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7.3d. Philosophy of Psychology, Misc (Philosophy of Psychology, Misc on PhilPapers)

Adams, E. M. (1967). Mind and the language of psychology. Ratio 9 (December):122-139.   (Google)
Angell, James Rowland (1907). The province of functional psychology. Psychological Review 14:61-91.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Bergmann, Gustav (1940). On some methodological problems of psychology. Philosophy of Science 7 (April):205-219.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2005). Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Bickle, John (2002). Philosophy of mind and the sciences. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Block, Ned (ed.) (1981). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Block, Ned (ed.) (1980). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 79 | Google)
Block, Ned & Segal, Gabriel (1998). The philosophy of psychology. In Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Brown, Stuart C. (ed.) (1974). Philosophy Of Psychology. London,: Macmillan.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Brunswik, Egon (1976). The conceptual focus of some psychological systems. Erkenntnis 8 (1).   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bunge, Mario & Ardila, Ruben (1987). Philosophy Of Psychology. Springer.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Campagnac, E. T. (1923). An appeal to psychologists. Mind 32 (127):289-303.   (Google | More links)
Candlish, Stewart (online). Testing Wittgenstein's dismissal of experimental psychology against examples.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most notorious — and dismissive — passages in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is Part II section xiv, which begins like this: The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. Strong words. But we know that at one stage in his life Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology was sufficient for him to have done some experimental research, and that he was well acquainted with the work of at least some of the prominent psychologists active in his own lifetime. That is, his quoted remarks were not made from ignorance; and we should accordingly take them seriously enough to consider why he made them, what he had in mind, and to what extent — if any — they may have been (and, though this was all a long time ago, may still be) justified
Carruthers, Peter (2002). Human creativity: Its evolution, its cognitive basis, and its connections with childhood pretence. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 53 (2):225-249.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other¾namely, capacities to generate and to reason with suppositions (or imagined possibilities). Second, it argues that the evolutionary function of childhood pretence is to practice and enhance adult forms of creativity. The paper goes on to show how these proposals can provide a smooth and evolutionarily-plausible explanation of the gap between the first appearance of our species in Southern Africa some 100,000 years ago, and the 'creative explosion' of cultural, technological and artistic change which took place within dispersed human populations some 60,000 years later. The intention of the paper is to sketch a proposal which might serve as a guide for future interdisciplinary research
Cerf, Walter (1962). Studies in philosophical psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):537-558.   (Google | More links)
Chaplin, William F. (1987). On the thoughtfulness of cognitive psychologists. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:269-279.   (Google)
Chace Tolman, Edward (1935). Psychology versus immediate experience. Philosophy of Science 2 (3):356-380.   (Google | More links)
Corballis, Michael C. (1988). Psychology's place in the science of the mind/brain? Biology and Philosophy 3 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen 2008. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of “hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Costall, Alan (ed.) (1987). Cognitive Psychology In Question. St Martin's Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Dewey, John (1897). The psychology of effort. Philosophical Review 6 (1):43-56.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dobbs, H. A. C. (1946). 'Substance' in psychology. Mind 55 (July):193-203.   (Google | More links)
Duca, Simone (2009). Rationality and the Wason Selection Task: a Logical Account. Psyche 15 (1):109-131.   (Google)
Abstract: The main goal of the paper is to investigate the relation between indicative conditionals and rationality. We wil l do this by consider- ing several interpretations of a very wel l-known example of reasoning involving conditionals, that is the Wason selection task, and showing how those interpretations have different bearings on the notion of ra- tionality. In particular, in the first part of the paper, after having briefly presented the selection task, we wil l take a look at two prag- matic responses to the chal lenge posed by the task, through Wason’s notion of confirmation bias and Grice’s theory of conversational im- plicature. The second part wil l introduce Adams’ probabilistic view of indicative conditionals and wil l give reasons for preferring his account to those aforementioned. The conclusion wil l evaluate the question of human rationality in the light of the new standpoint acquired.
Feest, U. (2003). Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):937-948.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology
Fodor, Jerry A. (2003). Hume's program (and ours). In Hume Variation. Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Garrett, Richard (1991). Why not naturalistic psychology? Philosophia 20 (4):377-385.   (Google | More links)
Gauld, Alan (1989). Cognitive psychology, entrapment, and the philosophy of mind. In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008). Alief and belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript]
Gendler, Tamar (2009). Alief in action (and reaction). Mind & Language 23 (5):552-585.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2004). Thought experiments rethought—and reperceived. Philosophy of Science 71 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Contemplating imaginary scenarios that evoke certain sorts of quasi‐sensory intuitions may bring us to new beliefs about contingent features of the natural world. These beliefs may be produced quasi‐observationally; the presence of a mental image may play a crucial cognitive role in the formation of the belief in question. And this albeit fallible quasi‐observational belief‐forming mechanism may, in certain contexts, be sufficiently reliable to count as a source of justification. This sheds light on the central puzzle surrounding scientific thought experiment, which is how contemplation of an imaginary scenario can lead to new knowledge about contingent features of the natural world
Gopnik, Alison & Schwitzgebel, Eric (1998). Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology. In M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This chapter examines several ways in which philosophical attention to intuition can contribute to empirical scientific psychology. The authors then discuss one prevalent misuse of intuition. An unspoken assumption of much argumentation in the philosophy of mind has been that to articulate our folk psychological intuitions, our ordinary concepts of belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, is itself sufficient to give a theoretical account of what belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, actually are. It is believed that this assumption rests on an inadequate understanding of the nature of intuition and its appropriate applications, and that it results in errors. Three notable examples of this sort of misuse of intuition in philosophy are briefly discussed. Finally, the authors provide developmental evidence for the mutability and fallibility of everyday intuitions about the mind, evidence that undermines arguments, that depend on taking such intuitions as a final authority for substantive claims about what the mind is like.
Griffing, Harold (1896). On the relations of psychology to other sciences. Philosophical Review 5 (5):489-501.   (Google | More links)
Gross, Steven (2001). Book review. Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong Jerry Fodor. Mind 110 (438).   (Google)
Guthrie, E. R. (1924). Purpose and mechanism in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 21 (25):673-681.   (Google | More links)
Hartshorne, Charles (1934). The parallel development of method in physics and psychology. Philosophy of Science 1 (4):446-459.   (Google | More links)
Harre, Rom (2004). The relevance of the philosophy of psychology to a science of psychology. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2002). Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science: Reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology. Mind and Language 17 (3):207-232.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article critically examines the views that psychology ?rst came into existence as a discipline ca. 1879, that philosophy and psychology were estranged in the ensuing decades, that psychology ?nally became scienti?c through the in?uence of logical empiricism, and that it should now disappear in favor of cognitive science and neuroscience. It argues that psychology had a natural philosophical phase (from antiquity) that waxed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this psychology transformed into experimental psychology ca. 1900, that philosophers and psychologists collaboratively discussed the subject matter and methods of psychology in the ?rst two decades of the twentieth century, that the neobehaviorists were not substantively in?uenced by the Vienna Circle, that the study of perception and cognition in psy- chology did not disappear in the behaviorist period and so did not reemerge as a result of arti?cial intelligence, linguistics, and the computer analogy, that although some psychologists adopted the language-of-thought approach of traditional cognitive science, many did not, and that psychology will not go away because it contributes independently of cognitive science and neuroscience
Hatfield, Gary (1995). Remaking the science of mind: Psychology as a natural science. In C. Fox, R. Porter & R. Wokler (eds.), Inventing Human Science. University of California Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Inventing Human Science, ed. by Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 184–231. Key words: Wolff, Bonnet, Godart, Krüger, Hartley, Priestley, history of psychology in the 17th and 18th centuries, history of experiment in psychology, psychology as a natural science, idea of a natural science
Hearnshaw, L. S. (1941). Psychology and operationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 19 (April):44-57.   (Google | More links)
Hodge, K. Mitch (2008). Descartes Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption that Humans are Intuitive Cartesian Dualists. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.   (Google)
Abstract: This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally identical, and that the mind is the sole source of identity) are not compatible with cultural representations such as mythologies, funerary rites, iconography and doctrine as well as empirical evidence concerning intuitive folk reasoning about the mind and body concerning the afterlife. Finally, the article







suggests an alternative and more parsimonious explanation for understanding intuitive folk representations of the afterlife.
Hodge, K. Mitch (forthcoming). Why Immortality Alone will not get Me to the Afterlife. Philosophical Psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this; the simulation constraint theory (Bering 2002), the imaginative obstacle

theory (Nichols 2007) and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of those theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal immortality, leave



an explanatory gap in that they do not explain why one would intuitively attribute survival of death to others. To fill in the gap, I offer a cognitive theory based on offline social reasoning and social embodiment which provides for the belief in an eternal social realm in which the deceased survive—the afterlife.
Huda, M. (1963). Contemporary psychology and its status as a science. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 10:46-53.   (Google)
Hughes, Percy (1927). Theory and practise in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 24 (5):113-120.   (Google | More links)
Hyslop, James H. (1895). Desiderata in psychology. Philosophical Review 4 (5):531-535.   (Google | More links)
Jack, Anthony I. & Roepstorff, Andreas (2004). Trust or interaction? Editorial introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8).   (Google)
James, William (1892). A plea for psychology as a 'natural science'. Philosophical Review 1 (2):146-153.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Johnson, Gregory (2008). LeDoux's Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):739 - 757.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.
Johnson, Gregory (2009). Mechanisms and functional brain areas. Minds and Machines 19 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Explanations of how psychological capacities are carried out often invoke functional brain areas. I argue that such explanations cannot succeed. Psychological capacities are carried out by identifiable entities and their activities in the brain, but functional brain areas are not the relevant entities. I proceed by assuming that if functional brain areas did carry out psychological capacities, then these brain areas could be included in descriptions of mechanisms. And if functional brain areas participate in mechanisms, then they must engage in activities. A number of ways in which we might understand the claim that functional brain areas engage in activities are examined. None are successful, and so one conclusion is that functional brain areas do not participate in mechanisms. Consequently, they are not the entities that carry out psychological capacities
Jones, Anne H. (1915). The method of psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (17):462-471.   (Google | More links)
Kline, Paul (1987). Philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kukla, André (1989). Non-empirical issues in psychology. American Psychologist 44:485-94.   (Annotation | Google)
Leslie, Sarah-Jane (forthcoming). The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization. The Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Louch, A. R. (1962). Science and psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (February):314-327.   (Google | More links)
Loveday, T. (1909). On certain objections to psychology. Mind 18 (70):208-230.   (Google | More links)
Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1922). The paradox of the thinking behaviorist. Philosophical Review 31 (2):135-147.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Macdonald, Graham F. (1980). Psychology and physical science. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):32-35.   (Google)
Macdonald, Cynthia (ed.) (1995). Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Madden, Edward H. (1957). A logical analysis of 'psychological isomorphism'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (November):177-191.   (Google | More links)
Madden, Edward H. (1962). Philosophical Problems Of Psychology. Odyssey Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mandler, George & Kessen, William (1959). The Language Of Psychology. Wiley.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Martínez Manrique, Fernando & Vicente, Agustín (2005). Overhearing a Sentence: Recanati and the Cognitive View of Language. Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (219):251.   (Google)
Abstract: Many pragmaticians have distinguished three levels of meaning involved in the comprehension of utterances, and there is an ongoing debate about how to characterize the intermediate level. Recanati has called it the level of ‘what is said’ and has opposed the idea that it can be determined semantically — a position that he labels ‘pragmatic minimalism’. To this end he has offered two chief arguments: semantic underdeterminacy and the Availability Principle. This paper exposes a tension between both arguments, relating this discussion with Carruthers’s cognitive view of language, according to which some thoughts are, literally, sentences of our natural language. First we explain how this view entails minimalism, and we construct an argument based on semantic underdeterminacy that shows that natural language sentences do not have the compositional properties required to constitute thoughts. Then we analyze the example of a subject’s overhearing a sentence without an interpretive context, arguing that in the light of the Availability Principle the corresponding thought can be regarded as a natural language sentence. Thus, semantic underdeterminacy and availability pull in different directions, and we claim that there is no characterization of the latter that can relieve this tension. We contend that Recanati’s availability shares with Carruthers’s introspectivism an overreliance on intuitions about what appears consciously in one’s mind. We conclude, therefore, that the Availability Principle ought to be abandoned.
Margolis, Joseph (1984). Philosophy Of Psychology. Englewood: Cliffs Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Martin, J. E. (1971). Theoretical languages in psychology. Philosophy of Science 38 (September):344-352.   (Google | More links)
Misiak, Henryk (1961). The Philosophical Roots Of Scientific Psychology. Fordham University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mischel, Theodore (1970). Wundt and the conceptual foundations of psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (September):1-26.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Moore, Jared S. (1923). A defense of the foundations of psychology. Journal of Philosophy 20 (15):405-413.   (Google | More links)
O'neil, W. M. (1949). The relation of inner experience and overt behaviour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 27 (May):27-45.   (Google | More links)
O'Nuillain, S.; McKevitt, Paul & MacAogain, E. (eds.) (1997). Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Peters, R. S. (1951). Observationalism in psychology. Mind 60 (January):43-61.   (Google | More links)
Phillips, Dayton Z. (1946). The foundations of experience. Philosophy of Science 13 (April):150-165.   (Google | More links)
Preston, Beth (1994). Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative? Synthese 100 (2):167-96.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively exhaustive either, on the grounds that dropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctively different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alternative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualism
Qadir, C. A. (1961). Methodology of psychology. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 8:133-144.   (Google)
Rignano, E. (1926). Psychology in its relations to philosophy and science. Mind 35 (140):441-451.   (Google | More links)
Rockwell, Teed (ms). The effects of atomistic ontology on the history of psychology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: _This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how_ _those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of_ _Wundt, his most well known disciples, Titchener and Külpe, embraced an atomistic view of experience which_ _was at_ _least partly responsible for many of their failures. When the behaviorists rejected the_ _introspectionism of Titchener and Külpe, they kept their atomism, using the reflex_
Rogosin, H. (1942). Scientific method in current psychology. Philosophy of Science 9 (April):183-188.   (Google | More links)
Smith, Joel (2006). Review of Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Edited by N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack and J. Roessler. Mind 115 (460):1126-9.   (Google | More links)
Rupert, Robert D. (2007). Realization, completers, and Ceteris Paribus laws in psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing a, or she gets distracted from her goal that q, or she suddenly has a severe brain hemorrhage, or.... No one can say precisely where the list ends, but the idea is supposed to be clear enough: normally the law holds, but there are many cases, exceptions, one might say, in which the law does not; the difficulty of characterizing these exceptions invites the qualification ‘c.p.’ as a catch-all
Scripture, E. W. (1891). The problem of psychology. Mind 16 (63):305-326.   (Google | More links)
Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism 5:1-10.   (Cited by 55 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1979). A physicalist account of psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4).   (Google | More links)
Smith, Frederick V. (1959). Psychological concepts and linguistic restraints. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (November):223-227.   (Google | More links)
Somerville, John (1934). The strange case of modern psychology. Journal of Philosophy 31 (21):571-577.   (Google | More links)
Spaulding, Shannon (2010). Embodied cognition and mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.   (Google)
Abstract: Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition
Stevens, S. S. (1936). Psychology: The propaedeutic science. Philosophy of Science 3 (1):90-103.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, A. E. (1906). The place of psychology in the classification of the sciences. Philosophical Review 15 (4):380-386.   (Google | More links)
Titchener, Edward Bradford (1899). Structural and functional psychology. Philosophical Review 8 (3):290-299.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Titchener, Edward Bradford (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology. Philosophical Review 7 (5):449-465.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Titchener, Edward Bradford (1893). Two recent criticisms of 'modern' psychology. Philosophical Review 2 (4):450-458.   (Google | More links)
Trumbull Ladd, George (1911). The ontological problem of psychology. Philosophical Review 20 (4):363-385.   (Google | More links)
Vuysje, D. (1956). "Verification" of statements in psychology. Synthese 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: (1) In contradistinction to mathematics, physics and biology, psychology and psychiatry deal to a large extent with the verbal behaviour of their objects. They are faced with two kinds of sense-problems: those with which the observer has to do in his theory-construction, and those which are characteristic of the verbal behaviour of his subjects.(2) Apart from a schematic and simplified usage, as it occurs in filling-up exercises and other laboratory verbal behaviour, the psychologist has to do with statements the sense of which, on the one hand, is determined by the usage of his subjects and, on the other hand, so far as his records and theory are concerned, by his own language-sense
Watson, John B. (1893). Metaphysic and psychology. Philosophical Review 2 (5):513-528.   (Google | More links)
Whiton Calkins, Mary (1907). Psychology: What is it about? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (25):673-683.   (Google | More links)
Whiton Calkins, Mary (1923). The foundations of psychology. Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):5-15.   (Google | More links)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1975). Anthropomorphism and analogy in psychology. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (April):126-137.   (Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (2005). Philosophy of psychology. In Sahotra Sarkar (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the most prominent four examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting
Wundt, Wilhelm (1969). Outlines of Psychology.   (Cited by 105 | Google)