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7.4d. Mental Illness (Mental Illness on PhilPapers)

Adshead, Gwen (1999). Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bach, Kent (1993). Emotional disorder and attention. In George Graham (ed.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Some would say that philosophy can contribute more to the occurrence of mental disorder than to the study of it. Thinking too much does have its risks, but so do willful ignorance and selective inattention. Well, what can philosophy contribute? It is not equipped to enumerate the symptoms and varieties of disorder or to identify their diverse causes, much less offer cures (maybe it can do that-personal philosophical therapy is now available in the Netherlands). On the other hand, the scientific study of mental disorder has a long way to go. There is much disagreement and uncertainty about the nature, causes, and treatment of many specific disorders, as is evident from DSM's classification of them in predominantly symptomatic terms. And even if what is reflected in DSM were a consensus rather than a compromise, still this shifts periodically with each new edition. Moreover, it is a notorious fact that many patients who clearly have psychiatric abnormalities do not fit any of the recognized diagnostic categories.1
Bjorklund, M. S.; RN, ; CS, & PMHNP, (2004). 'There but for the grace of God': Moral responsibility and mental illness. Nursing Philosophy 5 (3):188–200.   (Google | More links)
Blashfield, Elizabeth H. Flanagan Roger K. (2007). Clinicians' folk taxonomies of mental disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 249-269.   (Google)
Abstract: Using methods from anthropology and cognitive psychology, this study investigated the relationship between clinicians’ folk taxonomies of mental disorder and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Expert and novice psychologists were given sixty-seven DSM-IV diagnoses, asked to discard unfamiliar diagnoses, put the remaining diagnoses into groups that had “similar treatments” using hierarchical (making more inclusive and less inclusive groups) and dimensional (placing groups in a two-dimensional space) methodologies, and give names to the groups in their taxonomies. Clinicians were familiar with a substantially smaller number of diagnoses than are in the DSM. Cultural consensus analysis and follow-up residual agreement analysis revealed similarities across clinicians’ folk taxonomies. Correlations between folk taxonomies and the DSM were moderate. Cluster analysis showed that clinicians preserved DSM higher order categories (e.g., mood disorders) but not the Axis I–Axis II distinction. This study suggests important differences between the way clinicians conceptualize mental disorders and the organization of the DSM-IV
Blashfield, Elizabeth H. Flanagan Roger K. (2007). Should clinicians' views of mental illness influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 285-287.   (Google)
Boivin, Suzanne M. Phillips Monique D. (2007). Hildegard and holism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 377-379.   (Google)
Boivin, Suzanne M. Phillips Monique D. (2007). Medieval holism: Hildegard of bingen on mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 359-368.   (Google)
Abstract: Current efforts to think holistically about mental disorder may be assisted by considering the integrative strategies used by Hildegard of Bingen, a twelfth-century abbess and healer. We search for integrative strategies in the detailed records of Hilde-gard’s treatment of the noblewoman Sigewiza and in Hildegard’s more general writings. Three strategies support Hildegard’s holistic thinking: the use of narrative approaches to mental illness, acknowledging interdependence between perspectives, and applying principles of balance to the relationships between perspectives. Applying these three strategies to the present-day conceptualization and treatment of mental disorder could move us toward a more thoroughly integrated understanding of the field
Bolton, Derek (2001). Problems in the definition of 'mental disorder'. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):182-199.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals
Brendel, David H. (2007). Beyond Engel: Clinical pragmatism as the foundation of psychiatric practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 311-313.   (Google)
Brendel, David H. (2007). Psychophysical causation and a pragmatist approach to human behavior. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 205-207.   (Google)
Brülde, Bengt (2007). Art and science, facts and knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 111-127.   (Google)
Brülde, Bengt & Radovic, Filip (2006). Dysfunctions, disabilities, and disordered minds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):133-141.   (Google)
Brülde, Bengt (2007). Mental disorder and values. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 93-102.   (Google)
Abstract: It is now generally agreed that we have to rely on value judgments to distinguish mental disorders from other conditions, but it is not quite clear how. To clarify this, we need to know more than to what extent attributions of disorder are dependent on values. We also have to know (1) what kind of evaluations we have to rely on to identify the class of mental disorder; (2) whether attributions of disorder contain any implicit reference to some specific evaluative standard; and (3) whether the concept of mental disorder is value laden in the definitional or in the epistemic sense. I will argue that the evaluations we have to rely on are mainly considerations of harm, but that we also need to rely on other evaluations; that there should be no references to specific evaluative standards; and that even though mental disorders are necessarily undesirable, "mental disorder" may well be a descriptive phrase
Brülde, Bengt & Radovic, Filip (2006). What is mental about mental disorder? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):99-116.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (2009). Mental illness as mental: a defence of psychological realism. Humana.Mente 11.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can lead either to instrumentalism or to eliminativism about psychiatry, depending on whether psychiatric classification is regarded as useful. Position (2), which is inspired by the growing interest in neuroscience within scientific psychiatry, leads to biological realism or essentialism. In this paper we endorse a different realist position, which we label psychological realism. Psychiatric disorders are identified and addressed on the basis of their psychological manifestations which are often described as violations of epistemic, moral or social norms. A couple of examples are proposed by reference to the pathological aspects of delusions, and the factors contributing to their formation.
Broome, Matthew; Bortolotti, Lisa & Mameli, Matteo (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: a case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187.   (Google)
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (2010). What's wrong with 'mental' disorders? Psychological Medicine.   (Google)
Abstract: Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V".
Canali, Stefano (2004). On the concept of the psychological. Topoi 23 (2):177-86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The idea that certain mental phenomena (e.g. emotions, depression, anxiety) can represent risk factors for certain somatic diseases runs through common thinking on the subject and through a large part of biomedical science. This idea still lies at the focus of the research tradition in psychosomatic medicine and in certain interdisciplinary approaches that followed it, such as psychoneuroimmunology. Nevertheless, the inclusion in the scientific literature of specifically mental phenomena in the list of risk factors pertaining to a specific pathological condition would seem, to say the least, problematic when not completely absent, unlike what happens for certain behavioural factors, such as smoking, sedentary life, and alcohol abuse. It is also significant that insurance companies and health and welfare services do not pay for interventions and treatment for states of anxiety, disorders of mood and of the personality, alexithymia and stress reduction, as means of prevention or treatment of somatic diseases, as instead they do for the treatment of tobacco addiction. However, as I shall endeavour to argue here, there are numerous and well grounded reasons why this different consideration of psychic conditions compared with behaviours is valid and must be maintained in the evaluation of pathogenetic risk factors
Champlin, T. S. (2008). The metaphor of mental illness - by Neil Pickering. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):353-355.   (Google)
Cheetham, Jochen Fahrenberg Marcus (2007). Assumptions about human nature and the impact of philosophical concepts on professional issues: A questionnaire-based study with 800 students from psychology, philosophy, and science. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 183-201.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical anthropology is concerned with assumptions about human nature, differential psychology with the empirical investigation of such belief systems. A questionnaire composed of 64 questions concerning brain and consciousness, free will, evolution, meaning of life, belief in God, and theodicy problem was used to gather data from 563 students of psychology at seven universities and from 233 students enrolled in philosophy or the natural sciences. Essential concepts were monism–dualism–complementarity, atheism–agnosticism–deism–theism, attitude toward transcendence–immanence, and self-ratings of religiosity and interest in meaning of life. The response profiles (Menschenbild) of women and men, and of psychology students in the first and midterm of study were very similar. The method of statistical twins indicated a number of differences between students of psychology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. The majority of respondents were convinced that philosophical preconceptions on mind–body and free will have important practical implications for the way in which psychotherapists, physicians, or and judges exercise their professions
Cheetham, Jochen Fahrenberg Marcus (2007). The evaluation of implicit anthropologies. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 213-214.   (Google)
Clegg, Jennifer (2007). Exploding the semantic horizon. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 233-235.   (Google)
Cohen, Peter J. (2001). A shooting on capitol hill: "The Ruby satellite system," mental illness, and failure of the american legal system. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11 (4).   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Commentary: Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Google)
Cooper, Rachel (2004). What is wrong with the DSM? History of Psychiatry 15 (1):5-25.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has come in for fierce criticism, with many commentators believing it to be conceptually flawed in a variety of ways. This paper assesses some of these philosophical worries. The first half of the paper asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that ‘cuts nature at the joints’ makes sense. What is mental disorder? Are types of mental disorder natural kinds (that is, are the distinctions between them objective and of fundamental theoretical importance, as are, say, the distinctions between the chemical elements)? The second half of the paper addresses epistemic worries. Even if types of mental disorder are natural kinds there may be reason to doubt that the DSM will come to reflect their natural structure. In particular, I examine the extent to which the DSM is theory-laden, and look at how it has been shaped by social and financial factors. Ultimately, I conclude that although the DSM is of immense practical importance it is not likely to become the best possible classification of mental disorders.
Cresswell, Mark (2008). Szasz and his interlocutors: Reconsidering Thomas Szasz's "myth of mental illness" thesis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):23–44.   (Google | More links)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1998). Commentary on mind, body, and mental illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (4):343-345.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Abstract: who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: 1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of alien control and of thought insertion, which are characteristic of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992)
Double, D. B. (2007). Adolf Meyer's psychobiology and the challenge for biomedicine. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 331-339.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel’s biopsychosocial model was associated with the critique of biomedical dogmatism and acknowledged the historical precedence of the work of Adolf Meyer. However, the importance of Meyer’s psychobiology is not always recognized. One of the reasons may be because of his tendency to compromise with biomedical attitudes. This paper restates the Meyerian perspective, explicitly acknowledging the split between biomedical and biopsychological approaches in the origin of modern psychiatry. Our present-day understanding of this conflict is confounded by reactions to ‘anti-psychiatry.’ Neo-Meyerian principles can only be reestablished by a challenge to biomedicine that accepts, as did Meyer, the inherent uncertainty of medicine and psychiatry
Double, D. B. (2007). Eclecticism and Adolf Meyer's functional understanding of mental illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 356-358.   (Google)
Elliott, Carl (2004). Mental illness and its limits. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Flew, Antony G. N. (1981). Disease and mental disease. In Concepts Of Health And Disease. Reading: Addison-Wesley.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Frith, Christopher D. & Gallagher, Shaun (2002). Models of the pathological mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):57-80.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fuchs, Thomas (2005). Overcoming dualism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):115-117.   (Google | More links)
Fulford, K. William M. (1995). Mind and madness: New directions in the philosophy of psychiatry. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fulford, K. W. M. (1993). Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion, belief and Searle's theory of intentionality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality
Gallup, Gordon G. & Platek, Steven M. (2001). Cognitive empathy presupposes self-awareness: Evidence from phylogeny, ontogeny, neuropsychology, and mental illness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):36-37.   (Google)
Abstract: We argue that cognitive empathy and other instances of mental state attribution are a byproduct of self-awareness. Evidence is brought to bear on this proposition from comparative psychology, early child development, neuropsychology, and abnormal behavior
Gert, Bernard & Culver, Charles M. (2004). Defining mental disorder. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (2007). Adolf Meyer: Psychiatric anarchist. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 341-345.   (Google)
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (2007). The Concepts of Psychiatry: A Pluralistic Approach to the Mind and Mental Illness. Johns Hopkins University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The status quo: dogmatism, the biopsychosocial model, and alternatives -- What there is: of mind and brain -- How we know: understanding the mind -- What is scientific method? -- Reading Karl Jaspers's General Psychopathology -- What is scientific method in psychiatry? -- Darwin's dangerous method: the essentialist fallacy -- What we value: the ethics of psychiatry -- Desire and self: Hellenistic and Islamic approaches -- On the nature of mental illness: disease or myth? -- Order out of chaos: from insanity to DSM-III to a pluralistic nosology -- A theory of DSM-IV: ideal types -- Dimensions versus categories -- The perils of belief: psychosis -- The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune: depression -- Life's rollercoaster: mania -- Being self-aware: insight -- Calvinism or hedonism? -- Truth and statistics: problems of empirical psychiatry -- A climate of opinion: what remains of psychoanalysis -- Being there: existential psychotherapy -- Beyond eclecticism: teaching psychotherapy in the twenty-first century -- Bridging the biology/psychology dichotomy: the hopes of integrationism -- Why it is hard to be pluralist.
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gipps, Richard (2006). Mental disorder and intentional order. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):117-121.   (Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1993). Mind and mine. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Graham, Janice E. & Ritchie, Karen (2006). Mild cognitive impairment: Ethical considerations for nosological flexibility in human kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):31-43.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Graham, George (2004). Self-ascription: Thought insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Graham, George (2009). The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Conceiving mental disorder -- Disorder of mental disorder -- On being skeptical about mental disorder -- Seeking norms for mental disorder -- An original position -- Addiction and responsibility for self -- Reality lost and found -- Minding the missing me.
Griffiths, A. Phillips (1995). Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection establishes the importance of this interdisciplinary approach and explores new directions in the "philosophy of psychiatry and psychology.
Grunbaum, A. (1986). The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry. Psychological Medicine 16 (1):19-38.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Hacking, Ian (2007). Kinds of People: Moving Targets. Proceedings of the British Academy 151:285-318.   (Google)
Hacking, Ian (1999). The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Haslam, Nick (2007). Folk taxonomies versus official taxonomies. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 281-284.   (Google)
Haslam, Nick (2002). Kinds of kinds: A conceptual taxonomy of psychiatric categories. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9:203-217.   (Google)
Abstract: A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms—non-kinds, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, discrete kinds, and natural kinds—is presented and exemplified. It is argued that psychiatric categories cannot all be understood as pragmatically grounded, and at least some reflect naturally occurring discontinuities without thereby representing natural kinds. Even if essentialist accounts of mental disorders are generally mistaken, they are not implied whenever a psychiatric category that is not pragmatically grounded is posited.
Hirstein, William (2004). Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). On thought insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their experiences have to be explained in terms of a withdrawal, on the part of the patients themselves, from certain forms of active engagement in reasoning. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between this view and the idea that patients’ reports of thought insertion reflect a situation in which the boundaries between the self and the world have become uncertain.
Holm, Soren (1998). Mind, body, and mental illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (4):337-341.   (Google)
Horwitz, Allan V. (2002). Creating Mental Illness. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this surprising book, Allan V. Horwitz argues that our current conceptions of mental illness as a disease fit only a small number of serious psychological conditions and that most conditions currently regarded as mental illness are cultural constructions, normal reactions to stressful social circumstances, or simply forms of deviant behavior
Jones, James T. R., Mental illness, stigma, and the person in the office next door.   (Google)
Abstract:      Recently I wrote a review for the Louisville Courier-Journal newspaper of Professor Elyn Saks' memoir of life while secretly suffering from schizophrenia. I did not mention the parallels between my life and Professor Saks'. I also have a successful career as a law professor. I accomplished it while harboring the secret I have the severe mental illness bipolar disorder (formerly known as "manic-depressive illness"). Why did I hide my condition for so long? Mainly I kept quiet due to the fear of stigma. Sadly, people today stigmatize more than they did fifty years ago. They need to realize that a history of mental illness is not a moral failing, and that it is a chronic condition like any "physical" disease. Although most with severe mental illness pose no threat to anyone, stereotypes unduly link violence with mental illness. The vast majority of those with mental illness like Professor Saks and me are not violent; a very small portion of the level of violence in society is attributable to people with mental disorders. Why have I now chosen to tell my story? I write, as did Professor Saks, to show people can be effective members of society in high-level and often stressful jobs despite their psychiatric conditions. I wish to be accepted for who I am, a person with a full and satisfying professional and personal life, and not have to endure stigma or doubt as to my ability to perform. While not all with mental disorders flourish as Professor Saks and I have done, we show what is possible. How many other successful individuals with mental illness who for now remain silent, probably due to stigma concerns, are out there? Perhaps each of us should look at those in the offices next to us, or our friends and neighbors, and wonder which of these people secretly live with a severe mental condition
Klein, Peter K. (1998). Insanity and the sublime: Aesthetics and theories of mental illness in goya's yard with lunatics and related works. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61:198-252.   (Google | More links)
Kroll, Jerome L. (2007). Hildegard: Medieval holism and 'presentism'— or, did sigewiza have health insurance? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 369-372.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). Norms, conventions, and psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 163-170.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). The responsibility of the psychopath revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.   (Google)
Abstract: The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility
Lewis, Bradley (2007). George Engel's legacy for the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 327-330.   (Google)
Lewis, Bradley (2007). The biopsychosocial model and philosophic pragmatism: Is George Engel a pragmatist? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 299-310.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel designed his biopsychosocial model to be a broad framework for medicine and psychiatry. Although the model met with great initial success, it now needs conceptual attention to make it relevant for future generations. Engel articulated the model as a version of biological systems theory, but his work is better interpreted as the beginnings of a richly nuanced philosophy of medicine. We can make this reinterpretation by connecting Engel’s work with the tradition of American pragmatism. Engel initiates inquiry like a pragmatist, he understands theory and philosophy like a pragmatist, he justifies beliefs like a pragmatist, and he understands the world like a pragmatist. By drawing out these similarities, medical and psychiatric scholars can revitalize the biopsychosocial model, and they can open medicine and psychiatry to a rich philosophic heritage and a flourishing interdisciplinary tradition
Macklin, Ruth (1972). Mental health and mental illness: Some problems of definition and concept formation. Philosophy of Science 39 (3):341-365.   (Google | More links)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2005). Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy. Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality
Matravers, Matt (2007). Holding psychopaths responsible. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 139-142.   (Google)
Melges, F. T. (1989). Disorders of time and the brain in severe mental illness. In J. T. Fraser (ed.), Time and Mind: Interdisciplinary Issues. International Universities Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Moore, Michael S. (1975). Some myths about 'mental illness'. Inquiry 18 (3):233 – 265.   (Google)
Moreno, Jonathan D. (1982). Discourse in the Social Sciences: Strategies for Translating Models of Mental Illness. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Morris, Charles (1959). Philosophy, psychiatry, mental illness and health. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1):47-55.   (Google | More links)
Moulyn, Adrian C. (1947). Mechanisms and mental phenomena. Philosophy of Science 14 (July):242-253.   (Google | More links)
Mundale, Jennifer (2004). That way madness lies: At the intersection of philosophy and clinical psychology. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):661-674.   (Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic & Woolfolk, Robert L. (2000). Conceptual analysis versus scientific understanding: An assessment of Wakefield's folk psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):271-293.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic (2005). Can evolution explain insanity? Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):745-766.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I distinguish three evolutionary explanations of mental illness: first, breakdowns in evolved computational systems; second, evolved systems performing their evolutionary function in a novel environment; third, evolved personality structures. I concentrate on the second and third explanations, as these are distinctive of an evolutionary psychopathology, with progressively less credulity in the light of the empirical evidence. General morals are drawn for evolutionary psychiatry
Murphy, Dominic (2000). Darwin in the madhouse: Evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorders. Evolution and the Human Mind.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a ground swell of interest in the application of evolutionary theory to issues in psychopathology (Nesse & Williams 1995, Stevens & Price 1996, McGuire & Troisi 1998). Much of this work has been aimed at finding adaptationist explanations for a variety of mental disorders ranging from phobias to depression to schizophrenia. There has, however, been relatively little discussion of the implications that the theories proposed by evolutionary psychologists might have for the classification of mental disorders. This is the theme we propose to explore. We'll begin, in Section 2, by providing a brief overview of the account of the mind advanced by evolutionary psychologists. In Section 3 we'll explain why issues of taxonomy are important and why the dominant approach to the classification of mental disorders is radically and alarmingly unsatisfactory. We will also indicate why we think an alternative approach, based on theories in evolutionary psychology, is particularly promising. In Section 4 we'll try to illustrate some of the virtues of the evolutionary psychological approach to classification. The discussion in Section 4 will highlight a quite fundamental distinction between those disorders that arise from the malfunction of a component of the mind and those that can be traced to the fact that our minds must now function in environments that are very different from the environments in which they evolved. This mis-match between the current and ancestral environments can, we maintain, give rise to serious mental disorders despite the fact that, in one important sense, there is nothing at all wrong with the people suffering the disorder. Their minds are functioning exactly as Mother Nature intended them to. In Section 5, we'll give a brief overview of some of the ways in which the sorts of malfunctions catalogued in Section 4 might arise, and sketch two rather different strategies for incorporating this etiologically
Murphy, Dominic (2001). Hacking's reconciliation: Putting the biological and sociological together in the explanation of mental illness. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In a series of recent works, Ian Hacking has produced a model of social causation in mental illness and begun to sketch in outline how this might be integrated with the medical model of psychiatry. This article elaborates and revises Hacking's model of social forces, criticizes him for attempting a merely semantic resolution of the tension between the social and the biological, and sketches an alternative approach that builds upon his substantial insights
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Abstract: Introduction : the existence of mental illness -- The likeness argument -- The categorical argument -- Metaphor -- Two metaphors from physical medicine -- The metaphor of mental illness -- Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, social construction, and metaphor -- Metaphors and models.
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Abstract: This is a comprehensive resource of original essays by leading thinkers exploring the newly emerging inter-disciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry. The contributors aim to define this exciting field and to highlight the philosophical assumptions and issues that underlie psychiatric theory and practice, the category of mental disorder, and rationales for its social, clinical and legal treatment. As a branch of medicine and a healing practice, psychiatry relies on presuppositions that are deeply and unavoidably philosophical. Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy frame our understanding and treatment of mental disorder. Philosophical questions of evidence, reality, truth, science, and values give meaning to each of the social institutions and practices concerned with mental health care. The psyche, the mind and its relation to the body, subjectivity and consciousness, personal identity and character, thought, will, memory, and emotions are equally the stuff of traditional philosophical inquiry and of the psychiatric enterprise. A new research field--the philosophy of psychiatry--began to form during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Prompted by a growing recognition that philosophical ideas underlie many aspects of clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the economics and politics of mental health care, academic philosophers, practitioners, and philosophically trained psychiatrists have begun a series of vital, cross-disciplinary exchanges. This volume provides a sampling of the research yield of those exchanges. Leading thinkers in this area, including clinicians, philosophers, psychologists, and interdisciplinary teams, provide original discussions that are not only expository and critical, but also a reflection of their authors' distinctive and often powerful and imaginative viewpoints and theories. All the discussions break new theoretical ground. As befits such an interdisciplinary effort, they are methodologically eclectic, and varied and divergent in their assumptions and conclusions; together, they comprise a significant new exploration, definition, and mapping of the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice
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Abstract: This book is psychiatry's reply to the diverse group of antipsychiatrists, including Laing, Foucault, Goffman, Szasz and Bassaglia, that has made fashionable the view that mental illness is merely socially deviant behaviour and that psychiatrists are agents of the capitalist society seeking to repress such behaviour. It establishes, by the use of evidence from historical and transcultural studies, that mental illness has been recognised in all cultures since the beginning of history and goes on to explore the philosophical and medical basis for psychiatry's diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. Finally, it tackles two issues where psychiatry has recently been seen as at odds with the values prevailing in society: involuntary hospitalization and the insanity defence. The Reality of Mental Illness does not pretend to offer simple answers to the complex problems it discusses, but will leave the reader with a much greater understanding of psychiatry's aims, practices and problems
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Abstract: Introduction. Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 Method. Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. Results. Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, non- question-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. Conclusions. A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion
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Abstract: This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM.
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Abstract: Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion