Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

7.4. Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology (Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology on PhilPapers)

See also:
Gerrans, Philip (2003). Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):41-52.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Nativists about syntactic processing have argued that linguisticprocessing, understood as the implementation of a rule-basedcomputational architecture, is spared in Williams syndrome, (WMS)subjects – and hence that it provides evidence for a geneticallyspecified language module. This argument is bolstered by treatingSpecific Language Impairments (SLI) and WMS as a developmental doubledissociation which identifies a syntax module. Neuroconstructivists haveargued that the cognitive deficits of a developmental disorder cannot beadequately distinguished using the standard gross behavioural tests ofneuropsychology and that the linguistic abilities of the WMS subject canbe equally well explained by a constructivist strategy of neurallearning in the individual, with linguisitic functions implemented in anassociationist architecture. The neuroconstructivist interpretation ofWMS undermines the hypothesis of a double dissociation between SLI andWMS, leaving unresolved the question of nativism about syntax. Theapparent linguistic virtuosity of WMS subjects is an artefact ofenhanced phonological processing, a fact which is easier to demonstratevia the associationist computational model embraced byneuroconstructivism
Lloyd, Dan (1998). The Fables of Lucy R.: Association and Dissociation in Neural Networks. In Dan J. Stein & J. Ludick (eds.), Neural Networks and Psychopathology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: According to Aristotle, "to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind," (Poetics 1448b). But even as he affirms the unbounded human capacity for integrating new experience with existing knowledge, he alludes to a significant exception: "The sight of certain things gives us pain, but we enjoy looking at the most exact images of them, whether the forms of animals which we greatly despise or of corpses." Our capacity for learning is happily engaged in viewing representations of painful objects, but not, it seems, in viewing the objects themselves. When an experience is intensely painful, what then is a rational animal to do? We can neither disable our learning process, nor erase its traces. In the face of intense pain, horror, or terror, learning and remembrance cause no pleasure but rather persistent psychological pain and disruption. The memorious mind reverberates with trauma
Mullen, Paul E. (2007). On building arguments on shifting sands. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 143-147.   (Google)
Silvdaa, Roberto R. Evangelista (2007). Life as a process of production. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 239-242.   (Google)
Thornton, Tim (2006). The ambiguities of mild cognitive impairment. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):21-27.   (Google | More links)

7.4a Psychopathology and Emotion

Angelette, Will (ms). Rationality, emotion, and belief revision: Waller's move beyond CBT & REBT.   (Google)
Abstract:      Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client affect. I suggest that, if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one whose objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision. I then note some limitations of the new proposal and the possibility of incommensurability in the comparison of our different views
Appelbaum, Paul S. (1998). Ought we to require emotional capacity as part of decisional competence? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8 (4).   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1998). Appreciation and emotion: Theoretical reflections on the Macarthur treatment competence study. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8 (4).   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (2009). Technological reason and the regulation of emotion. In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fujiwara, Esther & Kinsbourne, Marcel (2006). Forging a link between cognitive and emotional repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):519-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Erdelyi distinguishes between cognitive and emotional forms of repression, but argues that they use the same general mechanism. His discussion of experimental memory findings, on the one hand, and clinical examples, on the other, does indeed indicate considerable overlap. As an in-between level of evidence, research findings on emotion in neuroscience, as well as experimental and social/personality psychology, further support his argument
Hillman, James (1960). Emotion: A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meaning for Therapy. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Lacewing, Michael (2004). Emotion and cognition: Recent developments and therapeutic practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (2):175-186.   (Google | More links)
McEachrane, Michael (2009). Capturing emotional thoughts: The philosophy of cognitive-behavioral therapy. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Medford, Nick & David, Anthony S. (2006). Learning from repression: Emotional memory and emotional numbing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):527-528.   (Google)
Abstract: Erdelyi argues persuasively for his unified theory of repression. Beyond this, what can studying repression bring to our understanding of other aspects of emotional function? Here we consider ways in which work on repression might inform the study of, on one hand, emotional memory, and on the other, the emotional numbing seen in patients with chronic persistent depersonalization symptoms
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2002). Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that the sciences constitute a derivative means of disclosing the world and our place within it, as opposed to an ontologically and epistemologically privileged domain of inquiry
Shanker, Stuart G. (2004). Autism and the dynamic developmental model of emotions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):219-233.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shibles, Warren A. (1974). Emotion: The Method Of Philosophical Therapy. Language Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Whiting, Demian (2004). Emotional disorder. Ratio 17 (1):90-103.   (Google | More links)

7.4b Delusions

Bayne, Timothy J. & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2004). Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some otherwise rational people appear to believe strange things. Sometimes people believe that someone, usually a near relative or member of their family - often their spouse - has been replaced by an impostor. Sometimes people believe that they are dead. These two delusions – known as the Capgras and Cotard delusion respectively – are instances of monothematic delusions, for they are limited to very specific topics. Other monothematic delusions involve the delusion that one is being followed by known people in disguise (the Frégoli delusion), or that the person one sees in the mirror is someone else (mirrored-self misidentification). We will focus on the Capgras delusion
Bayne, Tim, Delusion and self-deception: Mapping the terrain.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located and introduces the reader to some of the general issues that frame the discussion of subsequent chapters
Bayne, Timothy J. & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2005). In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained
Berrios, G. (1991). Delusions as 'wrong beliefs': A conceptual history. British Journal of Psychiatry 159:6-13.   (Cited by 48 | Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders. Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Broome, Matthew (2009). A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition
Bortolotti, Lisa (forthcoming). Classification and diagnosis in psychiatry: delusions and confabulations. Paradigmi.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (online). Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals
Bortolotti, Lisa (2005). Delusions and the background of rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place
Bortolotti, Lisa, Epistemic rationality and the definition of delusions.   (Google)
Abstract: According to one argument for the anti-doxastic conception of delusions, delusions are not beliefs because they are not responsive to evidence and responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In this paper, I concede that delusions are not responsive to evidence, but I challenge the other premise of this anti-doxastic argument, namely, that responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In order to undermine the premise, I describe instances of non-pathological beliefs that strenuously resist counterevidence. I conclude that considerations about responsiveness to evidence do not necessarily lead us to deny that delusions are beliefs. On the contrary, they seem to support the view that there is continuity between delusions and non-pathological beliefs
Bortolotti, Lisa & Broome, Matthew (2008). Delusional beliefs and reason giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which deluded subjects are committed to the content of their delusional beliefs, that is, to whether they can be regarded as authors of their beliefs (Moran 2001). We consider several levels of commitment one can have to a reported belief, delusional or otherwise, and we distinguish between _ownership_ and _authorship_ of beliefs (Gallagher 2000). After examining some examples of belief authoring (or lack thereof) in psychopathology, we argue that there is no straight-forward and unitary answer to the question whether deluded subjects author their beliefs. Nevertheless, introducing the notion of authorship in the debate can significantly contribute to the philosophical literature on the rationality of delusions and can also have important implications for diagnosis and therapy in psychiatry
Breen, Nora; Caine, Diana; Coltheart, Max; Hendy, Julie & Roberts, Corrine (2000). Towards an understanding of delusions of misidentification: Four case studies. Mind and Language 15 (1):74–110.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, J. (2001). Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Chadwick, Ruth F. (1994). Kant, thought insertion, and mental unity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):105-113.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cochrane, Thomas I. (2007). Religious delusions and the limits of spirituality in decision-making. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (7):14 – 15.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Commentary: Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Coltheart, Max & Davies, Martin (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Blackwell, 2000 Review by George Graham, Ph.D on Oct 27th 2000 Volume: 4, Number: 43
Cooper, David E. (1981). Delusions of modesty: A reply to my critics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 15 (1):125–135.   (Google | More links)
Corlett, J. Angelo (2009). Dawkins' God less delusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3).   (Google)
Cowley, Fraser (1991). Metaphysical Delusion. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Currie, Gregory & Jureidini, Jon (2001). Delusion, rationality, empathy. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):159-62.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Currie, Gregory (2000). Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin; Davies, Anne Aimola & Coltheart, Max (2005). Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):241-57.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to the right hemisphere of the brain. In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with anosognosia for hemiplegia. But we shall also use the term ‘anosognosia’ in an inclusive way to encompass lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of any impairment. Indeed, in the construction ‘anosognosia for X’, X might even be anosognosia for some Y
Davidson, Larry (1994). Commentary on insight, delusion, and belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (4):243-244.   (Google)
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Abstract: who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
Davies, Martin; Coltheart, Max; Langdon, Robyn & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: 1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of alien control and of thought insertion, which are characteristic of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992)
Dawkins, Richard (1998). Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for Wonder. Houghton Mifflin.   (Google)
Abstract: Did Newton "unweave the rainbow" by reducing it to its prismatic colors, as Keats contended? Did he, in other words, diminish beauty? Far from it, says Dawkins--Newton's unweaving is the key too much of modern astronomy and to the breathtaking poetry of modern cosmology. Mysteries don't lose their poetry because they are solved: the solution often is more beautiful than the puzzle, uncovering deeper mystery. (The Keats who spoke of "unweaving the rainbow" was a very young man, Dawkins reminds us.) With the wit, insight, and spellbinding prose that have made his books worldwide bestsellers, Dawkins addresses the most important and compelling topics in modern science, from astronomy and genetics to language and virtual reality, and combines them in a landmark statement of the human appetite for wonder. This is the book that Richard Dawkins was meant to write: a brilliant assessment of what science is (and what it isn't), a tribute to science "not because it is useful (though it is), but but because it is uplifting, in the same way as the best poetry is uplifting."
Dennett, Daniel (ms). Review of Richard Dawkins, the God delusion for free inquiry.   (Google)
Abstract: We agree about most matters, and have learned a lot from each other, but on one central issue we are not (yet) of one mind: Dawkins is quite sure that the world would be a better place if religion were hastened to extinction and I am still agnostic about that. I don’t know what could be put in religion’s place–or what would arise unbidden–so I am still eager to explore the prospect of reforming religion, a task that cries out for a better understanding of the phenomena, and hence a lot more research than has yet been attempted
Dutton, Denis (ms). Delusions of postmodernism.   (Google)
Abstract: That postmodernism is a general cultural mood and a style in art, architecture, and literature is uncontroversial. But does postmodernism present a coherent intellectual doctrine or theory of politics, art, or life? In the discussion which follows, I will concentrate on two aspects of the intellectual pretensions of postmodernism. First, I examine the postmodernist claim that to justify the idea that the postmodern world is characterized by a general indeterminacy of meaning. Next I will look at aspects of the postmodernist contention that the present age has witnessed the decline of individuality
Egan, Andy (online). Imagination, delusion, and self-deception.   (Google)
Abstract: Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife is has been replaced by an impostor, we might say that the victim of Capgras delusion believes that it is, in some respects, as if his wife has been replaced by an impostor. Another is to say that we’ve misidentified the attitude that the delusional subject bears to the content of their delusion. So for example, Gregory Currie and co-authors have suggested that rather than believing that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, we should say that the victim of Capgras delusion merely imagines that his wife has been replaced by an impostor.3
Franceschi, Paul (ms). An analytic view of delusion.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions
Frankish, Keith, Delusions: A two-level framework.   (Google)
Abstract: Although well-documented, delusions have proved extremely hard to explain, and many important questions remain open, including the basic one of what kind of mental state a delusion is. The standard position is that delusions are beliefs (the doxastic conception); but there are difficulties for this view, and alternative characterizations have been offered. In this chapter I shall propose a new framework for conceptualizing delusions, building on recent work in philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. There are good reasons for thinking that the term ‘belief’ is commonly used to refer to two different types of mental state, located at different levels. This view harmonizes with work in the psychology of reasoning, where many researchers now endorse some form of dual system theory. I shall outline what is, I believe, the most attractive version of this two-level view and show how it offers an account of delusions that explains our competing intuitions about their status. The chapter is in four sections. The first introduces the doxastic conception and its problems. The second distinguishes the two levels of belief, and argues that delusions, if they are beliefs at all, belong to the second. The third section offers an account of second-level belief, according to which it is a species of a broader mental type, acceptance, which is dependent on attitudes at the first level. The fourth section proposes that delusions are acceptances, some of which fall within, and some without, the narrower class of secondlevel beliefs, and the chapter concludes with some reflections on the implications of this view. Throughout, I shall focus on monothematic delusions, rather than the elaborate polythematic kind, and use simple, schematic examples. This is not because I think it is unimportant to pay attention to the diversity of delusions and the detail of clinical observation (far from it). Rather, it reflects the modest aim of the chapter, which is to propose a hypothesis for subsequent elaboration and evaluation..
Fulford, K. W. M. (1993). Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion, belief and Searle's theory of intentionality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality
Fulford, Kwm (2004). Neuro-ethics or neuro-values? Delusion and religious experience as a case study in values-based medicine. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):297-313.   (Google)
Abstract: Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by a case study of the differential diagnosis between delusion and religious experience. In a traditional model of scientific medicine, such challenges would be expected to become less pressing with advances in medical science. Philosophical value theory suggests, to the contrary, that scientific progress, through opening up an ever-wider range of choices, will increasingly bring the full range and diversity of human values into play not just in psychiatry but in all areas of medicine. The future, then, for medicine, is an integrated model in which VBM and EBM are equal partners in a genuinely human discipline
Fulford, K. William M. (1994). Value, illness, and failure of action: Framework for a philosophical psychopathology of delusions. In George Graham & Lester D. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Garvey, Brian (1999). Adolf Grünbaum on religious delusions. Religious Studies 35 (1):19-35.   (Google)
Gerrans, Philip (2002). A one-stage explanation of the cotard delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation of the difference in content between the Capgras and Cotard delusions. That explanation treats them as alternative rationalizations of essentially the same phenomenology. I show, however, that once we distinguish the phenomenology (and the neuroetiology), a one-stage model is adequate. In the final section I make some more general remarks on the oneand two-stage models
Gerrans, Philip (2001). Delusions as performance failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Delusions are explanations of anomalous experiences. A theory of delusion requires an explanation of both the anomalous experience _and _the apparently irrational explanation generated by the delusional subject. Hence, we require a model of rational belief formation against which the belief formation of delusional subjects can be evaluated. _Method. _I first describe such a model, distinguishing procedural from pragmatic rationality. Procedural rationality is the use of rules or procedures, deductive or inductive, that produce an inferentially coherent set of propositions. Pragmatic rationality is the use of procedural rationality _in context_. I then apply the distinction to the explanation of the Capgras and the Cotard delusions. I then argue that delusions are failures of pragmatic rationality. I examine the nature of these failures employing the distinction between performance and competence familiar from Chomskian linguistics. _Results. _This approach to the irrationality of delusions reconciles accounts in which the explanation of the anomalous experience exhausts the explanation of delusion, accounts that appeal to further deficits within the reasoning processes of delusional subjects, and accounts that argue that delusions are not beliefs at all. (Respectively, one-stage, two-stage, and expressive accounts.) _Conclusion. _In paradigm cases that concern cognitive neuropsychiatry the irrationality of delusional subjects should be thought of as a performance deficit in pragmatic rationality
Gerrans, Philip (1999). Delusional misidentification as subpersonal disintegration. The Monist 82 (4):590-608.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gerrans, Philip (2000). Refining the explanation of cotard's delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: An elegant theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry explains the Capgras and Cotard delusions as resulting from the same type of anomalous phenomenal experience explained in different ways by different sufferers. ‘Although the Capgras and Cotard delusions are phenomenally distinct, we thus think that they represent patients’ attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences’ (Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 168). On the theory proposed by Young and Leafhead, the anomalous experience results from damage to an information processing subsystem which associates an affect of ‘familiarity’ with overt recognition of faces, and, sometimes, scenes and objects. When the normal affect of familiarity is absent the subject experiences an unusual feeling of derealization or depersonalization. The Cotard and Capgras patients adopt different, delusional, explanations of this unusual qualitative state, for reasons to do with ‘attributional style’. It is part of this attribution hypothesis that delusional subjects, like normal people, interpret perceptual phenomena in the light of a set of background beliefs whose structure is a product of social/contextual influences and individual psychological dispositions. That structure predisposes people to reason in certain ways, to discount or reinterpret evidence and to favour certain hypoth-
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (1999). An empirical approach to understanding delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):21-24.   (Google | More links)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). The limits of subjectivity: A response to the commentary. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):207-208.   (Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (2004). Cognition: Brain pain: Psychotic cognition, hallucinations, and delusions. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gillett, Grant (1990). Insight from delusion. Inquiry 33 (2):231 – 244.   (Google)
Gold, Ian & Hohwy, Jakob (2000). Rationality and schizophrenic delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):146-167.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1993). Mind and mine. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Graham, George (2004). Self-ascription: Thought insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hak, Tony (1998). "There are clear delusions." The production of a factual account. Human Studies 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents a case study of a psychiatric intervention as an example of an institutional ethnography of psychiatric work. Institutional ethnography, a mode of inquiry outlined by Dorothy Smith (1987), is conceived here as an approach to the analysis of work in institutions as the contingent, local and context-bound insertion of a particular "case" - a patron, a pupil, a client, a patient - into both institutional and other social (e. g. gender, class) relations. The case presented in this paper, shows how a psychiatric factual account is the outcome of a process of the recognition, and/or the production, of "mentionables," followed by the documentary interpretation of mentionables as symptoms. Subsequently it is demonstrated that, and how, the recognition of mentionables depends on non-professional interpretations which by their nature express other social (such as gender, class, etc.) relations. This description of psychiatric diagnostic work is produced by means of a method of discourse analysis that consists of the juxtaposition of the various institutional texts (the two reports) with the transcript of the interview. An analysis of only the interview data would undoubtedly have resulted in some insights about psychiatric interviewing but would have shown neither how the interview functioned as a stage in the institutional process of (re)writing reports nor how ideological evaluations entered the diagnostic process. On the other hand, an analysis of only the two reports would have resulted in some insights about psychiatric reporting but would not have shown how these reports were produced
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). On thought insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their experiences have to be explained in terms of a withdrawal, on the part of the patients themselves, from certain forms of active engagement in reasoning. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between this view and the idea that patients’ reports of thought insertion reflect a situation in which the boundaries between the self and the world have become uncertain.
Hohwy, Jakob (2004). Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Hohwy, Jakob & Rosenberg, Raben (2005). Unusual experiences, reality testing and delusions of alien control. Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with which delusions are maintained, their often bizarre content, the patients' inability to dismiss them, and their often circumscribed character
Hopkin, Charles Edward (1982). The Share of Thomas Aquinas in the Growth of the Witchcraft Delusion. Ams Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction.--pt. I. The demonology of Thomas Aquinas.--pt. II. Thomas Aquinas as mediator between earlier and later beliefs.--Conclusion.--Bibliography (p. 185-188)
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignmont's model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.   (Google)
Abstract: De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented.
Kennett, Jeanette & Matthews, Steve (2003). Delusion, dissociation and identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and that there is little theoretical motivation to yield to that view in light of the fact that the core symptoms of DID bear remarkable similarity to the symptoms of these other disorders where no such extravagance is ever seriously entertained.
Klee, Robert (2004). Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):25-34.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Langdon, Robyn (2009). Confabulation and delusion: A review of Hirstein's brain fiction. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):785 – 802.   (Google)
Langdon, Robyn & Coltheart, Max (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Ledwig, Marion (2007). Richard Dawkins the God delusion. (London: Bantam press; new York NY: Houghton mifflin company, 2006). Pp. X+406. £20.00; $27.00 (hbk). ISBN 0618680004. Religious Studies 43 (3):368-372.   (Google)
Levi, Don S. (2004). The root delusion enshrined in common sense and language. Asian Philosophy 14 (1):3 – 23.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is a critique of certain arguments given by the Milindapanha and Jay Garfield for the conventional nature of reality or existence. These arguments are of interest in their own right. They also are significant if they are presumed to attack an obstacle we all face in achieving non-attachment, namely, our belief in the inherent or substantial existence of ourselves and the familiar objects of our world. The arguments turn on a distinction between these objects, and some other way of conceiving of them, in terms of which their conventional existence becomes apparent. After the distinction and the arguments that depend on it are shown to be problematic, the paper concludes with some reflections on the doctrine of skillful means and its applicability to Buddhist philosophical argument
Lloyd, G. E. R. (2005). The Delusions of Invulnerability: Wisdom and Morality in Ancient Greece, China, and Today. Duckworth.   (Google)
Loizzo, Joseph (1994). Commentary on insight, delusion, and belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (4):241-242.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
MacDonald, Angus W. (2008). A sneaking suspicion: The semantics of emotional beliefs and delusions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):719-720.   (Google)
Maher, B. A. (2003). Schizophrenia, aberrant utterance and delusions of control: The disconnection of speech and thought, and the connection of experience and belief. Mind and Language 18 (1):1-22.   (Google | More links)
Mahbubani, Kishore (2009). The dangers of democratic delusions. Ethics and International Affairs 23 (1):19-25.   (Google)
Milward, Peter (2008). The God delusion. By Richard Dawkins. Heythrop Journal 49 (4):696–700.   (Google | More links)
Oltmanns, T. F. & Maher, B. A. (1988). Delusional Beliefs. John Wiley.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Orr, David (1994). Green delusions: An environmentalist critique of radical environmentalism. Environmental Ethics 16 (3):329-332.   (Google)
Pacherie, Elisabeth; Green, Melissa & Bayne, Timothy J. (2006). Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). Similarly, the Cotard delusion (which involves the belief that one is dead or unreal in some way) may stem from a general..
Parnas, Josef (2004). Belief and pathology of self-awareness: A phenomenological contribution to the classification of delusions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):148-161.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Parnas, Josef & Sass, Louis A. (2001). Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):101-120.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Parsons, Elsie Clews (1917). The teleological delusion. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (17):463-468.   (Google | More links)
Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, (2006). Sources of delusion in analytica posteriora 1. Phronesis 51 (3):252-284.   (Google)
Abstract: Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in Analytica Posteriora 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into thinking we have a primary-universal proof. These three sources of delusion are shown to concern situations in which our arguments do establish the desired conclusion for the largest possible domain, but still fail to be real primary-universal proofs. Presupposing the concept of what may be called an immediate proof, in which something is proved of an arbitrary individual, Aristotle in response now demands that a proof be immediate of the primary thing itself and goes on to sketch a framework in which an intensional criterion for primacy can be formulated.For the most part this article is a comprehensive and detailed commentary on Aristotle's very concise exposition in 1.5. One important result is that the famous passage 74a17-25 referring to two ways of proving the alternation of proportions cannot be used as evidence for the development of pre-Euclidean mathematics
Radulescu, Anca (ms). Psychic embedding — vision and delusion.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper introduces the idea that the human brain may apply complex mathematical modules in order to process and understand the world. We speculate that the substrate of what appears outwardly as intuition, or prophetic power, may be a mathematical apparatus such as time-delay embedding. In this context, predictive accuracy may be the reflection of an appropriate choice of the embedding parameters. We further put this in the perspective of mental illness, and search for the possible differences between good intuition and delusive ideation. We speculate that the task at which delusional schizophrenic patients falter is not necessarily of perception, but rather of model selection. Failure of the psychotic patient to correctly choose the embedding parameters may readily lead to misinterpretation of an accurate perception through an altered reconstructed of the object perceived
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2004). Interpreting delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of delusional experience can serve to make explicit the manner in which we ordinarily experience the world under a taken-for-granted aspect of affective familiarity. This implicit feeling is, I argue, partly constitutive of our sense of reality. However, so-called ''folk psychology,'' which is generally adopted by philosophers as an initial interpretive backdrop for delusional beliefs and for beliefs more generally, fails to accommodate it. As a consequence, some pervasive philosophical assumptions concerning the manner in which we experience and understand the world, ourselves, and each other are called into question
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2008). The phenomenological role of affect in the capgras delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate the role played by ‘affective relatedness’ in constituting (a) a sense of who a particular person is and (b) a sense of others as people rather than impersonal objects. I draw on the phenomenological concept of horizon to offer an interpretation of the Capgras experience that shows how the content ‘this entity is not my spouse but an impostor’ can be part of the experience, rather than something that is inferred from a strange experience
Roessler, Johannes (2001). Understanding delusions of alien control. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):177-187.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Rust, John (1990). Delusions, irrationality, and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):123-138.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sheredos, Benjamin, Embodied delusions and intentionality.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton’s claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions
Southard, E. E. (1916). On the application of grammatical categories to the analysis of delusions. Philosophical Review 25 (3):424-455.   (Google | More links)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (2004). Reconceiving delusions. International Review of Psychiatry 16:236-241.   (Google)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (2005). The delusional stance. In M. Chung, K. William M. Fulford & George Graham (eds.), The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Stone, Tony & Young, Andrew W. (1997). Delusions and brain injury: The philosophy and psychology of belief. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Thornton, Tim (2002). Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introduction. Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 Method. Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. Results. Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, non- question-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. Conclusions. A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion
Thornton, Tim (2008). Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions
Tumulty, Maura, Delusions and dispositional beliefs.   (Google)
Abstract: In some ways, someone suffering from the delusion that his or her spouse has been kidnapped and replaced with an imposter appears to believe that he or she eats dinner with an imposter every night. But the imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it hard to classify them as beliefs, and easier to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie want to use Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief to restore confidence in the doxastic character of delusion. While dispositionalism appears to allow us to classify delusions as beliefs, this allowance isn’t a robust vindication of doxasticism. The significance of the allowance can be increased by emphasizing the role of folk-psychological norms in individuating propositional attitudes. But letting those norms play a large role in the individuation of belief makes it hard to count as believers the deluded subjects who violate most such norms. Dispositionalism about belief can’t defend doxasticism about delusion
Young, Andrew W. (1999). Delusions. The Monist 82 (4):571-589.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Young, Garry (2006). Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion
Young, Garry (2008). Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the capgras delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined, emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed

7.4c Other Mental Disorders

Arpaly, Nomy (2005). How it is not "just like diabetes": Mental disorders and the moral psychologist. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):282–298.   (Google | More links)
Bavidge, Michael (2006). Under the floorboards: Examining the foundations of mild cognitive impairment. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):75-77.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bond, John & Corner, Lynne (2006). Mild cognitive impairment: Where does it go from here? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):29-30.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Cox, Rochelle (2009). 'Faultless' ignorance: strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.
Cruz, Joe (1997). Simulation and the psychology of sociopathy. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 20 (3):525-527.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2007). Norms, conventions, and psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 163-170.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). The responsibility of the psychopath revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.   (Google)
Abstract: The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2005). Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy. Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality
Matravers, Matt (2007). Holding psychopaths responsible. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 139-142.   (Google)
Metzinger, Thomas (2003). Why are identity disorders interesting for philosophers? In T Schramme & J Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: “Identity disorders” constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms of self-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients’ phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content (for example, complete losses of proprioception, resulting in a “bodiless” state of self-consciousness, see Cole 1995, Gallagher and Cole 1995, Sacks 1998). There are also various typologies of phenomenal disintegration as in schizophrenia, in depersonalization disorders and in_ Dissociative Identity Disorder_ (DID), sometimes accompanied by multiplications of the phenomenal self within one and the same physical system. It is important to not only analyze these state-classes in terms of functional deficits or phenomenology alone, but as _self-representational _content as well. For instance, in the second type of cases just mentioned, we confront major redistributions of the phenomenal property of "mineness” in representational space, of what is sometimes also called the “sense of ownership”. Finally, there are at least four different delusions of misidentification (DM1; namely Capgras syndrome, Frégoli syndrome, intermetamorphosis, reverse intermetamorphosis and reduplicative paramnesia). Being a philosopher, I will discuss two particular types of identity disorder
2
in this contribution - disorders, which are of direct philosophical relevance: A specific form of DM, and the Cotard delusion. Why should philosophers do this? And why should psychiatrists care?
Nichols, Manuel Vargas Shaun (2007). Psychopaths and moral knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 157-162.   (Google)
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicago   (Google)
Abstract: This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM.
Vargas, Shaun Nichols Manuel (2007). How to be fair to psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 153-155.   (Google)

7.4d Mental Illness

Adshead, Gwen (1999). Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bach, Kent (1993). Emotional disorder and attention. In George Graham (ed.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Some would say that philosophy can contribute more to the occurrence of mental disorder than to the study of it. Thinking too much does have its risks, but so do willful ignorance and selective inattention. Well, what can philosophy contribute? It is not equipped to enumerate the symptoms and varieties of disorder or to identify their diverse causes, much less offer cures (maybe it can do that-personal philosophical therapy is now available in the Netherlands). On the other hand, the scientific study of mental disorder has a long way to go. There is much disagreement and uncertainty about the nature, causes, and treatment of many specific disorders, as is evident from DSM's classification of them in predominantly symptomatic terms. And even if what is reflected in DSM were a consensus rather than a compromise, still this shifts periodically with each new edition. Moreover, it is a notorious fact that many patients who clearly have psychiatric abnormalities do not fit any of the recognized diagnostic categories.1
Bjorklund, M. S.; RN, ; CS, & PMHNP, (2004). 'There but for the grace of God': Moral responsibility and mental illness. Nursing Philosophy 5 (3):188–200.   (Google | More links)
Blashfield, Elizabeth H. Flanagan Roger K. (2007). Clinicians' folk taxonomies of mental disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 249-269.   (Google)
Abstract: Using methods from anthropology and cognitive psychology, this study investigated the relationship between clinicians’ folk taxonomies of mental disorder and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Expert and novice psychologists were given sixty-seven DSM-IV diagnoses, asked to discard unfamiliar diagnoses, put the remaining diagnoses into groups that had “similar treatments” using hierarchical (making more inclusive and less inclusive groups) and dimensional (placing groups in a two-dimensional space) methodologies, and give names to the groups in their taxonomies. Clinicians were familiar with a substantially smaller number of diagnoses than are in the DSM. Cultural consensus analysis and follow-up residual agreement analysis revealed similarities across clinicians’ folk taxonomies. Correlations between folk taxonomies and the DSM were moderate. Cluster analysis showed that clinicians preserved DSM higher order categories (e.g., mood disorders) but not the Axis I–Axis II distinction. This study suggests important differences between the way clinicians conceptualize mental disorders and the organization of the DSM-IV
Blashfield, Elizabeth H. Flanagan Roger K. (2007). Should clinicians' views of mental illness influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 285-287.   (Google)
Boivin, Suzanne M. Phillips Monique D. (2007). Hildegard and holism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 377-379.   (Google)
Boivin, Suzanne M. Phillips Monique D. (2007). Medieval holism: Hildegard of bingen on mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 359-368.   (Google)
Abstract: Current efforts to think holistically about mental disorder may be assisted by considering the integrative strategies used by Hildegard of Bingen, a twelfth-century abbess and healer. We search for integrative strategies in the detailed records of Hilde-gard’s treatment of the noblewoman Sigewiza and in Hildegard’s more general writings. Three strategies support Hildegard’s holistic thinking: the use of narrative approaches to mental illness, acknowledging interdependence between perspectives, and applying principles of balance to the relationships between perspectives. Applying these three strategies to the present-day conceptualization and treatment of mental disorder could move us toward a more thoroughly integrated understanding of the field
Bolton, Derek (2001). Problems in the definition of 'mental disorder'. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):182-199.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals
Brendel, David H. (2007). Beyond Engel: Clinical pragmatism as the foundation of psychiatric practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 311-313.   (Google)
Brendel, David H. (2007). Psychophysical causation and a pragmatist approach to human behavior. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 205-207.   (Google)
Brülde, Bengt (2007). Art and science, facts and knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 111-127.   (Google)
Brülde, Bengt & Radovic, Filip (2006). Dysfunctions, disabilities, and disordered minds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):133-141.   (Google)
Brülde, Bengt (2007). Mental disorder and values. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 93-102.   (Google)
Abstract: It is now generally agreed that we have to rely on value judgments to distinguish mental disorders from other conditions, but it is not quite clear how. To clarify this, we need to know more than to what extent attributions of disorder are dependent on values. We also have to know (1) what kind of evaluations we have to rely on to identify the class of mental disorder; (2) whether attributions of disorder contain any implicit reference to some specific evaluative standard; and (3) whether the concept of mental disorder is value laden in the definitional or in the epistemic sense. I will argue that the evaluations we have to rely on are mainly considerations of harm, but that we also need to rely on other evaluations; that there should be no references to specific evaluative standards; and that even though mental disorders are necessarily undesirable, "mental disorder" may well be a descriptive phrase
Brülde, Bengt & Radovic, Filip (2006). What is mental about mental disorder? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):99-116.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Mental illness as mental: a defence of psychological realism. Humana.Mente 11.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can lead either to instrumentalism or to eliminativism about psychiatry, depending on whether psychiatric classification is regarded as useful. Position (2), which is inspired by the growing interest in neuroscience within scientific psychiatry, leads to biological realism or essentialism. In this paper we endorse a different realist position, which we label psychological realism. Psychiatric disorders are identified and addressed on the basis of their psychological manifestations which are often described as violations of epistemic, moral or social norms. A couple of examples are proposed by reference to the pathological aspects of delusions, and the factors contributing to their formation.
Broome, Matthew; Bortolotti, Lisa & Mameli, Matteo (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: a case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187.   (Google)
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (2010). What's wrong with 'mental' disorders? Psychological Medicine.   (Google)
Abstract: Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V".
Canali, Stefano (2004). On the concept of the psychological. Topoi 23 (2):177-86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The idea that certain mental phenomena (e.g. emotions, depression, anxiety) can represent risk factors for certain somatic diseases runs through common thinking on the subject and through a large part of biomedical science. This idea still lies at the focus of the research tradition in psychosomatic medicine and in certain interdisciplinary approaches that followed it, such as psychoneuroimmunology. Nevertheless, the inclusion in the scientific literature of specifically mental phenomena in the list of risk factors pertaining to a specific pathological condition would seem, to say the least, problematic when not completely absent, unlike what happens for certain behavioural factors, such as smoking, sedentary life, and alcohol abuse. It is also significant that insurance companies and health and welfare services do not pay for interventions and treatment for states of anxiety, disorders of mood and of the personality, alexithymia and stress reduction, as means of prevention or treatment of somatic diseases, as instead they do for the treatment of tobacco addiction. However, as I shall endeavour to argue here, there are numerous and well grounded reasons why this different consideration of psychic conditions compared with behaviours is valid and must be maintained in the evaluation of pathogenetic risk factors
Champlin, T. S. (2008). The metaphor of mental illness - by Neil Pickering. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):353-355.   (Google)
Cheetham, Jochen Fahrenberg Marcus (2007). Assumptions about human nature and the impact of philosophical concepts on professional issues: A questionnaire-based study with 800 students from psychology, philosophy, and science. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 183-201.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical anthropology is concerned with assumptions about human nature, differential psychology with the empirical investigation of such belief systems. A questionnaire composed of 64 questions concerning brain and consciousness, free will, evolution, meaning of life, belief in God, and theodicy problem was used to gather data from 563 students of psychology at seven universities and from 233 students enrolled in philosophy or the natural sciences. Essential concepts were monism–dualism–complementarity, atheism–agnosticism–deism–theism, attitude toward transcendence–immanence, and self-ratings of religiosity and interest in meaning of life. The response profiles (Menschenbild) of women and men, and of psychology students in the first and midterm of study were very similar. The method of statistical twins indicated a number of differences between students of psychology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. The majority of respondents were convinced that philosophical preconceptions on mind–body and free will have important practical implications for the way in which psychotherapists, physicians, or and judges exercise their professions
Cheetham, Jochen Fahrenberg Marcus (2007). The evaluation of implicit anthropologies. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 213-214.   (Google)
Clegg, Jennifer (2007). Exploding the semantic horizon. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 233-235.   (Google)
Cohen, Peter J. (2001). A shooting on capitol hill: "The Ruby satellite system," mental illness, and failure of the american legal system. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11 (4).   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Commentary: Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Google)
Cooper, Rachel (2004). What is wrong with the DSM? History of Psychiatry 15 (1):5-25.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has come in for fierce criticism, with many commentators believing it to be conceptually flawed in a variety of ways. This paper assesses some of these philosophical worries. The first half of the paper asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that ‘cuts nature at the joints’ makes sense. What is mental disorder? Are types of mental disorder natural kinds (that is, are the distinctions between them objective and of fundamental theoretical importance, as are, say, the distinctions between the chemical elements)? The second half of the paper addresses epistemic worries. Even if types of mental disorder are natural kinds there may be reason to doubt that the DSM will come to reflect their natural structure. In particular, I examine the extent to which the DSM is theory-laden, and look at how it has been shaped by social and financial factors. Ultimately, I conclude that although the DSM is of immense practical importance it is not likely to become the best possible classification of mental disorders.
Cresswell, Mark (2008). Szasz and his interlocutors: Reconsidering Thomas Szasz's "myth of mental illness" thesis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):23–44.   (Google | More links)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1998). Commentary on mind, body, and mental illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (4):343-345.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Abstract: who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: 1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of alien control and of thought insertion, which are characteristic of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992)
Double, D. B. (2007). Adolf Meyer's psychobiology and the challenge for biomedicine. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 331-339.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel’s biopsychosocial model was associated with the critique of biomedical dogmatism and acknowledged the historical precedence of the work of Adolf Meyer. However, the importance of Meyer’s psychobiology is not always recognized. One of the reasons may be because of his tendency to compromise with biomedical attitudes. This paper restates the Meyerian perspective, explicitly acknowledging the split between biomedical and biopsychological approaches in the origin of modern psychiatry. Our present-day understanding of this conflict is confounded by reactions to ‘anti-psychiatry.’ Neo-Meyerian principles can only be reestablished by a challenge to biomedicine that accepts, as did Meyer, the inherent uncertainty of medicine and psychiatry
Double, D. B. (2007). Eclecticism and Adolf Meyer's functional understanding of mental illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 356-358.   (Google)
Elliott, Carl (2004). Mental illness and its limits. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Flew, Antony G. N. (1981). Disease and mental disease. In Concepts Of Health And Disease. Reading: Addison-Wesley.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Frith, Christopher D. & Gallagher, Shaun (2002). Models of the pathological mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):57-80.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fuchs, Thomas (2005). Overcoming dualism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):115-117.   (Google | More links)
Fulford, K. William M. (1995). Mind and madness: New directions in the philosophy of psychiatry. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fulford, K. W. M. (1993). Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion, belief and Searle's theory of intentionality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality
Gallup, Gordon G. & Platek, Steven M. (2001). Cognitive empathy presupposes self-awareness: Evidence from phylogeny, ontogeny, neuropsychology, and mental illness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):36-37.   (Google)
Abstract: We argue that cognitive empathy and other instances of mental state attribution are a byproduct of self-awareness. Evidence is brought to bear on this proposition from comparative psychology, early child development, neuropsychology, and abnormal behavior
Gert, Bernard & Culver, Charles M. (2004). Defining mental disorder. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (2007). Adolf Meyer: Psychiatric anarchist. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 341-345.   (Google)
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (2007). The Concepts of Psychiatry: A Pluralistic Approach to the Mind and Mental Illness. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The status quo: dogmatism, the biopsychosocial model, and alternatives -- What there is: of mind and brain -- How we know: understanding the mind -- What is scientific method? -- Reading Karl Jaspers's General Psychopathology -- What is scientific method in psychiatry? -- Darwin's dangerous method: the essentialist fallacy -- What we value: the ethics of psychiatry -- Desire and self: Hellenistic and Islamic approaches -- On the nature of mental illness: disease or myth? -- Order out of chaos: from insanity to DSM-III to a pluralistic nosology -- A theory of DSM-IV: ideal types -- Dimensions versus categories -- The perils of belief: psychosis -- The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune: depression -- Life's rollercoaster: mania -- Being self-aware: insight -- Calvinism or hedonism? -- Truth and statistics: problems of empirical psychiatry -- A climate of opinion: what remains of psychoanalysis -- Being there: existential psychotherapy -- Beyond eclecticism: teaching psychotherapy in the twenty-first century -- Bridging the biology/psychology dichotomy: the hopes of integrationism -- Why it is hard to be pluralist.
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gipps, Richard (2006). Mental disorder and intentional order. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):117-121.   (Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1993). Mind and mine. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Graham, Janice E. & Ritchie, Karen (2006). Mild cognitive impairment: Ethical considerations for nosological flexibility in human kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):31-43.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Graham, George (2004). Self-ascription: Thought insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Graham, George (2009). The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Conceiving mental disorder -- Disorder of mental disorder -- On being skeptical about mental disorder -- Seeking norms for mental disorder -- An original position -- Addiction and responsibility for self -- Reality lost and found -- Minding the missing me.
Griffiths, A. Phillips (1995). Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection establishes the importance of this interdisciplinary approach and explores new directions in the "philosophy of psychiatry and psychology.
Grunbaum, A. (1986). The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry. Psychological Medicine 16 (1):19-38.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Hacking, Ian (2007). Kinds of People: Moving Targets. Proceedings of the British Academy 151:285-318.   (Google)
Hacking, Ian (1999). The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Haslam, Nick (2007). Folk taxonomies versus official taxonomies. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 281-284.   (Google)
Haslam, Nick (2002). Kinds of kinds: A conceptual taxonomy of psychiatric categories. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9:203-217.   (Google)
Abstract: A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms—non-kinds, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, discrete kinds, and natural kinds—is presented and exemplified. It is argued that psychiatric categories cannot all be understood as pragmatically grounded, and at least some reflect naturally occurring discontinuities without thereby representing natural kinds. Even if essentialist accounts of mental disorders are generally mistaken, they are not implied whenever a psychiatric category that is not pragmatically grounded is posited.
Hirstein, William (2004). Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). On thought insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their experiences have to be explained in terms of a withdrawal, on the part of the patients themselves, from certain forms of active engagement in reasoning. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between this view and the idea that patients’ reports of thought insertion reflect a situation in which the boundaries between the self and the world have become uncertain.
Holm, Soren (1998). Mind, body, and mental illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (4):337-341.   (Google)
Horwitz, Allan V. (2002). Creating Mental Illness. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this surprising book, Allan V. Horwitz argues that our current conceptions of mental illness as a disease fit only a small number of serious psychological conditions and that most conditions currently regarded as mental illness are cultural constructions, normal reactions to stressful social circumstances, or simply forms of deviant behavior
Jones, James T. R., Mental illness, stigma, and the person in the office next door.   (Google)
Abstract:      Recently I wrote a review for the Louisville Courier-Journal newspaper of Professor Elyn Saks' memoir of life while secretly suffering from schizophrenia. I did not mention the parallels between my life and Professor Saks'. I also have a successful career as a law professor. I accomplished it while harboring the secret I have the severe mental illness bipolar disorder (formerly known as "manic-depressive illness"). Why did I hide my condition for so long? Mainly I kept quiet due to the fear of stigma. Sadly, people today stigmatize more than they did fifty years ago. They need to realize that a history of mental illness is not a moral failing, and that it is a chronic condition like any "physical" disease. Although most with severe mental illness pose no threat to anyone, stereotypes unduly link violence with mental illness. The vast majority of those with mental illness like Professor Saks and me are not violent; a very small portion of the level of violence in society is attributable to people with mental disorders. Why have I now chosen to tell my story? I write, as did Professor Saks, to show people can be effective members of society in high-level and often stressful jobs despite their psychiatric conditions. I wish to be accepted for who I am, a person with a full and satisfying professional and personal life, and not have to endure stigma or doubt as to my ability to perform. While not all with mental disorders flourish as Professor Saks and I have done, we show what is possible. How many other successful individuals with mental illness who for now remain silent, probably due to stigma concerns, are out there? Perhaps each of us should look at those in the offices next to us, or our friends and neighbors, and wonder which of these people secretly live with a severe mental condition
Klein, Peter K. (1998). Insanity and the sublime: Aesthetics and theories of mental illness in goya's yard with lunatics and related works. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61:198-252.   (Google | More links)
Kroll, Jerome L. (2007). Hildegard: Medieval holism and 'presentism'— or, did sigewiza have health insurance? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 369-372.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). Norms, conventions, and psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 163-170.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). The responsibility of the psychopath revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.   (Google)
Abstract: The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility
Lewis, Bradley (2007). George Engel's legacy for the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 327-330.   (Google)
Lewis, Bradley (2007). The biopsychosocial model and philosophic pragmatism: Is George Engel a pragmatist? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 299-310.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel designed his biopsychosocial model to be a broad framework for medicine and psychiatry. Although the model met with great initial success, it now needs conceptual attention to make it relevant for future generations. Engel articulated the model as a version of biological systems theory, but his work is better interpreted as the beginnings of a richly nuanced philosophy of medicine. We can make this reinterpretation by connecting Engel’s work with the tradition of American pragmatism. Engel initiates inquiry like a pragmatist, he understands theory and philosophy like a pragmatist, he justifies beliefs like a pragmatist, and he understands the world like a pragmatist. By drawing out these similarities, medical and psychiatric scholars can revitalize the biopsychosocial model, and they can open medicine and psychiatry to a rich philosophic heritage and a flourishing interdisciplinary tradition
Macklin, Ruth (1972). Mental health and mental illness: Some problems of definition and concept formation. Philosophy of Science 39 (3):341-365.   (Google | More links)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2005). Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy. Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality
Matravers, Matt (2007). Holding psychopaths responsible. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 139-142.   (Google)
Melges, F. T. (1989). Disorders of time and the brain in severe mental illness. In J. T. Fraser (ed.), Time and Mind: Interdisciplinary Issues. International Universities Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Moore, Michael S. (1975). Some myths about 'mental illness'. Inquiry 18 (3):233 – 265.   (Google)
Moreno, Jonathan D. (1982). Discourse in the Social Sciences: Strategies for Translating Models of Mental Illness. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Morris, Charles (1959). Philosophy, psychiatry, mental illness and health. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1):47-55.   (Google | More links)
Moulyn, Adrian C. (1947). Mechanisms and mental phenomena. Philosophy of Science 14 (July):242-253.   (Google | More links)
Mundale, Jennifer (2004). That way madness lies: At the intersection of philosophy and clinical psychology. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):661-674.   (Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic & Woolfolk, Robert L. (2000). Conceptual analysis versus scientific understanding: An assessment of Wakefield's folk psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):271-293.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic (2005). Can evolution explain insanity? Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):745-766.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I distinguish three evolutionary explanations of mental illness: first, breakdowns in evolved computational systems; second, evolved systems performing their evolutionary function in a novel environment; third, evolved personality structures. I concentrate on the second and third explanations, as these are distinctive of an evolutionary psychopathology, with progressively less credulity in the light of the empirical evidence. General morals are drawn for evolutionary psychiatry
Murphy, Dominic (2000). Darwin in the madhouse: Evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorders. Evolution and the Human Mind.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a ground swell of interest in the application of evolutionary theory to issues in psychopathology (Nesse & Williams 1995, Stevens & Price 1996, McGuire & Troisi 1998). Much of this work has been aimed at finding adaptationist explanations for a variety of mental disorders ranging from phobias to depression to schizophrenia. There has, however, been relatively little discussion of the implications that the theories proposed by evolutionary psychologists might have for the classification of mental disorders. This is the theme we propose to explore. We'll begin, in Section 2, by providing a brief overview of the account of the mind advanced by evolutionary psychologists. In Section 3 we'll explain why issues of taxonomy are important and why the dominant approach to the classification of mental disorders is radically and alarmingly unsatisfactory. We will also indicate why we think an alternative approach, based on theories in evolutionary psychology, is particularly promising. In Section 4 we'll try to illustrate some of the virtues of the evolutionary psychological approach to classification. The discussion in Section 4 will highlight a quite fundamental distinction between those disorders that arise from the malfunction of a component of the mind and those that can be traced to the fact that our minds must now function in environments that are very different from the environments in which they evolved. This mis-match between the current and ancestral environments can, we maintain, give rise to serious mental disorders despite the fact that, in one important sense, there is nothing at all wrong with the people suffering the disorder. Their minds are functioning exactly as Mother Nature intended them to. In Section 5, we'll give a brief overview of some of the ways in which the sorts of malfunctions catalogued in Section 4 might arise, and sketch two rather different strategies for incorporating this etiologically
Murphy, Dominic (2001). Hacking's reconciliation: Putting the biological and sociological together in the explanation of mental illness. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In a series of recent works, Ian Hacking has produced a model of social causation in mental illness and begun to sketch in outline how this might be integrated with the medical model of psychiatry. This article elaborates and revises Hacking's model of social forces, criticizes him for attempting a merely semantic resolution of the tension between the social and the biological, and sketches an alternative approach that builds upon his substantial insights
Murphy, Dominic (2005). Psychiatry in the Scientific Image. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Murphy, Dominic & Woolfolk, Robert L. (2000). The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):241-252.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Muscari, Paul G. (1981). The structure of mental disorder. Philosophy of Science 48 (December):553-572.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Nicki, Andrea (2002). Feminist philosophy of disability, care ethics and mental illness. Nursing Philosophy 3 (3):270–272.   (Google | More links)
Nichols, Manuel Vargas Shaun (2007). Psychopaths and moral knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 157-162.   (Google)
Oltmanns, T. F. & Maher, B. A. (1988). Delusional Beliefs. John Wiley.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Papineau, David (1994). Mental disorder, illness and biological disfunction. Philosophy 37:73-82.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Papineau, David (1995). Mind, health, and biological purpose. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Perring, Christian (online). Mental illness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Pickering, Neil (2006). The Metaphor of Mental Illness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction : the existence of mental illness -- The likeness argument -- The categorical argument -- Metaphor -- Two metaphors from physical medicine -- The metaphor of mental illness -- Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, social construction, and metaphor -- Metaphors and models.
Rackley, Lloyd A. Wells Sandra J. (2007). Ontological and other assumptions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 203-204.   (Google)
Radden, Jennifer H. (2007). Sigewiza's cure. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 373-376.   (Google)
Radden, Jennifer (ed.) (2004). The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: This is a comprehensive resource of original essays by leading thinkers exploring the newly emerging inter-disciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry. The contributors aim to define this exciting field and to highlight the philosophical assumptions and issues that underlie psychiatric theory and practice, the category of mental disorder, and rationales for its social, clinical and legal treatment. As a branch of medicine and a healing practice, psychiatry relies on presuppositions that are deeply and unavoidably philosophical. Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy frame our understanding and treatment of mental disorder. Philosophical questions of evidence, reality, truth, science, and values give meaning to each of the social institutions and practices concerned with mental health care. The psyche, the mind and its relation to the body, subjectivity and consciousness, personal identity and character, thought, will, memory, and emotions are equally the stuff of traditional philosophical inquiry and of the psychiatric enterprise. A new research field--the philosophy of psychiatry--began to form during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Prompted by a growing recognition that philosophical ideas underlie many aspects of clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the economics and politics of mental health care, academic philosophers, practitioners, and philosophically trained psychiatrists have begun a series of vital, cross-disciplinary exchanges. This volume provides a sampling of the research yield of those exchanges. Leading thinkers in this area, including clinicians, philosophers, psychologists, and interdisciplinary teams, provide original discussions that are not only expository and critical, but also a reflection of their authors' distinctive and often powerful and imaginative viewpoints and theories. All the discussions break new theoretical ground. As befits such an interdisciplinary effort, they are methodologically eclectic, and varied and divergent in their assumptions and conclusions; together, they comprise a significant new exploration, definition, and mapping of the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice
Rego, Mark D. (2009). Frontal fatigue : How technology may contribute to mental illness. In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Roberts, John Russell (2001). Mental illness, motivation and moral commitment. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):41-59.   (Google | More links)
Ross, Patricia A. (2007). The fact value dichotomy in demarcating disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 107-109.   (Google)
Roth, Martin (1986). The Reality of Mental Illness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book is psychiatry's reply to the diverse group of antipsychiatrists, including Laing, Foucault, Goffman, Szasz and Bassaglia, that has made fashionable the view that mental illness is merely socially deviant behaviour and that psychiatrists are agents of the capitalist society seeking to repress such behaviour. It establishes, by the use of evidence from historical and transcultural studies, that mental illness has been recognised in all cultures since the beginning of history and goes on to explore the philosophical and medical basis for psychiatry's diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. Finally, it tackles two issues where psychiatry has recently been seen as at odds with the values prevailing in society: involuntary hospitalization and the insanity defence. The Reality of Mental Illness does not pretend to offer simple answers to the complex problems it discusses, but will leave the reader with a much greater understanding of psychiatry's aims, practices and problems
Schoeneman, Thomas J.; Brooks, Shannon; Gibson, Carla; Routbort, Julia & Jacobs, Dieter (1994). Seeing the insane in textbooks of abnormal psychology: The uses of art in histories of mental illness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (2):111–141.   (Google | More links)
Spike, Jeffrey P. (2007). The philosophy of George Engel and the philosophy of medicine. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 315-319.   (Google)
Swain, James E. & Swain, John D. (2008). Creativity or mental illness: Possible errors of relational priming in neural networks of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):398-399.   (Google)
Szasz, Thomas Stephen (1974). The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. New York,Harper & Row.   (Google)
Thornton, Tim (2004). Reductionism/antireductionism. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Thornton, Tim (2002). Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introduction. Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 Method. Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. Results. Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, non- question-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. Conclusions. A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicago   (Google)
Abstract: This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM.
Tyreman, Stephen (2007). It's illness, but is it mental disorder? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 103-106.   (Google)
Vargas, Shaun Nichols Manuel (2007). How to be fair to psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 153-155.   (Google)
Wakefield, Jerome C. (2006). What makes a mental disorder mental? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):123-131.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wallace, I. V. (2007). Adolph Meyer's psychobiology in historical context, and its relationship to George Engel's biopsychosocial model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 347-353.   (Google)
Walach, Harald (2007). Folk psychology and the psychological background of scientific reasoning. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 209-212.   (Google)
Watson, John B. (1916). Behavior and the concept of mental disease. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (22):589-597.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Waterman, G. Scott (2007). Clinicians' “folk” taxonomies and the DSM: Pick your poison. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 271-275.   (Google)
Weiner, Steve (2007). Lack of autonomy: A view from the inside. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 237-238.   (Google)
Westerman, Michael A. (2007). Integrating the parts of the biopsychosocial model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 321-326.   (Google)
Widdershoven, Guy (1999). Cognitive psychology and hermeneutics: Two approaches to meaning and mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (4):245-253.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Widiger, Thomas A. (2007). The impact of clinicians on the diagnostic manual. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 277-280.   (Google)
Woolfolk, Robert L. (1999). Malfunction and mental illness. The Monist 82 (4):658-670.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Young, Garry (2006). Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion

7.4e Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis

Adams, Michael Vannoy (1996). The Multicultural Imagination: Race, Color, and the Unconscious. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The Multicultural Imagination is a challenging inquiry into the complex interrelationship between our ideas about race, color and the unconscious. Drawing on clinical case material, Michael Vannoy Adams argues that race is just as important as sex or any other content of the unconscious. He does not assume that racism will simply vanish if we psychoanalyze a patient, but shows how a non-defensive ego and a self-image that is receptive to other-images can move us towards a more productive discourse of cultural differences. The Multicultural Imagination provokes the reader--analyst or not--to confront personally those unconscious attitudes which stand in the way of authentic multicultural relationships
Bainbridge, Caroline (ed.) (2007). Culture and the Unconscious. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Since Freud, psychoanalysis has always concerned itself with questions of art, creativity, politics, and war. This collection of essays from leading writers on psychoanalysis explores questions of culture through a close dialogue between psychoanalytic clinical and academic traditions. Culture and the Unconscious is a major contribution to these debates. With accessible introductions to its central themes, the book opens up conversations between the spheres of art, academia and psychoanalysis, revealing points of commonality and divergence
Baruch, Elaine Hoffman (1996). She Speaks/He Listens: Women on the French Analyst's Couch. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Although much attention has been given to Jacques Lacan in his rereading of Freud and to French women analysts in their deconstruction of traditional psychoanalysis, little has been available in the US on contemporary male French analysts and their treatment of women. She Speaks/He Listens illustrates the range of thought among some well-known French male psychoanalysts today--from Lacanians to anti-Lacanians to eclectics--with regard to women and sexual difference. Through the interview format, with its possibilities for surprise and spontaneity, the book makes available the thought of Alain Didier-Weill, Bela Grunberger, Patrick Guyomard, Serge Lebovici, Rene Major, Gerard Pommier and Francois Roustang, as well as the internationally famed analyst Otto Kernberg, who gives a fascinating account of the French influences on his work. Other themes addressed include the place of Freud and Lacan in current theory and the relation of feminism to contemporary French male psychoanalysts
Bell, David (ed.) (1999). Psychoanalysis and Culture: A Kleinian Perspective. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This book establishes how Hanna Segal's approach provides a clear focus to this burgeoning yet troublesome area of thought. With contributions from internationally-renowned psychoanalysts and academics influenced by Hanna Segal-Wollheim, Feldman, Steiner, Sodre, Anserson and others-this book addresses a wide range of issues such as classic and contemporary literature, film, the problems of old age, emotions, modernism and emigration
Benjamin, Jessica (1997). Shadow of the Other: Intersubjectivity and Gender in Psychoanalysis. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Shadow of the Other is a discussion of how the individual has two sorts of relationships with an "other"--other individuals. The first regards the other as a s work apart is her brilliant utilization of a systematic dialectical approach to her subject, always maintaining the delicate balance between opposing tensions: masculinity and femininity, subjectivity and objectivity, passivity and activity, love and aggression, fantasy and reality, modernism and postmodernism, the intrapsychic and the intersubjective. Benjamin s work apart is her brilliant utilization of a systematic dialectical approach to her subject, always maintaining the delicate balance between opposing other as a mental repository fo unwanted characteristics cast from the self. Jessica benjamin shows the implications of this dual relationship for male/female hierarchy and offers a possibility for balancing the two. This book continues the author's well-known explorations of the themes of intersubjectivity and gender, taking up issues at the forefront of contemporary debates in feminist theory and psychoanalysis
Bernstein, Jerome S. (2005). Living in the Borderland: The Evolution of Consciousness and the Challenge of Healing Trauma. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Living in the Borderland addresses the evolution of Western consciousness and describes the emergence of the 'Borderland,' a spectrum of reality that is beyond the rational yet is palpable to an increasing number of individuals. Building on Jungian theory, Jerome Bernstein argues that a greater openness to transrational reality experienced by Borderland personalities allows new possibilities for understanding and healing confounding clinical and developmental enigmas. In three sections, this book charts the evolution of Western consciousness, examines the psychological and clinical implications and looks at how the new Borderland consciousness bridges the mind-body divide. It challenges the standard clinical model, which views normality as an absence of pathology and equates normality with the rational, and abnormality with the transrational. Jerome Bernstein describes how psychotherapy itself often contributes to the alienation of many Borderland personalities by misdiagnosing the difference between the pathological and the sacred and uses case studies to illustrate the potential such misdiagnoses have for causing serious psychic and emotional damage to the patient. This challenge to the orthodoxies and complacencies of Western medicine's concept of pathology will interest Jungian Analysts, Psychoanalysts, Psychotherapists and Psychiatrists
Bishop, Paul (2007). Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller & Jung. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller, and Jung , volume 1, The Development of the Personality investigates the extent to which analytical psychology draws on concepts found in German classical aesthetics. It aims to place analytical psychology in the German-speaking tradition of Goethe and Schiller, with which Jung was well acquainted. This volume argues that analytical psychology appropriates many of its central notions from German classical aesthetics, and that, when seen in its intellectual historical context, the true originality of analytical psychology lies in its reformulation of key tenets of German classicism. Although the importance for Jung of German thought in general, and of Goethe and Schiller in particular, has frequently been acknowledged, until now it has never been examined in any detailed or systematic way. Through an analysis of Jung’s reception of Goethe and Schiller, Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics demonstrates the intellectual continuity within analytical psychology and the filiation of ideas from German classical aesthetics to Jungian thought. In this way it suggests that a rereading of analytical psychology in the light of German classical aesthetics offers an intellectually coherent understanding of analytical psychology. By uncovering the philosophical sources of analytical psychology, this first volume returns Jung’s thought to its core intellectual tradition, in the light of which analytical psychology gains new critical impact and fresh relevance for modern thought. Written in a scholarly yet accessible style, this book will interest students and scholars alike in the areas of analytical psychology, comparative literature, and the history of ideas
Black, David M. (ed.) (2006). Psychoanalysis and Religion in the Twenty-First Century: Competitors or Collaborators? Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Freud described religion as the universal obsessional neurosis, and uncompromisingly rejected it in favor of "science". Ever since, there has been the assumption that psychoanalysts are hostile to religion. Yet, from the beginning, individual analysts have questioned Freud's blanket rejection of religion. In this book, David Black brings together contributors from a wide range of schools and movements to discuss the issues. They bring a fresh perspective to the subject of religion and psychoanalysis, answering vital questions such as: · How do religious stories carry (or distort) psychological truth? · How do religions 'work', psychologically? · What is the nature of religious experience? · Are there parallels between psychoanalysis and particular religious traditions? Psychoanalysis and Religion in the 21st Century will be of great interest to psychoanalysts, psychoanalytic therapists, psychodynamic counselors, and anyone interested in the issues surrounding psychoanalysis, religion, theology and spirituality
Bloch, Sidney & Green, Stephen A. (eds.) (2009). Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Ethical issues are pivotal to the practice of psychiatry. Anyone involved in psychiatric practice and mental healthcare has to be aware of the range of ethical issues relevant to their profession. An increased professional commitment to accountability, in parallel with a growing "consumer" movement has paved the way for a creative engagement with the ethical movement. The bestselling 'Psychiatric Ethics' has carved out a niche for itself as the major comprehensive text and core reference in the field, covering a range of complex ethical dilemmas which face clinicians and researchers in their everyday practice. This new edition takes a fresh look at recent trends and developments at the interface between ethics and psychiatric practice. Coming ten years after the third edition, the editors have observed several emerging aspects of psychiatric practice requiring coverage, as a result, 5 new chapters have been added, including cutting edge topics - such as neuroethics. All other chapters have been fully revised and updated. The book will continue to be essential reading for psychiatrists, psychologists, other mental health professionals, and bioethicists, as well as of interest to policy makers, managers and lawyers
Boothby, Richard (2001). Freud as Philosopher: Metapsychology After Lacan. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Using Jacques Lacan's work as a key, this groundbreaking work reassesses the philosophical significance of Freud's most ambitious general theory of mental functioning: metapsychology. Richard Boothby forcefully argues that this theory has been misunderstood, and that therefore Freud's impact on philosophy has been unjustly muted. Freud as Philosopher illuminates in a fresh and newly accessible way the central points of Freud's metapsychology-including the guiding metaphor of psychical energy and the final, enigmatic theory of the twin drives of life and death-through the three cardinal Lacanian categories of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. This exciting and brilliant book will have a definitive impact on how psychoanalysis is conceived in relation to philosophy
Braddock, Louise & Lacewing, Michael (eds.) (2007). The Academic Face of Psychoanalysis: Papers in Philosophy, the Humanities, and the British Clinical Tradition. Taylor & Francis.   (Google)
Abstract: Ever since Freud, psychoanalysts have explored the connections between psychoanalysis and literature and psychoanalysis and philosophy, while literary criticism, social science and philosophy have all reflected on and made use of ideas from psychoanalytic theory. The Academic Face of Psychoanalysis presents contributions from these fields and gives the reader an insight into different understandings and applications of psychoanalytic theory. This book comprises twelve contributions from experts in their fields covering philosophy, psychoanalysis, sociology and literary theory. The chapters are divided into three distinct sections: Psychoanalysis Philosophy Social science and literary theory Louise Braddock and Michael Lacewing successfully bring these contributions together with an in-depth introduction that allows the reader to explore the connections between the different disciplines. The multi-disciplinary approach to this book is rare; it will appeal to academics and students, from the subject areas of psychoanalysis, humanities and social science
Brennan, Teresa (ed.) (1989). Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis. Routledge.   (Google)
Brooke, Roger (1993). Jung and Phenomenology. Routledge.   (Google)
Brown, Norman Oliver (1966). Love's Body. University of California Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Originally published in 1966 and now recognized as a classic, Norman O. Brown's meditation on the condition of humanity and its long fall from the grace of a natural, instinctual innocence is available once more for a new generation of readers. Love's Body is a continuation of the explorations begun in Brown's famous Life Against Death . Rounding out the trilogy is Brown's brilliant Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis
Bucky, Steven F. (ed.) (2009). Ethical and Legal Issues for Mental Health Professionals: In Forensic Settings. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Buhle, Mari Jo (1998). Feminism and its Discontents: A Century of Struggle with Psychoanalysis. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Burack, Cynthia (2004). Healing Identities: Black Feminist Thought and the Politics of Groups. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychoanalysis, race, and racism -- From psychoanalysis to political theory -- Reparative group leadership -- Conflict and authenticity -- Bonding and solidarity -- Coalitions and reparative politics.
Campbell, Jan (2000). Arguing with the Phallus: Feminist, Queer, and Postcolonial Theory: A Psychoanalytic Contribution. Distributed in the Usa Exclusively by St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What can psychoanalysis offer contemporary arguments in the fields of Feminism, Queer Theory and Post-Colonialism? Jan Campbell introduces and analyses the way that psychoanalysis has developed and made problematic models of subjectivity linked to issues of sexuality, ethnicity, gender, and history. Via discussions of such influential and diverse figures as Lacan, Irigaray, Kristeva, Dollimore, Bhabha, Toni Morrison, and Alice Walker, Campbell uses psychoanalysis as a mediatory tool in a range of debates across the human sciences, while also arguing for a transformation of psychoanalytic theory itself
Campbell, Kirsten (2004). Jacques Lacan and Feminist Epistemology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In this ground breaking new book, Kirsten Campbell takes up the debate, but instead of asking what feminist politics is or should be, she examines how feminism changes the ways we understand ourselves and others. Using Lacanian psychoanalysis as a starting point, Campbell examines contemporary feminism's turn to accounts of feminist "knowing" to create new conceptions of the political, before going on to develop a theory of that feminist knowing as political practice in itself
Campbell, Jan & Harbord, Janet (eds.) (1998). Psycho-Politics and Cultural Desires. Ucl Press.   (Google)
Casement, Ann & Tacey, David (eds.) (2006). The Idea of the Numinous: Contemporary Jungian and Psychoanalytic Perspectives. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The idea of the numinous is often raised in psychoanalytic and psychodynamic contexts, but it is rarely itself subjected to close scrutiny. This volume examines how the numinous has gained currency in the post-modern world, demonstrating how the numinous is no longer confined to religious discourses but is included in humanist, secular and scientific views of the world. Questions of soul and spirit are increasingly being raised in connection with the scientific exploration of the psyche, and especially in the context of psychotherapy. The contributors to this volume are interested in exploring the numinous in the human psyche, in clinical work, world events, anthropology, sociology, philosophy and the humanities. They originate from multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural backgrounds, bringing a variety of approaches to subjects including: · Witchcraft: the numinous power of humans · Jung and Derrida: the numinous, deconstruction and myth · Accessing the numinous: Apolline and Dionysian pathways · The role of the numinous in the reception of Jung The Idea of the Numinous will fascinate all analytical psychologists, psychoanalysts, and psychotherapists interested in investigating the overlap between therapeutic and religious interests
Cavell, Marcia (2006). Becoming a Subject: Reflections in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Marcia Cavell draws on philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the sciences of the mind in a fascinating and original investigation of human subjectivity. A "subject" is a creature, we may say, who recognizes herself as an "I," taking in the world from a subjective perspective; an agent, doing things for reasons, sometimes self-reflective, and able to assume responsibility for herself and some of her actions. If this is an ideal, how does a person become a subject, and what might stand in the way? One of Marcia Cavell's guiding premises is that philosophical investigation into the specifically human way of being in the world cannot separate itself from investigations of a more empirical sort. Cavell brings together for the first time reflections in philosophy, findings in neuroscience, studies in infant development, psychoanalytic theory, and clinical vignettes from her own psychoanalytic practice
Cavell, Marcia (1993). The Psychoanalytic Mind: From Freud to Philosophy. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Clarke, Simon (2003). Social Theory, Psychoanalysis, and Racism. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Sociological explanations of racism tend to concentrate on the structures and dynamics of modern life that facilitate discrimination and hierarchies of inequality. In doing so, they often fail to address why racial hatred arises (as opposed to how it arises) as well as to explain why it can be so visceral and explosive in character. Bringing together sociological perspectives with psychoanalytic concepts and tools, this text offers a clear, accessible and thought-provoking synthesis of varieties of theory, with the aim of clarifying the complex character of racism, discrimination and social exclusion in the contemporary world
Cooper, Steven H. (2000). Objects of Hope: Exploring Possibility and Limit in Psychoanalysis. Analytic Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Objects of Hope brings ranging scholarship and refreshing candor to bear on the knotty issue of what can and cannot be achieved in the course of psychoanalytic therapy. It will be valued not only as an exemplary exercise in comparative psychoanaly
Corradi Fiumara, Gemma (2001). The Mind's Affective Life: A Psychoanalytic and Philosophical Inquiry. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The Mind's Affective Life is a refreshing and innovative examination of the relationship between feeling and thinking. Our thoughts and behavior are shaped by both our emotions and reason; yet until recently most of the literature analyzing thought has concentrated largely on philosophical reasoning and neglected emotions. This book is an original and provocative contribution to the rapidly growing literature on the neglected "affective" dimensions of modern thought. The author draws on contemporary psychoanalysis, philosophy, feminist theory, and recent innovations in neuroscience to argue that in order to understand thought, we need to consider not only both emotional and rational aspects of thought but also the complex interactions between these different aspects. Only through such a rich and complicated understanding of modern thought can we hope to avoid what the author identifies as a significant contemporary problem for individuals and cultures; that is, suppression or denial of intolerable states of feeling
Cowan, Lyn (2002). Tracking the White Rabbit: A Subversive View of Modern Culture. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Like Alice following the white rabbit into a topsy-turvy world where the laws of logic don't apply, subversive thinking unearths the mysteries behind the mundane. Tracking the White Rabbit is a fascinating, original work that invites us to use depth psychology to challenge our deepest assumptions about world politics, theology, social norms, everyday speech, and usual ideas of sex and emotion. Raised in an environment of McCarthyism and rock-and-roll, Jungian analyst Lyn Cowan shows readers-through provocative essays on memory and homosexuality, music and the art of cursing-that we can flip our ingrained attitudes on their heads and achieve a better understanding of our cultural landscape. America has been plagued by a flattening of its psychic life, Cowan argues, exhibited in the escalating need for external stimulation and the distrust of intense emotion. With humor and insight, she confronts the "isms" that entrap our imaginations (capitalism, fundamentalism, feminism, sexism, antisemitism, communism) in order to unearth a more soul-serving culture. Encouraging us to mine the creativity of spontaneous imagination, this psychology brings dramatic new ideas and themes into focus, breaking down barriers and yielding fresh perspectives on some of the more pressing individual dilemmas of our time: abortion, gender, language, homosexuality, and victimization
Crockett, Clayton (2007). Interstices of the Sublime: Theology and Psychoanalytic Theory. Fordham University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Interstices of the Sublime represents a powerful theological engagement with psychoanalytic theory in Freud, Lacan, Kristeva and Zi zek, as well as major expressions of contemporary Continental philosophy, including Deleuze, Derrida, Marion, and Badiou. Through creative and constructive psycho-theological readings of topics such as sublimation, schizophrenia, God, and creation ex nihilo, this book contributes to a new form of radical theological thinking that is deeply involved in the world. Here the idea of the Kantian sublime is read into Freud and Lacan, and compared with sublimation. The sublime refers to a conflict of the Kantian faculties of reason and imagination, and involves the attempt to represent what is intrinsically unrepresentable. Sublimation, by contrast, involves the expression and partial satisfaction of primal desires in culturally acceptable terms. The sublime is negatively expressed in sublimation, because it is both the "source" of sublimation as well as that which resists being sublimated. That is, the Freudian sublime is related to the process of sublimation, but it also distorts or disrupts sublimation, and invokes what Lacan calls the Real. The effects of the sublime are not just psychoanalytic but, importantly, theological, because the sublime is the main form that "God" takes in the modern world. A radical postmodern theology attends to the workings of the sublime in our thinking and living, and provides resources to understand the complexity of reality. This book is one of the first sustained theological readings of Lacan in English
Dalal, Farhad (2002). Race, Colour and the Process of Racialization: New Perspectives From Group Analysis, Psychoanalysis, and Sociology. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Farhad Dalal argues that people differentiate between races in order to make a distinction between the "haves" and "must-not-haves", and that this process is cognitive, emotional and political rather than biological. Examining the subject over the past thousand years, Race, Colour and the Process of Racialisation covers theories of racism and a general theory of difference based on the works of Fanon, Elias, Matte-Blanco and Foulkes, as well as application of this theory to race and racism. Farhad Dalal concludes that the structures of society are reflected in the structures of the psyche, and both of these are colour coded. This book will be invaluable to students, academics and practitioners in the areas of psychoanalysis, group analysis, psychotherapy and counseling
Dallett, Janet (1998). The Not-yet-Transformed God: Depth Psychology and the Individual Religious Experience. Distributed to the Trade by Samuel Weiser.   (Google)
Dalal, Farhad (1998). Taking the Group Seriously: Towards a Post-Foulkesian Group Analytic Theory. J. Kingsley.   (Google)
De Silva, Padmasiri (1992). Buddhist and Freudian Psychology. Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore.   (Google)
Dickenson, Donna (2000). In Two Minds: A Casebook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In Two Minds is a practical casebook of problem solving in psychiatric ethics. Written in a lively and accessible style, it builds on a series of detailed case histories to illustrate the central place of ethical reasoning as a key competency for clinical work and research in psychiatry. Topics include risk, dangerousness and confidentiality; judgements of responsibility; involuntary treatment and mental health legislation; consent to genetic screening; dual role issues in child and adolescent psychiatry; needs assessment; cross-cultural and gender issues; rational and irrational suicide; shared decision making in multi-agency teams, and the growing role of the user's voice in psychiatry. Key ethical concepts are carefully introduced and explained. The text is richly supported by detailed guides for further reading. There are separate chapters on teaching psychiatric ethics, including a sample seminar, and on writing a research ethics application. Each case history and discussion is followed by a critical commentary from a practitioner with relevant experience. Jim Birley adds a comparative international perspective on psychiatric ethics. Cartoons by Johnny Cowee provide punchy counterpoint! In Two Minds is the sister volume to the third edition of Sidney, Paul Chodoff and Steven Green's highly successful Psychiatric Ethics. In providing a bridge between theory and practice, it will be essential reading for everyone concerned with improving standards in mental health care
DiCenso, James (1999). The Other Freud: Religion, Culture, and Psychoanalysis. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The Other Freud undertakes an exciting and original analysis of Freud's major writings on religion and culture. James DiCenso suggests that Freud's texts on religion are unjustifiably ignored or taken for granted, and he shows that Freud's commentary on religion are rich, multifaceted texts, and deserve far more attention. Using concepts derived primarily from Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, DiCenso draws an unparalleled critical portrait of the "other Freud". This book is rich with new ideas and fresh interpretations
Donald, James (ed.) (1991). Psychoanalysis and Cultural Theory: Thresholds. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Doverspike, William F. (1999). Ethical Risk Management: Guidelines for Practice. Professional Resource Press.   (Google)
Edwards, Rem Blanchard (ed.) (1997). Ethics and Psychiatry: Insanity, Rational Autonomy, and Mental Health Care. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Edwards, Rem Blanchard (ed.) (1982). Psychiatry and Ethics: Insanity, Rational Autonomy, and Mental Health Care. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Egginton, William (2007). The Philosopher's Desire: Psychoanalysis, Interpretation, and Truth. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The interpretation string -- The psychosis string -- The purloined string -- The temporality string.
Elliott, Anthony (1999). Social Theory and Psychoanalysis in Transition: Self and Society From Freud to Kristeva. Free Association Books.   (Google)
Elliott, Anthony (2004). Social Theory Since Freud: Traversing Social Imaginaries. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In this compelling book, Anthony Elliott traces the rise of psychoanalysis from the Frankfurt School to postmodernism, exploring in detail the social and political factors that have led intellectuals to draw from the insights of Freud. Examining how pathbreaking theorists such as Adorno, Marcuse, Lacan and Lyotard have deployed psychoanalysis to politicize issues like desire, sexuality, repression and identity, Elliott develops a powerful assessment of the gains and losses arising from this appropriation of psychoanalysis in social theory and cultural studies. Moving from the impact of the Culture Wars and recent Freud-bashing to contemporary debates in social theory, feminism and postmodernism, Elliott argues for a new alliance between social-theoretical and psychoanalytic perspectives
Fairbairn, Susan & Fairbairn, Gavin (eds.) (1987). Psychology, Ethics, and Change. Routledge & Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Feldstein, Richard & Roof, Judith (eds.) (1989). Feminism and Psychoanalysis. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Ford, Gary George (2000). Ethical Reasoning in the Mental Health Professions. Crc Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The ability to reason ethically is an extraordinarily important aspect of professionalism in any field. Indeed, the greatest challenge in ethical professional practice involves resolving the conflict that arises when the professional is required to choose between two competing ethical principles. Ethical Reasoning in the Mental Health Professions explores how to develop the ability to reason ethically in difficult situations. Other books merely present ethical and legal issues one at a time, along with case examples involving "right" and "wrong" answers. In dramatic contrast, Ethical Reasoning in the Mental Health Professions provides you with the needed background in methods of ethical reasoning and introduces an innovative nine-step model of ethical decision-making for resolving ethical dilemmas. Ethical Reasoning in the Mental Health Profession discusses the ethical codes of both psychology and counseling. This interdisciplinary approach promotes a better understanding of the similarities and differences in the points of emphasis in the two codes, which, in turn, enriches your understanding of the range of ethical considerations relevant to the practice of the mental health professions
Frie, Roger & Orange, Donna M. (eds.) (2009). Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Theory and Practice. Routledge.   (Google)
Frosh, Stephen (2002). After Words: The Personal in Gender, Culture, and Psychotherapy. Palgrave.   (Google)
Abstract: For a long time the human sciences have debated the relationship between social structures--the group, and subjectivity--the individual, with much of the debate centering round areas such as identity, (gender, race, sexuality), discourse, (talk, conversation, the limits of language), and therapy. This book, by a well-known and highly respected academic in the cross-cutting fields of gender studies, therapy, and psychoanalysis, brings together important material on these debates, and provides a substantial contribution to theory on the relationships between psychology, psychotherapy, and social theory
Frosh, Stephen (1991). Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and the Self. Routledge.   (Google)
Fromm, Erich (1960). Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism. Unwin Paperbacks.   (Google)
Fromm, Erich (1963). The Dogma of Christ. H. Holt.   (Google)
Geoghegan, William D. (2002). Jung's Psychology as a Spiritual Practice and a Way of Life: A Dialogue. University Press of America.   (Google)
Golan, Ruth (2006). Loving Psychoanalysis: Looking at Culture with Freud and Lacan. Karnac.   (Google)
Green, Stephen A. & Bloch, Sidney (eds.) (2006). An Anthology of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Grosz, E. A. (1990). Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Grosz gives a critical overview of Lacan's work from a feminist perspective. Discussing previous attempts to give a feminist reading of his work, she argues for women's autonomy based on an indifference to the Lacanian phallus
Grunbaum, A. (1986). The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry. Psychological Medicine 16 (1):19-38.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Gundry, Mark R. (2006). Beyond Psyche: Symbol and Transcendence in C.G. Jung. Peter Lang.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Undermining the hermeneutics of suspicion -- The historical emergence of psychological man -- The "religious" therapeutics -- Rieff on Jung's "language of faith" -- Rieff and the hermeneutics of suspicion -- An alternative hermeneutic -- Applying this hermeneutic to depth psychology -- Concluding remarks -- The historical sources of Jung's psychology -- The young metaphysician -- Tempering metaphysical inclinations with a pragmatic standpoint -- The resurgence of metaphysics in Jung's psychology -- Jung's subjectivist argument -- The influence of vitalism -- Individuation and the prospective method -- From the prospective method to a metaphysics of archetypes -- Jung and the Paracelsian theory of knowledge -- The persistence of metaphysical questions -- Hermeneutics and Jung's psychology -- The re-discovery of the psychogenic -- Towards a more adequate understanding of the psychogenic -- The methodological problems facing depth psychology -- The symbolic life -- The "realism of the East" -- The symbol of the self -- The "two kinds of thinking" -- "The transcendent function" -- From signs to symbols -- The practice of the transcendent function -- Definitions from psychological types (1921) -- The symbolic attitude -- Transcendent presence -- Alignment with the self -- Projective psychology and divine transcendence -- The relevance of the dispute between Jung and Buber -- The still point -- The beyond -- Contemporary psychoanalysis and the still point -- Ogden on potential space.
Hauke, Christopher (2000). Jung and the Postmodern: The Interpretation of Realities. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The psychological writing of Jung and the post-Jungians is all too often ignored as anachronistic, archaic and mystic. In Jung and the Postmodern, Christopher Hauke challenges this, arguing that Jungian psychology is more relevant now than ever before - not only can it be a response to modernity, but it can offer a critique of modernity and Enlightenment values which brings it in line with the postmodern critique of contemporary culture. After introducing Jungians to postmodern themes in Jameson, Baudrillard, Jencks and Foucault, the author introduces postmodernists to Jung's cultural critique and post-Jungian discussions of representation, individuation, consciousness, and the alternatives to Enlightenment rationality. He also takes a totally fresh approach to topics such as hysteria and the body, Jung and Nietzsche, architecture and affect, Princess Diana and the 'death' of the subject, postmodern science and synchronicity, and to psychosis and alternative 'rationalities'. Jung and the Postmodern is vital reading for everyone interested in contemporary culture, not only Jungians and other psychotherapists who want to explore the social relevance of their discipline, but anyone who shares a assionate concern for where we are heading in postmodern times
Hill, Derek & Jones, Caroline (eds.) (2003). Forms of Ethical Thinking in Therapeutic Practice. Open University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Most books about ethics focus either on the origins of ethics, or on the application of ethical thinking to a single form of therapy. This book sets out to span a range of very different forms of therapy and explores the similarities and the differences between the ethical thinking of the practitioners concerned. By looking at ethical issues in different therapeutic settings the reader is challenged to reconsider the working assumptions which underpin familiar therapeutic practice. Readers of Forms of Ethical Thinking in Therapeutic Practice are offered the unique opportunity to gain insights into the ethical thinking of experienced practitioners offering strikingly different services to their clients and working in contrasting contexts. Essential reading for all practitioners in counselling and the therapies, students, trainers, supervisors and providers of therapeutic services
Hoggett, Paul (1992). Partisans in an Uncertain World: The Psychoanalysis of Engagement. Free Association Books.   (Google)
Homans, Peter (1989). The Ability to Mourn: Disillusionment and the Social Origins of Psychoanalysis. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Peter Homans offers a new understanding of the origins of psychoanalysis and relates the psychoanalytic project as a whole to the sweep of Western culture, past and present. He argues that Freud's fundamental goal was the interpretation of culture and that, therefore, psychoanalysis is fundamentally a humanistic social science. To establish this claim, Homans looks back at Freud's self-analysis in light of the crucial years from 1906 to 1914 when the psychoanalytic movement was formed and shows how these experiences culminated in Freud's cultural texts. By exploring the "culture of psychoanalysis," Homans seeks a better understanding of what a "psychoanalysis of culture" might be. Psychoanalysis, Homans shows, originated as a creative response to the withering away of traditional communities and their symbols in the aftermath of the industrial revolution. The loss of these attachments played a crucial role in the lives of the founders of psychoanalysis, especially Sigmund Freud but also Karl Abraham, Carl Jung, Otto Rank, and Ernest Jones. The personal, political, and religious losses that these figures experienced, the introspection that followed, and the psychological discovery that resulted are what Homans calls "the ability to mourn." Homans expands this historical analysis to construct a general model of psychological discovery: the loss of shared ideals and symbols can produce a deeper sense of self (psychological structure-building, or individuation) and can then lead to the creation of new forms of meaning and self-understanding. He shows how Freud, Jung, and other psychoanalysts began to extend their introspection outward, reinterpreting the meanings of Western art, history, and religion. In conclusion, Homans evaluates Freud's theory of culture and discusses the role that psychoanalysis might play in social and cultural criticism. Throughout the book, Homans makes use of the many histories, biographies, and psychobiographies that have been written about the origins of psychoanalysis, drawing them into a comprehensive sociocultural model. Rich in insights and highly original in approach, this work will interest psychoanalysts and students of Freud, sociologists concerned with modernity and psychoanalysis, and cultural critics in the fields of religion, anthropology, political science, and social history
Hook, Savio; Teresa, Maria & Akhtar, Salman (eds.) (2007). The Geography of Meanings: Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Place, Space, Land, and Dislocation. International Psychoanalytical Association.   (Google)
Hughes, Judith M. (1994). From Freud's Consulting Room: The Unconscious in a Scientific Age. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Jones, Caroline (ed.) (2000). Questions of Ethics in Counselling and Therapy. Open University Press.   (Google)
Jones, James William (2002). Terror and Transformation: The Ambiguity of Religion in Psychoanalytic Perspective. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Religion has been responsible for both horrific acts against humanity and some of humanity's most sublime teachings and experiences. How is this possible? From a contemporary psychoanalytic perspective, this book seeks to answer that question in terms of psychology dynamic of realism. At the heart of living religion is the idealization of everyday objects. Such idealizations provide much of the transforming power of religious experience, which is one of the positive contributions of religion to psychological life. However, idealization can also lead to religious fanaticism, which can be very destructive. Drawing on the work of various contemporary relational theorists within psychoanalysis, this book develops a psychoanalytically informed theory of the transforming terror-producing effects of religious experience. It discusses the question of whether or not, if idealism is the cause of many of the destructive acts done in the name of religion, there can be vital religion without idealism. Thisis the first book to address the nature of religion and its capacity to sponsor both terrorism and transformation in terms of contemporary relational psychoanalytic theory. It will be invaluable to students and practitioners of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, psychology and religious studies
Jonte-Pace, Diane E. (ed.) (2003). Teaching Freud. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the central questions of the field of Religious Studies is "What is religion and how might we best understand it?". Sigmund Freud was surely a paradigmatic cartographer of this terrain. Among the first theorists to explore the unconscious fantasies, fears, and desires underlying religious ideas and practices, Freud can be considered a grandfather of the field. Yet Freud's legacy is deeply contested. His reputation is perhaps at its lowest point since he came to public attention a century ago, and students often assume that Freud is sexist, dangerous, passe, and irrelevant to the study of religion. How can Freud be taught in this climate of critique and controversy? The fourteen contributors to this volume, all recognized scholars of religion and psychoanalysis, describe how they address Freud's contested legacy: they "teach the debates." They describe their courses on Freud and religion, their innovative pedagogical practices, and the creative ways they work with resistance. P I focuses on institutional and curricular contexts: contributors describe how they teach Freud at a Catholic and Jesuit undergraduate institution, a liberal seminary, and a large multicultural university. In Part II contributors describe courses structured around psychoanalytic interpretations of religious figures and phenomena: Ramakrishna, Jesus and Augustine, myth and mysticism. Part III focuses explicitly on courses structured around major debates over gender, Judaism, anti-semitism, religion and ritual. Part IV describes courses in which psychoanalysis is presented as a powerful pedagogy of transformation and insight
Kakar, Sudhir (1997). Culture and Psyche: Psychoanalysis and India. Psyche Press.   (Google)
Kakar, Sudhir (2001). The Essential Writings of Sudhir Kakar. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Since the last quarter of a century, Sudhir Kakar's work on Indian culture and society has found large appreciative audiences both in India and abroad. The selection by the author covers a wide spectrum from classical love poetry to modern mysticism, from Hindu childhood to India's healing traditions, from male-female relations to Hindu-Muslim violence. These extracts from his several books, which have been translated into all the major languages, include psychoanalytic reflections on dominant themes in the emotional life of Hindu men, psycho-biographical essays on such cultural heroes as Ramakrishna, Vivekananda and Gahndi, the unveiling of the erotic secret in the Radha and Krishna legend and the healing secret of the guru, love in Hindu cinema and the psychology of religious fanaticism. Kakar's wide-ranging reflections are indespensable for a psychological understanding of the country as it moves into a new millennium
Kaplan, Louise J. (2006). Cultures of Fetishism. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: In her latest book, Dr. Louise Kaplan, author of the groundbreaking Female Perversions, explores the fetishism strategy, a psychological defense that aims to tame, subdue, and if necessary, murder human vitalities. Through an exploration of such cultural phenomena as footbinding, reality television, and the construction of robots, Kaplan demonstrates how, in a technology-driven world, an understanding of the fetishism strategy can help to preserve the human dialogue that is the basis of all human relationships. Kaplan writes from the heart as well as from the intellect
Khanna, Ranjana (2003). Dark Continents: Psychoanalysis and Colonialism. Duke University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Genealogies -- Psychoanalysis and archaeology -- Freud in the sacred grove -- Colonial rescriptings -- War, decolonization, psychoanalysis -- Colonial melancholy -- Haunting and the future -- The ethical ambiguities of transnational feminism -- Hamlet in the colonial archive.
Kristeva, Julia (1987). In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Lader, Malcolm Harold (1977). Psychiatry on Trial. Penguin.   (Google)
Lakin, Martin (1988). Ethical Issues in the Psychotherapies. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Mental health professionals face many complex questions in the course of their work with clients and patients. Among the most difficult are dilemmas that involve ethical issues. This book presents a forthright exploration of these dilemmas and the ethical considerations they raise. Drawing on extensive interviews, the author identifies common ethical problems that practitioners encounter. What happens, for example, when personal interests intrude into therapy? How can the therapist make an accurate assessment of his or her appropriateness as a care provider for a particular patient? What about confidentiality? How are problematic financial arrangements best addressed? The author goes on to show how these dilemmas may be intensified by the unique assumptions of different therapeutic orientations--individual, group, family, marital, and organizational--and how professionals can learn from such experiences to better understand and apply their particular approach. This analysis--and the words of the therapists themselves--provide both a guide to practice and a unique store of experience for the growing number of researchers and students concerned with ethical problems in psychotherapy
Langlais, Michael J. (2005). A Heideggerian Critique of C.G. Jung's Concept of Self. Edwin Mellen Press.   (Google)
Lear, Jonathan (2005). Freud. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) developed the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, one of the twentieth century's most influential schools of psychology. He also made profound insights into the psychology and understanding of human beings. In this brilliant and long-awaited introduction, Jonathan Lear--one of the most respected writers on Freud--shows how Freud also made fundamental contributions to philosophy and why he ranks alongside Plato, Aristotle, Marx and Darwin as a great theorist of human nature. Freud is one of the most important introductions and contributions to understanding this great thinker to have been published for many years, and will be essential reading for anyone in the humanities, social sciences and beyond with an interest in Freud or philosophy
Lear, Jonathan (2000). Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Lear, Jonathan (1998). Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Leledakis, Kanakis (1995). Society and Psyche: Social Theory and the Unconscious Dimension of the Social. Berg Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: Providing interpretations and drawing critically from classical and modern social theory, post-structuralism, and psychoanalytic theory, this original study offers an alternative way of thinking about the social and the individual. It offers critical analyses of, among others, Marx, Giddens, Bourdieu, Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, Castoriadis, Freud and modern psychoanalytic theorists, and considers their roles in advancing our present-day conceptualization of the social and the self. In theorizing that behaviour is both socially determined and autonomous, it avoids the impasses of either individualist or structuralist approaches
Levine, Michael P. (ed.) (1999). The Analytic Freud: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The Analytic Freud is an important and stimulating corrective to this overlooked but highly significant area. Moving away from the longstanding debate over the scientific status of Freudian theory, The Analytic Freud discusses the implications of Freud for philosophy in four clear sections: Philosophy of Mind Ethics Sexuality Civilization The essays discuss both the problems Freudian theory poses for contemporary philosophy and what philosophy can ask of Freudian theory. An international team of contributors explore the tensions and dialogue between psychoanalysis and philosophical theories on emotion, will, self-deception, sexuality, love, humor, morality and social interaction, demonstrating how productive and mutually enhancing the relationship between philosophy and Freudian theory can be. Essential reading for all who are interested in philosophy and psychoanalysis, The Analytic Freud presents and enriching and timely discussion of Freud and contemporary philosophy
Marcus, Paul (2003). Ancient Religious Wisdom, Spirituality, and Psychoanalysis. Praeger.   (Google)
Meltzer, Donald (1988). The Apprehension of Beauty: The Role of Aesthetic Conflict in Development, Violence and Art. Clunie Press for Roland Harris Trust.   (Google)
Meyerowitz, Jacob (1994). Before the Beginning of Time. Rrp Pub..   (Google)
Meyer, Ted (2001). Shrink Yourself: The Complete Do-It-Yourself Guide to Freudian Psychoanalysis. Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Griffin.   (Google)
Minsky, Rosalind (1998). Psychoanalysis and Culture: Contemporary States of Mind. Rutgers University Press.   (Google)
Minsky, Rosalind (1996). Psychoanalysis and Gender: An Introductory Reader. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: What is object-relations theory and what does it have to do with literary studies? How can Freud's phallocentric theories be applied by feminist critics? In Psychoanalysis and Gender: An Introductory Reader Rosalind Minsky answers these questions and more, offering students a clear, straightforward overview without ever losing them in jargon. In the first section Minsky outlines the fundamentals of the theory, introducing the key thinkers and providing clear commentary. In the second section, the theory is demonstratedn by an anthology of seminal essays which include Femininity by Sigmund Freud; Envy and Gratitude by Melanie Klein; an extract from Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena by Donald Winnicot; The Meaning of the Phallus by Jacques Lacan; an extract from Women's Time by Julia Kristeva; and an extract from Speculum of the Other Woman by Luce Irigaray. Psychoanalysis and Gender:An introductory Reader is designed especiallyfor students and written with unpretentious prose and carefully selected material. It is an invaluable guide to this major field
Molino, Anthony (ed.) (2004). Culture, Subject, Psyche: Dialogues in Psychoanalysis and Anthropology. Wesleyan University Press.   (Google)
Molino, Anthony (ed.) (1998). The Couch and the Tree: Dialogues in Psychoanalysis and Buddhism. North Point Press.   (Google)
Moorjani, Angela B. (2000). Beyond Fetishism and Other Excursions in Psychopragmatics. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Do the meanings of the innumerable fetish-signs appearing in recent artworks depend on the senders' intentions? Is the meaning of postfeminist glamour the celebration of femininity that its practitioners tout to counter ersatz macho posturing? To fully examine and clarify these and other issues involving gender, postcolonial, and artistic otherness, this book argues for a more adequate view of performativity than presently available from speech-act theory and certain strains of linguistic pragmatics. In drawing simultaneously on Charles Sander Peirce’s pragmatic analysis of signs, Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic inquiry, and radical feminist thought, the concern of Beyond Fetishism is with the ethical and aesthetic import of the psychopragmatics resulting from this intermingling
Muller, John P. (1996). Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad: Developmental Semiotics in Freud, Peirce, and Lacan. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In this original work of psychoanalytic theory, John Muller explores the formative power of signs and their impact on the mind, the body and subjectivity, giving special attention to work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Muller explores how Lacan's way of understanding experience through three dimensions--the real, the imaginary and the symbolic--can be useful both for thinking about cultural phenomena and for understanding the complexities involved in treating psychotic patients. Muller develops Lacan's perspective gradually, presenting it as distinctive approaches to data from a variety of sources, such as cognitive, social and developmental psychology, literature, history, art, and psychoanalytic treatment. The book's first four chapters present Muller's reading of selected data from child development research, psychology and linguistics, approximating a semiotic model of "normal" development. The following three chapters examine in a Lacanian framework the structural basis of psychotic stages as indicative of massive semiotic failure in development. The final chapters on human narcissism suggest reasons that "normal" development may be impossible
Nobus, Dany (2005). Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid: Elements for a Psychoanalytic Epistemology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid , Dany Nobus and Malcolm Quinn draw on recent research to provide a thorough and illuminating discussion of the status of knowledge and truth in psychoanalysis and related disciplines. Adopting a Lacanian framework of reference, this book clarifies the status of knowledge in psychoanalysis and the implications of this for knowledge construction, acquisition and transmission across a variety of humanities and social sciences. The authors provide an original perspective on psychoanalytic epistemology and methodology, including discussion of central questions such as that of the status of psychoanalysis as an art, science or religion. This provocative discussion of the dialectics of knowing and not knowing, and how they inform Freudian and Lacanian theory, will be welcomed by practicing Psychoanalysts and students of psychoanalytic studies, cultural studies, sociology and philosophy
Oliver, Kelly & Edwin, Steve (eds.) (2002). Between the Psyche and the Social: Psychoanalytic Social Theory. Rowman & Littlefield.   (Google)
Palmer Barnes, Fiona (1998). Complaints and Grievances in Psychotherapy: A Handbook of Ethical Practice. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: This up-to-date and comprehensive handbook guides the reader, step-by-step, through all aspects of complaints and grievance management. It includes useful addresses, current codes of ethics from the major organizations, protocols and sample letters
Palmer, Michael F. (1997). Freud and Jung on Religion. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Michael Palmer provides a detailed account of two of the most important theories of religion in the history of psychology--those of Freud and Jung. The book first analyzes Freud's claim that religion is an obsessional neurosis, a psychological illness fueled by sexual repression. He then considers Jung's rejection of Freud's theory, and his own assertion that it is the absence of religion, not its presence, which leads to neurosis
Parsons, Michael (2000). The Dove That Returns, the Dove That Vanishes: Paradox and Creativity in Psychoanalysis. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The nature of psychoanalysis seems contradictory - deeply personal, subjective and intuitive, yet requiring systematic theory and principles of technique. The objective quality of psychoanalytic knowledge is paradoxically dependent on the personal engagement of the knower with what is known. In The Dove that Returns, The Dove that Vanishes , Michael Parsons explores the tension of this paradox. As they respond to it, and struggle to sustain it creatively, analysts discover their individual identities. The work of outstanding clinicians such as Marion Milner and John Klauber is examined in detail. The reader also encounters oriental martial arts, Greek Tragedy, the landscape painting of John Constable, a Winnicottian theory of creativity and a discussion of the significance of play in psychoanalysis. From such varied topics evolves a deepening apprehension of the nature of the clinical experience. Illustrated throughout with clinical examples, The Dove that Returns, The Dove that Vanishes will prove valuable to those in the field of psychoanalysis, and to those in the arts and humanities who are interested in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking
Parsons, William Barclay (1999). The Enigma of the Oceanic Feeling: Revisioning the Psychoanalytic Theory of Mysticism. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This study examines the history of the psychoanalytic theory of mysticism, starting with the seminal correspondence between Freud and Romain Rolland concerning the concept of "oceanic feeling." Providing a corrective to current views which frame psychoanalysis as pathologizing mysticism, Parsons reveals the existence of three models entertained by Freud and Rolland: the classical reductive, ego-adaptive, and transformational (which allows for a transcendent dimension to mysticism). Then, reconstructing Rolland's personal mysticism (the "oceanic feeling") through texts and letters unavailable to Freud, Parsons argues that Freud misinterpreted the oceanic feeling. In offering a fresh interpretation of Rolland's mysticism, Parsons constructs a new dialogical approach for psychoanalytic theory of mysticism which integrates culture studies, developmental perspectives, and the deep epistemological and transcendent claims of the mystics
Pedersen, Loren E. (1991). Dark Hearts: The Unconscious Forces That Shape Men's Lives. Shambhala.   (Google)
Pelletier, Kenneth R. (1985). A New Age: Problems & Potential. R. Briggs Associates.   (Google)
Pellegrini, Ann (1997). Performance Anxieties: Staging Psychoanalysis, Staging Race. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Performance Anxieties looks at the on-going debates over the value of psychoanalysis for feminist theory and politics--specifically concerning the social and psychical meanings of racialization. Beginning with an historicized return to Freud and the meaning of Jewishness in Freud's day, Ann Pellegrini indicates how "race" and racialization are not incidental features of psychoanalysis or of modern subjectivity, but are among the generative conditions of both. Performance Anxieties stages a series of playful encounters between elite and popular performance texts--Freud meets Sarah Bernhardt meets Sandra Bernhard; Joan Riviere's masquerading women are refigured in relation to the hard female bodies in the film Pumping Iron II: The Women ; and the Terminator and Alien films. In re-reading psychoanalysis alongside other performance texts, Pellegrini unsettles relations between popular and elite, performance and performative
Pile, Steve (1996). The Body and the City: Psychoanalysis, Space, and Subjectivity. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Over the last century, psychoanalysis has transformed the ways in which we think about our relationships with others. Psychoanalytic concepts and methods, such as the unconscious and dream analysis, have greatly impacted on social, cultural and political theory. Reinterpreting the ways in which geography has explored people's mental maps and their deepest feelings about places, The Body and the City outlines a new cartography of the subject. Mapping key coordinates of meaning, identity and power across the sites of body and city, author Steve Pile explores a wide range of critical thinking, particularly the work of Lefebvre, Freud and Lacan to present a pathbreaking psychoanalysis of space
Prager, Jeffrey (1998). Presenting the Past: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Misremembering. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Reiser, Stanley Joel (ed.) (1987). Divided Staffs, Divided Selves: A Case Approach to Mental Health Ethics. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Divided Staffs, Divided Selves offers a case-centered approach to the teaching of health care ethics to a wide range of students and clinicians. The book provides both clinical case material and a method for engaging in a dialogue regarding difficult decisions in the mental health care field that have potentially tragic choices. The essays that introduce the volume place the ethical problems of treating mentally ill people in the context of the health care ethics movement and traditions of ethical decision making. The individual cases are real, derived from actual clinical and consultative experiences
Richards, Barry (1994). Disciplines of Delight: The Psychoanalysis of Popular Culture. Free Association Books.   (Google)
Richards, Barry (1989). Images of Freud: Cultural Responses to Psychoanalysis. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Roland, Alan (1996). Cultural Pluralism and Psychoanalysis: The Asian and North American Experience. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: The influence of culture and sociohistorical change on all aspects of the psyche and on psychoanalytic theory is the missing dimension in psychoanalysis. This dimension is especially relevant to clinicians in the mental health field--whether psychoanalyst, psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker or marriage counselor--to enable them to understand what is at stake in working with those from various Asian cultures in North America and European societies. It is even more relevant than most clinicians realize to working with those from one's own culture. Cultural Pluralism and Psychoanalysis explores the creative dialogue that the major psychoanalysts since Freud have had with the modern Northern European/North American culture of individualism; and tries to resolve major problems that occur when psychoanalysis, with its cultural legacy of individualism, is applied to those from various Asian cultures. Alan Roland first examines the theoretical issues involved in developing a multicultural psychoanalysis. He then looks at the interface between Asian-Americans and other Americans, discussing the frequent dissonances, miscommunications, and misunderstandings that result from each coming from vastly different cultural and psychological realms. Finally, Roland examines the various ways in which culture enters the space of psychoanalytic work with Asians in America, illustrating his clinical theory with case vignettes of immigrants and second and third generation patients in the United States
Rosenfeld, David (1988). Psychoanalysis and Groups: History and Dialectics. Karnac Books.   (Google)
Rustin, Michael (2001). Reason and Unreason: Psychoanalysis, Science , and Politics. Wesleyan University Press.   (Google)
Ryan, Robert E. (2002). Shamanism and the Psychology of C.G. Jung: The Great Circle. Vega.   (Google)
Abstract: Carl Jung's work played an important role in shaping modern psychology. Through a thorough exploration of Jung's psychological ideas and the ancient beliefs of shamanistic cultures, this unique investigation unveils startling parallels between the two. As different as they may seem at first glance, these two branches of human paradigm and belief have amazing similarities in structure and function. Interspersed with the writings of Jung, this fascinating account traces the forces and patterns of symbolism common to shamanism and depth psychology. By studying these parallels, it is possible to get a glimpse into major aspects of the human psyche and understand the universality of psychic events in time and space
Safouan, Moustafa (2002). Speech or Death?: Language as Social Order: A Psychoanalytic Study. Palgrave.   (Google)
Abstract: How is social agreement ever reached, given that the notion of intersubjectivity cannot offer an adequate account? A problem for psychoanalytic theory is that of the sovereign third person who apparently holds the balance. Using the question of ambiguity in language and interpretation in psychoanalysis, this book explores the alliance of religion and the social as they support the sacred
Samuels, Robert (1993). Between Philosophy & Psychoanalysis: Lacan's Reconstruction of Freud. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Using the concepts developed by Lacan to analyse the inner logic of Freud's thought Samuels provides a bridge between Lacanian theory and traditional categories of psychoanalytic theory and practice
Samuels, Andrew (1993). The Political Psyche. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: A radical and original study, The Political Psyche joins together depth psychology with politics in a way that fully reflects the discoveries made in analysis and therapy. In an attempt to show that an inner journey and a desire to fashion something practical out of passionate political convictions are linked projects, author Andrew Samuels brings an acute psychological perspective to political issues such as the distribution of wealth, the market economy, Third World development, environmentalism, and nationalism--expanding and enhancing our conception of "the political". However, keeping true to his aim of creating a two-way dialogue between depth psychology and politics, Samuels also lays bare the hidden politics of the father, the male body, and men's issues in general. The Political Psyche does not collapse politics and psychology together, nor is Samuels unaware of the troubled relationship of depth psychology to the political events of the century. In the book he presents his acclaimed and cathartic work on Jung, anti-semitism and the Nazis to the wider public. The text employs a political analysis to shed a fascinating light on clinical work. Samuels conducted a large-scale international survey of analysts and psychotherapists concerning what they do when their patients/clients bring overtly political material into the clinical setting. The results, including what the respondents reveal about their own political attitudes, destabilize any preconceived notions about the political sensitivity of analysis and psychotherapy
Sandner, Donald & Wong, Steven H. (eds.) (1997). The Sacred Heritage: The Influence of Shamanism on Analytical Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Although in modern times and clinical settings, we rarely see the old characteristics of tribal shamanism such as deep trances, out-of-body experiences, and soul retrieval, the archetypal dreams, waking visions and active imagination of modern depth psychology represents a liminal zone where ancient and modern shamanism overlaps with analytical psychology. These essays explore the contributors' excursions as healers and therapists into this zone. The contributors describe the many facets shamanism and depth psychology have in common: animal symbolism; recognition of the reality of the collective unconscious; and healing rituals that put therapist and patient in touch with transpersonal powers. By reintroducing the core of shamanism in contemporary form, these essays shape a powerful means of healing that combines the direct contact with the inner psyche one finds in shamanism with the self-reflection and critical awareness of modern consciousness. The essays draw from the contributors' experiences both inside and outside the consulting room, and with cultures that include the Lakota Sioux, and those of the Peruvian Andes and the Hawaiian Islands. The focus is on those aspects of shamanism most useful and relevant to the modern practice of depth psychology. As a result, these explorations bring the young practice of analytical psychology into perspective as part of a much more ancient heritage of shamanistic healing. Contributors: Margaret Laurel Allen, Norma Churchill, Arthur Colman, Lori Cromer, Patricia Damery, C. Jess Groesbeck, Pansy Hawk Wing, June Kounin, Carol McRae, Pilar Montero, Jeffrey A. Raff, Janet S. Robinson, Meredith Sabini, Dyane N. Sherwood, Sara Spaulding-Phillips, Bradley A. Te Paske and Louis M. Vuksinick
Sayers, Janet (2003). Divine Therapy: Love, Mysticism, and Psychoanalysis. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: There is mounting evidence that strong personal relationships and spiritual beliefs contribute to our well-being. In Divine Therapy, Janet Sayers employs a biographical approach to the lives and writings of a range of eminent psychotherapists and psychologists to illuminate the link between physical and mental well-being and the 'at-one-ness' provided by love, religious and mystical experiences
Schermer, Victor L. (2003). Spirit and Psyche: A New Paradigm for Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and Psychotherapy. Jessica Kingsley Publishers.   (Google)
Seshadri-Crooks, Kalpana (2000). Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Desiring Whiteness provides a compelling new interpretation of how we understand race. Race is often presumed to be a social construction and we continue to deploy race thinking in our everyday life as a way of telling people apart visually. Desiring Whiteness explores this visual discrimination by asking questions in specifically psychoanalytic terms: how do subjects become raced? Is it common sense to read bodies as racially marked? Employing Lacan's theories of the subject and sexual difference, Seshadri-Crooks explores how the discourse of race parallels that of sexual difference in making racial identity a fundamental component of our thinking. Through close readings of literary and film texts, Seshadri-Crooks demonstrates that race is a system of differences organized around a privileged term: Whiteness. Contra "Whiteness Studies," she argues that Whiteness should not be understood as the bodily or material property of a particular group, but as a term that makes the logic of race thinkingpossible
Shanker, Uday (1992). Psycho-Analysis Vs. Psycho Synthesis or Yoga: A Comparative Study of Psycho-Analysis & Yoga Psychology. Enkay Publishers.   (Google)
Sim, Julius (1997). Ethical Decision-Making in Therapy Practice. Butterworth-Heinemann.   (Google)
Sorenson, Randall Lehmann (2004). Minding Spirituality. Analytic Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In Minding Spirituality, Randall Sorenson, a clinical psychoanalyst, "invites us to take an interest in our patients' spirituality that is respectful but not diffident, curious but not reductionistic, welcoming but not indoctrinating." Out of this
Spezzano, Charles & Gargiulo, Gerald J. (eds.) (1997). Soul on the Couch: Spirituality, Religion, and Morality in Contemporary Psychoanalysis. Analytic Press.   (Google)
Stavrakakis, Yannis (1999). Lacan and the Political. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Yannis Stavrakakis moves beyond the standard discussion of the Lacanian concept of the subject in a socio-political context, toward an analysis of the objective side of human experience. In the first part of Lacan and the Political, the author highlights Lacan's innovative understanding of the sociopolitical field and offers a straightforward and systematic assessment of the importance of Lanca's categories and theoretical construction for concrete political analysis. The second half of he book applies Lacanian theory to specific examples of widely discussed political issues, such as Green ideology, the question of democracy and the hegemony of advertising in contemporary culture. Lacan and the Political demonstrates the immense potential of Lacanian thought to invigorate our consideration of the political and will be of interest to all who seek to further their understanding of modern ideological discourse in politics
Symington, Neville (1994). Emotion and Spirit: Questioning the Claims of Psychoanalysis and Religion. St. Martin's Press.   (Google)
Symington, Neville (1994). Psychoanalysis and Religion. Cassell.   (Google)
Symington, Neville (2004). The Blind Man Sees: Freud's Awakening and Other Essays. Karnac.   (Google)
Tacey, David J. (2001). Jung and the New Age. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Just as formal religion appears to dwindle to a minority interest, 'New Age' spirituality gathers increasing momentum and baffles us with its popular appeal. What is more, it has appropriated Jung as one of its spiritual leaders. In his own trenchant style, David Tacey, offers a theoretical and philosophical account of the New Age phenomenon and the archetypal imperatives that have brought it about. He also investigates the popular claim that Jung is a prophet or mystic, and argues that critics have been only too willing to concur with what the New Age has made of him, conspiring to turn Jung into a figure of ridicule. Jung and the New Age redresses the balance while offering a wide-ranging discussion about the state of consciousness in the New Age culture and the future of spirituality versus formal religion
Tancredi, Laurence R. (1977). Ethical Policy in Mental Health Care: The Goals of Psychiatric Intervention. Prodist.   (Google)
Tjeltveit, Alan C. (1999). Ethics and Values in Psychotherapy. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Ethics and Values in Psychotherapy examines the ways in which the ethical convictions of both therapist and client contribute to the practical process of psychotherapy. Practitioners are increasingly focusing on the issue of their extensive--and often problematic--ethical influence on clients as they attempt to agree on guidelines and standards for professional practice. Alan C. Tjeltveit argues that any discussion of ethical practice in psychotherapy must be carried out in connection with traditional ethical theories. The author draws on scientific, clinical, and philosophical approaches to address issues such as: the role of therapy in society; the goals and outcomes of psychotherapy; techniques and practices; the existence and operation of values; and the intellectual and social context in which therapy takes place. This comprehensive study is a significant contribution to the debate on the ethical character of psychotherapy
Vandermeersch, Patrick (1991). Unresolved Questions in the Freud/Jung Debate: On Psychosis, Sexual Identity, and Religion. Leuven University Press.   (Google)
Walton, Jean (2001). Fair Sex, Savage Dreams: Race, Psychoanalysis, Sexual Difference. Duke University Press.   (Google)
Weatherill, Rob (1994). Cultural Collapse. Free Association Books.   (Google)
Werth, James L.; Welfel, Elizabeth Reynolds & Benjamin, G. Andrew H. (eds.) (2009). The Duty to Protect: Ethical, Legal, and Professional Considerations for Mental Health Professionals. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Widdershoven, Guy (ed.) (2008). Empirical Ethics in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Wright, Elizabeth (ed.) (1992). Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary. Blackwell.   (Google)

7.4e.1 Psychoanalysis, Misc

Dilman, Ilham (1959). The unconscious. Mind 68 (October):446-473.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Erwin, Edward (1984). The standing of psychoanalysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):115-128.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: tries to elucidate some of the rational considerations that determine the standing and value of psychoanalysis. He is sceptical about much of the positive evidence, but he also tries to provide some support for Freudian doctrines. I examine his supporting arguments and try to show that they have serious weaknesses
Gardner, Sebastian (1996). Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Abstract: In a reconstruction of the theories of Freud and Klein, Sebastian Gardner asks: what causes irrationality, what must the mind be like for it to be irrational,...
Gardner, Sebastian (2000). Psychoanalysis and the personal/sub-personal distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself as understood by Dennett A revised view of the distinction, which is argued to reflect its true metaphysical significance, is proposed
Grünbaum, Adolf (1983). Logical foundations of psychoanalytic theory. Erkenntnis 19 (1-3).   (Google)
Grunbaum, Adolf (2001). Does Freudian theory resolve "the paradoxes of irrationality"? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):129-143.   (Google | More links)
Grunbaum, Adolf (1980). Epistemological liabilities of the clinical appraisal of psychoanalytic theory. Noûs 14 (3):307-385.   (Google | More links)
Grunbaum, Adolf (1983). Is object-relations theory better founded than orthodox psychoanalysis? A reply to Jane Flax. Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):46-51.   (Google | More links)
Grunbaum, Adolf, Psychoanalysis and theism.   (Google)
Abstract: The topic of "Psychoanalysis and Theism" suggests two distinct questions. First, what is the import, if any, of psychoanalytic theory for the truth or falsity of theism? And furthermore, what was the attitude of Freud, the man, toward belief in God? It must be borne in mind that psychological explanations of any sort as to why people believe in God are subject to an important caveat. Even if they are true, such explanations are not entitled to beg the following different question: Is religious belief justified by pertinent evidence or argument, whatever its motivational inspiration? Freud's usage, as well as stylistic reasons of my own, prompt me to use the terms "religion" and "theism" more or less interchangeably, although in other contexts the notion of religion is, of course, more inclusive
Lockie, Robert (2003). Depth psychology and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception--in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose--or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception--the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception--not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches
Sachs, David & Grünbaum, Adolf (1989). In fairness to Freud: A critical notice of the foundations of psychoanalysis. Philosophical Review 98 (3):349-378.   (Google | More links)
Sandowsky, Louis N., Existential psychoanalysis and Freudian psychoanalysis.   (Google)
Abstract: This essay examines the similarities and dissimilarities between Freudian psychoanalysis and the form of analysis outlined by Sartre in Being and Nothingness in relation to the theory of inten- tionality developed by Brentano and Husserl. The principal aim of the paper is to establish a suitable starting point for a dialogue between these two forms of analysis, whose respective terminologies with respect to consciousness and the unconscious appear to cancel one another out

7.4e.2 Psychotherapy

Bond, Tim (2000). Standards and Ethics for Counselling in Action. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: Standards and Ethics for Counselling in Action is the highly acclaimed guide to the major responsibilities which trainees and counselors in practice must be aware of before working with clients. Author Tim Bond outlines the values and ethical principles inherent in counselling and points out that the counselor is at the center of a series of responsibilities: to the client, to him/herself as a counselor and to the wider community. Now fully revised and updated, the second edition examines issues fundamental to the process of counselling. A wide range of ethical problems is discussed and advice is given for resolving these dilemmas. Topics covered include: confidentiality, legal aspects of counselling, working with suicidal clients, false or recovered memory, record keeping, and the importance of adequate supervision. Full of practical information and guidance, the second edition of Standards and Ethics for Counselling in Action will be essential reading and a continuing source of reference for all those involved in counselling training and practice
Kiley, John Cantwell (1974). The Art of Self-Rescue: A Manual in Clinical Philosophy. Finisterre Books.   (Google)
Pope, Kenneth S. (2007). Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counseling: A Practical Guide. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Abstract: Praise for Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counseling, Third Edition "This is absolutely the best text on professional ethics around. . . . This is a refreshingly open and inviting text that has become a classic in the field." —Derald Wing Sue, professor of psychology, Teachers College, Columbia University "I love this book! And so will therapists, supervisors, and trainees. In fact, it really should be required reading for every mental health professional and aspiring professional. . . . And it is a fun read to boot!" —Stephen J. Ceci, H. L. Carr Professor of Psychology, Cornell University "Pope and Vasquez have done it again. . . . an indispensable resource for seasoned professionals and students alike." —Beverly Greene, professor of psychology, St. John's University "[The third edition] focuses on how to think about ethical dilemmas . . . with empathy for the decision-maker whose best option may have to be a compromise between different values. If there is only room on the shelf for one book in the genre, this is it." —Patrick O'Neill, former president, Canadian Psychological Association "This third edition of the classic ethics text provides invaluable resources and enables readers to engage in critical thinking in order to make their own decisions.?This superb reference belongs in every psychology training program's curriculum and on every psychologist's?bookshelf." —Lillian Comas-Diaz, 2006 president, APA Division of Psychologists in Independent Practice "Ken Pope and Melba Vasquez are right on target once again in the third edition, a book that every practicing mental health professional should read and have in their reference library." —Jeffrey N. Younggren, risk management consultant, American Psychological Association Insurance Trust "Without a doubt, this is the definitive book on ethics within psychology that can inform students, educators, clinical researchers, and practitioners." —Nadine J. Kaslow, professor, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science, Emory University School of Medicine "This stunningly good book . . . should be on every therapist's desk for quick reference." —David Barlow, professor of psychology and psychiatry, Boston University
Pope, Kenneth S. (1991). Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counseling: A Practical Guide for Psychologists. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
Abstract: The comprehensive guide to ethics "An excellent blend of case law, research evidence, down-to-earth principles, and practical examples from two authors with outstanding expertise. Promotes valuable understanding through case illustrations, self-directed exercises, and thoughtful discussion of such issues as cultural diversity."--Dick Suinn, president-elect 1998, American Psychological Association "The scenarios and accompanying questions will prove especially helpful to those who offer courses and workshops concerned with ethics in psychology."--Charles D. Spielberger, former president, American Psychological Association; distinguished research professor of psychology, University of South Florida The authors draw on their professional experience, empirical studies, and case examples to examine the ethical responsibilities that confront psychotherapists and counselors in their day-to-day practice. They offer insights into contending with the sometimes competing demands of clients' needs, formal ethical principles, personal values, and evolving legal standards in a range of areas--including fees, informed consent, sexual concerns, confidentiality, documentation, and supervision

7.4e.3 Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, Misc

7.4f Psychopathology

Adshead, Gwen (1999). Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Behrendt, Ralf-Peter & Young, Claire (2004). Psychopathology of psychosis: Towards integration from an idealist perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):808-830.   (Google)
Abstract: The commentators provide a wealth of additional neurobiological data that ought to be integrated in a comprehensive model. This response article, however, focuses on clarification of conceptual queries, thereby outlining the proposed theory of hallucinations more sharply, discussing its relationship with schizophrenia, and explaining why underconstrained thalamocortical activation may well be a candidate mechanism responsible for acute schizophrenic symptoms other than hallucinations
Berrios, G. E. (1996). The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive Psychopathology Since the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Since psychiatry remains a descriptive discipline, it is essential for its practitioners to understand how the language of psychiatry came to be formed. This important book, written by a psychiatrist-historian, traces the genesis of the descriptive categories of psychopathology and examines their interaction with the psychological and philosophical context within which they arose. The author explores particularly the language and ideas that have characterised descriptive psychopathology from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. He presents a masterful survey of the history of the main psychiatric symptoms, from the metaphysics of classical antiquity to the operational criteria of today. Tracing the evolution of concepts such as memory, consciousness, will and personality, and of symptoms ranging from catalepsy and aboulia to anxiety and self-harm, this book provides fascinating insights into the subjective nature of mental illness, and into the ideas of British, Continental and American authorities who sought to clarify and define it
Bickhard, Mark H. (ms). Psychopathology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I wish to address the question of the nature of psychopathology. It might naturally be felt that we already know a great deal about psychopathology, and thus that such a paper would be primarily a review and discussion of the literature; I will argue, however, that the most fundamental form of the question concerning the nature of psychopathology is rarely posed in the literature, that it is prevented from being posed by presuppositions inherent in standard theoretical approaches, and that, on those rare occasions when it does get addressed, it has received inadequate answers. Therefore, the paper will have more of the character of a conceptual explication and theoretical exegesis than it will of a review of the literature
Bob, Petr (2006). Self-awareness deficits in psychiatric patients. Neurobiology. Assessment and treatment. Journal of Analytical Psychology 51 (2):311-312.   (Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Broome, Matthew (2009). A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition
Brüne, Martin (2006). Evolutionary psychiatry is dead – long liveth evolutionary psychopathology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):408-408.   (Google)
Abstract: Keller & Miller (K&M) propose that many psychiatric disorders are best explained in terms of a genetic watershed model. This view challenges traditional evolutionary accounts of psychiatric disorders, many of which have tried to argue in support of a presumed balanced polymorphism, implying some hidden adaptive advantage of the alleles predisposing people to psychiatric disorders. Does this mean that evolutionary ideas are no longer viable to explain psychiatric disorders? The answer is no. However, K&M's critical evaluation supports the view that psychiatric disorders are not categorically distinct from normalcy, and that evolutionary psychopathology should be grounded in rigorous empirical testing. (Published Online November 9 2006)
Broome, Matthew; Bortolotti, Lisa & Mameli, Matteo (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: a case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187.   (Google)
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (eds.) (2009). Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in the study of psychopathology. The book examines numerous cognitive neuroscientific methods, such as neuroimaging and the use of neuropsychological models, in the context of a variety of psychiatric disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, dependence syndrome, and personality disorders. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience includes chapters on the nature of psychiatry as a science; the compatibility of the accounts of mental illness derived from neuroscience, information-processing, and folk psychology; the nature of mental illness; the impact of methods such as fMRI, neuropsychology, and neurochemistry, on psychiatry; the relationship between phenomenological accounts of mental illness and those provided by naturalistic explanations; the status of delusions and the continuity between delusions and ordinary beliefs; the interplay between clinical and empirical findings in psychopathology and issues in moral psychology and ethics. With contributions from world class experts in philosophy and cognitive science, this book will be essential reading for those who have an interest in the importance and the limitations of cognitive neuroscience as an aid to understanding mental illness.
Brown, Eric, Stoic psychopathology.   (Google)
Abstract: Apathy is the best-known feature of Stoicism; even Webster's records that a Stoic lives without passions.1 But it remains unclear what Stoic apathy amounts to, because it remains unclear what Stoics understand by passions and why they find passions problematic. In this essay, I start with four unsettled questions about the Stoic definition of passions, and to answer these questions, I explain the passions as central elements of Stoic psychopathology, that is, as defects relative to the Stoic account of the psychological norm. This hypothesis, I claim, clarifies what the evidence by itself leaves uncertain. I close by bringing my conclusions to bear on the scope of Stoic apathy. Throughout, I focus on the account of the passions offered by the greatest Greek Stoic, Chrysippus of Soli, who headed the school in the third..
Canali, Stefano (2004). On the concept of the psychological. Topoi 23 (2):177-86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The idea that certain mental phenomena (e.g. emotions, depression, anxiety) can represent risk factors for certain somatic diseases runs through common thinking on the subject and through a large part of biomedical science. This idea still lies at the focus of the research tradition in psychosomatic medicine and in certain interdisciplinary approaches that followed it, such as psychoneuroimmunology. Nevertheless, the inclusion in the scientific literature of specifically mental phenomena in the list of risk factors pertaining to a specific pathological condition would seem, to say the least, problematic when not completely absent, unlike what happens for certain behavioural factors, such as smoking, sedentary life, and alcohol abuse. It is also significant that insurance companies and health and welfare services do not pay for interventions and treatment for states of anxiety, disorders of mood and of the personality, alexithymia and stress reduction, as means of prevention or treatment of somatic diseases, as instead they do for the treatment of tobacco addiction. However, as I shall endeavour to argue here, there are numerous and well grounded reasons why this different consideration of psychic conditions compared with behaviours is valid and must be maintained in the evaluation of pathogenetic risk factors
Charland, Louis C. (2007). Affective neuroscience and addiction. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):20 – 21.   (Google)
Coe, John (2009). A transformational approach to psychopathology, sin and the demonic. In John H. Coe (ed.), Psychology in the Spirit: Contours of a Transformational Psychology. Ivp Academic.   (Google)
Cohen, D. Ashley (online). Differences in awareness of neuropsychological deficits among three patient populations.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Coltheart, Max & Davies, Martin (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Blackwell, 2000 Review by George Graham, Ph.D on Oct 27th 2000 Volume: 4, Number: 43
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (1999). The philosophy of psychopathology. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):154 – 158.   (Google)
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Abstract: who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: 1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of alien control and of thought insertion, which are characteristic of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992)
DeBerry, Stephen (1991). The Externalization of Consciousness and the Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Deutsch, Curtis K.; Ludwig, Wesley W. & McIlvane, William J. (2008). Heterogeneity and hypothesis testing in neuropsychiatric illness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):266-267.   (Google)
Double, D. B. (2007). Adolf Meyer's psychobiology and the challenge for biomedicine. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 331-339.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel’s biopsychosocial model was associated with the critique of biomedical dogmatism and acknowledged the historical precedence of the work of Adolf Meyer. However, the importance of Meyer’s psychobiology is not always recognized. One of the reasons may be because of his tendency to compromise with biomedical attitudes. This paper restates the Meyerian perspective, explicitly acknowledging the split between biomedical and biopsychological approaches in the origin of modern psychiatry. Our present-day understanding of this conflict is confounded by reactions to ‘anti-psychiatry.’ Neo-Meyerian principles can only be reestablished by a challenge to biomedicine that accepts, as did Meyer, the inherent uncertainty of medicine and psychiatry
Drayson, Zoe (2009). Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, I look at the current relationship between orthodox cognitive science and the study of mental disorder, and consider the implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in psychopathology.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1989). Alternative philosophical conceptualizations of psychopathology. In Phenomenology and Beyond: The Self and its Language. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Home Courses Selected Papers Selected Books C.V. Dreydegger.org Phil. Faculty Dept. Philosophy UC Berkeley
Erwin, Edward (1999). Curing psychopathology: Can philosophy help? Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):189-205.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is argued that philosophers can contribute indirectly to the cure of psychopathology by helping to resolve problems that impede the development of effective treatments. Two such problems are discussed. The first arises because different schools of therapy use conflicting criteria in evaluating therapeutic outcomes. A theory of Defective Desires is developed to deal with this problem. The second issue, which divides the field of psychotherapy, concerns the need for experiments, especially in validating claims of therapeutic efficacy. An epistemological foundation is developed to support the need for experiments
Fisher, Celia B. & Wallace, Scyatta A. (2000). Through the community looking glass: Reevaluating the ethical and policy implications of research on adolescent risk and psychopathology. Ethics and Behavior 10 (2):99 – 118.   (Google)
Abstract: Drawing on a conception of scientists and community members as partners in the construction of ethically responsible research practices, this article urges investigators to seek the perspectives of teenagers and parents in evaluating the personal and political costs and benefits of research on adolescent risk behaviors. Content analysis of focus group discussions involving over 100 parents and teenagers from diverse ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds revealed community opinions regarding the scientific merit, social value, racial bias, and participant and group harms and benefits associated with surveys, informant reports, intervention studies, blood sampling, and genetic research on youth problems. Participant comments highlight new directions for socially responsible research
Flanagan, Elizabeth H. (2000). Essentialism and a folk-taxonomic approach to the classification of psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):183-189.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Flew, Antony G. N. (1981). Disease and mental disease. In Concepts Of Health And Disease. Reading: Addison-Wesley.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Forrest, K. A. (2001). Toward an etiology of dissociative identity disorder: A neurodevelopmental approach. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):259-293.   (Google)
Abstract: This article elaborates on Putnam's ''discrete behavioral states'' model of dissociative identity disorder (Putnam, 1997) by proposing the involvement of the orbitalfrontal cortex in the development of DID and suggesting a potential neurodevelopmental mechanism responsible for the development of multiple representations of self. The proposed ''orbitalfrontal'' model integrates and elaborates on theory and research from four domains: the neurobiology of the orbitalfrontal cortex and its protective inhibitory role in the temporal organization of behavior, the development of emotion regulation, the development of the self, and experience-dependent reorganizing neocortical processes. The hypothesis being proposed is that the experience-dependent maturation of the orbitalfrontal cortex in early abusive environments, characterized by discontinuity in dyadic socioaffective interactions between the infant and the caregiver, may be responsible for a pattern of lateral inhibition between conflicting subsets of self-representations which are normally integrated into a unified self. The basic idea is that the discontinuity in the early caretaking environment is manifested in the discontinuity in the organization of the developing child's self
Frith, Christopher D. & Gallagher, Shaun (2002). Models of the pathological mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):57-80.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fuchs, Thomas (2005). Overcoming dualism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):115-117.   (Google | More links)
Fulford, K. William M. (1995). Mind and madness: New directions in the philosophy of psychiatry. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fulford, K. William M. (1994). Value, illness, and failure of action: Framework for a philosophical psychopathology of delusions. In George Graham & Lester D. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Gert, Bernard & Culver, Charles M. (2004). Defining mental disorder. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (2007). Adolf Meyer: Psychiatric anarchist. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 341-345.   (Google)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). The limits of subjectivity: A response to the commentary. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):207-208.   (Google | More links)
Gipps, Richard (2006). Mental disorder and intentional order. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):117-121.   (Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, Lester D. (1994). An introduction to philosophical psychopathology: Its nature, scope, and emergence. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Grant, Donald C. (2002). Becoming conscious and schizophrenia. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 4 (1):199-207.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1993). Mind and mine. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Graham, Janice E. & Ritchie, Karen (2006). Mild cognitive impairment: Ethical considerations for nosological flexibility in human kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):31-43.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1994). Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Graham, George (2002). Recent work in philosophical psychopathology. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):109-134.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Graham, George (online). Self-consciousness, psychopathology, and realism about self.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Graham, George (2004). Self-ascription: Thought insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Griffiths, A. Phillips (1995). Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection establishes the importance of this interdisciplinary approach and explores new directions in the "philosophy of psychiatry and psychology.
Grunbaum, A. (1986). The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry. Psychological Medicine 16 (1):19-38.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Harding, By Brian (2007). Dialectics of desire and the psychopathology of alterity: From Levinas to Kierkegaard via lacan. Heythrop Journal 48 (3):406–422.   (Google | More links)
Haslam, Nick (2007). Folk taxonomies versus official taxonomies. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 281-284.   (Google)
Haslam, Nick (2002). Kinds of kinds: A conceptual taxonomy of psychiatric categories. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9:203-217.   (Google)
Abstract: A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms—non-kinds, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, discrete kinds, and natural kinds—is presented and exemplified. It is argued that psychiatric categories cannot all be understood as pragmatically grounded, and at least some reflect naturally occurring discontinuities without thereby representing natural kinds. Even if essentialist accounts of mental disorders are generally mistaken, they are not implied whenever a psychiatric category that is not pragmatically grounded is posited.
Hirstein, William (2004). Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
Hoenig, J. (1965). Karl Jaspers and psychopathology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (2):216-229.   (Google | More links)
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). On thought insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their experiences have to be explained in terms of a withdrawal, on the part of the patients themselves, from certain forms of active engagement in reasoning. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between this view and the idea that patients’ reports of thought insertion reflect a situation in which the boundaries between the self and the world have become uncertain.
Hohwy, Dr Jakob (ms). Cognitive neuropsychiatry 8: 237–242, 2003.   (Google)
Abstract: The field of philosophical psychopathology is basically the philosophical study of mental disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, autism, as well as more specific symptoms and signs such as Capgras’ delusion (the delusion that your spouse, for example, is an impostor) or the anarchic hand sign (where your hand seems to act on its own intentions). This simple epithet covers a multitude of approaches: how can philosophy help to explain mental disorder? What does mental disorder tell us about consciousness, cognition, emotion and ‘self’? What does the study of mental disorder tell us about phenomenology? What does philosophical phenomenology tell us about mental disorder? What do mental disorders tell us about reasoning, rationality and belief formation? What are the particular ethical aspects of mental disorder and its treatment? If philosophical..
Hohwy, Jakob & Rosenberg, Raben (2005). Cognitive neuropsychiatry: Conceptual, methodological and philosophical perspectives. World Journal of Biological Psychiatry 6 (3):192-197.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive neuropsychiatry attempts to understand psychiatric disorders as disturbances to the normal function of human cognitive organisation, and it attempts to link this functional framework to relevant brain structures and their pathology. This recent scientific discipline is the natural extension of cognitive neuroscience into the domain of psychiatry. We present two examples of recent research in cognitive neuropsychiatry: delusions of control in schizophrenia, and affective disorders. The examples demonstrate how the cognitive approach is a fruitful and necessary supplement to the otherwise successful biological psychiatry paradigm, which tend to bypass the cognitive level. Philosophy concerns some of the core concepts involved in psychiatric illness, particularly concerning rationality, thought and action, reality testing, and the self. We present concrete examples that illustrate how philosophical conceptual tools can be particularly important for the construction and interpretation of the cognitive models relevant to the understanding of psychiatric illness. We conclude that cognitive neuropsychiatry is a fruitful and necessary supplement to biological psychiatry. Furthermore, cognitive neuropsychiatry itself may benefit significantly from employing philosophical conceptual tools in the interpretation and construction of its cognitive models. The cognitive and philosophical approaches may thus be further steps towards a scientific psychopathology
Hyman, Steven E. (2007). The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):8 – 11.   (Google)
Abstract: There continues to be a debate on whether addiction is best understood as a brain disease or a moral condition. This debate, which may influence both the stigma attached to addiction and access to treatment, is often motivated by the question of whether and to what extent we can justly hold addicted individuals responsible for their actions. In fact, there is substantial evidence for a disease model, but the disease model per se does not resolve the question of voluntary control. Recent research at the intersection of neuroscience and psychology suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior, but this "loss of control" is not complete or simple. Possible mechanisms and implications are briefly reviewed
Jacobs, David H. (1994). Environmental failure--oppression is the only cause of psychopathology. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (1-2):1-18.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kircher, Tilo & David, Anthony S. (2003). Self-consciousness: An integrative approach from philosophy, psychopathology and the neurosciences. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kroll, Jerome L. (2007). Hildegard: Medieval holism and 'presentism'— or, did sigewiza have health insurance? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 369-372.   (Google)
Langdon, Robyn & Coltheart, Max (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2009). Autonomy is (largely) irrelevant. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):50 – 51.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). Norms, conventions, and psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 163-170.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). The responsibility of the psychopath revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.   (Google)
Abstract: The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility
Lewis, Bradley (2007). George Engel's legacy for the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 327-330.   (Google)
Lewis, Bradley (2007). The biopsychosocial model and philosophic pragmatism: Is George Engel a pragmatist? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 299-310.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel designed his biopsychosocial model to be a broad framework for medicine and psychiatry. Although the model met with great initial success, it now needs conceptual attention to make it relevant for future generations. Engel articulated the model as a version of biological systems theory, but his work is better interpreted as the beginnings of a richly nuanced philosophy of medicine. We can make this reinterpretation by connecting Engel’s work with the tradition of American pragmatism. Engel initiates inquiry like a pragmatist, he understands theory and philosophy like a pragmatist, he justifies beliefs like a pragmatist, and he understands the world like a pragmatist. By drawing out these similarities, medical and psychiatric scholars can revitalize the biopsychosocial model, and they can open medicine and psychiatry to a rich philosophic heritage and a flourishing interdisciplinary tradition
Lowe, E. Jonathan (2006). Can the self disintegrate? Personal identity, psychopathology, and disunities of consciousness. In Julian C. Hughes, Stephen J. Louw & Steven R. Sabat (eds.), Dementia: Mind, Meaning, and the Person. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (2007). Philosophical psychopathology and self-consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Macdonald, Graham F. (1999). Folk-psychology, psychopathology, and the unconscious. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):206-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a 'philosophers' assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science
Maher, B. A. (1999). Anomalous experience in everyday life: Its significance for psychopathology. The Monist 82 (4):547-70.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2005). Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy. Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality
Matravers, Matt (2007). Holding psychopaths responsible. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 139-142.   (Google)
Mogg, Karin; Stopa, Lusia & Bradley, Brendan P. (2001). From the conscious into the unconscious: What can cognitive theories of psychopathology learn from Freudian theory? Psychological Inquiry 12 (3):139-143.   (Google)
Moulyn, Adrian C. (1947). Mechanisms and mental phenomena. Philosophy of Science 14 (July):242-253.   (Google | More links)
Mundale, Jennifer (2004). That way madness lies: At the intersection of philosophy and clinical psychology. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):661-674.   (Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic & Woolfolk, Robert L. (2000). Conceptual analysis versus scientific understanding: An assessment of Wakefield's folk psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):271-293.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic (2005). Can evolution explain insanity? Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):745-766.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I distinguish three evolutionary explanations of mental illness: first, breakdowns in evolved computational systems; second, evolved systems performing their evolutionary function in a novel environment; third, evolved personality structures. I concentrate on the second and third explanations, as these are distinctive of an evolutionary psychopathology, with progressively less credulity in the light of the empirical evidence. General morals are drawn for evolutionary psychiatry
Murphy, Dominic (2000). Darwin in the madhouse: Evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorders. Evolution and the Human Mind.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a ground swell of interest in the application of evolutionary theory to issues in psychopathology (Nesse & Williams 1995, Stevens & Price 1996, McGuire & Troisi 1998). Much of this work has been aimed at finding adaptationist explanations for a variety of mental disorders ranging from phobias to depression to schizophrenia. There has, however, been relatively little discussion of the implications that the theories proposed by evolutionary psychologists might have for the classification of mental disorders. This is the theme we propose to explore. We'll begin, in Section 2, by providing a brief overview of the account of the mind advanced by evolutionary psychologists. In Section 3 we'll explain why issues of taxonomy are important and why the dominant approach to the classification of mental disorders is radically and alarmingly unsatisfactory. We will also indicate why we think an alternative approach, based on theories in evolutionary psychology, is particularly promising. In Section 4 we'll try to illustrate some of the virtues of the evolutionary psychological approach to classification. The discussion in Section 4 will highlight a quite fundamental distinction between those disorders that arise from the malfunction of a component of the mind and those that can be traced to the fact that our minds must now function in environments that are very different from the environments in which they evolved. This mis-match between the current and ancestral environments can, we maintain, give rise to serious mental disorders despite the fact that, in one important sense, there is nothing at all wrong with the people suffering the disorder. Their minds are functioning exactly as Mother Nature intended them to. In Section 5, we'll give a brief overview of some of the ways in which the sorts of malfunctions catalogued in Section 4 might arise, and sketch two rather different strategies for incorporating this etiologically
Murphy, Dominic (2004). Darwinian models of psychopathology. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Murphy, Dominic (2005). Psychiatry in the Scientific Image. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Murphy, Dominic & Woolfolk, Robert L. (2000). The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):241-252.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Muscari, Paul G. (1981). The structure of mental disorder. Philosophy of Science 48 (December):553-572.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Nichols, Manuel Vargas Shaun (2007). Psychopaths and moral knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 157-162.   (Google)
Oltmanns, T. F. & Maher, B. A. (1988). Delusional Beliefs. John Wiley.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Papineau, David (1994). Mental disorder, illness and biological disfunction. Philosophy 37:73-82.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Papineau, David (1995). Mind, health, and biological purpose. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Poland, Jeffrey S.; von Eckardt, Barbara & Spaulding, Will (1994). Problems with the DSM approach to classifying psychopathology. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Rackley, Lloyd A. Wells Sandra J. (2007). Ontological and other assumptions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 203-204.   (Google)
Radden, Jennifer H. (2007). Sigewiza's cure. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 373-376.   (Google)
Radden, Jennifer (ed.) (2004). The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: This is a comprehensive resource of original essays by leading thinkers exploring the newly emerging inter-disciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry. The contributors aim to define this exciting field and to highlight the philosophical assumptions and issues that underlie psychiatric theory and practice, the category of mental disorder, and rationales for its social, clinical and legal treatment. As a branch of medicine and a healing practice, psychiatry relies on presuppositions that are deeply and unavoidably philosophical. Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy frame our understanding and treatment of mental disorder. Philosophical questions of evidence, reality, truth, science, and values give meaning to each of the social institutions and practices concerned with mental health care. The psyche, the mind and its relation to the body, subjectivity and consciousness, personal identity and character, thought, will, memory, and emotions are equally the stuff of traditional philosophical inquiry and of the psychiatric enterprise. A new research field--the philosophy of psychiatry--began to form during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Prompted by a growing recognition that philosophical ideas underlie many aspects of clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the economics and politics of mental health care, academic philosophers, practitioners, and philosophically trained psychiatrists have begun a series of vital, cross-disciplinary exchanges. This volume provides a sampling of the research yield of those exchanges. Leading thinkers in this area, including clinicians, philosophers, psychologists, and interdisciplinary teams, provide original discussions that are not only expository and critical, but also a reflection of their authors' distinctive and often powerful and imaginative viewpoints and theories. All the discussions break new theoretical ground. As befits such an interdisciplinary effort, they are methodologically eclectic, and varied and divergent in their assumptions and conclusions; together, they comprise a significant new exploration, definition, and mapping of the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice
Roland, Alan (2005). The spiritual self and psychopathology : Theoretical reflections and clinical observations. In Ashok Vohra, Arvind Sharma & Mrinal Miri (eds.), Dharma, the Categorial Imperative. D.K. Printworld.   (Google)
Ross, Patricia A. (2007). The fact value dichotomy in demarcating disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 107-109.   (Google)
Shahar, Larry Davidson Golan (2007). From deficit to desire: A philosophical reconsideration of action models of psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 215-232.   (Google)
Abstract: Emerging action perspectives on psychopathology depict individuals as actively shaping those environmental conditions that then impact on their risk for psychopathology, resilience in the face of it, and successful recovery from it. This view, although having important implications for research and clinical practice, has yet to be articulated in terms of its underlying philosophical framework. To begin to address this challenge, we situate action theory in the context of the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, who, in their seemingly anti-psychiatric series entitled Capitalism and Schizophrenia, argue for the central role of human agency as a fundamentally active force in determining subjective life. Within this context, they propose an alternative approach to the current deficit focus of much psychopathology research, replacing the notion of deficit with a fundamentally productive notion of desire (what they call “desiring-production”). After our exposition of this philosophical perspective on human agency, implications of this approach for action-informed research and clinical practice are discussed
Sigmon, Sandra T. (1995). Ethical practices and beliefs of psychopathology researchers. Ethics and Behavior 5 (4):295 – 309.   (Google)
Abstract: Ethical guidelines are vague concerning how situations should be handled when researchers encounter participants in preexisting psychological distress. Ethical issues of beneficence, autonomy, and the nature of informed consent may arise in these situations. This study investigated the ethical practices and beliefs of 84 psychopathology researchers when confronting research participants in distress. Results indicated that psychopathology researchers in general engaged in diverse ethical practices in providing debriefing, treatment referrals, and providing for distressed participants. Characteristics of the designated studies and of the researchers accounted for significant differences in ethical practices. In addition, the type of psychopathology being assessed accounted for significant differences in ethical practices and beliefs. Guidelines are offered to aid researchers who encounter participants in preexisting distress
Sneddon, Andrew (2002). Towards externalist psychopathology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):297-316.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The "width" of the mind is an important topic in contemporary philosophical psychology. Support for active externalism derives from theoretical, engineering, and observational perspectives. Given the history of psychology, psychopathology is notable in its absence from the list of avenues of support for the idea that some cognitive processes extend beyond the physical bounds of the organism in question. The current project is to defend the possibility, plausibility, and desirability of externalist psychopathology. Doing so both adds to the case for externalism and suggests ways of improving our study of cognitive dysfunction. I establish the possibility of externalist psychopathology through the development of models of wide cognitive processing, and, by implication, failure of such processing, from the work of S.L. Hurley and Robert Wilson. The plausibility of wide conceptualization and explanation of cognitive disorders is shown through an examination of apraxia, disorders of learned, skilled movements. The desirability of externalist psychopathology is suggested through a look at theoretical and therapeutic virtues, again drawing on Wilson's work
Spike, Jeffrey P. (2007). The philosophy of George Engel and the philosophy of medicine. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 315-319.   (Google)
Stanghellini, Giovanni (2001). Psychopathology of common sense. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):201-218.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (1994). Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought-insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1):1-10.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Thornton, Tim (2003). Psychopathology and two kinds of narrative accounts of the self. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):361-368.   (Google | More links)
Thornton, Tim (2004). Reductionism/antireductionism. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Thornton, Tim (1997). Reasons and causes in philosophy and psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (4):307-317.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Thornton, Tim (2002). Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introduction. Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 Method. Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. Results. Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, non- question-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. Conclusions. A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion
Thornton, Tim (2004). Wittgenstein and the limits of empathic understanding in psychopathology. International Review of Psychiatry.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Summary The aim of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, to briefly set out how strategic choices made about theorising about intentionality or content have actions at a distance for accounting for delusion. Secondly, to investigate how successfully a general difficulty facing a broadly interpretative approach to delusions might be eased by the application of any of three Wittgensteinian interpretative tools. Thirdly, to draw a general moral about how the later Wittgenstein gives more reason to be pessimistic than optimistic about the prospects of a philosophical psychopathology aimed at empathic understanding of delusions
Vargas, Shaun Nichols Manuel (2007). How to be fair to psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 153-155.   (Google)
Villagrán, José M. (2003). Consciousness disorders in schizophrenia: A forgotten land for psychopathology. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 3 (2):209-234.   (Google)
Wakefield, Jerome C. (2006). What makes a mental disorder mental? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):123-131.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wallace, I. V. (2007). Adolph Meyer's psychobiology in historical context, and its relationship to George Engel's biopsychosocial model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 347-353.   (Google)
Walach, Harald (2007). Folk psychology and the psychological background of scientific reasoning. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 209-212.   (Google)
Watson, John B. (1916). Behavior and the concept of mental disease. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (22):589-597.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Waterman, G. Scott (2007). Clinicians' “folk” taxonomies and the DSM: Pick your poison. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 271-275.   (Google)
Weiner, Steve (2007). Lack of autonomy: A view from the inside. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 237-238.   (Google)
Westerman, Michael A. (2007). Integrating the parts of the biopsychosocial model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 321-326.   (Google)
Widdershoven, Guy (1999). Cognitive psychology and hermeneutics: Two approaches to meaning and mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (4):245-253.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Widiger, Thomas A. (2007). The impact of clinicians on the diagnostic manual. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 277-280.   (Google)
Young, Garry (2006). Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion

7.4g Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc

Adshead, Gwen (1999). Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bach, Kent (1993). Emotional disorder and attention. In George Graham (ed.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Some would say that philosophy can contribute more to the occurrence of mental disorder than to the study of it. Thinking too much does have its risks, but so do willful ignorance and selective inattention. Well, what can philosophy contribute? It is not equipped to enumerate the symptoms and varieties of disorder or to identify their diverse causes, much less offer cures (maybe it can do that-personal philosophical therapy is now available in the Netherlands). On the other hand, the scientific study of mental disorder has a long way to go. There is much disagreement and uncertainty about the nature, causes, and treatment of many specific disorders, as is evident from DSM's classification of them in predominantly symptomatic terms. And even if what is reflected in DSM were a consensus rather than a compromise, still this shifts periodically with each new edition. Moreover, it is a notorious fact that many patients who clearly have psychiatric abnormalities do not fit any of the recognized diagnostic categories.1
Bavidge, Michael (2006). Under the floorboards: Examining the foundations of mild cognitive impairment. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):75-77.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bayne, Timothy J. & Bacherie, Elisabeth (2004). Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):81-86.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency
Blair, R. J. R. (2007). What emotional responding is to blame it might not be to responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 149-151.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (online). Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals
Bortolotti, Lisa & Cox, Rochelle (2009). 'Faultless' ignorance: strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (eds.) (2009). Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in the study of psychopathology. The book examines numerous cognitive neuroscientific methods, such as neuroimaging and the use of neuropsychological models, in the context of a variety of psychiatric disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, dependence syndrome, and personality disorders. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience includes chapters on the nature of psychiatry as a science; the compatibility of the accounts of mental illness derived from neuroscience, information-processing, and folk psychology; the nature of mental illness; the impact of methods such as fMRI, neuropsychology, and neurochemistry, on psychiatry; the relationship between phenomenological accounts of mental illness and those provided by naturalistic explanations; the status of delusions and the continuity between delusions and ordinary beliefs; the interplay between clinical and empirical findings in psychopathology and issues in moral psychology and ethics. With contributions from world class experts in philosophy and cognitive science, this book will be essential reading for those who have an interest in the importance and the limitations of cognitive neuroscience as an aid to understanding mental illness.
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (2010). What's wrong with 'mental' disorders? Psychological Medicine.   (Google)
Abstract: Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V".
Cruz, Joe (1997). Simulation and the psychology of sociopathy. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 20 (3):525-527.   (Google | More links)
Radden, Jennifer (ed.) (2004). The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: This is a comprehensive resource of original essays by leading thinkers exploring the newly emerging inter-disciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry. The contributors aim to define this exciting field and to highlight the philosophical assumptions and issues that underlie psychiatric theory and practice, the category of mental disorder, and rationales for its social, clinical and legal treatment. As a branch of medicine and a healing practice, psychiatry relies on presuppositions that are deeply and unavoidably philosophical. Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy frame our understanding and treatment of mental disorder. Philosophical questions of evidence, reality, truth, science, and values give meaning to each of the social institutions and practices concerned with mental health care. The psyche, the mind and its relation to the body, subjectivity and consciousness, personal identity and character, thought, will, memory, and emotions are equally the stuff of traditional philosophical inquiry and of the psychiatric enterprise. A new research field--the philosophy of psychiatry--began to form during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Prompted by a growing recognition that philosophical ideas underlie many aspects of clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the economics and politics of mental health care, academic philosophers, practitioners, and philosophically trained psychiatrists have begun a series of vital, cross-disciplinary exchanges. This volume provides a sampling of the research yield of those exchanges. Leading thinkers in this area, including clinicians, philosophers, psychologists, and interdisciplinary teams, provide original discussions that are not only expository and critical, but also a reflection of their authors' distinctive and often powerful and imaginative viewpoints and theories. All the discussions break new theoretical ground. As befits such an interdisciplinary effort, they are methodologically eclectic, and varied and divergent in their assumptions and conclusions; together, they comprise a significant new exploration, definition, and mapping of the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2007). Hacking on the looping effects of psychiatric classifications: What is an interactive and indifferent kind? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):329 – 344.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines Ian Hacking's analysis of the looping effects of psychiatric classifications, focusing on his recent account of interactive and indifferent kinds. After explicating Hacking's distinction between 'interactive kinds' (human kinds) and 'indifferent kinds' (natural kinds), I argue that Hacking cannot claim that there are 'interactive and indifferent kinds,' given the way that he introduces the interactive-indifferent distinction. Hacking is also ambiguous on whether his notion of interactive and indifferent kinds is supposed to offer an account of classifications or objects of classification. I argue that these conceptual difficulties show that Hacking's account of interactive and indifferent kinds cannot be based on - and should be clearly separated from - his distinction between interactive kinds and indifferent kinds. In clarifying Hacking's account, I argue that interactive and indifferent kinds should be regarded as objects of classification (i.e., kinds of people) that can be identified with reference to a law-like biological regularity and are aware of how they are classified. Schizophrenia and depression are discussed as examples. I subsequently offer reasons for resisting Hacking's claim that the objects of classification in the human sciences - as a result of looping effects - are 'moving targets'
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2009). Rationality and compulsion: Applying action theory to psychiatry – by Lennart Nordenfelt. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):415-418.   (Google)
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2010). Review of Rachel Cooper, Classifying Madness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):453-457.   (Google | More links)
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2009). Review of Derek Bolton, What is Mental Disorder? Metascience 18 (2):251-255.   (Google | More links)
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicago   (Google)
Abstract: This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM.