Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

8.10a. Blindsight (Blindsight on PhilPapers)

See also:
Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2010). Blindsight in Monkeys: Lost and (perhaps) found. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Stoerig and Cowey’s work is widely regarded as showing that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly persuasively argue that the experimental results are compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing only a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised procedure which can distinguish these hypotheses, and offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis provides a superior explanation. The study of blindsight might contribute towards a general investigation into animal consciousness, though there is a problem when it comes to showing how a non-verbal animal can indicate whether or not it is perceiving consciously. Perhaps whether there is something that it is like to be a given animal depends on whether it exhibits the cognitive profile of conscious vision as opposed to non-conscious “natural blindsight.”
Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2008). Insects and the problem of simple minds: Are bees natural zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8).   (Google | More links)
Anders, Silke; Birbaumer, Niels; Sadowski, Bettina; Erb, Michael; Mader, Irina; Grodd, Wolfgang & Lotze, Martin (2004). Parietal somatosensory association cortex mediates affective blindsight. Nature Neuroscience 7 (4):339-340.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Azzopardi, Paul & Cowey, Alan (1998). Blindsight and visual awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):292-311.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some patients with damaged striate cortex have blindsight-the ability to discriminate unseen stimuli in their clinically blind visual field defects when forced-choice procedures are used. Blindsight implies a sharp dissociation between visual performance and visual awareness, but signal detection theory indicates that it might be indistinguishable from the behavior of normal subjects near the lower limit of conscious vision, where the dissociations could arise trivially from using different response criteria during clinical and forced-choice tests. We tested the latter possibility with a hemianopic subject during yes-no and forced-choice detection of static and moving targets. His response criterion differed significantly between yes-no and forced-choice responding, and the difference was sufficient to produce a blindsight-like dissociation with bias-sensitive measures of performance. When measured independently of bias, his sensitivity to static targets was greater in the forced-choice than in the yes-no task (unlike normal control subjects), but his sensitivity to moving targets did not differ. Differences in response criterion could therefore account for dissociations between yes-no and forced-choice detection of motion, but not of static pattern. The results explain why patients with blindsight are apparently more often ''aware'' of moving stimuli than of static stimuli. However, they also imply that blindsight is unlike normal vision near threshold, and that pattern- and motion-detection in blindsight may depend on different sets of neural mechanisms during yes-no and forced-choice tests
Azzopardi, Paul & Cowey, Alan (1997). Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 94 (25):14190-14194.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Azzopardi, Paul & Cowey, Alan (2001). Why is blindsight blind? In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Barbur, J. L.; Watson, J. D. G.; Frackowiak, R. D. G. & Zeki, Semir (1993). Conscious visual perception without V. Brain 116:1293-1302.   (Google | More links)
Braddick, O.; Atkinson, J.; Hood, B. & Harkness, W. (1992). Possible blindsight in infants lacking one cerebral hemisphere. Nature 360:461-463.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Campion, J.; Latto, R. & Smith, Y. (1983). Is blindsight an effect of scattered light, spared cortex, and near-threshold vision? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:423-86.   (Cited by 194 | Google)
Carey, D. P.; Goodale, Melvyn A. & Sprowl, E. G. (1990). Blindsight in rodents: The use of a "high-level" distance cue in gerbils with lesions of primary visual cortex. Behavioural Brain Research 38:283-289.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2001). Who is blind to blindsight? Psyche 7 (4).   (Google)
Cowey, Alan (1995). Blindsight in monkeys. Nature 373:247-9.   (Cited by 140 | Google | More links)
Cowey, Alan (1995). Blindsight in real sight. Nature 377:290-1.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Cowey, A.; Stoerig, P. & Le Mare, C. (1998). Effects of unseen stimuli on reaction times to seen stimuli in monkeys with blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):312-323.   (Google)
Abstract: In three macaque monkeys with unilateral removal of primary visual cortex and in one unoperated monkey, we measured reaction times to a visual target that was presented at a lateral eccentricity of 20o in the normal, left, visual hemifield. When an additional stimulus was presented at the corresponding position in the right hemifield (hemianopic in three of the monkeys), it significantly slowed the reaction time to the left target if it preceded it by delays from 100-500 msec. The most effective delay depended on the particular experimental paradigm and perhaps on the experience of the monkey with the task. The results show that reaction times to seen targets in the normal hemifield of monkeys are influenced by the presentation of ''unseen'' targets in the anopic hemifield, as in some patients with cortically blind visual field defects
Cowey, Alan & Azzopardi, Paul (2001). Is blindsight motion blind? In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Cowey, Alan & Stoerig, Petra (1992). Reflections on blindsight. In A. David Milner & M. D. Rugg (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 49 | Google)
Cowey, Alan & Stoerig, Petra (1991). The neurobiology of blindsight. Trends in Neurosciences 14:140-5.   (Cited by 150 | Google)
Cowey, Alan (2004). The 30th sir Frederick Bartlett lecture: Fact, artefact, and myth about blindsight. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 57 (4):577-609.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Cowey, Alan & Stoerig, Petra (1997). Visual detection in monkeys with blindsight. Neuopsychologia 35:929-39.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Danckert, James & Goodale, Melvyn A. (2000). Blindsight: A conscious route to unconscious vision. Current Biology 10 (1):31-43.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Danckert, James & Rossetti, Yves (2005). Blindsight in action: What can the different sub-types of blindsight tell us about the control of visually guided actions? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 29 (7):1035-1046.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Danckert, James; Revol, Patrice; Pisella, Laure; Krolak-Salmon, Pierre; Vighetto, Alain; Goodale, Melvyn A. & Rosetti, Yves (2003). Measuring unconscious actions in action-blindsight: Exploring the kinematics of pointing movements to targets in the blind field of two patients with cortical hemianopia. Neuropsychologia 41 (8):1068-1081.   (Google)
de Gelder, Beatrice; Vroomen, Jean; Pourtois, Gilles & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2000). Affective blindsight: Are we blindly led by emotions? Response to Heywood and Kentridge (2000). Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):126-127.   (Google | More links)
de Gelder, Beatrice; Pourtois, Gilles; van Raamsdonk, Monique; Vroomen, Jean & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2001). Unseen stimuli modulate conscious visual experience: Evidence from interhemispheric summation. Neuroreport 12 (2):385-391.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Engelien, Almut; Huber, W.; Silbersweig, D.; Stern, E.; Frith, Christopher D.; Doring, W.; Thron, A. & Frachowiak, R. S. J. (2000). The neural correlates of 'deaf-hearing' in man. Conscious sensory awareness enabled by attentional modulation. Brain 123 (3):532-545.   (Google)
Gazzaniga, Michael S.; Fendrich, R. & Wessinger, C. M. (1994). Blindsight reconsidered. Current Directions in Psychological Science 3:93-96.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
De Gelder, Beatrice; Vroomen, Jean & Pourtois, Gilles (2001). Covert affective cognition and affective blindsight. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goebel, Rainer; Muckli, Lars; Zanella, Friedhelm E.; Singer, Wolf & Stoerig, Petra (2001). Sustained extrastriate cortical activation without visual awareness revealed by fMRI studies in hemianopic patients. Vision Research 41 (10):1459-1474.   (Cited by 59 | Google | More links)
Graves, R. E. & Jones, B. S. (1992). Conscious visual perceptual awareness vs non-conscious visual spatial localisation examined with normal subjects using possible analogues of blindsight and neglect. Cognitive Neuropsychology 9:487-508.   (Google)
Guzeldere, Guven; Flanagan, Owen J. & Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2000). The nature and function of consciousness: Lessons from blindsight. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Hamm, Alfons O.; Weike, Almut I.; Schupp, Harald T.; Treig, Thomas; Dressel, Alexander & Kessler, Christof (2003). Affective blindsight: Intact fear conditioning to a visual cue in a cortically blind patient. Brain 126 (2):267-275.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Harris, Justin A.; Karlov, Lisa & Clifford, Colin W. G. (2006). Localization of tactile stimuli depends on conscious detection. Journal of Neuroscience 26 (3):948-952.   (Google | More links)
Heywood, Charles A. & Kentridge, Robert W. (2000). Affective blindsight? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):125-126.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Heywood, Charles A.; Kentridge, Robert W. & Cowey, Alan (1998). Cortical color blindness is not ''blindsight for color''. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):410-423.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cortical color blindness, or cerebral achromatopsia, has been likened by some authors to ''blindsight'' for color or an instance of ''covert'' processing of color. Recently, it has been shown that, although such patients are unable to identify or discriminate hue differences, they nevertheless show a striking ability to process wavelength differences, which can result in preserved sensitivity to chromatic contrast and motion in equiluminant displays. Moreover, visually evoked cortical potentials can still be elicited in response to chromatic stimuli. We suggest that these demonstrations reveal intact residual processes rather than the operation of covert processes, where proficient performance is accompanied by a denial of phenomenal awareness. We sought evidence for such covert processes by conducting appropriate tests on achromatopsic subject M.S. An ''indirect'' test entailing measurement of reaction times for letter identification failed to reveal covert color processes. In contrast, in a forced choice oddity task for color, M.S. was unable to verbally indicate the position of the different color, but was surprisingly adept at making an appropriate eye movement to its location. This ''direct'' test thus revealed the possible covert use of chromatic differences
Heywood, Charles A.; Cowey, Alan & Newcombe, F. (1991). Chromatic discrimination in a cortically colour-blind observer. European Journal of Neuroscience 3:802-12.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Holt, Jason (1999). Blindsight in debates about qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):54-71.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Humphrey, Nicholas (1974). Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: A case study. Perception 3 (3):241-55.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract. A rhesus monkey, Helen, from whom the striate cortex was almost totally removed, was studied intensively over a period of 8 years. During this time she regained an effective, though limited, degree of visually guided behaviour. The evidence suggests that while Helen suffered a permanent loss of `focal vision she retained (initially unexpressed) the capacity for `ambient vision
Jackson, Stephen (2000). Perception, awareness and action: Insights from blindsight. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Kelly, Sean Dorrance, On the demonstration of blindsight in monkeys.   (Google)
Abstract: : The work of Alan Cowey and Petra Stoerig is often taken to have shown that, following lesions analogous to those that cause blindsight in humans, there is blindsight in monkeys. The present paper reveals a problem in Cowey and Stoerig ’ s case for blindsight in monkeys. The problem is that Cowey and Stoerig ’ s results would only provide good evidence for blindsight if there is no difference between their two experimental paradigms with regard to the sorts of stimuli that are likely to come to consciousness. We show that the paradigms could differ in this respect, given the connections that have been shown to exist between working memory, perceptual load, attention, and consciousness
Kentridge, Robert W. & Heywood, Charles A. (2001). Attention and alerting: Cognitive processes spared in blindsight. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kentridge, Robert W.; Heywood, Charles A. & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1999). Attention without awareness in blindsight. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 266:1805-11.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Kentridge, Robert W.; Heywood, Charles A. & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2004). Spatial attention speeds discrimination without awareness in blindsight. Neuropsychologia 42 (6):831-835.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Kentridge, Robert W. & Heywood, Charles A. (1999). The status of blindsight: Near-threshold vision, islands of cortex and the riddoch phenomenon. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):3-11.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kentridge, Robert W. (2001). Why do stationary visual transients apparently fail to elicit phenomenal vision after unilateral destruction of primary visual cortex? Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):588-590.   (Google)
Kentridge, R. W. (1999). When is information represented explicitly in blindsight and cerebral achromatopsia? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):156-157.   (Google)
Abstract: Discrimination of forms defined solely by color and discrimination of hue are dissociated in cerebral achromatopsia. Both must be based on potentially explicit information derived from differentially color-sensitive photoreceptors, yet only one gives rise to phenomenal experience of color. By analogy, visual information may be used to form explicit representations for action without giving rise to any phenomenal experience other than that of making the action
Klein, S. A. (1998). Double-judgment psychophysics for research on cosnciousness: Application to blindsight. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kolb, F. C. & Braun, Jochen (1995). Blindsight in normal observers. Nature 377:336-8.   (Cited by 79 | Google | More links)
Kranda, K. (1998). Blindsight in the blind spot. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):762-763.   (Google)
Abstract: The filling-in process proposed as a cover up for the existence of the blind spot has some conceptual similarities to blindsight. The perceptual operation of a hypothetical mechanism responsible for filling in represents a logical paradox. The apparent indeterminacy of the percept in the optic-disc region can be tested experimentally by viewing the grating test pattern below
Kroustallis, Basileios (2005). Blindsight. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):31-43.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Blindsight is the ability of patients with an impaired visual cortex to perform visually in their blind field without acknowledging that performance. This ability has been interpreted as a sign of the absence of phenomenal consciousness, and neuroscientific studies have extensively studied cases of it. Different proposals separate visual form recognition from motion perception, and attempt to show that either the former or the latter is solely responsible for blindsight performance. However, a review of current experimental evidence shows that a poor performance (on both form and motion) is accompanied by poor awareness. Blindsight cases do not influence the qualia debate, because they denote a severe visual performance deficit, and not because of a purportedly non-phenomenal nature of consciousness
Lamme, Victor A. F. (2001). Blindsight: The role of feedforward and feedback corticocortical connections. Acta Psychologica 107 (1):209-228.   (Cited by 47 | Google)
Lane, Richard D. R.; Ahern, G. L.; Schwartz, Gary E. & Kaszniak, Alfred W. (1997). Is alexithymia the emotional equivalent of blindsight? Biological Psychiatry 42:834-44.   (Cited by 107 | Google | More links)
Lau, Hakwan C. & Passingham, Richard E. (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (49):18763-18768.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Leh, Sandra E.; Johansen-Berg, Heidi & Ptito, Alain (2006). Unconscious vision: New insights into the neuronal correlate of blindsight using diffusion tractography. Brain 129 (7):1822-1832.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Marshall, John C. & Halligan, Peter W. (1988). Blindsight and insight in visuospatial neglect. Nature 336:766-67.   (Google)
Marcel, Anthony J. (1998). Blindsight and shape perception: Deficit of visual consciousness or of visual function? Brain 121:1565-88.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
McCauley, Robert N. (1993). Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 2:155-64.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Mole, Christopher & Kelly, Sean D. (2006). On the demonstration of blindsight in monkeys. Mind and Language 21 (4):475-483.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The work of Alan Cowey and Petra Stoerig is often taken to have shown that, following lesions analogous to those that cause blindsight in humans, there is blindsight in monkeys. The present paper reveals a problem in Cowey and Stoerig's case for blindsight in monkeys. The problem is that Cowey and Stoerig's results would only provide good evidence for blindsight if there is no difference between their two experimental paradigms with regard to the sorts of stimuli that are likely to come to consciousness. We show that the paradigms could differ in this respect, given the connections that have been shown to exist between working memory, perceptual load, attention, and consciousness
Moore, Tirin; Rodman, Hillary R. & Gross, Charles G. (2001). Recovery of visual function following damage to the striate cortex in monkeys. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Morgan, Morris J.; Mason, A. J. S. & Solomon, J. A. (1997). Blindsight in normal subjects? Nature 385:401-2.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1997). Blindsight and consciousness. American Journal of Psychology 110:1-33.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1982). Conscious perception and the paradox of "blind-sight". In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)
Paillard, Jacques; Michel, F. & Stelmach, C. E. (1983). Localization without content: A tactile analogue of "blind sight". Archives of Neurology 40:548-51.   (Cited by 93 | Google | More links)
Place, Ullin T. (2000). Consciousness and the zombie within: A functional analysis of the blindsight evidence. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (2000). Is vision continuous with cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences.   (Cited by 140 | Google | More links)
Rao, Anling; Nobre, Anna C. & Cowey, Alan (2001). Disruption of visual evoked potentials following a v1 lesion: Implications for blindsight. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Robichaud, Leonard & Stelmach, Lew B. (2003). Inducing blindsight in normal observes. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 10 (1):206-209.   (Google)
Ro, Tony & Rafal, Robert (2006). Visual restoration in cortical blindness: Insights from natural and TMS-induced blindsight. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):377-396.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sahraie, Arash; Weiskrantz, Lawrence; Barbur, J. L.; Simmons, Alison & Brammer, M. (1997). Pattern of neuronal activity associated with conscious and unconscious processing of visual signals. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 94:9406-9411.   (Cited by 106 | Google | More links)
Schroeder, Timothy (2005). Blindsight and the nature of consciousness. Dialogue 44 (1):196-198.   (Google)
Schurger, Aaron; Cowey, Alan & Tallon-Baudry, Catherine (2006). Induced gamma-band oscillations correlate with awareness in hemianopic patient GY. Neuropsychologia 44 (10):1796-1803.   (Google)
Schärli, Heinz; Brugger, P.; Regard, M.; Mohr, C. & Landis, Th (2003). Localisation of "unseen" visual stimuli: Blindsight in normal observers? Swiss Journal of Psychology - Schweizerische Zeitschrift Für Psychologie - Revue Suisse de Psychologie 62 (3):159-165.   (Google)
Schumacher, Ralph (1998). Visual perception and blindsight: The role of the phenomenal qualities. Acta Analytica 20 (20):71-82.   (Google)
Silvanto, Juha (2008). A re-evaluation of blindsight and the role of striate cortex (V1) in visual awareness. Neuropsychologia.   (Google)
Abstract: Some patients with a lesion to the striate cortex (V1), when assessed through forced-choice paradigms, are able to detect stimuli presented in the blind field, despite reporting a complete lack of visual experience. This phenomenon, known as blindsight, strongly implicates V1 in visual awareness. However, the view that V1 is indispensable for conscious visual perception is challenged by a recent finding that the blindsight subject GY can be aware of visual qualia in his blind field, implying that V1may not be critical under all circumstances. This apparent contradiction raises the following question: if V1 is not always necessary for phenomenal awareness, why do V1 lesions have such a detrimental effect on conscious perception? It is suggested here that this contradiction can be resolved by considering the impact of V1 lesions on the functioning of the whole visual cortex.
Stoerig, Petra; Zontanou, Aspasia & Cowey, Alan (2002). Aware or unaware: Assessment of cortical blindness in four men and a monkey. Cerebral Cortex 12 (6):565-574.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra & Cowey, Alan (1993). Blindsight and perceptual consciousness: Neuropsychological aspects of striate cortical function. In B. Gulyas, D. Ottoson & P. Rol (eds.), Functional Organization of the Human Visual Cortex. Pergamon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stoerig, Petra & Cowey, Alan (1997). Blindsight in man and monkey. Brain 120:535-59.   (Cited by 139 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra & Cowey, Alan (1991). Increment threshold spectral sensitivity in blindsight: Evidence for colour opponency. Brain 114 (3):1487-1512.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra & Barth, E. (2001). Low-level phenomenal vision despite unilateral destruction of primary visual cortex. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):574-587.   (Google)
Abstract: GY, an extensively studied human hemianope, is aware of salient visual events in his cortically blind field but does not call this ''vision.'' To learn whether he has low-level conscious visual sensations or whether instead he has gained conscious knowledge about, or access to, visual information that does not produce a conscious phenomenal sensation, we attempted to image process a stimulus s presented to the impaired field so that when the transformed stimulus T(s) was presented to the normal hemifield it would cause a sensation similar to that caused by s in the impaired field. While degradation of contrast, spatio-temporal filtering, contrast reversal, and addition of smear and random blobs all failed to match the response to a flashed bar sf, moving textures of low contrast were accepted to match the response to a moving contrast-defined bar, sm. Orientation and motion direction discrimination of the perceptually matched stimuli [sm and T(sm)] was closely similar. We suggest that the existence of a satisfactory match indicates that GY has phenomenal vision
Stoerig, Petra (1997). Phenomenal vision and apperception: Evidence from blindsight. Mind and Language 2 (2):224-37.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra (1998). Varieties of vision: From blind responses to conscious recognition. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 94 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra & Cowey, Alan (1989). Wavelength sensitivity in blindsight. Nature 342:916-18.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra & Cowey, Alan (1989). Wavelength sensitivity in blindsight. Wavelength sensitivity in blindsight. Brain 115:425-44.   (Google)
Tapp, J. D. (1997). Blindsight in hindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 6:67-74.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Torjussen, T. (1978). Visual processing in cortically blind hemifields. Neuropsychologia 16:5-21.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Trevethan, Ceri T.; Sahraie, Arash & Weiskrantz, Larry (2007). Can blindsight be superior to 'sighted-sight?'. Cognition 103 (3):491-501.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (1993). Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Vaina, L. M. (1995). Akinetopsia, achromatopsia and blindsight: Recent studies on perception without awareness. Synthese 105 (3):253-271.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The neural substrate of early visual processing in the macaque is used as a framework to discuss recent progress towards a precise anatomical localization and understanding of the functional implications of the syndromes of blindsight, achromatopsia and akinetopsia in humans. This review is mainly concerned with how these syndromes support the principles of organization of the visual system into parallel pathways and the functional hierarchy of visual mechanisms
Vision, Gerald (1998). Blindsight and philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):137-59.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: The evidence of blindsight is occasionally used to argue that we can see things, and thus have perceptual belief, without the distinctive visual awareness accompanying normal sight; thereby displacing phenomenality as a component of the concept of vision. I maintain that arguments to this end typically rely on misconceptions about blindsight and almost always ignore associated visual (or visuomotor) pathologies relevant to the lessons of such cases. More specifically, I conclude, first, that the phenomena very likely do not result from dissociations within a single system, but from the interaction of evolutionarily distinct, if interacting, systems; second, that a closer study of spared motor abilities indicates that verbal responses of patients result not from degraded vision but from proprioception; and, finally, above chance verbal responses, being forced guesses, are not tentative beliefs and cannot become beliefs just by training patients to have more confidence in their responses
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1986). Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 609 | Google)
Abstract: within-field task as testing proceeded. (In any case, the two-field task is presumably a more difficult one than the one-field task. ...
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1995). Blindsight: Conscious vs. unconscious aspects. In Joseph E. King & Karl H. Pribram (eds.), Scale in Conscious Experience. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2000). Blindsight: Implications for the conscious experience of emotion. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel & G. L. Ahern (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1995). Blindsight: Not an island unto itself. Current Directions in Psychological Science 4 (1):146-151.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2001). Blindsight - Putting Beta (?) on the Back Burner. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1996). Blindsight revisited. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6:215-220.   (Cited by 76 | Google | More links)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1998). Consciousness and commentaries. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1997). Consciousness Lost and Found. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 296 | Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence & Cowey, Alan (1970). Filling in the scotoma: A study of residual vision after striate cortex lesions in monkeys. Progress in Physiological Psychology 3.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1990). Outlooks for blindsight: Explicit methodologies for implicit processes. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 239:247-78.   (Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2002). Prime-sight and blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):568-581.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence; Barbur, J. L. & Sahraie, Arash (1995). Parameters affecting conscious versus unconscious visual discrimination without V. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 92:6122-26.   (Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1998). Pupillary responses with and without awareness in blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):324-326.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2007). The case of blindsight. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Wessinger, C. M.; Fendrich, R. & Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1997). Islands of residual vision in hemianopic patients. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 9:203-21.   (Google)
Wessinger, C. M.; Fendrich, R.; Ptito, A. & Villemure, J. G. (1996). Residual vision with awareness in the field contralateral to a partial or complete functional hemispherectomy. Neuropsychologia 34:1129-1137.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Zeki, Semir (1996). The motion vision of the blind and the modularity of consciousness. Transactions of the Medical Society of London 112:11-18.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Zeki, Semir; Aglioti, S.; McKeefry, D. & Berlucchi, G. (1999). The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient. Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences Of The United States Of America 96 (24):14124-14129.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Zeki, Semir & Ffytche, D. H. (1998). The riddoch syndrome: Insights into the neurobiology of conscious vision. Brain 121:25-45.   (Cited by 83 | Google | More links)
Zihl, J. (1980). "Blindsight": Improvement of visually guided eye movements by systematic practice in patients with cerebral blindness. Neuropsychologia 18 (1):71-77.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Zihl, J. & Werth, R. (1984). Contributions to the study of "blindsight", parts I & II. Neuropsychologia 22:1-22.   (Google)
Zihl, J. & von Cramon, D. (1980). Registration of light stimuli in the cortically blind hemifield and its effect on localization. Behavior and Brain Research 1:287-298.   (Cited by 13 | Google)