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7.4e.1. Psychoanalysis, Misc (Psychoanalysis, Misc on PhilPapers)

Dilman, Ilham (1959). The unconscious. Mind 68 (October):446-473.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Erwin, Edward (1984). The standing of psychoanalysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):115-128.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: tries to elucidate some of the rational considerations that determine the standing and value of psychoanalysis. He is sceptical about much of the positive evidence, but he also tries to provide some support for Freudian doctrines. I examine his supporting arguments and try to show that they have serious weaknesses
Gardner, Sebastian (1996). Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Abstract: In a reconstruction of the theories of Freud and Klein, Sebastian Gardner asks: what causes irrationality, what must the mind be like for it to be irrational,...
Gardner, Sebastian (2000). Psychoanalysis and the personal/sub-personal distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself as understood by Dennett A revised view of the distinction, which is argued to reflect its true metaphysical significance, is proposed
Grünbaum, Adolf (1983). Logical foundations of psychoanalytic theory. Erkenntnis 19 (1-3).   (Google)
Grunbaum, Adolf (2001). Does Freudian theory resolve "the paradoxes of irrationality"? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):129-143.   (Google | More links)
Grunbaum, Adolf (1980). Epistemological liabilities of the clinical appraisal of psychoanalytic theory. Noûs 14 (3):307-385.   (Google | More links)
Grunbaum, Adolf (1983). Is object-relations theory better founded than orthodox psychoanalysis? A reply to Jane Flax. Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):46-51.   (Google | More links)
Grunbaum, Adolf, Psychoanalysis and theism.   (Google)
Abstract: The topic of "Psychoanalysis and Theism" suggests two distinct questions. First, what is the import, if any, of psychoanalytic theory for the truth or falsity of theism? And furthermore, what was the attitude of Freud, the man, toward belief in God? It must be borne in mind that psychological explanations of any sort as to why people believe in God are subject to an important caveat. Even if they are true, such explanations are not entitled to beg the following different question: Is religious belief justified by pertinent evidence or argument, whatever its motivational inspiration? Freud's usage, as well as stylistic reasons of my own, prompt me to use the terms "religion" and "theism" more or less interchangeably, although in other contexts the notion of religion is, of course, more inclusive
Lockie, Robert (2003). Depth psychology and self-deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception--in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose--or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception--the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception--not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches
Sachs, David & Grünbaum, Adolf (1989). In fairness to Freud: A critical notice of the foundations of psychoanalysis. Philosophical Review 98 (3):349-378.   (Google | More links)
Sandowsky, Louis N., Existential psychoanalysis and Freudian psychoanalysis.   (Google)
Abstract: This essay examines the similarities and dissimilarities between Freudian psychoanalysis and the form of analysis outlined by Sartre in Being and Nothingness in relation to the theory of inten- tionality developed by Brentano and Husserl. The principal aim of the paper is to establish a suitable starting point for a dialogue between these two forms of analysis, whose respective terminologies with respect to consciousness and the unconscious appear to cancel one another out