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7.3c.2. Psychological Laws (Psychological Laws on PhilPapers)

Antony, Louise M. (1995). Law and order in psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:429-46.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bauer, Mark (2010). Psychological laws (revisited). Erkenntnis 73 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: It has been suggested that a functionalist understanding of the metaphysics of psychological typing eliminates the prospect for psychological laws. Kim, Millikan, and Shapiro have each separately argued that, if psychological types as functional types are multiply realized, then the diversity of realizing mechanisms demonstrates that there can be no laws of psychology. Additionally, Millikan has argued that the role of functional attribution in the explanation of historical kinds limits the formulation of psychological principles to particular taxa; hence, psychological laws applicable to any cognitive being are not possible. Both arguments against the possibility of psychological laws, I want to suggest, only succeed at showing that certain types of empirical principles will not be laws. I will suggest that a further type of empirical principle, grounded in the general constraints on the sustainability of population types, remains in the running as a candidate law. Importantly, the formulation of these principles presupposes a functionalist understanding of psychological typing
Braithwaite, Margaret (1949). Causal laws in psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 23:45-60.   (Google)
Carrier, Martin (1998). In defense of psychological laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217 – 232.   (Google)
Cleeremans, Axel (1994). Attention and awareness in sequence learning. Proceedings of the Fiftheenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society:227-232.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract: referred to as implicit learning (Reber, 1989). Implicit learning contrasts with explicit learning (exhibited for
Cleeremans, Axel (1998). Implicit learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (10):406-416.   (Cited by 201 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Implicit learning is the process through which we become sensitive to certain regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those regularities (2) in the absence of awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express
Cleeremans, Axel & Jimenez, Luis (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective. In Robert M. French & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Abstract: While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current thinking about these three issues in a way that specifically links consciousness with adaptation and learning. Our assumptions about this relationship are rooted in further assumptions about the nature of processing and of representation in cognitive systems. When considered together, we believe that these assumptions offer a new perspective on the relationships between conscious and unconscious processing and on the function of consciousness in cognitive systems
Cleeremans, Axel & Destrebecqz, Arnaud (2005). Real rules are conscious. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):19-20.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 68 words Main Text: 1256 words References: 192 words Total Text: 1516 words
Cleeremans, Axel & Destrebecqz, Arnaud (2003). The self-organizing conundrum. (Commentary on perruchet & vinter on The Self-Organizing Conundrum. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (334).   (Google)
Abstract: 59 words Main Text: 1108 words References: 114 words Total Text: 1281 words
Crawford, Sean (2003). Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts
Destrebecqz, Arnaud; Peigneux, Philippe; Laureys, Steven; Degueldre, Christian; Del Fiore, Guy; Aerts, Joel; Luxen, Andre; van der Linden, Martial; Cleeremans, Axel & Maquet, Pierre (2003). Cerebral correlates of explicit sequence learning. Cognitive Brain Research 16 (3):391-398.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Using positron emission tomography (PET) and regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) measurements, we investigated the cerebral correlates of consciousness in a sequence learning task through a novel application of the Process Dissociation Procedure, a behavioral paradigm that makes it possible to separately assess conscious and unconscious contributions to performance. Results show that the metabolic response in the anterior cingulate / mesial prefrontal cortex (ACC / MPFC) is exclusively and specifically correlated with the explicit component of performance during recollection of a learned sequence. This suggests a significant role for the ACC / MPFC in the explicit processing of sequential material.  2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Destrebecqz, Arnaud & Cleeremans, Axel (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the process dissociation procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 8 (2):343-350.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Running head: Implicit sequence learning ABSTRACT Can we learn without awareness? Although this issue has been extensively explored through studies of implicit learning, there is currently no agreement about the extent to which knowledge can be acquired and projected onto performance in an unconscious way. The controversy, like that surrounding implicit memory, seems to be at least in part attributable to unquestioned acceptance of the unrealistic assumption that tasks are process-pure, that is, that a given task exclusively involves either implicit or explicit knowledge
Destrebecqz, Arnaud; Peigneux, Philippe; Laureys, Steven; Degueldre, Christian; Del Fiore, Guy; Aerts, Joel; Luxen, Andre; Van Der Linden, Martia; Cleeremans, Axel & Maquet, Pierre (2005). The neural correlates of implicit and explicit sequence learning: Interacting networks revealed by the process dissociation procedure. Learning and Memory 12 (5):480-490.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In cognitive neuroscience, dissociating the brain networks that ing—has thus become one of the best empirical situations subtend conscious and nonconscious memories constitutes a through which to study the mechanisms of implicit learning, very complex issue, both conceptually and methodologically
Fodor, Jerry A. (1989). Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):59-79.   (Cited by 94 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.   (Cited by 47 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gaillard, Vincian; Vandenberghe, Muriel; Destrebecqz, Arnaud & Cleeremans, Axel (2006). First and third-person approaches in implicit learning research. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain
Guarini, Marcello (2000). Horgan and Tienson on ceteris paribus laws. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hannay, Alastair (1995). Conscious episodes and ceteris paribus. The Monist 78 (4):447-463.   (Google)
Harman, Gilbert (1967). Scriven on the unknowability of psychological laws. Philosophical Studies 18 (June):61-63.   (Google | More links)
Henderson, David K. (1991). On the testability of psychological generalizations (psychological testability). Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (1990). Soft laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15:256-279.   (Annotation | Google)
Jimenez, Luis; Mendez, Castor & Cleeremans, Axel (1996). Comparing direct and indirect measures of sequence learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 22 (4):948-969.   (Cited by 71 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Comparing the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect measures of learning is proposed as the best way to provide evidence for unconscious learning when both conceptual and operative definitions of awareness are lacking. This approach was first proposed by Reingold & Merikle (1988) in the context of subliminal perception. In this paper, we apply it to a choice reaction time task in which the material is generated based on a probabilistic finite-state grammar (Cleeremans, 1993). We show (1) that participants progressively learn about the statistical structure of the stimulus material over training with the choice reaction time task, and (2) that they can use some of this knowledge to predict the location of the next stimulus in a subsequent “generation” task. However, detailed partial correlational analyses of the correspondence between performance during the reaction time task and the statistical structure of the training material showed that large effects remained even when controlling for explicit knowledge as assessed by the generation task. Hence we conclude (1) that at least some of the knowledge expressed through reaction time performance can not be characterized as conscious, and (2) that even when associations are found at a global level of analysis, dissociations can still be obtained when more detailed analyses are conducted. Finally, we also show that participants are limited in the depth of the contingencies they can learn about, and that these limitations are shared by the Simple Recurrent Network model of Cleeremans & McClelland (1991)
Kincaid, Harold (2004). There are laws in the social sciences. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Publishing.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kitchener, Richard F. (1976). Are there molar psychological laws? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6 (2).   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1981). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1981). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Mace, C. A. (1949). Causal laws in psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 23:61-68.   (Google)
Mace, C. D. (1949). Causal laws in psychology, part III. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-68.   (Google)
Maquet, Pierre; Laureys, Steven; Peigneux, Philippe; Fuchs, Sonia; Petiau, Christophe; Phillips, Christophe; Aerts, Joel; Del Fiore, Guy; Degueldre, Christian; Meulemans, Thierry; Luxen, Andre; Franck, Georges; Van Der Linden, Martial; Smith, Carlyle & Cleeremans, Axel (2000). Experience-dependent changes in cerebral activation during human Rem sleep. Nature Neuroscience 3 (8):831-36.   (Cited by 174 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pierre Maquet1,2,6, Steven Laureys1,2, Philippe Peigneux1,2,3, Sonia Fuchs1, Christophe Petiau1, Christophe Phillips1,6, Joel Aerts1, Guy Del Fiore1, Christian Degueldre1, Thierry Meulemans3, André Luxen1, Georges Franck1,2, Martial Van Der Linden3, Carlyle Smith4 and Axel Cleeremans5
Marcello, G. (2000). Horgan and Tienson on ceteris paribus laws. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):301-315.   (Google)
Mott, Peter (1992). Fodor and ceteris paribus laws. Mind 101 (402):335-46.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Pietroski, Paul M. & Rey, Georges (1995). When other things aren't equal: Saving ceteris paribus laws from vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.   (Cited by 48 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora of explanatory commitments; and claims that such commitments are satisfied will be as (dis) confirmable as other empirical claims
Poortinga, Ype H. & Van de Vijver, Fons J. R. (1997). Is there no cross-cultural evidence in colour categories of psychological laws, only of cultural rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):205-206.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (2008). Ceteris paribus laws, component forces, and the nature of special-science properties. Noûs 42 (3):349-380.   (Google | More links)
Rupert, Robert D. (2007). Realization, completers, and Ceteris Paribus laws in psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing a, or she gets distracted from her goal that q, or she suddenly has a severe brain hemorrhage, or.... No one can say precisely where the list ends, but the idea is supposed to be clear enough: normally the law holds, but there are many cases, exceptions, one might say, in which the law does not; the difficulty of characterizing these exceptions invites the qualification ‘c.p.’ as a catch-all
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1991). Ceteris paribus laws. Mind 100 (397):1-17.   (Cited by 51 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Silverberg, Arnold (2003). Psychological laws. Erkenntnis 58 (3):275-302.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   John McDowell claims that the propositional attitudes, and our conceptual abilities in general, are not appropriate topics for inquiry of the sort that is done in natural science. He characterizes the natural sciences as making phenomena intelligible in terms of their place in the realm of laws of nature. He claims that this way of making phenomena intelligible contrasts crucially with essential features of our understanding of propositional attitudes and conceptual abilities. In this article I show that scientific work of the sort McDowell claims cannot be done is in fact being done, and that this work presents strong evidence that there are psychological laws. The research I discuss is that by the psychologist Norman H. Anderson and his colleagues. I also argue that the considerations McDowell presents in defense of his claims do not constitute a significant challenge to the research that Anderson and his colleagues have done. It will be noted in the article that Anderson's work is relevant not just to McDowell's writings, but also to several much discussed issues in philosophy of cognitive science: the above two issues of whether there can be a science of ordinary psychological phenomena, higher cognition, comparable to that of the natural sciences and whether such a science would present laws, and also the issue of whether in such a science, and its laws, notions of folk psychology would play crucial constitutive roles. Anderson's work presents strong grounds for affirmative answers to all of these questions
Silverberg, Arnold (1996). Psychological laws and nonmonotonic logic. Erkenntnis 44 (2):199-224.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this essay I enter into a recently published debate between Stephen Schiffer and Jerry Fodor concerning whether adequate sense can be made of the ceteris paribus conditions in special science laws, much of their focus being on the case of putative psychological laws. Schiffer argues that adequate sense cannot be made of ceteris paribus clauses, while Fodor attempts to overcome Schiffer's arguments, in defense of special science laws. More recently, Peter Mott has attempted to show that Fodor's response to Schiffer fails, and furthermore that further study shows that the logical framework in which Schiffer and Fodor address their issue is susceptible to inconsistency.In this essay I argue that adequate sense can be made of ceteris paribus conditions. Against Mott, I argue that recent work in the model theory of non-monotonic logic indicates how his problem involving logical inconsistencies can be overcome. Against Schiffer, I argue that the claims that he makes against ceteris paribus clauses would lead to a fatal skepticism concerning indefinitely many of the claims we make about the world (and indeed that his claims would be destructive of the view of the special sciences that Schiffer himself presents in his paper), and that the semantical considerations from non-monotonic logic that I present provide a suitable framework for dealing with his complaints. Thus I come out on the whole on Fodor's side of this debate, although for my own reasons, as I argue against much of Fodor's own argumentation
Spohn, Wolfgang (2002). Laws, ceteris paribus conditions, and the dynamics of belief. Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn out that a law is simply the deterministic analogue of a sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables. This entails that de Finetti's representation theorems can be directly transformed into an account of confirmation of laws thus conceived
Stueber, Karsten, Intentional explanation, psychological laws, and the irreducibility of the first person perspective.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction: Naturalism and Psychological Explanations To a large extent, contemporary philosophical debate takes place within a framework of naturalistic assumptions. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, naturalism is the legacy of positivism without its empiricist epistemology and empiricist conception of meaning and cognitive significance. Systematically, it is best to characterize naturalism as the philosophical articulation of the underlying presuppositions of a reductive scientific research program that was rather successful in the last few centuries and, equally important, promises to be so in the future particularly in the biological sciences and the neurosciences. It seems as if the secrets of human life and behavior and the mysteries of the mind will be cracked on the molecular level of the genes or the brain, or at least so we are told. Viewed in this manner it is understandable why philosophical naturalism tends to be committed to monism, both as a metaphysical or ontological claim and as a methodological position in the philosophy of social science. Naturalists are inclined to adopt a physicalist ontology that rejects free floating Cartesian substances and they view higher order macroscopic facts and properties as being dependent or supervenient on basic micro-physical facts. Naturalists, furthermore, expect that any scientific explanation of higher order properties has to provide an account of why and how these lower order facts give rise to higher order ones. These ontological and epistemic commitments also underpin a position of methodological monism in regard to the social sciences and the explanation of human agency. If the above ontological picture is correct then there is no reason to expect that the structure of the sciences dealing with higher order properties on the social level should fundamentally differ in their methodology from the natural sciences. In both domains of investigation, scientists will develop and make explanatory use of comprehensive and empirically well supported theories with adequate predictive powers that describe....
Warfield, Ted A. (1993). Folk-psychological ceteris-paribus laws. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):99-112.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Witmer, G. (2003). Multiple realizability and psychological laws: Evaluating Kim's challenge. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 1 | Google)