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7.4a. Psychopathology and Emotion (Psychopathology and Emotion on PhilPapers)

Angelette, Will (ms). Rationality, emotion, and belief revision: Waller's move beyond CBT & REBT.   (Google)
Abstract:      Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client affect. I suggest that, if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one whose objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision. I then note some limitations of the new proposal and the possibility of incommensurability in the comparison of our different views
Appelbaum, Paul S. (1998). Ought we to require emotional capacity as part of decisional competence? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8 (4).   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1998). Appreciation and emotion: Theoretical reflections on the Macarthur treatment competence study. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8 (4).   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (2009). Technological reason and the regulation of emotion. In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fujiwara, Esther & Kinsbourne, Marcel (2006). Forging a link between cognitive and emotional repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):519-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Erdelyi distinguishes between cognitive and emotional forms of repression, but argues that they use the same general mechanism. His discussion of experimental memory findings, on the one hand, and clinical examples, on the other, does indeed indicate considerable overlap. As an in-between level of evidence, research findings on emotion in neuroscience, as well as experimental and social/personality psychology, further support his argument
Hillman, James (1960). Emotion: A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meaning for Therapy. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Lacewing, Michael (2004). Emotion and cognition: Recent developments and therapeutic practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (2):175-186.   (Google | More links)
McEachrane, Michael (2009). Capturing emotional thoughts: The philosophy of cognitive-behavioral therapy. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Medford, Nick & David, Anthony S. (2006). Learning from repression: Emotional memory and emotional numbing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):527-528.   (Google)
Abstract: Erdelyi argues persuasively for his unified theory of repression. Beyond this, what can studying repression bring to our understanding of other aspects of emotional function? Here we consider ways in which work on repression might inform the study of, on one hand, emotional memory, and on the other, the emotional numbing seen in patients with chronic persistent depersonalization symptoms
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2002). Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that the sciences constitute a derivative means of disclosing the world and our place within it, as opposed to an ontologically and epistemologically privileged domain of inquiry
Shanker, Stuart G. (2004). Autism and the dynamic developmental model of emotions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):219-233.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shibles, Warren A. (1974). Emotion: The Method Of Philosophical Therapy. Language Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Whiting, Demian (2004). Emotional disorder. Ratio 17 (1):90-103.   (Google | More links)