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7.3b.3. The Simulation Theory (The Simulation Theory on PhilPapers)

See also:
Adams, Frederick R. (2001). Empathy, neural imaging and the theory versus simulation debate. Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Bernier, Paul (2002). From simulation to theory. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Biggs, Stephen (2007). The phenomenal mindreader: A case for phenomenal simulation. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper specifies two hypotheses that are intimated in recent research on empathy and mindreading. The first, the phenomenal simulation hypothesis, holds that those attributing mental states (i.e., mindreaders) sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). The second, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis, holds that this phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some mental state attributions. After explicating these hypotheses, the paper focuses on the first. It argues that neuropsychological experiments on empathy and behavioral experiments on imitation provide good reason to think that mindreaders sometimes simulate targets' phenomenal states. Accordingly, the paper concludes, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis merits consideration
Borg, Emma (2007). If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two distinct conditions: (i) when an agent performs a specific action, like a precision grasp of an object using fingers, and (ii) when an agent observes that action performed by another. Some theorists have suggested that the existence of such neurons may lend support to the simulation approach to mindreading (e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998, 'Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading'). In this note I critically examine this suggestion, in both its original and a revised form (due to Iacoboni et al., 2005, 'Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system'), and argue that the existence of mirror neurons can in fact tell us very little about how intentional attribution actually proceeds
Campbell, J. (2002). Joint attention and simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Child, William (2002). Reply to Alvin I. Goldman. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google)
Child, William (2002). Reply to Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Cruz, Joe (online). A Humean psychological alternative to Kant and Wittgenstein: Comments on Stueber's Importance of Simulation for Understanding Linguistic and Rational Agency.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Let me begin by saying that I am sympathetic to the simulation theory, especially where it is conceived of as a crucial and central addition alongside the theory-theory as the explanation of our capacity to attribute mental states, rather than as an exclusive and exhaustive account by itself.1 I part company with Professor Stueber, however, in that I view the recent simulation theory/theory- theory controversy as subject to resolution primarily through empirical findings. Still, it cannot be denied that Stueber has helped to crystallize elements of the simulation theory/theory-theory debate that have been lurking all along, and has illuminated an important avenue of inquiry into the status of simulation
Currie, Gregory & Ravenscroft, Ian (1997). Mental simulation and motor imagery. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-80.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Currie, Gregory (1996). Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from autism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Currie, Gregory (1995). Visual imagery as the simulation of vision. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (1998). Folk psychology and mental simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.1 At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (eds.) (1995). Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell.   (Cited by 164 | Google)
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2001). Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Philosophical Topics 29:127-73.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in apparent contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But amongst theory theorists, and amongst simulation theorists, there are significant differences of approach
Davies, Martin & Stone, Tony (2000). Simulation theory. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses, or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding of the thoughts, decisions or emotions of another
Davies, Martin (1994). The mental simulation debate. Philosophical Issues 5:189-218.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Decety, J. (2002). Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Dokic, Jérôme (2002). Reply to 'the scope and limit of mental simulation'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Dokic, Jérôme & Proust, Joëlle (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Fisher, Justin C. (2006). Does simulation theory really involve simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the cognitive processes involved when one person predicts a target person's behavior and/or attributes a mental state to that target person. According to simulation theory, a person typically performs these tasks by employing some part of her brain as a simulation of what is going on in a corresponding part of the brain of the target person. I propose a general intuitive analysis of what 'simulation' means. Simulation is a particular way of using one process to acquire knowledge about another process. What distinguishes simulation from other ways of acquiring knowledge is that simulation requires, for its non-accidental success, that the simulating process reflect significant aspects of the simulated process. This conceptual work is of independent philosophical interest, but it also enables me to argue for two conclusions that are of great significance to the debate about mental simulation theory. First, I argue that, in order to stake a non-trivial claim, simulation theory must hold that mental simulation involves what I call concretely similar processes. Second, I argue for the surprising conclusion that a significant class of cases that simulation theorists have claimed as intuitive cases of simulation do not actually involve simulation, after all. I close by sketching an alternative account that might handle these problematic cases
Fuller, Gary (1995). Simulation and psychological concepts. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gallese, Vittorio (2007). Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gallagher, Shaun (2006). Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do their best to avoid the theoretical stance by using their own experience as the measure of everyone else's. When it comes to explaining how we understand other people some of the very best contemporary philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists are simulationists. For example, Vittorio Gallese, Alvin Goldman, Robert Gordon, Jane Heal, Susan Hurley, and Marc Jeannerod. This short list of simulationists, however, already involves some problems. Not everyone on this list understands simulation in the same way. In effect, there are different simulation theories, and although it is important to distinguish them, and I will do so before I go much further, I will in the end argue against all of them. For several reasons I don't think that the concept of simulation explains our primary and pervasive way of understanding others, any more than theory theory does
Galgut, Elisa (2005). Simulation and irrationality. Philosophical Papers 34 (1):25-44.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems
Gallagher, Shaun (2001). The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Gallese, Vittorio (2001). The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.   (Cited by 143 | Google)
Garson, James W. (2003). Simulation and connectionism: What is the connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Simulation has emerged as an increasingly popular account of folk psychological (FP) talents at mind-reading: predicting and explaining human mental states. Where its rival (the theory-theory) postulates that these abilities are explained by mastery of laws describing the connections between beliefs, desires, and action, simulation theory proposes that we mind-read by "putting ourselves in another's shoes." This paper concerns connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory (ST) and the theory-theory (TT). It is only natural to associate TT with classical architectures where rule governed operations apply to explicit propositional representations. On the other hand, ST would seem better tuned to procedurally oriented non-symbolic structures found in connectionist models. This paper explores the possible alignment between ST and connectionist architecture. Joe Cruz argues that connectionist models with distributed non-symbolic representations are particularly well suited to simulation theory. The purported linkage between connectionist architecture and simulation theory is criticized in this paper. The conclusion is that there are reasons for thinking that connectionist forms of representation are the enemy of both TT and ST. So the contribution of connectionism may be to suggest the need for an alternative to both views
Gianfranco, S. (2002). Reply to 'from simulation to theory'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Goldman, A. (2000). Folk psychology and mental concepts. Protosociology 14:4-25.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Goldman, A. (1992). In defense of the simulation theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.   (Cited by 119 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1989). Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language 4:161-85.   (Cited by 163 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1996). Simulation and interpersonal utility. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis
Goldman, A. (2002). Simulation theory and mental concepts. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Goldman, A. (2002). The mentalizing folk. Protosociology 16:7-34.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. & Barker, John A. (1994). Autism and the "theory of mind" debate. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language 1:158-71.   (Cited by 350 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. (online). Representing minds.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: investigation).{1} We project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, . . . even into what from his behavior we imagine a mouse's state of mind to have been, and dramatize it as a belief, wish or striving, verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us in the state thus
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). 'Radical' simulationism. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 56 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Perner and Howes. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):98-103.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). Reply to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (2001). Simulation and reason explanation: The radical view. Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):175-192.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Alvin Goldman's early work in action theory and theory of knowledge was a major influence on my own thinking and writing about emotions. For that reason and others, it was a very happy moment in my professional life when I learned, in 1988, that in his presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Goldman endorsed and defended the “simulation” theory I had put forward in a 1986 article. I discovered afterward that we share a strong conviction that empirical evidence is relevant to a full assessment of the theory. We both find the burgeoning evidence from cognitive neuroscience to be of particular interest, I believe, in part because it makes possible a major departure for the philosophy of mind: turning its attention from
the neural basis of mental states,
Gordon, Robert M. (2000). Simulation and the explanation of action. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1996). Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Gordon, Robert M. & Cruz, Joe (2002). Simulation theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory
Gordon, Robert M. (1995). Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 81 | Google)
Gordon, Robert M. (1992). The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1999). Simulation, theory-theory and cognitive penetration: No 'instance of the fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Harris, P. F. (1992). From simulation to folk psychology: The case for development. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):120-144.   (Cited by 131 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1998). Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach. Mind and Language 13 (4):477-498.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (1995). How to think about thinking. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2000). Other minds, rationality and analogy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 74 (74):1-19.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1986). Replication and functionalism. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation and cognitive penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation, theory, and content. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1994). Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue? In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Heal, Jane (2000). Understanding other minds from the inside. Protosociology 14:39-55.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Henderson, David K. & Horgan, Terence E. (2000). Simulation and epistemic competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy
Herschbach, Mitchell (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts
Hoerl, Christoph (2002). Reply to Jean Decety: Perceiving Actions and Understanding Agency. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: Decety presents evidence for the claim that neural mechanisms involved in the generation of actions are also recruited in the observation and mental simulation of actions. This paper explores the relationship between such neuropsychological findings and our common-sense understanding of what it is for a person to imitate or imagine performing an action they have observed. A central question is whether imitation and imagination necessarily involve the ability to distinguish between one's own actions and those of others. It is argued that certain imitative and imaginative capacities can be present, and play a key role in the acquisition of knowledge, even in the absence of an ability to distinguish between self and other in this way.
Hutto, Daniel D. (online). Minding our language: The role of simulation in linguistic interpretation.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Historically, the philosophy of language has held pride of place in the analytical tradition. In fact, it would be safe to say that for a long time it had been unquestioningly regarded as first philosophy. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, many analytical philosophers held (and many still hold) that we could only get at the underlying nature of our world by understanding the nature of thought. And secondly, they held (and many still hold) that we could only understand the nature of thought by "an analysis of its linguistic expression" (Dummett, 1993, p. 154). Dummett recently goes so far as to tells us that the latter assumption is the fundamental axiom of analytical philosophy
Jacob, Pierre (2002). The scope and limit of mental simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Jarrold, Chris; Carruthers, Peter; Boucher, Jill & Smith, Peter K. (1994). Pretend play. Mind and Language 9 (4).   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: Children’s ability to pretend, and the apparent lack of pretence in children with autism, have become important issues in current research on ‘theory of mind’, on the assumption that pretend play may be an early indicator of metarepresentational abilities
Jeannerod, Marc & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution
Kuehberger, Anton; Kogler, Christoph; Hug, Angelika & Moesl, Evelyne (2006). The role of the position effect in theory and simulation. Mind and Language 21 (5):610-625.   (Google)
Kuhberger, A.; Perner, Josef; Schulte, M. & Leingruber, R. (1995). Choice or no choice: Is the Langer effect evidence against simulation? Mind and Language 10 (4):423-36.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kuipers, Theo A. F. (2005). Verstehen, einfhlen and mental simulation: Reply to Anne Rugh Mackor. In Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. New York: Rodopi NY.   (Google | More links)
Lebar, M. (2001). Simulation, theory, and emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it may be useful to consider the role emotion plays in the respective interpretive processes. I give reasons for believing that affective processes are more heavily involved in simulation (especially in situations of practical judgment and practical reasoning) than in theory-application. But affective processes have distinctive neurological and metabolic properties. These distinctive features of emotion may not only enrich our understanding of the simulation process, but also afford us a step towards responding to Perner's challenge
Levin, Janet (1995). Folk psychology and the simulationist challenge. Acta Analytica 10 (14):77-100.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ludwig, Pascal (2002). Reply to Can 'Radical' Simulation Theories Explain Psychological Concept Acquisition?. In J. Dokic & J. Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2007). The presence of others. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):161-190.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Hybrid accounts of folk psychology maintain that we sometimes theorize and sometimes simulate in order to understand others. An important question is why this is the case. In this paper, I present a view according to which simulation, but not theory, plays a central role in empathy. In contrast to others taking a similar approach to simulation, I do not focus on empathy’s cognitive aspect, but stress its affective-motivational one. Simulating others’ emotions usually engages our motivations altruistically. By vicariously feeling what others are feeling, we directly come to be motivated by their projects and concerns. Simulation contrasts with more theoretical approaches to psychological attribution that help us understand and explan others, but that do not move us altruistically. This helps us see why we would posit two different folk psychological approaches instead of merely one
Montero, Barbara (2006). Proprioceiving someone else's movement. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):149 – 161.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Proprioception - the sense by which we come to know the positions and movements of our bodies - is thought to be necessarily confined to the body of the perceiver. That is, it is thought that while proprioception can inform you as to whether your left knee is bent or straight, it cannot inform you as to whether someone else's knee is bent or straight. But while proprioception certainly provides us with information about the positions and movements of our own bodies, I will argue that it does more than that. Surprising as this may sound, one can proprioceive someone else's movement. To show this, I first present the results of some studies that suggest that in seeing others move, we kinesthetically represent their movement in our bodies. I then argue, by means of an analogy to prosthetic vision, that such 'kinesthetic vision' should count as proprioceiving others move
Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen P. & Leslie, Alan M. (1995). Choice effects and the ineffectiveness of simulation. Mind and Language 10 (4):437-45.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (1998). Rethinking co-cognition: A reply to Heal. Mind and Language 13 (4):499-512.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen P.; Leslie, Alan M. & Klein, David B. (1996). Varieties of off-line simulation. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over off-line simulation has largely focussed on the capacity to predict behavior, but the basic idea of off-line simulation can be cast in a much broader framework. The central claim of the off-line account of behavior prediction is that the practical reasoning mechanism is taken off-line and used for predicting behavior. However, there's no reason to suppose that the idea of off-line simulation can't be extended to mechanisms other than the practical reasoning system. In principle, any cognitive component can be taken off-line and used to perform some other function. On this view of off-line simulation, such accounts differ radically from traditional information-based accounts of cognitive capacities. And cognitive penetrability provides a wedge for empirically determining whether a capacity requires an information-based account or an off-line simulation account. Stich and Nichols (1992) argued that the simulation theory of behavior prediction was inadequate because behavior prediction seemed to be cognitively penetrable. We present empirical evidence that supports the claim that the behavior prediction is cognitively penetrable. As a result, the simulation account of behavior prediction still seems unpromising. However, off-line simulation might provide accounts of other cognitive capacities. Indeed, off- line simulation accounts have recently been offered for a strikingly diverse set of capacities including counterfactual reasoning, empathy and mental imagery. Goldman, for instance, maintains that counterfactual reasoning and empathy clearly demand off-line simulation accounts. We argue that there are alternative information-based explanations of these phenomena. Nonetheless, the off-line accounts of these phenomena are interesting and clearly worthy of further exploration
Noë, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness
Noë, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Sorting out the neural basis of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):87-98.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: noe@socrates.berkeley.edu_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: evant@yorku.ca_
Ohreen, David (2008). Empathy, Folk Psychology, and Explaining Behaviour. Res Cogitans - Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):39-56.   (Google)
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2002). Reply to Joint Attention and Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Pelletier, Jerome (2002). Reply to Varieties of Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Perner, Josef & Howes, Deborrah (1992). He thinks he knows: And more developmental evidence against the simulation (role taking) theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):72-86.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Perner, Josef (1996). Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: Arguments for a simulation-theory mix. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Perner, Josef (1994). The necessity and impossibility of simulation. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
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Proust, Joëlle (2002). Can 'radical' simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Pust, Joel (1999). External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Ravenscroft, Ian (2003). Simulation, collapse and Humean motivation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Ravenscroft, Ian (1998). What is it like to be someone else? Simulation and empathy. Ratio 11 (2):170-185.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Recanati, François (2002). Varieties of simulation. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ribeiro, Anna Christina (online). Do mirror neurons support a simulation theory of mind-reading?   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Both macaque monkeys and humans have been shown to have what are called ‘mirror neurons’, a class of neurons that respond to goal-related motor-actions, both when these actions are performed by the subject and when they are performed by another individual observed by the subject. Gallese and Goldman (1998) contend that mirror neurons may be seen as ‘a part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind- reading ability’, and that of the two competing theories of mind-reading, mirror neurons lend support to simulation theory. I here offer four reasons why I think mirror neurons do not provide support for simulation theory over its contender, theory theory
Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: The argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-79.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (ms). A difficulty for simulation theory due to the close connection of pretense and action in early childhood.   (Google | More links)
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Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1993). Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory? Mind and Language 7 (1-2):35-71.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1995). Second thoughts on simulation. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Stone, Tony & Davies, Martin (1996). The mental simulation debate: A progress report. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction For philosophers, the current phase of the debate with which this volume is concerned can be taken to have begun in 1986, when Jane Heal and Robert Gordon published their seminal papers (Heal, 1986; Gordon, 1986; though see also, for example, Stich, 1981; Dennett, 1981). They raised a dissenting voice against what was becoming a philosophical orthodoxy: that our everyday, or folk, understanding of the mind should be thought of as theoretical. In opposition to this picture, Gordon and Heal argued that we are not theorists but simulators. For psychologists, the debate had begun somewhat earlier when Heider (1958) produced his work on lay psychology; and in more recent times the psychological debate had continued in developmental psychology and in work on animal cognition
Stueber, Karsten R. (2000). Understanding other minds and the problem of rationality. In K.R. Stueber & H.H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Attitude and image, or, what will simulation theory let us eliminate?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement of scientific understanding of the mind it will be possible to entirely eliminate the mentalistic and intentional from our ontology, thus dissolving the mind-body problem. The first claim (which has been argued in detail) supplies the principal grounds for accepting the second, much more ambitious and significant, claim. Robert Gordon's (1995, 1996, 2000) radical simulation theory of "folk psychology", proposed initially (Gordon, 1986) as an alternative to "theory theory" accounts of self and interpersonal understanding, but subsequently developing into a quite general challenge to symbolic computational accounts of mind, is not merely consistent with, but actually provides considerable additional support for, the first eliminativist claim. However, although radical simulationism has no use for reified propositional attitudes, it relies on another family of mentalistic and intentional notions, including perspective taking, "seeing as", pretending, imagery, and, most centrally, imagination. It is thus inconsistent with eliminativist metaphysical ambitions. Nevertheless, from this perspective the mind-body problem is transformed. Its solution no longer depends on accounting directly for the intentionality of the attitudes, but rather on accounting for the intentionality of imagination. Although standard accounts of imagination derive its intentionality from that of the attitudes, the recently proposed "perceptual activity" theory of imagery and imagination (Thomas, 1999) can provide a direct account of the intentionality of imagination that is consistent with physicalism..
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2003). Imagining minds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):79-84.   (Google)
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Weiskopf, Daniel A. (2005). Mental mirroring as the origin of attributions. Mind and Language 20 (5):495-520.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A ‘Radical Simulationist’ account of how folk psychology functions has been developed by Robert Gordon. I argue that Radical Simulationism is false. In its simplest form it is not sufficient to explain our attribution of mental states to subjects whose desires and preferences differ from our own. Modifying the theory to capture these attributions invariably generates innumerable other false attributions. Further, the theory predicts that deficits in mentalizing ought to co-occur with certain deficits in imagining perceptually-based scenarios. I present evidence suggesting that this prediction is false, and outline further possible empirical tests of the theory
Weiskopf, Daniel A. (2008). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading - by Alvin I. Goldman. Philosophical Books 49 (2):168-170.   (Google)
Wilkerson, William S. (2001). Simulation, theory, and the frame problem: The interpretive moment. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization - that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved
Wringe, Bill (2003). Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)