Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
updated 2008-07-26
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
click here for help on how to search

Philosophy of Cognitive Science :: Philosophy of Neuroscience :: Representation in Neuroscience

See also:
Breidbach, Olaf (1999). Internal representations--a prelude for neurosemantics. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):403-419.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Churchland, Patricia S. & Sejnowski, Terrence J. (1989). Neural representation and neural computation. In L. Nadel (ed.), Neural Connections, Mental Computations. MIT Press.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Churchland, Paul M. (1986). Cognitive neurobiology: A computational hypothesis for laminar cortex. Biology and Philosophy 1 (1):25-51.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   This paper outlines the functional capacities of a novel scheme for cognitive representation and computation, and it explores the possible implementation of this scheme in the massively parallel organization of the empirical brain. The suggestion is that the brain represents reality by means of positions in suitably constitutes phase spaces; and the brain performs computations on these representations by means of coordinate transformations from one phase space to another. This scheme may be implemented in the brain in two distinct forms: (1) as a phase-space sandwich, which may explain certain laminar structures, such as cerebral cortex and the superior colliculus; and (2) as a neural matrix, which may explain other structures, such as the beautifully orthogonal architecture of the cerebellum
Eliasmith, Chris (2000). How Neurons Mean. Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content
Garson, James W. (2003). The introduction of information into neurobiology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):926-936.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: The first use of the term “information” to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrian's The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrian's use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic information. I suggest that Adrian's concept of information can be to derive a concept of arbitrariness or semioticity in representation. This in turn provides one way of resolving some of the challenges that confront recent attempts in the philosophy of biology to restrict the notion of information to those causal connections that can in some sense be referred to as arbitrary or semiotic
Grush, Rick (2003). In defense of some "cartesian" assumption concerning the brain and its operation. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):53-92.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract:   I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland's bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by dynamical systems theory and situated robotics to the effect that cognitive activity does not involve representations. Both of these strands depend not only on a shift of emphasis from higher cognitive functions to things like sensorimotor processes, but also depend on a certain understanding of how sensorimotor processes are implemented - as closed-loop control systems. I describe a much more sophisticated model of sensorimotor processing that is not only more powerful and robust than simple closed-loop control, but for which there is great evidence that it is implemented in the nervous system. The is the emulation theory of representation, according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensorimotor counterfactuals. I then show that the emulation framework is immune to the radical arguments, and makes apparent why the brain is a component in the cognitive activity, and exactly what the representations are in sensorimotor control
Grush, Rick (2001). The semantic challenge to computational neuroscience. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)
Kayser, Christoph & Logothetis, Nicos (2006). Vision: Stimulating your attention. Current Biology 16 (15):R581-R583.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Keeley, Brian L. (1999). Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception. Biology and Philosophy 14 (3):395-430.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)
Mandik, Pete (2003). Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):95-130.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   In this paper I discuss one of the key issuesin the philosophy of neuroscience:neurosemantics. The project of neurosemanticsinvolves explaining what it means for states ofneurons and neural systems to haverepresentational contents. Neurosemantics thusinvolves issues of common concern between thephilosophy of neuroscience and philosophy ofmind. I discuss a problem that arises foraccounts of representational content that Icall ``the economy problem'': the problem ofshowing that a candidate theory of mentalrepresentation can bear the work requiredwithin in the causal economy of a mind and anorganism. My approach in the current paper isto explore this and other key themes inneurosemantics through the use of computermodels of neural networks embodied and evolvedin virtual organisms. The models allow for thelaying bare of the causal economies of entireyet simple artificial organisms so that therelations between the neural bases of, forinstance, representation in perception andmemory can be regarded in the context of anentire organism. On the basis of thesesimulations, I argue for an account ofneurosemantics adequate for the solution of theeconomy problem
Stufflebeam, Robert S. (2001). Brain matters: A case against representations in the brain. In William P. Bechtel, P. M, Valerie , Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

11 displayed