · Arguments for the autonomy of psychology · Fuctionalist approaches to cognition · Computational models of the mind · Neural network modeling · Rationality and mental causation · Perception, action and cognition · The language of thought and the architecture of cognition Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction is a very clear and well-structured textbook from one of the leaders in the field
Blowers, G. H. & Turtle, Alison M. (eds.) (1987). Psychology Moving East: The Status of Western Psychology in Asia and Oceania. Sydney University Press.   (Google)
Boden, Margaret A. (1988). Computer Models On Mind: Computational Approaches In Theoretical Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 64 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the mind? How does it work? How does it influence behavior? Some psychologists hope to answer such questions in terms of concepts drawn from computer science and artificial intelligence. They test their theories by modeling mental processes in computers. This book shows how computer models are used to study many psychological phenomena--including vision, language, reasoning, and learning. It also shows that computer modeling involves differing theoretical approaches. Computational psychologists disagree about some basic questions. For instance, should the mind be modeled by digital computers, or by parallel-processing systems more like brains? Do computer programs consist of meaningless patterns, or do they embody (and explain) genuine meaning?
Boden, Margaret A. (1981). Minds And Mechanisms: Philosophical Psychology And Computational Models. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Bolton, Neil (ed.) (1979). Philosophical Problems in Psychology. Methuen.   (Google)
Botterill, George (1999). The Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology? Are they in conflict with one another? Or do they perform quite different, though perhaps complementary, roles? George Botterill and Peter Carruthers discuss these questions, defending a robust form of realism about the commitments of folk psychology and about the prospects for integrating those commitments into natural science. Their focus throughout the book is on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to our common-sense self-image - arguing that our native conception of the mind will be enriched, but not overturned, by science. The Philosophy of Psychology is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning graduate students in philosophy and cognitive science, but as a text that not only surveys but advances the debates on the topics discussed, it will also be of interest to researchers working in these areas
Brett, George Sidney (1912). A History of Psychology. Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Abstract: 'the whole work is remarkably fresh, vivid and attractively written psychologists will be grateful that a work of this kind has been done ... by one who has the scholarship, science, and philosophical training that are requisite for the task' - Mind This renowned three-volume collection records chronologically the steps by which psychology developed from the time of the early Greek thinkers and the first writings on the nature of the mind, through to the 1920s and such modern preoccupations as criminal and animal psychology. It is only in relatively recent times that psychology has been considered an empirical science independent of philosophy. Brett's account is thus concerned with the broadest definition of psychology, taking in such philosophical aspects as the relation of mind and body, thought processes, etc. For each period he gives an account of the state of the sciences which influenced psychology, the state of psychology itself, the influence psychology had on other areas, and the applications of psychological theories. Examining a huge range of figures, he describes their attitudes on fundamental questions and their contribution to the progress of the subject, as well as the history of the different methods of inquiry. The thinkers he discusses range from Aristotle, Democritus, Socrates, Plato, and Xenocrates to Proclus, the Arabian teachers, Magnus, Duns Scotus, and Ockham from Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, and Cudworth to Locke, Berkeley, Condillac, and Kant from Reid, Stewart, Herbart, and Schopenhauer to Bain, Spencer, Mill and Darwin. Surprisingly clear and easy to read, Brett's account succeeds in illuminating the nature of psychology as well as its history. It remains a classic overview of the subject from its broad roots in philosophy through to the independent empirical science of the modern era. --a scarce work, rarely found as a complete set --a classic work - all historians of psychology and philosophy should have A History of Psychology
Brent, Sandor B. (1984). Psychological and Social Structures. Erlbaum Associates, Pub..   (Google)
Brunschwig, Jacques & Nussbaum, Martha Craven (eds.) (1993). Passions & Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind: Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophers of the Hellenistic schools in ancient Greece and Rome (Epicureans, Stoics, Sceptics, Academics, Cyrenaics) made important contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. This volume, which contains the proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, describes and analyses their contributions on issues such as: the nature of perception, imagination and belief; the nature of the passions and their role in action; the relationship between mind and body; freedom and determinism; the role of pleasure as a goal; the effects of poetry on belief and passion. Written with a high level of historical and philosophical scholarship, the essays are intended both for classicists and for specialists interested in the philosophy of mind
Budd, Malcolm (1989). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Carrier, Martin & Mittelstrass, J (1991). Mind, Brain, Behavior: The Mind-Body Problem and the Philosophy of Psychology. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Translation of: Geist, Gehirn, Verhalten.
Carruthers, Peter & Botterill, George (1999). Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2006). The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter Carruthers, a leading philosopher of mind, provides a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. Written with unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of research in cognitive science, it will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the mind
Christou, Evangelos (2007). The Logos of the Soul. Spring Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- General clarification of philosophical-scientific concepts -- Science and philosophy -- The analytic and synthetic methods -- The knowledge myth -- Observation and justification -- The soul as mystery -- The knowledge myth in psychology -- Conclusion -- Psychological experience -- Reality in science and philosophy -- Reality of psychological experience -- Conclusion -- Toward a science of the soul -- Verification -- Psychology and the body -- Psychology and the mind -- Psychology and the soul -- Conclusion -- Meaning in psychological experience -- Observation -- Interpretation and formulation -- Conclusion -- Addenda : excerpts from notebooks and letters.
Coulter, Jeff (1979). The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield.   (Google)
Craig, A. P. (2005). What is the Self?: A Philosophy of Psychology. Edwin Mellen Press.   (Google)
Cruz, Joseph (ms). Philosophy of psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: There is a long tradition in philosophy where philosophers attend to the nature, limits, and aspirations of science in general. The increased specialization of scientists themselves, however, has precipitated a parallel development in the philosophy of science. Thus, in addition to general philosophy of science research, it is now common to find philosophers investigating the foundations of particular sciences. Three sciences — physics, biology, and psychology — have received the most attention, as the philosophical issues within these fields have crystallized in a particularly challenging and intriguing way. This is a course in the philosophy of psychology. The aim is not to tell psychologists how to conduct their research, but rather to situate psychology within the wider fabric of intellectual inquiry
DeBerry, Stephen (1993). Quantum Psychology: Steps to a Postmodern Ecology of Being. Praeger.   (Google)
Deigh, John (1996). The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The essays in this collection are concerned with the psychology of moral agency. They focus on moral feelings and moral motivation, and seek to understand the operations and origins of these phenomena as rooted in the natural desires and emotions of human beings. An important feature of the essays, and one that distinguishes the book from most philosophical work in moral psychology, is the attention to the writings of Freud. Many of the essays draw on Freud's ideas about conscience and morality, while several explore the depths and limits of Freud's theories. An underlying theme of the volume is a critique of influential rationalist accounts of moral agency. John Deigh shows that one can subject the principles of morality to rational inquiry without thereby holding that reason alone can originate action
Dienes, Zoltan (2008). Understanding Psychology as a Science: An Introduction to Scientific and Statistical Inference. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: An accessible and illuminating exploration of the conceptual basisof scientific and statistical inference and the practical impact this has on conducting psychological research. The book encourages a critical discussion of the different approaches and looks at some of the most important thinkers and their influence
Dilthey, Wilhelm (1977). Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding. Nijhoff.   (Google)
Dunlap, Knight (1920). Mysticism, Freudianism, and Scientific Psychology. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.   (Google)
Eacker, Jay N. (1975). Problems Of Philosophy And Psychology. Chicago Il: Nelson-Hall.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Feuer, Lewis Samuel (1973). Psychoanalysis and Ethics. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Flannery, Kevin L. (2009). Why does Elizabeth Anscombe say that we need today a philosophy of psychology? In Craig Steven Titus (ed.), Philosophical Psychology: Psychology, Emotions, and Freedom. Distributed by Catholic University of America Press.   (Google)
Fox, Michael W. (1980). One Earth, One Mind. R.E. Krieger Pub. Co..   (Google)
Galdston, Iago (ed.) (1971). Ministry and Medicine in Human Relations. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.   (Google)
Garson, JW (1999). Review. Connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. T Horgan, J Tienson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2).   (Google)
Gauld, Alan (1977). Human Action and its Psychological Investigation. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Gergen, Kenneth J. (2009). Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Prologue: Toward a new Enlightenment -- From bounded to relational being -- Bounded being -- In the beginning is the relationship -- The relational self -- The body as relationship : emotion, pleasure and pain -- Relational being in everyday life -- Multi-being and the adventure of everyday life -- Bonds, barricades, and beyond -- Relational being in practice -- Knowledge as co-creation -- Education in a relational key -- Therapy as relational recovery -- Organizing : the precarious balance -- From the moral to the sacred -- Beyond moral pluralism -- All our relations, approaching the sacred -- Epilogue: The coming of relational consciousness.
Giegerich, Wolfgang (1998). The Soul's Logical Life: Towards a Rigorous Notion of Psychology. P. Lang.   (Google)
Glover, Jonathan (ed.) (1976). The Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Farrell, B. A. The criteria for a psycho-analytic interpretation.--Gardiner, P. Error, faith, and self-deception.--Cohen, G. A. Beliefs and roles.--Deutsch, J. A. The structural basis of behaviour.--Hampshire, S. Feeling and expression.--Putnam, H. The mental life of some machines.--Davidson, D. Psychology as philosophy.--Nagel, T. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.--Williams, B. The self and the future.--Parfit, D. Personal identity.
Golomb, Jacob (1989). Nietzsche's Enticing Psychology of Power. Magness Press, Hebrew University.   (Google)
Gooch, Stan (1980). The Double Helix of the Mind. Wildwood.   (Google)
Green, Christopher D. (2003). Early Psychological Thought: Ancient Accounts of Mind and Soul. Praeger.   (Google)
Greenwood, John D. (ed.) (1987). The Idea of Psychology: Conceptual and Methodological Issues. Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore.   (Google)
Guastello, Stephen J. (ed.) (2009). Chaos and Complexity in Psychology: The Theory of Nonlinear Dynamical Systems. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gullahorn, Jeanne E. (1979). Psychology and Women: In Transition. Distributed by Halsted Press.   (Google)
Hacker, P. M. S., The relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology to the psychological sciences.   (Google)
Abstract: P. M. S. Hacker 1. The ‘confusion of psychology’ On the concluding page of what is now called ‘Part II’ of the Investigations, Wittgenstein wrote..
Hamlyn, D. W. (1983). Perception, Learning, and the Self: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge & K. Paul.   (Google)
Hanly, Charles & Lazerowitz, Morris (eds.) (1970). Psychoanalysis and Philosophy. New York,International Universities Press.   (Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1997). Distinctions without differences: Commentary on Horgan and Tienson's connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):373 – 384.   (Google)
Abstract: Horgan and Tienson do a wonderful job of explicating the dynamical system perspective and contrasting that view with classical AI approaches. However, their arguments for replacing a classical conception of connectionism with system dynamics rely on philosophical distinctions that do not make a difference. In particular, (1) their generalized version of Man's three levels of analysis collapses into itself; (2) their description of attractor dynamics works better than their metaphor of forces; and (3) their versions of “soft laws” and physical laws amount to the same thing
Hebb, D. O. (1980). Essay on Mind. L. Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Abstract: Donald Olding Hebb, referred to by American Psychologist as one of "the 20th century's most eminent and influential theorists in the realm of brain function and behavior," contributes greatly to the understanding of mind and thought in Essays on Mind. His objective was to learn about thought which he considered "the central problem of psychology -- but also, not less important, to learn how to think clearly about thought, which is philosophy." The volume is written for advanced undergraduates, graduates, professionals, and lay people interested in or studying the mind. Hebb offers an increased understanding of the mind from a biological perspective that affects long-standing philosophical and psychological problems. "Psychology and Philosophy were divorced some time ago but, like other divorced couples, they still have problems in common," writes Hebb. The first three chapters establish the methodological and philosophical basis for his biologically centered theory of behavior, including the evolution of the mind, nature versus nurture, the origination and status of cell-assembly theory, and infant thought and language development. He concludes with a discussion of the workings of scientific thought from a practical rather than theoretical perspective
Heider, Fritz (1987). Methods, Principles, and Philosophy of Science. Psychologie Verlags Union.   (Google)
Henle, Mary (1986). 1879 and All That: Essays in the Theory and History of Psychology. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Hillner, Kenneth P. (2000). A Psychological Approach to Ethical Reality. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: The pre-eminent 19th century British ethicist, Henry Sidgwick once said: "All important ethical notions are also psychological, except perhaps the fundamental antitheses of 'good' and 'bad' and 'wrong', with which psychology, as it treats of what is and not of what ought to be, is not directly concerned" (quoted in T.N. Tice and T.P. Slavens, 1983). Sidgwick's statement can be interpreted to mean that psychology is relevant for ethics or that psychological knowledge contributes to the construction of an ethical reality. This interpretation serves as the basic impetus to this book, but Sidgwick's statement is also analyzed in detail to demonstrate why a current exposition on the relevance of psychology for ethical reality is necessary and germane
Hillner, Kenneth P. (1987). Psychology's Compositional Problem. Sole Distributors for the U.S.A. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..   (Google)
Hillner, Kenneth P. (1985). Psychological Reality. Sole Distributors for the U.S.A. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..   (Google)
Holzman, Lois (ed.) (1999). Performing Psychology: A Postmodern Culture of the Mind. Routledge.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 123 | Google)
Abstract: In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
Horgan, Terence & Tienson, John (1997). Pr cis of connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):337 – 356.   (Google)
Abstract: Connectionism was explicitly put forward as an alternative to classical cognitive science. The questions arise: how exactly does connectionism differ from classical cognitive science, and how is it potentially better? The classical “rules and representations” conception of cognition is that cognitive transitions are determined by exceptionless rules that apply to the syntactic structure of symbols. Many philosophers have seen connectionism as a basis for denying structured symbols. We, on the other hand, argue that cognition is too rich and flexible to be simulable by the exceptionless representation-level rules that classicism requires. However, this very richness of cognition requires syntactically structured representations—what philosophers call a language of thought. The natural mathematical characterization of neural networks comes from the theory of dynamical systems. We propose that the mathematics of dynamical systems, not the mathematics of algorithms, holds the key to how cognitive structure and cognitive processes can be realized in the physical structure and processes of a network
Horgan, Terence E. (1999). Short prcis of connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):9-21.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hume, David (2003). The Elements of Mentality: The Foundations of Psychology and Philosophy. Distribution, Ipg.   (Google)
Hyland, Michael (1981). Introduction to Theoretical Psychology. University Park Press.   (Google)
Ions, Edmund S. (1977). Against Behaviouralism: A Critique of Behavioural Science. Rowman and Littlefield.   (Google)
Jaques, Elliott (2002). The Life and Behavior of Living Organisms: A General Theory. Praeger.   (Google)
Justman, Stewart (1998). The Psychological Mystique. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Kagan, Jerome (1998). Three Seductive Ideas. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Kao, Henry S. R. & Sinha, Durganand (eds.) (1996). Asian Perspectives on Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: Focusing on what makes psychology in Asia distinct from that in the West, the contributors to Asian Perspectives on Psychology present perspectives and approaches to psychological knowledge as practiced in Asian countries. The original essays cover socialization and development, cognition and emotion, social behavior and personality, and indigenous approaches to health by experts from different countries. The contributors make the case that Asian psychologists, as distinct from their Western colleagues, take into account the spiritual and transcendental, are more practically oriented, and show a greater concern for larger societal and personal issues. This volume demonstrates how Asian psychological traditions can provide fresh perspectives to enrich the field and argues for a greater complementarity between Western and Eastern approaches. For those schooled in Western psychological approaches, Asian Perspectives on Psychology offers a new take on the field of psychology that will stimulate discussion. Students as well as academics and researchers in cross-cultural psychology, multicultural counseling and psychology, cultural anthropology, and research methods will want to consider the information offered in this volume
Kemp, Simon (1990). Medieval Psychology. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Kendler, Howard H. (1981). Psychology: A Science in Conflict. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert (2001). George Botterill and Peter Carruthers the philosophy of psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1).   (Google)
Kovitz, Benjamin (2008). Humanity Against Itself: The Retreat From Reason. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Abstract: Human nature -- On mental disorder -- The meaning of anxiety -- To someone considering psychotherapy -- The sinner in the saint -- Our incoherent world -- The contribution of science -- Making sense of experience -- On reason and religion -- The world of religion -- A note on the aesthetic -- Where are we headed?
Kumāra, Nirmala (1981). Ṛta Psychology Beyond Freud. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.   (Google)
Kusch, Martin (1995). Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place. Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until the two fields eventually matured and grew apart. Until the publication of Martin Kursch's masterly work Psychologism , few philosophers and psychologists have attended to their originally unhappy, turn-of-the-century engagement. Martin Kusch explores the origins of psychologism in Germany and fin de siecle Vienna by examining two major figures of twentieth century philosophy: Frege and Husserl. As one of the few serious works on Frege, Kusch trenchantly and clearly reconstructs the debate and the context in which it flourished. Psychologism will prove to be a key work of intellectual history on a subject which has largely been overlooked and, above all, understudied
Kusch, Martin (1999). Psychological Knowledge: A Social History and Philosophy. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: An introduction to the workings of constructivism, Psychological Knowledge is an insightful introduction to the history of psychology and the recent philosophy of mind
Ladd, George Trumbull (1895). Philosophy of Mind. Ams Press.   (Google)
Leary, Timothy (1977). Exo-Psychology: A Manual on the Use of the Human Nervous System According to the Instructions of the Manufacturers. Starseed/Peace Press.   (Google)
Leslie, Sarah-Jane (2007). Generics and the structure of the mind. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):375–403.   (Google | More links)
Leslie, Sarah-Jane (2008). Generics: Cognition and acquisition. Philosophical Review 117 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Ducks lay eggs' is a true sentence, and `ducks are female' is a false one. Similarly, `mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus' is obviously true, whereas `mosquitoes don't carry the West Nile virus' is patently false. This is so despite the egg-laying ducks' being a subset of the female ones and despite the number of mosquitoes that don't carry the virus being ninety-nine times the number that do. Puzzling facts such as these have made generic sentences defy adequate semantic treatment. However complex the truth conditions of generics appear to be, though, young children grasp generics more quickly and readily than seemingly simpler quantifiers such as `all' and `some'. I present an account of generics that not only illuminates the strange truth conditions of generics, but also explains how young children find them so comparatively easy to acquire. I then argue that generics give voice to our most cognitively primitive generalizations and that this hypothesis accounts for a variety of facts ranging from acquisition patterns to cross-linguistic data concerning the phonological articulation of operators. I go on to develop an account of the nature of these cognitively fundamental generalizations and argue that this account explains the strange truth-conditional behavior of generics
Lindskoog, Donald (1998). The Idea of Psychology: Reclaiming the Discipline's Identity. Howard University Press.   (Google)
Litch, Mary (1999). Learning connectionist networks and the philosophy of psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):87-110.   (Google)
Lowry, Richard (1971). The Evolution of Psychological Theory; 1650 to the Present. Chicago,Aldine·Atherton.   (Google)
Lundin, Robert W. (1972). Theories and Systems of Psychology. Lexington, Mass.,Heath.   (Google)
Luo, Jun (2008). José Luis bermúdez, philosophy of psychology: A contemporary introduction, Routledge contemporary introduction to philosophy series. Minds and Machines 18 (1).   (Google)
Lyons, Jack (ms). Philosophy of psychology Phil 4093/PSYC 409v science engineering 408, TR 9:30–10:50am.   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophy of psychology is concerned primarily with philosophical issues involving the foundations and methodology of psychology. Some of these issues are strictly philosophical (e.g., what is psychology? how can it be constrained by, yet independent of, neuroscience?), though some are actually high level theoretical issues in empirical psychology (e.g., to what extent are mental capacities the product of natural selection? what are the mechanisms by which humans form judgments about the mental states of others?). We will address both kinds of questions here
Machery, Eduoard (online). Philosophy of psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: In F. Allhoff (Ed.), Philosophy of the Special Sciences. SUNY Press
Macdonald, Cynthia & Macdonald, Graham (eds.) (1995). Philosophy of Psychology. Blackwell.   (Google)
MacDonald, Graham (2003). Review of Andrew Ariew, Robert Cummins (eds.), Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (7).   (Google)
Macnamara, John (1999). Through the Rearview Mirror: Historical Reflections on Psychology. Mit Press.   (Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1972). Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein. London,Allen and Unwin.   (Google)
Margolis, Joseph (ed.) (1986). Psychology, Designing the Discipline. Basil Blackwell.   (Google)
Marx, Melvin Herman (1973). Systems and Theories in Psychology. New York,Mcgraw-Hill.   (Google)
Mason, Kelby; Sripada, Chandra & Stich, Stephen P. (forthcoming). The philosophy of psychology. In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The 20th century has been a tumultuous time in psychology – a century in which the discipline struggled with basic questions about its intellectual identity, but nonetheless managed to achieve spectacular growth and maturation. It’s not surprising, then, that psychology has attracted sustained philosophical attention and stimulated rich philosophical debate. Some of this debate was aimed at understanding, and sometimes criticizing, the assumptions, concepts and explanatory strategies prevailing in the psychology of the time. But much philosophical work has also been devoted to exploring the implications of psychological findings and theories for broader philosophical questions like: Are humans really rational animals? How malleable is human nature? and Do we have any innate knowledge or innate ideas? One particularly noteworthy fact about philosophy of psychology in the 20th century is that, in the last quarter of the century, the distinction between psychology and the philosophy of psychology began to dissolve as philosophers played an increasingly active role in articulating and testing empirical theories about the mind and psychologists became increasingly interested in the philosophical underpinnings and implications of their work. Our survey is divided into five sections, each focusing on an important theme in 20th century psychology which has been the focus of philosophical attention and has benefited from philosophical scrutiny
McGinn, Colin (1982). The Character of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 83 | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1996). The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 83 | Google)
Abstract: The Character of Mind provides a sweeping and accessible general introduction to the philosophy of mind. Colin McGinn covers all of the main topics--the mind-body problem, the nature of acquaintance, the relation between thought and language, agency, and the self.In particular, McGinn addresses the issue of consciousness, and the difficulty of combining the two very different perspectives on the mind that arise from introspection and from the observation of other people. This second edition has been updated with three new cutting-edge chapters on consciousness, content, and cognitive science to make it the reader of choice on this vital topic
Miller, James Grier[from old catalog] (1974). A General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences. New York,J. Norton Publishers.   (Google)
Moreno, Francisco José (1977). Between Faith and Reason: An Approach to Individual and Social Psychology. New York University Press.   (Google)
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle (ed.) (2007). Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This anthology focuses on the extraordinary contributions Wittgenstein made to several areas in the philosophy of psychology - contributions that extend to psychology, psychiatry, sociology and anthropology. To bring them a richly-deserved attention from across the language barrier, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock has translated papers by eminent French Wittgensteinians. They here join ranks with more familiar renowned specialists on Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. While revealing differences in approach and interests, this coming together of some of the best minds on the subject discloses a surprising degree of consensus, and gives us the clearest picture yet of Wittgenstein as a philosopher of psychology
Mărgineanu, Nicolae (1998). Depth and Height Psychology. Editura Presa Universitară Clujeană.   (Google)
Nahem, Joseph (1981). Psychology & Psychiatry Today: A Marxist View. International Publishers.   (Google)
Newman, Fred (1996). Unscientific Psychology: A Cultural-Performatory Approach to Understanding Human Life. Praeger.   (Google)
O'Donohue, William T. & Kitchener, Richard F. (eds.) (1995). Psychology and Philosophy: Interdisciplinary Problems and Responses. Allyn and Bacon.   (Google)
O'Donohue, William T. & Kitchener, Richard F. (eds.) (1996). The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: This essential book provides a comprehensive explanation of the key topics and debates arising in the philosophy of psychology. In editors William O'Donohue and Richard Kitchener's thoughtful examination, philosophy and psychology converge on several themes of great importance such as the foundations of knowledge, the nature of science, rationality, behaviorism, cognitive science, folk psychology, neuropsychology, psychoanalysis, professionalism, and research ethics. The Philosophy of Psychology also provides an in-depth discussion of ethics in counseling and psychiatry while exploring the diverse topics listed above. The internationally renowned group of contributors to this volume both stimulating and informative. The Philosophy of Psychology will be invaluable for students and academics in theories and systems in psychology, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of the mind, and related courses
Ollinheimo, Ari (1999). Metapsychology and the Suggestion Argument: A Reply to Grünbaum's Critique of Psychoanalysis. Finnish Academy of Science and Letters.   (Google)
Parker, Ian & Gordo-López, Ángel J. (eds.) (1999). Cyberpsychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: On a basic level, "cyberpsychology" refers to the comparison of the mind with different kinds of machines. This multidisciplinary collection brings together essays by leading psychologists and cultural theorists working in the spheres of technology and psychology to explore links between popular culture, technoscience, feminism and politics. Tracing historical and contemporary lines of argument around the fascination between different forms of psychological and machine culture, contributors articulate "cyberpsychological" reflections on contemporary crises in psychology with emerging technologies of the self. The volume offers challenging perspectives and insights to anyone interested in the connections between psychology and technological developments in the information age
Parsell, Mitch (2009). Quinean social skills: Empirical evidence from eye-gaze against information encapsulation. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Since social skills are highly significant to the evolutionary success of humans, we should expect these skills to be efficient and reliable. For many Evolutionary Psychologists efficiency entails encapsulation: the only way to get an efficient system is via information encapsulation. But encapsulation reduces reliability in opaque epistemic domains. And the social domain is darkly opaque: people lie and cheat, and deliberately hide their intentions and deceptions. Modest modularity [Currie and Sterelny (2000) Philos Q 50:145–160] attempts to combine efficiency and reliability. Reliability is obtained by placing social skills in un-encapsulated central cognition; efficiency by having the social system sensitive to encapsulated socially tagged cues. In this paper, I argue that this approach fails. I focus on eye-gaze as a plausible example of a socially significant encapsulated cue. I demonstrate contra modest modularity that eye-gaze is subject to influence from central cognition
Parker, Ian (2007). Revolution in Psychology: Alienation to Emancipation. Pluto Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychology is meant to help people cope with the afflictions of modern society. But how useful is it? Ian Parker argues that current psychological practice has become part of the problem rather than the solution. Ideal for undergraduates, this book unravels the discipline to reveal the conformist assumptions that underlie its theory and practice. Psychology focuses on the happiness of "the individual." Yet it neglects the fact that personal experience depends on social and political surroundings. Parker argues that a new approach to psychology is needed. He offers an alternative vision, outlining how debates in the discipline can be linked to political practice and how it can become part of a wider progressive agenda. Parker's groundbreaking book is at the cutting edge of current thinking on the discipline and should be required reading in all psychology courses
Pathak, P. V. (1932). The Heyapaksha of Yoga; or, Towards a Constructive Synthesis of Psychological Material in Indian Philosophy. Asian Publication Services.   (Google)
Peters, R. S. (1974). Psychology and Ethical Development: A Collection of Articles on Psychological Theories, Ethical Development and Human Understanding. Allen & Unwin.   (Google)
Pronko, N. H. (1988). From Ai to Zeitgeist: A Philosophical Guide for the Skeptical Psychologist. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Puligandla, R. (1974). Fact and Fiction in B. F. Skinner's Science & Utopia: An Essay on Philosophy of Psychology. W. H. Green.   (Google)
Rainio, Kullervo (1986). Stochastic Field Theory of Behavior. Academic Bookstore [Distributor].   (Google)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2007). Rethinking Comonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind, and Simulation. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: This book proposes a series of interconnected arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves the use of a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology. Ratcliffe suggests that folk psychology, construed as the attribution of internal mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, is a theoretically motivated and misleading abstraction from social life. He draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology to offer an alternative account that emphasizes patterned interactions between people in shared social situations
Riegel, Klaus F. (1979). Foundations of Dialectical Psychology. Academic Press.   (Google)
Robinson, Daniel N. (1985). Philosophy of Psychology. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Robinson, Daniel N. (1979). Systems of Modern Psychology: A Critical Sketch. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Rogers, David Price (ed.) (1984). Foundations of Psychology: Some Personal Views. Praeger.   (Google)
Romanyshyn, Robert D. (1982). Psychological Life: From Science to Metaphor. University of Texas Press.   (Google)
Russell, James (1984). Explaining Mental Life: Some Philosophical Issues in Psychology. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Russell, James (ed.) (1987). Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology. Basil Blackwell.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (ed.) (1976). Dialectic: Humanistic Rationale for Behavior and Development. S. Karger.   (Google)
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1988). The Psychology of Rigorous Humanism. New York University Press.   (Google)
Safaya, Raghunath (1975). Indian Psychology: A Critical and Historical Analysis of the Psychological Speculations in Indian Philosophical Literature. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.   (Google)
Sanguineti, Vincenzo R. (2003). A Rosetta Stone to the Human Mind: Three Alphabets to Decipher Psyche. Psychosocial Press.   (Google)
Schlosser, G. (2003). Naturalizing functions-unity beyond pluralism? - Functions-new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biologyandre Ariew, Robert Cummins, & mark Perlman (eds.); Oxford university press, oxford, 2002, pp.VIII+449, price £50.00 hardback, ISBN 0-19-925580-6, price £16.99 paperback, ISBN 0-19-925581-. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 34 (4):685-697.   (Google)
Scharnberg, Max (1984). The Myth of Paradigm-Shift, or, How to Lie with Methodology. Distributor, Almqvist & Wiksell International.   (Google)
Staats, Arthur W. (1983). Psychology's Crisis of Disunity: Philosophy and Method for a Unified Science. Praeger.   (Google)
Stein, Edith (2006). An Investigation Concerning the State. Ics Publications.   (Google)
Stein, Edith (2000). Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities. Ics Publications, Institute of Carmelite Studies.   (Google)
Christensen, Wayne; McIlwain, Doris; Sutton, John & Geeves, Andrew (2008). Critical review of 'Practicing Perfection: memory & piano performance'. Empirical Musicology Review 3 (3).   (Google)
Symons, John & Calvo, Paco (eds.) (2009). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Teichman, Jenny (1988). Philosophy and the Mind. B. Blackwell.   (Google)
Teo, Thomas (2005). The Critique of Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: Closely paralleling the history of psychology is the history of its critics, their theories, and their contributions. The Critique of Psychology is the first book to trace this alternate history, from a unique perspective that complements the many existing empirical, theoretical, and social histories of the field. Thomas Teo cogently synthesizes major historical and theoretical narratives to describe two centuries of challenges to—and the reactions of—the mainstream. Some of these critiques of content, methodology, relevance, and philosophical worldview have actually influenced and become integrated into the canon; others pose moral questions still under debate. All are accessibly presented so that readers may judge their value for themselves: - Kant’s critique of rational and empirical psychology at the end of the 18th century - The natural-scientific critique of philosophical psychology in the 19th century - The human-scientific critique of natural-scientific psychology - The Marxist traditions of critique - Feminist and postmodern critiques and the contemporary mainstream - Postcolonial critiques and the shift from cross-cultural to multicultural psychology This is not a book of critique for critique’s sake: Teo defines the field as a work in progress with goals that are evolving yet constant. In emphasizing ethical and political questions faced by psychology as a discipline, this visionary book points students, academics, and practitioners toward new possibilities for their shared future
Thagard, Paul (ed.) (2007). Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. North-Holland.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychology is the study of thinking, and cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence that also includes philosophy, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. In these investigations, many philosophical issues arise concerning methods and central concepts. The Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science contains 16 essays by leading philosophers of science that illuminate the nature of the theories and explanations used in the investigation of minds. Topics discussed include representation, mechanisms, reduction, perception, consciousness, language, emotions, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology. Key Features - Comprehensive coverage of philosophy of psychology and cognitive science - Distinguished contributors: leading philosophers in this area - Contributions closely tied to relevant scientific research
Thornton, Mark (1989). Folk Psychology: An Introduction. Published by Canadian Philosophical Monographs for the Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy.   (Google)
Tuomela, Raimo (1974). Human Action and its Explanation. Institute of Philosophy, University of Helsinki].   (Google)
Turner, Merle B. (1971). Realism and the Explanation of Behavior. New York,Appleton-Century-Crofts.   (Google)
Uttal, William R. (2003). Psychomythics: Sources of Artifacts and Misconceptions in Scientific Psychology. L. Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Abstract: Uttal has written 9 LEA titles over the past 25 yrs. The audience will be the same people who bought Uttal's past work, as well as people teaching courses in THEORY & METHODS of PSYCH.,those w/interests in THEORETICAL PSYCH & the HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF
Valentine, Elizabeth R. (1992). Conceptual Issues in Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This comprehensive and up-to-date textbook gives a clear account of the different philosophical and theoretical approaches to psychology and discusses major philosophical questions such as free will and the relation between mind and body
van Rappard, J. F. H. (1979). Psychology as Self-Knowledge: The Development of the Concept of the Mind in German Rationalistic Psychology and its Relevance Today. Van Gorcum.   (Google)
Westland, Gordon (1978). Current Crises of Psychology. Heinemann Educational.   (Google)
White, Alan R. (1967). The Philosophy Of Mind. Random House.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1973). Physicalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Wilson, Robert Anton (1990). Quantum Psychology: How Brain Software Programs You and Your World. New Falcon.   (Google)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1982). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: v. 1. Preliminary studies for part II of the Philosophical investigations -- v. 2. The inner and the outer, 1949-1951.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Basil Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Wittgenstein finished part 1 of the Philosophical Investigations in the spring of 1945. From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption. The present two-volume work comprises many of his writings over this period. Some of the remarks contained here were culled for part 2 of the Investigations ; others were set aside and appear in the collection known as Zettel . The great majority, however, although of excellent quality, have hitherto remained unpublished. This bilingual edition of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology presents the first English translation of an essential body of Wittegenstein's work. It elaborates Wittgenstein's views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons. It also shows strong emphasis on the "anthropological" aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Philosophers, as well as anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists will welcome this important publication
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1988). Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology, 1946-47. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: From his return to Cambridge in 1929 to his death in 1951, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who published only one work in his lifetime, influenced philosophy almost exclusively through teaching and discussion. These lecture notes, therefore, are an important record of the development of Wittgenstein's thought; they indicate the interests he maintained in his later years and signal what he considered the salient features of his thinking. Further, the notes from an enlightening addition to his posthumously published writings. P. T. Geach, A. C. Jackson, and K. J. Shah kept meticulous notes from the last formal course that Wittgenstein taught at Cambridge. In order to reconstruct as accurately as possible the words of Wittgenstein, this volume compiles all three sets of notes with no attempt to conflate or edit them beyond rendering them into lucid English. Topics covered by the notes in this volume include the private language argument, the grammar of sensation statements, certainty and experimentation in psychology, and, in general, the same set of concerns as are to be found in his Last Writings and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology . The source material provided in these lecture notes is vital to Wittgenstein scholarship

7.3a Movements in Psychology

7.3a.1 Psychological Behaviorism

LeDoux, Stephen (1993). About Behaviorology: An Introduction to the Incompatible Paradigms and Historical and Philosophical Developments Among Disciplines Addressing the Behavior of Individuals. Abcs.   (Google)
Lee, Vicki L. (1988). Beyond Behaviorism. L. Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Abstract: Beyond Behaviorism explores and contrasts means and ends psychology with conventional psychology -- that of stimuli and response. The author develops this comparison by exploring the general nature of psychological phenomena and clarifying many persistent doubts about psychology. Dr. Lee contrasts conventional psychology (stimuli and responses) involving reductionistic, organocentric, and mechanistic metatheory with alternative psychology (means and ends) that is autonomous, contextual, and evolutionary
Meisenberg, Gerhard (2007). In God's Image: The Natural History of Intelligence and Ethics. Book Guild Pub..   (Google)
Moore, Jay (2008). Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism. Sloan Pub..   (Google)
Roettger, Walter B. (1977). Parsons, Behavioralism, and the Notion of Responsibility. Emporia State University.   (Google)
Skinner, B. F. (1974). Behaviorism at Fifty. New York,J. Norton Publishers.   (Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (1989). Experience and theory as determinants of attitudes toward mental representation: The case of Knight Dunlap and the vanishing images of J.b. Watson. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Galton and subsequent investigators find wide divergences in people's subjective reports of mental imagery. Such individual differences might be taken to explain the peculiarly irreconcilable disputes over the nature and cognitive significance of imagery which have periodically broken out among psychologists and philosophers. However, to so explain these disputes is itself to take a substantive and questionable position on the cognitive role of imagery. This article distinguishes three separable issues over which people can be "for" or "against" mental images. Conflation of these issues can lead to theoretical differences being mistaken for experiential differences, even by theorists themselves. This is applied to the case of John B. Watson, who inaugurated a half-century of neglect of image psychology. Watson originally claimed to have vivid imagery; by 1913 he was denying the existence of images. This strange reversal, which made his behaviorism possible, is explicable as a "creative misconstrual" of Dunlap's "motor" theory of imagination
Thyer, Bruce A. (ed.) (1999). The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism. Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism is the first book to describe the unique contributions of a behavioral perspective to the major issues of philosophy. Leading behavioral philosophers and psychologists have contributed chapters on: the origins of behaviorism as a philosophy of science; the basic principles of behaviorism; ontology; epistemology; values and ethics; free will, determinism and self-control; and language and verbal behavior. A concluding chapter provides an overview of some scholarly criticisms of behavioral philosophy. Far from espousing a `black box' perspective on human cognition and philosophical reasoning, behaviorism (as derived from the works of B. F. Skinner) represents a contemporary and viable approach to conceptualizing important philosophical and psychological issues. Audience: This work will make an excellent text for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students in the fields of philosophy and psychology, as well as being of interest to established scholars in those disciplines
Zuriff, G. E. (1985). Behaviorism: A Conceptual Reconstruction. Columbia University Press.   (Google)

7.3a.2 Cognitivism in Psychology

Pfeiffle, Horst (2008). On the psychogenesis of the a priori: Jean Piaget's critique of Kant. Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: The seal of the a priori is imprinted on the reception of Kant's philosophy. Piaget's epistemological argumentation seems to ascribe knowledge a more fruitful constructiveness than Kant, seeing the a priori as rooted in unvarying reason. Yet, it seems, he failed to recognize the complexity of Kant's theory, which does not always follow a quid iuris line. Moments of experience, analysis and self-observation played more than a marginal role in his discovery of the a priori. Indeed, Kant himself raises the question of ontogenetic category assimilation in a review which pre-empts Piaget, borrowing the category of `original acquisition' from the doctrine of the laws of natural right. And although Kant should not be elevated to the harbinger of the knowledge on development issues delivered thus far by the history of science and experiments, he did recognize the temporal reference of their categories in principle without resolving their validity in psychogenetic terms. Key Words: a priori • categories • genetic epistemology • Geneva School • neo-Kantianism • original acquisition • Jean Piaget • psychogenesis • self-observation

7.3a.3 Movements in Psychology, Misc

7.3b Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology

7.3b.1 The Nature of Folk Psychology

Andrews, Kristin (online). It's in your nature: A pluralistic folk psychology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn’t endorse, and so could not serve as the target’s reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits–who the person is–rather than by beliefs and desires–what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed
Andrews, Kristin (online). The functions of folk psychology.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debates about the form of folk psychology and the potential eliminability of folk psychology rest on a particular view about how humans understand other minds. That is, though folk psychology is described as --œour commonsense conception of psychological phenomena--� (Churchland 1981, p. 67), there have been implicit assumptions regarding the nature of that commonsense conception. It has been assumed that folk psychology involves two practices, the prediction and explanation of behavior. And it has been assumed that one cognitive mechanism subsumes both these practices
Barker, John A. (2002). Computer modeling and the fate of folk psychology. Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):30-48.   (Google | More links)
Bennett, Jonathan (1991). Folk-psychological explanations. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2003). The domain of folk psychology. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Blackburn, Simon W. (1992). Theory, observation, and drama. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):187-203.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1997). Interpreting Minds: The Evolution of a Practice. MIT Press/Bradford Books.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (ed.) (1991). Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The contributors to this volume examine current controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind. Common sense provides a familiar and friendly psychological scheme by which to talk about the mind. Its categories (belief, desire, intention, consciousness, emotion, and so on) tend to portray the mind as quite different from the rest of nature, and thus irreducible to physical matters and its laws. In this volume a variety of positions on common sense psychology from critical to supportive, from exegetical to speculative, are represented. Among the questions posed are: Is common sense psychology an empirical theory, a body of analytic knowledge, a practice, or a strategy? If it is a legitimate enterprise can it be naturalized or not? If it is not legitimate can it be eliminated? Is its fate tied to our understanding of consciousness? Should we approach its concepts and generalizations from the standpoint of conceptual analysis or from the philosophy of science?
Bogdan, Radu J. (2003). Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1993). The architectural nonchalance of commonsense psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminativism assumes that commonsense psychology describes and explains the mind in terms of the internal design and operation of the mind. If this assumption is invalidated, so is eliminativism. The same conditional is true of intentional realism. Elsewhere (Bogdan 1991) I have argued against this 'folk- theory-theory' assumption by showing that commonsense psychology is not an empirical prototheory of the mind but a biosocially motivated practice of coding, utilizing, and sharing information from and about conspecifics. Here, without presupposing a specific analysis of commonsense psychology, I want to challenge a key implication of the 'folk-theory-theory' assumption to the effect that commonsense psychology is committed to a definite architecture of the mind
Botterill, George (1996). Folk psychology and theoretical status. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Botterill, George (1989). Human nature and folk psychology in the person and the human mind: Issues. In Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Braddon-Mitchell, David (2004). Folk theories of the third kind. Ratio 17 (3):277-293.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Braddon-Mitchell, David (1998). Metarepresentation. Mind and Language 13 (1):29-34.   (Google | More links)
Breheny, Richard (2006). Communication and folk psychology. Mind and Language 21 (1):74-107.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Prominent accounts of language use (those of Grice, Lewis, Stalnaker, Sperber and Wilson among others) have viewed basic communicative acts as essentially involving the attitudes of the participating agents. Developmental data poses a dilemma for these accounts, since it suggests children below age four are competent communicators but would lack the ability to conceptualise communication if philosophers and linguists are right about what communication is. This paper argues that this dilemma is quite serious and that these prominent accounts would be undermined if an adequate more minimal alternative were available. Just such a minimalist account of communication is offered, drawing on ideas from relevance theory and situation theory
Cantwell Smith, Brian (1996). Does science underwrite our folk psychology? In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Chater, Nick & Pickering, Martin J. (2003). Two realms of mental life: The non-overlap of belief ascription and the scientific study of mind and behavior. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):335-353.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1988). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21.   (Cited by 36 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1987). From folk psychology to naive psychology. Cognitive Science 11:139-54.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1995). Is 'mind' a scientific kind? In Mind and Cognition. Taipei: Inst Euro-Amer Stud.   (Google)
Collins, John M. (2000). Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):465-490.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. I show that, while my ensemble account of ToM and language refutes the culturalist presuppositions that tend to underlie eliminativist arguments, the falsity of folk psychology is consistent with the account
de bij Weg, Henk (2001). The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory. Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):17-30.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In studying what people do two points of view can be distinguished: We can choose the perspective of the actors themselves (the actor’s perspective), or we can look at what is going on from the outside, from a distance (the researcher’s perspective). Regarding the relation between both points of view three standpoints have been defended
Demeter, Tamás (2009). Folk Psychology Is Not a Metarepresentational Device. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):19-38.   (Google)
Abstract: Here I challenge the philosophical consensus that we use folk psychology for the purposes of metarepresentation. The paper intends to show that folk psychology should not be conceived on par with fact-stating discourses in spite of what its surface semantics may suggest. I argue that folk-psychological discourse is organised in a way and has conceptual characteristics such that it cannot fulfill a fact-stating function. To support this claim I develop an open question argument for psychological interpretations, and I draw attention to the central role of rationality, the conceptual connections, and the essential evaluative content inherent in folk psychological ascriptions. As a conclusion I propose that a fictionalist account of the discourse would fit its characteristics better than a factualist-realist interpretation.
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs opinion. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Let us begin with what all of us here agree on: folk psychology is not immune to revision. It has a certain vulnerability in principle. Any particular part of it might be overthrown and replaced by some other doctrine. Yet we disagree about how likely it is that that vulnerability in principle will turn into the actual demise of large portions--or all--of folk psychology. I am of the view that folk psychology is here for the long haul, and for some very good reasons. But I am not going to concentrate on that in my remarks. What nobody has bothered saying here yet, but is probably worth saying, is that for all of its blemishes, warts and perplexities, folk psychology is an extraordinarily powerful source of prediction. It is not just prodigiously powerful but remarkably easy for human beings to use. We are virtuoso exploiters of not so much a theory as a craft. That is, we might better call it a folk craft rather than a folk theory. The theory of folk psychology is the ideology about the craft, and there is lots of room, as anthropologists will remind us, for false ideology
Fletcher, G. (1995). The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fletcher, G. (1995). Two uses of folk psychology: Implications for psychological science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are valid or scientifically useful). This distinction is then applied to both common practices within psychology and the philosophical arguments concerning the scientific validity of folk psychology. Adopting a social psychological perspective, I argue that (a) the two uses are often conflated in psychology with deleterious consequences; and (b) that the arguments for the elimination of folk psychology as a basis for scientific psychology presented by Churchland and others, are weakened by the failure to attend to this distinction
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Attitudes without psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gauker, Christopher (2005). The belief-desire law. Facta Philosophica 7.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2005). Folk psychology as a model. Philosopher's Imprint 5 (6):1-16.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: <b>1. Introduction</b> <b>2. One sense of "model"</b> <b>3. Folk psychology as a model</b> <b>4. Versions and construals</b> <b>5. Folk psychology in cognitive science and analytic philosophy</b>
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2005). Folk psychology as a model. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (6):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that everyday folk-psychological skill might best be explained in terms of the deployment of something like a model, in a specific sense drawn from recent philosophy of science. Theoretical models in this sense do not make definite commitments about the systems they are used to understand; they are employed with a particular kind of flexibility. This analysis is used to dissolve the eliminativism debate of the 1980s, and to transform a number of other questions about the status and role of folk psychology
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2004). On folk psychology and mental representation. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: into the old view of the mind as a kind of “ghost inside the machine.”
Goldman, A. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:15-28.   (Cited by 135 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding of mental states. This subfield of scientific psychology is what I mean by the phrase 'the psychology of folk psychology'
Gordon, Robert M. (online). Reason explanations and counterfactuals.   (Google)
Abstract: In evaluating conditionals concerning what a person would have done in counterfactual circumstances, we suppose the counterfactual antecedent to be true, just as in what I loosely term the standard "Ramsey" procedure; but then we follow a different path--a simulative path--in evaluating the consequent. The simulative path imposes an implicit restriction on possible worlds, a procedural guarantee that the individual simulated is aware of or knows about the counterfactual condition. This difference makes clear the way in which reason explanations are implicitly cognitive and psychological
Graham, George & Horgan, Terence E. (1988). How to be realistic about folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Abstract: Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among philosophers of mind, is a distinct form of realism from scientific realism, and that it is not yet knowable whether scientific or non-scientific realism is true. We also outline how adopting realism, but remaining neutral between scientific and non-scientific realism, offers fresh insights into such topics as instrumentalism, supervenience, the language of thought hypothesis, and elimin-ativism
Graham, George (1987). The origins of folk psychology. Inquiry 30 (December):357-79.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (ed.) (1991). The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The essays in this volume are concerned with our everyday and developed scientific systems of explanation of human behavior in terms of beliefs, attitudes,...
Gruene-Yanoff, Till (online). Folk psychological realism without representational commitments - the measurement- theoretic account revisited.   (Google)
Abstract: Standardly, mental properties like beliefs, desires, fears, etc. are analysed as relations between the agent, to whom the predicate is ascribed, and a proposition, which is the intentional content of this property. According to this relational analysis, having a thought implies having its content present to the mind. This has wide-ranging philosophical implications, e.g. for the possibility of children and animals having intentional mental properties, or for the problem of knowing one’s own thoughts. Further, according to the relational analysis, the causal efficacy of mental properties must be in virtue of their content. This implies that folk-psychological explanations acquire a special status, for they employ mental properties as the explanans of behaviour. Mental properties can be conceived of as causally efficacious, and hence like standard scientific explanans, only if a satisfactory account is provided how they are causally efficacious in virtue of their semantic content. A successful account of this sort, I submit, does not exist as of yet; hence it seems, on the relational account, that folk psychological explanations are non-scientific, if they are explanations at all
Haldane, John J. (1988). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behaviour: Understanding folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 223:223-254.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2005). Joint Attention and Understanding the Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Oxford University PressJoint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). False-belief understanding and the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.   (Google)
Abstract: The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human social understanding than the critics suggest. First, I use standard false-belief tasks to spell out the commitments of the folk psychological picture. Next, I explicate the critics' account in terms of Michael Wheeler's distinction between online and offline intelligence. I then demonstrate the challenge that false-belief understanding -- a paradigm case of mental state understanding -- poses to the critics' online, non- mentalistic account. Recent research on false-belief understanding illustrates that mental state understanding comes in both online and offline forms. This challenges the critics' claim that our online social understanding does not require folk psychology
Heyes, Cecilia M. & Dickinson, Anthony (1995). Folk psychology won't go away: Response to Allen and Bekoff. Mind and Language 10 (4):329-332.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hodgson, David (1994). Neuroscience and folk psychology: An overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):205-216.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1992). From cognitive science to folk psychology: Computation, mental representation, and belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):449-484.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (1993). A tactical defense of folk psychology. Inside/Out.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Folk psychology is under threat - that is to say - our everyday conception that human beings are agents who experience the world in terms of sights, sounds, tastes, smells and feelings and who deliberate, make plans, and generally execute actions on the basis of their beliefs, needs and wants - is under threat. This threat is evidenced in intellectual circles by the growing attitude amongst some cognitive scientists that our common sense categories are in competition with connectionist theories and modern neuroscience. It is often thought that either folk psychology or modern cognitive science must go. It is in these terms that the battle lines of today’s philosophy of mind are drawn
Hutto, Daniel D. (2004). The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of 'embodied practice', I defend a secondpersonal approach in this paper
Jackson, Frank (2000). Hornsby and Baker on the physicalist orthodoxy. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):188-192.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Knowles, Jonathan (2001). Does intentional psychology need vindicating by cognitive science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments for the idea that intentional psychological states, such as beliefs, must be seen as requiring in-the-head mental representations for us to be able to understand their characteristic causal powers and argue that none of them validly generate their desired conclusions. I go on to argue that RTM, or some computational version thereof, is not motivated by appeal to the nature of cognitive science research either. I conclude that intentional psychology, though an empirical theory, is autonomous from details of lower level mechanism in a way that renders RTM unwarranted
Knobe, Joshua (ed.) (2007). Folk psychology: Science and morals. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely agreed that folk psychology plays an important role in people’s moral judgments. For a simple example, take the process by which we determine whether or not an agent is morally blameworthy. Although the judgment here is ultimately a moral one, it seems that one needs to use a fair amount of folk psychology along the way. Thus, one might determine that an agent broke the vase intentionally and therefore conclude that she is blameworthy for breaking it. Here it seems that one starts out with a folkpsychological judgment (that the agent acted intentionally) and then uses it as input to a process that eventually yields a moral judgment (that the agent is blameworthy). Many other cases have a similar structure. In recent years, however, a number of studies have shown that there are also cases in which the arrow of causation goes in the opposite direction. That is, there appear to be cases in which people start out with a moral judgment and then use it as input to a process that eventually yields a folk-psychological judgment (Knobe 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). These findings come as something of a surprise, and it can be difficult to know just what to make of them. My own view is that the findings are best explained by the hypothesis that moral considerations truly do play a role in people’s underlying folk-psychological concepts (Knobe 2003b, 2004, forthcoming). The key claim here is that the effects revealed in recent experiments are not the result of any kind of ‘bias’ or ‘distortion.’ Rather, moral considerations truly do figure in a fundamental way in the issues people are trying to resolve when they grapple with folk-psychological questions. I must confess, however, that not all researchers in the field share this view. Although many have been convinced that moral considerations actually do play a role in folk-psychological concepts, others have suggested that there might be better ways to account for the results of recent experiments..
Knowles, Jonathan (2002). Is folk psychology different? Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very notion of such a different kind of explanation. I argue first that the in some sense a priori and conceptual nature of folk psychological principles does not support the idea that these are other than empirical generalisations, by appeal to recent nativist ideas in cognitive science and to Lewis's conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. Second, I argue that there is no coherent sense in which folk psychological explanations can be seen as normative. Thirdly, I examine the putatively holistic character of the mental and conclude that that too fails to provide any cogent reasons for viewing folk psychological explanations as different from other kinds of explanation
Knobe, Joshua (2007). Reason explanation in folk psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Consider the following explanation: (1) George took his umbrella because it was just about to rain. This is an explanation of a quite distinctive sort. It is profoundly different from the sort of explanation we might use to explain, say, the movements of a bouncing ball or the gradual rise of the tide on a beach. Unlike these other types of explanations, it explains an agent’s behavior by describing the agent’s own _reasons_ for performing that behavior. Explanations that work in this way have a number of distinctive and important properties, and we will refer to them here as _reason explanations_. Looking at the use of reason explanations with a philosophical eye, one is apt to experience a certain puzzlement. One wants to know precisely what makes a given reason explanation true or false. So, for example, the explanation given above seems to be saying that George’s reason for taking his umbrella was that it was just about to rain. But what exactly makes it the case that this is George’s reason? Does he have to actually be
Knobe, Joshua & Malle, Bertram (ms). Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behavior to the situation whereas observers tend to attribute behavior to the person (Jones & Nisbett 1972). The authors argue that this simple hypothesis fails to capture the complexity of actual actor-observer differences in people’s behavioral explanations. A new framework is proposed in which reason explanations are distinguished from explanations that cite causes, especially stable traits. With this framework in place, it becomes possible to show that there are a number of distinct actorobserver asymmetries in explanation, each stemming from a distinct psychological process by which explanations are generated
Landy, David (2005). Inside doubt: On the non-identity of the theory of mind and propositional attitude psychology. Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in our interpersonal relationships. I contend that these eliminativist arguments typically run together two distinct capacities: the folk psychological mechanisms which we use to understand one another, and scientific and philosophical guesses about the structure of those understandings. Both capacities are ontologically committed and therefore empirical. However, the commitments whose prospects look so dismal to the eliminativist, in particular the causal and logical image of propositional attitudes, belong to the guesses, and not necessarily to the underlying mechanisms. It is the commitments of traditional philosophical perspectives about the operation of our folk psychology which are contradicted by?new evidence and modeling methods in connectionist psychology. Our actual folk psychology was not clearly committed to causal, sentential propositional attitudes, and thus is not directly threatened by connectionist psychology
Leon, Mark . (1998). The unnaturalness of the mental: The status of folk psychology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):367-92.   (Google)
Luis Bermúdez, José (2001). The domain of folk psychology. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1997). Folk psychology and its liabilities. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Machery, Edouard (2006). The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ? Thanks for helpful comments to Gregory Currie, Josh Knobe, Ron Mallon, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Steve Stich, Liane Young, the readers of the blog Experimental Philosophy (http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/) as well as two anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to my research assistant on this project, Julie Sokolow, for her help and her comments
Macdonald, C. (2002). Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'. Mind and Language 17 (5):467-488.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Malle, Bertram F. (2004). How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction. MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this provocative monograph, Bertram Malle describes behavior explanations as having a dual nature -- as being both cognitive and social acts -- and proposes...
Margolis, Joseph (1991). The autonomy of folk psychology. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McDonough, Richard M. (1991). A culturalist account of folk psychology. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Mills, Stephen L. (1998). Is there only one folk psychology? Acta Analytica 20 (20):25-41.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Millar, Alan (2004). Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends a conception according to which normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action; the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons; the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people; and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter. Understanding People will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning
Morton, Adam (1980). Frames of Mind: Constraints On The Common-Sense Conception Of The Mental. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Morton, Adam (1996). Folk psychology is not a predictive device. Mind 105 (417):119-37.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Morton, Adam (1991). The inevitability of folk psychology. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Morton, Adam (2003). The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology As Ethics. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Abstract: The Importance of Being Understood argues for an alternative to traditional accounts in contemporary philosophy of the power of folk psychology to explain our...
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (1994). Folk psychology. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. Doing that will require a quick look at a bit of the history of philosophical discussions about the mind. We’ll then turn our attention to the lively contemporary discussions aimed at clarifying the philosophical role that folk psychology is expected to play and at using findings in the cognitive sciences to get a clearer understanding of the exact nature of folk psychology
Nudds, Matthew (2001). Common-sense and scientific psychology. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):171-180.   (Google)
O'Brien, Gerard (1993). A conflation of folk psychologies. Prospects for Intentionality Working Papers in Philosophy 3:42-51.   (Google)
Abstract: Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to Stich, is that most of the philosophers in this field are undertaking work that is quite futile:
It is my contention that most of the players in this very crowded field have _no_ coherent project
that could possibly be pursued successfully with the methods they are using. (p.244)
Stich readily admits that this is a startling conclusion; so startling, he thinks, that some may even take it as an indication that he has simply "failed to figure out what those who are searching for a theory of mental representation are up to" (p.244). But it is a conclusion that he is willing to stand by, and he sets about it defending it in the body of his paper
Ohreen, David E. (2004). The Scope and Limits of Folk Psychology: A Socio-Linguistic Approach. New York: Peter Lang.   (Google)
Ohreen, David (2007). Why Folk Psychology Is Not Universal. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):55-78.   (Google)
Pettit, Philip (2000). How the folk understand folk psychology. Protosociology 14:26-38.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Place, Ullin T. (1996). Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Pratt, Ian (1996). Encoding psychological knowledge. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Preston, John M. (1989). Folk psychology as theory or practice? The case for eliminative materialism. Inquiry 32 (September):277-303.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Pust, Joel (1999). External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2006). "Folk psychology" is not folk psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology
Robinson, William S. (1996). Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents' (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor for the supporting assumption about the commitments of folk psychology. Several generally implicit arguments in support of the latter assumption are considered. Explicit arguments for it by Ramsey et al. (1990) and Wellman (1990) are examined and judged unsuccessful. An explicit argument for strong realism by Cummins (in conversation) is also found inadequate. Consideration of this latter argument helps to explain why we cannot be satisfied with Dennett's own very brief discussion of causation by beliefs
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1999). Folk psychology. In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: In recent years, folk psychology has become a topic of debate not just among philosophers, but among development psychologists and primatologists as well
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1999). What is this thing called 'commonsense psychology'? Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain intentional action as ordinarily described--e.g., Jack went to the store because he wanted some ice cream. Commonsense psychology also is used to explain mental states--e.g., Jill feared that she would be late because she thought that the meeting began at 4:00. Commonsense psychology is the province of everyone; we all use it all the time
Scott-Kakures, Dion (1995). Erstwhile vindicationism. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (3):205-223.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sehon, Scott R. (1997). Natural kind terms and the status of folk psychology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):333-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sehon, Scott R. (2005). Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sharlow, Mark (online). As true as "you think": Preserving the core of folk psychology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I argue in defense of an important fragment of folk psychology. Specifically, I argue that many propositions about the ontology of mental states and about mental causation are true largely because of certain observable features of human linguistic behavior. I conclude that these propositions are immune to common avenues of eliminativist criticism. I compare and contrast this argument with some previous arguments about the truth of folk psychology
Sharpe, R. A. (1987). The very idea of a folk psychology. Inquiry 30 (December):381-93.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Sifferd, Katrina L. (forthcoming). Translating Scientific Evidence into the Language of the ‘Folk’: Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility. In Nicole A. Vincent (ed.), Legal Responsibility and Neuroscience. OUP.   (Google)
Abstract: There are legitimate worries about gaps between scientific evidence of brain states and function (for example, as evidenced by fMRI data) and legal criteria for determining criminal culpability. In this paper I argue that behavioral evidence of capacity, motive and intent appears easier for judges and juries to use for purposes of determining criminal liability because such evidence triggers the application of commonsense psychological (CSP) concepts that guide and structure criminal responsibility. In contrast, scientific evidence of neurological processes and function – such as evidence that the defendant has a large brain tumor – will not generally lead a judge or jury to directly infer anything that is relevant to the legal determination of criminal culpability . (Vincent 2008) In these cases, an expert witness will be required to indicate to the fact-finder what this evidence means with regard to mental capacity; and then another inference will have to be made from this possible lack of capacity to the legal criteria for guilt, cast in CSP terms.

To reliably link evidence of brain function and structure and assessment of criminal responsibility, we need to re-conceptualize the mental capacities necessary for responsibility, particularly those that are recognized as missing or compromised by the doctrines of “legal capacity” (Hart 1968) and “diminished capacity.” I argue that formulating these capacities as executive functions within the brain can provide this link. I further claim that it would be extremely useful to consider evidence of executive function as related to the diminished capacity doctrine at sentencing. This is because it is primarily at this stage in criminal proceedings where the use of the diminished capacity doctrine is most prevalent, as evidenced by the recent Supreme Court cases of Atkins v. Virginia (536 U.S. 304 (2002)) and Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
Stemmer, Nathan (1995). A behaviorist account to theory and simulation theories of folk psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1):29-41.   (Google)
Sterelny, Kim (1998). Intentional agency and the metarepresentation hypothesis. Mind and Language 13 (1):11-28.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. (1991). Causal holism and commonsense psychology: A reply to O'Brien. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):179-181.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 570 | Annotation | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (2002). Folk psychology. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. Doing that will require a quick look at a bit of the history of philosophical discussions about the mind. We’ll then turn our attention to the lively contemporary discussions aimed at clarifying the philosophical role that folk psychology is expected to play and at using findings in the cognitive sciences to get a clearer understanding of the exact nature of folk psychology
Stich, Stephen P. & Ravenscroft, R. (1994). What is folk psychology? Cognition 50:447-68.   (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the last two decades a doctrine called ‘‘eliminative materialism’’ (or sometimes just ‘‘eliminativism’’) has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind. It is easy to understand why eliminativism has attracted so much attention, for it is hard to imagine a more radical and provocative doctrine. What eliminativism claims is that the intentional states and processes that are alluded to in our everyday descriptions and explanations of people’s mental lives and their actions are _myths_. Like the gods that Homer invoked to explain the outcome of battles, or the witches that Inquisitors invoked to explain local catastrophes, they _do not exist_. According to eliminativists, there are no such things as beliefs or desires or hopes or fears or thoughts. These putative states and processes are the badly misguided posits of a seriously mistaken theory, just like phlogiston and caloric fluid and the luminiferous ether.1
Tanney, Julia (ms). Ordinary language and commonsense psychology.   (Google)
Von Eckardt, Barbara (1997). The empirical naivete in the current philosophical conception of folk psychology. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Weatherall, P. (1996). What do propositions measure in folk psychology? Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation of propositional attitudes in order to provide a naturalistic account of their use. I argue that a closer examination of the analogy implies rather than avoids the existence of structured representations constituting a language of thought, and thus that it should be abandoned by those who wish to avoid the postulation of such internal representations
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1984). Pragmatics in science and theory in common sense. Inquiry 27 (December):339-61.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1991). The long past and the short history. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1991). The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology. Synthese 89 (October):15-39.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) — which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many differences between the aims, interests, explananda, explanantia, methodology, conceptual frameworks, and relationships to the neurosciences, that divide CSP and SP. Each of the two is valid within its own territory, and there is no competition between them — primarily because CSP is not, and has no interest in being, a scientific theory. In the second section some implications are drawn. First, neither CSP nor SP has the mind-body problem in its familiar form. Second, CSP, for excellent reasons, is not equipped to handle irrational or non-rational behaviour; there are some grounds for believing that this can and should be the task of SP. Third, philosophical psychology, or armchair theories of action, perception, etc., are doomed to failure. And, fourth, the realm of the psychological is so heterogeneous that no single model for either CSP or SP is likely to succeed
Wringe, Bill (2002). Is folk psychology a Lakatosian research program? Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian research program. I argue that although the Lakatosian model may seem promising--particularly to those who are interested in studying the development of children's understanding of the mind--the analogy between Lakatosian research programs and folk psychology cannot be made good because folk psychology does not possess anything analogous to the positive heuristic of a Lakatosian research program. I also argue that Lakatos' account of theories may not be the best one for developmental psychologists to adopt because of the emphasis which Lakatos places on the social embeddedness of scientific theorising

7.3b.2 The Theory Theory

Bishop, Michael A. (2002). The theory theory thrice over: The child as scientist, superscientist, or social institution? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (1):121-36.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) a rational reconstruction of a Superscientist, or (iii) the scientific community. We argue that (i) is false, (ii) is non-empirical (which is problematic since the theory theory is supposed to be a bold empirical hypothesis), and (iii) is either false or doesn’t make enough sense to have a truth-value. We conclude that the theory theory is an interesting failure. Its failure points the way to a full, empirical picture of scientific development, one that marries a concern with the social dynamics of science to a psychological theory of scientific cognition.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Bostrom, Nick (online). Cortical integration: Possible solutions to the binding and linking problems in perception, reasoning and long term memory.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The problem of cortical integration is described and various proposed solutions, including grandmother cells, cell assemblies, feed-forward structures, RAAM and synchronization, are reviewed. One method, involving complex attractors, that has received little attention in the literature, is explained and developed. I call this binding through annexation. A simulation study is then presented which suggests ways in which complex attractors could underlie our capacity to reason. The paper ends with a discussion of the efficiency and biological plausibility of the proposals as integration mechanisms for different regions and functions of the brain
DeVries, Willem (2006). Folk psychology, theories, and the Sellarsian roots. In Michael P. Wolf (ed.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars (Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Volume 9. Rodopi.   (Google)
Downes, Stephen M. (1999). Can scientific development and children's cognitive development be the same process? Philosophy of Science 66 (4):565-578.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Fine, A. (1996). Science as child's play: Tales from the crib. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):534-37.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Attitudes without psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gauker, Christopher (2005). The belief-desire law. Facta Philosophica 7.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law
Glennan, Stuart S. (2005). The modeler in the crib. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):217-227.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A number of developmental psychologists have argued for a theory they call the theory theory - a theory of cognitive development that suggests that infants and small children make sense of their world by constructing cognitive representations that have many of the attributes of scientific theories. In this paper I argue that there are indeed close parallels between the activities of children and scientists, but that these parallels will be better understood if one recognizes that both scientists and children are not so much theorists as model builders
Glymour, C. (2000). Android epistemology for babies. Synthese 122 (1-2):53-68.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: _Words_, _Thoughts and Theories _argues that infants and children discover the physical and psychological features of the world by a process akin to scientific inquiry, more or less as conceived by philosophers of science in the 1960s (the theory theory). This essay discusses some of the philosophical background to an alternative, more popular, “modular” or “maturational” account of development, dismisses an array of philosoph- ical objections to the theory theory, suggests that the theory theory offers an undeveloped project for artificial intelligence, and, relying on recent psychological work on causation, offers suggestions about how principles of causal inference may provide a developmental solution to the “frame problem”
Gopnik, Alison (1990). Developing the idea of intentionality: Children's theories of mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):89-114.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Gopnik, Alison (1997). The scientist as child. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):485-514.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Gopnik, Alison (2003). The theory theory as an alternative to the innateness hypothesis. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gopnik, Alison & Meltzoff, Andrew N. (1998). Theories vs. modules: To the Max and beyond: A reply to poulin-Dubois and to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 13 (3):450-456.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gopnik, Alison & Wellman, H. M. (1992). Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.   (Cited by 210 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Sellars's Rylean ancestors revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114.   (Google)
Greenwood, John D. (2007). Unnatural epistemology. Mind and Language 22 (2):132-149.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘Naturalized’ philosophers of mind regularly appeal to the empirical psychological literature in support of the ‘theory-theory’ account of the natural epistemology of mental state ascription (to self and others). It is argued that such appeals are not philosophically neutral, but in fact presuppose the theory-theory account of mental state ascription. It is suggested that a possible explanation of the popularity of the theory-theory account is that it is generally assumed that alternative accounts in terms of introspection (and simulation) presuppose a discredited ‘inner ostensive definition’ account of the meaning of mental state terms. However, the inner ostensive definition account is not the only alternative to the theory-theory account of the meaning of mental state terms, and commitment to a theory-theory account of the meaning of mental state terms does not mandate commitment to a theory-theory account of the epistemology of mental state ascription
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
Jackson, Frank (2000). Psychological explanation and implicit theory. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer an account of the relation between explanations of behaviour in terms of psychological states and explanations in terms of neural states that: makes it transparent how they can be true together; explains why explanations in terms of psychological states are characteristically of behaviour described in general and relational terms, and explains why certain sorts of neurological investigations undermine psychological explanations of behaviour, while others leave them intact. In the course of the argument, I offer an account of implicit theories
Jusczyk P. W., ; Johnson S. P., ; Spelke E. S., & Kennedy L. J., (1999). Synchronous change and perception of object unity: Evidence from adults and infants. Cognition 71 (3):257-288.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Adults and infants display a robust ability to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object undergo common motion (e.g. Kellman, P.J., Spelke, E.S., 1983. Perception of partly occluded objects in infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483±524). Ecologically oriented accounts of this ability focus on the primacy of motion in the perception of segregated objects, but Gestalt theory suggests a broader possibility: observers may perceive object unity by detecting patterns of synchronous change, of which common motion is a special case. We investigated this possibility with observations of adults and 4-month-old infants. Participants viewed a center-occluded object whose visible surfaces were either misaligned or aligned, stationary or moving, and unchanging or synchronously changing in color or bright- ness in various temporal patterns (e.g. ¯ashing). Both alignment and common motion con- tributed to adults' perception of object unity, but synchronous color changes did not. For infants, motion was an important determinant of object unity, but other synchronous changes and edge alignment were not. When a stationary object with aligned edges underwent syn- chronous changes in color or brightness, infants showed high levels of attention to the object, but their perception of its unity appeared to be indeterminate. An inherent preference for fast over slow ¯ash rates, and a novelty preference elicited by a change in rate, both indicated that infants detected the synchronous changes, although they failed to use them as information for object unity. These ®ndings favor ecologically oriented accounts of object perception in which surface motion plays a privileged role. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Leslie, Alan M. & German, T. P. (1995). Knowledge and ability in "theory of mind": A one-eyed overview of a debate. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Levin, Janet (2001). The myth of Jones and the return of subjectivity. Mind and Language 16 (2):173-192.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.   (Cited by 225 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2003). The mindreader and the scientist. Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our knowledge is of theoretical models and hypotheses, not of universal generalisations. Adopting this alternative view of (scientific) theories, we come to see that, given time and reflection, we can say what we know
Nazer, Daniel; Ruby, Aaron; Nichols, Shaun; Weinberg, Jonathan; Stich, Stephen; Faucher, Luc & Mallon, Ron (2002). The baby in the lab-coat: Why child development is not an adequate model for understanding the development of science. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich & M. Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Alison Gopnik and her collaborators have recently proposed a bold and intriguing hypothesis about the relationship between scientific cognition and cognitive development in childhood. According to this view, the processes underlying cognitive development in infants and children and the processes underlying scientific cognition are _identical_. We argue that Gopnik’s bold hypothesis is untenable because it, along with much of cognitive science, neglects the many important ways in which human minds are designed to operate within a social environment. This leads to a neglect of _norms_ and the processes of _social_ _transmission_ which have an important effect on scientific cognition and cognition more generally
Origgi, Gloria (online). Theories of theories of mind.   (Google)
Proust, Joëlle (2007). Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1996). Theories in children and the rest of us. Philosophy of Science Association 3 (3):S202-S210.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1998). Theory theory to the Max. Mind and Language 13 (3):421-449.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Sussman, Alan N. (1975). Mental entities of theoretical entities. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (October):277-288.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Triplett, Timm & DeVries, Willem A. (2006). Is Sellars's Rylean hypothesis plausible? A dialogue. In Michael P. Wolf & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum, Josef Parnas & T. Grunbaum (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone

7.3b.3 The Simulation Theory

Adams, Frederick R. (2001). Empathy, neural imaging and the theory versus simulation debate. Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Bernier, Paul (2002). From simulation to theory. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Biggs, Stephen (2007). The phenomenal mindreader: A case for phenomenal simulation. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper specifies two hypotheses that are intimated in recent research on empathy and mindreading. The first, the phenomenal simulation hypothesis, holds that those attributing mental states (i.e., mindreaders) sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). The second, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis, holds that this phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some mental state attributions. After explicating these hypotheses, the paper focuses on the first. It argues that neuropsychological experiments on empathy and behavioral experiments on imitation provide good reason to think that mindreaders sometimes simulate targets' phenomenal states. Accordingly, the paper concludes, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis merits consideration
Borg, Emma (2007). If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds
Campbell, J. (2002). Joint attention and simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Child, William (2002). Reply to Alvin I. Goldman. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google)
Child, William (2002). Reply to Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Cruz, Joe (online). A Humean psychological alternative to Kant and Wittgenstein: Comments on Stueber's Importance of Simulation for Understanding Linguistic and Rational Agency.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Let me begin by saying that I am sympathetic to the simulation theory, especially where it is conceived of as a crucial and central addition alongside the theory-theory as the explanation of our capacity to attribute mental states, rather than as an exclusive and exhaustive account by itself.1 I part company with Professor Stueber, however, in that I view the recent simulation theory/theory- theory controversy as subject to resolution primarily through empirical findings. Still, it cannot be denied that Stueber has helped to crystallize elements of the simulation theory/theory-theory debate that have been lurking all along, and has illuminated an important avenue of inquiry into the status of simulation
Currie, Gregory & Ravenscroft, Ian (1997). Mental simulation and motor imagery. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-80.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Currie, Gregory (1996). Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from autism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Currie, Gregory (1995). Visual imagery as the simulation of vision. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (1998). Folk psychology and mental simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.1 At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (eds.) (1995). Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell.   (Cited by 164 | Google)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2001). Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Philosophical Topics 29:127-73.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in apparent contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But amongst theory theorists, and amongst simulation theorists, there are significant differences of approach
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2000). Simulation theory. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses, or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding of the thoughts, decisions or emotions of another
Davies, Martin (1994). The mental simulation debate. Philosophical Issues 5:189-218.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Decety, J. (2002). Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Dokic, Jérôme (2002). Reply to 'the scope and limit of mental simulation'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Dokic, Jérôme & Proust, Joëlle (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Fisher, Justin C. (2006). Does simulation theory really involve simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the cognitive processes involved when one person predicts a target person's behavior and/or attributes a mental state to that target person. According to simulation theory, a person typically performs these tasks by employing some part of her brain as a simulation of what is going on in a corresponding part of the brain of the target person. I propose a general intuitive analysis of what 'simulation' means. Simulation is a particular way of using one process to acquire knowledge about another process. What distinguishes simulation from other ways of acquiring knowledge is that simulation requires, for its non-accidental success, that the simulating process reflect significant aspects of the simulated process. This conceptual work is of independent philosophical interest, but it also enables me to argue for two conclusions that are of great significance to the debate about mental simulation theory. First, I argue that, in order to stake a non-trivial claim, simulation theory must hold that mental simulation involves what I call concretely similar processes. Second, I argue for the surprising conclusion that a significant class of cases that simulation theorists have claimed as intuitive cases of simulation do not actually involve simulation, after all. I close by sketching an alternative account that might handle these problematic cases
Fuller, Gary (1995). Simulation and psychological concepts. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gallese, Vittorio (2007). Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do their best to avoid the theoretical stance by using their own experience as the measure of everyone else's. When it comes to explaining how we understand other people some of the very best contemporary philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists are simulationists. For example, Vittorio Gallese, Alvin Goldman, Robert Gordon, Jane Heal, Susan Hurley, and Marc Jeannerod. This short list of simulationists, however, already involves some problems. Not everyone on this list understands simulation in the same way. In effect, there are different simulation theories, and although it is important to distinguish them, and I will do so before I go much further, I will in the end argue against all of them. For several reasons I don't think that the concept of simulation explains our primary and pervasive way of understanding others, any more than theory theory does
Galgut, Elisa (2005). Simulation and irrationality. Philosophical Papers 34 (1):25-44.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems
Gallagher, Shaun (2001). The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Gallese, Vittorio (2001). The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.   (Cited by 143 | Google)
Garson, James W. (2003). Simulation and connectionism: What is the connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Simulation has emerged as an increasingly popular account of folk psychological (FP) talents at mind-reading: predicting and explaining human mental states. Where its rival (the theory-theory) postulates that these abilities are explained by mastery of laws describing the connections between beliefs, desires, and action, simulation theory proposes that we mind-read by "putting ourselves in another's shoes." This paper concerns connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory (ST) and the theory-theory (TT). It is only natural to associate TT with classical architectures where rule governed operations apply to explicit propositional representations. On the other hand, ST would seem better tuned to procedurally oriented non-symbolic structures found in connectionist models. This paper explores the possible alignment between ST and connectionist architecture. Joe Cruz argues that connectionist models with distributed non-symbolic representations are particularly well suited to simulation theory. The purported linkage between connectionist architecture and simulation theory is criticized in this paper. The conclusion is that there are reasons for thinking that connectionist forms of representation are the enemy of both TT and ST. So the contribution of connectionism may be to suggest the need for an alternative to both views
Gianfranco, S. (2002). Reply to 'from simulation to theory'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Goldman, A. (2000). Folk psychology and mental concepts. Protosociology 14:4-25.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Goldman, A. (1992). In defense of the simulation theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.   (Cited by 119 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1989). Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language 4:161-85.   (Cited by 163 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1996). Simulation and interpersonal utility. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis
Goldman, A. (2002). Simulation theory and mental concepts. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Goldman, A. (2002). The mentalizing folk. Protosociology 16:7-34.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. & Barker, John A. (1994). Autism and the "theory of mind" debate. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language 1:158-71.   (Cited by 350 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (online). Representing minds.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: investigation).{1} We project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, . . . even into what from his behavior we imagine a mouse's state of mind to have been, and dramatize it as a belief, wish or striving, verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us in the state thus
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). 'Radical' simulationism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Perner and Howes. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):98-103.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (2001). Simulation and reason explanation: The radical view. Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):175-192.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Alvin Goldman's early work in action theory and theory of knowledge was a major influence on my own thinking and writing about emotions. For that reason and others, it was a very happy moment in my professional life when I learned, in 1988, that in his presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Goldman endorsed and defended the “simulation” theory I had put forward in a 1986 article. I discovered afterward that we share a strong conviction that empirical evidence is relevant to a full assessment of the theory. We both find the burgeoning evidence from cognitive neuroscience to be of particular interest, I believe, in part because it makes possible a major departure for the philosophy of mind: turning its attention from
(a)
the neural basis of mental states,
to
Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Simulation and the explanation of action. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. & Cruz, Joe (2002). Simulation theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory
Gordon, Robert M. (1995). Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 81 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1999). Simulation, theory-theory and cognitive penetration: No 'instance of the fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Harris, P. F. (1992). From simulation to folk psychology: The case for development. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):120-144.   (Cited by 131 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1998). Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach. Mind and Language 13 (4):477-498.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (1995). How to think about thinking. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2000). Other minds, rationality and analogy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 74 (74):1-19.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1986). Replication and functionalism. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation and cognitive penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation, theory, and content. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1994). Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue? In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2000). Understanding other minds from the inside. Protosociology 14:39-55.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Henderson, David K. & Horgan, Terence E. (2000). Simulation and epistemic competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
Hoerl, Christoph (2002). Reply to Jean Decety: Perceiving Actions and Understanding Agency. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: Decety presents evidence for the claim that neural mechanisms involved in the generation of actions are also recruited in the observation and mental simulation of actions. This paper explores the relationship between such neuropsychological findings and our common-sense understanding of what it is for a person to imitate or imagine performing an action they have observed. A central question is whether imitation and imagination necessarily involve the ability to distinguish between one's own actions and those of others. It is argued that certain imitative and imaginative capacities can be present, and play a key role in the acquisition of knowledge, even in the absence of an ability to distinguish between self and other in this way.
Hutto, Daniel D. (online). Minding our language: The role of simulation in linguistic interpretation.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Historically, the philosophy of language has held pride of place in the analytical tradition. In fact, it would be safe to say that for a long time it had been unquestioningly regarded as first philosophy. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, many analytical philosophers held (and many still hold) that we could only get at the underlying nature of our world by understanding the nature of thought. And secondly, they held (and many still hold) that we could only understand the nature of thought by "an analysis of its linguistic expression" (Dummett, 1993, p. 154). Dummett recently goes so far as to tells us that the latter assumption is the fundamental axiom of analytical philosophy
Jacob, Pierre (2002). The scope and limit of mental simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Jarrold, Chris; Carruthers, Peter; Boucher, Jill & Smith, Peter K. (1994). Pretend play. Mind and Language 9 (4).   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: Children’s ability to pretend, and the apparent lack of pretence in children with autism, have become important issues in current research on ‘theory of mind’, on the assumption that pretend play may be an early indicator of metarepresentational abilities
Jeannerod, Marc & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution
Kuehberger, Anton; Kogler, Christoph; Hug, Angelika & Moesl, Evelyne (2006). The role of the position effect in theory and simulation. Mind and Language 21 (5):610-625.   (Google)
Kuhberger, A.; Perner, Josef; Schulte, M. & Leingruber, R. (1995). Choice or no choice: Is the Langer effect evidence against simulation? Mind and Language 10 (4):423-36.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kuipers, Theo A. F. (2005). Verstehen, einfhlen and mental simulation: Reply to Anne Rugh Mackor. In Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. New York: Rodopi NY.   (Google | More links)
Lebar, M. (2001). Simulation, theory, and emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be useful to consider the role emotion plays in the respective interpretive processes. I give reasons for believing that affective processes are more heavily involved in simulation (especially in situations of practical judgment and practical reasoning) than in theory-application. But affective processes have distinctive neurological and metabolic properties. These distinctive features of emotion may not only enrich our understanding of the simulation process, but also afford us a step towards responding to Perner's challenge
Levin, Janet (1995). Folk psychology and the simulationist challenge. Acta Analytica 10 (14):77-100.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ludwig, Pascal (2002). Reply to Can 'Radical' Simulation Theories Explain Psychological Concept Acquisition?. In J. Dokic & J. Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2007). The presence of others. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):161-190.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Hybrid accounts of folk psychology maintain that we sometimes theorize and sometimes simulate in order to understand others. An important question is why this is the case. In this paper, I present a view according to which simulation, but not theory, plays a central role in empathy. In contrast to others taking a similar approach to simulation, I do not focus on empathy’s cognitive aspect, but stress its affective-motivational one. Simulating others’ emotions usually engages our motivations altruistically. By vicariously feeling what others are feeling, we directly come to be motivated by their projects and concerns. Simulation contrasts with more theoretical approaches to psychological attribution that help us understand and explan others, but that do not move us altruistically. This helps us see why we would posit two different folk psychological approaches instead of merely one
Montero, Barbara (2006). Proprioceiving someone else's movement. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):149 – 161.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Proprioception - the sense by which we come to know the positions and movements of our bodies - is thought to be necessarily confined to the body of the perceiver. That is, it is thought that while proprioception can inform you as to whether your left knee is bent or straight, it cannot inform you as to whether someone else's knee is bent or straight. But while proprioception certainly provides us with information about the positions and movements of our own bodies, I will argue that it does more than that. Surprising as this may sound, one can proprioceive someone else's movement. To show this, I first present the results of some studies that suggest that in seeing others move, we kinesthetically represent their movement in our bodies. I then argue, by means of an analogy to prosthetic vision, that such 'kinesthetic vision' should count as proprioceiving others move
Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen P. & Leslie, Alan M. (1995). Choice effects and the ineffectiveness of simulation. Mind and Language 10 (4):437-45.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (1998). Rethinking co-cognition: A reply to Heal. Mind and Language 13 (4):499-512.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen P.; Leslie, Alan M. & Klein, David B. (1996). Varieties of off-line simulation. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over off-line simulation has largely focussed on the capacity to predict behavior, but the basic idea of off-line simulation can be cast in a much broader framework. The central claim of the off-line account of behavior prediction is that the practical reasoning mechanism is taken off-line and used for predicting behavior. However, there's no reason to suppose that the idea of off-line simulation can't be extended to mechanisms other than the practical reasoning system. In principle, any cognitive component can be taken off-line and used to perform some other function. On this view of off-line simulation, such accounts differ radically from traditional information-based accounts of cognitive capacities. And cognitive penetrability provides a wedge for empirically determining whether a capacity requires an information-based account or an off-line simulation account. Stich and Nichols (1992) argued that the simulation theory of behavior prediction was inadequate because behavior prediction seemed to be cognitively penetrable. We present empirical evidence that supports the claim that the behavior prediction is cognitively penetrable. As a result, the simulation account of behavior prediction still seems unpromising. However, off-line simulation might provide accounts of other cognitive capacities. Indeed, off- line simulation accounts have recently been offered for a strikingly diverse set of capacities including counterfactual reasoning, empathy and mental imagery. Goldman, for instance, maintains that counterfactual reasoning and empathy clearly demand off-line simulation accounts. We argue that there are alternative information-based explanations of these phenomena. Nonetheless, the off-line accounts of these phenomena are interesting and clearly worthy of further exploration
Noë, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness
Noë, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Sorting out the neural basis of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):87-98.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: noe@socrates.berkeley.edu_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: evant@yorku.ca_
Ohreen, David (2008). Empathy, Folk Psychology, and Explaining Behaviour. Res Cogitans - Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):39-56.   (Google)
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2002). Reply to Joint Attention and Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Pelletier, Jerome (2002). Reply to Varieties of Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Perner, Josef & Howes, Deborrah (1992). He thinks he knows: And more developmental evidence against the simulation (role taking) theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):72-86.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Perner, Josef (1996). Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: Arguments for a simulation-theory mix. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Perner, Josef (1994). The necessity and impossibility of simulation. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Peterson, Donald M. (2002). Mental simulation, dialogical processing and the syndrome of autism. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Proust, Joëlle (2002). Can 'radical' simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Pust, Joel (1999). External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ravenscroft, Ian (2003). Simulation, collapse and Humean motivation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Ravenscroft, Ian (1998). What is it like to be someone else? Simulation and empathy. Ratio 11 (2):170-185.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Recanati, François (2002). Varieties of simulation. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ribeiro, Anna Christina (online). Do mirror neurons support a simulation theory of mind-reading?   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Both macaque monkeys and humans have been shown to have what are called ‘mirror neurons’, a class of neurons that respond to goal-related motor-actions, both when these actions are performed by the subject and when they are performed by another individual observed by the subject. Gallese and Goldman (1998) contend that mirror neurons may be seen as ‘a part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind- reading ability’, and that of the two competing theories of mind-reading, mirror neurons lend support to simulation theory. I here offer four reasons why I think mirror neurons do not provide support for simulation theory over its contender, theory theory
Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: The argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-79.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (ms). A difficulty for simulation theory due to the close connection of pretense and action in early childhood.   (Google | More links)
Scheutz, Matthias & Peschl, Markus F. (2001). Explicating the epistemological role of simulation in the development of theories of cognition. In Proceedings of the 7th International Colloquium on Cognitive.   (Google)
Schatzki, Theodore R. (2000). Simulation theory and the verstehen school: A Wittgensteinian approach. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Google)
Sharpe, R. A. (1997). One cheer for the simulation theory. Inquiry 40 (1):115-31.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1997). Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1993). Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory? Mind and Language 7 (1-2):35-71.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1995). Second thoughts on simulation. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Stone, Tony & Davies, Martin (1996). The mental simulation debate: A progress report. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction For philosophers, the current phase of the debate with which this volume is concerned can be taken to have begun in 1986, when Jane Heal and Robert Gordon published their seminal papers (Heal, 1986; Gordon, 1986; though see also, for example, Stich, 1981; Dennett, 1981). They raised a dissenting voice against what was becoming a philosophical orthodoxy: that our everyday, or folk, understanding of the mind should be thought of as theoretical. In opposition to this picture, Gordon and Heal argued that we are not theorists but simulators. For psychologists, the debate had begun somewhat earlier when Heider (1958) produced his work on lay psychology; and in more recent times the psychological debate had continued in developmental psychology and in work on animal cognition
Stueber, Karsten R. (2000). Understanding other minds and the problem of rationality. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Attitude and image, or, what will simulation theory let us eliminate?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement of scientific understanding of the mind it will be possible to entirely eliminate the mentalistic and intentional from our ontology, thus dissolving the mind-body problem. The first claim (which has been argued in detail) supplies the principal grounds for accepting the second, much more ambitious and significant, claim. Robert Gordon's (1995, 1996, 2000) radical simulation theory of "folk psychology", proposed initially (Gordon, 1986) as an alternative to "theory theory" accounts of self and interpersonal understanding, but subsequently developing into a quite general challenge to symbolic computational accounts of mind, is not merely consistent with, but actually provides considerable additional support for, the first eliminativist claim. However, although radical simulationism has no use for reified propositional attitudes, it relies on another family of mentalistic and intentional notions, including perspective taking, "seeing as", pretending, imagery, and, most centrally, imagination. It is thus inconsistent with eliminativist metaphysical ambitions. Nevertheless, from this perspective the mind-body problem is transformed. Its solution no longer depends on accounting directly for the intentionality of the attitudes, but rather on accounting for the intentionality of imagination. Although standard accounts of imagination derive its intentionality from that of the attitudes, the recently proposed "perceptual activity" theory of imagery and imagination (Thomas, 1999) can provide a direct account of the intentionality of imagination that is consistent with physicalism..
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2003). Imagining minds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):79-84.   (Google)
Vendler, Zeno (1984). The Matter of Minds. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Weiskopf, Daniel A. (2005). Mental mirroring as the origin of attributions. Mind and Language 20 (5):495-520.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A ‘Radical Simulationist’ account of how folk psychology functions has been developed by Robert Gordon. I argue that Radical Simulationism is false. In its simplest form it is not sufficient to explain our attribution of mental states to subjects whose desires and preferences differ from our own. Modifying the theory to capture these attributions invariably generates innumerable other false attributions. Further, the theory predicts that deficits in mentalizing ought to co-occur with certain deficits in imagining perceptually-based scenarios. I present evidence suggesting that this prediction is false, and outline further possible empirical tests of the theory
Weiskopf, Daniel A. (2008). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading - by Alvin I. Goldman. Philosophical Books 49 (2):168-170.   (Google)
Wilkerson, William S. (2001). Simulation, theory, and the frame problem: The interpretive moment. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization - that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved
Wringe, Bill (2003). Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

7.3b.4 Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology, Misc

Allen, Colin (ms). Macaque mirror neurons.   (Google)
Abstract: Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view
Andrews, Kristin (2003). Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I predict someone’s future behavior, I would at that moment also have an explanation of the behavior. I argue that advocates of both the theory theory and the simulation theory accept the symmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. However, there is very good reason to believe that this hypothesis is false. Just as we can predict the occurrence of some physical phenomena that we have no explanation for, we are also able to make accurate predictions of intentional behavior without having an explanation. Rather than requiring mental state attribution, I argue that the prediction of human behavior is most often accomplished by statistical induction rather than through an appeal to mental states. However, explanations are not given in these terms
Andrews, Kristin (online). The need to explain behavior: Predicting, explaining, and the social function of mental state attribution.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: According to both the traditional model of folk psychology and the social intelligence hypothesis, our folk psychological notions of belief and desire developed in order to make better predictions of behavior, and the fundamental role for our folk psychological notions of belief and desire are for making more accurate predictions of behavior (than predictions made without appeal to folk psychological notions). My strategy in this paper is to show that these claims are false. I argue that we need not appeal to mental states to make predictions of many behaviors, and I will offer a positive account of how we might go about predicting intentional behavior. Finally, I suggest that taken together, the critique of traditional folk psychology along with the alternative account of our predictive practices leads to a new hypothesis. While it may be true that mental state concepts developed in response to social-environmental pressures, I suggest that this pressure was more likely the need to explain behavior, rather than the need to predict it
Arkway, Angela (online). Folk psychological explanation, and causal laws.   (Google)
Arkway, Angela (2000). The simulation theory, the theory theory and folk psychological explanation. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Arkway, Angela (online). The simulation theory and explanations that 'make sense of behavior'.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barnes, Allison & Thagard, Paul R. (1997). Empathy and analogy. Dialogue 36 (4):705-720.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We contend that empathy is best viewed as a kind of analogical thinking of the sort described in the multiconstraint theory of analogy proposed by Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (1995). Our account of empathy reveals the Theory-theory/Simulation theory debate to be based on a false assumption and formulated in terms too simple to capture the nature of mental state ascription. Empathy is always simulation, but may simultaneously include theory-application. By properly specifying the analogical processes of empathy and their constraints, we are able to show how the amount of theory needed to empathize is determined
Barresi, John (online). The neuroscience of social understanding.   (Google)
Abstract: In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (Eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, in press
Bloom, Paul (2006). My brain made me do it. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1): 1567-7095.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Shaun Nichols (this issue) correctly points out that current theories of the development of mindreading say nothing about children's intuitions concerning indeterminist choice. That is, there are numerous theories of how children make sense of belief, desire, and action, but none that appeal to any notion of free will. Nichols suggests two alternatives for why this is the case. It could either be (a) an --outrageous oversight-- on the part of developmental psychologists or (b) a principled omission, reflecting a consensus that the notion of indeterminist choice is absent from children's mindreading processes. Nichols charitably favors the sec- ond alternative
Bogdan, Radu J. (2001). Developing mental abilities by representing intentionality. Synthese 129 (2):233-258.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Communication by shared meaning, themastery of word semantics,metarepresentation and metamentation aremental abilities, uniquely human, that share a sense ofintentionality or reference. The latteris developed by a naive psychology or interpretation – acompetence dedicated to representingintentional relations between conspecifics and the world. Theidea that interpretation builds new mentalabilities around a sense of reference is based on three linesof analysis – conceptual, psychological andevolutionary. The conceptual analysis reveals that a senseof reference is at the heart of the abilitiesin question. Psychological data track tight developmentalcorrelations between interpretation and theabilities it designs. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesislooks at why interpretation designed thosenew abilities around a sense of reference
Bogdan, Radu J. (2007). Inside loops: Developmental premises of self-ascriptions. Synthese 159 (2):235-252.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations
Bogdan, Radu J. (2003). Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (2005). Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late. In B. Malle & S. Hodges. (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers and a few psychologists think that we understand our own minds before we understand those of others. Most developmental psychologists think that children understand their own minds at about the same time they understand other minds, by using the same cognitive abilities. I disagree with both views. I think that children understand other minds before they understand their own. Their self-understanding depends on some cognitive abilities that develop later than, and independently of, the abilities involved in understanding other minds. This is the general theme of this chapter
Bogdan, Radu J. (2003). Watch your metastep: The first-order limits of early intentional attributions. In C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer & L. Runggaldier (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: There is a wide and puzzleful gap between the child’s mastery of first- and recursive or higher-order attributions of attitudes, measured not only in years but also in the cognitive resources involved. Some accounts explain the gap in terms of the maturation of the competencies involved, others invoke the slow development of enabling resources, such as short-term memory, the syntax of sentence embedding or sequential reasoning. All these accounts assume a continuity of competence between first- and higher-order attributions. I disagree and argue, with psychological and neuroscientific support, that there are two distinct (though developmentally overlapping and interacting) competencies, one metaintentional and the other metarepresentational. I focus below on the former and argue that it is egocentric, situated, nonpropositional and thus intrinsically limited to first-order attributions, even when all the enabling resources are in place
Campbell, John (2005). Joint attention and common knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Autism as mindblindness: An elaboration and partial defence. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter I defend the mind-blindness theory of autism, by showing how it can accommodate data which might otherwise appear problematic for it. Specifically, I show how it can explain the fact that autistic children rarely engage in spontaneous pretend-play, and also how it can explain the executive-function deficits which are characteristic of the syndrome. I do this by emphasising what I take to be an entailment of the mind-blindness theory, that autistic subjects have difficulties of access to their own mental states, as well as to the mental states of other people
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency
Carruthers, Peter & Smith, Peter K. (eds.) (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 300 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other species? The volume's four parts together offer a state of the art survey of the major topics in the theory-theory/simulationism debate within philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, the aetiology of autism and primatology. The volume will be of great interest to researchers and students in all areas interested in the 'theory of mind' debate
Cruz, Joseph L. H. (1998). Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture. Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support this claim
Currie, Gregory (1998). Pretence, pretending, and metarepresenting. Mind and Language 13 (1):35-55.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (eds.) (1995). Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Blackwell.   (Cited by 163 | Google)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2003). Psychological understanding and social skills. In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), _Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical_ _Development_. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003.
Egeth, Marc (2009). Representing Metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition? Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):244-254.   (Google)
Abstract: What cognitive mechanisms do people use to represent other people's mental states? Do children who have difficulty processing other people's higher-level mental states such as beliefs also have difficulty processing higher-level non-mental representations such as meta-photographs? See the preprint here or find the final version in print or on the journal website.
Eilan, Naomi; Hoerl, Christoph; Roessler, Johannes & McCormack, Teresa (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention cause the other’s. The latter can and does happen much earlier, whenever the adult follows the baby’s gaze and homes in on the same object as the baby is attending to; or, from the age of six months, when babies begin to follow the gaze of an adult. We have the relevant sense of joint attention in play only when the fact that both child and adult are attending to the same object is, to use Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) phrase, ‘mutually manifest’. Psychologists sometimes speak of such jointness as a case of attention being ‘shared’ by infant and adult, or of a ‘meeting of minds’ between infant and adult, all phrases intended to capture the idea that when joint attention occurs everything about the fact that both subjects are attending to the same object is out in the open, manifest to both participants
Eilan, Naomi M. (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention cause the other’s. The latter can and does happen much earlier, whenever the adult follows the baby’s gaze and homes in on the same object as the baby is attending to; or, from the age of six months, when babies begin to follow the gaze of an adult. We have the relevant sense of joint attention in play only when the fact that both child and adult are attending to the same object is, to use Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) phrase, ‘mutually manifest’. Psychologists sometimes speak of such jointness as a case of attention being ‘shared’ by infant and adult, or of a ‘meeting of minds’ between infant and adult, all phrases intended to capture the idea that when joint attention occurs everything about the fact that both subjects are attending to the same object is out in the open, manifest to both participants
Eilan, Naomi M. (2005). Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention cause the other’s. The latter can and does happen much earlier, whenever the adult follows the baby’s gaze and homes in on the same object as the baby is attending to; or, from the age of six months, when babies begin to follow the gaze of an adult. We have the relevant sense of joint attention in play only when the fact that both child and adult are attending to the same object is, to use Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) phrase, ‘mutually manifest’. Psychologists sometimes speak of such jointness as a case of attention being ‘shared’ by infant and adult, or of a ‘meeting of minds’ between infant and adult, all phrases intended to capture the idea that when joint attention occurs everything about the fact that both subjects are attending to the same object is out in the open, manifest to both participants
Freeman, Norman H. (1995). Theories of mind in collision: Plausibility and authority. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). The narrative alternative to theory of mind. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2004). Understanding interpersonal problems in autism: Interaction theory as an alternative to theory of mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):199-217.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. & Gallagher, Shaun (1998). The neuronal platonist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):706-717.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2003). On the relation between pretense and belief. In Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects only within that pretense-episode (e.g. the child does not expect that ‘spilling’ ( pretend) ‘tea’1 will result in the table really being wet), or more generally, to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the pretended state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world. Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues (e.g. the child does expect that if she up-ends the teapot above the table, then the table will become wet in the pretense), or, more generally to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content
Gerrans, Philip (1998). The norms of cognitive development. Mind and Language 13 (1):56-75.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (online). Developing commonsense psychology: Experimental data and philosophical data.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have been debating the nature of folk or commonsense psychology for three decades. We ask: What are the resources that enable us to navigate the social world, anticipating what others do, explaining what they’ve done, and perceiving them--and ourselves--as selves, subjects, persons, with beliefs, desire, perceptions, and feelings? Unlike traditional philosophy of mind, instead of directly confronting the mind-body problem and subproblems such as intentionality and qualia, we step back and look at the resources that give us the concepts that get us into these knots
Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Sellars's Ryleans revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Wilfrid Sellars's essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," (1) introduced, although it did not exactly endorse, what many philosophers consider the first defense of functionalism in the philosophy of mind and the original "theory" theory of commonsense psychology
Gozzano, Simone (1997). Theory of mind and the ontology of belief. Il Cannocchiale 2 (May-August):145-156.   (Google)
Henderson, David K. (1996). Simulation theory versus theory theory: A difference without a difference in explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34:65-93.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). False-belief understanding and the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.   (Google)
Abstract: The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human social understanding than the critics suggest. First, I use standard false-belief tasks to spell out the commitments of the folk psychological picture. Next, I explicate the critics' account in terms of Michael Wheeler's distinction between online and offline intelligence. I then demonstrate the challenge that false-belief understanding -- a paradigm case of mental state understanding -- poses to the critics' online, non- mentalistic account. Recent research on false-belief understanding illustrates that mental state understanding comes in both online and offline forms. This challenges the critics' claim that our online social understanding does not require folk psychology
Hutto, Daniel D. (2004). Folk psychological narratives and the case of autism. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):345-361.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (2006). Narrative practice and understanding reasons: Reply to Gallagher. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Jackson, Frank (1999). All that can be at issue in the theory-theory/simulation debate. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):77-96.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Knobe, Joshua (2005). Theory of mind and moral cognition: Exploring the connections. Trends in Cognitive Science 9:357-359.   (Google)
Abstract: An extremely brief (3 page) review of recent work on the ways in which people's moral judgments can influence their use of folk-psychological concepts
Langdon, Robyn; Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2002). Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia. Mind and Language 17 (1-2):68-104.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive neuropsychology is that branch of cognitive psychology that investi- gates people with acquired or developmental disorders of cognition. The aim is to learn more about how cognitive systems normally operate or about how they are normally acquired by studying selective patterns of cognitive break- down after brain damage or selective dif?culties in acquiring particular cogni- tive abilities. In the early days of modern cognitive neuropsychology, research focused on rather basic cognitive abilities such as speech comprehension or production at the single-word level, reading and spelling, object and face recognition, and short-term memory. More recently the cognitive-neuro- psychological approach has been applied to the study of rather more complex domains of cognition such as belief ?xation (e.g. Coltheart and Davies, 2000; Langdon and Coltheart, 2000) and pragmatic aspects of communication (e.g. McDonald and Van Sommers, 1993). Our paper concerns the investigation of pragmatic disorders in one clinical group in which such disorders are common, patients with schizophrenia, and what the study of such people can tell us about the normal processes of communication
Maibom, Heidi L. (2007). Social systems. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children
Malle, Bertram F. (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Malle, Bertram F. & Hodges, Sara D. (eds.) (2005). Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
McGeer, Victoria (2001). Psycho-practice, psycho-theory and the contrastive case of autism: How practices of mind become second-nature. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):109-132.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 124 | Google)
Abstract: The everyday capacity to understand the mind, or 'mindreading', plays an enormous role in our ordinary lives. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich provide a detailed and integrated account of the intricate web of mental components underlying this fascinating and multifarious skill. The imagination, they argue, is essential to understanding others, and there are special cognitive mechanisms for understanding oneself. The account that emerges has broad implications for longstanding philosophical debates over the status of folk psychology. Mindreading is another trailblazing volume in the prestigious interdisciplinary Oxford Cognitive Science series
Nichols, Shaun (2001). Mindreading and the cognitive architecture underlying altruistic motivation. Mind and Language 16 (4):425-455.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying altruistic motivation, one central question is the extent to which the capacity for altruism depends on the capacity for understanding other minds, or ‘mindreading’. Some theorists maintain that the capacity for altruism is independent of any capacity for mindreading; others maintain that the capacity for altruism depends on fairly sophisticated mindreading skills. I argue that none of the prevailing accounts is adequate. Rather, I argue that altruistic motivation depends on a basic affective system, a ‘Concern Mechanism’, which requires only a minimal capacity for mindreading
Nichols, Shaun (web). Mindreading and the philosophy of mind. In J. Prinz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In J. Prinz (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press
Olson, David R. (forthcoming). Self-ascription of intention: Responsibility, obligation and self-control. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: In the late preschool years children acquire a “theory of mind”, the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children’s ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children’s developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability to ascribe intentions to themselves. This is achieved, I argue, when they possess the ability to hold an utterance or rule in mind in the form of a quoted expression, and second, when they grasp the causal relation between the rule and their action. The account of how children learn to ascribe intention to themselves and others will then be used to explore the larger question of the relations amongst language, intentional states and the ascription and avowal of those states
Papafragou, Anna (2002). Mindreading and verbal communication. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):55–67.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The idea that verbal communication involves a species of mindreading is not new. Among linguists and philosophers, largely as a result of Grice’s (1957, 1967) influence, it has long been recognized that the act of communicating involves on the part of the communicator and the addressee mutual metarepresentations of each others’ mental states. In psychology, the coordination of common ground and attention in conversation has been pursued in a variety of studies (e.g. Clark and Marshall, 1981; Bruner, 1983)
Peacocke, Christopher (2005). Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: Two parents are watching their son take his first upright steps in learning to walk. Here we have a paradigm of joint attention. The two parents are attending to their son; they are aware of each other’s attention to their son; and all this attention is wholly overt. Everything is in the open, nothing is hidden. In what does this openness consist? Can we characterize it explicitly, without using metaphors?
Perner, Josef; Gschaider, A.; Kuhberger, A. & Schrofner, S. (1999). Predicting others through simulation or by theory? A method to decide. Mind and Language 14 (1):57-79.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Perner, Josef (1991). Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 1060 | Google)
Roessler, Johannes (2005). Joint attention and the problem of other minds. In Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ruffman, Ted (1996). Do children understand the mind by means of a simulation or a theory? Evidence from their understanding of inference. Mind and Language 11 (4):388-414.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Russell, James (forthcoming). Controlling core knowledge: Conditions for the ascription of intentional states to self and others by children. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as ‘the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts’ [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432–451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes the form of three concentric circles. The ‘periphery’ is analogous to Fodor’s [(1983), The modularity of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA] input systems. The ‘core’ contains copies of peripheral representations, and between these representations there is executive competition. At the ‘nucleus’, operations are performed on the core representations of, at least, negation and recursion. I argue that this provides a fruitful way in which to conceptualise why theory-of-mind tasks challenge pre-school children, how some degree of first-person authority is mental state attribution is possible, and how executive inhibition is achieved
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1999). Children's theories and the drive to explain. Science and Education 8:457-488.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1999). Gradual belief change in children. Human Development 42 (6):283-296.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Scholl, Brian J. & Leslie, Alan M. (1999). Modularity, development and "theory of mind". Mind and Language 14 (1):131-153.   (Cited by 91 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of _develop-_ _ment_: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought to be static and ‘anti-developmental’. We suggest that this mistaken view relies on an overly limited notion of modularity, and we explore how ToM might be grounded in a cognitive module and yet still afford development. Modules must ‘come on-line’, and even fully developed modules may still develop _internally_, based on their constrained input. We make these points con- crete by focusing on a recent proposal to capture the development of ToM in a module via _parameterization_
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1997). Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology. Dissertation, University of California Berkeley   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another
Spaulding, Shannon (2010). Embodied cognition and mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.   (Google)
Abstract: Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition
Sterelny, Kim (2004). The triumph of a reasonable man: Stich, mindreading, and nativism. In Michael A. Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Humans interpret others. We are able to anticipate both the actions and intentional states of other agents. We do not do so perfectly, but since we are complex and flexible creatures even limited success needs explanation. For some years now Steve Stich (frequently in collaboration with Shaun Nichols) has been both participant in, and observer of, debates about the foundation of these capacities (Stich and Nichols 1992; Stich and Nichols 1995). As a commentator on this debate, Stich (with Nichols) gave explicit and fair-minded sketches of the cognitive architectures presupposed by the various theories of mindreading. As a participant, Stich has mostly been a defender of the theory-theory, the view that normal human agents have an internally represented theory of other agents and they use that theory in interpreting other agents. The main recent rival to this position, simulationism, claims that agents use their own decision-making mechanisms as a model of those of other agents, and derive their predictions by modelling others in something like the way aeronautical engineers derive predictions from the use of scale models in wind-tunnels. Stich has been sceptical about this alternative, for on his view simulation theory makes mistaken predictions about both the development of interpretive competence and about the pattern of interpretive success and failure
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (2000). A cognitive theory of pretense. Cognition 74 (2):115-147.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by describing a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content as beliefs. Indeed, we suggest that pretense representations are in the same representational ``code'' as beliefs and that the representations in the Possible World Box are processed by the same inference and UpDating mechanisms that operate over real beliefs. Our model also posits a Script Elaborator which is implicated in the embellishment that occurs in pretense. Finally, we claim that the behavior that is seen in pretend play is motivated not from a ``pretend desire'', but from a real desire to act in a way that ®ts the description being constructed in the Possible World Box. We maintain that this account can accommodate the central features of pretense exhibited in the examples of pretense, and we argue that the alternative accounts either can't accommodate or fail to address entirely some of the central features of pretense. q 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Suddendorf, Thomas & Fletcher-Flinn, Claire (1997). Theory of mind and the origins of divergent thinking. Journal of Creative Behavior 31:169-179.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The development of a `theory of mind' may not only be important for understanding the minds of others but also for using one's own mind. To investigate this supposition, forty children between the ages of three and four were given false-belief and creativity tasks. The numbers of appropriate and of original responses in the creativity test were found to correlate positively with performance on false-belief tasks. This association was robust, as it continued to be strong and significant even when age and verbal intelligence were partialled out. The results support the hypothesis that the metarepresentational skills involved in theory of mind also affect the way children can access and scan their own mental repertoire beyond the areas of currently activated content (i.e. divergent thinking). With the advent of theory of mind a basic cognitive shift takes place in human development, and possibly took place in cognitive evolution
Tomasello, Michael & Rakoczy, Hannes (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Wegner, Daniel; Gray, H. & Gray, K. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. Science 315:619.   (Google)

7.3b.5 Folk Concepts and Folk Intuitions

Adams, Frederick R. & Steadman (online). Folk concepts, surveys and intentional action.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by Joshua Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Knobe’s surveys appear to show that the folk judge unintended but known side effects of actions to be performed intentionally. In this paper we will reject Mele’s suggestion that the Simple View is “fiction.” We will also discuss the relationship between surveys and philosophical theories, and the abilities of surveys to access folk core concepts. We will argue that considerations of both fail to support Mele’s suggestion
Bering, Jesse M. (2006). The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):453-+.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The present article examines how people’s belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one’s afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is “like” to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people’s interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive “system” dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment
Feltz, Adam & Cokely, Edward (2007). An anomaly in intentional action ascription: More evidence of folk diversity. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society.   (Google)
Gonnerman, Chad (2008). Reading conflicted minds: An empirical follow-up to Knobe and roedder. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):193 – 205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder found that folk attributions of valuing tend to vary according to the perceived moral goodness of the object of value. This is an interesting finding, but it remains unclear what, precisely, it means. Knobe and Roedder argue that it indicates that the concept MORAL GOODNESS is a feature of the concept VALUING. In this article, I present a study of folk attributions of desires and moral beliefs that undermines this conclusion. I then propose the beginnings of an alternative interpretation of the data that appeals to intrinsic biases in our third-person mindreading mechanisms
Jackman, Henry (2009). Semantic intuitions, conceptual analysis, and cross-cultural variation. Philosophical Studies 146 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: While philosophers of language have traditionally relied upon their intuitions about cases when developing theories of reference, this methodology has recently been attacked on the grounds that intuitions about reference, far from being universal, show significant cultural variation, thus undermining their relevance for semantic theory. I’ll attempt to demonstrate that (1) such criticisms do not, in fact, undermine the traditional philosophical methodology, and (2) our underlying intuitions about the nature of reference may be more universal than the authors suppose
Jorgensen, Andrew Kenneth (2010). The sky over canberra: Folk discourse and serious metaphysics. Philosophia 38 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: I take up the task of examining how someone who takes seriously the ambitious programme of conceptual analysis advocated by the Canberra School can minimise the eliminative consequences which I argue the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis recipe of conceptual analysis is likely to have for many folk discourses. The objective is to find a stable means to preserve the constative appearance of folk discourse and to find it generally successful in its attempts to describe an external world, albeit in non-scientific terms that do not reflect the nature of things. The view I settle on, quasi-fictionalism, is modelled on a modified descriptivist version of Kendall Walton’s account of prop-oriented games of make-believe
Knobe, Joshua; Malle, B. F. & Nelson, S. (2007). Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (4):491-514.   (Google)
Abstract: A long series of studies in social psychology have shown that the explanations people give for their own behaviors are fundamentally different from the explanations they give for the behaviors of others. Still, a great deal of uncertainty remains about precisely what sorts of differences one finds here. We offer a new approach to addressing the problem. Specifically, we distinguish between two levels of representation ─ the level of linguistic structure (which consists of the actual series of words used in the explanation) and the level of conceptual structure (which consists of the concepts these words are used to express). We then formulate and test hypotheses both about self-other differences in conceptual structure and about self-other differences in the mapping from conceptual structure to linguistic structure.
Morton, Adam (ms). But are they right? The prospects for empirical conceptology.   (Google)
Abstract: This is exciting stuff. Philosophers have long explored the structure of human concepts from the inside, by manipulating their skills as users of those concepts. And since Quine most reasonable philosophers have accepted that the structure is a contingent matter – we or not too different creatures could have thought differently – which in principle can be..
Knobe, Joshua & Burra, Arudra (2006). Experimental philosophy and folk concepts: Methodological considerations. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):331-342.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Experimental philosophy is a comparatively new field of research, and it is only natural that many of the key methodological questions have not even been asked, much less answered. In responding to the comments of our critics, we therefore find ourselves brushing up against difficult questions about the aims and techniques of our whole enterprise. We will do our best to address these issues here, but the field is progressing at a rapid clip, and we suspect that it will be possible to provide more adequate answers a few years down the line
Knobe, Joshua (ed.) (2007). Folk psychology: Science and morals. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely agreed that folk psychology plays an important role in people’s moral judgments. For a simple example, take the process by which we determine whether or not an agent is morally blameworthy. Although the judgment here is ultimately a moral one, it seems that one needs to use a fair amount of folk psychology along the way. Thus, one might determine that an agent broke the vase intentionally and therefore conclude that she is blameworthy for breaking it. Here it seems that one starts out with a folkpsychological judgment (that the agent acted intentionally) and then uses it as input to a process that eventually yields a moral judgment (that the agent is blameworthy). Many other cases have a similar structure. In recent years, however, a number of studies have shown that there are also cases in which the arrow of causation goes in the opposite direction. That is, there appear to be cases in which people start out with a moral judgment and then use it as input to a process that eventually yields a folk-psychological judgment (Knobe 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). These findings come as something of a surprise, and it can be difficult to know just what to make of them. My own view is that the findings are best explained by the hypothesis that moral considerations truly do play a role in people’s underlying folk-psychological concepts (Knobe 2003b, 2004, forthcoming). The key claim here is that the effects revealed in recent experiments are not the result of any kind of ‘bias’ or ‘distortion.’ Rather, moral considerations truly do figure in a fundamental way in the issues people are trying to resolve when they grapple with folk-psychological questions. I must confess, however, that not all researchers in the field share this view. Although many have been convinced that moral considerations actually do play a role in folk-psychological concepts, others have suggested that there might be better ways to account for the results of recent experiments..
Knobe, Joshua (2003). Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis 63 (3):190–194.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g
Knobe, Joshua (2003). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people’s concept of intentional action.
Knobe, Joshua (2004). Intention, intentional action and moral considerations. Analysis 64 (2):181–187.   (Google | More links)
Knobe, Joshua (2006). The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool used in prediction, explanation and control or whether it has been shaped in fundamental ways by some other aspect of its use
Knobe, Joshua & Malle, Bertram (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically-based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to directly define the term intentional, people mention four components of intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness. Study 3 confirms the importance of a fifth component, namely, skill. In light of these findings, the authors propose a model of the folk concept of intentionality and provide a further test in Study 4. The discussion compares the proposed model to past ones and examines its implications for social perception, attribution, and cognitive development
Knobe, Joshua (2006). The folk concepts of intention and intentional action: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):113-132.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent studies point to a surprising divergence between people's use of the concept of _intention_ and their use of the concept of _acting intentionally_. It seems that people's application of the concept of intention is determined by their beliefs about the agent's psychological states whereas their use of the concept of acting intentionally is determined at least in part by their beliefs about the moral status of the behavior itself (i.e., by their beliefs about whether the behavior is morally good or morally bad). These findings raise a number of difficult questions about the relationship between the concept of intention and the concept of acting intentionally. The present paper addresses those questions using a variety of different methods, including conceptual analysis, psychological experimentation, and an examination of people's use of certain expressions in other languages
Knobe, Joshua & Mendlow, Gabriel (2004). The good, the bad and the blameworthy: Understanding the role of evaluative reasoning in folk psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:252-258.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Abstract: People ordinarily make sense of their own behavior and that of others by invoking concepts like belief, desire, and intention. Philosophers refer to this network of concepts and related principles as 'folk psychology.' The prevailing view of folk psychology among philosophers of mind and psychologists is that it is a proto-scientific theory whose function is to explain and predict behavior
Korman, Daniel Z. (2009). Eliminativism and the challenge from folk belief. Noûs 43 (2):242-264.   (Google)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2008). Review of Terence E. Horgan, matjaž potrč, Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (10).   (Google)
Abstract: You could say that Horgan and Potrč aren't big on commitment. As they would have it, an ordinary utterance of 'there is a brown chair in the corner' is strictly and literally true, and yet there are no such things as chairs or corners, nor is there any such thing as being brown. Their project in Austere Realism is to supply a semantic framework in which this and other such sentences of ordinary discourse (as well as scientific discourse) are unambiguously true, despite the fact that the sorts of items that would ordinarily be taken to answer to their quantifiers, referring expressions, and predicates do not exist. The conciliatory strategy that they develop is designed to be compatible with a variety of different austere ontologies, though they ultimately come down in favor of a monist ontology on which there exists exactly one concrete particular: "the blobject," that is, the whole cosmos. Although I cannot hope to do justice to all of the intricacies of their ontological-cum-semantic theory in this review, I will do my best to touch on all of the main themes of the book, and I will try to indicate why I was not persuaded.
Machery, Eduoard; Mallon, R. & Stich, S. (web). Against arguments from reference. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press
Machery, Edouard (2006). The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ? Thanks for helpful comments to Gregory Currie, Josh Knobe, Ron Mallon, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Steve Stich, Liane Young, the readers of the blog Experimental Philosophy (http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/) as well as two anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to my research assistant on this project, Julie Sokolow, for her help and her comments
Machery, Eduoard & Livengood, J. (2007). The folk probably don't think what you think they think: Experiments on causation by absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):107-127.   (Google)
Abstract: Folk theories—untutored people’s (often implicit) theories about various features of the world—have been fashionable objects of inquiry in psychology for almost two decades now (e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994), and more recently they have been of interest in experimental philosophy (Nichols 2004). Folk theories of psy- chology, physics, biology, and ethics have all come under investigation. Folk meta- physics, however, has not been as extensively studied. That so little is known about folk metaphysics is unfortunate for (at least) two reasons. First, folk metaphysics is almost certainly implicit, and it is likely to be our default way of thinking about metaphysical problems. Moreover, one’s metaphysical commitments can have pro- found consequences—in scientific, religious, and ethical contexts, for example. Thus, folk metaphysics ought to be dragged out into the open and exposed to criticism. As Peirce eloquently remarked (1994, 1.129; see also 1994, 7.579)
Malle, Bertram F. (2006). Of windmills and straw men: Folk assumptions of mind and action. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Malle, Bertram F. (2006). The relation between judgments of intentionality and morality. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:61-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Meeks, Roblin R. (2004). Unintentionally biasing the data: Reply to Knobe. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:220-223.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Knobe (2003) wants to help adjudicate the philosophical debate concerning whether and under what conditions we normally judge that some side effect x was brought about intentionally. His proposal for doing so is perhaps an obvious one—simply elicit the intuitions of “The Folk” directly on the matter and record the results. His findings were a bit less obvious, however. When Knobe presented New York parkgoers with scenarios including either good or bad side effects, they tended to judge that the bad side effect was brought about intentionally and that the good side effect was not. In light of these responses, Knobe concludes that
[p]eople’s judgments depend in a crucial way on what x happens to be. In
particular, it makes a great deal of difference whether they think that x is
something good or something bad. (2003: 191)
He further explains this conclusion in terms of an underlying normative asymmetry, for according to Knobe the data suggests that “people are considerably more willing to blame the agent for bad side effects than to praise the agent for good side effects” (2003: 193). Hence, people’s judgment that a side effect was brought about intentionally apparently rests, at least in part, upon how blameworthy they find the agent responsible for it
Mele, Alfred R. (2003). Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.   (Cited by 66 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article reviews some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what agents do intentionally and what they intend in various stories and explores its bearing on the philosophical project of providing a conceptual analysis of intentional action. The article is a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a variety of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and vice versa. Topics examined include double effect; the influence of moral considerations on judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended; the influence of considerations of luck, skill, and causal deviance on judgments about what agents do intentionally; what interesting properties all cases of intentional action might share; and the debate between proponents of, respectively, "the Simple View" of the connection between intentional action and intention and "the Single Phenomenon View" of that connection. A substantial body of literature is devoted to the project of analyzing intentional action [1] . In this article, I explore the bearing on that project of some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended. This article may reasonably be regarded as a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a range of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and, likewise, of the potential bearing of attempted philosophical analyses of folk concepts on empirical studies of those concepts
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2006). Desire, foresight, intentions, and intentional actions: Probing folk intuitions. Journal of Cognition and Culture.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A number of philosophers working under the rubric of “experimental philosophy” have recently begun focusing on analyzing the concepts of ordinary language and investigating the intuitions of laypersons in an empirically informed way.1 In a series of papers these philosophers—who often work in collaboration with psychologists—have presented the results of empirical studies aimed at proving folk intuitions in areas as diverse as ethics, epistemology, free will, and the philosophy of action. In this paper, I contribute to this research program by discussing the results of some new experiments that further probe folk intuitions about the relationship between desire, foresight, intent, intentional action, and moral considerations
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2004). On praise, side effects, and folk ascriptions of intentionality. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:196-213.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In everyday discourse, we often draw a distinction between actions that are performed intentionally (e.g. opening your car door) and those that are performed unintentionally (e.g. shutting a car door on your finger). This distinction has interested philosophers working in a number of different areas. Indeed, intentional actions are not only the primary focus of those concerned with understanding and explaining human behavior, but they often occupy center stage in philosophical discussions of free will and moral and legal responsibility as well. And while most philosophers agree that the distinction between intentional and unintentional action plays an important role in our folk psychology, there is still wide-scale disagreement about the precise nature of this role. Until recently, there has been a lack of empirical data about the folk concept of intentional action and as a result the debate among philosophers has been mostly
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2006). On trying to save the simple view. Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the 'Simple View', intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the ordinary concept of intentional action is concerned, an agent need not intend to x in order to x intentionally
Ohreen, David E. (2006). The origins of folk psychological concepts. Facta Philosophica 8 (1/2):41-51.   (Google)
Phelan, Mark & Sarkissian, Hagop (2009). Is the 'trade-off hypothesis' worth trading for? Mind and Language 24 (2):164-180.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: Recently, the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown that the folk are more inclined to describe side effects as intentional actions when they bring about bad results. Edouard Machery has offered an intriguing new explanation of Knobe's work—the 'trade-off hypothesis'—which denies that moral considerations explain folk applications of the concept of intentional action. We critique Machery's hypothesis and offer empirical evidence against it. We also evaluate the current state of the debate concerning the concept of intentionality, and argue that, given the number of variables at play, any parsimonious account of the relevant data is implausible
Phelan, Mark T. & Sarkissian, Hagop (2008). The folk strike back; or, why you didn't do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it. Philosophical Studies 138 (2).   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain
Phillips, Jonathan & Knobe, Joshua (2009). Moral judgments and intuitions about freedom. Psychological Inquiry 20 (1):30-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Reeder’s article offers a new and intriguing approach to the study of people’s ordinary understanding of freedom and constraint. On this approach, people use information about freedom and constraint as part of a quasi-scientific effort to make accurate inferences about an agent’s motives. Their beliefs about the agent’s motives then affect a wide variety of further psychological processes, including the process whereby they arrive at moral judgments. In illustrating this new approach, Reeder cites an elegant study he conducted a number of years ago (Reeder & Spores, 1983). All subjects were given a vignette about a man who goes with his date to a pizza parlor and happens to come across a box that has been designated for charitable donations. In one condition, the man’s date then requests that he make a donation; in the other, she requests that he steal the money that is already in the box. In both conditions, the man chooses to comply with this request. The key question is how subjects will use his behavior to make inferences about whether he is a morally good or morally bad person. The results revealed a marked difference between conditions. When the man donated to charity, subjects were generally disinclined to conclude that he must have been a morally good person. It is as though they were thinking: ‘He didn’t just do this out of the goodness of his heart
Sverdlik, Steven (2004). Intentionality and moral judgments in commonsense thought about action. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:224-236.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. Philosophers of action, psychologists and moral philosophers all have taken an interest in understanding this important concept. One issue that has been discussed by philosophers is whether the concept of intentional action is purely ‘naturalistic’, that is, whether it is entirely a descriptive concept that can be used to explain and predict behavior. (Of course, judgments using such a concept could be used to support moral or evaluative judgments about responsibility, praise and blame.) A related question is whether speakers’ views about moral and evaluative issues at least affect their judgments about intentionality, even if their explicit concept of intentional action is not itself evaluative
Turner, Jason & Nahmias, Eddy A. (2006). Are the folk agent-causationists? Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Experimental examination of how the folk conceptualize certain philosophically loaded notions can provide information useful for philosophical theorizing. In this paper, we explore issues raised in Shaun Nichols' (2004) studies involving people's conception of free will, focusing on his claim that this conception fits best with the philosophical theory of agent-causation. We argue that his data do not support this conclusion, highlighting along the way certain considerations that ought to be taken into account when probing the folk conception of free will
Turner, Jason (2004). Folk intuitions, asymmetry, and intentional side effects. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:214-219.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: An agent _S_ wants to _A_ and knows that if she _A_-s she will also bring about _B_. _S_ does not care at all about _B_. _S_ then _A_-s, also bringing about _B_. Did she _intentionally_ bring _B_ about?
Wright, Jennifer & Bengson, John (online). Asymmetries in judgments of responsibility and intentional action.   (Cited by 2 | Google)

7.3c Issues in Psychology

7.3c.1 Parapsychology

Beloff, John (1990). Parapsychology and radical dualism. In The Relentless Question. McFarland & Company.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Beloff, John (1987). Parapsychology and the mind-body problem. Inquiry 30 (September):215-25.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Braude, Stephen, Guest column: Terminological reform in parapsychology: A giant step backwards.   (Google)
Abstract: Parapsychologists have never been entirely satisfied with their technical vo- cabulary, and occasionally their discontent leads to attempts at terminological reform.1 Recently, a number of prominent parapsychologists, led by Ed May, have regularly abandoned some of parapsychology’s traditional and central categories in favor of some novel alternatives (see, e.g., May, Utts, and Spot- tiswoode, 1995a, 1995b; May, Spottiswood, Utts, and James, 1995). They rec- ommend replacing the term ª ESPº with ª anomalous cognitionº (or AC) and ª psychokinesis (PK)º with ª anomalous perturbationº (or AP). Advocates of these new terms also propose replacing the term ª psiº or ª psi phenomenaº with ª anomalous mental phenomena.º Superf icially at least, these proposals seem merely to be modest extensions of parapsychology’s increasingly fre- quent use of the term ª anomalousº as a substitute for ª paranormal,º a practice which (although controversial) is not without merit, and which Palmer has vigorously defended (1986, 1987, 1992). But in my view, the proposed new terminology creates more problems than it solves
Burns, Jean E. (1993). Current hypotheses about the nature of the mind-brain relationship and their relationship to findings in parapsychology. In K. Ramakrishna Rao (ed.), Cultivating Consciousness. Praeger.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1987). How parapsychology could become a science. Inquiry 30 (3):227 – 239.   (Google)
Dilley, Frank B. (1998). David Ray Griffin, parapsychology, philosophy and spirituality: A postmodern exploration. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1).   (Google)
Fales, Evan (1998). David Ray Griffin, parapsychology, philosophy, and spirituality: A postmodern exploration. (Albany, NY: State university of new York press, 1997.) Pp. XIV+339, US $59.50 hb., $19.95 pk. Religious Studies 34 (1):103-114.   (Google)
Flew, Antony (ed.) (1987). Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Parapsychology. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
French, Peter A. (ed.) (1975). Philosophers in Wonderland: Philosophy and Psychical Research. Llewellyn Publications.   (Google)
Godbey Jr, John W. (1975). Central-state materialism and parapsychology. Analysis 36 (October):22-25.   (Google)
Griffin, David Ray (1993). Parapsychology and philosophy: A Whiteheadian postmodern perspective. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 87:217-88.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
King, Peter (2003). Parapsychology without the 'para' (or the psychology). Think 3.   (Google)
Abstract: possible, your investigation is unlikely ever to get off the ground), there’s no such excuse for philosophers. The philosopher should be unrestricted by fashions in thought, including the unquestioning acceptance of whatever scientific theories are currently dominant. The fact is, however, that in this field and in the philosophy of mind, many
Lloyd, Peter (ms). Application of mental monism to parapsychology.   (Google)
Abstract: This short essay is a follow-on to Mental Monism Considered as a Solution to the Mind- Body Problem, in ‘Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness’, edited by Alexander Batthyany and Avshalom Elitzur, published by Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, December 2005. It was originally planned as a final section of that essay but, at forty-four pages the latter was already oversize, so the parapsychology section was dropped from that publication
Ludwig, Jan (ed.) (1978). Philosophy and Parapsychology. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Morris, Robert L. (1987). Parapsychology and the demarcation problem. Inquiry 30 (3):241 – 251.   (Google)
Palmquist, Stephen (online). Kant’s criticism of swedenborg: Parapsychology and the origin of the copernican hypothesis.   (Google)
Abstract: Parapsychology, Philosophy and the Mind: A Festschrift in Honour of John Beloff’s 80th Birthday, ed. Fiona Steinkamp (McFarland Press, 2002)
Palmer, John (1998). Parapsychology, anomaly, and altered states of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):302-303.   (Google)
Poortman, J. J. (1964). Philosophy, Theosophy, Parapsychology. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff.   (Google)
Price, E. A. (1981). A "three worlds" perspective to the mind-brain relationship in parapsychology. Parapsychological Journal of South Africa 2:38-49.   (Google)
Price, H. H. (1995). Philosophical Interactions with Parapsychology: The Major Writings of H.H. Price on Parapsychology and Survival. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a collection of the most important writings of Oxford philosopher H.H. Price on the topics of psychical research and survival of death, collected from a wide variety of sources unavailable to most interested readers. Included are discussions of telepathy, clairvoyance, telekinesis, precognition, hauntings and apparitions, the impact of psychical research on western philosophy and science, and what afterlife is probably like. Few twentieth century English-speaking philosophers have written much on these topics. Of those who did so and whose writings have not been collected and published in a single source, H.H. Price was the most important
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (2003). What might parapsychology contribute to our view of the world. Think 5.   (Google)
Stokes, Douglas M. (1997). The Nature of Mind: Parapsychology and the Role of Consciousness in the Physical World. McFarland and Co.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Thakur, Shivesh Chandra (ed.) (1976). Philosophy and Psychical Research. Humanities Press.   (Google)
Wassermann, G. D. (1955). Some comments on methods and statements in parapsychology and other sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (22):122-140.   (Google | More links)

7.3c.2 Psychological Laws

Antony, Louise M. (1995). Law and order in psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:429-46.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bauer, Mark (2010). Psychological laws (revisited). Erkenntnis 73 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: It has been suggested that a functionalist understanding of the metaphysics of psychological typing eliminates the prospect for psychological laws. Kim, Millikan, and Shapiro have each separately argued that, if psychological types as functional types are multiply realized, then the diversity of realizing mechanisms demonstrates that there can be no laws of psychology. Additionally, Millikan has argued that the role of functional attribution in the explanation of historical kinds limits the formulation of psychological principles to particular taxa; hence, psychological laws applicable to any cognitive being are not possible. Both arguments against the possibility of psychological laws, I want to suggest, only succeed at showing that certain types of empirical principles will not be laws. I will suggest that a further type of empirical principle, grounded in the general constraints on the sustainability of population types, remains in the running as a candidate law. Importantly, the formulation of these principles presupposes a functionalist understanding of psychological typing
Braithwaite, Margaret (1949). Causal laws in psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 23:45-60.   (Google)
Carrier, Martin (1998). In defense of psychological laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217 – 232.   (Google)
Cleeremans, Axel (1994). Attention and awareness in sequence learning. Proceedings of the Fiftheenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society:227-232.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract: referred to as implicit learning (Reber, 1989). Implicit learning contrasts with explicit learning (exhibited for
Cleeremans, Axel (1998). Implicit learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (10):406-416.   (Cited by 201 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Implicit learning is the process through which we become sensitive to certain regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those regularities (2) in the absence of awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express
Cleeremans, Axel & Jimenez, Luis (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective. In Robert M. French & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Abstract: While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current thinking about these three issues in a way that specifically links consciousness with adaptation and learning. Our assumptions about this relationship are rooted in further assumptions about the nature of processing and of representation in cognitive systems. When considered together, we believe that these assumptions offer a new perspective on the relationships between conscious and unconscious processing and on the function of consciousness in cognitive systems
Cleeremans, Axel & Destrebecqz, Arnaud (2005). Real rules are conscious. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):19-20.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 68 words Main Text: 1256 words References: 192 words Total Text: 1516 words
Cleeremans, Axel & Destrebecqz, Arnaud (2003). The self-organizing conundrum. (Commentary on perruchet & vinter on The Self-Organizing Conundrum. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (334).   (Google)
Abstract: 59 words Main Text: 1108 words References: 114 words Total Text: 1281 words
Crawford, Sean (2003). Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts
Destrebecqz, Arnaud; Peigneux, Philippe; Laureys, Steven; Degueldre, Christian; Del Fiore, Guy; Aerts, Joel; Luxen, Andre; van der Linden, Martial; Cleeremans, Axel & Maquet, Pierre (2003). Cerebral correlates of explicit sequence learning. Cognitive Brain Research 16 (3):391-398.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Using positron emission tomography (PET) and regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) measurements, we investigated the cerebral correlates of consciousness in a sequence learning task through a novel application of the Process Dissociation Procedure, a behavioral paradigm that makes it possible to separately assess conscious and unconscious contributions to performance. Results show that the metabolic response in the anterior cingulate / mesial prefrontal cortex (ACC / MPFC) is exclusively and specifically correlated with the explicit component of performance during recollection of a learned sequence. This suggests a significant role for the ACC / MPFC in the explicit processing of sequential material.  2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Destrebecqz, Arnaud & Cleeremans, Axel (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the process dissociation procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 8 (2):343-350.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Running head: Implicit sequence learning ABSTRACT Can we learn without awareness? Although this issue has been extensively explored through studies of implicit learning, there is currently no agreement about the extent to which knowledge can be acquired and projected onto performance in an unconscious way. The controversy, like that surrounding implicit memory, seems to be at least in part attributable to unquestioned acceptance of the unrealistic assumption that tasks are process-pure, that is, that a given task exclusively involves either implicit or explicit knowledge
Destrebecqz, Arnaud; Peigneux, Philippe; Laureys, Steven; Degueldre, Christian; Del Fiore, Guy; Aerts, Joel; Luxen, Andre; Van Der Linden, Martia; Cleeremans, Axel & Maquet, Pierre (2005). The neural correlates of implicit and explicit sequence learning: Interacting networks revealed by the process dissociation procedure. Learning and Memory 12 (5):480-490.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In cognitive neuroscience, dissociating the brain networks that ing—has thus become one of the best empirical situations subtend conscious and nonconscious memories constitutes a through which to study the mechanisms of implicit learning, very complex issue, both conceptually and methodologically
Fodor, Jerry A. (1989). Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):59-79.   (Cited by 94 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.   (Cited by 47 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gaillard, Vincian; Vandenberghe, Muriel; Destrebecqz, Arnaud & Cleeremans, Axel (2006). First and third-person approaches in implicit learning research. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain
Guarini, Marcello (2000). Horgan and Tienson on ceteris paribus laws. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hannay, Alastair (1995). Conscious episodes and ceteris paribus. The Monist 78 (4):447-463.   (Google)
Harman, Gilbert (1967). Scriven on the unknowability of psychological laws. Philosophical Studies 18 (June):61-63.   (Google | More links)
Henderson, David K. (1991). On the testability of psychological generalizations (psychological testability). Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (1990). Soft laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15:256-279.   (Annotation | Google)
Jimenez, Luis; Mendez, Castor & Cleeremans, Axel (1996). Comparing direct and indirect measures of sequence learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 22 (4):948-969.   (Cited by 71 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Comparing the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect measures of learning is proposed as the best way to provide evidence for unconscious learning when both conceptual and operative definitions of awareness are lacking. This approach was first proposed by Reingold & Merikle (1988) in the context of subliminal perception. In this paper, we apply it to a choice reaction time task in which the material is generated based on a probabilistic finite-state grammar (Cleeremans, 1993). We show (1) that participants progressively learn about the statistical structure of the stimulus material over training with the choice reaction time task, and (2) that they can use some of this knowledge to predict the location of the next stimulus in a subsequent “generation” task. However, detailed partial correlational analyses of the correspondence between performance during the reaction time task and the statistical structure of the training material showed that large effects remained even when controlling for explicit knowledge as assessed by the generation task. Hence we conclude (1) that at least some of the knowledge expressed through reaction time performance can not be characterized as conscious, and (2) that even when associations are found at a global level of analysis, dissociations can still be obtained when more detailed analyses are conducted. Finally, we also show that participants are limited in the depth of the contingencies they can learn about, and that these limitations are shared by the Simple Recurrent Network model of Cleeremans & McClelland (1991)
Kincaid, Harold (2004). There are laws in the social sciences. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Publishing.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kitchener, Richard F. (1976). Are there molar psychological laws? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6 (2).   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1981). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1981). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Mace, C. A. (1949). Causal laws in psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 23:61-68.   (Google)
Mace, C. D. (1949). Causal laws in psychology, part III. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-68.   (Google)
Maquet, Pierre; Laureys, Steven; Peigneux, Philippe; Fuchs, Sonia; Petiau, Christophe; Phillips, Christophe; Aerts, Joel; Del Fiore, Guy; Degueldre, Christian; Meulemans, Thierry; Luxen, Andre; Franck, Georges; Van Der Linden, Martial; Smith, Carlyle & Cleeremans, Axel (2000). Experience-dependent changes in cerebral activation during human Rem sleep. Nature Neuroscience 3 (8):831-36.   (Cited by 174 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pierre Maquet1,2,6, Steven Laureys1,2, Philippe Peigneux1,2,3, Sonia Fuchs1, Christophe Petiau1, Christophe Phillips1,6, Joel Aerts1, Guy Del Fiore1, Christian Degueldre1, Thierry Meulemans3, André Luxen1, Georges Franck1,2, Martial Van Der Linden3, Carlyle Smith4 and Axel Cleeremans5
Marcello, G. (2000). Horgan and Tienson on ceteris paribus laws. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315.   (Google)
Mott, Peter (1992). Fodor and ceteris paribus laws. Mind 101 (402):335-46.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Pietroski, Paul M. & Rey, Georges (1995). When other things aren't equal: Saving ceteris paribus laws from vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.   (Cited by 48 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora of explanatory commitments; and claims that such commitments are satisfied will be as (dis) confirmable as other empirical claims
Poortinga, Ype H. & Van de Vijver, Fons J. R. (1997). Is there no cross-cultural evidence in colour categories of psychological laws, only of cultural rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):205-206.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (2008). Ceteris paribus laws, component forces, and the nature of special-science properties. Noûs 42 (3):349-380.   (Google | More links)
Rupert, Robert D. (2007). Realization, completers, and Ceteris Paribus laws in psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing a, or she gets distracted from her goal that q, or she suddenly has a severe brain hemorrhage, or.... No one can say precisely where the list ends, but the idea is supposed to be clear enough: normally the law holds, but there are many cases, exceptions, one might say, in which the law does not; the difficulty of characterizing these exceptions invites the qualification ‘c.p.’ as a catch-all
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1991). Ceteris paribus laws. Mind 100 (397):1-17.   (Cited by 51 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Silverberg, Arnold (2003). Psychological laws. Erkenntnis 58 (3):275-302.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   John McDowell claims that the propositional attitudes, and our conceptual abilities in general, are not appropriate topics for inquiry of the sort that is done in natural science. He characterizes the natural sciences as making phenomena intelligible in terms of their place in the realm of laws of nature. He claims that this way of making phenomena intelligible contrasts crucially with essential features of our understanding of propositional attitudes and conceptual abilities. In this article I show that scientific work of the sort McDowell claims cannot be done is in fact being done, and that this work presents strong evidence that there are psychological laws. The research I discuss is that by the psychologist Norman H. Anderson and his colleagues. I also argue that the considerations McDowell presents in defense of his claims do not constitute a significant challenge to the research that Anderson and his colleagues have done. It will be noted in the article that Anderson's work is relevant not just to McDowell's writings, but also to several much discussed issues in philosophy of cognitive science: the above two issues of whether there can be a science of ordinary psychological phenomena, higher cognition, comparable to that of the natural sciences and whether such a science would present laws, and also the issue of whether in such a science, and its laws, notions of folk psychology would play crucial constitutive roles. Anderson's work presents strong grounds for affirmative answers to all of these questions
Silverberg, Arnold (1996). Psychological laws and nonmonotonic logic. Erkenntnis 44 (2):199-224.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this essay I enter into a recently published debate between Stephen Schiffer and Jerry Fodor concerning whether adequate sense can be made of the ceteris paribus conditions in special science laws, much of their focus being on the case of putative psychological laws. Schiffer argues that adequate sense cannot be made of ceteris paribus clauses, while Fodor attempts to overcome Schiffer's arguments, in defense of special science laws. More recently, Peter Mott has attempted to show that Fodor's response to Schiffer fails, and furthermore that further study shows that the logical framework in which Schiffer and Fodor address their issue is susceptible to inconsistency.In this essay I argue that adequate sense can be made of ceteris paribus conditions. Against Mott, I argue that recent work in the model theory of non-monotonic logic indicates how his problem involving logical inconsistencies can be overcome. Against Schiffer, I argue that the claims that he makes against ceteris paribus clauses would lead to a fatal skepticism concerning indefinitely many of the claims we make about the world (and indeed that his claims would be destructive of the view of the special sciences that Schiffer himself presents in his paper), and that the semantical considerations from non-monotonic logic that I present provide a suitable framework for dealing with his complaints. Thus I come out on the whole on Fodor's side of this debate, although for my own reasons, as I argue against much of Fodor's own argumentation
Spohn, Wolfgang (2002). Laws, ceteris paribus conditions, and the dynamics of belief. Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn out that a law is simply the deterministic analogue of a sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables. This entails that de Finetti's representation theorems can be directly transformed into an account of confirmation of laws thus conceived
Stueber, Karsten, Intentional explanation, psychological laws, and the irreducibility of the first person perspective.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction: Naturalism and Psychological Explanations To a large extent, contemporary philosophical debate takes place within a framework of naturalistic assumptions. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, naturalism is the legacy of positivism without its empiricist epistemology and empiricist conception of meaning and cognitive significance. Systematically, it is best to characterize naturalism as the philosophical articulation of the underlying presuppositions of a reductive scientific research program that was rather successful in the last few centuries and, equally important, promises to be so in the future particularly in the biological sciences and the neurosciences. It seems as if the secrets of human life and behavior and the mysteries of the mind will be cracked on the molecular level of the genes or the brain, or at least so we are told. Viewed in this manner it is understandable why philosophical naturalism tends to be committed to monism, both as a metaphysical or ontological claim and as a methodological position in the philosophy of social science. Naturalists are inclined to adopt a physicalist ontology that rejects free floating Cartesian substances and they view higher order macroscopic facts and properties as being dependent or supervenient on basic micro-physical facts. Naturalists, furthermore, expect that any scientific explanation of higher order properties has to provide an account of why and how these lower order facts give rise to higher order ones. These ontological and epistemic commitments also underpin a position of methodological monism in regard to the social sciences and the explanation of human agency. If the above ontological picture is correct then there is no reason to expect that the structure of the sciences dealing with higher order properties on the social level should fundamentally differ in their methodology from the natural sciences. In both domains of investigation, scientists will develop and make explanatory use of comprehensive and empirically well supported theories with adequate predictive powers that describe....
Warfield, Ted A. (1993). Folk-psychological ceteris-paribus laws. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):99-112.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Witmer, G. (2003). Multiple realizability and psychological laws: Evaluating Kim's challenge. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

7.3c.3 Psychological Explanation

Amundson, Ron & Smith, Laurence D. (1984). Clark Hull, Robert Cummins, and functional analysis. Philosophy of Science 51 (December):657-666.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Arkway, Angela (online). Folk psychological explanation, and causal laws.   (Google)
Arkway, Angela (2000). The simulation theory, the theory theory and folk psychological explanation. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bechtel, William & Wright, Cory (2009). What is psychological explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what is involved in these types of explanations, we consider the ways in which law-like representations of regularities and representations of mechanisms factor in psychological explanations. This consideration directs us to certain fundamental questions, e.g., "To what extent are laws necessary for psychological explanations?" and "What do psychologists have in mind when they appeal to mechanisms in explanation?" In answering such questions, it appears that laws do play important roles in psychological explanations, although most explanations in psychology appeal to accounts of mechanisms. Consequently, we provide a unifying account of what psychological explanation is.
Bernal, Sara (2005). Object lessons: Spelke principles and psychological explanation. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal here is to suggest answers to these questions. I argue that the object principles are not explicitly represented, first addressing some confusion in the debate about what that means. On the positive side, I conclude that the principles supply a competence account, at Marr's computational level, and that they function like natural constraints in vision. These are among their considerable explanatory benefits - benefits endowed by rules and principles in other cognitive domains as well. Characterizing the explanatory role of the object principles is my main project here, but in pursuing certain sub-goals I am led to other conclusions of interest in their own right. I address an argument that the object principles are explicitly represented which assumes that object perception is substantially thought-like. This provokes a jaunt off the main path which leads to interesting territory: the boundary between thought and perception. I argue that object apprehension is much closer to perception than to thought on the spectrum between the two
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2002). Rationality and psychological explanation without language. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Block, Ned (1971). Are mechanistic and teleological explanations of behaviour incompatible? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):109-117.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Botterill, George (2009). Right and wrong reasons in folk-psychological explanation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):463 – 488.   (Google)
Abstract: Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson ( Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively becaue of one reason. Folk psychology appears to allow for this phenomenon. However, appreciation of 'rationalization' as a form of contrastive explanation reveals the existence of the Davidsonian possibility to the problematic. Claims that 'I did it because of R 1 , not because of R 2 ' are entertained in folk psychology, and may be sincere or insincere. But as reports of conscious practical reasoning, even when sincere, they are not authoritative about the mechanism of motivation
Bridges, Jason (2006). Teleofunctionalism and psychological explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):359-372.   (Google | More links)
Brown, Robert (1965). The explanation of behaviour. Philosophy 40 (October):344-348.   (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (ms). Williamson on knowledge and psychological explanation.   (Google)
Abstract: According to many philosophers, psychological explanation can legit- imately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in terms of knowl- edge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psycho- logical explanation. Williamson’s argument works on two fronts. First, he argues against the claim that, unlike knowledge, belief is “composite” (rep- resentable as a conjunction of a narrow and a broad condition). Belief’s failure to be composite, Williamson thinks, undermines the usual motiva- tions for psychological explanation in terms of belief rather than knowl- edge. Unfortunately, we claim, the motivations Williamson argues against do not depend on the claim that belief is composite, so what he says leaves the case for a psychology of belief unscathed. Second, Williamson argues that knowledge can sometimes provide a better explanation of action than belief can. We argue that, in the cases considered, explanations that cite beliefs (but not knowledge) are no less successful than explanations that cite knowledge. Thus, we conclude that Williamson’s arguments fail both coming and going: they fail to undermine a psychology of belief, and they fail to motivate a psychology of knowledge
Cruz, Joe (online). Psychological explanation and noise in modeling. Comments on Whit Schonbein's "cognition and the power of continuous dynamical systems".   (Google)
Abstract: I find myself ambivalent with respect to the line of argument that Schonbein offers. I certainly want to acknowledge and emphasize at the outset that Schonbein’s discussion has brought to the fore a number of central, compelling and intriguing issues regarding the nature of the dynamical approach to cognition. Though there is much that seems right in this essay, perhaps my view is that the paper invites more questions than it answers. My remarks here then are in the spirit of scouting some of the surrounding terrain in order to see just what Schonbein’s claim is and what arguments or options may be open to the dynamicist
Cummins, Robert E. (1983). Analysis and subsumption in the behaviorism of Hull. Philosophy of Science 50 (March):96-111.   (Google | More links)
Cummins, Robert E. (2000). "How does it work" versus "what are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation. In F. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (eds.), Explanation and Cognition, 117-145. MIT Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the beginning, there was the DN (Deductive Nomological) model of explanation, articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). According to DN, scientific explanation is subsumption under natural law. Individual events are explained by deducing them from laws together with initial conditions (or boundary conditions), and laws are explained by deriving them from other more fundamental laws, as, for example, the simple pendulum law is derived from Newton's laws of motion
Cummins, Robert E. (1991). The role of mental meaning in psychological explanation. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Cummins, Robert E. (1982). The internal manual model of psychological explanation. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:257-68.   (Google)
Cummins, Robert E. (1983). The Nature of Psychological Explanation. MIT Press.   (Cited by 216 | Annotation | Google)
Davies, Martin (1986). Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Davies, Martin (1986). Individualism and supervenience: Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.   (Google)
Dilman, Ilham (2000). Psychology and human behaviour: Is there a limit to psychological explanation? Philosophy 75 (2):183-201.   (Google)
Ehring, Douglas E. (1985). Dispositions and functions: Cummins on functional analysis. Erkenntnis 23 (November):243-249.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Farrell, B. A. (1977). On the psychological explanation of visual perception. Synthese 35 (3).   (Google | More links)
Finn, D. R. (1968). Categories of psychological explanation. Mind 77 (October):550-555.   (Google | More links)
Finocchiaro, Maurice A. (1979). The psychological explanation of reasoning: Logical and methodological problems. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (3).   (Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1968). Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology. Ny: Random House.   (Cited by 198 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1968). The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.   (Cited by 47 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Glossop, Ronald J. (1970). Explaining human behavior. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (March):444-449.   (Google | More links)
Gregory, Richard L. (1981). Mind In Science: A History Of Explanations In Psychology And Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 63 | Google)
Gustafson, Donald F. (1964). Explanation in psychology. Mind 73 (April):280-281.   (Google | More links)
Hamlyn, D. W. (1951). Psychological explanation and the gestalt hypothesis. Mind 60 (240):506-520.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hedman, Carl G. (1970). Gustafson on explanation in psychology. Mind 79 (April):272-274.   (Google | More links)
Heil, John (1986). Formalism and psychological explanation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:1-10.   (Annotation | Google)
Heil, John (1985). Rationality and psychological explanation. Inquiry 28 (1-4):359 – 371.   (Google)
Hershfield, Jeffrey (2001). Structural causation and psychological explanation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):249-261.   (Google)
Hitchcock, Christopher & Knobe, Joshua (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.   (Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (2000). Psychological explanation and implicit theory. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer an account of the relation between explanations of behaviour in terms of psychological states and explanations in terms of neural states that: makes it transparent how they can be true together; explains why explanations in terms of psychological states are characteristically of behaviour described in general and relational terms, and explains why certain sorts of neurological investigations undermine psychological explanations of behaviour, while others leave them intact. In the course of the argument, I offer an account of implicit theories
Jackson, Julian M. (1995). Why mental explanations are physical explanations. South African Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):109-123.   (Google)
Joseph, H. W. B. (1910). The psychological explanation of the development of the perception of external objects (I.). Mind 19 (75):305-321.   (Google | More links)
Joseph, H. W. B. (1910). The psychological explanation of the development of the perception of external objects. Mind 19 (76):457-469.   (Google | More links)
Joseph, H. W. B. (1911). The psychological explanation of the development of the perception of external objects (III.). (Reply to prof. Stout.). Mind 20 (78):161-180.   (Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1989). Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 3:77-108.   (Cited by 84 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Klee, Robert (1992). Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, then there can be no purely physical laws either. This is illustrated with a case from immunology involving interferons. Since there clearly are physical laws, Davidson cannot be correct
Knight, D. (1997). A poetics of psychological explanation. Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):63-80.   (Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1987). The nature of psychological explanation by Robert Cummins: A critical notice. Philosophical Review 96 (2):249-274.   (Google | More links)
Lockie, Robert (2004). Knowledge, provenance and psychological explanation. Philosophy 79 (3):421-433.   (Google)
Abstract: Analytic theories of knowledge have traditionally maintained that the provenance of a true belief is critically important to deciding whether it is knowledge. However, a comparably widespread view is that it is our beliefs alone, regardless of their (potentially dubious) provenance which feature in psychological explanation, including the explanation of action: thus, that knowledge itself and as such is irrelevant in psychological explanation. The paper gives initial reasons why the ‘beliefs alone’ view of explanation should be resisted—arguments deriving ultimately from the Meno indicate that the provenance of a true belief may be relevant to the explanation of action. However, closer scrutiny of these arguments shows that they are incapable of according provenance anything like as central a role in action explanation as provenance has traditionally been given in the theory of knowledge. A consideration of the history of science suggests anyway that all knowledge has a compromised provenance if one looks back any significant distance. It is concluded that the importance of the provenance of our beliefs is something that has been seriously over-emphasised in epistemology
Macdonald, Cynthia (1995). Anti-individualism and psychological explanation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Macdonald, C. (ed.) (1995). Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Macklin, Ruth (1969). Explanation and action: Recent issues and controversies. Synthese 20 (October):388-415.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Macdonald, Cynthia (ed.) (1995). Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Machery, Eduoard & Livengood, J. (2007). The folk probably don't think what you think they think: Experiments on causation by absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):107-127.   (Google)
Abstract: Folk theories—untutored people’s (often implicit) theories about various features of the world—have been fashionable objects of inquiry in psychology for almost two decades now (e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994), and more recently they have been of interest in experimental philosophy (Nichols 2004). Folk theories of psy- chology, physics, biology, and ethics have all come under investigation. Folk meta- physics, however, has not been as extensively studied. That so little is known about folk metaphysics is unfortunate for (at least) two reasons. First, folk metaphysics is almost certainly implicit, and it is likely to be our default way of thinking about metaphysical problems. Moreover, one’s metaphysical commitments can have pro- found consequences—in scientific, religious, and ethical contexts, for example. Thus, folk metaphysics ought to be dragged out into the open and exposed to criticism. As Peirce eloquently remarked (1994, 1.129; see also 1994, 7.579)
Macdonald, Cynthia (2006). 'The Metaphysics of Mental Causation'. The Journal of Philosophy 103 (11):539-576.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A debate has been raging in the philosophy of mind for at least the past two decades. It concerns whether the mental can make a causal difference to the world. Suppose that I am reading the newspaper and it is getting dark. I switch on the light, and continue with my reading. One explanation of why my switching on of the light occurred is that a desiring with a particular content (that I continue reading), a noticing with a particular content (that it is getting dark), and a believing with a particular content (that by switching on the light I could continue reading) occurred in me, and these events caused my switching on of the light. This explanation works by citing the intentional contents of mental phenomena as causes of that action. It is because the intentional causes have the contents that they do, and because those contents play a causal role in bringing about my action, that my action is causally explained
Magnus, P. D. & Cohen, Jonathan (2003). Williamson on knowledge and psychological explanation. Philosophical Studies 116 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   According to many philosophers, psychological explanation canlegitimately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in termsof knowledge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psychological explanation.Williamson's argument works on two fronts.First, he argues against the claim that, unlike knowledge, belief is``composite'' (representable as a conjunction of a narrow and a broadcondition). Belief's failure to be composite, Williamson thinks, undermines the usual motivations for psychological explanation in terms of belief rather than knowledge.Unfortunately, we claim, the motivations Williamson argues against donot depend on the claim that belief is composite, so what he saysleaves the case for a psychology of belief unscathed.Second, Williamson argues that knowledge can sometimes provide abetter explanation of action than belief can.We argue that, in the cases considered, explanations that cite beliefs(but not knowledge) are no less successful than explanations that citeknowledge. Thus, we conclude that Williamson's arguments fail both coming andgoing: they fail to undermine a psychology of belief, and they fail tomotivate a psychology of knowledge
Malcolm, Norman (1967). Explaining behavior. Philosophical Review 76 (January):97-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Martin, Michael (1971). Neurophysiological reduction and psychological explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1 (1).   (Google)
Margolis, Joseph (1980). The trouble with homunculus theories. Philosophy of Science 47 (June):244-259.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
McClamrock, Ron (1993). Functional analysis and etiology. Erkenntnis 38 (2):249-260.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Cummins (1982) argues that etiological considerations are not onlyinsufficient butirrelevant for the determination offunction. I argue that his claim of irrelevance rests on a misrepresentation of the use of functions in evolutionary explanations. I go on to suggest how accepting anetiological constraint on functional analysis might help resolve some problems involving the use of functional explanations
McCauley, Robert N. (1987). The role of cognitive explanations in psychology. Behaviorism 15:27-40.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1992). Akrasia, self-control, and second-order desires. Noûs 26 (3):281-302.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and desires (for support, see Mele 1987 and 1992). That theme will be left largely in the background here, however. The issue to be explored is a narrower one: the place of higher-order desires in a proper conception of continent and incontinent behavior. My guiding question is whether an action's counting as continent or incontinent depends upon the agent's having at the time a pertinent higher-order desire. The answer that I shall defend is, in a word, 'No.'
Mele, Alfred R. (1998). Noninstrumental rationalizing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):236–250.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A central notion in Donald Davidson's philosophy of mind and action is "rationalization," a species of causal explanation designed in part to reveal the point or purpose of the explananda. An analogue of this notion - noninstrumental rationalization - merits serious attention. I develop an account of this species of rationalization and display its utility in explaining the production of certain desires and of motivationally biased beliefs.
Millikan, Ruth G. (1993). Explanation. In Biopsychology in Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Millikan, Ruth G. (1993). Explanation in biopsychology. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Morris, M. (1986). Causes of behavior. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):123-44.   (Google | More links)
Moser, Paul K. (1994). Naturalism and psychological explanation. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):63-84.   (Google)
Abstract: This article explores the possibility of naturalized theory of action. It distinguishes ontological naturalism from conceptual naturalism, and asks whether a defensible theory of action can be either ontologically or conceptually naturalistic. The distinction between conditions for an ontology and conditions for a concept receives support from Donald Davidson's identification of two modes of explanation for action: rational and physical causal explanation. Davidson's action theory provides a naturalized ontology for action theory, but not a naturalized concept of intentional action. This article raises doubts about Davidson's basis for such one-sided naturalism. It examines some conditions for a mode of explanation, in order to clarify whether an intentional mode of explanation might have ontological significance and thus raise problems for ontological naturalism. The article argues for the central role of certain instrumental factors in explanatory strategies, whether naturalistic or intentional; and it casts doubt on Jaegwon Kim's recent argument that intentional psychology and neuroscience are mutually exclusive as explanatory strategies. A key lesson is that variable end-dependent reasons are our only wherewithal in the evaluation of explanatory strategies. In this sense, our explanatory strategies are ultimately instrumental and perspectival. The article draws out the implications of this lesson for naturalized action theory and for psychological explanation. It opposes any suggested monopoly on explanation from the physical sciences
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1975). Neurophysiological reduction, psychological explanation and neuropsychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5 (3).   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy (1997). Is Free Will Just Another Chaotic Process? (Review of Three Books). Times Literary Supplement (Dec.5).   (Google)
O'Connor, Timothy & Theiner, Georg (2002). Review of Paul Pietroski, Causing Actions. The Philosophical Review 111:291-294.   (Google)
Owens, Joseph (1998). Psychological explanation and causal deviancy. Synthese 115 (2):143-169.   (Google | More links)
Owens, Joseph (1994). Psychological externalism and psychological explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):921-928.   (Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1981). Demonstrative thought and psychological explanation. Synthese 49 (2):187-217.   (Google)
Peacocke, Christopher (1979). Holistic explanation: An outline of a theory. In Rational Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Perry, John & Israel, David J. (1991). Fodor and psychological explanation. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [In Meaning in Mind, edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey. Oxford: Basil Black- well, 1991, 165
Quillen, Keith (1986). Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation. Mind and Language 1:133-57.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Quillen, Keith (1989). Perceptual belief and psychological explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (July):276-293.   (Google | More links)
Rakover, Sam S. (1983). Hypothesizing from introspections: A model for the role of mental entities in psychological explanation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 13 (2):211–230.   (Google | More links)
Ringen, Jon D. (1976). Explanation, teleology, and operant behaviorism. Philosophy of Science 43 (June):223-253.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Rock, Irvin (1991). On explanation in psychology. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Sandis, Constantine (2009). Gods and mental states : The causation of action in ancient tragedy and modern philosophy of mind. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Sandis, Constantine (ed.) (2009). New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: A solid cast of contributors present the first collection of essays on the Philosophy of Action
Sawyer, Sarah (2006). The role of object-dependent content in psychological explanation. Teorema 25 (1):181-192.   (Google)
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (1989). Functional explanations and reasons as causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:137-164.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If we assume that a conceptual connection does hold between reasons and action, the arguments for both theses are strikingly simple. In defense of the first thesis, all that need be added is Hume's Principle: between cause and effect only a (logically) contingent relation holds. For given Hume's Principle, and the conceptual connection (which after all is not a contingent one), it follows that no causal connection holds. In defense of the second thesis, all that need be added is one assumption and one observation. The assumption is that the covering-law model of explanation is adequate to the natural sciences; the observation is that if a conceptual connection does hold, then covering-laws are not required to explain a person's action given the presence of the relevant beliefs and desires (because the presence of the latter entail the performance of the former). Together the assumption and the observation undermine the view that one model of explanation will fit both natural science and human psychology
Schneider, Susan (2005). Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases. Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases
Schechtman, Marya (1996). The story of the mind: Psychological and biological explanations of human behavior. Zygon 31 (4):597-614.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (online). Explaining cognition.   (Google)
Sober, Elliott (1978). Psychologism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 8 (July):165-91.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Steedman, Mark (1985). LFG and psychological explanation. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (3).   (Google)
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn (2005). Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation. Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy 6:15-28.   (Google)
Abstract: In his Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge can be causally efficacious and as such figure in psychological explanation. His argument for this claim figures as a response to a key objection to his overall thesis that knowing is a mental state. In this paper I argue that although Williamson succeeds in establishing that knowledge in some cases is essential to the power of certain causal explanations of actions, he fails to do this in a way that establishes knowledge itself as a causal factor. The argument thus fails to support his overall claim that knowledge should be conceived as a state of mind.
Taylor, C. (1964). The Explanation Of Behaviour. Humanities Press.   (Cited by 160 | Google)
Treisman, Michel (1962). Psychological explanation: The 'private data' hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (August):130-143.   (Google | More links)
Valentine, Elizabeth (1988). Teleological explanations and their relation to causal explanation in psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.   (Google)
Abstract: The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient conditions, typically being unable to provide necessary ones, whereas teleological explanations tend to point to necessary features. Nor is a distinction in terms of intensional and extensional logic entirely satisfactory, although there is some support for the view that teleological and causal explanations invoke different types of explanatory framework. A key feature of teleogical explanation is the achievement of the same goal by a variety of means. Thus its main scientific function is likely to be heuristic rather than predictive
Ward, Andrew (1993). Question-begging psychological explanations. Southwest Philosophical Studies 15:82-94.   (Google)
Weisberg, Josh (2003). Being all that we can be: A critical review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.   (Google)
Abstract: Some theorists approach the Gordian knot of consciousness by proclaiming its inherent tangle and mystery. Others draw out the sword of reduction and cut the knot to pieces. Philosopher Thomas Metzinger, in his important new book, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity,1 instead attempts to disentangle the knot one careful strand at a time. The result is an extensive and complex work containing almost 700 pages of philosophical analysis, phenomenological reflection, and scientific data. The text offers a sweeping and comprehensive tour through the entire landscape of consciousness studies, and it lays out Metzinger's rich and stimulating theory of the subjective mind. Metzinger's skilled integration of philosophy and neuroscience provides a valuable framework for interdisciplinary research on consciousness. Metzinger's overall goal in Being No One is to defend a representational theory of subjectivity, one that reduces subjective mental processes to representational mental processes. Subjective experiences take place whe n there is a conscious perspective, an active first-person point of view. It occurs in
Weil, Vivian M. (1980). Intentional and mechanistic explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (June):459-473.   (Google | More links)
Wright, Cory (2007). Is psychological explanation going extinct? In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations of the mesocorticolimbic system in order to demonstrate why preclusion/extinction claims are dubious.
Wright, Cory D. & Bechtel, William P. (2007). Mechanisms and psychological explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than reduce them, as well as the different ways in which mechanisms are discovered. Finally, we offer a more detailed example of an important psychological phenomenon for which mechanistic explanation has provided the main source of scientific understanding
Wright, L. (1973). Rival explanations. Mind 82 (October):497-514.   (Google | More links)

7.3d Philosophy of Psychology, Misc

Adams, E. M. (1967). Mind and the language of psychology. Ratio 9 (December):122-139.   (Google)
Angell, James Rowland (1907). The province of functional psychology. Psychological Review 14:61-91.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Bergmann, Gustav (1940). On some methodological problems of psychology. Philosophy of Science 7 (April):205-219.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2005). Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Bickle, John (2002). Philosophy of mind and the sciences. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Block, Ned (ed.) (1981). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Block, Ned (ed.) (1980). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 79 | Google)
Block, Ned & Segal, Gabriel (1998). The philosophy of psychology. In Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Brown, Stuart C. (ed.) (1974). Philosophy Of Psychology. London,: Macmillan.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Brunswik, Egon (1976). The conceptual focus of some psychological systems. Erkenntnis 8 (1).   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bunge, Mario & Ardila, Ruben (1987). Philosophy Of Psychology. Springer.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Campagnac, E. T. (1923). An appeal to psychologists. Mind 32 (127):289-303.   (Google | More links)
Candlish, Stewart (online). Testing Wittgenstein's dismissal of experimental psychology against examples.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most notorious — and dismissive — passages in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is Part II section xiv, which begins like this: The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. Strong words. But we know that at one stage in his life Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology was sufficient for him to have done some experimental research, and that he was well acquainted with the work of at least some of the prominent psychologists active in his own lifetime. That is, his quoted remarks were not made from ignorance; and we should accordingly take them seriously enough to consider why he made them, what he had in mind, and to what extent — if any — they may have been (and, though this was all a long time ago, may still be) justified
Carruthers, Peter (2002). Human creativity: Its evolution, its cognitive basis, and its connections with childhood pretence. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 53 (2):225-249.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other¾namely, capacities to generate and to reason with suppositions (or imagined possibilities). Second, it argues that the evolutionary function of childhood pretence is to practice and enhance adult forms of creativity. The paper goes on to show how these proposals can provide a smooth and evolutionarily-plausible explanation of the gap between the first appearance of our species in Southern Africa some 100,000 years ago, and the 'creative explosion' of cultural, technological and artistic change which took place within dispersed human populations some 60,000 years later. The intention of the paper is to sketch a proposal which might serve as a guide for future interdisciplinary research
Cerf, Walter (1962). Studies in philosophical psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):537-558.   (Google | More links)
Chaplin, William F. (1987). On the thoughtfulness of cognitive psychologists. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:269-279.   (Google)
Chace Tolman, Edward (1935). Psychology versus immediate experience. Philosophy of Science 2 (3):356-380.   (Google | More links)
Corballis, Michael C. (1988). Psychology's place in the science of the mind/brain? Biology and Philosophy 3 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen 2008. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of “hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Costall, Alan (ed.) (1987). Cognitive Psychology In Question. St Martin's Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Dewey, John (1897). The psychology of effort. Philosophical Review 6 (1):43-56.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dobbs, H. A. C. (1946). 'Substance' in psychology. Mind 55 (July):193-203.   (Google | More links)
Duca, Simone (2009). Rationality and the Wason Selection Task: a Logical Account. Psyche 15 (1):109-131.   (Google)
Abstract: The main goal of the paper is to investigate the relation between indicative conditionals and rationality. We wil l do this by consider- ing several interpretations of a very wel l-known example of reasoning involving conditionals, that is the Wason selection task, and showing how those interpretations have different bearings on the notion of ra- tionality. In particular, in the first part of the paper, after having briefly presented the selection task, we wil l take a look at two prag- matic responses to the chal lenge posed by the task, through Wason’s notion of confirmation bias and Grice’s theory of conversational im- plicature. The second part wil l introduce Adams’ probabilistic view of indicative conditionals and wil l give reasons for preferring his account to those aforementioned. The conclusion wil l evaluate the question of human rationality in the light of the new standpoint acquired.
Feest, U. (2003). Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):937-948.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology
Fodor, Jerry A. (2003). Hume's program (and ours). In Hume Variation. Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Garrett, Richard (1991). Why not naturalistic psychology? Philosophia 20 (4):377-385.   (Google | More links)
Gauld, Alan (1989). Cognitive psychology, entrapment, and the philosophy of mind. In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008). Alief and belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript]
Gendler, Tamar (2009). Alief in action (and reaction). Mind & Language 23 (5):552-585.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2004). Thought experiments rethought—and reperceived. Philosophy of Science 71 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Contemplating imaginary scenarios that evoke certain sorts of quasi‐sensory intuitions may bring us to new beliefs about contingent features of the natural world. These beliefs may be produced quasi‐observationally; the presence of a mental image may play a crucial cognitive role in the formation of the belief in question. And this albeit fallible quasi‐observational belief‐forming mechanism may, in certain contexts, be sufficiently reliable to count as a source of justification. This sheds light on the central puzzle surrounding scientific thought experiment, which is how contemplation of an imaginary scenario can lead to new knowledge about contingent features of the natural world
Gopnik, Alison & Schwitzgebel, Eric (1998). Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology. In M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This chapter examines several ways in which philosophical attention to intuition can contribute to empirical scientific psychology. The authors then discuss one prevalent misuse of intuition. An unspoken assumption of much argumentation in the philosophy of mind has been that to articulate our folk psychological intuitions, our ordinary concepts of belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, is itself sufficient to give a theoretical account of what belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, actually are. It is believed that this assumption rests on an inadequate understanding of the nature of intuition and its appropriate applications, and that it results in errors. Three notable examples of this sort of misuse of intuition in philosophy are briefly discussed. Finally, the authors provide developmental evidence for the mutability and fallibility of everyday intuitions about the mind, evidence that undermines arguments, that depend on taking such intuitions as a final authority for substantive claims about what the mind is like.
Griffing, Harold (1896). On the relations of psychology to other sciences. Philosophical Review 5 (5):489-501.   (Google | More links)
Gross, Steven (2001). Book review. Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong Jerry Fodor. Mind 110 (438).   (Google)
Guthrie, E. R. (1924). Purpose and mechanism in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 21 (25):673-681.   (Google | More links)
Hartshorne, Charles (1934). The parallel development of method in physics and psychology. Philosophy of Science 1 (4):446-459.   (Google | More links)
Harre, Rom (2004). The relevance of the philosophy of psychology to a science of psychology. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2002). Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science: Reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology. Mind and Language 17 (3):207-232.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article critically examines the views that psychology ?rst came into existence as a discipline ca. 1879, that philosophy and psychology were estranged in the ensuing decades, that psychology ?nally became scienti?c through the in?uence of logical empiricism, and that it should now disappear in favor of cognitive science and neuroscience. It argues that psychology had a natural philosophical phase (from antiquity) that waxed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this psychology transformed into experimental psychology ca. 1900, that philosophers and psychologists collaboratively discussed the subject matter and methods of psychology in the ?rst two decades of the twentieth century, that the neobehaviorists were not substantively in?uenced by the Vienna Circle, that the study of perception and cognition in psy- chology did not disappear in the behaviorist period and so did not reemerge as a result of arti?cial intelligence, linguistics, and the computer analogy, that although some psychologists adopted the language-of-thought approach of traditional cognitive science, many did not, and that psychology will not go away because it contributes independently of cognitive science and neuroscience
Hatfield, Gary (1995). Remaking the science of mind: Psychology as a natural science. In C. Fox, R. Porter & R. Wokler (eds.), Inventing Human Science. University of California Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Inventing Human Science, ed. by Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 184–231. Key words: Wolff, Bonnet, Godart, Krüger, Hartley, Priestley, history of psychology in the 17th and 18th centuries, history of experiment in psychology, psychology as a natural science, idea of a natural science
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Hodge, K. Mitch (2008). Descartes Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption that Humans are Intuitive Cartesian Dualists. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.   (Google)
Abstract: This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally identical, and that the mind is the sole source of identity) are not compatible with cultural representations such as mythologies, funerary rites, iconography and doctrine as well as empirical evidence concerning intuitive folk reasoning about the mind and body concerning the afterlife. Finally, the article







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Hodge, K. Mitch (forthcoming). Why Immortality Alone will not get Me to the Afterlife. Philosophical Psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this; the simulation constraint theory (Bering 2002), the imaginative obstacle

theory (Nichols 2007) and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of those theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal immortality, leave



an explanatory gap in that they do not explain why one would intuitively attribute survival of death to others. To fill in the gap, I offer a cognitive theory based on offline social reasoning and social embodiment which provides for the belief in an eternal social realm in which the deceased survive—the afterlife.
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Abstract: LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.
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Abstract: Explanations of how psychological capacities are carried out often invoke functional brain areas. I argue that such explanations cannot succeed. Psychological capacities are carried out by identifiable entities and their activities in the brain, but functional brain areas are not the relevant entities. I proceed by assuming that if functional brain areas did carry out psychological capacities, then these brain areas could be included in descriptions of mechanisms. And if functional brain areas participate in mechanisms, then they must engage in activities. A number of ways in which we might understand the claim that functional brain areas engage in activities are examined. None are successful, and so one conclusion is that functional brain areas do not participate in mechanisms. Consequently, they are not the entities that carry out psychological capacities
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Abstract: Many pragmaticians have distinguished three levels of meaning involved in the comprehension of utterances, and there is an ongoing debate about how to characterize the intermediate level. Recanati has called it the level of ‘what is said’ and has opposed the idea that it can be determined semantically — a position that he labels ‘pragmatic minimalism’. To this end he has offered two chief arguments: semantic underdeterminacy and the Availability Principle. This paper exposes a tension between both arguments, relating this discussion with Carruthers’s cognitive view of language, according to which some thoughts are, literally, sentences of our natural language. First we explain how this view entails minimalism, and we construct an argument based on semantic underdeterminacy that shows that natural language sentences do not have the compositional properties required to constitute thoughts. Then we analyze the example of a subject’s overhearing a sentence without an interpretive context, arguing that in the light of the Availability Principle the corresponding thought can be regarded as a natural language sentence. Thus, semantic underdeterminacy and availability pull in different directions, and we claim that there is no characterization of the latter that can relieve this tension. We contend that Recanati’s availability shares with Carruthers’s introspectivism an overreliance on intuitions about what appears consciously in one’s mind. We conclude, therefore, that the Availability Principle ought to be abandoned.
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Abstract:   Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively exhaustive either, on the grounds that dropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctively different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alternative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualism
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Abstract: _This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how_ _those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of_ _Wundt, his most well known disciples, Titchener and Külpe, embraced an atomistic view of experience which_ _was at_ _least partly responsible for many of their failures. When the behaviorists rejected the_ _introspectionism of Titchener and Külpe, they kept their atomism, using the reflex_
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Abstract: University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing a, or she gets distracted from her goal that q, or she suddenly has a severe brain hemorrhage, or.... No one can say precisely where the list ends, but the idea is supposed to be clear enough: normally the law holds, but there are many cases, exceptions, one might say, in which the law does not; the difficulty of characterizing these exceptions invites the qualification ‘c.p.’ as a catch-all
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Abstract: Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition
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Abstract: (1) In contradistinction to mathematics, physics and biology, psychology and psychiatry deal to a large extent with the verbal behaviour of their objects. They are faced with two kinds of sense-problems: those with which the observer has to do in his theory-construction, and those which are characteristic of the verbal behaviour of his subjects.(2) Apart from a schematic and simplified usage, as it occurs in filling-up exercises and other laboratory verbal behaviour, the psychologist has to do with statements the sense of which, on the one hand, is determined by the usage of his subjects and, on the other hand, so far as his records and theory are concerned, by his own language-sense
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Abstract: In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the most prominent four examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting
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