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8.1. Consciousness and Neuroscience (Consciousness and Neuroscience on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alkire, M. T.; Haier, R. J. & James, H. F. (1998). Toward the neurobiology of consciousness: Using brain imaging and anesthesia to investigate the anatomy of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Atmanspacher, Harald (2006). Consciousness: A mathematical treatment of the global neuronal workspace model. Acta Biotheoretica 54 (2).   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1999). Attention vs consciousness in the visual brain: Differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology. Journal of General Psychology 126:224-33.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2006). Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience? In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Barnes, Hazel E. (2006). Consciousness and digestion: Sartre and Neuroscience. Sartre Studies International 11 (1-2):117-132.   (Google)
Barnes, Hazel E. (2005). Consciousness and digestion Sartre and neuroscience. Sartre Studies International 11 (s 1-2):117-132.   (Google)
Abstract: While Sartre scholars cannot fairly be described as being opposed to science, they have, for the most part, stayed aloof. The field of psychology, of course, has been an exception. Sartre himself felt compelled to present his own existential psychoanalysis by marking the parallels and differences between his position and traditional approaches, particularly the Freudian. The same is true with respect to his concept of bad faith and of emotional behavior. Scholars have followed his lead with richly productive results. But we may note that the debate has centered on psychic and therapeutic issues, aspects of what Sartre called le vécu or lived experience, rather than on the findings of cognitive science or neuroscience. Although all existentialists and phenomenologists accept as a central tenet the fact that consciousness is embodied, there has been virtually no concern with the biological substratum. But the study of consciousness cannot be restricted within its own narrow confines—unlike, say, Greek grammar, which can be learned without reference to the rules of Arabic. At some point, there must be established an organic foundation for the behavior of the conscious organism
Bermond, B. (2001). A neuropsychological and evolutionary approach to animal consciousness and animal suffering. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:47- 62.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bernstein, Marica; Stiehl, Samantha & Bickle, John (2000). The effect of motivation on the stream of consciousness: Generalizing from a neurocomputational model of cingulo-frontal circuits controlling saccadic eye movements. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Bickle, J.; Worley, C. & Bernstein, M. (2000). Vector subtraction implemented neurally: A neurocomputational model of some sequential cognitive and conscious processes. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):117-144.   (Google)
Abstract: Although great progress in neuroanatomy and physiology has occurred lately, we still cannot go directly to those levels to discover the neural mechanisms of higher cognition and consciousness. But we can use neurocomputational methods based on these details to push this project forward. Here we describe vector subtraction as an operation that computes sequential paths through high-dimensional vector spaces. Vector-space interpretations of network activity patterns are a fruitful resource in recent computational neuroscience. Vector subtraction also appears to be implemented neurally in primate frontal eye field activity, which computes dimensions of saccadic eye movements. We use this apparent neural implementation as a model and construct from it a general neurocomputational account of an important type of sequential cognitive and conscious process. We defend the biological plausibility of all components of the general model and show that it yields testable anatomical and physiological predictions. We close by suggesting some interesting consequences for consciousness if our model characterizes correctly the neural mechanisms producing a common type of episode in our conscious streams
Blanke, Olaf & Mohr, Christine (2005). Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin. Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self consciousness. Brain Research Reviews 50 (1):184-199.   (Google)
Boly, Mélanie; Faymonville, Marie-Elisabeth; Vogt, Brent A.; Maquet, Pierre & Laureys, Steven (2007). Hypnotic regulation of consciousness and the pain neuromatrix. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Broughton, R. J. (1982). Human consciousness and sleep/waking rhythms: A review and some neuropsychological considerations. Journal of Clinical Neuropsychology 4:193-218.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Brook, Andrew (2005). Making consciousness safe for neuroscience. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Changeux, Jean-Pierre & Dehaene, Stanislas (2005). Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.   (Google)
Abstract: 1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
Chiao, Joan & Harada, T. (2008). Cultural neuroscience of consciousness: From visual perception to self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):58-69.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical inquiries into the nature of consciousness have long been intrinsically tied to questions regarding the nature of the self. Although philosophers of mind seldom make reference to the role of cultural context in shaping consciousness, since antiquity culture has played a notable role in philosophical conceptions of the self. Western philosophers, from Plato to Locke, have emphasized an individualistic view of the self that is autonomous and consistent across situations, while Eastern philosophers, such as Lao Tzu and Confucius, have argued for a collectivistic view of the self, one that is interconnected to others and embedded within specific social contexts and situations. Here we argue that a comprehensive theory of consciousness needs to account for the role of cultural context and its bidirectional interaction with neural and genetic mechanisms in shaping a variety of conscious phenomena, from visual perception to self- awareness. We review recent evidence of cultural variation in neurobiological mechanisms underlying these phenomena and discuss the implications of these cultural neuroscience findings for the study of consciousness
Churchland, Patricia (ms). A neurophilosophical slant on consciousness research.   (Google)
Abstract: Explaining the nature and mechanisms of conscious experience in neurobiological terms seems to be an attainable, if yet unattained, goal. Research at many levels is important, including research at the cellular level that explores the role of recurrent pathways between thalamic nuclei and the cortex, and research that explores consciousness from the perspective of action. Conceptually, a clearer understanding of the logic of expressions such as ‘‘causes’’ and ‘‘correlates’’, and about what to expect from a theory of consciousness are required. The logic of some terms, such as ‘‘qualia’’ and ‘‘reductionism’’, continues to generate misunderstandings about the scientific possibilities and limits. Experimentally, a deeper understanding of the role of the thalamus in coordinating activity across cortical levels, and a readiness to reconsider the orthodox approach to thalamocortical organization are also required
Cimino, Cristiana & Correale, Antonello (2005). Projective identification and consciousness alteration: A bridge between psychoanalysis and neuroscience? International Journal of Psychoanalysis 86 (1):51-60.   (Google)
Cleeremans, Axel & Maia, Tiago V. (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):397-404.   (Google)
Abstract: Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the ‘enabling factors’ for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-
Coenen, Anton M. L. (2007). Consciousness without a cortex, but what kind of consciousness is this? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):87-88.   (Google)
Abstract: Merker suggests that the thalamocortical system is not an essential system for consciousness, but, instead, that the midbrain reticular system is responsible for consciousness. Indeed, the latter is a crucial system for consciousness, when consciousness is regarded as the waking state. However, when consciousness is regarded as phenomenal consciousness, for which experience and perception are essential elements, the thalamocortical system seems to be indispensable. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Cooney, Jeffrey W. & Gazzaniga, Michael S. (2003). Neurological disorders and the structure of human consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):161-165.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1995). Why neuroscience may be able to explain consciousness. Scientific American 273 (6):84-85.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Desmarais, Michele Marie (2008). Changing Minds: Mind, Consciousness, and Identity in Patañjali's Yoga--Sūtra and Cognitive Neuroscience. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.   (Google)
Dietrich, A. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):231-256.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Faulkner, Deborah & Foster, Jonathan K. (2002). The decoupling of "explicit" and "implicit" processing in neuropsychological disorders: Insights into the neural basis of consciousness? Psyche 8 (2).   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Feinberg, Todd E. (2000). The nested hierarchy of consciousness: A neurobiological solution to the problem of mental unity. Neurocase 6 (2):75-81.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fins, Joseph J. (2006). Clinical pragmatism and the care of brain damaged patients: Towards a palliative neuroethics for disorders of consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Google)
Fins, Joseph J. & Illes, Judy (2008). Lights, camera, inaction? Neuroimaging and disorders of consciousness. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):W1 – W3.   (Google)
Fins, Joseph J.; Illes, Judy; Bernat, James L.; Hirsch, Joy; Laureys, Steven & Murphy, Emily (2008). Neuroimaging and disorders of consciousness: Envisioning an ethical research agenda. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):3 – 12.   (Google)
Abstract: The application of neuroimaging technology to the study of the injured brain has transformed how neuroscientists understand disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states, and deepened our understanding of mechanisms of recovery. This scientific progress, and its potential clinical translation, provides an opportunity for ethical reflection. It was against this scientific backdrop that we convened a conference of leading investigators in neuroimaging, disorders of consciousness and neuroethics. Our goal was to develop an ethical frame to move these investigative techniques into mature clinical tools. This paper presents the recommendations and analysis of a Working Meeting on Ethics, Neuroimaging and Limited States of Consciousness held at Stanford University during June 2007. It represents an interdisciplinary approach to the challenges posed by the emerging use of neuroimaging technologies to describe and characterize disorders of consciousness
Fins, Joseph J. & Plum, F. (2004). Neurological diagnosis is more than a state of mind: Diagnostic clarity and impaired consciousness. Archives of Neurology 61 (9):1354-1355.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Friend, David (2007). Consciousness and the Road to Belief: An Exploration of Neurobiological Evidence Suggesting That Belief is a Fundamental Property of Consciousness. Maple Court Press.   (Google)
Gadenne, Volker (2006). Consciousness: Psychological, neuroscientific, and cultural perspectives. In Kurt Pawlik & Gery d'Ydewalle (eds.), Psychological Concepts: An International Historical Perspective. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Google)
Galin, David (2000). Comments on Epstein's neurocognitive interpretation of William James's model of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):576-583.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Giacino, Joseph T. (1997). Disorders of consciousness: Differential diagnosis and neuropathologic features. Seminars in Neurology 17:105-11.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Gjedde, Albert (2005). Subjectivity and the self : The neurobiology of consciousness. In Anjum P. Saleemi, Ocke-Schwen Bohn & Albert Gjedde (eds.), In Search of a Language for the Mind-Brain: Can the Multiple Perspectives Be Unified? Aarhus University Press ;.   (Google)
Glannon, Walter (2008). Neurostimulation and the minimally conscious state. Bioethics 22 (6):337–345.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neurostimulation to restore cognitive and physical functions is an innovative and promising technique for treating patients with severe brain injury that has resulted in a minimally conscious state (MCS). The technique may involve electrical stimulation of the central thalamus, which has extensive projections to the cerebral cortex. Yet it is unclear whether an improvement in neurological functions would result in a net benefit for these patients. Quality-of-life measurements would be necessary to determine whether any benefit of neurostimulation outweighed any harm in their response to different degrees of cognitive and physical disability. These measures could also indicate whether the technique could be ethically justified and whether surrogates could give proxy consent to its use on brain-injured patients
Grobstein, Paul (2005). Making the unconscious conscious, and vice versa: A bi-directional bridge between neuroscience/cognitive science and psychotherapy? Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):663-668.   (Google)
Grush, Rick (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. Synthese 153 (3):417-450.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts
Guérit, Jean-Michel (2005). Neurophysiological patterns of vegetative and minimally conscious states. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):357-371.   (Google)
Hameroff, Stuart (2006). Consciousness, neurobiology and quantum mechanics: The case for a connection. In J. Tuszynski (ed.), The Emerging Physics of Consciousness. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness involves phenomenal experience, self-awareness, feelings, choices, control of actions, a model of the world, etc. But what _is_ _it?_ Is consciousness something specific, or merely a byproduct of information processing? Whatever it is, consciousness is a multi-faceted puzzle. Despite enormous strides in behavioral and brain science, essential features of consciousness continue to elude explanation. Unresolved problems include: 1) Neural correlates of conscious perception apparently occur too late—150 to 500 milliseconds (msec) after impingement on our sense organs—to have causal efficacy in seemingly conscious perceptions and willful actions, often initiated or completed within 100 msec after sensory impingement. For example in the
Hanna, Robert & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Harth, E. (1996). Self-referent mechanisms as the neuronal basis of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hesslow, Germund (1996). Will neuroscience explain consciousness? Journal of Theoretical Biology 171 (7-8):29-39.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Hirsch, J. (2006). Functional neuroimaging during altered states of consciousness: How and what do we measure? In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hobson, Allan (2004). A model for madness? Dream consciousness: Our understanding of the neurobiology of sleep offers insight into abnormalities in the waking brain. Nature 430 (6995):21.   (Google)
Hobson, J. Allan; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Stickgold, Robert (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.   (Cited by 214 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
Hobson, J. Allan; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Stickgold, Robert (2003). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 216 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
Hobson, J. Allan & Pace-Schott, Edward F. (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal systems, consciousness and learning. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3:679-93.   (Cited by 171 | Google | More links)
Stickgold, R. & Hobson, J. Allan (1995). The conscious state paradigm: A neurocognitive approach to waking, sleeping, and dreaming. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Hobson, J. Allan (1998). The conscious state paradigm: A neuropsychological analysis of waking, sleeping, and dreaming. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Humphreys, Glyn W. & Riddoch, M. Jane (1999). Disorder of colour consciousness: The view from neuropsychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):956-957.   (Google)
Abstract: We discuss the difficulty of measuring the perceptual experience of colour, supporting Palmer's assertion that neuropsychological disorders of colour processing can be informative in this respect. We point out that some disorders seem to affect the perceptual experience of colour over and above the perceptual processing of colour, providing direct insights into the neural mechanisms supporting perceptual experience
Ito, Masao (2004). How neuroscience accounts for the illusion of conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):664-665.   (Google)
Abstract: Wegner's monograph presents the view that conscious will is a feeling that we experience when we perform an action through a mechanistic process of the brain, rather than a mental force that causes the action. The view is supported by several lines of evidence in which conscious will is dissociated from the actual performance of voluntary movements, as in automatism. The book further extends an insightful analysis of the mental system behind the illusion of conscious will and inspires neuroscientists to reflect on its neural substrates
Jamieson, Graham A., Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective.   (Google)
Jamieson, Graham A. (2007). Previews and prospects for the cognitive neuroscience of hypnosis and conscious states. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2003). Consciousness of action and self-consciousness: A cognitive neuroscience approach. In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Johnson, L. Syd M. (2010). Implications of recent neuroscientific findings in patients with disorders of consciousness. Neuroethics 3 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: A pressing issue in neuroscience is the high rate of misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness. As new research on patients with disorders of consciousness has revealed surprising and previously unknown cognitive capacities, the need to develop better and more reliable methods of diagnosing these disorders becomes more urgent. So too the need to expand our ethical and social frameworks for thinking about these patients, to accommodate new concerns that will accompany new revelations. A recent study on trace conditioning and learning in vegetative and minimally conscious patients shows promise as a potential diagnostic and prognostic tool, both for differentiating between states of diminished consciousness, and for predicting patient outcomes, but it also generates fresh concerns about quality of life in patients previously thought to be completely unaware. Optimism about progress in diagnosing and treating disorders of consciousness must be tempered by the understanding that not all progress will necessarily be good for all patients. The prognosis for most patients remains bleak, and we must remain vigilant to acute questions and concerns about welfare and quality of life
Kak, Subhash (2004). Architecture of Knowledge: Quantum Mechanics, Neuroscience, Computers, and Consciousness. Centre for Studies in Civilization.   (Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1998). Representations in consciousness and the neuropsychology of insight. In Xavier F. Amador & A. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kircher, Tilo & David, Anthony S. (2003). Self-consciousness: An integrative approach from philosophy, psychopathology and the neurosciences. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kobylarz, Erik J. & Schiff, Nicholas D. (2005). Neurophysiological correlates of persistent vegetative and minimally conscious states. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. Vol 15 (3-4):323-332.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Koch, Christof (1998). The neuroanatomy of visual consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Koch, Christof (1996). Toward the neuronal substrate of visual consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Koehler, S. & Moscovitch, Morris (1997). Unconscious visual processing in neuropsychological syndromes: A survey of the literature and evaluation of models of consciousness. In M. D. Rugg (ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience. MIT Press.   (Google)
Lane, Richard D. R. & McRae, K. (2004). Neural substrates of conscious emotional experience: A cognitive-neuroscientific perspective. Consciousness, emotional self-regulation and the brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Laughlin, Charles D. (1990). Brain, Symbol & Experience: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Human Consciousness. New Science Library.   (Google)
Le Van Quyen, Michel & Petitmengin, Claire (2002). Neuronal dynamics and conscious experience: An example of reciprocal causation before epileptic seizures. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Neurophenomenology (Varela 1996) is not only philosophical but also empirical and experimental. Our purpose in this article is to illustrate concretely the efficiency of this approach in the field of neuroscience and, more precisely here, in epileptology. A number of recent observations have indicated that epileptic seizures do not arise suddenly simply as the effect of random fluctuations of brain activity, but require a process of pre-seizure changes that start long before. This has been reported at two different levels of description: on the one hand, the epileptic patient often experiences some warning symptoms that precede seizures from several minutes to hours in the form of very specific lived events. On the other hand, the analyses of brain electrical activities have provided strong evidence that it is possible to detect a pre-seizure state in the neuronal dynamics several minutes before the electro-clinical onset of a seizure. We review here some of the ongoing work of our research group concerning seizure anticipation. In particular, we discuss experimental evidence of upward (local-to-global) formation of conscious experience and its neural substrate, but also of the downward (global-to-local) determination of local neuronal activity by situated conscious activity and its substrate large-scale neural assemblies. This causal role of conscious experience may lead to new kinds of therapy for epileptic patients
Llinas, Rodolfo (2008). Of self and self awareness: The basic neuronal circuit in human consciousness and the generation of self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (9):64-74.   (Google)
Abstract: The fascination of Velasquez's painting Las Meninas stems largely from the ambiguous relationship between the painting as a whole, viewed by a single perceiver, and the variety of different perceptual viewpoints it invites. This situation resonates strongly with a central puzzle in the study of consciousness: the apparent unity of perceptual experience despite multiple sense modalities. Understanding more of this latter might help to explain the way we respond to the painting
Lloyd, Dan (1996). Consciousness, connectionism, and cognitive neuroscience: A meeting of the minds. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):61-78.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Accounting for phenomenal structure—the forms, aspects, and features of conscious experience—poses a deep challenge for the scientific study of consciousness, but rather than abandon hope I propose a way forward. Connectionism, I argue, offers a bi-directional analogy, with its oft-noted “neural inspiration” on the one hand, and its largely unnoticed capacity to illuminate our phenomenology on the other. Specifically, distributed representations in a recurrent network enable networks to superpose categorical, contextual, and temporal information on a specific input representation, much as our own experience does. Artificial neural networks also suggest analogues of four salient distinctions between sensory and nonsensoty consciousness. The paper concludes with speculative proposals for discharging the connectionist heuristics to leave a robust, detailed empirical theory of consciousness
Lombard, Jay (2008). Synchrnoic consciousness from a neurological point of view: The philosophical foundations for neuroethics. Synthese 162 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Daniel Kolak’s theory of synchronic consciousness according to which the entire range of dissociative phenomena, from pathologies such as MPD and schizophrenia to normal dream states, are best explained in terms of consciousness becoming simultaneously identified as many selves, has revolutionary therapeutic implications for neurology and psychiatry. All these selves, according to Kolak—even the purely imaginary ones that exist as such only in our dreams—are not just conscious but also self-conscious, with beliefs, intentions, living lives informed by memories (confabulatory, in the case of the fictional ones) and personal histories. Kolak’s derivation of psychiatrically relevant aspects of his theory—a neurological rendition of a Kantian transcendental argument—can be given a straightforward neurological, and therefore open to scientific scrutiny, interpretation that would then more easily lend itself to the clinical setting in which these perplexing phenomena, along with their purveyors, must live and cope. This will be the main focus of this paper
Lormand, Eric (2000). Comments on "a neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):260-266.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness. Psycoloquy 11 (35).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1)
Lutz, Antoine; Dunne, John D. & Davidson, Richard J. (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: in Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness edited by Zelazo P., Moscovitch M. and Thompson E. (2007)
Lutz, Antoine & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology - integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.   (Cited by 54 | Google)
Lynds, Peter (ms). Subjective perception of time and a progressive present moment: The neurobiological key to unlocking consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The conclusion of physics, within both a historical and more recent context, that an objectively progressive time and present moment are derivative notions without actual physical foundation in nature, illustrate that these perceived chronological features originate from subjective conscious experience and the neurobiological processes underlying it. Using this conclusion as a stepping stone, it is posited that the phenomena of an in-built subjective conception of a progressive present moment in time and that of conscious awareness are actually one and the same thing, and as such, are also the outcome of the same neurobiological processes. A possible explanation as to how this might be achieved by the brain through employing the neuronal induced nonconscious cognitive manipulation of a small interval of time is proposed. The CIP phenomenon, elucidated within the context of this study is also then discussed
MacLennan, Bruce J. (1996). The elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5):409-424.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
MacLennan, Bruce J. (1995). The investigation of consciousness through phenomenology and neuroscience. In Joseph E. King & Karl H. Pribram (eds.), Proceedings Scale in Conscious Experience: Third Appalachian Conference on Behavioral Neurodynamics.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The principal problem of consciousness is how brain processes cause subjective awareness. Since this problem involves subjectivity, ordinary scientific methods, applicable only to objective phenomena, cannot be used. Instead, by parallel application of phenomenological and scientific methods, we may establish a correspondence between the subjective and the objective. This correspondence is effected by the construction of a theoretical entity, essentially an elementary unit of consciousness, the intensity of which corresponds to electrochemical activity in a synapse. Dendritic networks correspond to causal dependencies between these subjective units. Therefore, the structure of conscious experience is derived from synaptic connectivity. This parallel phenomenal/neural analysis provides a framework for the investigation of a number of problems, including sensory inversions, the unity of consciousness, and the nature of nonhuman consciousness
Maia, Tiago V. & Cleeremans, Axel (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):397-404.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Maldonato, Mauro (2009). From neuron to consciousness: For an experience-based neuroscience. World Futures 65 (2):80 – 93.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Up until only a few decades ago, not many scholars recognized scientific dignity in the problem of consciousness. In the last few years this scenario has changed. The rapid development of non-invasive research techniques that explore cerebral functions has not only increased our knowledge on the correlations between mental processes and cerebral structures, but it has fed our hopes for the possibility of facing the ancient and elusive question about the mind-brain relationship with a new way of thinking. The meeting between neurosciences and phenomenology represents one of the most promising frontiers of current research. Neurophenomenology , a paradigm of research inaugurated by the Chilean neuroscientist Francisco Varela, tries to indicate a remedy to the various explicatory philosophical and scientific gaps, establishing a methodological and epistemological bridge between the so-called phenomenological reports in “first person” and the scientific evidence in “third person,” incorporating the experience on neurodynamic levels in an explicit and rigorous way and, above all, avoiding every alternative in the direction of any form of ontological reduction
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Abstract: Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here
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Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
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Abstract: Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are moving towards increasingly specific accounts of the neural basis of conscious experience. These efforts will leave some questions unanswered, but they are no less significant for that
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Abstract: This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the widely held belief that sensation precedes perception will all be found wanting. The theory will also be used to illustrate and defend a methodology that fills the gulf between functionalists who ignore the brain and neural reductionists who repudiate functionalism
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Abstract: Consciousness seems to be an enigmatic phenomenon: it is difficult to imagine how our perceptions of the world and our inner thoughts, sensations and feelings could be related to the immensely complicated biological organ we call the brain. This volume presents the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers and cognitive scientists who have recently participated in the discussion of the status of consciousness in science. The focus of inquiry is the question: "Is it possible to incorporate consciousness into science?" Philosophers have suggested different alternatives -- some think that consciousness should be altogether eliminated from science because it is not a real phenomenon, others that consciousness is a real, higher-level physical or neurobiological phenomenon, and still others that consciousness is fundamentally mysterious and beyond the reach of science. At the same time, however, several models or theories of the role of conscious processing in the brain have been developed in the more empirical cognitive sciences. It has been suggested that non-conscious processes must be sharply separated from conscious ones, and that the necessity of this distinction is manifested in the curious behavior of certain brain-damaged patients. This book demonstrates the dialogue between philosophical and empirical points of view. The writers present alternative solutions to the brain-consciousness problem and they discuss how the unification of biological and psychological sciences could thus become feasible. Covering a large ground, this book shows how the philosophical and empirical problems are closely interconnected. From this interdisciplinary exploration emerges the conviction that consciousness can and should be a natural part of our scientific world view
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Schacter, Daniel L.; McAndrews, M. P. & Moscovitch, Morris (1986). Access to consciousness: Dissociations between implicit and explicit knowledge in neuropsychological syndromes. In Lawrence Weiskrantz (ed.), Thought Without Language. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
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Schwartz, Rob & Schwartz, Mirra (2008). The risks of reducing consciousness to neuroimaging. American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):25 – 26.   (Google)
Seth, Anil K.; Dienes, Zoltan; Cleeremans, Axel; Overgaard, Morten & Pessoa, Luiz, Measuring consciousness: Relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches.   (Google)
Abstract: The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track graded consciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We identify possible and actual conflicts among measures that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude that measures must prove themselves by iteratively building knowledge in the context of theoretical frameworks. Advances in measuring consciousness have implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for comparative studies of consciousness and for clinical applications
Sevush, Steven (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts nonlinearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron
Sevush, Steven (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts nonlinearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron
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Stanczak, D. E.; White, J. G. & Gouview, W. D. (1984). Assessment of level of consciousness following severe neurological insult: A comparison of the psychometric qualities of the Glasgow coma scale and the comprehensive level of consciousness scale. Journal of Neurosurgery 60:955-60.   (Google)
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Abstract: _ Theoretical Physics Group_ _ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory_ _ University of California_ _ Berkeley, California 94720_
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Dunne, John D.; Lutz, Antione & Davidson, Richard (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness: An introduction. In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness.   (Google)
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Velmans, Max (1995). The limits of neuropsychological models of consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain
Velmans, Max (ed.) (1996). The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. Routledge.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Abstract: Of all the problems facing science none are more challenging yet fascinating than those posed by consciousness. In The Science of Consciousness leading researchers examine how consciousness is being investigated in the key areas of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and clinical psychology. Within cognitive psychology, special focus is given to the function of consciousness, and to the relation of conscious processing to nonconscious processing in perception, learning, memory and information dissemination. Neuropsychology includes examination of the neural conditions for consciousness and the effects of brain damage. Finally, mind/body interactions in clinical and experimental settings are considered, including the somatic effects of imagery, biofeedback and placebo effects. Every chapter is written by an expert in the field. They each provide a clear overview of existing research along with an exciting new synthesis of consciousness studies. The The Science of Consciousness will be invaluable for students, researchers and clinicians interested in the developments and directions of this rapidly growing field
Vimal, Ram Lakhan Pandey (2009). Necessary Ingredients of Consciousness: Integration of Psychophysical, Neurophysiological, and Consciousness Research for the Red-Green Channel. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research 1 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: A general definition of consciousness is: ‘consciousness is a mental aspect of a system or a process, which is a conscious experience, a conscious function, or both depending on the context’, where the term context refers to metaphysical views, constraints, specific aims, and so on. One of the aspects of visual consciousness is the visual subjective experience (SE) or the first person experience that occurs/emerges in the visual neural-network of thalamocortical system (which includes dorsal and ventral visual pathways and frontal cortex) during dynamic interactions among widely distributed neuronal groups. In this article, however, consciousness and SE are interchangeably used unless noted. Consciousness can be either access (reportable) or phenomenal consciousness. For access consciousness, the interactions are between feed forward stimulus dependent signals and fronto-parietal feedback attentional signals. The necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness are (i) wakefulness, (ii) reentrant interactions among neural populations, (iii) fronto-parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness, (iv) working memory that retains information for consciousness, (v) stimulus at or above threshold level, and (vi) neural-network proto-experiences (PEs) that are superposed SEs embedded in a neural-network. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for phenomenal consciousness. The neural source for the arousal system is the ascending reticular activating system in the brain stem, which brings the thalamocortical neural networks to wakeful state as a baseline for consciousness to occur. Reentrant interactions among neural populations bind stimulus attributes (such as location and features) and entail consciousness. Attention could be the results of reentry and competitive interactions, and modulates the stimulus related feed forward signal and consciousness. The ‘sources’ of attention may be thalamic reticular nucleus for bottom-up or frontal cortex for top-down direction. The ‘target’ of visual attention is ‘V4/V8/VO’ for Red-Green (R-G) channel. The neural correlates of the psychophysical entity R-G channel appear to be ‘V4/V8/VO’-neural-network (retina → LGN ↔ V1 ↔ V2 ↔ ‘V4/V8/VO’, and areas for attention, memory, and wakefulness). The psychophysical Red-Green Channel, its neurophysiological correlates V4/V8/VO-neural-network, and related experience (such as redness) are integrated. The dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework (Vimal, J Integr Neurosci 7:49–73, 2008) was used to address the explanatory gap problem of materialism. Neural-network and related SEs are the results of the co-evolution and co-development of the material aspect (mass, charge, spin, force, quanta, and space-time) and the mental aspect of fundamental particles (strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons)). Their mental aspects are considered as the carriers of superposed multiple possible experiences (SEs/PEs) in unexpressed form. These possibilities are actualized when neural-networks are formed via neural Darwinism, and a specific SE is selected by a matching process when the necessary ingredients of consciousness/SE are satisfied. A simple experimental design is suggested to address the necessary and sufficient attributes of consciousness.
Vogeley, Kai & Kupke, Christian (2007). Disturbances of time consciousness from a phenomenological and neuroscientific perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.   (Google | More links)
Wallace, Rodrick, Consciousness, cognition, and the hierarchy of context: Expanding the global neuronal workspace.   (Google)
Abstract: Adapting Dretske's approach on the necessary conditions for mental process, we apply a communication theory analysis of interacting cognitive biological and social modules to the global neuronal workspace, the emerging standard model for consciousness. Using an obvious canonical homology with statistical physics, the method, when iterated, generates a fluctuating dynamic threshold recognizably similar to phase transition in a physical system, but constrained to a manifold/atlas structure analogous to a tunable retina. The resulting 'General Cognitive Model' can be extended in a straightforward manner to include the effects of psychosocial stress, culture, or other cognitive modules which constitute a structured, embedding hierarchy of contextual constraints acting at a slower rate than neuronal function itself. This produces a 'biopsychosociocultural' treatment of consciousness that, while otherwise remarkably similar to the standard development, meets compelling philosophical and other objections to brain-only descriptions
Watt, Douglas F. (2007). Affirmative-action for the brainstem in the neuroscience of consciousness: The zeitgeist of the brainstem as a “dumb arousal” system. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):108-110.   (Google)
Abstract: Merker offers a remarkable statement about the neural integration essential to conscious states provided by the mesodiencephalon. The model for triangular interaction between action selection, target selection, and emotion is heuristic. Unfortunately, there is little interest (relatively speaking) in neuroscience in the mesodiencephalon, and attention is currently heavily directed to the telencephalon. This suggests that there may be less real momentum than commonly assumed towards the Holy Grail of neuroscience, a scientific theory of mind, despite the major upsurge in interest. (Published Online May 1 2007)
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Weiskrantz, Lawrence & Davies, Martin (eds.) (2008). Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years consciousness has become a significant area of study in the cognitive sciences. The Frontiers of Consciousness is a major interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. The book stems from the Chichele lectures held at All Souls College in Oxford, and features contributions from a 'who's who' of authorities from both philosophy and psychology. The result is a truly interdisciplinary volume, which tackles some of the biggest and most impenetrable problems in consciousness. The book includes chapters considering the apparent explanatory gap between science and consciousness, our conscious experience of emotions such as fear, and of willed actions by ourselves and others. It looks at subjective differences between two ways in which visual information guides behaviour, and scientific investigation of consciousness in non-human animals. It looks at the challenges that the mind-brain relation presents for clinical practice as well as for theories of consciousness. The book draws on leading research from philosophy, experimental psychology, functional imaging of the brain, neuropsychology, neuroscience, and clinical neurology. Distinctive in its accessibility, authority, and its depth of coverage, Frontiers of Consciousness will be a groundbreaking and influential addition to the consciousness literature
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Zaveri, J. S. (1992). Neuroscience & Karma: The Jain Doctrine of Psycho-Physical Force. Jain Vishva Bharati Institute.   (Google)
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Zeki, Semir & Ffytche, D. H. (1998). The riddoch syndrome: Insights into the neurobiology of conscious vision. Brain 121:25-45.   (Cited by 83 | Google | More links)

8.1a Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness

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Abstract: This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense that it continuously mediates the interaction of input with memory. While our approaches overlap in a number of ways, each of us tends to focus on different areas of detail. What is most striking, and we believe significant, is the extent of consensus, which we believe to be consistent with other contemporary approaches by Weiskrantz, Gray, Crick and Koch, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Newell and colleagues, Posner, Baddeley, and a number of others. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience is moving toward a shared understanding of consciousness in the brain
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Abstract: 1.1 Bilateral damage to the thalamus abolishes waking consciousness. The critical site of this damage is believed to be a relatively small cluster of neurons, about the size of a pencil eraser on either side of the brain's midline, called the Intra-Laminar Nuclei (ILN) because they are located inside the white layers (laminae) that divide the two thalami into their major groupings of nuclei. The fact that bilateral damage to the ILNs abolishes consciousness is very unusual. There is no other site in the brain that has this property, except the reticular formation in the brain stem. In contrast, huge chunks of cortex can be damaged without abolishing the STATE of consciousness. (Cortical damage does change the CONTENTS of consciousness, of course)
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Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
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Edelman, Gerald M. & Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan (2000). Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
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Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingerlkurts, Alexander A. (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem. Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Neves, Carlos F. H. (2009). Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum. In Robert Kozma & John Caulfield (eds.), Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday. World Scientific.   (Google)
Abstract: In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain activity organization, and what mediates between them. Implications for linguistic semantics, self-organized distributed computing algorithms, artificial machine consciousness, and diagnosis of dynamic brain diseases will be discussed briefly.
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Abstract: Various neurophysiological experiments have revealed remarkable correlations between cortical neuronal activity and subjective experiences. However, the mere presence of neuronal electrical activity does not appear to be sufficient to produce these experiences. It has been suggested that the explanation for the neural basis of consciousness might lie in understanding the reason that some types of neuronal activity possess subjective correlates and others do not. Here I propose and develop the idea that this difference may be caused by the existence of an elementary nonarbitrary linkage between temporal or spatiotemporal patterns of neuronal activity and their subjective attributes. I also show how cortical neural circuits capable of generating experience-coding patterns could emerge during evolution and brain development, due to the presence of spontaneous stochastic neuronal activity and activity-dependent synaptic plasticity. This hypothesis leads to several testable predictions, principal among which is the idea that the neural correlates of consciousness are essentially innate and universal
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Abstract: I dispute that consciousness is generated by core circuitry in the forebrain, with predominance of motor areas, as Cotterillproposes in Enchanted Looms and other theorists do also. Ipropose instead that conscious contents are the momentary modeof action of the integrated cortical field, expressed as a point vector ( dominant focus ), to which, in varying degree, allsectors of the network contribute. Consciousness is the brain''saccess to its own activity space, and is identical with the moment''sdominant mode of activity. The dominant focus is generally weightedtoward enactively encoded percepts. Anticipation and preparation,perception and action, inextricably interdigitate. I also dispute the view of Cotterill and others that consciousnesshas unique agency, which bestowed adaptive advantage when the brain evolved. Being identical with the activity of the network,consciousness can have no additional agency, and it can offerno adaptive advantages beyond those that characterize the network
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Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
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Abstract: I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci
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Abstract: A dualistic approach to consciousness is presented that employs Hebbian synaptic dynamics and the basic notion of measurement in science to bridge the so-called explanatory gap between first-person consciousness and third-person science. Unconscious processing by neural circuitry characterizes (i) the neuron as a measuring instrument and (ii) the neural signal as the quantity to be measured. Hebbian synaptic dynamics, effectuating the storage of information, implements the role of an observer of a measurement outcome. The approach extends physical renormalization techniques, as applied to phase changes, to biology. This leads to the proposal of a ramification process in neural systems (brains) from a primitive form of sensation associated with the Hebbian synapse toward more elaborate experiential forms of consciousness (feelings, qualia) associated with hierarchies of neuronal assemblies. Characterizing sensation as a form of mutual information at the synaptic level motivates a relation between consciousness and phase changes of information
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Abstract: A broad consensus has developed in recent years in the cognitive and neurosciences that the cognitive functions of the mind arise out of the activities of an extensive and diverse array of specialized processors operating as a parallel, distributed system. A theoretical perspective is presented which expands upon this "society" model to include globally integrative infuences upon this arrary of processors. This perspective serves as the basis for an explicit neural model of a "global workspace within a system of distributed specialized processors". Anatomical and physiological evidence are reviewed which suggest that this parallel, modular architecture is superceded by a more diffuse, tangential intracortical network capable of integrating underlying modular activites into increasingly global cognitive representations. There follows an explication of the role of this "neural global workspace" in providing the essential basis for the central control of attention and the generation of unified, conscious percepts. Finally the role of thalamic and brainstem activation systems in these integrative processes is discussed
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Abstract: At the phenomenal level, consciousness arises in a consistently coherent fashion as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness (subjectivity) with explicitly orientational characteristics—that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain. Understanding these twin elements of consciousness begins with the recognition that ultimately (and most primitively), cognitive systems serve the biological self-regulatory regime in which they subsist. The psychological structures supporting self-located subjectivity involve an evolutionary elaboration of the two basic elements necessary for extending self-regulation into behavioral interaction with the environment: an orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing interaction in terms of controllable spatiotemporal parameters, and processing architecture that relates behavior to homeostatic needs via feedback. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged the emergence of anticipative feedforward processing mechanisms, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive self-locational schema processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness-as-subjectivity.
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Abstract: In Enchanted Looms , Rodney Cotterill defends the hypothesisthat conscious sensory experience depends on motor response. Thepositive evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive, andnegative evidence can be marshaled against it. I present analternative hypothesis according to which consciousness involvesintermediate level sensory processing, attention, and workingmemory. The circuitry of consciousness can be dissociated fromaction systems and may mark an evolutionary advance from a priorphylogenetic stage in which motor outputs and sensory inputswere more intimately bound
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Abstract: Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well
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Abstract: A recent theoretical emphasis on complex interactions within neural systems underlying consciousness has been accompanied by proposals for the quantitative characterization of these interactions. Here, we distinguish key aspects of consciousness that are amenable to quantitative measurement from those that are not. We carry out a formal analysis of the strengths and limitations of three quantitative measures of dynamical complexity in the neural systems underlying consciousness: neural complexity, information integration, and causal density. We find that no single measure fully captures the multidimensional complexity of these systems and all have practical limitations. Our analysis suggests guidelines for the specification of alternative measures which, in combination, may improve the quantitative characterization of conscious neural systems. Given that some aspects of consciousness are likely to resist quantification altogether, we conclude that a satisfactory theory is likely to be one that combines both qualitative and quantitative elements
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Stuss, Donald T. (1991). Self, awareness, and the frontal lobes: A neuropsychological perspective. In J. Strauss (ed.), The Self: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 42 | Google)
Taylor, John G. (2002). From matter to mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):3-22.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Taylor, John G. (2001). The central role of the parietal lobes in consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):379-417.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are now various approaches to understand where and how in the brain consciousness arises from neural activity, none of which is universally accepted. Difficulties among these approaches are reviewed, and a missing ingredient is proposed here to help adjudicate between them, that of ''perspectivalness.'' In addition to a suitable temporal duration and information content of the relevant bound brain activity, this extra component is posited as being a further important ingredient for the creation of consciousness from neural activity. It guides the development of what is termed the ''Central Representation,'' which is supposed to be present in all mammals and extended in humans to support self-consciousness as well as phenomenal consciousness. Experimental evidence and a theoretical framework for the existence of the central representation are presented, which relates the extra component to specific buffer working memory sites in the inferior parietal lobes, acting as attentional coordinators on the spatial maps making up the central representation. The article closes with a discussion of various open questions
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan & Edelman, Gerald M. (1998). Consciousness and the integration of information in the brain. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan (2003). Consciousness differentiated and integrated. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Travis, Frederick T. & Orme-Johnson, D. W. (1989). Field model of consciousness: EEG coherence changes as indicators of field effects. International Journal of Neuroscience 49:203-11.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Trehub, Arnold (2007). Space, self, and the theater of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):310-330.   (Google)
Umilta, Carlo (2000). Conscious experience depends on multiple brain systems. European Psychologist 5:3-11.   (Google)
Umiltà, Carlo (2000). "Conscious experience depends on multiple brain systems": Response. European Psychologist 5 (1):17-18.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Van der Werf, Ysbrand D.; Witter, Menno P. & Groenewegen, Henk J. (2002). The intralaminar and midline nuclei of the thalamus. Anatomical and functional evidence for participation in processes of arousal and awareness. Brain Research Reviews 39 (2):107-140.   (Google)
Zeki, Semir (2007). A theory of micro-consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Zeman, Adam Z. J.; Grayling, A. C. & Cowey, Alan (1997). Contemporary theories of consciousness. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 62:549-552.   (Cited by 14 | Google)

8.1b Neural Correlates of Consciousness

Baars, Bernard J. (1995). Surprisingly small subcortical structures are needed for the state of waking consciousness, while cortical projection areas seem to provide perceptual contents of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 4:159-62.   (Google)
Balog, Katalin (2007). Comments on Ned Block's target article “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.   (Google)
Abstract: Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument.
Bauer, R. (2004). In search of a neural signature of consciousness: Facts, hypotheses, and proposals. Synthese 141 (2):233-45.   (Google)
Abstract:   Evolution leads to more and more complex structures, e.g., molecules, cells and organisms. By means of such structures elementary dynamic bio-electrical fields originate in single cells. They further develop into neurons with neuronal fields, and these combine and integrate in brains into global neuro-electrical fields (NEF) as a medium for the fast representation of outer stimuli. The present hypothesis proposes a specific state of the global NEF in brains as the signature of consciousness. This NEF changes periodically between two states, a de- and a hyperpolarized brain state, and these in turn are paralleled intimately by transitions between consciousness and unconsciousness. In the hyperpolarized state the elementary neuronal fields are enslaved and synchronized by strong oscillations, and under these conditions the NEF is of low information capacity. In the depolarized state, however, the elementary fields are freed to self-organize and superimpose into an integrated NEF rich in information. In this condition the NEF acquires a qualitatively new state variable: consciousness. This new variable is no longer physically measurable; it can only be perceived by introspection
Becchio, Cristina & Bertone, Cesare (2005). Beyond cartesian subjectivism: Neural correlates of shared intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):20-30.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neuro- physiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of view the problem is not 'how is it possible to share the intentions of others', but rather 'how one can distinguish one's own action/intention from those of other people'
Blankenburg, F.; Ruff, C. C.; Deichmann, R.; Rees, G. & Driver, J. (2006). The cutaneous rabbit illusion affects human primary sensory cortex somatotopically. PLoS Biology 4 (3):e69.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brown, Richard (2006). What is a brain state? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain
Coenen, A. M. L. (1998). Neuronal phenomena associated with vigilance and consciousness: From cellular mechanisms to electroencephalographic patterns. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (1):42-53.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The neuroanatomical substrates controlling and regulating sleeping and waking, and thus consciousness, are located in the brain stem. Most crucial for bringing the brain into a state conducive for consciousness and information processing is the mesencephalic part of the brain stem. This part controls the state of waking, which is generally associated with a high degree of consciousness. Wakefulness is accompanied by a low-amplitude, high-frequency electroencephalogram, due to the fact that thalamocortical neurons fire in a state of tonic depolarization. Information can easily pass the low-level threshold of these neurons, leading to a high transfer ratio. The complexity of the electroencephalogram during conscious waking is high, as expressed in a high correlation dimension. Accordingly, the level of information processing is high. Spindles, and alpha waves in humans, mark the transition from wakefulness to sleep. These phenomena are related to drowsiness, associated with a reduction in consciousness. Drowsiness occurs when cells undergo moderate hyperpolarizations. Increased inhibitions result in a reduction of afferent information, with a lowered transfer ratio. Information processing subsides, which is also expressed in a diminished correlation dimension. Consciousness is further decreased at the onset of slow wave sleep. This sleep is controlled by the medullar reticular formation and is characterized by a high-voltage, low-frequency electroencephalogram. Slow wave sleep becomes manifest when neurons undergo a further hyperpolarization. Inhibitory activities are so strong that the transfer ratio further drops, as does the correlation dimension. Thus, sensory information is largely blocked and information processing is on a low level. Finally, rapid eye movement sleep is regulated by the pontine reticular formation and is associated with a ''wake-like'' electroencephalographic pattern. Just as during wakefulness, this is the expression of a depolarization of thalamocortical neurons. The transfer ratio of rapid eye movement sleep has not yet been determined, but seems to vary. Evidence exists that this type of sleep, associated with dreaming, with some kind of perception and consciousness, is involved in processing of ''internal'' information. In line with this, rapid eye movement sleep has higher correlation dimensions than slow-wave sleep and sometimes even higher than wakefulness. It is assumed that the ''near-the-threshold'' depolarized state of neurons in the thalamus and cerebral cortex is a necessary condition for perceptual processes and consciousness, such as occurs during waking and in an altered form during rapid eye movement sleep
Coghill, Robert C.; McHaffie, John G. & Yen, Ye-Fen (2003). Neural correlates of interindividual differences in the subjective experience of pain. Pnas 100 (14):8538-8542.   (Cited by 68 | Google | More links)
Collerton, Daniel & Perry, Elaine (2007). Do multiple cortical-subcortical interactions support different aspects of consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):88-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Merker's core idea, that the experience of being conscious reflects the interactions of actions, targets, and motivations in the upper brainstem, with cortex providing the content of the conscious experience, merits serious consideration. However, we have two areas of concern: first, that his definition of consciousness is so broad that it is difficult to find any organisms with a brain that could be non-conscious; second, that the focus on one cortical–subcortical system neglects other systems (e.g., basal forebrain and brainstem cholinergic systems and their cortical and thalamic target areas) which may be of at least equal significance. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Daselaar, Sander M.; Fleck, Mathias S.; Prince, Steven E. & Cabeza, Roberto (2006). The medial temporal lobe distinguishes old from new independently of consciousness. Journal of Neuroscience 26 (21):5835-5839.   (Google | More links)
Del Cul, Antoine; Baillet, Sylvain & Dehaene, Stanislas (2007). Brain dynamics underlying the nonlinear threshold for access to consciousness. Public Library of Science, Biology 5 (10):e260.   (Google)
Dimond, S. J. (1976). Brain circuits for consciousness. Brain, Behavior, and Evolution 13:376-95.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Duzel, Emrah; Yonelinas, Andrew P.; Mangun, G. R.; Heinze, H. J. & Tulving, Endel (1997). Event-related brain potential correlates of two states of conscious awareness in memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 94:5973-8.   (Cited by 191 | Google | More links)
Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Fingelkurts, Andrew A. (2009). Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience. Cognitive Processing 10 (4):293-326.   (Google)
Abstract: To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing consciousness/mind/spirit and brain/body/matter to be seen as different sides of the same phenomenon, neither reducible to each other. The emergence of a form of causation distinctive from physics where mental/conscious agency (a) is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and (b) does exert “downward” causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning is discussed. This manuscript also discusses the role of cognitive processes in religious experience and outlines what can neuroscience offer for study of religious experience and what is the significance of this study for neuroscience, clinicians, theology and philosophy. A methodological shift from “explanation” to “description” of religious experience is suggested. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion between theologians, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingerlkurts, Alexander A. (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem. Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Neves, Carlos F. H. (2009). Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum. In Robert Kozma & John Caulfield (eds.), Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday. World Scientific.   (Google)
Abstract: In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain activity organization, and what mediates between them. Implications for linguistic semantics, self-organized distributed computing algorithms, artificial machine consciousness, and diagnosis of dynamic brain diseases will be discussed briefly.
Freeman, Walter J. (2007). Roles of allocortex and centrencephalon in intentionality and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):92-93.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: “Decortication” does not distinguish between removing all cerebral cortex, including three-layered allocortex or just six-layered neocortex. Functional decortication, by spreading depression, reversibly suppresses only neocortex, leaving minimal intentionality. Removal of all forebrain structures except a hypothalamic “island” blocks all intentional behaviors, leaving only tropisms. To what extent do Merker's examples retain allocortex, and how might such residues affect his interpretations? (Published Online May 1 2007)
Gallese, Vittorio (2000). The acting subject: Toward the neural basis of social cognition. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1998). Brain and conscious experience. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1993). Brain mechanisms and conscious experience. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1988). The prefrontal contribution to working memory and conscious experience. In O. D. Creutzfeld & John C. Eccles (eds.), The Brain and Conscious Experience. Pontifical Academy.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Grossenbacher, Peter G. (ed.) (1997). Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gusnard, Debra A. (2006). Neural Substrates of Self-Awareness. In John T. Cacioppo, Penny S. Visser & Cynthia L. Pickett (eds.), Social Neuroscience: People Thinking About Thinking People. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hashimoto, Yasuki & Sakai, Kuniyoshi L. (2003). Brain activations during conscious self-monitoring of speech production with delayed auditory feedback: An fMRI study. Human Brain Mapping 20 (1):22-28.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Jasper, H. (1998). Sensory information and conscious experience. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
John, E. Roy; Easton, P. & Isenhart, R. (1997). Consciousness and cognition may be mediated by multiple independent coherent ensembles. Consciousness and Cognition 6:3-39.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Jones, B. E. (1998). The neural basis of consciousness across the sleep-waking cycle. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
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Kleitman, N. (1955). The role of the cerebral cortex in the development and maintenance of consciousness. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Third Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
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Lehmann, Daniel; Strik, W. K.; Henggeler, B. & Koenig, T. (1998). Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual Imagery and Abstract Thoughts. International Journal of Psychophysiology 29:1-11.   (Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1982). Brain stimulation in the study of neuronal functions for conscious sensory experiences. Human Neurobiology 1:235-42.   (Cited by 42 | Google)
Logothetis, Nikos K. & Schall, Jeffrey D. (1989). Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception. Science 245:761-63.   (Cited by 222 | Google | More links)
Logothetis, Nikos K. & Leopold, David A. (1998). Single-neuron activity and visual perception. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Meiran, N.; Hommel, Bernhard; Bibi, U. & Lev, I. (2002). Consciousness and control in task switching. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):10-33.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Participants were required to switch among randomly ordered tasks, and instructional cues were used to indicate which task to execute. In Experiments 1 and 2, the participants indicated their readiness for the task switch before they received the target stimulus; thus, each trial was associated with two primary dependent measures: (1) readiness time and (2) target reaction time. Slow readiness responses and instructions emphasizing high readiness were paradoxically accompanied by slow target reaction time. Moreover, the effect of task switching on readiness time was an order of magnitude smaller then the (objectively estimated) duration required for task preparation (Experiment 3). The results strongly suggest that participants have little conscious awareness of their preparedness and challenge commonly accepted assumptions concerning the role of consciousness in cognitive control
Merker, Bjorn (2007). Grounding consciousness: The mesodiencephalon as thalamocortical base. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):110-134.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: My response addresses general commentary themes such as my neglect of the forebrain contribution to human consciousness, the bearing of blindsight on consciousness theory, the definition of wakefulness, the significance of emotion and pain perception for consciousness theory, and concerns regarding remnant cortex in children with hydranencephaly. Further specific topics, such as phenomenal and phylogenetic aspects of mesodiencephalic-thalamocortical relations, are also discussed. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Metzinger, Thomas (2000). Introduction: Consciousness research at the end of the twentieth century. In T. Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: conscious content like ``the self in the act of In 1989 the philosopher Colin McGinn asked the knowing'' (see, e.g., chapters 7 and 20 in this following question: ``How can technicolor phe- volume) or high-level phenomenal properties like nomenology arise from soggy gray matter?'' ``coherence'' or ``holism'' (e.g., chapters 8 and 9 (1989: 349). Since then many authors in the ®eld in this volume). But what, precisely, does it mean of consciousness research have quoted this ques- that conscious experience has a ``content''? Is tion over and over, like a slogan that in a nut- this an entity open to empirical research pro- shell conveys a deep and important theoretical grams and interdisciplinary cooperation? And problem. It seems that almost none of them dis- what would it mean to map this content onto covered the subtle trap inherent in this question. physical states ``under a certain description''? In The brain is not gray. The brain is colorless. other words: What kinds of relations a
Metzinger, Thomas (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.   (Cited by 80 | Google)
Abstract: This book brings together an international group of neuroscientists and philosophers who are investigating how the content of subjective experience is...
Morsella, Ezequiel & Bargh, John A. (2007). Supracortical consciousness: Insights from temporal dynamics, processing-content, and olfaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):100.   (Google)
Abstract: To further illuminate the nature of conscious states, it may be progressive to integrate Merker's important contribution with what is known regarding (a) the temporal relation between conscious states and activation of the mesodiencephalic system; (b) the nature of the information (e.g., perceptual vs. premotor) involved in conscious integration; and (c) the neural correlates of olfactory consciousness. (Published Online May 1 2007)
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Palva, Satu; Linkenkaer-Hansen, Klaus; Näätänen, Risto & Palva, J. Matias (2005). Early neural correlates of conscious somatosensory perception. Journal of Neuroscience 25 (21):5248-5258.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
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Raichle, M. E. (2000). The neural correlates of consciousness: An analysis of cognitive skill learning. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Rapcsak, S. & Kaszniak, Alfred W. (2000). Searching for the neural correlates of consciousness: Clues from face recognition research. Brain and Cognition 42 (1):37-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Schall, Jeffrey D. (2000). Investigating neural correlates of consciousness with ambiguous stimuli. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):32-35.   (Google | More links)
Schubert, Ruth; Blankenburg, Felix; Lemm, Steven; Villringer, Arno & Curio, Gabriel (2006). Now you feel it--now you don't: ERP correlates of somatosensory awareness. Psychophysiology 43 (1):31-40.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sewards, Terence V. & Sewards, Mark A. (2002). On the neural correlates of object recognition awareness: Relationship to computational activities and activities mediating perceptual awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):51-77.   (Google)
Abstract: Based on theoretical considerations of Aurell (1979) and Block (1995), we argue that object recognition awareness is distinct from purely sensory awareness and that the former is mediated by neuronal activities in areas that are separate and distinct from cortical sensory areas. We propose that two of the principal functions of neuronal activities in sensory cortex, which are to provide sensory awareness and to effect the computations that are necessary for object recognition, are dissociated. We provide examples of how this dissociation might be achieved and argue that the components of the neuronal activities which carry the computations do not directly enter the awareness of the subject. The results of these computations are sparse representations (i.e., vector or distributed codes) which are activated by the presentation of particular sensory objects and are essentially engrams for the recognition of objects. These final representations occur in the highest order areas of sensory cortex; in the visual analyzer, the areas include the anterior part of the inferior temporal cortex and the perirhinal cortex. We propose, based on lesion and connectional data, that the two areas in which activities provide recognition awareness are the temporopolar cortex and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Activities in the temporopolar cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the remote past (consolidated object recognition), and those in the medial orbitofrontal cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the recent past. The activation of the sparse representation for a particular sensory object in turn activates neurons in one or both of these regions of cortex, and it is the activities of these neurons that provide the awareness of recognition of the object in question. The neural circuitry involved in the activation of these representations is discussed
Sewards, Terence V. & Sewards, Mark A. (2000). The awareness of thirst: Proposed neural correlates. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):463-487.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The neural and endocrine bases of the generation of thirst are reviewed. Based on this review, a hierarchical system of neural structures that regulate water conservation and acquisition is proposed. The system includes primary sensory-receptive areas; secondary sensory structures (circumventricular organs), which detect levels of hormones, including angiotensin II and vasopressin, which are involved in generating thirst; preoptic and hypothalamic structures; and an area within the ventrolateral quadrant of the periaqueductal gray matter. Hodological and other data are used to determine the hierarchical organization of the system. Based on studies of the effects of lesions to various structures within the hierarchy of the system, it is proposed that the awareness of thirst in rodents is either entirely or predominantly due to neuronal activities in a subsection of the ventrolateral periaqueductal gray matter. It is also hypothesized that the awareness of thirst in primates is due to neuronal activities in both the ventrolateral periaqueductal gray and in a region within the medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex
Silvanto, Juha (2007). Abstract Making the blindsighted see. Neuropsychologia 45 (14):3346-50.   (Google)
Abstract: A lesion of striate cortex, area V1, produces blindness in the retinotopically corresponding part of the visual field, although in some cases visual abilities in the blind field remain that are paradoxically devoid of conscious visual percepts ("blindsight"). Here we demonstrate that the blindsight subject GY can experience visual sensations of phosphenes in his blind field induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Such blind field percepts could only be induced when stimulation was applied bilaterally, i.e. over GY's area V5/MT in both hemispheres. Consistent with an earlier report [Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2000). Magnetically induced phosphenes in sighted, blind and blindsighted observers. Neuroreport, 11, 3269-3273], GY never experienced phosphenes when stimulation was restricted to his ipsilesional V5/MT. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time GY has experienced visual qualia in his blind hemifield. The present report characterizes the necessary conditions for such conscious experience in his hemianopic visual field and interprets them as demonstrating that only via a contribution from GY's intact hemisphere can activation in the damaged hemisphere reach visual awareness.
Stoerig, Petra (2007). Hunting the ghost: Toward a neuroscience of consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Sytsma, Justin, Searching for evidence of phenomenal consciousness in ncc research.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent scientific work aiming to give a neurobiological explanation of phenomenal consciousness has largely focused on finding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). The hope is that by locating neural correlates of phenomenally conscious mental states, some light will be cast on how the brain is able to give rise to such states. In this paper I argue that NCC research is unable to produce evidence of such neural correlates. I do this by considering two alternative interpretations of NCC research—an eliminativist and a disjunctivist interpretation. I show that each of these interpretations is compatible with the scientific data and yet is more parsimonious than accounts involving the supposed phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness
Vanderwolf, C. (2000). Are neocortical gamma waves related to consciousness? Brain Research 855 (2):217-224.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Verfaellie, Mieke & Keane, M. M. (1997). The neural basis of aware and unaware forms of memory. Seminars in Neurology 17:153-61.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Vogeley, Kai & Fink, Gereon R. (2003). Neural correlates of the first-person perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:38-42.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Vogeley, Kai; May, M.; Ritzl, A.; Falkai, P.; Zilles, K. & Fink, Gereon R. (2004). Neural correlates of first-person perspective as one constituent of human self-consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (5):817-827.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Vogt, B. A. & Laureys, Steven (2006). Posterior cingulate, precuneal and retrosplenial cortices: Cytology and components of the neural network correlates of consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Google)
Woolf, Nancy J. (1997). A possible role for cholinergic neurons of the basal forebrain and pontomesencephalon in consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 6:574-596.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)

8.1c Cerebral Hemispheres and Consciousness

Albert, M. L.; Silverberg, R.; Reches, A. & Berman, M. (1976). Cerebral dominance for consciousness. Archives of Neurology 33:453-4.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Austin, Glenn; Hayward, W. & Rouhe, S. (1974). A note on the problem of conscious man and cerebral disconnection by hemispherectomy. In Marcel Kinsbourne & W. Smith (eds.), Hemispheric Disconnection and Cerebral Function. Charles C.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Battro, A. (2001). Half a Brain is Enough: The Story of Nico. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Half a Brain is Enough is the extraordinary story of Nico, a three-year-old boy who was given a right hemispherectomy to control his severe intractable epilepsy...
Baynes, K. & Gazzaniga, Michael S. (2000). Consciousness, introspection, and the split-brain: The two minds/one body problem. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Beaumont, J. Graham (1981). Split brain studies and the duality of consciousness. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 2. Academic Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bogen, Joseph E. (1977). Further discussion of split brains and hemispheric capabilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (September):281-6.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bogen, Joseph E. (1968). The other side of the brain: An appositional mind. Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Society 34:135-62.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Colvin, Mary K. & Gazzaniga, Michael S. (2007). Split-brain cases. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Cucchiara, B.; Kasner, S. E.; Wolk, D. A.; Lyden, P. D.; Knappertz, V. A.; Ashwood, T.; Odergren, T. & Nordlund, A. (2003). Lack of hemispheric dominance for consciousness in acute ischaemic stroke. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 74 (7):889-892.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Dewitt, L. (1975). Consciousness, mind, self: The implications of the split-brain studies. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (March):41-47.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Dimond, S. J. (1978). Depletion of awareness and double-simultaneous stimulation in split-brain man. Cortex 14:604-607.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fecteau, Jillian H.; Kingstone, Alan & Enns, James T. (2004). Hemisphere differences in conscious and unconscious word reading. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):550-64.   (Google | More links)
Gainotti, Guido (2005). Emotions, unconscious processes, and the right hemisphere. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 7 (1):71-81.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1995). Consciousness and the cerebral hemispheres. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Gazzaniga, Michael S.; LeDoux, J. E. & Wilson, David H. (1977). Language, praxis, and the right hemisphere: Clues to some mechanisms of consciousness. Neurology 27:1144-1147.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1977). On dividing the self: Speculations from brain research. Excerpta Medica 434:233-44.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. & Miller, Melvin E. (2000). Testing tulving: The split brain approach. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Harrington, A. (1985). Nineteenth-century ideas on hemisphere differences and "duality of mind". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:617-660.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Henke, Hal; Robinson, P.; Drysdale, P. & Loxley, P. (2009). Spatiotemporal dynamics of pattern formation in the primary visual cortex and hallucinations. Biological Cybernetics 101 (1):3-18.   (Google)
Joseph, R. (1988). The right cerebral hemisphere: Emotion, music, visual-spatial skills, body-image, dreams, and awareness. Journal of Clinical Psychology 44:630-673.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Kavcic, V.; Fei, R.; Hu, S. & Doty, R. W. (2000). Hemispheric interaction, metacontrol, and mnemonic processing in split-brain macaques. Behavioural Brain Research 111:71-82.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Keenan, Julian Paul; Rubio, Jennifer; Racioppi, Connie; Johnson, Amanda & Barnacz, Allyson (2005). The right hemisphere and the dark side of consciousness. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):695-704.   (Google)
Kurian, G. & Santhakumari, K. (1990). Consciousness and the left cerebral hemisphere. Journal of Indian Psychology 8:33-36.   (Google)
Landis, Theodor; Graves, R. E. & Goodglass, H. (1981). Dissociated awareness of manual performance on two different visual associative tasks: A "split-brain" phenomenon in normal subjects? Cortex 17:435-440.   (Google)
LeDoux, J. E.; Wilson, David H. & Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1977). A divided mind: Observations of the conscious properties of the separated hemispheres. Annals of Neurology 2:417-21.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
LeDoux, J. E.; Wilson, David H. & Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1979). Beyond commissurotomy: Clues to consciousness. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Neurobiology. , Volume 2.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
LeDoux, J. E. (1986). Brain, mind, and language. In David A. Oakley (ed.), Brain and Mind. Methuen.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Lishman, W. A. (1971). Emotion, consciousness, and will after brain bisection in man. Cortex 7:181-92.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Mackay, Donald M. (1987). Divided brains -- divided minds? In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Manly, Tom; Dobler, Veronika B.; Dodds, Christopher M. & George, Melanie A. (2005). Rightward shift in spatial awareness with declining alertness. Neuropsychologia 43 (12):1721-1728.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Marks, Charles E. (1980). Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Mark, V. (1996). Conflicting communication in a split-brain patient: Support for dual consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Miller, L. (1986). Some comments on cerebral hemispheric models of consciousness. Psychoanalytic Review 73:129-44.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Morin, Alain (2002). Right hemispheric self-awareness: A critical assessment. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):396-401.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this commentaryI evaluate the claim made byKeenan, Nelson, OÕConnor, and Pascual-Leone (2001) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating brain activityand self-awareness; I closelyexamine their analysis of one specific review of literature and conclude that it appears to be biased. Finally, recent research suggests that inner speech (which is associated with left hemispheric activity) is linked to self-awareness—an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of a right hemispheric self-awareness. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved
Morin, Alain (2005). Self-awareness and the left hemisphere: The dark side of selectively reviewing the literature. Cortex 41:695-704.   (Google)
Morin, Alain (2001). The split-brain debate revisited: On the importance of language and self-recognition for right hemispheric consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (2):107-118.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this commentary I use recent empirical evidence and theoretical analyses concerning the importance of language and the meaning of self-recognition to reevaluate the claim that the right mute hemisphere in commissurotomized patients possesses a full consciousness. Preliminary data indicate that inner speech is deeply linked to self-awareness; also, four hypotheses concerning the crucial role inner speech plays in self-focus are presented. The legitimacy of self-recognition as a strong operationalization of self-awareness in the right hemisphere is also questioned on the basis that it might rather tap a preexisting body awareness having little to do with an access to mental events. I conclude with the formulation of an alternative interpretation of commissurotomy according to self-awareness — a “complete” one in the left hemisphere and a “primitive” one in the right hemisphere
Natsoulas, Thomas (1987). Consciousness and commissurotomy:. Spheres and Streams of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8 (2):435-468.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1988). Consciousness and commissurotomy:. Some Pertinencies for Intact Functioning. Journal of Mind and Behavior 9:515-548.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1991). Consciousness and commissurotomy: 3. toward the improvement of alternative conceptions. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (2):1-32.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1992). Consciousness and commissurotomy:. Three Hypothesized Dimensions of Deconnected Left-Hemispheric Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:37-67.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1991). Consciousness and commissurotomy: 5. concerning a hypothesis of normal dual consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (2):179-202.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1991). Consciousness and commissurotomy: 6. evidence for normal dual consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (2):181-205.   (Google)
Niebauer, Christopher L. (2004). Handedness and the fringe of consciousness: Strong handers ruminate while mixed handers self-reflect. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):730-745.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Niebauer, Christopher L.; Aselage, Justin & Schutte, Christian (2002). Hemispheric interaction and consciousness: Degree of handedness predicts the intensity of a sensory illusion. Laterality 7 (1):85-96.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Preilowski, B. (1979). Self-recognition as a test of consciousness in left and right hemisphere of "split-brain" patients. Activitas Nervosa Superior 19.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1977). Bilateral organization of consciousness in man. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 299:448-58.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Puccetti, Roland (1981). The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data and other considerations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:93-123.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Quen, J. M. (ed.) (1986). Split Minds/Split Brains: Historical and Current Perspectives. New York University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rusalova, M. N. (2005). Characteristics of interhemisphere interactions at different levels of consciousness. Neuroscience and Behavioral Physiology 35 (8):821-827.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sergent, J. (1987). A new look at the human split brain. Brain 110:1375-92.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Smith, Stephen D. & Bulman-Fleming, M. Barbara (2004). A hemispheric asymmetry for the unconscious perception of emotion. Brain and Cognition 55 (3):452-457.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Smith, Stephen D. (ms). Hemispheric specialization for the conscious and unconscious perception of emotional stimuli.   (Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1964). Brain bisection and mechanisms of consciousness. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Brain and Conscious Experience. Springer-Verlag.   (Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1984). Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain. Neuropsychologia 22:611-73.   (Cited by 52 | Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1977). Forebrain commissurotomy and conscious awareness. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2 (June):101-26.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Sperry, Roger W. (1968). Hemisphere deconnection and unity in conscious awareness. American Psychologist 23:723-733.   (Cited by 127 | Google)
Sperry, Roger W.; Zaidel, E. & Zaidel, D. (1979). Self recognition and social awareness in the deconnected minor hemisphere. Neuropsychologia 17:153-166.   (Cited by 67 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two patients with cerebral commissurotomy were tested with visual input lateralized to left or right half of the visual field by an opaque hemifield screen set in the focal plane of an optical system mounted on a scleral contact lens which allowed prolonged exposure and ocular scanning of complex visual arrays. Key personal and affect-laden stimuli along with items for assessing general social knowledgability were presented among neutral unknowns in visual arrays with 4-9 choices. Selective manual and associated emotional responses obtained from the minor hemisphere to pictures of subject's self, relatives, pets and belongings, and of public, historical and religious figures and personalities from the entertainment world revealed a characteristic social, political, personal and self-awareness comparable roughly to that of the major hemisphere of the same subject
Trevarthen, Colwyn (1974). Analysis of central activities that generate and regulate consciousness in commissurotomy patients. In S. J. Dimond & J. Graham Beaumont (eds.), Hemisphere Function in the Human Brain. Elek.   (Google)
Uddin, Lucina Q.; Rayman, Jan & Zaidel, Eran (2005). Split-brain reveals separate but equal self-recognition in the two cerebral hemispheres. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):633-640.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Wessinger, C. M.; Fendrich, R.; Ptito, A. & Villemure, J. G. (1996). Residual vision with awareness in the field contralateral to a partial or complete functional hemispherectomy. Neuropsychologia 34:1129-1137.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1978). Consciousness and commissurotomy. Philosophy 53 (April):185-99.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Zangwill, O. L. (1974). Consciousness and the cerebral hemispheres. In S. J. Dimond & J. Graham Beaumont (eds.), Heremisphere Function in the Human Brain. Wiley.   (Cited by 5 | Google)

8.1d Neural Timing and Consciousness

Banks, William P. & Pockett, Susan (2007). Benjamin Libet's work on the neuroscience of free will. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Bittner, T. J. (1996). Consciousness and the act of will. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):31-41.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bolbecker, Amanda R.; Cheng, Zixi; Felsten, Gary; Kong, King-Leung; Lim, Corrinne C. M.; Nisly-Nagele, Sheryl J.; Wang-Bennett, Lolin T. & Wasserman, Gerald S. (2002). Two asymmetries governing neural and mental timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):265-272.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2002). In support of Pockett's critique of Libet's studies of the time course of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):280-283.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (online). Determining the moment of consciousness? Commentary on Valerie Hardcastle.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course this is a very large and significant role for it to play, but it may be over-optimistic to suppose that it can play some further explanatory role, taking us where information-processing theories cannot. If so, then neurophysiological accounts will be no more and no less successful at dealing with consciousness than information-processing accounts are
Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Discussion: The timing of sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (September):492-497.   (Google)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). On the alleged backward referral of experience and its relevance to the mind-body problem. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):165-81.   (Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). The timing of sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):492-7.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-201.   (Cited by 394 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274
Durgin, Frank H. & Sternberg, Saul (2002). The time of consciousness and vice versa. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):284-290.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1996). Time and consciousness: The uneasy bearing of relativity on the mind-body problem. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingelkurts, Alexander A. (2006). Timing in cognition and EEG brain dynamics: Discreteness versus continuity. Cognitive Processing 7 (3):135-162.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of Operational Architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based on the OA framework, that brain functioning is best conceptualized in terms of continuity-discreteness unity which is also the characteristic property of cognition. At the end we emphasize where one might productively proceed for the future research.
Glynn, I. M. (1990). Consciousness and time. Nature 348:477-79.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Gomes, Gilberto (2002). On experimental and philosophical investigations of mental timing: A response to commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gomes, Gilberto (2002). Problems in the timing of conscious experience. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Gomes, Gilberto (2002). The interpretation of Libet's results on the timing of conscious events: A commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):221-230.   (Google)
Gomes, Gilberto (1999). Volition and the readiness potential. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):59-76.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological facts compatible with the belief that free will determines our voluntary acts? What is the role of consciousness in voluntary action? In this paper I will discuss these questions and the answers that Libet gave to them
Green, Christopher D. & Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Are mental events preceded by their physical causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.   (Google)
Abstract: Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events concerned given that Libet himself has found the reports of subjects to be unreliable in this regard. Third, there is a suspect assumption that there are such things as timable and locatable mental and brain events accompanying and causing human behaviour. For all these reasons we reject the claim that physical events are prior to and explain mental events
Haggard, Patrick & Libet, Benjamin W. (2001). Conscious intention and brain activity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):47-63.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (ms). Is the mind ahead of the brain? Rejoinder to Benjamin Libet.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (2005). On Benjamin Libet: Is the mind ahead of the brain? Behind it? In On Determinism and Freedom. Edinburgh University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Benjamin Libet and also Libet and collaborators claim to advance a single hypothesis, with important consequences, about the time of a conscious experience in relation to the time when there occurs a certain physical condition in the brain. This condition is spoken of as
_neural_
_adequacy_ for the experience, or, as we can as well say, _neural adequacy_ .5 This finding has been taken to throw doubt on theories that take neural and mental events to be in necessary or lawlike connection, and also certain identity theories of mind and brain, as well as determinist theories
Honderich, Ted (1984). The time of a conscious sensory experience and mind-brain theories. Journal of Theoretical Biology 110 (1):115-129.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Hoy, Ronald C. (1982). Ambiguities in the subjective timing of experiences debate. Philosophy of Science 49 (June):254-262.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Joordens, S.; van Duijn, Marc & Spalek, T. M. (2002). When timing the mind should also mind the timing: Biases in the measurement of voluntary actions. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):231-40.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Kiefer, Markus & Spitzer, Manfred (2000). Time course of conscious and unconscious semantic brain activation. Neuroreport 11 (11):2401-2407.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Klein, Stanley (2002). Libet's research on the timing of conscious intention to act: A commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):273-279.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Klein, S. A. (2002). Libet's temporal anomalies: A reassessment of the data. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):198-214.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Klein, Stanley (2002). Libet's timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Levy, Neil (2005). Libet's impossible demand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.   (Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1996). Commentary on free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (2004). Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Over a long career, Libet has conducted experiments that have shown, in clear and concrete ways, how the brain produces conscious awareness.
Libet, Benjamin W. (1993). Neurophysiology of Consciousness: Selected Papers and New Essays. Birkhauser.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1978). Neuronal vs. subjective timing for a conscious sensory experience. In P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser (eds.), Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Elsevier.   (Cited by 24 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W.; Wright, E. W.; Feinstein, B. & Pearl, D. K. (1992). Retroactive enhancement of a skin sensation by a delayed cortical stimulus in man: Evidence for delay of a conscious sensory experience. Consciousness and Cognition 1:367-75.   (Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1985). Subjective antedating of a sensory experience and mind-brain theories: Reply to Honderich. Journal of Theoretical Biology 114:563-70.   (Google)
Libet, Benjamin W.; E. W, Feinstein & B., Pearl (1979). Subjective referral of the timing for a cognitive sensory experience. Brain 102:193-224.   (Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1981). The experimental evidence for subjective referral of a sensory experience backwards in time: Reply to P.s. Churchland. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (2000). Time factors in conscious processes: Reply to Gilberto Gomes. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The critical reinterpretations of Libet's research by G. Gomes make speculative, unwarranted, and untested assumptions. These assumptions and arguments are analyzed and their status relative to Libet's findings is criticized
Libet, Benjamin W. (1993). The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).   (Cited by 59 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1981). Timing of cerebral processes relative to concomitant conscious experiences in man. In G. Adam, I. Meszaros & E.I. Banyai (eds.), Advances in Physiological Science.   (Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (2003). Timing of conscious experience: Reply to the 2002 commentaries on Libet's findings. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.   (Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (2002). The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529-66.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McKeen Cattell, James (1886). The time taken up by cerebral operations. Mind 11 (42):220-242.   (Google | More links)
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free will: Theories, analysis, and data. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1997). Strength of motivation and being in control - learning from Libet. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:319-32.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Miller, Jeff G. & Trevena, Judy A. (2002). Cortical movement preparation and conscious decisions: Averaging artifacts and timing biases. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):308-313.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Mortensen, Chris (1980). Neurophysiology and experiences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):250-264.   (Google | More links)
Oakley, David A. & Haggard, Patrick (2006). The timing of brain events: Authors' response to Libet's 'reply'. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):548-550.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pockett, Susan (2002). Backward referral, flash-lags, and quantum free will: A response to commentaries on articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and trevena and Miller. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.   (Google)
Pockett, Susan (2004). Hypnosis and the death of "subjective backwards referral". Consciousness and Cognition 13:621-25.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pockett, Susan (2002). On subjective back-referral and how long it takes to become conscious of a stimulus: A reinterpretation of Libet's data. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-61.   (Google)
Pockett, Susan (2006). The great subjective back-referral debate: Do neural responses increase during a train of stimuli? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):551-559.   (Google)
Pollen, Daniel A. (2006). Brain stimulation and conscious experience: Electrical stimulation of the cortical surface at a threshold current evokes sustained neuronal activity only after a prolonged latency. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):560-565.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pollen, Daniel A. (2004). Brain stimulation and conscious experience. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):626-645.   (Google)
Proust, Joelle (1994). Time and conscious experience. In C.C. Gould (ed.), Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice. Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ramakrishna, Chakravarthi (2002). Real latencies and facilitation. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):300-303.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Rossi, E. L. (1988). Paradoxes of time, consciousness, and free will: Integrating Bohm, Jung, and Libet on ethics. Psychological Perspectives 19:50-55.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). The timing of conscious states. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning
Shariff, Azim F. & Peterson, Jordan B. (2005). Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's Veto and a close-enough theory of free will. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Shevrin, Howard; Ghannam, Jess H. & Libet, Benjamin W. (2002). A neural correlate of consciousness related to repression. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):334-41.   (Google)
Trevena, Judy A. & Miller, Jeff G. (2002). Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):162-90.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
van de Grind, Wim (2002). Physical, neural, and mental timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):241-64.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Wolf, Fred Alan (1998). The timing of conscious experience: A causality-violating interpretation. Journal of Scientific Exploration 12 (4).   (Google)

8.1e Neural Synchrony and Binding

Arecchi, F. Tito (2003). Chaotic neuron dynamics, synchronization, and feature binding: Quantum aspects. Mind and Matter 1 (1):15-43.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A central issue of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how a large collection of coupled neurons combines external signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external stimulus localized at some input spreads over a large assembly of coupled neurons, building up a collective state univocally corresponding to the stimulus. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. Based on recent investigations of homoclinic chaotic systems and their synchronization, a novel conjecture for the dynamics of single neurons and, consequently, for neuron assemblies is formulated. Homoclinic chaos is proposed as a suitable way to code information in time by trains of equal spikes occurring at apparently erratic times. In order to classify the set of different perceptions, the percept space can be given a metric structure by introducing a distance measure between distinct percepts. The distance in percept space is conjugate to the duration of the perception in the sense that an uncertainty relation in percept space is associated with time-limited perceptions. This coding of different percepts by synchronized spike trains entails fundamental quantum features which are not restricted to microscopic phenomena. It is conjectured that they are related to the details of the perceptual chain rather than depending on Planck's action
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. & Nielsen, C. (1991). A model for cortical 40-Hertz oscillations invokes inter-area interactions. Neuroreport 2:289-92.   (Google)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1990). Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.   (Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1990). Synchronous activation in multiple cortical regions: A mechanism for recall. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:287-96.   (Cited by 74 | Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1989). The brain binds entities and events by multiregional activation from convergence zones. Neural Computation 1:123-32.   (Cited by 213 | Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1989). Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: A systems-level proposal for the neural substrates of recognition and recall. Cognition 3:25-62.   (Cited by 580 | Google)
Doesburg, Sam M.; Kitajo, Keiichi & Ward, Lawrence M. (2005). Increased gamma-band synchrony precedes switching of conscious perceptual objects in binocular rivalry. Neuroreport 16 (11):1139-1142.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Eckhorn, Reinhard; Reitbock, H. J.; Arndt, M. & Dicke, P. (1989). A neural network for feature linking via synchronous activity: Results from cat visual cortex and from simulations. In Rodney M. J. Cotterill (ed.), Models of Brain Function. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
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Engel, Andreas K.; Konig, P. Kreiter & Singer, Wolf (1991). Direct physiologic evidence for scene segmentation by temporal coding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 88:1936-40.   (Google)
Engel, Andreas K.; Fries, P.; Konig, P. Kreiter; Brecht, M. & Singer, Wolf (1999). Does time help to understand consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):260-68.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Engel, Andreas K. (2003). Time and conscious visual processing. In Hede Helfrich (ed.), Time and Mind II: Information Processing Perspectives. Hogrefe & Huber Publishers.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Engel, Andreas K. (2003). Temporal binding and the neural correlates of consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Engel, Andreas K. & Singer, Wolf (2001). Temporal binding and the neural correlates of sensory awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):16-25.   (Cited by 300 | Google | More links)
Engel, Andreas K.; Fries, P.; Konig, P. Kreiter; Brecht, M. & Singer, Wolf (1999). Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):128-51.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive functions like perception, memory, language, or consciousness are based on highly parallel and distributed information processing by the brain. One of the major unresolved questions is how information can be integrated and how coherent representational states can be established in the distributed neuronal systems subserving these functions. It has been suggested that this so-called ''binding problem'' may be solved in the temporal domain. The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information. As we intend to show here, this temporal binding hypothesis has implications for the search of the neural correlate of consciousness. We review experimental results, mainly obtained in the visual system, which support the notion of temporal binding. In particular, we discuss recent experiments on the neural mechanisms of binocular rivalry which suggest that appropriate synchronization among cortical neurons may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of perceptual states and awareness of sensory stimuli
Engel, Andreas K.; Konig, P. Kreiter & A. K., Schillen (1992). Temporal coding in the visual cortex: New vistas on integration in the nervous system. Trends in Neurosciences 15:218-26.   (Cited by 338 | Google | More links)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 45 (7):14521462.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition

and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to

the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences

between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,

beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingelkurts, Alexander A. (2004). Making Complexity Simpler: Multivariability and Metastability in the Brain. The International Journal of Neuroscience 114 (7):843 - 862.   (Google)
Abstract: This article provides a retrospective, current and prospective overview on developments in brain research and neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies are considered, with emphasis in the concept of multivariability and metastability in the brain. In this new view on the human brain, the potential multivariability of the neuronal networks appears to be far from continuous in time, but confined by the dynamics of short-term local and global metastable brain states. The article closes by suggesting some of the implications of this view in future multidisciplinary brain research.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingerlkurts, Alexander A. (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem. Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
Fries, Pascal; Roelfsema, Pieter R.; Engel, Andreas K. & Singer, Wolf (1997). Synchronization of oscillatory responses in visual cortex correlates with perception in interocular rivalry. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 94:12699-12704.   (Cited by 182 | Google | More links)
Garson, James W. (2001). (Dis)solving the binding problem. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):381 – 392.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The binding problem is to explain how information processed by different sensory systems is brought together to unify perception. The problem has two sides. First, we want to explain phenomenal binding: the fact that we experience a single world rather than separate perceptual fields for each sensory modality. Second, we must solve a functional problem: to explain how a neural net like the brain links instances to types. I argue that phenomenal binding and functional binding require very different treatments. The puzzle of phenomenal binding rests on a confusion and so can be dissolved. So only functional binding deserves explanation. The general solution to that problem is that information to be bound is arrayed along different dimensions. So sensory coding into separate topographic maps facilitates functional binding and there is no need based on the unity of perception for special mechanisms that bring "back together" information in different maps
Gold, Ian (1999). Does 40-hz oscillation play a role in visual consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):186-95.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Golledge, H. D. R.; Hilgetag, C. C. & Tovee, M. J. (1996). Information processing: A solution to the binding problem. Current Biology 6:1092-95.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gray, Charles M.; Konig, P. Kreiter; Engel, Andreas K. & Singer, Wolf (1992). Oscillatory responses in cat visual cortex exhibit inter-columnar synchronization which reflects global stimulus properties. Nature 338:334-7.   (Google)
Gray, Charles M. (1994). Synchronous oscillations in neuronal systems: Mechanisms and functions. Journal of Computational Neuroscience 1:11-38.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1997). Consciousness and the neurobiology of perceptual binding. Seminars in Neurology 17:163-70.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1996). How we get there from here: Dissolution of the binding problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):251-66.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1994). Psychology's "binding problem" and possible neurobiological solutions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:66-90.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Helekar, S. A. (1999). In defense of experience-coding nonarbitrary temporal neural activity patterns. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):455-461.   (Google | More links)
Humphreys, Glyn W. (2003). Conscious visual representations built from multiple binding processes: Evidence from neuropsychology. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Konig, P. Kreiter & Engel, Andreas K. (1995). Correlated firing in sensory-motor systems. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 5:511-19.   (Cited by 81 | Google | More links)
Konig, P. Kreiter; Engel, Andreas K.; Roelfsema, P. R. & Singer, Wolf (1995). How precise is neural synchronization? Neural Computation 7:469-85.   (Google)
Konig, P. Kreiter; Engel, Andreas K. & Singer, Wolf (1995). Relation between oscillatory activity and long-range synchronization in cat visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 92:290-94.   (Cited by 128 | Google | More links)
Lipton, Peter (1998). Binding the mind. In J. Cornwell (ed.), Consciousness and Human Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Several of the essays in this collection discuss the `binding problem', the problem of explaining in neurophysiological terms how it is that we see the various perceptual qualities of a physical object, such as its shape, colour, location and motion, as features of a single object. The perceived object seems to us a unitary thing, but its sensory properties are diverse and turn out to be processed in different areas of the brain. How then does the brain manage the integration? Readers of the essays in this collection may find themselves suffering from an analogous binding problem about the study of consciousness, though this problem is conceptual rather than perceptual, and here the difficulty is to achieve the integration rather than to understand how an effortless integration is achieved. Consciousness is the ideal topic for inter-disciplinary investigation. It is a central concern of such diverse disciplines as neurophysiology, evolutionary biology, psychology, cognitive science, philosophy and theology, among others, yet none of these disciplines has come close to providing full answers to the central questions that consciousness raises. Inter-disciplinary investigation seems an obvious way forward, but it generates the conceptual binding problem that this collection displays. The standard of the essays is very high, but it is extraordinarily difficult to integrate their content into anything like a single picture. We are all apparently talking about the same phenomenon, the conscious awareness of the world that each of us enjoys first-hand, but it is quite unclear how to see the very different things we say about this phenomenon as part of a single picture, or even as parts of different but compatible pictures. Having raised the binding problem for the inter-disciplinary study of consciousness, I hasten to say that I will not attempt even a partial substantive solution here: that is left as an exercise for the readers of this book.
Llinas, R. & Ribary, U. (1998). Temporal conjunction in thalamocortical transactions. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Lutz, Antoine; Martinerie, Jacques; Lachaux, Jean-Philippe & Varela, Francisco J. (2002). Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first- person data: Synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 99 (3):1586-1591.   (Google)
Abstract: Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Ce´re´brale (LENA), Hoˆpital de La Salpeˆtrie`re, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
McFadden, J. (2002). Synchronous firing and its influence on the brain's electromagnetic field: Evidence for an electromagnetic field theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):23-50.   (Google)
Meador, Kimford J.; Ray, P. G.; Echauz, J. R.; Loring, D. W. & Vachtsevanos, G. J. (2002). Gamma coherence and conscious perception. Neurology 59 (6):847-854.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Nelson, J. I. (1995). Binding in the visual system. In Michael A. Arbib (ed.), Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Newman, J. B. & Grace, A. A. (1999). Binding across time: The selective gating of frontal and hippocampal systems modulating working memory and attentional states. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):196-212.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal binding via 40-Hz synchronization of neuronal discharges in sensory cortices has been hypothesized to be a necessary condition for the rapid selection of perceptually relevant information for further processing in working memory. Binocular rivalry experiments have shown that late stage visual processing associated with the recognition of a stimulus object is highly correlated with discharge rates in inferotemporal cortex. The hippocampus is the primary recipient of inferotemporal outputs and is known to be the substrate for the consolidation of working memories to long-term, episodic memories. The prefrontal cortex, on the other hand, is widely thought to mediate working memory processes, per se. This article reviews accumulated evidence for the role of a subcortical matrix in linking frontal and hippocampal systems to select and ''stream'' conscious episodes across time (hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds). ''Streaming'' is hypothesized to be mediated by the selective gating of reentrant flows of information between these cortical systems and the subcortical matrix. The physiological mechanism proposed for this temporally extended form of binding is synchronous oscillations in the slower EEG spectrum (< 8 Hz)
O'Reilly, R. C.; Busby, R. & Soto, R. (2003). Three forms of binding and their neural substrates: Alternatives to temporal synchrony. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Prinzmetal, W. Amiri (1981). Principles of feature integration in visual perception. Perception and Psychophysics 30:330-40.   (Cited by 68 | Google | More links)
Revonsuo, A. & Newman, J. B. (1999). Binding and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):123-127.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Revonsuo, Antti (1999). Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):173-85.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas others are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formulations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical philosophical problem of the unity of consciousness and the currently fashionable search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Nonetheless, only a part of the current empirical research on binding is directly relevant to the study of consciousness. The main message of the present paper is that the science of consciousness needs to establish a clear theoretical view of the relation between binding and consciousness and to encourage further empirical work that builds on such a theoretical foundation
Robertson, Lynn C. (2003). Binding, spatial attention and perceptual awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4 (2):93-102.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Roskies, Adina L. (1999). The binding problem. Neuron 24.   (Cited by 69 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (von der Malsburg, 1981), “the binding problem” has with the visual percept of it, so that both are effortlessly captured the attention of researchers across many disci- perceived as being aspects of a single event. I like to plines, including psychology, neuroscience, computa- refer to these sorts of problems as perceptual binding tional modeling, and even philosophy. Despite the is- problems, since they involve unifying aspects of per- sue’s prominence in these fields, what “binding” means cepts. In addition, there are cognitive binding problems: is rarely made explicit. In this paper, I will briefly survey they include relating a concept to a percept, such as the many notions of binding and will introduce some linking the visual representation of an apple to all the issues that will be explored more fully in the reviews semantic knowledge stored about it (it is edible, how it that follow
Sauve, K. (1999). Gamma-band synchronous oscillations: Recent evidence regarding their functional significance. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):213-24.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How do our brains represent distinct objects in consciousness? In order to consciously distinguish between objects, our brains somehow selectively bind together activity patterns of spatially intermingled neurons that simultaneously represent similar and dissimilar features of distinct objects. Gamma-band synchronous oscillations (GSO) of neuroelectrical activity have been hypothesized to be a mechanism used by our brains to generate and bind conscious sensations to represent distinct objects. Most experiments relating GSO to specific features of consciousness have been published only in the last several years. This brief review focuses on a wide variety experiments in which animals, including humans, discriminate between sensory stimuli and make these discriminations evident in their behavior. Performance of these tasks, in humans, is invariably accompanied by conscious awareness of both stimuli and behavior. Results of these experiments indicate that specific patterns of GSO correlate closely with specific aspects of conscious sensorimotor processing. That is, GSO appear to be closely correlated with neural generation of our most paradigmatic cognitive state: consciousness
Schillen, T. B. & Konig, P. Kreiter (1994). Binding by temporal structure in multiple feature domains of an oscillatory neural network. Biological Cybernetics 5:397-405.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sewards, Terence V. & Sewards, Mark A. (2001). On the correlation between synchronized oscillatory activities and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):485-495.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent experiments have shown that the amplitudes of cortical gamma band oscillatory activities that occur during anesthesia are often greater than amplitudes of similar activities that occur without anesthesia. This result is apparently at odds with the hypothesis that synchronized oscillatory activities constitute the neural correlate of consciousness. We argue that while synchronization and oscillatory patterning are necessary conditions for consciousness, they are not sufficient. Based on the results of a binocular rivalry study of Fries et al. (1997), we propose that the degrees of oscillatory strength and synchronization of neuronal activities determine the degree of awareness those activities produce. On the other hand, the overal firing rates of neurons in cortical sensory areas are not correlated with the degree of awareness the activities of those neurons produce. The results of the experiment of Fries et al. (1997) appear to conflict with the results of another binocular rivalry experiment, in which monkeys were trained to pull a lever in order to report which stimulus object was being perceived (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996). In the latter experiment, it was demonstrated that the firing rates of neurons in striate cortex did not change during perceptual alterations, while 90% of neurons in inferior and superior temporal cortices changed their firing rate when the perceived image changed. This result led to the conclusion that activities in temporal cortex are correlated with visual awareness, but those in striate cortex are not. We argue that activities in temporal cortex contribute little, if anything, to perceptual awareness, and that their primary function is computational. Thus the correlation between the firing rates of neurons in these areas and the responses of the monkeys is due to the recognition of a particular stimulus object, which in turn is due to the computations made there
Shastri, Lokendra (2002). Episodic memory and cortico-hippocampal interactions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6:162-168.   (Cited by 81 | Google | More links)
Shastri, L. & Ajjanagadde, V. (1993). From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables, and dynamic binding using temporal synchrony. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:417-51.   (Google)
Sillito, A. M.; Jones, H. E.; Gerstein, G. L. & West, D. C. (1994). Feature-linked synchronization of thalamic relay cell firing induced by feedback from the visual cortex. Nature 369:479-82.   (Cited by 282 | Google | More links)
Singer, Wolf (2001). Consciousness and the binding problem. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:123-46.   (Cited by 68 | Google | More links)
Singer, Wolf; Engel, Andreas K.; Kreiter, A.; Munk, M. & Roelfsema, P. R. (1997). Neuronal assemblies: Necessity, signature, and detectability. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1:252-60.   (Cited by 110 | Google)
Singer, Wolf (1993). Synchronization of cortical activity and its putative role in information processing and learning. Annual Review of Physiology 55:349-74.   (Cited by 704 | Google | More links)
Singer, Wolf & Gray, Charles M. (1995). Visual feature integration and the temporal correlation hypothesis. Annual Review of Neuroscience 18:555-86.   (Cited by 1435 | Google | More links)
Srinivasan, Ramesh (2004). Internal and external neural synchronization during conscious perception. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 14:825-42.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Steriade, Mircea (1998). Corticothalamic networks, oscillations, and plasticity. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Steriade, Mircea; McCormick, D. A. & Sejnowski, Terrence J. (1993). Thalamocortical oscillations in the sleeping and aroused brain. Science 262:679-85.   (Cited by 1057 | Google | More links)
Stryker, M. (1989). Is grandmother an oscillation? Nature 338:297-8.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Summerfield, Christopher; Jack, Anthony Ian & Burgess, Adrian Philip (2002). Induced gamma activity is associated with conscious awareness of pattern masked nouns. International Journal of Psychophysiology 44 (2):93-100.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Tallon-Baudry, Catherine (2004). Attention and awareness in synchrony. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):523-525.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Tallon-Baudry, Catherine (2003). Oscillatory synchrony as a signature for the unity of visual experience in humans. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Treisman, Anne (1980). A feature integration theory of attention. Cognitive Psychology 12:97-136.   (Cited by 2811 | Google | More links)
Treisman, Anne (1996). The binding problem. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6:171-8.   (Cited by 248 | Google | More links)
Usher, Matthew & Donnelly, N. (1998). Visual synchrony affects binding and segmentation in perception. Nature 394:179-82.   (Google)
Vanni, S. (1999). Neural synchrony and dynamic connectivity. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):159-163.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Varela, F. & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: A neurophenomenological perspective. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
von der Malsburg, Christoph (1995). Binding in models of perception and brain function. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 5:520-28.   (Cited by 170 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The development of the issue of binding as fundamental to neural dynamics has made possible recent advances in the modeling of difficult problems of perception and brain function. Among them is perceptual segmentation, invariant pattern recognition and one-shot learning. Also, longer-term conceptual developments that have led to this success are reviewed
Ward, Lawrence M.; Doesburg, Sam M.; Kitajo, Keiichi; MacLean, Shannon E. & Roggeveen, Alexa B. (2006). Neural synchrony in stochastic resonance, attention, and consciousness. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 60 (4):319-326.   (Google)
Ward, Leo R. (2003). Synchronous neural oscillations and cognitive processes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:553-559.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Wolfe, J. M. & Bennett, S. C. (1997). Preattentive object Files: Shapeless bundles of basic features. Vision Research 37:25-43.   (Cited by 146 | Google)

8.1f Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues

Antoine, Lutz; Thompson E., Lutz & Cosmelli, D. (online). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers in cognition and the brain : The philosophy and neuroscience movement.   (Google)
Atlas, Jay David, Qualia, consciousness, and memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).   (Google)
Abstract: In his recent (2005) book "Sweet Dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness," Dennett renews his attack on a philosophical notion of qualia, the success of which attack is required if his brand of Functionalism is to survive. He also articulates once again what he takes to be essential to his notion of consciousness. I shall argue that his new, central argument against the philosophical concept of qualia fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that David Rosenthal's "higher-order thought" theory of consciousness also faces in accounting for qualia. I then contrast Dennett's newest account of consciousness with interestingly different conceptions by contemporary neuro-scientists, and I suggest that philosophers should take the recent suggestions by neuro-scientists more seriously as a subject for philosophical investigation
Baars, Bernard J. & McGovern, Katharine A. (2000). Consciousness cannot be limited to sensory qualities: Some empirical counterexamples. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):11-13.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2001). How could brain imaging not tell us about consciousness? Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):24-29.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. & Laureys, Steven (2005). One, not two, neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):269.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2004). Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: A stew of confusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-31.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2005). Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: The evidence from neurobiology and behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2001). The brain basis of a "consciousness monitor": Scientific and medical significance. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):159-164.   (Google)
Abstract: Surgical patients under anesthesia can wake up unpredictably and be exposed to intense, traumatic pain. Current medical techniques cannot maintain depth of anesthesia at a perfectly stable and safe level; the depth of unconsciousness may change from moment to moment. Without an effective consciousness monitor anesthesiologists may not be able to adjust dosages in time to protect patients from pain. An estimated 40,000 to 200,000 midoperative awakenings may occur in the United States annually. E. R. John and coauthors present the scientific basis of a practical ''consciousness monitor'' in two articles. One article is empirical and shows widespread and consistent electrical field changes across subjects and anesthetic agents as soon as consciousness is lost; these changes reverse when consciousness is regained afterward. These findings form the basis of a surgical consciousness monitor that recently received approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. This may be the first practical application of research on the brain basis of consciousness. The other John article suggests theoretical explanations at three levels, a neurophysiological account of anesthesia, a neural dynamic account of conscious and unconscious states, and an integrative field theory. Of these, the neurophysiology is the best understood. Neural dynamics is evolving rapidly, with several alternative points of view. The field theory sketched here is the most novel and controversial
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Closing the gap: Some questions for neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To what extent is neurophenomenology a distinctive and unified research programme? In this paper I attempt to shed some light on these questions
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Phenomenal holism, internalism, and the neural correlates of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.   (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Phenomenal holism, internalism, and the NCC. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1).   (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Phenomenal holism, internalism and the neural correlates of consciousness: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bickle, John (2005). Phenomenology and cortical microstimulation. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Birnbacher, Dieter (2006). Causal interpretations of correlations between neural and conscious events. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):115-128.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The contribution argues that causal interpretations of empirical correlations between neural and conscious events are meaningful even if not fully verifiable and that there are reasons in favour of an epiphenomenalist construction of psychophysical causality. It is suggested that an account of causality can be given that makes interactionism, epiphenomenalism and Leibnizian parallelism semantically distinct interpretations of the phenomena. Though neuroscience cannot strictly prove or rule out any one of these interpretations it can be argued that methodological principles favour a causal interpretation on epiphenomenalist lines, both for reasons of metaphysical parsimony and for reasons of coherence with established physical principles such as the conservation of energy. In the concluding chapter, some of the philosophical and the empirical challenges following from this model are outlined, the most important being closer scrutiny of the neurophysiological processes accompanying conscious volition
Bisiach, E. (1988). The (haunted) brain and consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google)
Block, Ned (web). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows
Block, Ned (2001). How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness. In The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong because he conflates the two senses. And Francis Crick and Christof Koch fall afoul of the ambiguity in arguing that visual area V1 is not part of the neural correlate of consciousness. Crick and Koch’s work raises issues that suggest that these two concepts of consciousness may have different (though overlapping) neural correlates--despite Crick and Koch’s implicit rejection of this idea
Block, Ned (1998). How to find the neural correlate of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (2005). The merely verbal problem of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):270.   (Google)
Block, Ned (2003). Tactile sensation via spatial perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:285-286.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boyle, Noel (2008). Neurobiology and phenomenology: Towards a three-tiered intertheoretic model of explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):34-58.   (Google)
Abstract: Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these two philosophical traditions. The first part briefly describes the existing literature which works across the analytic- phenomenology divide, situating my work within it as a focus on analytic physicalism and phenomenal explanation. In the longer second part, I sketch a model for explanation embedded simultaneously in both traditions. Hopefully, a theoretical framework emerges that the unlikely combination of Maurice Merleau- Ponty and Patricia Churchland could accept. In the third part, I apply the three-tiered model to a discussion of plasticity and suggest that the model both reflects existing research across three levels of analysis and can be a fruitful way to approach future research. My suggestion for a three-tiered model is quite tentative. Much less tentative is my claim that constructive dialogue between phenomeno- logical and physicalist study of consciousness is long-overdue, illuminating, and practical
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Chalmers, David J. (1998). On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my book _The Conscious Mind_ (Chalmers, 1996). ]]
Chalmers, David J. (2000). What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 79 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include
Churchland, Paul M. (2005). Chimerical colors: Some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself
Churchland, Patricia S. (1994). Can neurobiology teach us anything about consciousness? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):23-40.   (Cited by 24 | Google)
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Clark, Austen (forthcoming). Vicissitudes of consciousness, varieties of correlates: Review of The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. American Journal of Psychology.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: and denotes a number of different phenomena. We reason about “consciousness” using some premises that apply to one of the..
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Abstract: Research on consciousness is currently enjoying a spectacular revival of interest in the cognitive sciences. From an empirical point of view, the NCC program — the search for the “Neural Correlates of Consciousness” — holds the promise of establishing correlations between physiological and phenomenal states in a way that directly resembles G. T. Fechner´s (1860) so-called “inner psychophysics”. Should the NCC program be entirely successful, we would thus be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. we would be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. In this paper, we explore some of the conceptual and methodological difficulties of this approach. In both neurobiology and psychology, there are serious measurement problems that stand in the way of correlation research, even after the “hard problem” has been set aside. Thus, even if one had identified certain internal functional states as indicators of phenomenal states, the empirical psychologist would still be confronted with fundamental problems, such as determining the absence or presence of these functional states. In this respect, philosophy of science may help and provide a metatheoretical framework for the current interdisciplinary project
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Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Vimal, Ram Lakhan Pandey (2009). Dual Aspect Framework for Consciousness and Its Implications: West meets East for Sublimation Process. In G. Derfer, Z. Wang & M. Weber (eds.), The Roar of Awakening. A Whiteheadian Dialogue Between Western Psychotherapies and Eastern Worldviews. Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Abstract: Previously (Vimal, 2009b) in Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, we discussed (i) the dual-aspect-dual-mode proto-experience (PE)-subjective experience (SE) framework of consciousness based on neuroscience, (ii) its implication in war, suffering, peace, and happiness, (iii) the process of sublimation for optimizing them and converting the negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfish-love) into their positive aspects from both western and eastern perspectives. In this article, we summarize the recent development since then as follows. (1) In (Vimal, 2009e), we rigorously investigated the classical and quantum matching and selection processes for precisely experiencing a specific SE in a specific neural-network. (2) In (Vimal, 2009i), we unpacked the quantum view of superposition related to the superposition-based hypothesis H1 of our framework in terms of subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas) and addressed the related explanatory gaps. (3) In, we developed alternative hypotheses of our framework, namely, the superposition-then-integration-emergence based H2, the integration-emergence based H3, the intelligent mechanism based H4, and the vacuum/Aether based H5. We concluded that our framework with H1 is the most optimal one because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2009j). (4) In, we found over 40 different but overlapping meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ and suggested that authors must specify which aspect of consciousness they refer to when using this term to minimize confusion (Vimal, 2009f). (5) In, we proposed definitions of consciousness, qualia, mind, and awareness (Vimal, 2009h). (6) In, we investigated the necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness: wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory and so on (Vimal, 2009g). (7) In, we discussed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination with respect to our PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2009a). (8) In, we linked dynamic systems theory and fractal catalytic theory with standard representation theory using our framework (Vimal, 2009d). (9) In, we introduce the PE-SE aspects of consciousness in theoretical classical and quantum physics including loop quantum gravity and string theory (Vimal, 2009k). (10) In (Vimal, 2009c), we proposed that the SE of subject or ‘self’ in self-related neural-network is tuned to the self-related SEs/PEs superposed in other innumerable entities during samadhi state via matching and selection processes. This leads to bliss, ecstasy, or exceptionally high degree of climax at samadhi state. We conclude that, so far, the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework with hypothesis H1 is the most optimal framework for explaining our conventional reality because it has the least number of problems.
Dalton, Thomas C. (1998). The developmental gap in phenomenal experience: A comment on J. G. Taylor's "cortical activity and the explanatory gap''. J:Consciousness and cognition 7 (2):159-164. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.   (Google)
Abstract: J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible limit an understanding of the different experiential forms consciousness takes during neurobehavioral development. Recent studies suggest that neurobehavioral development is discontinuous and that judgment emerges under conditions of uncertainty to render feeling and perception in equivalent terms of energy and behavior. Approaching the problem of phenomenal experience from a developmental perspective may help resolve the paradox of feeling infinitely close as well as distant from one's self
de JongLooren, Huib (1996). Brain waves and bridges: Comments on Hardcastle's Discovering the Moment of Consciousness?. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):197-209.   (Google)
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Farber, Ilya B. (2005). How a neural correlate can function as an explanation of consciousness: Evidence from the history of science regarding the likely explanatory value of the NCC approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):77-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain and mind. Drawing on work in the history and philosophy of science, I argue that this assumption - along with the related claim that even a correct NCC theory would fail to explain consciousness - is grounded in an inadequate conception of the way in which scientific explanations develop. Examination of parallel developments in 20th century biology reveals that, under the right circumstances, seemingly crude correspondences can play an essential role in scientific discovery and can sometimes become central to our everyday understanding of the phenomena in question. A proper understanding of this process clarifies the value of NCC theories and sheds light on the standards by which they should be evaluated. In closing, I describe two specific criteria for evaluating NCC proposals: intertheoretic bridge potential and detailed mapping
Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Neves, Carlos F. H. (2010). Natural World Physical, Brain Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time. Physics of Life Reviews 7 (2):195-249.   (Google)
Abstract: Concepts of space and time are widely developed in physics. However, there is a considerable lack of biologically plausible theoretical frameworks that can demonstrate how space and time dimensions are implemented in the activity of the most complex life-system – the brain with a mind. Brain activity is organized both temporally and spatially, thus representing space-time in the brain. Critical analysis of recent research on the space-time organization of the brain’s activity pointed to the existence of so-called operational space-time in the brain. This space-time is limited to the execution of brain operations of differing complexity. During each such brain operation a particular short-term spatio-temporal pattern of integrated activity of different brain areas emerges within related operational space-time. At the same time, to have a fully functional human brain one needs to have a subjective mental experience. Current research on the subjective mental experience offers detailed analysis of space-time organization of the mind. According to this research, subjective mental experience (subjective virtual world) has definitive spatial and temporal properties similar to many physical phenomena. Based on systematic review of the propositions and tenets of brain and mind space-time descriptions, our aim in this review essay is to explore the relations between the two. To be precise, we would like to discuss the hypothesis that via the brain operational space-time the mind subjective space-time is connected to otherwise distant physical space-time reality.
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Abstract: Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological experience, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision...
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2004). Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Situated reductionism, or how to be an internalist and an externalist at the same time. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):39-42.   (Google)
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Abstract: Most consciousness researchers, almost no matter what their views of the metaphysics of consciousness, can agree that the first step in a science of consciousness is the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (the NCC). The reason for this agreement is that the notion of ‘correlation’ doesn’t by itself commit one to any particular metaphysical view about the relation between (neural) matter and consciousness. For example, some might treat the correlates as causally related, while others might view the correlation as evidence for identity between conscious states and brain states. The common ground therefore seems to be that the scientific search for the NCC is largely independent of the metaphysics of consciousness
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Hurley, Susan L. & Noe, Alva (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness: Reply to Block. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):342.   (Cited by 68 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley1111 andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë2222
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Abstract: Since Francis Crick popularized the term `Neural Correlate of Consciousness' (NCC), it has been the focus of what is perhaps the most exciting research area in the cognitive sciences. Different researchers and laboratories have offered different brain structures as candidates for the NCC prize. Different chunks of gray matter have been identified as the potential seat of consciousness. Some researchers attempt to identify the NCC via a characterization of the cognitive aspects of consciousness, such as its functional significance or intentional directedness, while others attempt a direct identification of the NCC, without any cognitive intermediary. Needless to say, no consensus is in sight on any of this
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Abstract: Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is argued that research on temporal binding plays no role in a naturalistic theory of consciousness if the gap argument can be solved on internal philosophical grounds or if it turns out to be unsolvable at the time being. But there may be a way to dissolve or deconstruct it, and the accessibility of this way may well depend on scientific progress, including neurobiological research on the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness
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Lloyd, Dan (2002). Functional MRI and the study of human consciousness. Journal Of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):818-831.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Abstract: & Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets from the National fMRI Data Center are considered: particularly the structures of temporality. In a second Hazeltine et al., Neural activation during response competi- interpretive approach, artificial neural networks were used tion; Ishai et al., The representation of objects in the human to detect a more explicit prediction from phenomenology, occipital and temporal cortex; Mechelli et al., The effects of namely, that present experience contains and is inflected by presentation rate during word and pseudoword reading; and past states of awareness and anticipated events. In all of 21 Postle et al., Activity in human frontal cortex associated with subjects in this analysis, nets were successfully trained to spatial working memory and saccadic behavior. The study of extract aspects of relative past and future brain states, in consciousness also draws from multiple disciplines. In this comparison with statistically similar controls. This exploratory article, the philosophical subdiscipline of phenomenology study thus concludes that the proposed methods for provides initial characterization of phenomenal structures ‘‘neurophenomenology’’ warrant further application, includ- conceptually necessary for an analysis of consciousness. These ing the exploration of individual differences, multivariate structures include phenomenal intentionality, phenomenal differences between cognitive task conditions, and explora- superposition, and experienced temporality..
Mandik, Pete (2007). The neurophilosophy of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the core philosophical issues of phenomenal conscious construe consciousness largely in terms of representations in neural networks associated with certain processes of attention and memory
McLaughlin, Brian P. & Bartlett, Gary (2004). Have Noe and Thompson cast doubt on the neural correlates of consciousness programme? Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):56-67.   (Google)
McLauglin, B. & Bartlett, Gary (2004). Have Noe and Thompson cast doubt on the NCC programme? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-86.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. & Bartlett, Gary (2004). Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Have Noe and Thompson cast doubt on the neural correlates of consciousness programme? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):56-67.   (Google)
Metzinger, Thomas (2004). Peer commentary on "are there neural correlates of consciousness": Appearance is not knowledge: The incoherent straw man, content-content confusions and mindless conscious subjects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):67-72.   (Google)
Miller, Steven M. (2007). On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness. Acta Neuropsychiatrica 19 (3):159-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Myin, Erik (2004). Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Quining kinds of content: The primacy of experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):72-77.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1999). A commentary system for consciousness?! Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (2):155-181.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Noë, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness
Noë, Alva & O'Regan, Kevin J. (2002). On the brain-basis of visual consciousnes: A sensorimotor account. In A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press.   (Google)
Noe, Alva & Thompson, Evan (2004). Sorting out the neural basis of consciousness: Authors' reply to commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):87-98.   (Google)
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Panksepp, Jaak (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: Implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind science. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):15-54.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness
Prinz, Jesse J. & Jack, Anthony I. (2004). Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Searching for a scientific experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):51-56.   (Google)
Rees, Geraint (2001). Can philosophy discover consciousness in the brain? Commentary on Revonsuo's Can Functional Brain Imaging Discover Consciousness in the Brain?. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):34-38.   (Google)
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Abstract: This paper concentrates on the basic properties of ''consciousness'' that temporal coding is postulated to relate to. A description of phenomenal consciousness based on what introspection tells us about its contents is offered. This includes a consideration of the effect of various brain lesions that result in cortical blindness, apperceptive and associative agnosia, and blindsight, together with an account of the manner in which sight is regained after cortical injuries. I then discuss two therories of perception-Direct Realism and the Representative Theory. This includes a discussion of the concept of the body-image, phantom limbs, the alleged projection of sensations, the ontological status of phenomenal space, the homunculus argument, the validity of topographic coding, the difference between the stimulus field and the visual field, and two theories of brain-mind relationship-the Identity Theory and the Bohr-Heisenberg theory of brain-mind complementarity. Finally I suggest that the binocular rivalry obtained in the case of the stroboscopic patterns that result from intermittent photic stimulation of one eye, when used in animal expeiments with unit recording, offers a good experimental method of investigating the binding problem
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Taylor, John G. (2001). Functional brain imaging to search for consciousness needs attention. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):39-43.   (Google)
Thompson, Evan & Varela, Francisco J. (2001). Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425.   (Cited by 166 | Google)
Vaas, Ruediger (1999). Why neural correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough. Anthropology and Philosophy 2 (2).   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required
van Gulick, Robert (2004). Neural correlates and the diversity of content. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1).   (Google)
van Gulick, Robert (2004). Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Neural correlates and the diversity of content. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):82-86.   (Google)
Varela, F. (2002). Upwards and downwards causation in the brain: Case studies on the emergence and efficacy of consciousness. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Vimal, Ram Lakhan Pandey (2009). Dependent Co-origination and Inherent Existence: Dual-Aspect Framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research 1 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Nāgārjuna rejects ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ in favor of co-dependent origination, and that is also why he rejects causality. Causality is a major issue in metaphysical views; for example, one could argue that consciousness causes/affects our brain/behavior/function/matter or vice-versa. My goals are as follows: (i) which entities lack ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ and which ones inherently exist? (ii) Do the entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise and hence can we reject causality as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy? (iii) Do the entities that exist inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence? (iv) Do structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other? And (v) we critically analyze, extend, and examine Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination (Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995)with respect to the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c). Our analysis suggests that: (i)All conventional entities lack inherently existence, except subjective experiences (SEs)/proto-experiences (PEs) that are fundamental and irreducible and hence inherently exist. (ii) The entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise, and hence causality for them can be rejected but instead conditions (such as efficient, percept-object, immediate, and dominant conditions) might be necessary, as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. (iii) It is not clear that SEs that exist inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence, but one could argue that (a) superposed PEs/SEs in the mental aspect of stings or elementary particles might be the motivation for the evolution to form neural-nets to realize a specific SE, and (b) Nāgārjuna’s rejection of causality and ‘relational ontology’ (Caponigro & Prakash, 2009) need to be reconsidered for SEs. For example, the SE redness (redness-bhutatma (Vimal, 2009g)) inherently, independently, and eternally exists; and hence causality may not be rejected and the ‘relational ontology’ may not apply for any such SE. (iv) It is not clear that structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other, but they might be linked via conditions. (v) Furthermore, (a) an entity has double aspect: mental and material aspects, (b) string is a dual-aspect entity that dependently co-arises from string-vacuum or brane, and (c) the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework is consistent with these premises. For example, PEs/SEs inherently exist and are in superposed form in the mental aspect of (a) string-vacuum and/or brane before Big-Bang, (b) strings, elementary particles (bosons and fermions) and all evolved entities after Big-Bang, and (c) entities before and after Big-Freeze/Big-Crunch or entities in cyclic universe as in the big bounce/quantum-bounce (Loop Quantum Gravity) framework. However, the selection of a specific SE has dependent co-origination (and hence not inherently existent, consistent with Nāgārjuna), i.e., a specific SE occurs in brain when (i) relevant neural-net is formed via neural Darwinism, (ii) the specific SE is selected via matching and selection mechanisms, and (iii) the necessary ingredients ―such as wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory, stimulus at above threshold, and neural-net PEs― are satisfied. If this is true, then only experiences (PEs/SEs in superposed form) are inherently existent and other entities have dependent co-origination.

8.1g Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc

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Abstract: A unifying theory of general anesthetic-induced unconsciousness must explain the common mechanism through which various anesthetic agents produce unconsciousness. Functional-brain-imaging data obtained from 11 volunteers during general anesthesia showed specific suppression of regional thalamic and midbrain reticular formation activity across two different commonly used volatile agents. These findings are discussed in relation to findings from sleep neurophysiology and the implications of this work for consciousness research. It is hypothesized that the essential common neurophysiologic mechanism underlying anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is, as with sleep-induced unconsciousness, a hyperpolarization block of thalamocortical neurons. A model of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is introduced to explain how the plethora of effects anesthetics have on cellular functioning ultimately all converge on a single neuroanatomic/neurophysiologic system, thus providing for a unitary physiologic theory of narcosis related to consciousness
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Abstract: I have suggested that the prefrontal cortex constitutes an ?executive committee? with five streams coming from posterior cortex and subcortical areas to five pre-frontal executive regions, each of which chairs at least one on-going ?sub-committee? and vies with the other executives for taking over central control of conscious attention and willed action. It is through the dynamic interaction of this executive committee that unified conscious experiences and a sense of continuous self-identity are created. There is growing evidence that the amygdala-orbitofrontal brain circuit, in particular, is crucial to impulse control, ?knowledge of good and evil,? personality, personhood, and even ?how X-me made Y-me do something.? There are striking examples of the ways that orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate ?committee members? can stage an insurrection against the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex executive chair
Fessard, A. E. (1952). Mechanisms of nervous integration and conscious experience. In J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
Focquaert, Farah; Braeckman, Johan & Platek, Steven M. (2008). An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind. Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):47 – 68.   (Google)
Abstract: The evolutionary claim that the function of self-awareness lies, at least in part, in the benefits of theory of mind (TOM) regained attention in light of current findings in cognitive neuroscience, including mirror neuron research. Although certain non-human primates most likely possess mirror self-recognition skills, we claim that they lack the introspective abilities that are crucial for human-like TOM. Primate research on TOM skills such as emotional recognition, seeing versus knowing and ignorance versus knowing are discussed. Based upon current findings in cognitive neuroscience, we provide evidence in favor of an introspection-based simulation theory account of human mindreading
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Abstract: We argue that cognitive empathy and other instances of mental state attribution are a byproduct of self-awareness. Evidence is brought to bear on this proposition from comparative psychology, early child development, neuropsychology, and abnormal behavior
Gallese, Vittorio (2005). Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology
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Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
Georgiev, Danko, Interneuronal macroscopic quantum coherence in the brain cortex! The role of the intrasynaptic adhesive proteins beta-neurexin and neuroligin-.   (Google)
Abstract: There are many blank areas in understanding the brain dynamics and especially how it gives rise to consciousness. Quantum mechanics is believed to be capable of explaining the enigma of conscious experience, however till now there is not good enough model considering both the data from clinical neurology and having some explanatory power! In this paper is presented a novel model in defence of macroscopic quantum events within and between neural cells. The beta-neurexin-neuroligin-1 link is claimed to be not just the core of the central neural synapse, instead it is a device mediating entanglement between the cytoskeletons of the cortical neurons. Thus a macroscopic quantum state can extend throughout large brain cortical areas and the subsequent collapse of the wavefunction could affect simultaneously the subneuronal events in millions of neurons. The beta-neurexin-neuroligin-1 complex also controls the process of exocytosis and provides an interesting and simple mechanism for retrograde signalling during learning-dependent changes in synaptic connectivity
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Abstract: _Figure 1. Dendrites and cell bodies of schematic neurons connected by dendritic-dendritic gap junctions form a laterally connected input_ _layer (“dendritic web”) within a neurocomputational architecture. Dendritic web dynamics are temporally coupled to gamma synchrony_ _EEG, and correspond with integration phases of “integrate and fire” cycles. Axonal firings provide input to, and output from, integration_ _phases (only one input, and three output axons are shown). Cell bodies/soma contain nuclei shown as black circles; microtubule networks_ _pervade the cytoplasm. According to the Orch OR theory, gamma EEG-synchronized integration phases include quantum computations in_ _microtubule networks which culminate with conscious moments. Insert closeup shows a gap junction through which microtubule quantum_ _states entangle among different neurons, enabling macroscopic quantum states in dendritic webs extending throughout cortex and other_ _brain regions._
Heilman, K. M. (2000). Emotional experience: A neurological model. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel, G. L. Ahern, J. Allen & Alfred W. Kaszniak (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
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Abstract: We assess St. Paul's account of kenōsis in Philippians 2:5–8 from a neurophenomenological horizon. We argue that kenōsis is not primarily a unique event but belongs to a class of experiences that could be called kenotic and are, at least in principle, to some degree accessible to all human beings. These experiences can be well analyzed, making use of both a phenomenological approach and the cognitive neuroscience of altered states of consciousness. We argue that kenotic experiences are ecstatic, in that they involve—both phenomenologically and neurologically—one's "stepping out of" his/her self and history. This seemingly impossible task of stepping out has led to the understanding of kenōsis as a unique event. We conclude that kenotic experiences are continuous with common, everyday experiences of the self's intimate communion with everything that exists. This means that kenotic Christology does not necessarily have to rest solely on the scriptures but can also be arrived at by way of the worldly experiences of actual, living persons
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Abstract: Although the brain enables us to perceive the external world and our body, it remains unknown whether brain processes themselves can be perceived. Brain tissue does not have receptors for its own activity. However, the ability of humans to acquire self-control of brain processes indicates that the perception of these processes may also be achieved by learning. In this study patients learned to control low-frequency components of their EEG: the so-called slow cortical potentials (SCPs). In particular ''probe'' sessions, the patients estimated the quality of the SCP shift they had produced in the preceding trial. The correspondence between the recorded SCP amplitudes and the subjective estimates increased with training. The ability to perceive the SCPs was related to the ability to control them; this perception was not mediated by peripheral variables such as changes in muscle tonus and cannot be reduced to simple vigilance monitoring. These data provide evidence that humans can learn to perceive the neural activity of their brain. Alternative interpretations are discussed
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Abstract: A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain – spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data – is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form a centralized functional design in which an upper brain stem system organized for conscious function performs a penultimate step in action control. This upper brain stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which an expanding forebrain – culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals – came to serve as a medium for the elaboration of conscious contents. This highly conserved upper brainstem system, which extends from the roof of the midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the massively parallel and distributed information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the limited-capacity, sequential mode of operation required for coherent behavior. It maintains special connective relations with cortical territories implicated in attentional and conscious functions, but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. This helps explain the purposive, goal-directed behavior exhibited by mammals after experimental decortication, as well as the evidence that children born without a cortex are conscious. Taken together these circumstances suggest that brainstem mechanisms are integral to the constitution of the conscious state, and that an adequate account of neural mechanisms of conscious function cannot be confined to the thalamocortical complex alone. (Published Online May 1 2007) Key Words: action selection; anencephaly; central decision making; consciousness; control architectures; hydranencephaly; macrosystems; motivation; target selection; zona incerta
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Abstract: In what computational aspect is the brain different from the computer? In what objective measures can the brain said to be “creative”? These are the fundamental questions that concerns the neural basis of human mental activity. Here we discuss several important aspects of the essential computational ingredients of human mind in order to understand the “creative” process going on in the brain. One of the key concepts is the nature of the source of "externality" that adds new ingredients to the system and its output. We argue that in addition to information input and stochasticity, we need to consider a third possibility, namely "dynamics-embedded externality". We discuss how the neural origin of the subjective sensory qualities (qualia) is related to this aspect of creativity. The invariance of qualia under a certain class of transformation, and the mapping of discrete,
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Abstract: _The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that_ _accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try to_ _understand the principle that bridges the neural firings in our_ _brain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial_ _importance when we try to study the functions of the brain from_ _an objective point of view. Qualia must be part of the_ _mathematical formulation of information we use to understand_ _the function of the brain._
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