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7.4b. Delusions (Delusions on PhilPapers)

Bayne, Timothy J. & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2004). Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some otherwise rational people appear to believe strange things. Sometimes people believe that someone, usually a near relative or member of their family - often their spouse - has been replaced by an impostor. Sometimes people believe that they are dead. These two delusions – known as the Capgras and Cotard delusion respectively – are instances of monothematic delusions, for they are limited to very specific topics. Other monothematic delusions involve the delusion that one is being followed by known people in disguise (the Frégoli delusion), or that the person one sees in the mirror is someone else (mirrored-self misidentification). We will focus on the Capgras delusion
Bayne, Tim, Delusion and self-deception: Mapping the terrain.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located and introduces the reader to some of the general issues that frame the discussion of subsequent chapters
Bayne, Timothy J. & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2005). In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained
Berrios, G. (1991). Delusions as 'wrong beliefs': A conceptual history. British Journal of Psychiatry 159:6-13.   (Cited by 48 | Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders. Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Broome, Matthew (2009). A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition
Bortolotti, Lisa (forthcoming). Classification and diagnosis in psychiatry: delusions and confabulations. Paradigmi.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (online). Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals
Bortolotti, Lisa (2005). Delusions and the background of rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place
Bortolotti, Lisa, Epistemic rationality and the definition of delusions.   (Google)
Abstract: According to one argument for the anti-doxastic conception of delusions, delusions are not beliefs because they are not responsive to evidence and responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In this paper, I concede that delusions are not responsive to evidence, but I challenge the other premise of this anti-doxastic argument, namely, that responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In order to undermine the premise, I describe instances of non-pathological beliefs that strenuously resist counterevidence. I conclude that considerations about responsiveness to evidence do not necessarily lead us to deny that delusions are beliefs. On the contrary, they seem to support the view that there is continuity between delusions and non-pathological beliefs
Bortolotti, Lisa & Broome, Matthew (2008). Delusional beliefs and reason giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which deluded subjects are committed to the content of their delusional beliefs, that is, to whether they can be regarded as authors of their beliefs (Moran 2001). We consider several levels of commitment one can have to a reported belief, delusional or otherwise, and we distinguish between _ownership_ and _authorship_ of beliefs (Gallagher 2000). After examining some examples of belief authoring (or lack thereof) in psychopathology, we argue that there is no straight-forward and unitary answer to the question whether deluded subjects author their beliefs. Nevertheless, introducing the notion of authorship in the debate can significantly contribute to the philosophical literature on the rationality of delusions and can also have important implications for diagnosis and therapy in psychiatry
Breen, Nora; Caine, Diana; Coltheart, Max; Hendy, Julie & Roberts, Corrine (2000). Towards an understanding of delusions of misidentification: Four case studies. Mind and Language 15 (1):74–110.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, J. (2001). Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Chadwick, Ruth F. (1994). Kant, thought insertion, and mental unity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):105-113.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cochrane, Thomas I. (2007). Religious delusions and the limits of spirituality in decision-making. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (7):14 – 15.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Commentary: Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Coltheart, Max & Davies, Martin (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Blackwell, 2000 Review by George Graham, Ph.D on Oct 27th 2000 Volume: 4, Number: 43
Cooper, David E. (1981). Delusions of modesty: A reply to my critics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 15 (1):125–135.   (Google | More links)
Corlett, J. Angelo (2009). Dawkins' God less delusion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3).   (Google)
Cowley, Fraser (1991). Metaphysical Delusion. Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Currie, Gregory & Jureidini, Jon (2001). Delusion, rationality, empathy. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):159-62.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Currie, Gregory (2000). Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin; Davies, Anne Aimola & Coltheart, Max (2005). Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):241-57.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to the right hemisphere of the brain. In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with anosognosia for hemiplegia. But we shall also use the term ‘anosognosia’ in an inclusive way to encompass lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of any impairment. Indeed, in the construction ‘anosognosia for X’, X might even be anosognosia for some Y
Davidson, Larry (1994). Commentary on insight, delusion, and belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (4):243-244.   (Google)
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Abstract: who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
Davies, Martin; Coltheart, Max; Langdon, Robyn & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: 1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of alien control and of thought insertion, which are characteristic of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992)
Dawkins, Richard (1998). Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for Wonder. Houghton Mifflin.   (Google)
Abstract: Did Newton "unweave the rainbow" by reducing it to its prismatic colors, as Keats contended? Did he, in other words, diminish beauty? Far from it, says Dawkins--Newton's unweaving is the key too much of modern astronomy and to the breathtaking poetry of modern cosmology. Mysteries don't lose their poetry because they are solved: the solution often is more beautiful than the puzzle, uncovering deeper mystery. (The Keats who spoke of "unweaving the rainbow" was a very young man, Dawkins reminds us.) With the wit, insight, and spellbinding prose that have made his books worldwide bestsellers, Dawkins addresses the most important and compelling topics in modern science, from astronomy and genetics to language and virtual reality, and combines them in a landmark statement of the human appetite for wonder. This is the book that Richard Dawkins was meant to write: a brilliant assessment of what science is (and what it isn't), a tribute to science "not because it is useful (though it is), but but because it is uplifting, in the same way as the best poetry is uplifting."
Dennett, Daniel (ms). Review of Richard Dawkins, the God delusion for free inquiry.   (Google)
Abstract: We agree about most matters, and have learned a lot from each other, but on one central issue we are not (yet) of one mind: Dawkins is quite sure that the world would be a better place if religion were hastened to extinction and I am still agnostic about that. I don’t know what could be put in religion’s place–or what would arise unbidden–so I am still eager to explore the prospect of reforming religion, a task that cries out for a better understanding of the phenomena, and hence a lot more research than has yet been attempted
Dutton, Denis (ms). Delusions of postmodernism.   (Google)
Abstract: That postmodernism is a general cultural mood and a style in art, architecture, and literature is uncontroversial. But does postmodernism present a coherent intellectual doctrine or theory of politics, art, or life? In the discussion which follows, I will concentrate on two aspects of the intellectual pretensions of postmodernism. First, I examine the postmodernist claim that to justify the idea that the postmodern world is characterized by a general indeterminacy of meaning. Next I will look at aspects of the postmodernist contention that the present age has witnessed the decline of individuality
Egan, Andy (online). Imagination, delusion, and self-deception.   (Google)
Abstract: Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife is has been replaced by an impostor, we might say that the victim of Capgras delusion believes that it is, in some respects, as if his wife has been replaced by an impostor. Another is to say that we’ve misidentified the attitude that the delusional subject bears to the content of their delusion. So for example, Gregory Currie and co-authors have suggested that rather than believing that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, we should say that the victim of Capgras delusion merely imagines that his wife has been replaced by an impostor.3
Franceschi, Paul (ms). An analytic view of delusion.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions
Frankish, Keith, Delusions: A two-level framework.   (Google)
Abstract: Although well-documented, delusions have proved extremely hard to explain, and many important questions remain open, including the basic one of what kind of mental state a delusion is. The standard position is that delusions are beliefs (the doxastic conception); but there are difficulties for this view, and alternative characterizations have been offered. In this chapter I shall propose a new framework for conceptualizing delusions, building on recent work in philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. There are good reasons for thinking that the term ‘belief’ is commonly used to refer to two different types of mental state, located at different levels. This view harmonizes with work in the psychology of reasoning, where many researchers now endorse some form of dual system theory. I shall outline what is, I believe, the most attractive version of this two-level view and show how it offers an account of delusions that explains our competing intuitions about their status. The chapter is in four sections. The first introduces the doxastic conception and its problems. The second distinguishes the two levels of belief, and argues that delusions, if they are beliefs at all, belong to the second. The third section offers an account of second-level belief, according to which it is a species of a broader mental type, acceptance, which is dependent on attitudes at the first level. The fourth section proposes that delusions are acceptances, some of which fall within, and some without, the narrower class of secondlevel beliefs, and the chapter concludes with some reflections on the implications of this view. Throughout, I shall focus on monothematic delusions, rather than the elaborate polythematic kind, and use simple, schematic examples. This is not because I think it is unimportant to pay attention to the diversity of delusions and the detail of clinical observation (far from it). Rather, it reflects the modest aim of the chapter, which is to propose a hypothesis for subsequent elaboration and evaluation..
Fulford, K. W. M. (1993). Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion, belief and Searle's theory of intentionality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality
Fulford, Kwm (2004). Neuro-ethics or neuro-values? Delusion and religious experience as a case study in values-based medicine. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):297-313.   (Google)
Abstract: Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by a case study of the differential diagnosis between delusion and religious experience. In a traditional model of scientific medicine, such challenges would be expected to become less pressing with advances in medical science. Philosophical value theory suggests, to the contrary, that scientific progress, through opening up an ever-wider range of choices, will increasingly bring the full range and diversity of human values into play not just in psychiatry but in all areas of medicine. The future, then, for medicine, is an integrated model in which VBM and EBM are equal partners in a genuinely human discipline
Fulford, K. William M. (1994). Value, illness, and failure of action: Framework for a philosophical psychopathology of delusions. In George Graham & Lester D. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Garvey, Brian (1999). Adolf Grünbaum on religious delusions. Religious Studies 35 (1):19-35.   (Google)
Gerrans, Philip (2002). A one-stage explanation of the cotard delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation of the difference in content between the Capgras and Cotard delusions. That explanation treats them as alternative rationalizations of essentially the same phenomenology. I show, however, that once we distinguish the phenomenology (and the neuroetiology), a one-stage model is adequate. In the final section I make some more general remarks on the oneand two-stage models
Gerrans, Philip (2001). Delusions as performance failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Delusions are explanations of anomalous experiences. A theory of delusion requires an explanation of both the anomalous experience _and _the apparently irrational explanation generated by the delusional subject. Hence, we require a model of rational belief formation against which the belief formation of delusional subjects can be evaluated. _Method. _I first describe such a model, distinguishing procedural from pragmatic rationality. Procedural rationality is the use of rules or procedures, deductive or inductive, that produce an inferentially coherent set of propositions. Pragmatic rationality is the use of procedural rationality _in context_. I then apply the distinction to the explanation of the Capgras and the Cotard delusions. I then argue that delusions are failures of pragmatic rationality. I examine the nature of these failures employing the distinction between performance and competence familiar from Chomskian linguistics. _Results. _This approach to the irrationality of delusions reconciles accounts in which the explanation of the anomalous experience exhausts the explanation of delusion, accounts that appeal to further deficits within the reasoning processes of delusional subjects, and accounts that argue that delusions are not beliefs at all. (Respectively, one-stage, two-stage, and expressive accounts.) _Conclusion. _In paradigm cases that concern cognitive neuropsychiatry the irrationality of delusional subjects should be thought of as a performance deficit in pragmatic rationality
Gerrans, Philip (1999). Delusional misidentification as subpersonal disintegration. The Monist 82 (4):590-608.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gerrans, Philip (2000). Refining the explanation of cotard's delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: An elegant theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry explains the Capgras and Cotard delusions as resulting from the same type of anomalous phenomenal experience explained in different ways by different sufferers. ‘Although the Capgras and Cotard delusions are phenomenally distinct, we thus think that they represent patients’ attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences’ (Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 168). On the theory proposed by Young and Leafhead, the anomalous experience results from damage to an information processing subsystem which associates an affect of ‘familiarity’ with overt recognition of faces, and, sometimes, scenes and objects. When the normal affect of familiarity is absent the subject experiences an unusual feeling of derealization or depersonalization. The Cotard and Capgras patients adopt different, delusional, explanations of this unusual qualitative state, for reasons to do with ‘attributional style’. It is part of this attribution hypothesis that delusional subjects, like normal people, interpret perceptual phenomena in the light of a set of background beliefs whose structure is a product of social/contextual influences and individual psychological dispositions. That structure predisposes people to reason in certain ways, to discount or reinterpret evidence and to favour certain hypoth-
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (1999). An empirical approach to understanding delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):21-24.   (Google | More links)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). The limits of subjectivity: A response to the commentary. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):207-208.   (Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (2004). Cognition: Brain pain: Psychotic cognition, hallucinations, and delusions. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gillett, Grant (1990). Insight from delusion. Inquiry 33 (2):231 – 244.   (Google)
Gold, Ian & Hohwy, Jakob (2000). Rationality and schizophrenic delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):146-167.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1993). Mind and mine. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Graham, George (2004). Self-ascription: Thought insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hak, Tony (1998). "There are clear delusions." The production of a factual account. Human Studies 21 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents a case study of a psychiatric intervention as an example of an institutional ethnography of psychiatric work. Institutional ethnography, a mode of inquiry outlined by Dorothy Smith (1987), is conceived here as an approach to the analysis of work in institutions as the contingent, local and context-bound insertion of a particular "case" - a patron, a pupil, a client, a patient - into both institutional and other social (e. g. gender, class) relations. The case presented in this paper, shows how a psychiatric factual account is the outcome of a process of the recognition, and/or the production, of "mentionables," followed by the documentary interpretation of mentionables as symptoms. Subsequently it is demonstrated that, and how, the recognition of mentionables depends on non-professional interpretations which by their nature express other social (such as gender, class, etc.) relations. This description of psychiatric diagnostic work is produced by means of a method of discourse analysis that consists of the juxtaposition of the various institutional texts (the two reports) with the transcript of the interview. An analysis of only the interview data would undoubtedly have resulted in some insights about psychiatric interviewing but would have shown neither how the interview functioned as a stage in the institutional process of (re)writing reports nor how ideological evaluations entered the diagnostic process. On the other hand, an analysis of only the two reports would have resulted in some insights about psychiatric reporting but would not have shown how these reports were produced
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). On thought insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their experiences have to be explained in terms of a withdrawal, on the part of the patients themselves, from certain forms of active engagement in reasoning. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between this view and the idea that patients’ reports of thought insertion reflect a situation in which the boundaries between the self and the world have become uncertain.
Hohwy, Jakob (2004). Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Hohwy, Jakob & Rosenberg, Raben (2005). Unusual experiences, reality testing and delusions of alien control. Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with which delusions are maintained, their often bizarre content, the patients' inability to dismiss them, and their often circumscribed character
Hopkin, Charles Edward (1982). The Share of Thomas Aquinas in the Growth of the Witchcraft Delusion. Ams Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction.--pt. I. The demonology of Thomas Aquinas.--pt. II. Thomas Aquinas as mediator between earlier and later beliefs.--Conclusion.--Bibliography (p. 185-188)
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignmont's model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.   (Google)
Abstract: De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented.
Kennett, Jeanette & Matthews, Steve (2003). Delusion, dissociation and identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and that there is little theoretical motivation to yield to that view in light of the fact that the core symptoms of DID bear remarkable similarity to the symptoms of these other disorders where no such extravagance is ever seriously entertained.
Klee, Robert (2004). Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):25-34.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Langdon, Robyn (2009). Confabulation and delusion: A review of Hirstein's brain fiction. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):785 – 802.   (Google)
Langdon, Robyn & Coltheart, Max (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Ledwig, Marion (2007). Richard Dawkins the God delusion. (London: Bantam press; new York NY: Houghton mifflin company, 2006). Pp. X+406. £20.00; $27.00 (hbk). ISBN 0618680004. Religious Studies 43 (3):368-372.   (Google)
Levi, Don S. (2004). The root delusion enshrined in common sense and language. Asian Philosophy 14 (1):3 – 23.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is a critique of certain arguments given by the Milindapanha and Jay Garfield for the conventional nature of reality or existence. These arguments are of interest in their own right. They also are significant if they are presumed to attack an obstacle we all face in achieving non-attachment, namely, our belief in the inherent or substantial existence of ourselves and the familiar objects of our world. The arguments turn on a distinction between these objects, and some other way of conceiving of them, in terms of which their conventional existence becomes apparent. After the distinction and the arguments that depend on it are shown to be problematic, the paper concludes with some reflections on the doctrine of skillful means and its applicability to Buddhist philosophical argument
Lloyd, G. E. R. (2005). The Delusions of Invulnerability: Wisdom and Morality in Ancient Greece, China, and Today. Duckworth.   (Google)
Loizzo, Joseph (1994). Commentary on insight, delusion, and belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (4):241-242.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
MacDonald, Angus W. (2008). A sneaking suspicion: The semantics of emotional beliefs and delusions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):719-720.   (Google)
Maher, B. A. (2003). Schizophrenia, aberrant utterance and delusions of control: The disconnection of speech and thought, and the connection of experience and belief. Mind and Language 18 (1):1-22.   (Google | More links)
Mahbubani, Kishore (2009). The dangers of democratic delusions. Ethics and International Affairs 23 (1):19-25.   (Google)
Milward, Peter (2008). The God delusion. By Richard Dawkins. Heythrop Journal 49 (4):696–700.   (Google | More links)
Oltmanns, T. F. & Maher, B. A. (1988). Delusional Beliefs. John Wiley.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Orr, David (1994). Green delusions: An environmentalist critique of radical environmentalism. Environmental Ethics 16 (3):329-332.   (Google)
Pacherie, Elisabeth; Green, Melissa & Bayne, Timothy J. (2006). Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). Similarly, the Cotard delusion (which involves the belief that one is dead or unreal in some way) may stem from a general..
Parnas, Josef (2004). Belief and pathology of self-awareness: A phenomenological contribution to the classification of delusions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):148-161.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Parnas, Josef & Sass, Louis A. (2001). Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):101-120.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Parsons, Elsie Clews (1917). The teleological delusion. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (17):463-468.   (Google | More links)
Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, (2006). Sources of delusion in analytica posteriora 1. Phronesis 51 (3):252-284.   (Google)
Abstract: Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in Analytica Posteriora 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into thinking we have a primary-universal proof. These three sources of delusion are shown to concern situations in which our arguments do establish the desired conclusion for the largest possible domain, but still fail to be real primary-universal proofs. Presupposing the concept of what may be called an immediate proof, in which something is proved of an arbitrary individual, Aristotle in response now demands that a proof be immediate of the primary thing itself and goes on to sketch a framework in which an intensional criterion for primacy can be formulated.For the most part this article is a comprehensive and detailed commentary on Aristotle's very concise exposition in 1.5. One important result is that the famous passage 74a17-25 referring to two ways of proving the alternation of proportions cannot be used as evidence for the development of pre-Euclidean mathematics
Radulescu, Anca (ms). Psychic embedding — vision and delusion.   (Google)
Abstract: The paper introduces the idea that the human brain may apply complex mathematical modules in order to process and understand the world. We speculate that the substrate of what appears outwardly as intuition, or prophetic power, may be a mathematical apparatus such as time-delay embedding. In this context, predictive accuracy may be the reflection of an appropriate choice of the embedding parameters. We further put this in the perspective of mental illness, and search for the possible differences between good intuition and delusive ideation. We speculate that the task at which delusional schizophrenic patients falter is not necessarily of perception, but rather of model selection. Failure of the psychotic patient to correctly choose the embedding parameters may readily lead to misinterpretation of an accurate perception through an altered reconstructed of the object perceived
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2004). Interpreting delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of delusional experience can serve to make explicit the manner in which we ordinarily experience the world under a taken-for-granted aspect of affective familiarity. This implicit feeling is, I argue, partly constitutive of our sense of reality. However, so-called ''folk psychology,'' which is generally adopted by philosophers as an initial interpretive backdrop for delusional beliefs and for beliefs more generally, fails to accommodate it. As a consequence, some pervasive philosophical assumptions concerning the manner in which we experience and understand the world, ourselves, and each other are called into question
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2008). The phenomenological role of affect in the capgras delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate the role played by ‘affective relatedness’ in constituting (a) a sense of who a particular person is and (b) a sense of others as people rather than impersonal objects. I draw on the phenomenological concept of horizon to offer an interpretation of the Capgras experience that shows how the content ‘this entity is not my spouse but an impostor’ can be part of the experience, rather than something that is inferred from a strange experience
Roessler, Johannes (2001). Understanding delusions of alien control. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):177-187.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Rust, John (1990). Delusions, irrationality, and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):123-138.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sheredos, Benjamin, Embodied delusions and intentionality.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton’s claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions
Southard, E. E. (1916). On the application of grammatical categories to the analysis of delusions. Philosophical Review 25 (3):424-455.   (Google | More links)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (2004). Reconceiving delusions. International Review of Psychiatry 16:236-241.   (Google)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (2005). The delusional stance. In M. Chung, K. William M. Fulford & George Graham (eds.), The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Stone, Tony & Young, Andrew W. (1997). Delusions and brain injury: The philosophy and psychology of belief. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Thornton, Tim (2002). Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introduction. Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 Method. Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. Results. Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, non- question-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. Conclusions. A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion
Thornton, Tim (2008). Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions
Tumulty, Maura, Delusions and dispositional beliefs.   (Google)
Abstract: In some ways, someone suffering from the delusion that his or her spouse has been kidnapped and replaced with an imposter appears to believe that he or she eats dinner with an imposter every night. But the imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it hard to classify them as beliefs, and easier to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie want to use Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief to restore confidence in the doxastic character of delusion. While dispositionalism appears to allow us to classify delusions as beliefs, this allowance isn’t a robust vindication of doxasticism. The significance of the allowance can be increased by emphasizing the role of folk-psychological norms in individuating propositional attitudes. But letting those norms play a large role in the individuation of belief makes it hard to count as believers the deluded subjects who violate most such norms. Dispositionalism about belief can’t defend doxasticism about delusion
Young, Andrew W. (1999). Delusions. The Monist 82 (4):571-589.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Young, Garry (2006). Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion
Young, Garry (2008). Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the capgras delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined, emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed