Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

8.1a. Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness (Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Baars, Bernard J. & Newman, J. B. (1994). A neurobiological interpretation of the global workspace theory of consciousness. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J.; Newman, J. B. & Taylor, John G. (1998). Neuronal mechanisms of consciousness: A relational global workspace approach. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense that it continuously mediates the interaction of input with memory. While our approaches overlap in a number of ways, each of us tends to focus on different areas of detail. What is most striking, and we believe significant, is the extent of consensus, which we believe to be consistent with other contemporary approaches by Weiskrantz, Gray, Crick and Koch, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Newell and colleagues, Posner, Baddeley, and a number of others. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience is moving toward a shared understanding of consciousness in the brain
Baars, Bernard J. (online). Why it must be consciousness - for real!   (Google)
Abstract: 1.1 Bilateral damage to the thalamus abolishes waking consciousness. The critical site of this damage is believed to be a relatively small cluster of neurons, about the size of a pencil eraser on either side of the brain's midline, called the Intra-Laminar Nuclei (ILN) because they are located inside the white layers (laminae) that divide the two thalami into their major groupings of nuclei. The fact that bilateral damage to the ILNs abolishes consciousness is very unusual. There is no other site in the brain that has this property, except the reticular formation in the brain stem. In contrast, huge chunks of cortex can be damaged without abolishing the STATE of consciousness. (Cortical damage does change the CONTENTS of consciousness, of course)
Bogen, Joseph E. (1998). Locating the subjectivity pump: The thalamic intralaminar nuclei. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Bogen, Joseph E. (1995). On the neurophysiology of consciousness, part I: An overview. Consciousness and Cognition 4:52-62.   (Google)
Bogen, Joseph E. (1995). On the neurophysiology of consciousness, part II: Constraining the semantic problem. Consciousness and Cognition 4:137-58.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Bogen, Joseph E. (1997). Some neurophysiologic aspects of consciousness. Seminars in Neurology 17:95-103.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Bogen, Joseph E. (2007). The thalamic intralaminar nuclei and the property of consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Boitano, J. (1996). Edelmans's biological theory of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Bremer, F. (1966). Neurophysiological correlates of mental unity. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Brain and Conscious Experience. Springer.   (Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (1998). Cortical models and the neurological gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):157-158.   (Google)
Brockman, Richard (2001). Toward a neurobiology of the unconscious. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry 29 (4):601-615.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Buser, P. A. & Rougeul-Buser, A. (1978). Cerebral correlates of conscious experience. Elsevier.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Clancey, William (1993). The biology of consciousness: Comparative review of Rosenfield and Edelman. Artificial Intelligence 60:313-356.   (Google)
Cosmelli, Diego J.; Lachaux, Jean-Philippe & Thompson, Evan (2007). Neurodynamical approaches to consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Coward, L. Andrew (2005). A System Architecture Approach to the Brain: From Neurons to Consciousness. Nova Biomedical Books.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (2007). A neurobiological framework for consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1998). Consciousness and neuroscience. Cerebral Cortex.   (Cited by 249 | Google | More links)
Crick, Francis (1984). Functions of the thalamic reticular complex: The searchlight hypothesis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 81:4586-93.   (Google)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1990). Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.   (Google)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (2003). What are the neural correlates of consciousness? In L. van Hemmen & Terrence J. Sejnowski (eds.), Problems in Systems Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (2000). A neurobiology for consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.   (Cited by 2364 | Google)
Das, Balaram (online). A framework for conscious information processing.   (Google | More links)
Dehaene, Stanislas; Kerszberg, Michel & Changeux, Jean-Pierre (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks. Pnas 95 (24):14529-14534.   (Cited by 140 | Google | More links)
Dehaene, Stanislas & Changeux, Jean-Pierre (2004). Neural Mechanisms for Access to Consciousness. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Dehaene, Stanislas & Naccache, Lionel (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition 79 (1):1-37.   (Cited by 220 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). Review of Damasio, Descartes' error.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
Edelman, Gerald M. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. Penguin.   (Cited by 1235 | Google | More links)
Edelman, Gerald M. (2001). Consciousness: The remembered present. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:111-122.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Edelman, Gerald M. & Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan (2000). Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Edelman, Gerald M. (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. Basic Books.   (Cited by 884 | Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2001). A theoretical model of the role of the cerebellum in cognition, attention and consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):300-309.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2000). Efferent brain processes and the enactive approach to consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):40-50.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Faw, Bill (2003). Pre-frontal executive committee for perception, working memory, attention, long-term memory, motor control, and thinking: A tutorial review. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):83-139.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Fell, J. (2004). Identifying neural correlates of consciousness: The state space approach. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):709-29.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingerlkurts, Alexander A. (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem. Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Neves, Carlos F. H. (2009). Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum. In Robert Kozma & John Caulfield (eds.), Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday. World Scientific.   (Google)
Abstract: In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain activity organization, and what mediates between them. Implications for linguistic semantics, self-organized distributed computing algorithms, artificial machine consciousness, and diagnosis of dynamic brain diseases will be discussed briefly.
Flohr, Hans (1990). Brain processes and phenomenal consciousness: A new and specific hypothesis. Theory and Psychology 1:245-62.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Flohr, Hans (1992). Qualia and brain processes. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Flohr, Hans (1995). Sensations and brain processes. Behavioral Brain Research 71:157-61.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Flohr, Hans (2006). Unconsciousness. Best Practice and Research Clinical Anaesthesiology 20 (1):11-22.   (Google | More links)
Garson, James W. (1998). A commentary on "cortical activity and the explanatory gap". Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):169-172.   (Google)
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1995). The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18:659-76.   (Cited by 134 | Google)
Greenfield, Susan A. (1998). A rosetta stone for mind and brain? In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Greenfield, Susan A. (1997). How might the brain generate consciousness? Communication and Cognition 30 (3-4):285-300.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Grossberg, Stephen (2004). The complementary brain: From brain dynamics to conscious experiences. In Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schroger & Hermann Müller (eds.), Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Helekar, S. A. (1999). On the possibility of universal neural coding of subjective experience. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):423-446.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Various neurophysiological experiments have revealed remarkable correlations between cortical neuronal activity and subjective experiences. However, the mere presence of neuronal electrical activity does not appear to be sufficient to produce these experiences. It has been suggested that the explanation for the neural basis of consciousness might lie in understanding the reason that some types of neuronal activity possess subjective correlates and others do not. Here I propose and develop the idea that this difference may be caused by the existence of an elementary nonarbitrary linkage between temporal or spatiotemporal patterns of neuronal activity and their subjective attributes. I also show how cortical neural circuits capable of generating experience-coding patterns could emerge during evolution and brain development, due to the presence of spontaneous stochastic neuronal activity and activity-dependent synaptic plasticity. This hypothesis leads to several testable predictions, principal among which is the idea that the neural correlates of consciousness are essentially innate and universal
Hobson, J. Allan (1997). Consciousness as a state-dependent phenomenon. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Hobson, J. Allan (1994). The Chemistry of Conscious States. Basic Books.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
John, E. Roy (2003). A theory of consciousness. Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (6):244-250.   (Google | More links)
John, E. Roy (2006). From synchronous neuronal discharges to subjective awareness? In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
John, E. Roy (2002). The neurophysics of consciousness. Brain Research Reviews 39 (1):1-28.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1988). An integrated field theory of consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (2000). How is consciousness expressed in the cerebral activation manifold? Brain and Mind 1 (2):265-74.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I dispute that consciousness is generated by core circuitry in the forebrain, with predominance of motor areas, as Cotterillproposes in Enchanted Looms and other theorists do also. Ipropose instead that conscious contents are the momentary modeof action of the integrated cortical field, expressed as a point vector ( dominant focus ), to which, in varying degree, allsectors of the network contribute. Consciousness is the brain''saccess to its own activity space, and is identical with the moment''sdominant mode of activity. The dominant focus is generally weightedtoward enactively encoded percepts. Anticipation and preparation,perception and action, inextricably interdigitate. I also dispute the view of Cotterill and others that consciousnesshas unique agency, which bestowed adaptive advantage when the brain evolved. Being identical with the activity of the network,consciousness can have no additional agency, and it can offerno adaptive advantages beyond those that characterize the network
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1993). Integrated cortical field model of consciousness. Ciba Foundation Symposium 174 (43-50).   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1995). Models of consciousness: Serial or parallel in the brain? In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1995). The intralaminar thalamic nuclei: Subjectivity pumps or attention-action co-ordinators? Consciousness and Cognition 4:167-71.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Koch, Christof & Crick, Francis (1994). Some further ideas regarding the neuronal basis of awareness. In Christof Koch & J. Davis (eds.), Large-Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain. MIT Press.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
Koch, Christof & Crick, Francis (2000). Some thoughts on consciousness and neuroscience. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Koch, Christof & Braun, Jochen (1996). Toward the neuronal correlate of visual awareness. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6:158-64.   (Google)
Kokoszka, Andrzej (1993). Information metabolism as a model of consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 68:165-77.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16:897-912.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
Lane, David Christopher (online). Is My I-Phone Conscious: Throwing a Sound Grenade at Believers and Skeptics. Integral World.   (Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1989). Conscious subjective experience vs. unconscious mental functions: A theory of the cerebral processes involved. In Rodney M. J. Cotterill (ed.), Models of Brain Function. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1998). Do the models offer testable proposals of brain functions for conscious experience? In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1996). Neural processes in the production of conscious experiences. In Max Velmans (ed.), The Science of Consciousness. Routledge.   (Google)
Llinas, R. (2001). Consciousness and the brain: The thalamocortical dialogue in health and disease. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:166-75.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Lonky, M. L. (1998). Commentary on "cortical activity and the explanatory gap". Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):190-192.   (Google)
Magoun, H. W. (1954). The ascending reticular system and wakefulness. In J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain Mechanism and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Mandik, Pete (2005). Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface. Endophysics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci
Markowitsch, Hans J. (1995). Cerebral bases of consciousness: A historical view. Neuropsychologia 33:1181-1192.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Miranker, Willard (2005). The Hebbian synapse: Progenitor of consciousness. Mind and Matter 3 (2):87-102.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A dualistic approach to consciousness is presented that employs Hebbian synaptic dynamics and the basic notion of measurement in science to bridge the so-called explanatory gap between first-person consciousness and third-person science. Unconscious processing by neural circuitry characterizes (i) the neuron as a measuring instrument and (ii) the neural signal as the quantity to be measured. Hebbian synaptic dynamics, effectuating the storage of information, implements the role of an observer of a measurement outcome. The approach extends physical renormalization techniques, as applied to phase changes, to biology. This leads to the proposal of a ramification process in neural systems (brains) from a primitive form of sensation associated with the Hebbian synapse toward more elaborate experiential forms of consciousness (feelings, qualia) associated with hierarchies of neuronal assemblies. Characterizing sensation as a form of mutual information at the synaptic level motivates a relation between consciousness and phase changes of information
Newman, J. B. & Baars, Bernard J. (1993). A neural attentional model for access to consciousness: A global workspace perspective. Concepts in Neuroscience 4 (2):255-90.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A broad consensus has developed in recent years in the cognitive and neurosciences that the cognitive functions of the mind arise out of the activities of an extensive and diverse array of specialized processors operating as a parallel, distributed system. A theoretical perspective is presented which expands upon this "society" model to include globally integrative infuences upon this arrary of processors. This perspective serves as the basis for an explicit neural model of a "global workspace within a system of distributed specialized processors". Anatomical and physiological evidence are reviewed which suggest that this parallel, modular architecture is superceded by a more diffuse, tangential intracortical network capable of integrating underlying modular activites into increasingly global cognitive representations. There follows an explication of the role of this "neural global workspace" in providing the essential basis for the central control of attention and the generation of unified, conscious percepts. Finally the role of thalamic and brainstem activation systems in these integrative processes is discussed
Newton, Natika (1991). Consciousness, qualia, and re-entrant signaling. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):21-41.   (Google)
Newman, J. B. (1997). Putting the puzzle together: Toward a general theory of the neural correlates of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):47-66.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Newman, J. B. (1995). Thalamic contributions to attention and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 4:172-93.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Northoff, Georg (2003). Qualia and the ventral prefrontal cortical function 'neurophenomenological' hypothesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (8):14-48.   (Google)
O'Keefe, John (1985). Is consciousness the gateway to the hippocampal cognitive map? A speculative essay on the neural basis of mind. In David A. Oakley (ed.), Brain and Mind. Methuen.   (Google)
Orpwood, R. D. (1994). A possible neural mechanism underlying consciousness based on the pattern processing capabilities of pyramidal neurons in the cerebral cortex. Journal of Theoretical Biology 169:403-18.   (Google)
Ortinski, Pavel & Meador, Kimford J. (2004). Neuronal mechanisms of conscious awareness. Archives of Neurology 61 (7):1017-1020.   (Google | More links)
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). The cradle of consciousness: A periconscious emotional homunculus? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):24-32.   (Google)
Parvizi, J. & Damasio, Antonio R. (2001). Consciousness and the brainstem. Cognition 79 (1):135-59.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Petty, P. G. (1998). Consciousness: A neurosurgical perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):86-96.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Peters, Frederic (2010). Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self-Location. Psychological Research.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: At the phenomenal level, consciousness arises in a consistently coherent fashion as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness (subjectivity) with explicitly orientational characteristics—that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain. Understanding these twin elements of consciousness begins with the recognition that ultimately (and most primitively), cognitive systems serve the biological self-regulatory regime in which they subsist. The psychological structures supporting self-located subjectivity involve an evolutionary elaboration of the two basic elements necessary for extending self-regulation into behavioral interaction with the environment: an orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing interaction in terms of controllable spatiotemporal parameters, and processing architecture that relates behavior to homeostatic needs via feedback. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged the emergence of anticipative feedforward processing mechanisms, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive self-locational schema processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness-as-subjectivity.
Prinz, Jesse J. (2000). The ins and outs of consciousness. Brain and Mind 1 (2):245-56.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Enchanted Looms , Rodney Cotterill defends the hypothesisthat conscious sensory experience depends on motor response. Thepositive evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive, andnegative evidence can be marshaled against it. I present analternative hypothesis according to which consciousness involvesintermediate level sensory processing, attention, and workingmemory. The circuitry of consciousness can be dissociated fromaction systems and may mark an evolutionary advance from a priorphylogenetic stage in which motor outputs and sensory inputswere more intimately bound
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. & Hirstein, William (1998). Three laws of qualia: What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):429-57.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Rudrauf, D. & Damasio, Antonio R. (2005). A conjecture regarding the biological mechanism of subjectivity and feeling. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):236-262.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rudrauf, David & Damasio, Antonio (2006). The biological basis of subjectivity: A hypothesis. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Samsonovich, Alexei V. (2007). Bringing consciousness to cognitive neuroscience: A computational perspective. Journal of Integrated Systems, Design and Process Science 11 (3):15-26.   (Google)
Samsonovich, Alexei V. & Nadel, Lynn (2005). Fundamental principles and mechanisms of the conscious self. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):669-689.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Schwartz, James H. (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus: Comment. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):36-37.   (Google)
Seth, Anil K. & Baars, Bernard J. (2005). Neural darwinism and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):140-168.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well
Seth, Anil K.; Edelman, Gerald M.; Izhikevich, Eugene I. & Reeke, George N. (2006). Theories and measures of consciousness: An extended framework. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 103 (28):10799-10804.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A recent theoretical emphasis on complex interactions within neural systems underlying consciousness has been accompanied by proposals for the quantitative characterization of these interactions. Here, we distinguish key aspects of consciousness that are amenable to quantitative measurement from those that are not. We carry out a formal analysis of the strengths and limitations of three quantitative measures of dynamical complexity in the neural systems underlying consciousness: neural complexity, information integration, and causal density. We find that no single measure fully captures the multidimensional complexity of these systems and all have practical limitations. Our analysis suggests guidelines for the specification of alternative measures which, in combination, may improve the quantitative characterization of conscious neural systems. Given that some aspects of consciousness are likely to resist quantification altogether, we conclude that a satisfactory theory is likely to be one that combines both qualitative and quantitative elements
Sevush, Steven (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A theory is outlined that shifts the presumed locus of mind/brain interaction from the whole brain level to that of single neurons. Neuroanatomical and neurophysiological evidence is offered in support of the existence of single neurons that may individually receive dendritic input of sufficient complexity and diversity to account for the full content of conscious experience, and of an arrangement in which the output of multiple such neurons summate to achieve amplification of the individually emitted messages. An ultramicroscopic extension of the theory is suggested as a way of moving forward on the philosophically difficult aspects of the mind/brain problem
Singer, Wolf (2007). Large-scale temporal coordination of cortical activity as a prerequisite for conscious experience. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Smythies, J. (1997). The functional neuroanatomy of awareness: With a focus on the role of various anatomical systems in the control of intermodal attention. Consciousness and Cognition 6:455-81.   (Google)
Sokolov, E. N. (1992). The neurophysiological mechanisms of consciousness. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology 30:6-12.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Strehler, B. L. (1991). Where is the self? A neuroanatomical theory of consciousness. Synapse 7:44-91.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Stuss, Donald T.; Picton, Terence W. & Alexander, Michael P. (2001). Consciousness, self-awareness and the frontal lobes. In S. Salloway, P. Malloy & J. Duffy (eds.), The Frontal Lobes and Neuropsychiatric Illness. American Psychiatric Press.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Stuss, Donald T. (1991). Self, awareness, and the frontal lobes: A neuropsychological perspective. In J. Strauss (ed.), The Self: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 42 | Google)
Taylor, John G. (2002). From matter to mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):3-22.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Taylor, John G. (2001). The central role of the parietal lobes in consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):379-417.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are now various approaches to understand where and how in the brain consciousness arises from neural activity, none of which is universally accepted. Difficulties among these approaches are reviewed, and a missing ingredient is proposed here to help adjudicate between them, that of ''perspectivalness.'' In addition to a suitable temporal duration and information content of the relevant bound brain activity, this extra component is posited as being a further important ingredient for the creation of consciousness from neural activity. It guides the development of what is termed the ''Central Representation,'' which is supposed to be present in all mammals and extended in humans to support self-consciousness as well as phenomenal consciousness. Experimental evidence and a theoretical framework for the existence of the central representation are presented, which relates the extra component to specific buffer working memory sites in the inferior parietal lobes, acting as attentional coordinators on the spatial maps making up the central representation. The article closes with a discussion of various open questions
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan & Edelman, Gerald M. (1998). Consciousness and the integration of information in the brain. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan (2003). Consciousness differentiated and integrated. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Travis, Frederick T. & Orme-Johnson, D. W. (1989). Field model of consciousness: EEG coherence changes as indicators of field effects. International Journal of Neuroscience 49:203-11.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Trehub, Arnold (2007). Space, self, and the theater of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):310-330.   (Google)
Umilta, Carlo (2000). Conscious experience depends on multiple brain systems. European Psychologist 5:3-11.   (Google)
Umiltà, Carlo (2000). "Conscious experience depends on multiple brain systems": Response. European Psychologist 5 (1):17-18.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Van der Werf, Ysbrand D.; Witter, Menno P. & Groenewegen, Henk J. (2002). The intralaminar and midline nuclei of the thalamus. Anatomical and functional evidence for participation in processes of arousal and awareness. Brain Research Reviews 39 (2):107-140.   (Google)
Zeki, Semir (2007). A theory of micro-consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Zeman, Adam Z. J.; Grayling, A. C. & Cowey, Alan (1997). Contemporary theories of consciousness. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 62:549-552.   (Cited by 14 | Google)