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7.3b. Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology (Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology on PhilPapers)

See also:

7.3b.1 The Nature of Folk Psychology

Andrews, Kristin (online). It's in your nature: A pluralistic folk psychology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn’t endorse, and so could not serve as the target’s reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits–who the person is–rather than by beliefs and desires–what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed
Andrews, Kristin (online). The functions of folk psychology.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debates about the form of folk psychology and the potential eliminability of folk psychology rest on a particular view about how humans understand other minds. That is, though folk psychology is described as --œour commonsense conception of psychological phenomena--� (Churchland 1981, p. 67), there have been implicit assumptions regarding the nature of that commonsense conception. It has been assumed that folk psychology involves two practices, the prediction and explanation of behavior. And it has been assumed that one cognitive mechanism subsumes both these practices
Barker, John A. (2002). Computer modeling and the fate of folk psychology. Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):30-48.   (Google | More links)
Bennett, Jonathan (1991). Folk-psychological explanations. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2003). The domain of folk psychology. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Blackburn, Simon W. (1992). Theory, observation, and drama. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):187-203.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1997). Interpreting Minds: The Evolution of a Practice. MIT Press/Bradford Books.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (ed.) (1991). Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The contributors to this volume examine current controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind. Common sense provides a familiar and friendly psychological scheme by which to talk about the mind. Its categories (belief, desire, intention, consciousness, emotion, and so on) tend to portray the mind as quite different from the rest of nature, and thus irreducible to physical matters and its laws. In this volume a variety of positions on common sense psychology from critical to supportive, from exegetical to speculative, are represented. Among the questions posed are: Is common sense psychology an empirical theory, a body of analytic knowledge, a practice, or a strategy? If it is a legitimate enterprise can it be naturalized or not? If it is not legitimate can it be eliminated? Is its fate tied to our understanding of consciousness? Should we approach its concepts and generalizations from the standpoint of conceptual analysis or from the philosophy of science?
Bogdan, Radu J. (2003). Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1993). The architectural nonchalance of commonsense psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminativism assumes that commonsense psychology describes and explains the mind in terms of the internal design and operation of the mind. If this assumption is invalidated, so is eliminativism. The same conditional is true of intentional realism. Elsewhere (Bogdan 1991) I have argued against this 'folk- theory-theory' assumption by showing that commonsense psychology is not an empirical prototheory of the mind but a biosocially motivated practice of coding, utilizing, and sharing information from and about conspecifics. Here, without presupposing a specific analysis of commonsense psychology, I want to challenge a key implication of the 'folk-theory-theory' assumption to the effect that commonsense psychology is committed to a definite architecture of the mind
Botterill, George (1996). Folk psychology and theoretical status. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Botterill, George (1989). Human nature and folk psychology in the person and the human mind: Issues. In Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Braddon-Mitchell, David (2004). Folk theories of the third kind. Ratio 17 (3):277-293.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Braddon-Mitchell, David (1998). Metarepresentation. Mind and Language 13 (1):29-34.   (Google | More links)
Breheny, Richard (2006). Communication and folk psychology. Mind and Language 21 (1):74-107.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Prominent accounts of language use (those of Grice, Lewis, Stalnaker, Sperber and Wilson among others) have viewed basic communicative acts as essentially involving the attitudes of the participating agents. Developmental data poses a dilemma for these accounts, since it suggests children below age four are competent communicators but would lack the ability to conceptualise communication if philosophers and linguists are right about what communication is. This paper argues that this dilemma is quite serious and that these prominent accounts would be undermined if an adequate more minimal alternative were available. Just such a minimalist account of communication is offered, drawing on ideas from relevance theory and situation theory
Cantwell Smith, Brian (1996). Does science underwrite our folk psychology? In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Chater, Nick & Pickering, Martin J. (2003). Two realms of mental life: The non-overlap of belief ascription and the scientific study of mind and behavior. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):335-353.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1988). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21.   (Cited by 36 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1987). From folk psychology to naive psychology. Cognitive Science 11:139-54.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1995). Is 'mind' a scientific kind? In Mind and Cognition. Taipei: Inst Euro-Amer Stud.   (Google)
Collins, John M. (2000). Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):465-490.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. I show that, while my ensemble account of ToM and language refutes the culturalist presuppositions that tend to underlie eliminativist arguments, the falsity of folk psychology is consistent with the account
de bij Weg, Henk (2001). The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory. Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):17-30.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In studying what people do two points of view can be distinguished: We can choose the perspective of the actors themselves (the actor’s perspective), or we can look at what is going on from the outside, from a distance (the researcher’s perspective). Regarding the relation between both points of view three standpoints have been defended
Demeter, Tamás (2009). Folk Psychology Is Not a Metarepresentational Device. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):19-38.   (Google)
Abstract: Here I challenge the philosophical consensus that we use folk psychology for the purposes of metarepresentation. The paper intends to show that folk psychology should not be conceived on par with fact-stating discourses in spite of what its surface semantics may suggest. I argue that folk-psychological discourse is organised in a way and has conceptual characteristics such that it cannot fulfill a fact-stating function. To support this claim I develop an open question argument for psychological interpretations, and I draw attention to the central role of rationality, the conceptual connections, and the essential evaluative content inherent in folk psychological ascriptions. As a conclusion I propose that a fictionalist account of the discourse would fit its characteristics better than a factualist-realist interpretation.
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs opinion. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Let us begin with what all of us here agree on: folk psychology is not immune to revision. It has a certain vulnerability in principle. Any particular part of it might be overthrown and replaced by some other doctrine. Yet we disagree about how likely it is that that vulnerability in principle will turn into the actual demise of large portions--or all--of folk psychology. I am of the view that folk psychology is here for the long haul, and for some very good reasons. But I am not going to concentrate on that in my remarks. What nobody has bothered saying here yet, but is probably worth saying, is that for all of its blemishes, warts and perplexities, folk psychology is an extraordinarily powerful source of prediction. It is not just prodigiously powerful but remarkably easy for human beings to use. We are virtuoso exploiters of not so much a theory as a craft. That is, we might better call it a folk craft rather than a folk theory. The theory of folk psychology is the ideology about the craft, and there is lots of room, as anthropologists will remind us, for false ideology
Fletcher, G. (1995). The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fletcher, G. (1995). Two uses of folk psychology: Implications for psychological science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are valid or scientifically useful). This distinction is then applied to both common practices within psychology and the philosophical arguments concerning the scientific validity of folk psychology. Adopting a social psychological perspective, I argue that (a) the two uses are often conflated in psychology with deleterious consequences; and (b) that the arguments for the elimination of folk psychology as a basis for scientific psychology presented by Churchland and others, are weakened by the failure to attend to this distinction
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Attitudes without psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gauker, Christopher (2005). The belief-desire law. Facta Philosophica 7.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2005). Folk psychology as a model. Philosopher's Imprint 5 (6):1-16.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: <b>1. Introduction</b> <b>2. One sense of "model"</b> <b>3. Folk psychology as a model</b> <b>4. Versions and construals</b> <b>5. Folk psychology in cognitive science and analytic philosophy</b>
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2005). Folk psychology as a model. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (6):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that everyday folk-psychological skill might best be explained in terms of the deployment of something like a model, in a specific sense drawn from recent philosophy of science. Theoretical models in this sense do not make definite commitments about the systems they are used to understand; they are employed with a particular kind of flexibility. This analysis is used to dissolve the eliminativism debate of the 1980s, and to transform a number of other questions about the status and role of folk psychology
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2004). On folk psychology and mental representation. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: into the old view of the mind as a kind of “ghost inside the machine.”
Goldman, A. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:15-28.   (Cited by 135 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding of mental states. This subfield of scientific psychology is what I mean by the phrase 'the psychology of folk psychology'
Gordon, Robert M. (online). Reason explanations and counterfactuals.   (Google)
Abstract: In evaluating conditionals concerning what a person would have done in counterfactual circumstances, we suppose the counterfactual antecedent to be true, just as in what I loosely term the standard "Ramsey" procedure; but then we follow a different path--a simulative path--in evaluating the consequent. The simulative path imposes an implicit restriction on possible worlds, a procedural guarantee that the individual simulated is aware of or knows about the counterfactual condition. This difference makes clear the way in which reason explanations are implicitly cognitive and psychological
Graham, George & Horgan, Terence E. (1988). How to be realistic about folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Abstract: Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among philosophers of mind, is a distinct form of realism from scientific realism, and that it is not yet knowable whether scientific or non-scientific realism is true. We also outline how adopting realism, but remaining neutral between scientific and non-scientific realism, offers fresh insights into such topics as instrumentalism, supervenience, the language of thought hypothesis, and elimin-ativism
Graham, George (1987). The origins of folk psychology. Inquiry 30 (December):357-79.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (ed.) (1991). The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The essays in this volume are concerned with our everyday and developed scientific systems of explanation of human behavior in terms of beliefs, attitudes,...
Gruene-Yanoff, Till (online). Folk psychological realism without representational commitments - the measurement- theoretic account revisited.   (Google)
Abstract: Standardly, mental properties like beliefs, desires, fears, etc. are analysed as relations between the agent, to whom the predicate is ascribed, and a proposition, which is the intentional content of this property. According to this relational analysis, having a thought implies having its content present to the mind. This has wide-ranging philosophical implications, e.g. for the possibility of children and animals having intentional mental properties, or for the problem of knowing one’s own thoughts. Further, according to the relational analysis, the causal efficacy of mental properties must be in virtue of their content. This implies that folk-psychological explanations acquire a special status, for they employ mental properties as the explanans of behaviour. Mental properties can be conceived of as causally efficacious, and hence like standard scientific explanans, only if a satisfactory account is provided how they are causally efficacious in virtue of their semantic content. A successful account of this sort, I submit, does not exist as of yet; hence it seems, on the relational account, that folk psychological explanations are non-scientific, if they are explanations at all
Haldane, John J. (1988). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behaviour: Understanding folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 223:223-254.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2005). Joint Attention and Understanding the Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Oxford University PressJoint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). False-belief understanding and the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.   (Google)
Abstract: The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human social understanding than the critics suggest. First, I use standard false-belief tasks to spell out the commitments of the folk psychological picture. Next, I explicate the critics' account in terms of Michael Wheeler's distinction between online and offline intelligence. I then demonstrate the challenge that false-belief understanding -- a paradigm case of mental state understanding -- poses to the critics' online, non- mentalistic account. Recent research on false-belief understanding illustrates that mental state understanding comes in both online and offline forms. This challenges the critics' claim that our online social understanding does not require folk psychology
Heyes, Cecilia M. & Dickinson, Anthony (1995). Folk psychology won't go away: Response to Allen and Bekoff. Mind and Language 10 (4):329-332.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hodgson, David (1994). Neuroscience and folk psychology: An overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):205-216.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1992). From cognitive science to folk psychology: Computation, mental representation, and belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):449-484.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (1993). A tactical defense of folk psychology. Inside/Out.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Folk psychology is under threat - that is to say - our everyday conception that human beings are agents who experience the world in terms of sights, sounds, tastes, smells and feelings and who deliberate, make plans, and generally execute actions on the basis of their beliefs, needs and wants - is under threat. This threat is evidenced in intellectual circles by the growing attitude amongst some cognitive scientists that our common sense categories are in competition with connectionist theories and modern neuroscience. It is often thought that either folk psychology or modern cognitive science must go. It is in these terms that the battle lines of today’s philosophy of mind are drawn
Hutto, Daniel D. (2004). The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of 'embodied practice', I defend a secondpersonal approach in this paper
Jackson, Frank (2000). Hornsby and Baker on the physicalist orthodoxy. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):188-192.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Knowles, Jonathan (2001). Does intentional psychology need vindicating by cognitive science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments for the idea that intentional psychological states, such as beliefs, must be seen as requiring in-the-head mental representations for us to be able to understand their characteristic causal powers and argue that none of them validly generate their desired conclusions. I go on to argue that RTM, or some computational version thereof, is not motivated by appeal to the nature of cognitive science research either. I conclude that intentional psychology, though an empirical theory, is autonomous from details of lower level mechanism in a way that renders RTM unwarranted
Knobe, Joshua (ed.) (2007). Folk psychology: Science and morals. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely agreed that folk psychology plays an important role in people’s moral judgments. For a simple example, take the process by which we determine whether or not an agent is morally blameworthy. Although the judgment here is ultimately a moral one, it seems that one needs to use a fair amount of folk psychology along the way. Thus, one might determine that an agent broke the vase intentionally and therefore conclude that she is blameworthy for breaking it. Here it seems that one starts out with a folkpsychological judgment (that the agent acted intentionally) and then uses it as input to a process that eventually yields a moral judgment (that the agent is blameworthy). Many other cases have a similar structure. In recent years, however, a number of studies have shown that there are also cases in which the arrow of causation goes in the opposite direction. That is, there appear to be cases in which people start out with a moral judgment and then use it as input to a process that eventually yields a folk-psychological judgment (Knobe 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). These findings come as something of a surprise, and it can be difficult to know just what to make of them. My own view is that the findings are best explained by the hypothesis that moral considerations truly do play a role in people’s underlying folk-psychological concepts (Knobe 2003b, 2004, forthcoming). The key claim here is that the effects revealed in recent experiments are not the result of any kind of ‘bias’ or ‘distortion.’ Rather, moral considerations truly do figure in a fundamental way in the issues people are trying to resolve when they grapple with folk-psychological questions. I must confess, however, that not all researchers in the field share this view. Although many have been convinced that moral considerations actually do play a role in folk-psychological concepts, others have suggested that there might be better ways to account for the results of recent experiments..
Knowles, Jonathan (2002). Is folk psychology different? Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very notion of such a different kind of explanation. I argue first that the in some sense a priori and conceptual nature of folk psychological principles does not support the idea that these are other than empirical generalisations, by appeal to recent nativist ideas in cognitive science and to Lewis's conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. Second, I argue that there is no coherent sense in which folk psychological explanations can be seen as normative. Thirdly, I examine the putatively holistic character of the mental and conclude that that too fails to provide any cogent reasons for viewing folk psychological explanations as different from other kinds of explanation
Knobe, Joshua (2007). Reason explanation in folk psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Consider the following explanation: (1) George took his umbrella because it was just about to rain. This is an explanation of a quite distinctive sort. It is profoundly different from the sort of explanation we might use to explain, say, the movements of a bouncing ball or the gradual rise of the tide on a beach. Unlike these other types of explanations, it explains an agent’s behavior by describing the agent’s own _reasons_ for performing that behavior. Explanations that work in this way have a number of distinctive and important properties, and we will refer to them here as _reason explanations_. Looking at the use of reason explanations with a philosophical eye, one is apt to experience a certain puzzlement. One wants to know precisely what makes a given reason explanation true or false. So, for example, the explanation given above seems to be saying that George’s reason for taking his umbrella was that it was just about to rain. But what exactly makes it the case that this is George’s reason? Does he have to actually be
Knobe, Joshua & Malle, Bertram (ms). Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behavior to the situation whereas observers tend to attribute behavior to the person (Jones & Nisbett 1972). The authors argue that this simple hypothesis fails to capture the complexity of actual actor-observer differences in people’s behavioral explanations. A new framework is proposed in which reason explanations are distinguished from explanations that cite causes, especially stable traits. With this framework in place, it becomes possible to show that there are a number of distinct actorobserver asymmetries in explanation, each stemming from a distinct psychological process by which explanations are generated
Landy, David (2005). Inside doubt: On the non-identity of the theory of mind and propositional attitude psychology. Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in our interpersonal relationships. I contend that these eliminativist arguments typically run together two distinct capacities: the folk psychological mechanisms which we use to understand one another, and scientific and philosophical guesses about the structure of those understandings. Both capacities are ontologically committed and therefore empirical. However, the commitments whose prospects look so dismal to the eliminativist, in particular the causal and logical image of propositional attitudes, belong to the guesses, and not necessarily to the underlying mechanisms. It is the commitments of traditional philosophical perspectives about the operation of our folk psychology which are contradicted by?new evidence and modeling methods in connectionist psychology. Our actual folk psychology was not clearly committed to causal, sentential propositional attitudes, and thus is not directly threatened by connectionist psychology
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Machery, Edouard (2006). The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ? Thanks for helpful comments to Gregory Currie, Josh Knobe, Ron Mallon, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Steve Stich, Liane Young, the readers of the blog Experimental Philosophy (http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/) as well as two anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to my research assistant on this project, Julie Sokolow, for her help and her comments
Macdonald, C. (2002). Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'. Mind and Language 17 (5):467-488.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Malle, Bertram F. (2004). How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction. MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this provocative monograph, Bertram Malle describes behavior explanations as having a dual nature -- as being both cognitive and social acts -- and proposes...
Margolis, Joseph (1991). The autonomy of folk psychology. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Millar, Alan (2004). Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends a conception according to which normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action; the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons; the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people; and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter. Understanding People will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning
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Morton, Adam (1991). The inevitability of folk psychology. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Morton, Adam (2003). The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology As Ethics. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Abstract: The Importance of Being Understood argues for an alternative to traditional accounts in contemporary philosophy of the power of folk psychology to explain our...
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (1994). Folk psychology. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. Doing that will require a quick look at a bit of the history of philosophical discussions about the mind. We’ll then turn our attention to the lively contemporary discussions aimed at clarifying the philosophical role that folk psychology is expected to play and at using findings in the cognitive sciences to get a clearer understanding of the exact nature of folk psychology
Nudds, Matthew (2001). Common-sense and scientific psychology. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):171-180.   (Google)
O'Brien, Gerard (1993). A conflation of folk psychologies. Prospects for Intentionality Working Papers in Philosophy 3:42-51.   (Google)
Abstract: Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to Stich, is that most of the philosophers in this field are undertaking work that is quite futile:
It is my contention that most of the players in this very crowded field have _no_ coherent project
that could possibly be pursued successfully with the methods they are using. (p.244)
Stich readily admits that this is a startling conclusion; so startling, he thinks, that some may even take it as an indication that he has simply "failed to figure out what those who are searching for a theory of mental representation are up to" (p.244). But it is a conclusion that he is willing to stand by, and he sets about it defending it in the body of his paper
Ohreen, David E. (2004). The Scope and Limits of Folk Psychology: A Socio-Linguistic Approach. New York: Peter Lang.   (Google)
Ohreen, David (2007). Why Folk Psychology Is Not Universal. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):55-78.   (Google)
Pettit, Philip (2000). How the folk understand folk psychology. Protosociology 14:26-38.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Place, Ullin T. (1996). Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Pratt, Ian (1996). Encoding psychological knowledge. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Preston, John M. (1989). Folk psychology as theory or practice? The case for eliminative materialism. Inquiry 32 (September):277-303.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Pust, Joel (1999). External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2006). "Folk psychology" is not folk psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology
Robinson, William S. (1996). Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents' (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor for the supporting assumption about the commitments of folk psychology. Several generally implicit arguments in support of the latter assumption are considered. Explicit arguments for it by Ramsey et al. (1990) and Wellman (1990) are examined and judged unsuccessful. An explicit argument for strong realism by Cummins (in conversation) is also found inadequate. Consideration of this latter argument helps to explain why we cannot be satisfied with Dennett's own very brief discussion of causation by beliefs
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1999). Folk psychology. In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: In recent years, folk psychology has become a topic of debate not just among philosophers, but among development psychologists and primatologists as well
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1999). What is this thing called 'commonsense psychology'? Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain intentional action as ordinarily described--e.g., Jack went to the store because he wanted some ice cream. Commonsense psychology also is used to explain mental states--e.g., Jill feared that she would be late because she thought that the meeting began at 4:00. Commonsense psychology is the province of everyone; we all use it all the time
Scott-Kakures, Dion (1995). Erstwhile vindicationism. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (3):205-223.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sehon, Scott R. (1997). Natural kind terms and the status of folk psychology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):333-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sehon, Scott R. (2005). Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sharlow, Mark (online). As true as "you think": Preserving the core of folk psychology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I argue in defense of an important fragment of folk psychology. Specifically, I argue that many propositions about the ontology of mental states and about mental causation are true largely because of certain observable features of human linguistic behavior. I conclude that these propositions are immune to common avenues of eliminativist criticism. I compare and contrast this argument with some previous arguments about the truth of folk psychology
Sharpe, R. A. (1987). The very idea of a folk psychology. Inquiry 30 (December):381-93.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Sifferd, Katrina L. (forthcoming). Translating Scientific Evidence into the Language of the ‘Folk’: Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility. In Nicole A. Vincent (ed.), Legal Responsibility and Neuroscience. OUP.   (Google)
Abstract: There are legitimate worries about gaps between scientific evidence of brain states and function (for example, as evidenced by fMRI data) and legal criteria for determining criminal culpability. In this paper I argue that behavioral evidence of capacity, motive and intent appears easier for judges and juries to use for purposes of determining criminal liability because such evidence triggers the application of commonsense psychological (CSP) concepts that guide and structure criminal responsibility. In contrast, scientific evidence of neurological processes and function – such as evidence that the defendant has a large brain tumor – will not generally lead a judge or jury to directly infer anything that is relevant to the legal determination of criminal culpability . (Vincent 2008) In these cases, an expert witness will be required to indicate to the fact-finder what this evidence means with regard to mental capacity; and then another inference will have to be made from this possible lack of capacity to the legal criteria for guilt, cast in CSP terms.

To reliably link evidence of brain function and structure and assessment of criminal responsibility, we need to re-conceptualize the mental capacities necessary for responsibility, particularly those that are recognized as missing or compromised by the doctrines of “legal capacity” (Hart 1968) and “diminished capacity.” I argue that formulating these capacities as executive functions within the brain can provide this link. I further claim that it would be extremely useful to consider evidence of executive function as related to the diminished capacity doctrine at sentencing. This is because it is primarily at this stage in criminal proceedings where the use of the diminished capacity doctrine is most prevalent, as evidenced by the recent Supreme Court cases of Atkins v. Virginia (536 U.S. 304 (2002)) and Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
Stemmer, Nathan (1995). A behaviorist account to theory and simulation theories of folk psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1):29-41.   (Google)
Sterelny, Kim (1998). Intentional agency and the metarepresentation hypothesis. Mind and Language 13 (1):11-28.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. (1991). Causal holism and commonsense psychology: A reply to O'Brien. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):179-181.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 570 | Annotation | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (2002). Folk psychology. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. Doing that will require a quick look at a bit of the history of philosophical discussions about the mind. We’ll then turn our attention to the lively contemporary discussions aimed at clarifying the philosophical role that folk psychology is expected to play and at using findings in the cognitive sciences to get a clearer understanding of the exact nature of folk psychology
Stich, Stephen P. & Ravenscroft, R. (1994). What is folk psychology? Cognition 50:447-68.   (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: For the last two decades a doctrine called ‘‘eliminative materialism’’ (or sometimes just ‘‘eliminativism’’) has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind. It is easy to understand why eliminativism has attracted so much attention, for it is hard to imagine a more radical and provocative doctrine. What eliminativism claims is that the intentional states and processes that are alluded to in our everyday descriptions and explanations of people’s mental lives and their actions are _myths_. Like the gods that Homer invoked to explain the outcome of battles, or the witches that Inquisitors invoked to explain local catastrophes, they _do not exist_. According to eliminativists, there are no such things as beliefs or desires or hopes or fears or thoughts. These putative states and processes are the badly misguided posits of a seriously mistaken theory, just like phlogiston and caloric fluid and the luminiferous ether.1
Tanney, Julia (ms). Ordinary language and commonsense psychology.   (Google)
Von Eckardt, Barbara (1997). The empirical naivete in the current philosophical conception of folk psychology. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Weatherall, P. (1996). What do propositions measure in folk psychology? Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation of propositional attitudes in order to provide a naturalistic account of their use. I argue that a closer examination of the analogy implies rather than avoids the existence of structured representations constituting a language of thought, and thus that it should be abandoned by those who wish to avoid the postulation of such internal representations
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1984). Pragmatics in science and theory in common sense. Inquiry 27 (December):339-61.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1991). The long past and the short history. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1991). The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology. Synthese 89 (October):15-39.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) — which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many differences between the aims, interests, explananda, explanantia, methodology, conceptual frameworks, and relationships to the neurosciences, that divide CSP and SP. Each of the two is valid within its own territory, and there is no competition between them — primarily because CSP is not, and has no interest in being, a scientific theory. In the second section some implications are drawn. First, neither CSP nor SP has the mind-body problem in its familiar form. Second, CSP, for excellent reasons, is not equipped to handle irrational or non-rational behaviour; there are some grounds for believing that this can and should be the task of SP. Third, philosophical psychology, or armchair theories of action, perception, etc., are doomed to failure. And, fourth, the realm of the psychological is so heterogeneous that no single model for either CSP or SP is likely to succeed
Wringe, Bill (2002). Is folk psychology a Lakatosian research program? Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian research program. I argue that although the Lakatosian model may seem promising--particularly to those who are interested in studying the development of children's understanding of the mind--the analogy between Lakatosian research programs and folk psychology cannot be made good because folk psychology does not possess anything analogous to the positive heuristic of a Lakatosian research program. I also argue that Lakatos' account of theories may not be the best one for developmental psychologists to adopt because of the emphasis which Lakatos places on the social embeddedness of scientific theorising

7.3b.2 The Theory Theory

Bishop, Michael A. (2002). The theory theory thrice over: The child as scientist, superscientist, or social institution? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (1):121-36.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) a rational reconstruction of a Superscientist, or (iii) the scientific community. We argue that (i) is false, (ii) is non-empirical (which is problematic since the theory theory is supposed to be a bold empirical hypothesis), and (iii) is either false or doesn’t make enough sense to have a truth-value. We conclude that the theory theory is an interesting failure. Its failure points the way to a full, empirical picture of scientific development, one that marries a concern with the social dynamics of science to a psychological theory of scientific cognition.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Bostrom, Nick (online). Cortical integration: Possible solutions to the binding and linking problems in perception, reasoning and long term memory.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The problem of cortical integration is described and various proposed solutions, including grandmother cells, cell assemblies, feed-forward structures, RAAM and synchronization, are reviewed. One method, involving complex attractors, that has received little attention in the literature, is explained and developed. I call this binding through annexation. A simulation study is then presented which suggests ways in which complex attractors could underlie our capacity to reason. The paper ends with a discussion of the efficiency and biological plausibility of the proposals as integration mechanisms for different regions and functions of the brain
DeVries, Willem (2006). Folk psychology, theories, and the Sellarsian roots. In Michael P. Wolf (ed.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars (Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Volume 9. Rodopi.   (Google)
Downes, Stephen M. (1999). Can scientific development and children's cognitive development be the same process? Philosophy of Science 66 (4):565-578.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Fine, A. (1996). Science as child's play: Tales from the crib. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):534-37.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Attitudes without psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gauker, Christopher (2005). The belief-desire law. Facta Philosophica 7.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law
Glennan, Stuart S. (2005). The modeler in the crib. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):217-227.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A number of developmental psychologists have argued for a theory they call the theory theory - a theory of cognitive development that suggests that infants and small children make sense of their world by constructing cognitive representations that have many of the attributes of scientific theories. In this paper I argue that there are indeed close parallels between the activities of children and scientists, but that these parallels will be better understood if one recognizes that both scientists and children are not so much theorists as model builders
Glymour, C. (2000). Android epistemology for babies. Synthese 122 (1-2):53-68.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: _Words_, _Thoughts and Theories _argues that infants and children discover the physical and psychological features of the world by a process akin to scientific inquiry, more or less as conceived by philosophers of science in the 1960s (the theory theory). This essay discusses some of the philosophical background to an alternative, more popular, “modular” or “maturational” account of development, dismisses an array of philosoph- ical objections to the theory theory, suggests that the theory theory offers an undeveloped project for artificial intelligence, and, relying on recent psychological work on causation, offers suggestions about how principles of causal inference may provide a developmental solution to the “frame problem”
Gopnik, Alison (1990). Developing the idea of intentionality: Children's theories of mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):89-114.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Gopnik, Alison (1997). The scientist as child. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):485-514.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Gopnik, Alison (2003). The theory theory as an alternative to the innateness hypothesis. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gopnik, Alison & Meltzoff, Andrew N. (1998). Theories vs. modules: To the Max and beyond: A reply to poulin-Dubois and to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 13 (3):450-456.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gopnik, Alison & Wellman, H. M. (1992). Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.   (Cited by 210 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Sellars's Rylean ancestors revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114.   (Google)
Greenwood, John D. (2007). Unnatural epistemology. Mind and Language 22 (2):132-149.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘Naturalized’ philosophers of mind regularly appeal to the empirical psychological literature in support of the ‘theory-theory’ account of the natural epistemology of mental state ascription (to self and others). It is argued that such appeals are not philosophically neutral, but in fact presuppose the theory-theory account of mental state ascription. It is suggested that a possible explanation of the popularity of the theory-theory account is that it is generally assumed that alternative accounts in terms of introspection (and simulation) presuppose a discredited ‘inner ostensive definition’ account of the meaning of mental state terms. However, the inner ostensive definition account is not the only alternative to the theory-theory account of the meaning of mental state terms, and commitment to a theory-theory account of the meaning of mental state terms does not mandate commitment to a theory-theory account of the epistemology of mental state ascription
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
Jackson, Frank (2000). Psychological explanation and implicit theory. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer an account of the relation between explanations of behaviour in terms of psychological states and explanations in terms of neural states that: makes it transparent how they can be true together; explains why explanations in terms of psychological states are characteristically of behaviour described in general and relational terms, and explains why certain sorts of neurological investigations undermine psychological explanations of behaviour, while others leave them intact. In the course of the argument, I offer an account of implicit theories
Jusczyk P. W., ; Johnson S. P., ; Spelke E. S., & Kennedy L. J., (1999). Synchronous change and perception of object unity: Evidence from adults and infants. Cognition 71 (3):257-288.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Adults and infants display a robust ability to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object undergo common motion (e.g. Kellman, P.J., Spelke, E.S., 1983. Perception of partly occluded objects in infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483±524). Ecologically oriented accounts of this ability focus on the primacy of motion in the perception of segregated objects, but Gestalt theory suggests a broader possibility: observers may perceive object unity by detecting patterns of synchronous change, of which common motion is a special case. We investigated this possibility with observations of adults and 4-month-old infants. Participants viewed a center-occluded object whose visible surfaces were either misaligned or aligned, stationary or moving, and unchanging or synchronously changing in color or bright- ness in various temporal patterns (e.g. ¯ashing). Both alignment and common motion con- tributed to adults' perception of object unity, but synchronous color changes did not. For infants, motion was an important determinant of object unity, but other synchronous changes and edge alignment were not. When a stationary object with aligned edges underwent syn- chronous changes in color or brightness, infants showed high levels of attention to the object, but their perception of its unity appeared to be indeterminate. An inherent preference for fast over slow ¯ash rates, and a novelty preference elicited by a change in rate, both indicated that infants detected the synchronous changes, although they failed to use them as information for object unity. These ®ndings favor ecologically oriented accounts of object perception in which surface motion plays a privileged role. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Leslie, Alan M. & German, T. P. (1995). Knowledge and ability in "theory of mind": A one-eyed overview of a debate. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Levin, Janet (2001). The myth of Jones and the return of subjectivity. Mind and Language 16 (2):173-192.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.   (Cited by 225 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2003). The mindreader and the scientist. Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our knowledge is of theoretical models and hypotheses, not of universal generalisations. Adopting this alternative view of (scientific) theories, we come to see that, given time and reflection, we can say what we know
Nazer, Daniel; Ruby, Aaron; Nichols, Shaun; Weinberg, Jonathan; Stich, Stephen; Faucher, Luc & Mallon, Ron (2002). The baby in the lab-coat: Why child development is not an adequate model for understanding the development of science. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich & M. Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Alison Gopnik and her collaborators have recently proposed a bold and intriguing hypothesis about the relationship between scientific cognition and cognitive development in childhood. According to this view, the processes underlying cognitive development in infants and children and the processes underlying scientific cognition are _identical_. We argue that Gopnik’s bold hypothesis is untenable because it, along with much of cognitive science, neglects the many important ways in which human minds are designed to operate within a social environment. This leads to a neglect of _norms_ and the processes of _social_ _transmission_ which have an important effect on scientific cognition and cognition more generally
Origgi, Gloria (online). Theories of theories of mind.   (Google)
Proust, Joëlle (2007). Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1996). Theories in children and the rest of us. Philosophy of Science Association 3 (3):S202-S210.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1998). Theory theory to the Max. Mind and Language 13 (3):421-449.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Sussman, Alan N. (1975). Mental entities of theoretical entities. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (October):277-288.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Triplett, Timm & DeVries, Willem A. (2006). Is Sellars's Rylean hypothesis plausible? A dialogue. In Michael P. Wolf & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum, Josef Parnas & T. Grunbaum (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone

7.3b.3 The Simulation Theory

Adams, Frederick R. (2001). Empathy, neural imaging and the theory versus simulation debate. Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Bernier, Paul (2002). From simulation to theory. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Biggs, Stephen (2007). The phenomenal mindreader: A case for phenomenal simulation. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper specifies two hypotheses that are intimated in recent research on empathy and mindreading. The first, the phenomenal simulation hypothesis, holds that those attributing mental states (i.e., mindreaders) sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). The second, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis, holds that this phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some mental state attributions. After explicating these hypotheses, the paper focuses on the first. It argues that neuropsychological experiments on empathy and behavioral experiments on imitation provide good reason to think that mindreaders sometimes simulate targets' phenomenal states. Accordingly, the paper concludes, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis merits consideration
Borg, Emma (2007). If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds
Campbell, J. (2002). Joint attention and simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Child, William (2002). Reply to Alvin I. Goldman. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google)
Child, William (2002). Reply to Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Cruz, Joe (online). A Humean psychological alternative to Kant and Wittgenstein: Comments on Stueber's Importance of Simulation for Understanding Linguistic and Rational Agency.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Let me begin by saying that I am sympathetic to the simulation theory, especially where it is conceived of as a crucial and central addition alongside the theory-theory as the explanation of our capacity to attribute mental states, rather than as an exclusive and exhaustive account by itself.1 I part company with Professor Stueber, however, in that I view the recent simulation theory/theory- theory controversy as subject to resolution primarily through empirical findings. Still, it cannot be denied that Stueber has helped to crystallize elements of the simulation theory/theory-theory debate that have been lurking all along, and has illuminated an important avenue of inquiry into the status of simulation
Currie, Gregory & Ravenscroft, Ian (1997). Mental simulation and motor imagery. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-80.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Currie, Gregory (1996). Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from autism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Currie, Gregory (1995). Visual imagery as the simulation of vision. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (1998). Folk psychology and mental simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.1 At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (eds.) (1995). Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell.   (Cited by 164 | Google)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2001). Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Philosophical Topics 29:127-73.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in apparent contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But amongst theory theorists, and amongst simulation theorists, there are significant differences of approach
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2000). Simulation theory. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses, or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding of the thoughts, decisions or emotions of another
Davies, Martin (1994). The mental simulation debate. Philosophical Issues 5:189-218.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Decety, J. (2002). Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Dokic, Jérôme (2002). Reply to 'the scope and limit of mental simulation'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Dokic, Jérôme & Proust, Joëlle (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Fisher, Justin C. (2006). Does simulation theory really involve simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the cognitive processes involved when one person predicts a target person's behavior and/or attributes a mental state to that target person. According to simulation theory, a person typically performs these tasks by employing some part of her brain as a simulation of what is going on in a corresponding part of the brain of the target person. I propose a general intuitive analysis of what 'simulation' means. Simulation is a particular way of using one process to acquire knowledge about another process. What distinguishes simulation from other ways of acquiring knowledge is that simulation requires, for its non-accidental success, that the simulating process reflect significant aspects of the simulated process. This conceptual work is of independent philosophical interest, but it also enables me to argue for two conclusions that are of great significance to the debate about mental simulation theory. First, I argue that, in order to stake a non-trivial claim, simulation theory must hold that mental simulation involves what I call concretely similar processes. Second, I argue for the surprising conclusion that a significant class of cases that simulation theorists have claimed as intuitive cases of simulation do not actually involve simulation, after all. I close by sketching an alternative account that might handle these problematic cases
Fuller, Gary (1995). Simulation and psychological concepts. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gallese, Vittorio (2007). Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do their best to avoid the theoretical stance by using their own experience as the measure of everyone else's. When it comes to explaining how we understand other people some of the very best contemporary philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists are simulationists. For example, Vittorio Gallese, Alvin Goldman, Robert Gordon, Jane Heal, Susan Hurley, and Marc Jeannerod. This short list of simulationists, however, already involves some problems. Not everyone on this list understands simulation in the same way. In effect, there are different simulation theories, and although it is important to distinguish them, and I will do so before I go much further, I will in the end argue against all of them. For several reasons I don't think that the concept of simulation explains our primary and pervasive way of understanding others, any more than theory theory does
Galgut, Elisa (2005). Simulation and irrationality. Philosophical Papers 34 (1):25-44.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems
Gallagher, Shaun (2001). The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Gallese, Vittorio (2001). The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.   (Cited by 143 | Google)
Garson, James W. (2003). Simulation and connectionism: What is the connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Simulation has emerged as an increasingly popular account of folk psychological (FP) talents at mind-reading: predicting and explaining human mental states. Where its rival (the theory-theory) postulates that these abilities are explained by mastery of laws describing the connections between beliefs, desires, and action, simulation theory proposes that we mind-read by "putting ourselves in another's shoes." This paper concerns connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory (ST) and the theory-theory (TT). It is only natural to associate TT with classical architectures where rule governed operations apply to explicit propositional representations. On the other hand, ST would seem better tuned to procedurally oriented non-symbolic structures found in connectionist models. This paper explores the possible alignment between ST and connectionist architecture. Joe Cruz argues that connectionist models with distributed non-symbolic representations are particularly well suited to simulation theory. The purported linkage between connectionist architecture and simulation theory is criticized in this paper. The conclusion is that there are reasons for thinking that connectionist forms of representation are the enemy of both TT and ST. So the contribution of connectionism may be to suggest the need for an alternative to both views
Gianfranco, S. (2002). Reply to 'from simulation to theory'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Goldman, A. (2000). Folk psychology and mental concepts. Protosociology 14:4-25.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Goldman, A. (1992). In defense of the simulation theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.   (Cited by 119 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1989). Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language 4:161-85.   (Cited by 163 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1996). Simulation and interpersonal utility. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis
Goldman, A. (2002). Simulation theory and mental concepts. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Goldman, A. (2002). The mentalizing folk. Protosociology 16:7-34.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. & Barker, John A. (1994). Autism and the "theory of mind" debate. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language 1:158-71.   (Cited by 350 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (online). Representing minds.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: investigation).{1} We project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, . . . even into what from his behavior we imagine a mouse's state of mind to have been, and dramatize it as a belief, wish or striving, verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us in the state thus
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). 'Radical' simulationism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Perner and Howes. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):98-103.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (2001). Simulation and reason explanation: The radical view. Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):175-192.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Alvin Goldman's early work in action theory and theory of knowledge was a major influence on my own thinking and writing about emotions. For that reason and others, it was a very happy moment in my professional life when I learned, in 1988, that in his presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Goldman endorsed and defended the “simulation” theory I had put forward in a 1986 article. I discovered afterward that we share a strong conviction that empirical evidence is relevant to a full assessment of the theory. We both find the burgeoning evidence from cognitive neuroscience to be of particular interest, I believe, in part because it makes possible a major departure for the philosophy of mind: turning its attention from
(a)
the neural basis of mental states,
to
Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Simulation and the explanation of action. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. & Cruz, Joe (2002). Simulation theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory
Gordon, Robert M. (1995). Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 81 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1999). Simulation, theory-theory and cognitive penetration: No 'instance of the fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Harris, P. F. (1992). From simulation to folk psychology: The case for development. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):120-144.   (Cited by 131 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1998). Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach. Mind and Language 13 (4):477-498.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (1995). How to think about thinking. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2000). Other minds, rationality and analogy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 74 (74):1-19.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1986). Replication and functionalism. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation and cognitive penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation, theory, and content. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1994). Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue? In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2000). Understanding other minds from the inside. Protosociology 14:39-55.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Henderson, David K. & Horgan, Terence E. (2000). Simulation and epistemic competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
Hoerl, Christoph (2002). Reply to Jean Decety: Perceiving Actions and Understanding Agency. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: Decety presents evidence for the claim that neural mechanisms involved in the generation of actions are also recruited in the observation and mental simulation of actions. This paper explores the relationship between such neuropsychological findings and our common-sense understanding of what it is for a person to imitate or imagine performing an action they have observed. A central question is whether imitation and imagination necessarily involve the ability to distinguish between one's own actions and those of others. It is argued that certain imitative and imaginative capacities can be present, and play a key role in the acquisition of knowledge, even in the absence of an ability to distinguish between self and other in this way.
Hutto, Daniel D. (online). Minding our language: The role of simulation in linguistic interpretation.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Historically, the philosophy of language has held pride of place in the analytical tradition. In fact, it would be safe to say that for a long time it had been unquestioningly regarded as first philosophy. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, many analytical philosophers held (and many still hold) that we could only get at the underlying nature of our world by understanding the nature of thought. And secondly, they held (and many still hold) that we could only understand the nature of thought by "an analysis of its linguistic expression" (Dummett, 1993, p. 154). Dummett recently goes so far as to tells us that the latter assumption is the fundamental axiom of analytical philosophy
Jacob, Pierre (2002). The scope and limit of mental simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Jarrold, Chris; Carruthers, Peter; Boucher, Jill & Smith, Peter K. (1994). Pretend play. Mind and Language 9 (4).   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: Children’s ability to pretend, and the apparent lack of pretence in children with autism, have become important issues in current research on ‘theory of mind’, on the assumption that pretend play may be an early indicator of metarepresentational abilities
Jeannerod, Marc & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution
Kuehberger, Anton; Kogler, Christoph; Hug, Angelika & Moesl, Evelyne (2006). The role of the position effect in theory and simulation. Mind and Language 21 (5):610-625.   (Google)
Kuhberger, A.; Perner, Josef; Schulte, M. & Leingruber, R. (1995). Choice or no choice: Is the Langer effect evidence against simulation? Mind and Language 10 (4):423-36.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kuipers, Theo A. F. (2005). Verstehen, einfhlen and mental simulation: Reply to Anne Rugh Mackor. In Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. New York: Rodopi NY.   (Google | More links)
Lebar, M. (2001). Simulation, theory, and emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be useful to consider the role emotion plays in the respective interpretive processes. I give reasons for believing that affective processes are more heavily involved in simulation (especially in situations of practical judgment and practical reasoning) than in theory-application. But affective processes have distinctive neurological and metabolic properties. These distinctive features of emotion may not only enrich our understanding of the simulation process, but also afford us a step towards responding to Perner's challenge
Levin, Janet (1995). Folk psychology and the simulationist challenge. Acta Analytica 10 (14):77-100.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ludwig, Pascal (2002). Reply to Can 'Radical' Simulation Theories Explain Psychological Concept Acquisition?. In J. Dokic & J. Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2007). The presence of others. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):161-190.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Hybrid accounts of folk psychology maintain that we sometimes theorize and sometimes simulate in order to understand others. An important question is why this is the case. In this paper, I present a view according to which simulation, but not theory, plays a central role in empathy. In contrast to others taking a similar approach to simulation, I do not focus on empathy’s cognitive aspect, but stress its affective-motivational one. Simulating others’ emotions usually engages our motivations altruistically. By vicariously feeling what others are feeling, we directly come to be motivated by their projects and concerns. Simulation contrasts with more theoretical approaches to psychological attribution that help us understand and explan others, but that do not move us altruistically. This helps us see why we would posit two different folk psychological approaches instead of merely one
Montero, Barbara (2006). Proprioceiving someone else's movement. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):149 – 161.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Proprioception - the sense by which we come to know the positions and movements of our bodies - is thought to be necessarily confined to the body of the perceiver. That is, it is thought that while proprioception can inform you as to whether your left knee is bent or straight, it cannot inform you as to whether someone else's knee is bent or straight. But while proprioception certainly provides us with information about the positions and movements of our own bodies, I will argue that it does more than that. Surprising as this may sound, one can proprioceive someone else's movement. To show this, I first present the results of some studies that suggest that in seeing others move, we kinesthetically represent their movement in our bodies. I then argue, by means of an analogy to prosthetic vision, that such 'kinesthetic vision' should count as proprioceiving others move
Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen P. & Leslie, Alan M. (1995). Choice effects and the ineffectiveness of simulation. Mind and Language 10 (4):437-45.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (1998). Rethinking co-cognition: A reply to Heal. Mind and Language 13 (4):499-512.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen P.; Leslie, Alan M. & Klein, David B. (1996). Varieties of off-line simulation. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over off-line simulation has largely focussed on the capacity to predict behavior, but the basic idea of off-line simulation can be cast in a much broader framework. The central claim of the off-line account of behavior prediction is that the practical reasoning mechanism is taken off-line and used for predicting behavior. However, there's no reason to suppose that the idea of off-line simulation can't be extended to mechanisms other than the practical reasoning system. In principle, any cognitive component can be taken off-line and used to perform some other function. On this view of off-line simulation, such accounts differ radically from traditional information-based accounts of cognitive capacities. And cognitive penetrability provides a wedge for empirically determining whether a capacity requires an information-based account or an off-line simulation account. Stich and Nichols (1992) argued that the simulation theory of behavior prediction was inadequate because behavior prediction seemed to be cognitively penetrable. We present empirical evidence that supports the claim that the behavior prediction is cognitively penetrable. As a result, the simulation account of behavior prediction still seems unpromising. However, off-line simulation might provide accounts of other cognitive capacities. Indeed, off- line simulation accounts have recently been offered for a strikingly diverse set of capacities including counterfactual reasoning, empathy and mental imagery. Goldman, for instance, maintains that counterfactual reasoning and empathy clearly demand off-line simulation accounts. We argue that there are alternative information-based explanations of these phenomena. Nonetheless, the off-line accounts of these phenomena are interesting and clearly worthy of further exploration
Noë, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness
Noë, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Sorting out the neural basis of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):87-98.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: noe@socrates.berkeley.edu_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: evant@yorku.ca_
Ohreen, David (2008). Empathy, Folk Psychology, and Explaining Behaviour. Res Cogitans - Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):39-56.   (Google)
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2002). Reply to Joint Attention and Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Pelletier, Jerome (2002). Reply to Varieties of Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Perner, Josef & Howes, Deborrah (1992). He thinks he knows: And more developmental evidence against the simulation (role taking) theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):72-86.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Perner, Josef (1996). Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: Arguments for a simulation-theory mix. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Perner, Josef (1994). The necessity and impossibility of simulation. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Peterson, Donald M. (2002). Mental simulation, dialogical processing and the syndrome of autism. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Proust, Joëlle (2002). Can 'radical' simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Pust, Joel (1999). External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ravenscroft, Ian (2003). Simulation, collapse and Humean motivation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Ravenscroft, Ian (1998). What is it like to be someone else? Simulation and empathy. Ratio 11 (2):170-185.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Recanati, François (2002). Varieties of simulation. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ribeiro, Anna Christina (online). Do mirror neurons support a simulation theory of mind-reading?   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Both macaque monkeys and humans have been shown to have what are called ‘mirror neurons’, a class of neurons that respond to goal-related motor-actions, both when these actions are performed by the subject and when they are performed by another individual observed by the subject. Gallese and Goldman (1998) contend that mirror neurons may be seen as ‘a part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind- reading ability’, and that of the two competing theories of mind-reading, mirror neurons lend support to simulation theory. I here offer four reasons why I think mirror neurons do not provide support for simulation theory over its contender, theory theory
Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: The argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-79.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (ms). A difficulty for simulation theory due to the close connection of pretense and action in early childhood.   (Google | More links)
Scheutz, Matthias & Peschl, Markus F. (2001). Explicating the epistemological role of simulation in the development of theories of cognition. In Proceedings of the 7th International Colloquium on Cognitive.   (Google)
Schatzki, Theodore R. (2000). Simulation theory and the verstehen school: A Wittgensteinian approach. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Google)
Sharpe, R. A. (1997). One cheer for the simulation theory. Inquiry 40 (1):115-31.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1997). Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1993). Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory? Mind and Language 7 (1-2):35-71.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1995). Second thoughts on simulation. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Stone, Tony & Davies, Martin (1996). The mental simulation debate: A progress report. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction For philosophers, the current phase of the debate with which this volume is concerned can be taken to have begun in 1986, when Jane Heal and Robert Gordon published their seminal papers (Heal, 1986; Gordon, 1986; though see also, for example, Stich, 1981; Dennett, 1981). They raised a dissenting voice against what was becoming a philosophical orthodoxy: that our everyday, or folk, understanding of the mind should be thought of as theoretical. In opposition to this picture, Gordon and Heal argued that we are not theorists but simulators. For psychologists, the debate had begun somewhat earlier when Heider (1958) produced his work on lay psychology; and in more recent times the psychological debate had continued in developmental psychology and in work on animal cognition
Stueber, Karsten R. (2000). Understanding other minds and the problem of rationality. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Attitude and image, or, what will simulation theory let us eliminate?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement of scientific understanding of the mind it will be possible to entirely eliminate the mentalistic and intentional from our ontology, thus dissolving the mind-body problem. The first claim (which has been argued in detail) supplies the principal grounds for accepting the second, much more ambitious and significant, claim. Robert Gordon's (1995, 1996, 2000) radical simulation theory of "folk psychology", proposed initially (Gordon, 1986) as an alternative to "theory theory" accounts of self and interpersonal understanding, but subsequently developing into a quite general challenge to symbolic computational accounts of mind, is not merely consistent with, but actually provides considerable additional support for, the first eliminativist claim. However, although radical simulationism has no use for reified propositional attitudes, it relies on another family of mentalistic and intentional notions, including perspective taking, "seeing as", pretending, imagery, and, most centrally, imagination. It is thus inconsistent with eliminativist metaphysical ambitions. Nevertheless, from this perspective the mind-body problem is transformed. Its solution no longer depends on accounting directly for the intentionality of the attitudes, but rather on accounting for the intentionality of imagination. Although standard accounts of imagination derive its intentionality from that of the attitudes, the recently proposed "perceptual activity" theory of imagery and imagination (Thomas, 1999) can provide a direct account of the intentionality of imagination that is consistent with physicalism..
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2003). Imagining minds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):79-84.   (Google)
Vendler, Zeno (1984). The Matter of Minds. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Weiskopf, Daniel A. (2005). Mental mirroring as the origin of attributions. Mind and Language 20 (5):495-520.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A ‘Radical Simulationist’ account of how folk psychology functions has been developed by Robert Gordon. I argue that Radical Simulationism is false. In its simplest form it is not sufficient to explain our attribution of mental states to subjects whose desires and preferences differ from our own. Modifying the theory to capture these attributions invariably generates innumerable other false attributions. Further, the theory predicts that deficits in mentalizing ought to co-occur with certain deficits in imagining perceptually-based scenarios. I present evidence suggesting that this prediction is false, and outline further possible empirical tests of the theory
Weiskopf, Daniel A. (2008). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading - by Alvin I. Goldman. Philosophical Books 49 (2):168-170.   (Google)
Wilkerson, William S. (2001). Simulation, theory, and the frame problem: The interpretive moment. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization - that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved
Wringe, Bill (2003). Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

7.3b.4 Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology, Misc

Allen, Colin (ms). Macaque mirror neurons.   (Google)
Abstract: Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view
Andrews, Kristin (2003). Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I predict someone’s future behavior, I would at that moment also have an explanation of the behavior. I argue that advocates of both the theory theory and the simulation theory accept the symmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. However, there is very good reason to believe that this hypothesis is false. Just as we can predict the occurrence of some physical phenomena that we have no explanation for, we are also able to make accurate predictions of intentional behavior without having an explanation. Rather than requiring mental state attribution, I argue that the prediction of human behavior is most often accomplished by statistical induction rather than through an appeal to mental states. However, explanations are not given in these terms
Andrews, Kristin (online). The need to explain behavior: Predicting, explaining, and the social function of mental state attribution.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: According to both the traditional model of folk psychology and the social intelligence hypothesis, our folk psychological notions of belief and desire developed in order to make better predictions of behavior, and the fundamental role for our folk psychological notions of belief and desire are for making more accurate predictions of behavior (than predictions made without appeal to folk psychological notions). My strategy in this paper is to show that these claims are false. I argue that we need not appeal to mental states to make predictions of many behaviors, and I will offer a positive account of how we might go about predicting intentional behavior. Finally, I suggest that taken together, the critique of traditional folk psychology along with the alternative account of our predictive practices leads to a new hypothesis. While it may be true that mental state concepts developed in response to social-environmental pressures, I suggest that this pressure was more likely the need to explain behavior, rather than the need to predict it
Arkway, Angela (online). Folk psychological explanation, and causal laws.   (Google)
Arkway, Angela (2000). The simulation theory, the theory theory and folk psychological explanation. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Arkway, Angela (online). The simulation theory and explanations that 'make sense of behavior'.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barnes, Allison & Thagard, Paul R. (1997). Empathy and analogy. Dialogue 36 (4):705-720.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We contend that empathy is best viewed as a kind of analogical thinking of the sort described in the multiconstraint theory of analogy proposed by Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (1995). Our account of empathy reveals the Theory-theory/Simulation theory debate to be based on a false assumption and formulated in terms too simple to capture the nature of mental state ascription. Empathy is always simulation, but may simultaneously include theory-application. By properly specifying the analogical processes of empathy and their constraints, we are able to show how the amount of theory needed to empathize is determined
Barresi, John (online). The neuroscience of social understanding.   (Google)
Abstract: In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (Eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, in press
Bloom, Paul (2006). My brain made me do it. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1): 1567-7095.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Shaun Nichols (this issue) correctly points out that current theories of the development of mindreading say nothing about children's intuitions concerning indeterminist choice. That is, there are numerous theories of how children make sense of belief, desire, and action, but none that appeal to any notion of free will. Nichols suggests two alternatives for why this is the case. It could either be (a) an --outrageous oversight-- on the part of developmental psychologists or (b) a principled omission, reflecting a consensus that the notion of indeterminist choice is absent from children's mindreading processes. Nichols charitably favors the sec- ond alternative
Bogdan, Radu J. (2001). Developing mental abilities by representing intentionality. Synthese 129 (2):233-258.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Communication by shared meaning, themastery of word semantics,metarepresentation and metamentation aremental abilities, uniquely human, that share a sense ofintentionality or reference. The latteris developed by a naive psychology or interpretation – acompetence dedicated to representingintentional relations between conspecifics and the world. Theidea that interpretation builds new mentalabilities around a sense of reference is based on three linesof analysis – conceptual, psychological andevolutionary. The conceptual analysis reveals that a senseof reference is at the heart of the abilitiesin question. Psychological data track tight developmentalcorrelations between interpretation and theabilities it designs. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesislooks at why interpretation designed thosenew abilities around a sense of reference
Bogdan, Radu J. (2007). Inside loops: Developmental premises of self-ascriptions. Synthese 159 (2):235-252.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations
Bogdan, Radu J. (2003). Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (2005). Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late. In B. Malle & S. Hodges. (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers and a few psychologists think that we understand our own minds before we understand those of others. Most developmental psychologists think that children understand their own minds at about the same time they understand other minds, by using the same cognitive abilities. I disagree with both views. I think that children understand other minds before they understand their own. Their self-understanding depends on some cognitive abilities that develop later than, and independently of, the abilities involved in understanding other minds. This is the general theme of this chapter
Bogdan, Radu J. (2003). Watch your metastep: The first-order limits of early intentional attributions. In C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer & L. Runggaldier (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: There is a wide and puzzleful gap between the child’s mastery of first- and recursive or higher-order attributions of attitudes, measured not only in years but also in the cognitive resources involved. Some accounts explain the gap in terms of the maturation of the competencies involved, others invoke the slow development of enabling resources, such as short-term memory, the syntax of sentence embedding or sequential reasoning. All these accounts assume a continuity of competence between first- and higher-order attributions. I disagree and argue, with psychological and neuroscientific support, that there are two distinct (though developmentally overlapping and interacting) competencies, one metaintentional and the other metarepresentational. I focus below on the former and argue that it is egocentric, situated, nonpropositional and thus intrinsically limited to first-order attributions, even when all the enabling resources are in place
Campbell, John (2005). Joint attention and common knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Autism as mindblindness: An elaboration and partial defence. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter I defend the mind-blindness theory of autism, by showing how it can accommodate data which might otherwise appear problematic for it. Specifically, I show how it can explain the fact that autistic children rarely engage in spontaneous pretend-play, and also how it can explain the executive-function deficits which are characteristic of the syndrome. I do this by emphasising what I take to be an entailment of the mind-blindness theory, that autistic subjects have difficulties of access to their own mental states, as well as to the mental states of other people
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency
Carruthers, Peter & Smith, Peter K. (eds.) (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 300 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other species? The volume's four parts together offer a state of the art survey of the major topics in the theory-theory/simulationism debate within philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, the aetiology of autism and primatology. The volume will be of great interest to researchers and students in all areas interested in the 'theory of mind' debate
Cruz, Joseph L. H. (1998). Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture. Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support this claim
Currie, Gregory (1998). Pretence, pretending, and metarepresenting. Mind and Language 13 (1):35-55.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (eds.) (1995). Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Blackwell.   (Cited by 163 | Google)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2003). Psychological understanding and social skills. In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), _Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical_ _Development_. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003.
Egeth, Marc (2009). Representing Metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition? Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):244-254.   (Google)
Abstract: What cognitive mechanisms do people use to represent other people's mental states? Do children who have difficulty processing other people's higher-level mental states such as beliefs also have difficulty processing higher-level non-mental representations such as meta-photographs? See the preprint here or find the final version in print or on the journal website.
Eilan, Naomi; Hoerl, Christoph; Roessler, Johannes & McCormack, Teresa (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention cause the other’s. The latter can and does happen much earlier, whenever the adult follows the baby’s gaze and homes in on the same object as the baby is attending to; or, from the age of six months, when babies begin to follow the gaze of an adult. We have the relevant sense of joint attention in play only when the fact that both child and adult are attending to the same object is, to use Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) phrase, ‘mutually manifest’. Psychologists sometimes speak of such jointness as a case of attention being ‘shared’ by infant and adult, or of a ‘meeting of minds’ between infant and adult, all phrases intended to capture the idea that when joint attention occurs everything about the fact that both subjects are attending to the same object is out in the open, manifest to both participants
Eilan, Naomi M. (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention cause the other’s. The latter can and does happen much earlier, whenever the adult follows the baby’s gaze and homes in on the same object as the baby is attending to; or, from the age of six months, when babies begin to follow the gaze of an adult. We have the relevant sense of joint attention in play only when the fact that both child and adult are attending to the same object is, to use Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) phrase, ‘mutually manifest’. Psychologists sometimes speak of such jointness as a case of attention being ‘shared’ by infant and adult, or of a ‘meeting of minds’ between infant and adult, all phrases intended to capture the idea that when joint attention occurs everything about the fact that both subjects are attending to the same object is out in the open, manifest to both participants
Eilan, Naomi M. (2005). Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention cause the other’s. The latter can and does happen much earlier, whenever the adult follows the baby’s gaze and homes in on the same object as the baby is attending to; or, from the age of six months, when babies begin to follow the gaze of an adult. We have the relevant sense of joint attention in play only when the fact that both child and adult are attending to the same object is, to use Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) phrase, ‘mutually manifest’. Psychologists sometimes speak of such jointness as a case of attention being ‘shared’ by infant and adult, or of a ‘meeting of minds’ between infant and adult, all phrases intended to capture the idea that when joint attention occurs everything about the fact that both subjects are attending to the same object is out in the open, manifest to both participants
Freeman, Norman H. (1995). Theories of mind in collision: Plausibility and authority. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). The narrative alternative to theory of mind. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2004). Understanding interpersonal problems in autism: Interaction theory as an alternative to theory of mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):199-217.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. & Gallagher, Shaun (1998). The neuronal platonist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):706-717.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2003). On the relation between pretense and belief. In Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects only within that pretense-episode (e.g. the child does not expect that ‘spilling’ ( pretend) ‘tea’1 will result in the table really being wet), or more generally, to the extent that proto-beliefs and proto-attitudes concerning the pretended state of affairs are not treated as beliefs and attitudes relevant to guiding action in the actual world. Mirroring is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues (e.g. the child does expect that if she up-ends the teapot above the table, then the table will become wet in the pretense), or, more generally to the extent that imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sorts of restrictions that govern believed content
Gerrans, Philip (1998). The norms of cognitive development. Mind and Language 13 (1):56-75.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (online). Developing commonsense psychology: Experimental data and philosophical data.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have been debating the nature of folk or commonsense psychology for three decades. We ask: What are the resources that enable us to navigate the social world, anticipating what others do, explaining what they’ve done, and perceiving them--and ourselves--as selves, subjects, persons, with beliefs, desire, perceptions, and feelings? Unlike traditional philosophy of mind, instead of directly confronting the mind-body problem and subproblems such as intentionality and qualia, we step back and look at the resources that give us the concepts that get us into these knots
Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Sellars's Ryleans revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Wilfrid Sellars's essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," (1) introduced, although it did not exactly endorse, what many philosophers consider the first defense of functionalism in the philosophy of mind and the original "theory" theory of commonsense psychology
Gozzano, Simone (1997). Theory of mind and the ontology of belief. Il Cannocchiale 2 (May-August):145-156.   (Google)
Henderson, David K. (1996). Simulation theory versus theory theory: A difference without a difference in explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34:65-93.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). False-belief understanding and the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.   (Google)
Abstract: The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human social understanding than the critics suggest. First, I use standard false-belief tasks to spell out the commitments of the folk psychological picture. Next, I explicate the critics' account in terms of Michael Wheeler's distinction between online and offline intelligence. I then demonstrate the challenge that false-belief understanding -- a paradigm case of mental state understanding -- poses to the critics' online, non- mentalistic account. Recent research on false-belief understanding illustrates that mental state understanding comes in both online and offline forms. This challenges the critics' claim that our online social understanding does not require folk psychology
Hutto, Daniel D. (2004). Folk psychological narratives and the case of autism. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):345-361.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (2006). Narrative practice and understanding reasons: Reply to Gallagher. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.   (Google)
Jackson, Frank (1999). All that can be at issue in the theory-theory/simulation debate. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):77-96.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Knobe, Joshua (2005). Theory of mind and moral cognition: Exploring the connections. Trends in Cognitive Science 9:357-359.   (Google)
Abstract: An extremely brief (3 page) review of recent work on the ways in which people's moral judgments can influence their use of folk-psychological concepts
Langdon, Robyn; Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2002). Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia. Mind and Language 17 (1-2):68-104.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive neuropsychology is that branch of cognitive psychology that investi- gates people with acquired or developmental disorders of cognition. The aim is to learn more about how cognitive systems normally operate or about how they are normally acquired by studying selective patterns of cognitive break- down after brain damage or selective dif?culties in acquiring particular cogni- tive abilities. In the early days of modern cognitive neuropsychology, research focused on rather basic cognitive abilities such as speech comprehension or production at the single-word level, reading and spelling, object and face recognition, and short-term memory. More recently the cognitive-neuro- psychological approach has been applied to the study of rather more complex domains of cognition such as belief ?xation (e.g. Coltheart and Davies, 2000; Langdon and Coltheart, 2000) and pragmatic aspects of communication (e.g. McDonald and Van Sommers, 1993). Our paper concerns the investigation of pragmatic disorders in one clinical group in which such disorders are common, patients with schizophrenia, and what the study of such people can tell us about the normal processes of communication
Maibom, Heidi L. (2007). Social systems. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children
Malle, Bertram F. (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Malle, Bertram F. & Hodges, Sara D. (eds.) (2005). Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
McGeer, Victoria (2001). Psycho-practice, psycho-theory and the contrastive case of autism: How practices of mind become second-nature. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):109-132.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 124 | Google)
Abstract: The everyday capacity to understand the mind, or 'mindreading', plays an enormous role in our ordinary lives. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich provide a detailed and integrated account of the intricate web of mental components underlying this fascinating and multifarious skill. The imagination, they argue, is essential to understanding others, and there are special cognitive mechanisms for understanding oneself. The account that emerges has broad implications for longstanding philosophical debates over the status of folk psychology. Mindreading is another trailblazing volume in the prestigious interdisciplinary Oxford Cognitive Science series
Nichols, Shaun (2001). Mindreading and the cognitive architecture underlying altruistic motivation. Mind and Language 16 (4):425-455.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying altruistic motivation, one central question is the extent to which the capacity for altruism depends on the capacity for understanding other minds, or ‘mindreading’. Some theorists maintain that the capacity for altruism is independent of any capacity for mindreading; others maintain that the capacity for altruism depends on fairly sophisticated mindreading skills. I argue that none of the prevailing accounts is adequate. Rather, I argue that altruistic motivation depends on a basic affective system, a ‘Concern Mechanism’, which requires only a minimal capacity for mindreading
Nichols, Shaun (web). Mindreading and the philosophy of mind. In J. Prinz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In J. Prinz (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press
Olson, David R. (forthcoming). Self-ascription of intention: Responsibility, obligation and self-control. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: In the late preschool years children acquire a “theory of mind”, the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children’s ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children’s developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability to ascribe intentions to themselves. This is achieved, I argue, when they possess the ability to hold an utterance or rule in mind in the form of a quoted expression, and second, when they grasp the causal relation between the rule and their action. The account of how children learn to ascribe intention to themselves and others will then be used to explore the larger question of the relations amongst language, intentional states and the ascription and avowal of those states
Papafragou, Anna (2002). Mindreading and verbal communication. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):55–67.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The idea that verbal communication involves a species of mindreading is not new. Among linguists and philosophers, largely as a result of Grice’s (1957, 1967) influence, it has long been recognized that the act of communicating involves on the part of the communicator and the addressee mutual metarepresentations of each others’ mental states. In psychology, the coordination of common ground and attention in conversation has been pursued in a variety of studies (e.g. Clark and Marshall, 1981; Bruner, 1983)
Peacocke, Christopher (2005). Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: Two parents are watching their son take his first upright steps in learning to walk. Here we have a paradigm of joint attention. The two parents are attending to their son; they are aware of each other’s attention to their son; and all this attention is wholly overt. Everything is in the open, nothing is hidden. In what does this openness consist? Can we characterize it explicitly, without using metaphors?
Perner, Josef; Gschaider, A.; Kuhberger, A. & Schrofner, S. (1999). Predicting others through simulation or by theory? A method to decide. Mind and Language 14 (1):57-79.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Perner, Josef (1991). Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 1060 | Google)
Roessler, Johannes (2005). Joint attention and the problem of other minds. In Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ruffman, Ted (1996). Do children understand the mind by means of a simulation or a theory? Evidence from their understanding of inference. Mind and Language 11 (4):388-414.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Russell, James (forthcoming). Controlling core knowledge: Conditions for the ascription of intentional states to self and others by children. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as ‘the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts’ [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432–451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes the form of three concentric circles. The ‘periphery’ is analogous to Fodor’s [(1983), The modularity of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA] input systems. The ‘core’ contains copies of peripheral representations, and between these representations there is executive competition. At the ‘nucleus’, operations are performed on the core representations of, at least, negation and recursion. I argue that this provides a fruitful way in which to conceptualise why theory-of-mind tasks challenge pre-school children, how some degree of first-person authority is mental state attribution is possible, and how executive inhibition is achieved
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1999). Children's theories and the drive to explain. Science and Education 8:457-488.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1999). Gradual belief change in children. Human Development 42 (6):283-296.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Scholl, Brian J. & Leslie, Alan M. (1999). Modularity, development and "theory of mind". Mind and Language 14 (1):131-153.   (Cited by 91 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of _develop-_ _ment_: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought to be static and ‘anti-developmental’. We suggest that this mistaken view relies on an overly limited notion of modularity, and we explore how ToM might be grounded in a cognitive module and yet still afford development. Modules must ‘come on-line’, and even fully developed modules may still develop _internally_, based on their constrained input. We make these points con- crete by focusing on a recent proposal to capture the development of ToM in a module via _parameterization_
Schwitzgebel, Eric (1997). Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology. Dissertation, University of California Berkeley   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another
Spaulding, Shannon (2010). Embodied cognition and mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.   (Google)
Abstract: Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition
Sterelny, Kim (2004). The triumph of a reasonable man: Stich, mindreading, and nativism. In Michael A. Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Humans interpret others. We are able to anticipate both the actions and intentional states of other agents. We do not do so perfectly, but since we are complex and flexible creatures even limited success needs explanation. For some years now Steve Stich (frequently in collaboration with Shaun Nichols) has been both participant in, and observer of, debates about the foundation of these capacities (Stich and Nichols 1992; Stich and Nichols 1995). As a commentator on this debate, Stich (with Nichols) gave explicit and fair-minded sketches of the cognitive architectures presupposed by the various theories of mindreading. As a participant, Stich has mostly been a defender of the theory-theory, the view that normal human agents have an internally represented theory of other agents and they use that theory in interpreting other agents. The main recent rival to this position, simulationism, claims that agents use their own decision-making mechanisms as a model of those of other agents, and derive their predictions by modelling others in something like the way aeronautical engineers derive predictions from the use of scale models in wind-tunnels. Stich has been sceptical about this alternative, for on his view simulation theory makes mistaken predictions about both the development of interpretive competence and about the pattern of interpretive success and failure
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (2000). A cognitive theory of pretense. Cognition 74 (2):115-147.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by describing a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content as beliefs. Indeed, we suggest that pretense representations are in the same representational ``code'' as beliefs and that the representations in the Possible World Box are processed by the same inference and UpDating mechanisms that operate over real beliefs. Our model also posits a Script Elaborator which is implicated in the embellishment that occurs in pretense. Finally, we claim that the behavior that is seen in pretend play is motivated not from a ``pretend desire'', but from a real desire to act in a way that ®ts the description being constructed in the Possible World Box. We maintain that this account can accommodate the central features of pretense exhibited in the examples of pretense, and we argue that the alternative accounts either can't accommodate or fail to address entirely some of the central features of pretense. q 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Suddendorf, Thomas & Fletcher-Flinn, Claire (1997). Theory of mind and the origins of divergent thinking. Journal of Creative Behavior 31:169-179.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The development of a `theory of mind' may not only be important for understanding the minds of others but also for using one's own mind. To investigate this supposition, forty children between the ages of three and four were given false-belief and creativity tasks. The numbers of appropriate and of original responses in the creativity test were found to correlate positively with performance on false-belief tasks. This association was robust, as it continued to be strong and significant even when age and verbal intelligence were partialled out. The results support the hypothesis that the metarepresentational skills involved in theory of mind also affect the way children can access and scan their own mental repertoire beyond the areas of currently activated content (i.e. divergent thinking). With the advent of theory of mind a basic cognitive shift takes place in human development, and possibly took place in cognitive evolution
Tomasello, Michael & Rakoczy, Hannes (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Wegner, Daniel; Gray, H. & Gray, K. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. Science 315:619.   (Google)

7.3b.5 Folk Concepts and Folk Intuitions

Adams, Frederick R. & Steadman (online). Folk concepts, surveys and intentional action.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by Joshua Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Knobe’s surveys appear to show that the folk judge unintended but known side effects of actions to be performed intentionally. In this paper we will reject Mele’s suggestion that the Simple View is “fiction.” We will also discuss the relationship between surveys and philosophical theories, and the abilities of surveys to access folk core concepts. We will argue that considerations of both fail to support Mele’s suggestion
Bering, Jesse M. (2006). The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):453-+.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The present article examines how people’s belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one’s afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is “like” to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people’s interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive “system” dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment
Feltz, Adam & Cokely, Edward (2007). An anomaly in intentional action ascription: More evidence of folk diversity. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society.   (Google)
Gonnerman, Chad (2008). Reading conflicted minds: An empirical follow-up to Knobe and roedder. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):193 – 205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder found that folk attributions of valuing tend to vary according to the perceived moral goodness of the object of value. This is an interesting finding, but it remains unclear what, precisely, it means. Knobe and Roedder argue that it indicates that the concept MORAL GOODNESS is a feature of the concept VALUING. In this article, I present a study of folk attributions of desires and moral beliefs that undermines this conclusion. I then propose the beginnings of an alternative interpretation of the data that appeals to intrinsic biases in our third-person mindreading mechanisms
Jackman, Henry (2009). Semantic intuitions, conceptual analysis, and cross-cultural variation. Philosophical Studies 146 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: While philosophers of language have traditionally relied upon their intuitions about cases when developing theories of reference, this methodology has recently been attacked on the grounds that intuitions about reference, far from being universal, show significant cultural variation, thus undermining their relevance for semantic theory. I’ll attempt to demonstrate that (1) such criticisms do not, in fact, undermine the traditional philosophical methodology, and (2) our underlying intuitions about the nature of reference may be more universal than the authors suppose
Jorgensen, Andrew Kenneth (2010). The sky over canberra: Folk discourse and serious metaphysics. Philosophia 38 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: I take up the task of examining how someone who takes seriously the ambitious programme of conceptual analysis advocated by the Canberra School can minimise the eliminative consequences which I argue the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis recipe of conceptual analysis is likely to have for many folk discourses. The objective is to find a stable means to preserve the constative appearance of folk discourse and to find it generally successful in its attempts to describe an external world, albeit in non-scientific terms that do not reflect the nature of things. The view I settle on, quasi-fictionalism, is modelled on a modified descriptivist version of Kendall Walton’s account of prop-oriented games of make-believe
Knobe, Joshua; Malle, B. F. & Nelson, S. (2007). Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (4):491-514.   (Google)
Abstract: A long series of studies in social psychology have shown that the explanations people give for their own behaviors are fundamentally different from the explanations they give for the behaviors of others. Still, a great deal of uncertainty remains about precisely what sorts of differences one finds here. We offer a new approach to addressing the problem. Specifically, we distinguish between two levels of representation ─ the level of linguistic structure (which consists of the actual series of words used in the explanation) and the level of conceptual structure (which consists of the concepts these words are used to express). We then formulate and test hypotheses both about self-other differences in conceptual structure and about self-other differences in the mapping from conceptual structure to linguistic structure.
Morton, Adam (ms). But are they right? The prospects for empirical conceptology.   (Google)
Abstract: This is exciting stuff. Philosophers have long explored the structure of human concepts from the inside, by manipulating their skills as users of those concepts. And since Quine most reasonable philosophers have accepted that the structure is a contingent matter – we or not too different creatures could have thought differently – which in principle can be..
Knobe, Joshua & Burra, Arudra (2006). Experimental philosophy and folk concepts: Methodological considerations. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):331-342.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Experimental philosophy is a comparatively new field of research, and it is only natural that many of the key methodological questions have not even been asked, much less answered. In responding to the comments of our critics, we therefore find ourselves brushing up against difficult questions about the aims and techniques of our whole enterprise. We will do our best to address these issues here, but the field is progressing at a rapid clip, and we suspect that it will be possible to provide more adequate answers a few years down the line
Knobe, Joshua (ed.) (2007). Folk psychology: Science and morals. Springer.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely agreed that folk psychology plays an important role in people’s moral judgments. For a simple example, take the process by which we determine whether or not an agent is morally blameworthy. Although the judgment here is ultimately a moral one, it seems that one needs to use a fair amount of folk psychology along the way. Thus, one might determine that an agent broke the vase intentionally and therefore conclude that she is blameworthy for breaking it. Here it seems that one starts out with a folkpsychological judgment (that the agent acted intentionally) and then uses it as input to a process that eventually yields a moral judgment (that the agent is blameworthy). Many other cases have a similar structure. In recent years, however, a number of studies have shown that there are also cases in which the arrow of causation goes in the opposite direction. That is, there appear to be cases in which people start out with a moral judgment and then use it as input to a process that eventually yields a folk-psychological judgment (Knobe 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). These findings come as something of a surprise, and it can be difficult to know just what to make of them. My own view is that the findings are best explained by the hypothesis that moral considerations truly do play a role in people’s underlying folk-psychological concepts (Knobe 2003b, 2004, forthcoming). The key claim here is that the effects revealed in recent experiments are not the result of any kind of ‘bias’ or ‘distortion.’ Rather, moral considerations truly do figure in a fundamental way in the issues people are trying to resolve when they grapple with folk-psychological questions. I must confess, however, that not all researchers in the field share this view. Although many have been convinced that moral considerations actually do play a role in folk-psychological concepts, others have suggested that there might be better ways to account for the results of recent experiments..
Knobe, Joshua (2003). Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis 63 (3):190–194.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g
Knobe, Joshua (2003). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people’s concept of intentional action.
Knobe, Joshua (2004). Intention, intentional action and moral considerations. Analysis 64 (2):181–187.   (Google | More links)
Knobe, Joshua (2006). The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool used in prediction, explanation and control or whether it has been shaped in fundamental ways by some other aspect of its use
Knobe, Joshua & Malle, Bertram (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically-based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to directly define the term intentional, people mention four components of intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness. Study 3 confirms the importance of a fifth component, namely, skill. In light of these findings, the authors propose a model of the folk concept of intentionality and provide a further test in Study 4. The discussion compares the proposed model to past ones and examines its implications for social perception, attribution, and cognitive development
Knobe, Joshua (2006). The folk concepts of intention and intentional action: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):113-132.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent studies point to a surprising divergence between people's use of the concept of _intention_ and their use of the concept of _acting intentionally_. It seems that people's application of the concept of intention is determined by their beliefs about the agent's psychological states whereas their use of the concept of acting intentionally is determined at least in part by their beliefs about the moral status of the behavior itself (i.e., by their beliefs about whether the behavior is morally good or morally bad). These findings raise a number of difficult questions about the relationship between the concept of intention and the concept of acting intentionally. The present paper addresses those questions using a variety of different methods, including conceptual analysis, psychological experimentation, and an examination of people's use of certain expressions in other languages
Knobe, Joshua & Mendlow, Gabriel (2004). The good, the bad and the blameworthy: Understanding the role of evaluative reasoning in folk psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:252-258.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Abstract: People ordinarily make sense of their own behavior and that of others by invoking concepts like belief, desire, and intention. Philosophers refer to this network of concepts and related principles as 'folk psychology.' The prevailing view of folk psychology among philosophers of mind and psychologists is that it is a proto-scientific theory whose function is to explain and predict behavior
Korman, Daniel Z. (2009). Eliminativism and the challenge from folk belief. Noûs 43 (2):242-264.   (Google)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2008). Review of Terence E. Horgan, matjaž potrč, Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (10).   (Google)
Abstract: You could say that Horgan and Potrč aren't big on commitment. As they would have it, an ordinary utterance of 'there is a brown chair in the corner' is strictly and literally true, and yet there are no such things as chairs or corners, nor is there any such thing as being brown. Their project in Austere Realism is to supply a semantic framework in which this and other such sentences of ordinary discourse (as well as scientific discourse) are unambiguously true, despite the fact that the sorts of items that would ordinarily be taken to answer to their quantifiers, referring expressions, and predicates do not exist. The conciliatory strategy that they develop is designed to be compatible with a variety of different austere ontologies, though they ultimately come down in favor of a monist ontology on which there exists exactly one concrete particular: "the blobject," that is, the whole cosmos. Although I cannot hope to do justice to all of the intricacies of their ontological-cum-semantic theory in this review, I will do my best to touch on all of the main themes of the book, and I will try to indicate why I was not persuaded.
Machery, Eduoard; Mallon, R. & Stich, S. (web). Against arguments from reference. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press
Machery, Edouard (2006). The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ? Thanks for helpful comments to Gregory Currie, Josh Knobe, Ron Mallon, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Steve Stich, Liane Young, the readers of the blog Experimental Philosophy (http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/) as well as two anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to my research assistant on this project, Julie Sokolow, for her help and her comments
Machery, Eduoard & Livengood, J. (2007). The folk probably don't think what you think they think: Experiments on causation by absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):107-127.   (Google)
Abstract: Folk theories—untutored people’s (often implicit) theories about various features of the world—have been fashionable objects of inquiry in psychology for almost two decades now (e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994), and more recently they have been of interest in experimental philosophy (Nichols 2004). Folk theories of psy- chology, physics, biology, and ethics have all come under investigation. Folk meta- physics, however, has not been as extensively studied. That so little is known about folk metaphysics is unfortunate for (at least) two reasons. First, folk metaphysics is almost certainly implicit, and it is likely to be our default way of thinking about metaphysical problems. Moreover, one’s metaphysical commitments can have pro- found consequences—in scientific, religious, and ethical contexts, for example. Thus, folk metaphysics ought to be dragged out into the open and exposed to criticism. As Peirce eloquently remarked (1994, 1.129; see also 1994, 7.579)
Malle, Bertram F. (2006). Of windmills and straw men: Folk assumptions of mind and action. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Malle, Bertram F. (2006). The relation between judgments of intentionality and morality. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:61-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Meeks, Roblin R. (2004). Unintentionally biasing the data: Reply to Knobe. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:220-223.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Knobe (2003) wants to help adjudicate the philosophical debate concerning whether and under what conditions we normally judge that some side effect x was brought about intentionally. His proposal for doing so is perhaps an obvious one—simply elicit the intuitions of “The Folk” directly on the matter and record the results. His findings were a bit less obvious, however. When Knobe presented New York parkgoers with scenarios including either good or bad side effects, they tended to judge that the bad side effect was brought about intentionally and that the good side effect was not. In light of these responses, Knobe concludes that
[p]eople’s judgments depend in a crucial way on what x happens to be. In
particular, it makes a great deal of difference whether they think that x is
something good or something bad. (2003: 191)
He further explains this conclusion in terms of an underlying normative asymmetry, for according to Knobe the data suggests that “people are considerably more willing to blame the agent for bad side effects than to praise the agent for good side effects” (2003: 193). Hence, people’s judgment that a side effect was brought about intentionally apparently rests, at least in part, upon how blameworthy they find the agent responsible for it
Mele, Alfred R. (2003). Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.   (Cited by 66 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article reviews some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what agents do intentionally and what they intend in various stories and explores its bearing on the philosophical project of providing a conceptual analysis of intentional action. The article is a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a variety of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and vice versa. Topics examined include double effect; the influence of moral considerations on judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended; the influence of considerations of luck, skill, and causal deviance on judgments about what agents do intentionally; what interesting properties all cases of intentional action might share; and the debate between proponents of, respectively, "the Simple View" of the connection between intentional action and intention and "the Single Phenomenon View" of that connection. A substantial body of literature is devoted to the project of analyzing intentional action [1] . In this article, I explore the bearing on that project of some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended. This article may reasonably be regarded as a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a range of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and, likewise, of the potential bearing of attempted philosophical analyses of folk concepts on empirical studies of those concepts
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2006). Desire, foresight, intentions, and intentional actions: Probing folk intuitions. Journal of Cognition and Culture.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A number of philosophers working under the rubric of “experimental philosophy” have recently begun focusing on analyzing the concepts of ordinary language and investigating the intuitions of laypersons in an empirically informed way.1 In a series of papers these philosophers—who often work in collaboration with psychologists—have presented the results of empirical studies aimed at proving folk intuitions in areas as diverse as ethics, epistemology, free will, and the philosophy of action. In this paper, I contribute to this research program by discussing the results of some new experiments that further probe folk intuitions about the relationship between desire, foresight, intent, intentional action, and moral considerations
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2004). On praise, side effects, and folk ascriptions of intentionality. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:196-213.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In everyday discourse, we often draw a distinction between actions that are performed intentionally (e.g. opening your car door) and those that are performed unintentionally (e.g. shutting a car door on your finger). This distinction has interested philosophers working in a number of different areas. Indeed, intentional actions are not only the primary focus of those concerned with understanding and explaining human behavior, but they often occupy center stage in philosophical discussions of free will and moral and legal responsibility as well. And while most philosophers agree that the distinction between intentional and unintentional action plays an important role in our folk psychology, there is still wide-scale disagreement about the precise nature of this role. Until recently, there has been a lack of empirical data about the folk concept of intentional action and as a result the debate among philosophers has been mostly
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2006). On trying to save the simple view. Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the 'Simple View', intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the ordinary concept of intentional action is concerned, an agent need not intend to x in order to x intentionally
Ohreen, David E. (2006). The origins of folk psychological concepts. Facta Philosophica 8 (1/2):41-51.   (Google)
Phelan, Mark & Sarkissian, Hagop (2009). Is the 'trade-off hypothesis' worth trading for? Mind and Language 24 (2):164-180.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: Recently, the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown that the folk are more inclined to describe side effects as intentional actions when they bring about bad results. Edouard Machery has offered an intriguing new explanation of Knobe's work—the 'trade-off hypothesis'—which denies that moral considerations explain folk applications of the concept of intentional action. We critique Machery's hypothesis and offer empirical evidence against it. We also evaluate the current state of the debate concerning the concept of intentionality, and argue that, given the number of variables at play, any parsimonious account of the relevant data is implausible
Phelan, Mark T. & Sarkissian, Hagop (2008). The folk strike back; or, why you didn't do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it. Philosophical Studies 138 (2).   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain
Phillips, Jonathan & Knobe, Joshua (2009). Moral judgments and intuitions about freedom. Psychological Inquiry 20 (1):30-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Reeder’s article offers a new and intriguing approach to the study of people’s ordinary understanding of freedom and constraint. On this approach, people use information about freedom and constraint as part of a quasi-scientific effort to make accurate inferences about an agent’s motives. Their beliefs about the agent’s motives then affect a wide variety of further psychological processes, including the process whereby they arrive at moral judgments. In illustrating this new approach, Reeder cites an elegant study he conducted a number of years ago (Reeder & Spores, 1983). All subjects were given a vignette about a man who goes with his date to a pizza parlor and happens to come across a box that has been designated for charitable donations. In one condition, the man’s date then requests that he make a donation; in the other, she requests that he steal the money that is already in the box. In both conditions, the man chooses to comply with this request. The key question is how subjects will use his behavior to make inferences about whether he is a morally good or morally bad person. The results revealed a marked difference between conditions. When the man donated to charity, subjects were generally disinclined to conclude that he must have been a morally good person. It is as though they were thinking: ‘He didn’t just do this out of the goodness of his heart
Sverdlik, Steven (2004). Intentionality and moral judgments in commonsense thought about action. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:224-236.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. Philosophers of action, psychologists and moral philosophers all have taken an interest in understanding this important concept. One issue that has been discussed by philosophers is whether the concept of intentional action is purely ‘naturalistic’, that is, whether it is entirely a descriptive concept that can be used to explain and predict behavior. (Of course, judgments using such a concept could be used to support moral or evaluative judgments about responsibility, praise and blame.) A related question is whether speakers’ views about moral and evaluative issues at least affect their judgments about intentionality, even if their explicit concept of intentional action is not itself evaluative
Turner, Jason & Nahmias, Eddy A. (2006). Are the folk agent-causationists? Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Experimental examination of how the folk conceptualize certain philosophically loaded notions can provide information useful for philosophical theorizing. In this paper, we explore issues raised in Shaun Nichols' (2004) studies involving people's conception of free will, focusing on his claim that this conception fits best with the philosophical theory of agent-causation. We argue that his data do not support this conclusion, highlighting along the way certain considerations that ought to be taken into account when probing the folk conception of free will
Turner, Jason (2004). Folk intuitions, asymmetry, and intentional side effects. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24:214-219.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: An agent _S_ wants to _A_ and knows that if she _A_-s she will also bring about _B_. _S_ does not care at all about _B_. _S_ then _A_-s, also bringing about _B_. Did she _intentionally_ bring _B_ about?
Wright, Jennifer & Bengson, John (online). Asymmetries in judgments of responsibility and intentional action.   (Cited by 2 | Google)