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7.4f. Psychopathology (Psychopathology on PhilPapers)

Adshead, Gwen (1999). Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Behrendt, Ralf-Peter & Young, Claire (2004). Psychopathology of psychosis: Towards integration from an idealist perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):808-830.   (Google)
Abstract: The commentators provide a wealth of additional neurobiological data that ought to be integrated in a comprehensive model. This response article, however, focuses on clarification of conceptual queries, thereby outlining the proposed theory of hallucinations more sharply, discussing its relationship with schizophrenia, and explaining why underconstrained thalamocortical activation may well be a candidate mechanism responsible for acute schizophrenic symptoms other than hallucinations
Berrios, G. E. (1996). The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive Psychopathology Since the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Since psychiatry remains a descriptive discipline, it is essential for its practitioners to understand how the language of psychiatry came to be formed. This important book, written by a psychiatrist-historian, traces the genesis of the descriptive categories of psychopathology and examines their interaction with the psychological and philosophical context within which they arose. The author explores particularly the language and ideas that have characterised descriptive psychopathology from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. He presents a masterful survey of the history of the main psychiatric symptoms, from the metaphysics of classical antiquity to the operational criteria of today. Tracing the evolution of concepts such as memory, consciousness, will and personality, and of symptoms ranging from catalepsy and aboulia to anxiety and self-harm, this book provides fascinating insights into the subjective nature of mental illness, and into the ideas of British, Continental and American authorities who sought to clarify and define it
Bickhard, Mark H. (ms). Psychopathology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I wish to address the question of the nature of psychopathology. It might naturally be felt that we already know a great deal about psychopathology, and thus that such a paper would be primarily a review and discussion of the literature; I will argue, however, that the most fundamental form of the question concerning the nature of psychopathology is rarely posed in the literature, that it is prevented from being posed by presuppositions inherent in standard theoretical approaches, and that, on those rare occasions when it does get addressed, it has received inadequate answers. Therefore, the paper will have more of the character of a conceptual explication and theoretical exegesis than it will of a review of the literature
Bob, Petr (2006). Self-awareness deficits in psychiatric patients. Neurobiology. Assessment and treatment. Journal of Analytical Psychology 51 (2):311-312.   (Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Broome, Matthew (2009). A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition
Brüne, Martin (2006). Evolutionary psychiatry is dead – long liveth evolutionary psychopathology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):408-408.   (Google)
Abstract: Keller & Miller (K&M) propose that many psychiatric disorders are best explained in terms of a genetic watershed model. This view challenges traditional evolutionary accounts of psychiatric disorders, many of which have tried to argue in support of a presumed balanced polymorphism, implying some hidden adaptive advantage of the alleles predisposing people to psychiatric disorders. Does this mean that evolutionary ideas are no longer viable to explain psychiatric disorders? The answer is no. However, K&M's critical evaluation supports the view that psychiatric disorders are not categorically distinct from normalcy, and that evolutionary psychopathology should be grounded in rigorous empirical testing. (Published Online November 9 2006)
Broome, Matthew; Bortolotti, Lisa & Mameli, Matteo (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: a case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187.   (Google)
Broome, Matthew & Bortolotti, Lisa (eds.) (2009). Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in the study of psychopathology. The book examines numerous cognitive neuroscientific methods, such as neuroimaging and the use of neuropsychological models, in the context of a variety of psychiatric disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, dependence syndrome, and personality disorders. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience includes chapters on the nature of psychiatry as a science; the compatibility of the accounts of mental illness derived from neuroscience, information-processing, and folk psychology; the nature of mental illness; the impact of methods such as fMRI, neuropsychology, and neurochemistry, on psychiatry; the relationship between phenomenological accounts of mental illness and those provided by naturalistic explanations; the status of delusions and the continuity between delusions and ordinary beliefs; the interplay between clinical and empirical findings in psychopathology and issues in moral psychology and ethics. With contributions from world class experts in philosophy and cognitive science, this book will be essential reading for those who have an interest in the importance and the limitations of cognitive neuroscience as an aid to understanding mental illness.
Brown, Eric, Stoic psychopathology.   (Google)
Abstract: Apathy is the best-known feature of Stoicism; even Webster's records that a Stoic lives without passions.1 But it remains unclear what Stoic apathy amounts to, because it remains unclear what Stoics understand by passions and why they find passions problematic. In this essay, I start with four unsettled questions about the Stoic definition of passions, and to answer these questions, I explain the passions as central elements of Stoic psychopathology, that is, as defects relative to the Stoic account of the psychological norm. This hypothesis, I claim, clarifies what the evidence by itself leaves uncertain. I close by bringing my conclusions to bear on the scope of Stoic apathy. Throughout, I focus on the account of the passions offered by the greatest Greek Stoic, Chrysippus of Soli, who headed the school in the third..
Canali, Stefano (2004). On the concept of the psychological. Topoi 23 (2):177-86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The idea that certain mental phenomena (e.g. emotions, depression, anxiety) can represent risk factors for certain somatic diseases runs through common thinking on the subject and through a large part of biomedical science. This idea still lies at the focus of the research tradition in psychosomatic medicine and in certain interdisciplinary approaches that followed it, such as psychoneuroimmunology. Nevertheless, the inclusion in the scientific literature of specifically mental phenomena in the list of risk factors pertaining to a specific pathological condition would seem, to say the least, problematic when not completely absent, unlike what happens for certain behavioural factors, such as smoking, sedentary life, and alcohol abuse. It is also significant that insurance companies and health and welfare services do not pay for interventions and treatment for states of anxiety, disorders of mood and of the personality, alexithymia and stress reduction, as means of prevention or treatment of somatic diseases, as instead they do for the treatment of tobacco addiction. However, as I shall endeavour to argue here, there are numerous and well grounded reasons why this different consideration of psychic conditions compared with behaviours is valid and must be maintained in the evaluation of pathogenetic risk factors
Charland, Louis C. (2007). Affective neuroscience and addiction. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):20 – 21.   (Google)
Coe, John (2009). A transformational approach to psychopathology, sin and the demonic. In John H. Coe (ed.), Psychology in the Spirit: Contours of a Transformational Psychology. Ivp Academic.   (Google)
Cohen, D. Ashley (online). Differences in awareness of neuropsychological deficits among three patient populations.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Coltheart, Max & Davies, Martin (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Blackwell, 2000 Review by George Graham, Ph.D on Oct 27th 2000 Volume: 4, Number: 43
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (1999). The philosophy of psychopathology. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):154 – 158.   (Google)
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Introduction: Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Abstract: who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
Davies, Martin & Coltheart, Max (2000). Pathologies of belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: 1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of alien control and of thought insertion, which are characteristic of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992)
DeBerry, Stephen (1991). The Externalization of Consciousness and the Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Deutsch, Curtis K.; Ludwig, Wesley W. & McIlvane, William J. (2008). Heterogeneity and hypothesis testing in neuropsychiatric illness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):266-267.   (Google)
Double, D. B. (2007). Adolf Meyer's psychobiology and the challenge for biomedicine. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 331-339.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel’s biopsychosocial model was associated with the critique of biomedical dogmatism and acknowledged the historical precedence of the work of Adolf Meyer. However, the importance of Meyer’s psychobiology is not always recognized. One of the reasons may be because of his tendency to compromise with biomedical attitudes. This paper restates the Meyerian perspective, explicitly acknowledging the split between biomedical and biopsychological approaches in the origin of modern psychiatry. Our present-day understanding of this conflict is confounded by reactions to ‘anti-psychiatry.’ Neo-Meyerian principles can only be reestablished by a challenge to biomedicine that accepts, as did Meyer, the inherent uncertainty of medicine and psychiatry
Drayson, Zoe (2009). Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, I look at the current relationship between orthodox cognitive science and the study of mental disorder, and consider the implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in psychopathology.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1989). Alternative philosophical conceptualizations of psychopathology. In Phenomenology and Beyond: The Self and its Language. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Home Courses Selected Papers Selected Books C.V. Phil. Faculty Dept. Philosophy UC Berkeley
Erwin, Edward (1999). Curing psychopathology: Can philosophy help? Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):189-205.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is argued that philosophers can contribute indirectly to the cure of psychopathology by helping to resolve problems that impede the development of effective treatments. Two such problems are discussed. The first arises because different schools of therapy use conflicting criteria in evaluating therapeutic outcomes. A theory of Defective Desires is developed to deal with this problem. The second issue, which divides the field of psychotherapy, concerns the need for experiments, especially in validating claims of therapeutic efficacy. An epistemological foundation is developed to support the need for experiments
Fisher, Celia B. & Wallace, Scyatta A. (2000). Through the community looking glass: Reevaluating the ethical and policy implications of research on adolescent risk and psychopathology. Ethics and Behavior 10 (2):99 – 118.   (Google)
Abstract: Drawing on a conception of scientists and community members as partners in the construction of ethically responsible research practices, this article urges investigators to seek the perspectives of teenagers and parents in evaluating the personal and political costs and benefits of research on adolescent risk behaviors. Content analysis of focus group discussions involving over 100 parents and teenagers from diverse ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds revealed community opinions regarding the scientific merit, social value, racial bias, and participant and group harms and benefits associated with surveys, informant reports, intervention studies, blood sampling, and genetic research on youth problems. Participant comments highlight new directions for socially responsible research
Flanagan, Elizabeth H. (2000). Essentialism and a folk-taxonomic approach to the classification of psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):183-189.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Flew, Antony G. N. (1981). Disease and mental disease. In Concepts Of Health And Disease. Reading: Addison-Wesley.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Forrest, K. A. (2001). Toward an etiology of dissociative identity disorder: A neurodevelopmental approach. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):259-293.   (Google)
Abstract: This article elaborates on Putnam's ''discrete behavioral states'' model of dissociative identity disorder (Putnam, 1997) by proposing the involvement of the orbitalfrontal cortex in the development of DID and suggesting a potential neurodevelopmental mechanism responsible for the development of multiple representations of self. The proposed ''orbitalfrontal'' model integrates and elaborates on theory and research from four domains: the neurobiology of the orbitalfrontal cortex and its protective inhibitory role in the temporal organization of behavior, the development of emotion regulation, the development of the self, and experience-dependent reorganizing neocortical processes. The hypothesis being proposed is that the experience-dependent maturation of the orbitalfrontal cortex in early abusive environments, characterized by discontinuity in dyadic socioaffective interactions between the infant and the caregiver, may be responsible for a pattern of lateral inhibition between conflicting subsets of self-representations which are normally integrated into a unified self. The basic idea is that the discontinuity in the early caretaking environment is manifested in the discontinuity in the organization of the developing child's self
Frith, Christopher D. & Gallagher, Shaun (2002). Models of the pathological mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):57-80.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fuchs, Thomas (2005). Overcoming dualism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):115-117.   (Google | More links)
Fulford, K. William M. (1995). Mind and madness: New directions in the philosophy of psychiatry. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fulford, K. William M. (1994). Value, illness, and failure of action: Framework for a philosophical psychopathology of delusions. In George Graham & Lester D. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Gert, Bernard & Culver, Charles M. (2004). Defining mental disorder. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ghaemi, S. Nassir (2007). Adolf Meyer: Psychiatric anarchist. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 341-345.   (Google)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gibbs, Paul J. (2000). The limits of subjectivity: A response to the commentary. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):207-208.   (Google | More links)
Gipps, Richard (2006). Mental disorder and intentional order. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):117-121.   (Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, Lester D. (1994). An introduction to philosophical psychopathology: Its nature, scope, and emergence. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Grant, Donald C. (2002). Becoming conscious and schizophrenia. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 4 (1):199-207.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1993). Mind and mine. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Graham, Janice E. & Ritchie, Karen (2006). Mild cognitive impairment: Ethical considerations for nosological flexibility in human kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):31-43.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1994). Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Graham, George (2002). Recent work in philosophical psychopathology. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):109-134.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Graham, George (online). Self-consciousness, psychopathology, and realism about self.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Graham, George (2004). Self-ascription: Thought insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Griffiths, A. Phillips (1995). Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection establishes the importance of this interdisciplinary approach and explores new directions in the "philosophy of psychiatry and psychology.
Grunbaum, A. (1986). The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry. Psychological Medicine 16 (1):19-38.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Harding, By Brian (2007). Dialectics of desire and the psychopathology of alterity: From Levinas to Kierkegaard via lacan. Heythrop Journal 48 (3):406–422.   (Google | More links)
Haslam, Nick (2007). Folk taxonomies versus official taxonomies. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 281-284.   (Google)
Haslam, Nick (2002). Kinds of kinds: A conceptual taxonomy of psychiatric categories. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9:203-217.   (Google)
Abstract: A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms—non-kinds, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, discrete kinds, and natural kinds—is presented and exemplified. It is argued that psychiatric categories cannot all be understood as pragmatically grounded, and at least some reflect naturally occurring discontinuities without thereby representing natural kinds. Even if essentialist accounts of mental disorders are generally mistaken, they are not implied whenever a psychiatric category that is not pragmatically grounded is posited.
Hirstein, William (2004). Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
Hoenig, J. (1965). Karl Jaspers and psychopathology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (2):216-229.   (Google | More links)
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). On thought insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to which their experiences have to be explained in terms of a withdrawal, on the part of the patients themselves, from certain forms of active engagement in reasoning. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between this view and the idea that patients’ reports of thought insertion reflect a situation in which the boundaries between the self and the world have become uncertain.
Hohwy, Dr Jakob (ms). Cognitive neuropsychiatry 8: 237–242, 2003.   (Google)
Abstract: The field of philosophical psychopathology is basically the philosophical study of mental disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, autism, as well as more specific symptoms and signs such as Capgras’ delusion (the delusion that your spouse, for example, is an impostor) or the anarchic hand sign (where your hand seems to act on its own intentions). This simple epithet covers a multitude of approaches: how can philosophy help to explain mental disorder? What does mental disorder tell us about consciousness, cognition, emotion and ‘self’? What does the study of mental disorder tell us about phenomenology? What does philosophical phenomenology tell us about mental disorder? What do mental disorders tell us about reasoning, rationality and belief formation? What are the particular ethical aspects of mental disorder and its treatment? If philosophical..
Hohwy, Jakob & Rosenberg, Raben (2005). Cognitive neuropsychiatry: Conceptual, methodological and philosophical perspectives. World Journal of Biological Psychiatry 6 (3):192-197.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive neuropsychiatry attempts to understand psychiatric disorders as disturbances to the normal function of human cognitive organisation, and it attempts to link this functional framework to relevant brain structures and their pathology. This recent scientific discipline is the natural extension of cognitive neuroscience into the domain of psychiatry. We present two examples of recent research in cognitive neuropsychiatry: delusions of control in schizophrenia, and affective disorders. The examples demonstrate how the cognitive approach is a fruitful and necessary supplement to the otherwise successful biological psychiatry paradigm, which tend to bypass the cognitive level. Philosophy concerns some of the core concepts involved in psychiatric illness, particularly concerning rationality, thought and action, reality testing, and the self. We present concrete examples that illustrate how philosophical conceptual tools can be particularly important for the construction and interpretation of the cognitive models relevant to the understanding of psychiatric illness. We conclude that cognitive neuropsychiatry is a fruitful and necessary supplement to biological psychiatry. Furthermore, cognitive neuropsychiatry itself may benefit significantly from employing philosophical conceptual tools in the interpretation and construction of its cognitive models. The cognitive and philosophical approaches may thus be further steps towards a scientific psychopathology
Hyman, Steven E. (2007). The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):8 – 11.   (Google)
Abstract: There continues to be a debate on whether addiction is best understood as a brain disease or a moral condition. This debate, which may influence both the stigma attached to addiction and access to treatment, is often motivated by the question of whether and to what extent we can justly hold addicted individuals responsible for their actions. In fact, there is substantial evidence for a disease model, but the disease model per se does not resolve the question of voluntary control. Recent research at the intersection of neuroscience and psychology suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior, but this "loss of control" is not complete or simple. Possible mechanisms and implications are briefly reviewed
Jacobs, David H. (1994). Environmental failure--oppression is the only cause of psychopathology. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (1-2):1-18.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kircher, Tilo & David, Anthony S. (2003). Self-consciousness: An integrative approach from philosophy, psychopathology and the neurosciences. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kroll, Jerome L. (2007). Hildegard: Medieval holism and 'presentism'— or, did sigewiza have health insurance? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 369-372.   (Google)
Langdon, Robyn & Coltheart, Max (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2009). Autonomy is (largely) irrelevant. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):50 – 51.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). Norms, conventions, and psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 163-170.   (Google)
Levy, Neil (2007). The responsibility of the psychopath revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.   (Google)
Abstract: The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility
Lewis, Bradley (2007). George Engel's legacy for the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 327-330.   (Google)
Lewis, Bradley (2007). The biopsychosocial model and philosophic pragmatism: Is George Engel a pragmatist? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 299-310.   (Google)
Abstract: George Engel designed his biopsychosocial model to be a broad framework for medicine and psychiatry. Although the model met with great initial success, it now needs conceptual attention to make it relevant for future generations. Engel articulated the model as a version of biological systems theory, but his work is better interpreted as the beginnings of a richly nuanced philosophy of medicine. We can make this reinterpretation by connecting Engel’s work with the tradition of American pragmatism. Engel initiates inquiry like a pragmatist, he understands theory and philosophy like a pragmatist, he justifies beliefs like a pragmatist, and he understands the world like a pragmatist. By drawing out these similarities, medical and psychiatric scholars can revitalize the biopsychosocial model, and they can open medicine and psychiatry to a rich philosophic heritage and a flourishing interdisciplinary tradition
Lowe, E. Jonathan (2006). Can the self disintegrate? Personal identity, psychopathology, and disunities of consciousness. In Julian C. Hughes, Stephen J. Louw & Steven R. Sabat (eds.), Dementia: Mind, Meaning, and the Person. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (2007). Philosophical psychopathology and self-consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Macdonald, Graham F. (1999). Folk-psychology, psychopathology, and the unconscious. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):206-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a 'philosophers' assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science
Maher, B. A. (1999). Anomalous experience in everyday life: Its significance for psychopathology. The Monist 82 (4):547-70.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Maibom, Heidi Lene (2005). Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy. Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality
Matravers, Matt (2007). Holding psychopaths responsible. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 139-142.   (Google)
Mogg, Karin; Stopa, Lusia & Bradley, Brendan P. (2001). From the conscious into the unconscious: What can cognitive theories of psychopathology learn from Freudian theory? Psychological Inquiry 12 (3):139-143.   (Google)
Moulyn, Adrian C. (1947). Mechanisms and mental phenomena. Philosophy of Science 14 (July):242-253.   (Google | More links)
Mundale, Jennifer (2004). That way madness lies: At the intersection of philosophy and clinical psychology. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):661-674.   (Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic & Woolfolk, Robert L. (2000). Conceptual analysis versus scientific understanding: An assessment of Wakefield's folk psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):271-293.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Murphy, Dominic (2005). Can evolution explain insanity? Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):745-766.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I distinguish three evolutionary explanations of mental illness: first, breakdowns in evolved computational systems; second, evolved systems performing their evolutionary function in a novel environment; third, evolved personality structures. I concentrate on the second and third explanations, as these are distinctive of an evolutionary psychopathology, with progressively less credulity in the light of the empirical evidence. General morals are drawn for evolutionary psychiatry
Murphy, Dominic (2000). Darwin in the madhouse: Evolutionary psychology and the classification of mental disorders. Evolution and the Human Mind.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a ground swell of interest in the application of evolutionary theory to issues in psychopathology (Nesse & Williams 1995, Stevens & Price 1996, McGuire & Troisi 1998). Much of this work has been aimed at finding adaptationist explanations for a variety of mental disorders ranging from phobias to depression to schizophrenia. There has, however, been relatively little discussion of the implications that the theories proposed by evolutionary psychologists might have for the classification of mental disorders. This is the theme we propose to explore. We'll begin, in Section 2, by providing a brief overview of the account of the mind advanced by evolutionary psychologists. In Section 3 we'll explain why issues of taxonomy are important and why the dominant approach to the classification of mental disorders is radically and alarmingly unsatisfactory. We will also indicate why we think an alternative approach, based on theories in evolutionary psychology, is particularly promising. In Section 4 we'll try to illustrate some of the virtues of the evolutionary psychological approach to classification. The discussion in Section 4 will highlight a quite fundamental distinction between those disorders that arise from the malfunction of a component of the mind and those that can be traced to the fact that our minds must now function in environments that are very different from the environments in which they evolved. This mis-match between the current and ancestral environments can, we maintain, give rise to serious mental disorders despite the fact that, in one important sense, there is nothing at all wrong with the people suffering the disorder. Their minds are functioning exactly as Mother Nature intended them to. In Section 5, we'll give a brief overview of some of the ways in which the sorts of malfunctions catalogued in Section 4 might arise, and sketch two rather different strategies for incorporating this etiologically
Murphy, Dominic (2004). Darwinian models of psychopathology. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Radden, Jennifer (ed.) (2004). The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: This is a comprehensive resource of original essays by leading thinkers exploring the newly emerging inter-disciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry. The contributors aim to define this exciting field and to highlight the philosophical assumptions and issues that underlie psychiatric theory and practice, the category of mental disorder, and rationales for its social, clinical and legal treatment. As a branch of medicine and a healing practice, psychiatry relies on presuppositions that are deeply and unavoidably philosophical. Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy frame our understanding and treatment of mental disorder. Philosophical questions of evidence, reality, truth, science, and values give meaning to each of the social institutions and practices concerned with mental health care. The psyche, the mind and its relation to the body, subjectivity and consciousness, personal identity and character, thought, will, memory, and emotions are equally the stuff of traditional philosophical inquiry and of the psychiatric enterprise. A new research field--the philosophy of psychiatry--began to form during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Prompted by a growing recognition that philosophical ideas underlie many aspects of clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the economics and politics of mental health care, academic philosophers, practitioners, and philosophically trained psychiatrists have begun a series of vital, cross-disciplinary exchanges. This volume provides a sampling of the research yield of those exchanges. Leading thinkers in this area, including clinicians, philosophers, psychologists, and interdisciplinary teams, provide original discussions that are not only expository and critical, but also a reflection of their authors' distinctive and often powerful and imaginative viewpoints and theories. All the discussions break new theoretical ground. As befits such an interdisciplinary effort, they are methodologically eclectic, and varied and divergent in their assumptions and conclusions; together, they comprise a significant new exploration, definition, and mapping of the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice
Roland, Alan (2005). The spiritual self and psychopathology : Theoretical reflections and clinical observations. In Ashok Vohra, Arvind Sharma & Mrinal Miri (eds.), Dharma, the Categorial Imperative. D.K. Printworld.   (Google)
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Shahar, Larry Davidson Golan (2007). From deficit to desire: A philosophical reconsideration of action models of psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 215-232.   (Google)
Abstract: Emerging action perspectives on psychopathology depict individuals as actively shaping those environmental conditions that then impact on their risk for psychopathology, resilience in the face of it, and successful recovery from it. This view, although having important implications for research and clinical practice, has yet to be articulated in terms of its underlying philosophical framework. To begin to address this challenge, we situate action theory in the context of the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, who, in their seemingly anti-psychiatric series entitled Capitalism and Schizophrenia, argue for the central role of human agency as a fundamentally active force in determining subjective life. Within this context, they propose an alternative approach to the current deficit focus of much psychopathology research, replacing the notion of deficit with a fundamentally productive notion of desire (what they call “desiring-production”). After our exposition of this philosophical perspective on human agency, implications of this approach for action-informed research and clinical practice are discussed
Sigmon, Sandra T. (1995). Ethical practices and beliefs of psychopathology researchers. Ethics and Behavior 5 (4):295 – 309.   (Google)
Abstract: Ethical guidelines are vague concerning how situations should be handled when researchers encounter participants in preexisting psychological distress. Ethical issues of beneficence, autonomy, and the nature of informed consent may arise in these situations. This study investigated the ethical practices and beliefs of 84 psychopathology researchers when confronting research participants in distress. Results indicated that psychopathology researchers in general engaged in diverse ethical practices in providing debriefing, treatment referrals, and providing for distressed participants. Characteristics of the designated studies and of the researchers accounted for significant differences in ethical practices. In addition, the type of psychopathology being assessed accounted for significant differences in ethical practices and beliefs. Guidelines are offered to aid researchers who encounter participants in preexisting distress
Sneddon, Andrew (2002). Towards externalist psychopathology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):297-316.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The "width" of the mind is an important topic in contemporary philosophical psychology. Support for active externalism derives from theoretical, engineering, and observational perspectives. Given the history of psychology, psychopathology is notable in its absence from the list of avenues of support for the idea that some cognitive processes extend beyond the physical bounds of the organism in question. The current project is to defend the possibility, plausibility, and desirability of externalist psychopathology. Doing so both adds to the case for externalism and suggests ways of improving our study of cognitive dysfunction. I establish the possibility of externalist psychopathology through the development of models of wide cognitive processing, and, by implication, failure of such processing, from the work of S.L. Hurley and Robert Wilson. The plausibility of wide conceptualization and explanation of cognitive disorders is shown through an examination of apraxia, disorders of learned, skilled movements. The desirability of externalist psychopathology is suggested through a look at theoretical and therapeutic virtues, again drawing on Wilson's work
Spike, Jeffrey P. (2007). The philosophy of George Engel and the philosophy of medicine. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 315-319.   (Google)
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Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (1994). Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought-insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1):1-10.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Thornton, Tim (2003). Psychopathology and two kinds of narrative accounts of the self. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):361-368.   (Google | More links)
Thornton, Tim (2004). Reductionism/antireductionism. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Thornton, Tim (1997). Reasons and causes in philosophy and psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (4):307-317.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Thornton, Tim (2002). Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introduction. Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 Method. Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. Results. Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, non- question-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. Conclusions. A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion
Thornton, Tim (2004). Wittgenstein and the limits of empathic understanding in psychopathology. International Review of Psychiatry.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Summary The aim of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, to briefly set out how strategic choices made about theorising about intentionality or content have actions at a distance for accounting for delusion. Secondly, to investigate how successfully a general difficulty facing a broadly interpretative approach to delusions might be eased by the application of any of three Wittgensteinian interpretative tools. Thirdly, to draw a general moral about how the later Wittgenstein gives more reason to be pessimistic than optimistic about the prospects of a philosophical psychopathology aimed at empathic understanding of delusions
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Villagrán, José M. (2003). Consciousness disorders in schizophrenia: A forgotten land for psychopathology. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 3 (2):209-234.   (Google)
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Wallace, I. V. (2007). Adolph Meyer's psychobiology in historical context, and its relationship to George Engel's biopsychosocial model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 347-353.   (Google)
Walach, Harald (2007). Folk psychology and the psychological background of scientific reasoning. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 209-212.   (Google)
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Waterman, G. Scott (2007). Clinicians' “folk” taxonomies and the DSM: Pick your poison. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 271-275.   (Google)
Weiner, Steve (2007). Lack of autonomy: A view from the inside. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 237-238.   (Google)
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Young, Garry (2006). Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion