MindPapers: 7.3e. Neurophilosophy

Bechtel, William P. & McCauley, Robert N. (1999). Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience. In Martin Hahn & S.C. Stoness (eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Functionalists in philosophy of mind traditionally raise two major arguments against the type identity theory: (1) psychological states are _multiply realizable_ so that there are no one-to-one mappings of psychological states onto neural states and (2) the most that evidence could ever establish is the _correlation_ of psychological and neural states, not their identity. We defend a variant on the traditional type identity theory which we call _heuristic identity theory_ (HIT) against both of these objections. Drawing its inspiration from scientific practice, heuristic identity theory construes identity claims as hypotheses that guide subsequent inquiry, not as conclusions of the research

Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness. Psycoloquy 11 (35). (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1)

Bickle, John (1997). From sensory neuroscience to neurophilosophy: Reflections on llinas and Churchland's mind-brain continuum. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530. (Google | Edit)

Brain, Walter R. (1951). Mind, Perception And Science. Blackwell Scientific. (Cited by 26 | Google | Edit)

Briscoe, Robert (forthcoming). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the two visual systems hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency.

Campbell, Charles A. (1953). Philosophy and brain physiology. Philosophical Quarterly 3 (January):51-56. (Google | More links | Edit)

Changeux, Jean-Pierre & Ricoeur, Paul (2002). What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue About Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. Princeton. (Cited by 22 | Google | Edit)

Chessick, Richard D. (1953). Neurological studies and philosophical problems. Philosophy of Science 20 (October):300-312. (Google | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1980). A perspective on mind-brain research. Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207. (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (2002). Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. MIT Press. (Cited by 79 | Google | More links | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1987). Epistemology in the age of neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84 (October):546-53. (Cited by 25 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1990). Is neuroscience relevant to philosophy? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 323:323-341. (Google | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press. (Cited by 964 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1988). Replies. Biology and Philosophy 3 (3). (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1986). Replies to comments to symposium on Patricia Smith Churchland's neurophilosophy. Inquiry 29 (June):241-272. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1988). Replies to reviews of Psychology's Place in the Science of the Mind/Brain. Biology and Philosophy 3 (July):393-402. (Google | Edit)

Churchland, Paul M. (2006). Into the brain: Where philosophy should go from here. Topoi 25 (1-2):29-32. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The maturation of the cognitive neurosciences will throw light on many central philosophical issues. Among them: semantic theory, perception, learning, social and moral knowledge, and practical reasoning and decision making. As contemporary medicine cannot do without the achievements of modern biology, philosophy would be pitiful if it disregarded the achievements of brain research

Churchland, Paul M. (2007). Neurophilosophy at Work. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Churchland, Paul M. (1998). The neural representation of the social world. In The Digital Phoenix. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Cited by 17 | Google | Edit)

Hatfield, Gary (1988). Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and empirical constraints. Cognitive Neuropsychology 5:723-46. (Google | Edit)

Klagge, James C. (1989). Wittgenstein and neuroscience. Synthese 78 (March):319-43. (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Lowenhard, Percy (1989). The mind-body problem: Some neurobiological reflections in reductionism and systems theory. In The Life Sciences: Some Problems and Perspectives. Norwell: Kluwer. (Google | Edit)

Madell, Geoffrey C. (1986). Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response. Inquiry 29 (June):153-168. (Google | Edit)

Mandik, Pete (online). The introspectibility of brain states as such. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental

Minsky, Marvin L. (online). Interior grounding, reflection, and self-consciousness. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Some computer programs are expert at some games. Other programs can recognize some words. Yet other programs are highly competent at solving certain technical problems. However, each of those programs is specialized, and no existing program today shows the common sense or resourcefulness of a typical two-year-old child—and certainly, no program can yet understand a typical sentence from a child’s first-grade storybook. Nor can any program today can look around a room and then identify the things that meet its eyes

Morin, Alain (2003). The self and its brain: A critical examination of The Face in the Mirror. Science and Consciousness Review 1. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Where is the self located in the brain? This is a question that has intrigued philosophers and scientists for quite some time. Four centuries ago, the French philosopher René Descartes thought that the self resided in the pineal gland, a small structure centrally positioned in the lower brain

Myin, Erik (2000). Direct self-consciousness. Psycoloquy. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view

Roskies, Adina L. (2002). Neuroethics for the new millennium. Neuron 35 (1):21-23. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem- plate how progress in each will affect the other. The past several months have seen heightened interest

_The Ethics of Neuroscience_

in the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided popular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May

Sereno, Martin (1986). A program for the neurobiology of mind. Inquiry 29 (June):217-240. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Smith, A. (1986). Brain-mind philosophy. Inquiry 29 (June):203-15. (Google | Edit)

Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1986). Nemo psychologus nisi physiologus. Inquiry 29 (June):168-185. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Young, J. Z. (1951). Doubt And Certainty In Science. Clarendon Press. (Cited by 31 | Google | Edit)

7.3e	Neurophilosophy [32]

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