MindPapers: 7.4e. Philosophy of Psychology

Adams, E. M. (1967). Mind and the language of psychology. Ratio 9 (December):122-139. (Google | Edit)

Angell, James Rowland (1907). The province of functional psychology. Psychological Review 14:61-91. (Cited by 39 | Google | Edit)

Bergmann, Gustav (1940). On some methodological problems of psychology. Philosophy of Science 7 (April):205-219. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bermudez, Jose Luis (2005). Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bickle, John (2002). Philosophy of mind and the sciences. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google | Edit)

Block, Ned (ed.) (1981). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Google | Edit)

Block, Ned (ed.) (1980). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Cited by 79 | Google | Edit)

Block, Ned & Segal, Gabriel (1998). The philosophy of psychology. In Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. New York: Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Brown, Stuart C. (ed.) (1974). Philosophy Of Psychology. London,: Macmillan. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Brunswik, Egon (1976). The conceptual focus of some psychological systems. Erkenntnis 8 (1). (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bunge, Mario & Ardila, Ruben (1987). Philosophy Of Psychology. Springer. (Cited by 35 | Google | Edit)

Campagnac, E. T. (1923). An appeal to psychologists. Mind 32 (127):289-303. (Google | More links | Edit)

Candlish, Stewart (online). Testing Wittgenstein's dismissal of experimental psychology against examples. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: One of the most notorious — and dismissive — passages in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is Part II section xiv, which begins like this: The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. Strong words. But we know that at one stage in his life Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology was sufficient for him to have done some experimental research, and that he was well acquainted with the work of at least some of the prominent psychologists active in his own lifetime. That is, his quoted remarks were not made from ignorance; and we should accordingly take them seriously enough to consider why he made them, what he had in mind, and to what extent — if any — they may have been (and, though this was all a long time ago, may still be) justified

Carruthers, Peter (2002). Human creativity. British Journal For The Philosophy Of Science 53 (2):225-249. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Cerf, Walter (1962). Studies in philosophical psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):537-558. (Google | More links | Edit)

Chace Tolman, Edward (1935). Psychology versus immediate experience. Philosophy of Science 2 (3):356-380. (Google | Edit)

Chaplin, William F. (1987). On the thoughtfulness of cognitive psychologists. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:269-279. (Google | Edit)

Corballis, Michael C. (1988). Psychology's place in the science of the mind/brain? Biology and Philosophy 3 (3). (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Costall, Alan (ed.) (1987). Cognitive Psychology In Question. St Martin's Press. (Cited by 10 | Google | Edit)

Dewey, John (1897). The psychology of effort. Philosophical Review 6 (1):43-56. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Dobbs, H. A. C. (1946). 'Substance' in psychology. Mind 55 (July):193-203. (Google | More links | Edit)

Feest, U. (2003). Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):937-948. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology

Fodor, Jerry A. (2003). Hume's program (and ours). In Hume Variation. Clarendon Press. (Google | Edit)

Garrett, Richard (1991). Why not naturalistic psychology? Philosophia 20 (4):377-385. (Google | More links | Edit)

Gauld, Alan (1989). Cognitive psychology, entrapment, and the philosophy of mind. In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. (Google | Edit)

Gopnik, Alison & Schwitzgebel, Eric (1998). Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology. In M.R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Griffing, Harold (1896). On the relations of psychology to other sciences. Philosophical Review 5 (5):489-501. (Google | More links | Edit)

Guthrie, E. R. (1924). Purpose and mechanism in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 21 (25):673-681. (Google | More links | Edit)

Harre, Rom (2004). The relevance of the philosophy of psychology to a science of psychology. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Hartshorne, Charles (1934). The parallel development of method in physics and psychology. Philosophy of Science 1 (4):446-459. (Google | More links | Edit)

Hatfield, Gary (2002). Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science: Reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology. Mind and Language 17 (3):207-232. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This article critically examines the views that psychology ﬁrst came into existence as a discipline ca. 1879, that philosophy and psychology were estranged in the ensuing decades, that psychology ﬁnally became scientiﬁc through the inﬂuence of logical empiricism, and that it should now disappear in favor of cognitive science and neuroscience. It argues that psychology had a natural philosophical phase (from antiquity) that waxed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this psychology transformed into experimental psychology ca. 1900, that philosophers and psychologists collaboratively discussed the subject matter and methods of psychology in the ﬁrst two decades of the twentieth century, that the neobehaviorists were not substantively inﬂuenced by the Vienna Circle, that the study of perception and cognition in psy- chology did not disappear in the behaviorist period and so did not reemerge as a result of artiﬁcial intelligence, linguistics, and the computer analogy, that although some psychologists adopted the language-of-thought approach of traditional cognitive science, many did not, and that psychology will not go away because it contributes independently of cognitive science and neuroscience

Hatfield, Gary (1995). Remaking the science of mind: Psychology as a natural science. In C. Fox, R. Porter & R. Wokler (eds.), Inventing Human Science. University of California Press. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In Inventing Human Science, ed. by Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 184–231. Key words: Wolff, Bonnet, Godart, Krüger, Hartley, Priestley, history of psychology in the 17th and 18th centuries, history of experiment in psychology, psychology as a natural science, idea of a natural science

Hearnshaw, L. S. (1941). Psychology and operationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 19 (April):44-57. (Google | Edit)

Huda, M. (1963). Contemporary psychology and its status as a science. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 10:46-53. (Google | Edit)

Hughes, Percy (1927). Theory and practise in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 24 (5):113-120. (Google | More links | Edit)

Hyslop, James H. (1895). Desiderata in psychology. Philosophical Review 4 (5):531-535. (Google | More links | Edit)

Jack, Anthony I. & Roepstorff, Andreas (2004). Trust or interaction? Editorial introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8). (Google | Edit)

James, William (1892). A plea for psychology as a 'natural science'. Philosophical Review 1 (2):146-153. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Jones, Anne H. (1915). The method of psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (17):462-471. (Google | More links | Edit)

Kline, Paul (1987). Philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1). (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Kukla, André (1989). Non-empirical issues in psychology. American Psychologist 44:485-94. (Annotation | Google | Edit)

Louch, A. R. (1962). Science and psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (February):314-327. (Google | More links | Edit)

Loveday, T. (1909). On certain objections to psychology. Mind 18 (70):208-230. (Google | More links | Edit)

Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1922). The paradox of the thinking behaviorist. Philosophical Review 31 (2):135-147. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Macdonald, Cynthia (ed.) (1995). Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Cited by 20 | Google | Edit)

Macdonald, Graham F. (1980). Psychology and physical science. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):32-35. (Google | Edit)

Madden, Edward H. (1957). 2.0.CO;2-D'>A logical analysis of 'psychological isomorphism'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (November):177-191. (Google | More links | Edit)

Madden, Edward H. (1962). Philosophical Problems Of Psychology. Odyssey Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Mandler, George & Kessen, William (1959). The Language Of Psychology. Wiley. (Cited by 13 | Google | Edit)

Margolis, Joseph (1984). Philosophy Of Psychology. Englewood: Cliffs Prentice-Hall. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Martin, J. E. (1971). Theoretical languages in psychology. Philosophy of Science 38 (September):344-352. (Google | More links | Edit)

Mischel, Theodore (1970). Wundt and the conceptual foundations of psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (September):1-26. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Misiak, Henryk (1961). The Philosophical Roots Of Scientific Psychology. Fordham University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Moore, Jared S. (1923). A defense of the foundations of psychology. Journal of Philosophy 20 (15):405-413. (Google | More links | Edit)

O'neil, W. M. (1949). The relation of inner experience and overt behaviour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 27 (May):27-45. (Google | Edit)

O'Nuillain, S.; McKevitt, Paul & MacAogain, E. (eds.) (1997). Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Peters, R. S. (1951). Observationalism in psychology. Mind 60 (January):43-61. (Google | More links | Edit)

Phillips, Dayton Z. (1946). The foundations of experience. Philosophy of Science 13 (April):150-165. (Google | More links | Edit)

Preston, Beth (1994). Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative? Synthese 100 (2):167-96. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively exhaustive either, on the grounds that dropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctively different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alternative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualism

Qadir, C. A. (1961). Methodology of psychology. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 8:133-144. (Google | Edit)

Rignano, E. (1926). Psychology in its relations to philosophy and science. Mind 35 (140):441-451. (Google | More links | Edit)

Rockwell, Teed (ms). The effects of atomistic ontology on the history of psychology. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: _This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how_ _those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of_ _Wundt, his most well known disciples, Titchener and Külpe, embraced an atomistic view of experience which_ _was at_ _least partly responsible for many of their failures. When the behaviorists rejected the_ _introspectionism of Titchener and Külpe, they kept their atomism, using the reflex_

Rogosin, H. (1942). Scientific method in current psychology. Philosophy of Science 9 (April):183-188. (Google | More links | Edit)

Scripture, E. W. (1891). The problem of psychology. Mind 16 (63):305-326. (Google | More links | Edit)

Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism 5:1-10. (Cited by 55 | Google | Edit)

Smart, J. J. C. (1979). A physicalist account of psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4). (Google | More links | Edit)

Smith, Frederick V. (1959). Psychological concepts and linguistic restraints. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (November):223-227. (Google | More links | Edit)

Somerville, John (1934). The strange case of modern psychology. Journal of Philosophy 31 (21):571-577. (Google | More links | Edit)

Stevens, S. S. (1936). Psychology: The propaedeutic science. Philosophy of Science 3 (1):90-103. (Google | More links | Edit)

7.4e	Philosophy of Psychology [81]

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