Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

8.10c. Schizophrenia (Schizophrenia on PhilPapers)

See also:
Amador, Xavier F. & David, Anthony S. (2004). Insight and psychosis: awareness of illness in schizophrenia and related disorders. Oxford University Press, USA.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Andreasen, N. (2000). Is schizophrenia a disorder of memory or consciousness? In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Area, R.; Garcia-Caballero, A.; Gómez, I.; Somoza, M. J.; Garcia-Lado, I.; Recimil, M. J. & Vila, L. (2003). Conscious compensations for thought insertion. Psychopathology 36 (3):129-131.   (Google | More links)
Bacon, E.; Danion, J. M.; Kauffmann-Muller, F. & Bruant, A. (2001). Consciousness in schizophrenia: A metacognitive approach to semantic memory. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):473-484.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent studies have shown that schizophrenia may be a disease affecting the states of consciousness. The present study is aimed at investigating metamemory, i.e., the knowledge about one's own memory capabilities, in patients with schizophrenia. The accuracy of the Confidence level (CL) in the correctness of the answers provided during a recall phase, and the predictability of the Feeling of Knowing (FOK) when recall fails were measured using a task consisting of general information questions and assessing semantic memory. Nineteen outpatients were paired with 19 control subjects with respect to age, sex, and education. Results showed that patients with schizophrenia exhibited an impaired semantic memory. CL ratings as well as CL and FOK accuracy were not significantly different in the schizophrenic and the control groups. However, FOK ratings were significantly reduced for the patient group, and discordant FOK judgments were also observed more frequently. Such results suggest that FOK judgments are impaired in patients with schizophrenia, which confirms that schizophrenia is an illness characterized by an impaired conscious awareness of one's own knowledge
Barr, W. B. (1998). Neurobehavioral Disorders of Awareness and Their Relevance to Schizophrenia. In Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Baumann, Sean E. (2005). The schizophrenias as disorders of self consciousness. South African Psychiatry Review 8 (3):95-99.   (Google | More links)
Behrendt, R. P. & Young, C. (2004). Hallucinations in schizophrenia, sensory impairment, and brain disease: A unifying model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):771-787.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Based on recent insight into the thalamocortical system and its role in perception and conscious experience, a unified pathophysiological framework for hallucinations in neurological and psychiatric conditions is proposed, which integrates previously unrelated neurobiological and psychological findings. Gamma-frequency rhythms of discharge activity from thalamic and cortical neurons are facilitated by cholinergic arousal and resonate in networks of thalamocortical circuits, thereby transiently forming assemblies of coherent gamma oscillations under constraints of afferent sensory input and prefrontal attentional mechanisms. If perception is based on synchronisation of intrinsic gamma activity in the thalamocortical system, then sensory input to specific thalamic nuclei may merely play a constraining role. Hallucinations can be regarded as underconstrained perceptions that arise when the impact of sensory input on activation of thalamocortical circuits and synchronisation of thalamocortical gamma activity is reduced. In conditions that are accompanied by hallucinations, factors such as cortical hyperexcitability, cortical attentional mechanisms, hyperarousal, increased noise in specific thalamic nuclei, and random sensory input to specific thalamic nuclei may, to a varying degree, contribute to underconstrained activation of thalamocortical circuits. The reticular thalamic nucleus plays an important role in suppressing random activity of relay cells in specific thalamic nuclei, and its dysfunction may be implicated in the biological vulnerability to hallucinations in schizophrenia. Combined with general activation during cholinergic arousal, this leads to excessive disinhibition in specific thalamic nuclei, which may allow cortical attentional mechanisms to recruit thalamic relay cells into resonant assemblies of gamma oscillations, regardless of their actual sensory input, thereby producing an underconstrained perceptual experience. Key Words: Charles Bonnet syndrome; gamma oscillations; hallucinations; late paraphrenia; Lewy body dementia; perception; schizophrenia; thalamocortical system
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders. Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa & Broome, Matthew (2009). A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition
Campbell, J. (1999). Schizophrenia, the space of reasons and thinking as a motor process. The Monist 82 (4):609-625.   (Cited by 42 | Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator model needs case-by-case adjustment to deal with problematic data. In response to this, the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete, it is more naturally constrained by the cases that are problematic for the comparator model. However, this model may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model approach has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model approach.
Chadwick, Ruth F. (1994). Kant, thought insertion, and mental unity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):105-113.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Chung, M.; Fulford, K. William M. & Graham, George (2005). The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Coltheart, Max (2005). Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Coltheart, Max & Davies, Martin (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Blackwell, 2000 Review by George Graham, Ph.D on Oct 27th 2000 Volume: 4, Number: 43
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen 2008. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of “hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Danion, Jean-Marie; Cuervo, Christine; Piolino, Pascale; Huron, Caroline; Riutort, Marielle; Peretti, Charles S. & Eustache, Francis (2005). Conscious recollection in autobiographical memory: An investigation in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):535-547.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Danion, Jean-Marie & Huron, Caroline (2007). Can we study subjective experiences objectively? First-person perspective approaches and impaired subjective states of awareness in schizophrenia? In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Danion, Jean-Marie; Huron, Caroline; Rizzo, Lydia & Vidailhet, Pierre (2004). Emotion, memory, and conscious awareness in schizophrenia. In Daniel Reisberg & Paula Hertel (eds.), Memory and Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Del Cul, Antoine; Dehaene, Stanislas & Leboyer, Marion (2006). Preserved subliminal processing and impaired conscious access in schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry 63 (12):1313-1323.   (Google)
Depraz, Natalie (2003). Putting the epoche into practice: Schizophrenic experience as illustrating the phenomenological exploration of consciousness. In K. William M. Fulford, Katherine J. Morris, John Z. Sadler & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Nature and Narrative: An Introduction to the New Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Edelstyn, Nicola M. J.; Drakeford, Justine; Oyebode, Femi & Findlay, Chris (2003). Investigation of conscious recollection, false recognition and delusional misidentification in patients with schizophrenia. Psychopathology 36 (6):312-319.   (Google)
Evans, Cathryn E. Y.; Bowman, Caroline H. & Turnbull, Oliver H. (2005). Subjective awareness on the iowa gambling task: The key role of emotional experience in schizophrenia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 27 (6):656-664.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Fernández, Jordi (2010). Thought insertion and self-knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.   (Google)
Abstract: I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way
Flashman, Laura A. (2004). Disorders of insight, self-awareness, and attribution in schizophrenia. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Flashman, Laura A. & Roth, Robert M. (2004). Neural correlates of unawareness of illness in psychosis. In Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Frith, Christopher D. (1979). Consciousness, information processing and schizophrenia. British Journal of Psychiatry 134:225-35.   (Cited by 108 | Google | More links)
Frith, Christopher D.; Blakemore, S. J. & Wolpert, D. (2000). Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):357-363.   (Cited by 140 | Google | More links)
Frith, Christopher D. & Gallagher, Shaun (2002). Models of the pathological mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):57-80.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fuchs, Thomas (2005). Corporealized and disembodied minds: A phenomenological view of the body in melancholia and schizophrenia. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):95-107.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2004). Agency, ownership, and alien control in schizophrenia. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gallup Jr, Gordon G.; Anderson, James R. & Platek, Steven M. (2003). Self-awareness, social intelligence and schizophrenia. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gambini, O.; Barbieri, V. & Scarone, S. (2004). Theory of mind in schizophrenia: First person vs third person perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):39-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Grant, Donald C. (2002). Becoming conscious and schizophrenia. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 4 (1):199-207.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Haggard, Patrick; Martin, Flavie; Taylor-Clarke, Marisa; Jeannerod, Marc & Franck, Nicolas (2003). Awareness of action in schizophrenia. Neuroreport 14 (7):1081-1085.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Herzog, Michael H. (2006). The relationship of visual masking and basic object recognition in healthy observers and patients with schizophrenia. In gmen, Haluk; Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. (Pp. 259-274). Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. Xi, 410 Pp.   (Google)
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). Introduction: Understanding, explaining, and intersubjectivity in schizophrenia. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):83-88.   (Google)
Abstract: This article provides an introduction to a special issue of the journal Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, On Understanding and Explaining Schizophrenia. The article identifies a common thread running through the different contributions to this special issue, inspired by Jaspers's (1963) suggestion that a profound impairment in the ability to engage in interpersonal and social relations is a key factor in psychiatric disorders. It is argued that this suggestion can help solve a central dilemma in psychopathology, which is to make intelligible the emergence and nature of psychiatric phenomena involving disturbances of rationality, intentionality and self-consciousness, whilst at the same time accounting for a sense in which such phenomena resist understanding.
Kircher, T. T. J. & Thienel, R. (2006). Functional brain imaging of symptoms and cognition in schizophrenia. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Kircher, T. T. J. & Leube, D. (2003). Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):656-669.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience
Light, G. & Braff, D. (2000). Do self-reports of perceptual anomalies reflect gating deficits in schizophrenia patients? Biological Psychiatry 47:463-467.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Medalia, Alice & Lim, Rosa W. (2004). Self-awareness of cognitive functioning in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research 71 (2):331-338.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Parnas, Josef & Sass, Louis A. (2001). Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):101-120.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Reynolds, Gavin P. (2002). Schizophrenia. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Roussel, Jean-Robert & Bachelor, Alexandra (2000). Altered state and phenomenology of consciousness in schizophrenia. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 20 (2):141-159.   (Google)
Sass, Louis A. (2004). Affectivity in schizophrenia: A phenomenological view. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):127-147.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sass, Louis A. & Parnas, Josef (2001). Phenomenology of self-disturbances in schizophrenia: Some research findings and directions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (4):347-356.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Sass, Louis A. & Parnas, Josef (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Sass, Louis A. (2000). Schizophrenia, self-experience, and the so-called "negative symptoms": Reflections on hyperreflexivity. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Schwartz, Michael A.; Wiggins, Osborne P.; Naudin, Jean & Spitzer, Manfred (2005). Rebuilding reality: A phenomenology of aspects of chronic schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Schizophrenia, like other pathological conditions of mental life, has not been systematically included in the general study of consciousness. By focusing on aspects of chronic schizophrenia, we attempt to remedy this omission. Basic components of Husserl’s phenomenology (intentionality, synthesis, constitution, epoche, and unbuilding) are explicated and then employed in an account of chronic schizophrenia. In schizophrenic experience, basic constituents of reality are lost and the subject must try to explicitly re-constitute them. “Automatic mental life” is weakened such that much of the world that is normally taken-for-granted cannot continue to be so. The subject must actively re-lay the ontological foundations of reality
Sonntag, Philippe; Gokalsing, Erick; Olivier, Carinne; Robert, Philippe; Burglen, Franck; Kauffmann-Muller, Françoise; Huron, Caroline; Salame, Pierre & Danion, Jean-Marie (2003). Impaired strategic regulation of contents of conscious awareness in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):190-200.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Stephens, G. Lynn & Graham, George (2005). The delusional stance. In M. Chung, K. William M. Fulford & George Graham (eds.), The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan & Edelman, Gerald M. (2000). Schizophrenia and the mechanisms of conscious integration. Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):391-400.   (Cited by 97 | Google | More links)
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2007). Hacking on the looping effects of psychiatric classifications: What is an interactive and indifferent kind? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):329 – 344.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines Ian Hacking's analysis of the looping effects of psychiatric classifications, focusing on his recent account of interactive and indifferent kinds. After explicating Hacking's distinction between 'interactive kinds' (human kinds) and 'indifferent kinds' (natural kinds), I argue that Hacking cannot claim that there are 'interactive and indifferent kinds,' given the way that he introduces the interactive-indifferent distinction. Hacking is also ambiguous on whether his notion of interactive and indifferent kinds is supposed to offer an account of classifications or objects of classification. I argue that these conceptual difficulties show that Hacking's account of interactive and indifferent kinds cannot be based on - and should be clearly separated from - his distinction between interactive kinds and indifferent kinds. In clarifying Hacking's account, I argue that interactive and indifferent kinds should be regarded as objects of classification (i.e., kinds of people) that can be identified with reference to a law-like biological regularity and are aware of how they are classified. Schizophrenia and depression are discussed as examples. I subsequently offer reasons for resisting Hacking's claim that the objects of classification in the human sciences - as a result of looping effects - are 'moving targets'
Tsou, Jonathan Y. (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicago   (Google)
Abstract: This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM.
Villagrán, José M. (2003). Consciousness disorders in schizophrenia: A forgotten land for psychopathology. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 3 (2):209-234.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2001). Schizophrenia and self-awareness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. Special Issue 8 (4):339-341.   (Google | More links)