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7.4c. Other Mental Disorders (Other Mental Disorders on PhilPapers)

Arpaly, Nomy (2005). How it is not "just like diabetes": Mental disorders and the moral psychologist. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):282–298.   (Google | More links)
Bavidge, Michael (2006). Under the floorboards: Examining the foundations of mild cognitive impairment. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):75-77.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bond, John & Corner, Lynne (2006). Mild cognitive impairment: Where does it go from here? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):29-30.   (Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Cox, Rochelle (2009). 'Faultless' ignorance: strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.
Cruz, Joe (1997). Simulation and the psychology of sociopathy. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 20 (3):525-527.   (Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2007). Norms, conventions, and psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 163-170.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). The responsibility of the psychopath revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.   (Google)
Abstract: The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2005). Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy. Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality
Matravers, Matt (2007). Holding psychopaths responsible. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 139-142.   (Google)
Metzinger, Thomas (2003). Why are identity disorders interesting for philosophers? In T Schramme & J Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: “Identity disorders” constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms of self-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients’ phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content (for example, complete losses of proprioception, resulting in a “bodiless” state of self-consciousness, see Cole 1995, Gallagher and Cole 1995, Sacks 1998). There are also various typologies of phenomenal disintegration as in schizophrenia, in depersonalization disorders and in_ Dissociative Identity Disorder_ (DID), sometimes accompanied by multiplications of the phenomenal self within one and the same physical system. It is important to not only analyze these state-classes in terms of functional deficits or phenomenology alone, but as _self-representational _content as well. For instance, in the second type of cases just mentioned, we confront major redistributions of the phenomenal property of "mineness” in representational space, of what is sometimes also called the “sense of ownership”. Finally, there are at least four different delusions of misidentification (DM1; namely Capgras syndrome, Frégoli syndrome, intermetamorphosis, reverse intermetamorphosis and reduplicative paramnesia). Being a philosopher, I will discuss two particular types of identity disorder
2
in this contribution - disorders, which are of direct philosophical relevance: A specific form of DM, and the Cotard delusion. Why should philosophers do this? And why should psychiatrists care?
Nichols, Manuel Vargas Shaun (2007). Psychopaths and moral knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 157-162.   (Google)
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicago   (Google)
Abstract: This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM.
Vargas, Shaun Nichols Manuel (2007). How to be fair to psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 153-155.   (Google)