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8.10d. Anosognosia (Anosognosia on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bisiach, E. & Geminiani, G. (1991). Anosognosia related to hemiplegia and hemianopia. In George P. Prigatano & Daniel L. Schacter (eds.), Awareness of Deficits After Brain Injury. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 83 | Google)
Clare, Linda (2002). Developing awareness about awareness in early-stage dementia: The role of psychosocial factors. Dementia 1 (3):295-312.   (Cited by 31 | Google)
Cohen, D. Ashley (online). Differences in awareness of neuropsychological deficits among three patient populations.   (Google)
Davies, Martin; Davies, Anne Aimola & Coltheart, Max (2005). Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):241-57.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to the right hemisphere of the brain. In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with anosognosia for hemiplegia. But we shall also use the term ‘anosognosia’ in an inclusive way to encompass lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of any impairment. Indeed, in the construction ‘anosognosia for X’, X might even be anosognosia for some Y
Dirette, Diane (2002). The development of awareness and the use of compensatory strategies for cognitive deficits. Brain Injury 16 (10):861-871.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Fleming, J. M. & Ownsworth, T. (2006). A review of awareness interventions in brain injury rehabilitation. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):474-500.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Galin, David (1992). Theoretical reflections on awareness, monitoring, and self in relation on anosognosia. Consciousness and Cognition 1:152-62.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gremley, Shelley Marie, Self-awareness and memory deficits in sub-acute traumatic brain injury.   (Google)
Halligan, Peter W. (2006). Awareness and knowing: Implications for rehabilitation. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):456-473.   (Google | More links)
Hart, Tessa; Whyte, John; Kim, Junghoon & Vaccaro, Monica (2005). Executive function and self-awareness of "real-world" behavior and attention deficits following traumatic brain injury. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation. Special Issue 20 (4):333-347.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hellman, K. M. (1991). Anosognosia: Possible neuropsychological mechanisms. In G. P. Prigatono & Daniel L. Schacter (eds.), Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury: Clinical and Theoretical Issues. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hufford, Bradley J. (2000). Self-Awareness of Neuropsychological Deficits in Children and Adolescents with Epilepsy. Dissertation, Purdue University   (Google | More links)
Jehkonen, M.; Ahonen, J.; Dastidar, P. & Vilkki, J. (2000). Unawareness of deficits after right hemisphere stroke: Double-dissociations of anosognosias. Acta Neurologica Scandinavica 102:378-384.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Karnath, Hans-Otto; Baier, Bernhard & Nägele, Thomas (2005). Awareness of the functioning of one's own Limbs mediated by the insular cortex? Journal of Neuroscience 25 (31):7134-7138.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Kihlstrom, John F. & Tobias, Betsy A. (1991). Anosognosia, consciousness, and the self. In G. P. Prigatono & Daniel L. Schacter (eds.), Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury: Clinical and Theoretical Issues. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Leritz, Elizabeth; Loftis, Chris; Crucian, Greg; Friedman, William J. & Bowers, Dawn (2004). Self-awareness of deficits in Parkinson disease. Clinical Neuropsychologist 18 (3):352-361.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Marková, Ivana S. & Berrios, German E. (2006). Approaches to the assessment of awareness: Conceptual issues. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):439-455.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Martin-Scull, Rebecca & Nilsen, Robert (2002). Evaluating awareness: A rating scale and its uses. International Journal of Cognitive Technology 7 (1):31-37.   (Google)
McGrath, John & Allman, Rebecca (2000). Awareness and unawareness of thought disorder. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 34 (1):35-42.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
McGlynn, S. M. & Schacter, Daniel L. (1989). Unawareness of deficits in neuropsychological syndromes. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 11:143-205.   (Cited by 214 | Google | More links)
Nikolinakos, Drakon (2004). Anosognosia and the unity of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 119 (3):315-342.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Prigatono, G. P. & Schacter, Daniel L. (eds.) (1991). Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury: Clinical and Theoretical Issues. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. (1995). Anosognosia in parietal lobe syndrome. Consciousness and Cognition 4:22-51.   (Cited by 70 | Google)
Rankin, K. P.; Baldwin, E.; Pace-Savitsky, C.; Kramer, J. H. & Miller, B. L. (2005). Self awareness and personality change in dementia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 76 (5):632-639.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Schacter, Daniel L. (1990). Toward a cognitive neuropsychology of awareness: Implicit knowledge and anosognosia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 12:155-78.   (Cited by 82 | Google)
Seiffer, A.; Clare, Linda & Harvey, Rudolf (2005). The role of personality and coping style in relation to awareness of current functioning in early-stage dementia. Aging and Mental Health 9 (6):535-541.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Glenn (2008). Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1302):1316.   (Google)
Abstract: The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb—the feeling that an amputated limb is still present—phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense.
Turnbull, Oliver H.; Jones, Karen & Reed-Screen, Judith (2002). Implicit awareness of deficit in anosognosia? An emotion-based account of denial of deficit. Comment. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 4 (1):69-86.   (Google)
Venneri, Annalena & Shanks, Michael F. (2004). Belief and awareness: Reflections on a case of persistent anosognosia. Neuropsychologia 42 (2):230-238.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)